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War College: December 1968 Review

... RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
... POW CONDUCT



NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

December 1968



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REAR ADMIRAL WILLIAM S. SIMS

FOREWORD

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CONTENTS

CHALLENGE!	1
Vice Admiral Richard G. Colbert, U.S. Navy President, Naval War College	
NAVY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT	4
The Honorable Robert A. Frosch	
COLD WAR OPERATIONS: THE POLITICS OF COMMUNIST CONFRONTATION	
Part XII: Communism in World Affairs	16
Professor Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr.	
SET AND DRIFT	27
PRISONERS OF WAR: PRESCRIPTIVE CONDUCT AND COMPLIANCE IN CAPTIVE SITUATIONS	29
Commander Philip R. Holt, U.S. Navy	
DEFINING AGGRESSION--UNITED STATES POLICY	80
Commander Rodney V. Hansen, U.S. Navy	
PROFESSIONAL READING	111
THE BAROMETER--READERS' COMMENTS	117

Cover: Oil portrait painted by Commander R.S. Bamby. Admiral Sims served as President, Naval War College from February 1917 until classes were suspended on April 11, 1917, and from April 1919 to October 1922.

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CHALLENGE!

Circumstances have caused the Mediterranean Sea to play a greater part in the history of the world, both in a commercial and a military point of view, than any other sheet of water of the same size. Nation after nation has striven to control it, and the strife goes on . . . but should any chance add to the control of the Black Sea Basin, which Russia has, the possession to the entrance to the Mediterranean, the existing strategic conditions affecting sea power would all be modified.

Mahan: *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*, 1890

A month has passed since I discussed with you, in rather broad and general terms, the recent shift in Soviet national strategy away from one founded principally on a continental military strategy toward one that incorporates the concept of a worldwide maritime power. This month I would like to focus more closely on one geographic area of the world where increased Soviet presence is an ever-threatening challenge to the peace and the security of the free world--I refer specifically to the Mediterranean.

It has become quite apparent that the current leadership in the Kremlin has accomplished what the czars and even Stalin failed to do--that is, it has projected a major Soviet military, political and economic presence into the Mediterranean basin. In spite of our attempts to bar Russian expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean by the Truman Doctrine, the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Baghdad Pact in the 1940s and 1950s, the Soviets now have bridged these former obstacles; as a result Soviet



naval forces are now freely operating, in force, in this most vital sea. While the challenge of this Soviet Fleet to the Sixth Fleet is of great consequence to the U.S. Navy, of equal significance is the implication of this Soviet move in the assessment of future, long range Soviet strategy.

The Soviets have traditionally been a land power and have historically been primarily concerned with the geopolitical preservation of the U.S.S.R. Their strategy has been based on the maintenance of "buffer states" around the periphery of Soviet territory. It has been the Red Army that has shouldered the burden of protecting the Soviet homeland, with the Soviet Navy having the primary mission of supporting the land forces in coastal waters and in adjacent seas. However, the Soviets' projection in recent years, of a substantial naval force in the Mediterranean, strongly suggests that they have purged themselves of the continental mentality that in the past has pervaded their strategic thought. By their own leaders' statements the mission of the Soviet Navy has changed from a strictly defensive one to now include a role as "a principal offensive arm" of the Soviet Supreme Command.

Western influence that had long dominated the Mediterranean area was initially breached in the mid 1950s by the Soviet political offensive that

2 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

appealed to Arab nationalism in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq and supported these states against Israel, using military and economic aid as tools. This political offensive was widened in the 1960s to include Algeria and Yemen and, to a degree, Iran, a recipient of considerable Soviet economic aid. As the political climate became more favorable, with increasing Arab dependence on Moscow, the Soviets responded by increasing their naval strength in the Eastern Mediterranean. At the time of the Arab-Israeli war the Soviets had a substantial naval force present in the Mediterranean.

While the Soviets suffered a major setback in their relations with the Arab States when they did not intervene with military force in the Arabs' behalf in this short and disastrous war of June 1967, it proved only temporary. They rapidly reasserted their position in the following months by quickly providing massive economic and military aid to the defeated nations in the aftermath of the war, supplementing this with large and impressive naval forces visiting ports such as Latakia, Port Said, Alexandria, and Algiers with Soviet admirals proclaiming support for the Arab States. On balance, the planning and implementation of this strategy combining political, psychological, economic and military factors was a remarkable example of overall coordination at the national level in Moscow. It succeeded. Today the U.S.S.R. would appear to have established itself as a significant power in the Mediterranean with key states on the Southern perimeter under her direct influence, if not control.

