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Legal Order in a Violent World

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tary philosophy in general, is more particularly and extremely critical of British military thinking, strategy and tactics, training methods, and, in addition, basic British defense policies. In the Introduction the author states that the primary purpose of his book is an attempt to discover a sound military doctrine for the armed forces of the free world which will prevent their headlong rush toward defeat in Eastern Asia—if, indeed, the use of military means for accomplishment of Western political aims in that area is at all feasible in the first place. He maintains that Western military leaders do not understand the significance of Mao Tse-tung's military theories and doctrine and that this has "... resulted in the French defeat in Indo-China; is resulting in the American failure in South Vietnam; and is likely to result in similar failures by British forces in the East." He approaches the study of his stated problem, therefore, through an analysis of the military philosophy of Mao Tse-tung and by a comparison of Mao's strategy and tactics with those of other successful practitioners of the art of mobile warfare, including such individuals as Marlborough, Napoleon, Stonewall Jackson, and Rommel, as well as with the forces of the German Wehrmacht in Europe and the Japanese in Malaya during the early part of World War II.

The author states that the circumstances and conditions of war have changed drastically in recent years and, therefore, the natural laws of war have changed. He argues that the old concepts of positional and linear war are no longer valid but have been replaced by the concepts of guerrilla warfare and modern mobile warfare as developed by Mao and further refined by Gen. Vo-nguyen-Giap. He concludes that unless the West adopts a military philosophy based on his concept of the current realities of war, "defeat in the East" is inevitable. His argument is weakened, however, by some serious flaws in his

own logic. For example, he fails adequately to acknowledge the necessity for positional defense of safe base areas without which mobile counter guerrilla forces would be unable to operate and, furthermore, fails to recognize the greatly increasing mobility of regular forces. In claiming that "Mao stands in time as the man with the most complete set of keys to the secrets of war in this era," the author, it is felt, overrates the "politico-military genius of Mao Tse-tung" and the universality of Mao's doctrines. By his own admission the concepts of mobile/guerrilla warfare are applicable primarily in the space and jungle environment of Africa and Eastern Asia and would be extremely difficult to pursue successfully, for instance, in Europe. He further admits the vulnerability and complete failure of the concepts of Mao against the linear war imposed by General Ridgway in Korea. In addition, the author, by claiming a special understanding of the mind of Mao, leading to a discovery of the secrets of war, also overrates the importance of his book. In spite of its shortcomings, however, this is a very interesting and thought-provoking study which does provide a fresh approach and some new ideas concerning Chairman Mao's thoughts and theories. It is recommended reading for any serious student of counterinsurgency.

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Falk, Richard A. *Legal Order in a Violent World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968. 610p.

In 15 essays, 10 of which are revised versions of articles published since 1960, the author, Professor of International Law at Princeton University and one of the most distinguished young scholars in the field, seeks to "describe and appraise the relevance of international law to the management of international violence." By examining a series of "concrete circumstances" in-

volving recent threats or uses of violence in international affairs, he successfully demonstrates just what "international law can and cannot do in the existing international environment." His book is an eloquent plea against what he characterizes the "human inertia, bureaucratic rigidity, and vested interests" that today prevent meaningful work "toward the drastic disarmament of states at the national level and toward the evolution of security substitutes for national military power at the supranational level, whether of regional or global scope, or both."

As one who has found himself "progressively alienated from that mainstream of American foreign policy which has culminated in the United States involvement in the Vietnam War," the author is naturally at odds with the low priority generally accorded international law by Government decisionmakers in recent years. Moreover, while acknowledging that "Professor McDougal has made the most significant statement of our time about the relevance of international law to the management of international violence," Falk often disagrees with the "ideological orientation of his former mentor at Yale, which he believes "confirms the auto-interpretative role of national elites so as virtually to nullify the distinction I deem crucial between the impartial application of international law and its adversary use." Although this reviewer does not agree with many of the conclusions reached in these profoundly pessimistic studies, he has used them repeatedly in their previously published forms and welcomes their collection in this convenient volume. Anyone seriously concerned with the management of international violence, both now and in the future, cannot overlook the wealth of ideas contained in this thought-provoking book.

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Harrison, Anthony. *The Framework of Economic Activity*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967. 189p.

The British author Anthony Harrison in his book *The Framework of Economic Activity* covers basic economic theories and practices existing throughout the world since the beginning of the 20th century. He is both complimentary and critical of certain U.S. economic practices during the period. His discussion of the international gold standard and its relationship to pound sterling in the initial chapter is particularly well done. He uses the gold standard as a foundation to support many of the views that he advances throughout the book. Perhaps the best presented portions of the volume are the pre- and post-World War I and II periods and the depression of the early thirties. While Harrison's treatment of the replacement of the United Kingdom by the United States as the center of world finance appears, at times, to be exceedingly caustic, his account of the efforts of the League of Nations and the United Nations toward providing, or attempting to provide, world economic stability is excellently developed. Also, his explanation of economic progress in the Soviet Union while the countries of North America and Western Europe were in the depths of depression is successfully handled. Likewise, he offers a commendable review of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Furthermore, state-controlled or managed economies are discussed for both democratic and totalitarian countries and can generate some thought-provoking concepts for the interested reader.

This book is a comprehensive primer for students of international economics and provides, along with its well-researched charts and graphs, a valuable review for even the most knowledgeable in that field. It permits the career naval officer unfamiliar with the field to