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Defeat in the East

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economic and military advantage, which each nation persists in following, works to the disadvantage of the West in general and of the indigenous peoples in particular.

The author's plea for Western unity and a reasonable policy for the political, economic, and social advancement of these peoples is largely unassailable. The courses of action that he advances rest on a recognition and resolution of the existing disunity. While conceding that France might prove recalcitrant in correlating her Asian and Pacific politics with those of the English-speaking nations, he emphasizes that the choice of promoting or disregarding increased Western solidarity in this region rests with the United States. Since the United States possesses most of the actual force in the area and must bear the bulk of the consequent burdens, she must determine the extent of her willingness to share responsibility with her Western allies. This book is a timely discussion of a neglected aspect of Western interests in the Pacific. It is also an interesting primer on the politics, culture, and economy of many of the island states and dependencies in that vast region.

J.D. STEVENS

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force

Alsop, Stewart J.O. *The Center*. New York: Harper & Row, 1968. 365p.

It's easy to agree with Stewart Alsop that *The Center* is not an *Inside Washington*. While containing some facts which may be found elsewhere (including an encyclopedia), *The Center* consists primarily of a series of entertaining stories about the people who inhabit the innermost portion of our Government. Unfortunately, not all of the stories are appearing in print for the first time. However, otherwise this book is so timely that Clark Clifford is recognized as the current Secretary of Defense. After initially brushing off the Civil Service as a "bureaucratic disaster," the

author later notes that "the conservative Republican businessman whom President Eisenhower brought into the government were uniformly surprised by the high quality of the men they found in the upper federal bureaucracy." Despite this "expert" opinion, Alsop continues to belabor the Civil Service throughout this book. Except for the Central Intelligence Agency, the Kennedys and Robert McNamara are the only "heroes" in *The Center*. If there is a real "bad guy" it is the "military bureaucracy" at whom Alsop snipes at every possible opportunity. Accusing them of obeying Parkinson's law with "more enthusiasm than any other bureaucracy," the author assures his reader that the corridors of the Pentagon are bursting "with majors and colonels and staff sergeants and civilian female secretaries and generals . . . taking in each other's bureaucratic laundry." Overlooked are the 2,157 civilian personnel located in the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the 70,000 civilians employed in agencies directly under that office. One who has plenty of time to spare and enjoys reading gossip about governmental VIP's might enjoy *The Center*. However, it should be read before a new administration changes the personalities located there. Anyone looking for a serious evaluation of the operations of the U.S. Government should not bother with *The Center*.

S.L. BARTH

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army

Elliott-Bateman, Michael. *Defeat in the East*. London: Oxford University Press, 1967. 270p.

According to its publisher, this book was written by a former officer in the British Royal Artillery who recently resigned his commission in order to continue his military studies, and who is now a lecturer in the Department of Government of the University of Manchester. For this reason, probably, the author, while critical of Western mili-

tary philosophy in general, is more particularly and extremely critical of British military thinking, strategy and tactics, training methods, and, in addition, basic British defense policies. In the Introduction the author states that the primary purpose of his book is an attempt to discover a sound military doctrine for the armed forces of the free world which will prevent their headlong rush toward defeat in Eastern Asia—if, indeed, the use of military means for accomplishment of Western political aims in that area is at all feasible in the first place. He maintains that Western military leaders do not understand the significance of Mao Tse-tung's military theories and doctrine and that this has "... resulted in the French defeat in Indo-China; is resulting in the American failure in South Vietnam; and is likely to result in similar failures by British forces in the East." He approaches the study of his stated problem, therefore, through an analysis of the military philosophy of Mao Tse-tung and by a comparison of Mao's strategy and tactics with those of other successful practitioners of the art of mobile warfare, including such individuals as Marlborough, Napoleon, Stonewall Jackson, and Rommel, as well as with the forces of the German Wehrmacht in Europe and the Japanese in Malaya during the early part of World War II.

The author states that the circumstances and conditions of war have changed drastically in recent years and, therefore, the natural laws of war have changed. He argues that the old concepts of positional and linear war are no longer valid but have been replaced by the concepts of guerrilla warfare and modern mobile warfare as developed by Mao and further refined by Gen. Vo-nguyen-Giap. He concludes that unless the West adopts a military philosophy based on his concept of the current realities of war, "defeat in the East" is inevitable. His argument is weakened, however, by some serious flaws in his

own logic. For example, he fails adequately to acknowledge the necessity for positional defense of safe base areas without which mobile counter guerrilla forces would be unable to operate and, furthermore, fails to recognize the greatly increasing mobility of regular forces. In claiming that "Mao stands in time as the man with the most complete set of keys to the secrets of war in this era," the author, it is felt, overrates the "politico-military genius of Mao Tse-tung" and the universality of Mao's doctrines. By his own admission the concepts of mobile/guerrilla warfare are applicable primarily in the space and jungle environment of Africa and Eastern Asia and would be extremely difficult to pursue successfully, for instance, in Europe. He further admits the vulnerability and complete failure of the concepts of Mao against the linear war imposed by General Ridgway in Korea. In addition, the author, by claiming a special understanding of the mind of Mao, leading to a discovery of the secrets of war, also overrates the importance of his book. In spite of its shortcomings, however, this is a very interesting and thought-provoking study which does provide a fresh approach and some new ideas concerning Chairman Mao's thoughts and theories. It is recommended reading for any serious student of counterinsurgency.

J.E. ARNOLD
Commander, U.S. Navy

Falk, Richard A. *Legal Order in a Violent World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968. 610p.

In 15 essays, 10 of which are revised versions of articles published since 1960, the author, Professor of International Law at Princeton University and one of the most distinguished young scholars in the field, seeks to "describe and appraise the relevance of international law to the management of international violence." By examining a series of "concrete circumstances" in-