Having succeeded in the Mediterranean, there would appear to be every reason for the Soviet leadership to look to the contiguous area of the Red Sea, Indian Ocean and oil-rich Persian Gulf as the next target. With the announced withdrawal of British forces from this area in the next few years and statements from many responsible spokes-

men in the United States that this nation will "no longer be the unilateral policeman of the world" and will not replace the British presence there, Moscow might well look on this area as the logical next place to exploit its successful "Mediterranean Strategy." The recent cruise of a Russian naval squadron visiting ports in East Africa, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf as well as India and Pakistan *for the first time in history* may well signal Soviet intentions. The unconfirmed reports of Soviet naval bases being established in the area, if proven true, would clearly indicate Soviet intentions.

Some authorities have argued that without attack aircraft carriers Soviet naval strategy must necessarily be defensive. This logic possibly has some merit for conflicts that might take place in the wide expanses of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, but not in the Mediterranean Sea. In World War II, German land-based aviation was quite effective in limiting Allied naval power in the Mediterranean and in supporting airborne invasions of Crete and other islands in the region. We certainly must credit Soviet land-based aircraft, equipped with standoff long range air-to-surface missiles, with a like capability if deployed in the area. Additionally, the sophisticated surface-to-surface missile capabilities of Soviet patrol boats, surface ships and submarines pose a significant threat. Therefore, while the U.S. Sixth Fleet with its attack carriers still possesses today a marked superiority vis-a-vis the Soviet Naval forces in the Mediterranean, future U.S. superiority could be challenged when one considers the missile attack capability not only of Soviet, but possibly Soviet controlled indigenous forces which might well develop in this area, particularly if U.S.S.R. political activities continue to prosper.

While this challenge would be valid in a hot war strategy, especially if it was based on a surprise missile attack against

our carriers and major elements of the Sixth Fleet from a peacetime environment, it is doubtful if a *rational* Soviet leadership would consider it. The consequences of escalation to general war would certainly restrain them from such a course of action. Too, in assessing their goals in the area and recognizing the political and psychological success already achieved, any strategy which might involve a direct military confrontation with U.S. forces would seem to offer unnecessary hazards. Preferable would seem to be a cold war strategy, an expansion of that which they are already embarked upon. Thus, with the selective use of military and economic assistance, and by progressively increasing and making visible their military capabilities—including a substantial amphibious capability (possibly based on the aircraft carrier MOSKVA which recently deployed into the area)—they could achieve their national goals, step by step. They may well have concluded that with this strategy they can outflank NATO to the South, without firing a gun and without fear of escalation.

If so, it in many ways poses an enigmatic problem for the United States and NATO. Such a Soviet strategy would not in itself be in contravention of international law or historical practice. The British followed a strategy not unlike this over many years in the

development of their empire. A U.S. and NATO strategy to counter this Soviet strategy poses a real challenge.

This is particularly true when one considers possible Soviet intentions now vis-a-vis the Algerian base of Mers-el-Kebir, (sitting near the entrance to the Mediterranean), and possibly later in relation to Tanzania, Aden, French Somaliland, Eritrea and the oil-rich Persian Gulf states. In hostile hands, these areas could have a major impact on the security of the United States and other NATO countries.

But what can be identified as the central issue, the core, in this problem as regards the U.S. Navy? Since World War II the U.S. Navy has been largely left alone in the exploitation of naval power, but it now has a serious contender. The Soviet switch to an offensive naval capability in the Mediterranean, even though limited to a cold war environment, deserves immediate attention and intensive study by our national policy planners backed up by our naval planners. We at the Naval War College may be able to contribute.

We must meet this threat and, over the longer term, effectively counter the many implications that this new Soviet strategy presents. Admiral Mahan perceived the problem, and his forewarning has today become our challenge.




R. G. COLBERT

Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy

President, Naval War College

NAVY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT



An address delivered at the Naval War College
on 13 June 1968

by

The Honorable Robert A. Frosch

Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development

I am not quite sure what the title of my talk really is. It started with a title like: "The Future of the Fleet," aimed more or less at the beginning of the 21st century. It might also be called: "What Does Make a Difference and What Does Not Make a Difference."

I can express one aspect of my central theme best in a statement that Vice Adm. Tommy Booth tells me was made by Sir John Carroll (then Chief Scientist to the British Admiralty) some time around 1963: "The ingenuity of your innovation nearly blinds me to its

utter uselessness." I am afraid that this is an overwhelming point about a good deal of military research and development. I have tried to avoid this flaw in what follows. As you will hear, I find concepts more significant than their hardware realizations.

My question is: "How can we make predictions of what we are likely to need, in time to carry out the implications of those predictions in such a way that we can have the Navy that we require, at the time that it is required?"

The history of prediction of any kind

is fairly dismal, and the longer ahead one has tried to make a prediction, the more dismal predictive history really is.

Inasmuch as the time it takes to develop and produce military systems has come to be long, compared with the time in which political and military change in the world is possible, we are now in an extraordinarily difficult situation.

I have tried to get at this problem by a process of extrapolation; that is, I have tried to look back over the past 30 years and ask myself, "What are the few things that I think have happened in technology in the past generation, the past 30 or 35 years, that have made a difference?" and then, looking at these, ask myself, "What are the things that are likely to happen between now and the year 2000 that are likely to make a difference?"

First I must say what I mean by a "difference." I am using the idea of difference at a rather extreme and high level. By difference, I mean things that make a radical change; things that change the character of warfare, particularly of naval warfare, in some qualitative way. I am looking for changes that are as radical as the change from sail to steam.

I think one needs to be careful about what it is that changes. For example, there is frequently a temptation, particularly among people who have not really dealt with naval warfare problems, to think that the change from sail to steam was principally significant because of a change in speed, and, of course, that is not particularly true. I believe the time for a trans-Pacific crossing actually increased with the shift from sail to steam, certainly initially. The radical nature of the change had little to do with speed. It consisted almost entirely of the fact that one became relatively independent of the weather for the first time so that the necessity for following the winds was greatly decreased.

This attempt to look for qualitative, rather than merely quantitative, changes is a difficult one. It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between things that make major differences and things that just make small differences, since the superficialities of what one sees frequently overwhelm the important inner characteristics. However, I have made my choice. Such a choice is partly a matter of taste, and we could argue about these choices rather profitably, or perhaps they will at least be some food for thought.

I have tried to pick the things that are in the first category of what I would call "three categories of change." The first category contains the things that make qualitative differences; that change the world in some intrinsic way, so that warfare or human activity is somehow different in a major way from what it was before.

There is a second category of change in which the change is not in itself intrinsically important, unless it occurs asymmetrically, so that one side makes the change but not the other. Then there is an imbalance. All that happens when both sides change symmetrically is that warfare is just as it was before, except balanced on a new quantitative level.

Changes in speed are usually like that. For example, I would say that the supersonic aircraft has no intrinsic significance whatever in warfare. It has a significance only on imbalance. If one side has it and the other side does not have it, then it may have a significance; but, if both sides have it, all that happens is that you have air warfare that is twice the speed you had before. I assert that there is really no important qualitative change there.

The third category are changes where the imbalance does not mean anything whatever even if it is asymmetric. These are imbalances that are offset by other things. That is, a particular weapon may be of some special use to one side or

6 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

another in a war for geographic reasons, but may quite naturally be offset by some totally different factor without leading to any basic change. For example, the use of silo-based ICBM's and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles in different mixes by two countries can be the result of geographic asymmetries and signify nothing as a strength asymmetry.

I will make one other comment which bears very strongly on the difficulty of making predictions at all. It is a statement about the nature of research and development. The best way I can make it is to make it by analogy, by making a comment which is mathematical in form: Theorems and the proof of theorems in mathematics are never found by systematic means; but after you have a completed collection of theorems and proofs, you always have a systematic arrangement of things. That is, the process of research and development, the process of getting ideas, particularly at the research end, is unsystematic; it is untidy; it is essentially unpredictable; and, in fact, in some ways, it is almost unmanageable. However, the process of taking things that have already been invented and turning them into specific engineering objects can be a very systematic kind of operation. We have two kinds of things, which are very different intellectually, going on inside the research and development community. At the research end, at the end of getting ideas, we have an untidy, difficult, ill-understood process in which what we do is try to get lots of people thinking and hope for the best. Once we have ideas and something that we want to go on and build, we then have a fairly systematic process even though there are many unsystematic and difficult things imbedded in the process. There are always unanticipated difficulties that feed back into further research and applied research.

For the reason that the research end of things is so unpredictable, before I go

on to making my predictions I will make a disclaiming statement: the most important technological developments for the next 30 years will turn out to be the fruit of things that have not yet been invented. It was that way if one made a prediction at the beginning of the last 30 years; I think it is that way now; it will always be that way. Thirty years is a long time for technological change. It is a human generation, but it is something between five and seven development generations; we could have technological changes several times in the course of the next human generation.

It is asserted from time to time that the time from the invention or discovery of an idea until its actual use in hardware is getting shorter and shorter. What is getting shorter and shorter is the time from the invention of an idea until somebody attempts to apply it. The time from the beginning of the attempt to apply the idea until it is actual hardware that can be used in the Fleet has stayed constant, perhaps gotten slightly longer, over the past couple of generations. The reason lies in the fact that the two processes are different. To get from the fundamental idea to the idea of an application—that is, to the beginning of development—one only needs communication and ideas, and the communication has been getting faster and better. To get from the beginning of the development to the end of the development takes a long sequence of detailed and specific steps. In particular, the beginning of development of the system is the point where one begins to have a complicated administrative problem, so that the process is governed by more than the availability of ideas and the availability of communications. If we get to a point in history such that the time from fundamental idea generation to the beginnings of application becomes zero, we will not necessarily continue to cut the time from the beginning of idea generation to actually

having completed weapons and devices. I'll come back to this point a little later.

At the present time I think we are in the position that the time to go from development into initial production is shorter than the time it takes for the development, and that is an important point for the next 30 years.

Now I will give you my list, with some comments of the dozen or so things developed over the past 30 years that I think have really made major differences in warfare. I think I would not get a very different list if I tried to make a list of the dozen things that have probably made the major difference in all of technology over the past 30 years.

The first thing that I would list is, of course, nuclear explosives, not because of the properties of the hardware, but because of the mere existence of the hardware. What has happened is that the existence of nuclear capability has introduced the formal idea of deterrence, the capability of deterrence on a worldwide scale, and that has probably changed warfare more than anything else, because it has introduced a peculiar level of doubt and difficulty that previously did not exist. I will later come back to what I think that means for the future.

The second major event was the invention and development of radar and communications. I put these together as the general use of the electromagnetic spectrum, because this has made it possible to see at great distances, to see through the weather, to communicate at great distances, and to communicate without regard to weather or to distance. It is no longer necessary for a detached unit to be out of communications, or for a detached unit to be unable to see.

The third change is related to the use of the electromagnetic spectrum, at least conceptually, and that is the use of space because it means that we can look at the whole earth; we can look at the weather; we can do surveillance; and perhaps most important, it has forced us

to think of the world as the world in a much more direct sense than we previously did. I think that there has been enforced a kind of psychological difference between looking at a globe and saying, "Oh, yes, the world is round, and at the present time around on the other side, it's nighttime," and looking at photographs from space. One sees it in a different way from the geography classroom than one observed it from photographs taken by astronauts from TV transmitted pictures of global weather, and so on. I think this concept of looking at the whole earth as the whole earth simultaneously has made a major difference.

In a direct naval warfare sense, I think the invention of nuclear power for submarines has made a qualitative difference because it has made the true submersible possible, and I think this has changed the nature of potential sea warfare greatly, even though we have not yet had to use it in warfare. It has changed the antisubmarine warfare problem profoundly, as well as making a special class of nuclear deterrent systems possible.

Nuclear power for surface ships I would class as a quantitative improvement, but not a qualitative improvement that changes everything completely as it does for submarines. That does not mean it is unimportant, but it does mean that I would not class it as one of the revolutionary and overriding changes.

The next thing I list is what I insist upon calling the revival of rocketry. The new rocketry, both tactically and strategically, has changed the world. The reason why rocketry could be revived is connected with one of my later points, which is probably of more importance.

Solid-state electronics, and its capability to pack a tremendous amount of information handling into a small space and weight, has of course been extremely important, and will continue to be so.

Perhaps as important, or more important, than the hardware capabilities that come with solid-state electronics, has been the philosophical change from analog thinking to digital thinking, from using continuous voltages and currents, as the computing elements themselves, to manipulating with numbers. This has meant an entire change in computing capability, in reliability, and, in fact, in whole new modes of thought about accuracy and about how to attack problems. This is making, and will make, a major change.

Another idea which is more important than its hardware, and is also connected in some ways to radar and communications, is the idea of the separation of the operator and the sensor; the idea that a man's eyes and ears, or what he uses for eyes and ears, do not have to be attached to him. There was always a rudimentary version of this in warfare in the sense of the forward scout who could go and look and come back and report, but we are in the beginnings of a revolution which is far beyond that, because we have begun to put the eyes and ears far away from the man who operates with the information. A man on the ground can now dig on the moon while he watches.

I would now like to mention four ideas which are more fundamental than any of the things I have already mentioned. They are ideas and not hardware. I think they are part of the really important intellectual inventions of the 20th century, and perhaps among the important intellectual technological inventions of all time. They are seldom or too infrequently mentioned.

The first is the idea of feedback: just the very idea that it is useful to take a portion of the output of a device and put it back into the input in order to change the operation of the system. This was invented originally as a technique for dealing with the stabilization of amplifiers in the early days of radio reception. It has become an idea which

has a life of its own far beyond its use in hardware. It has changed the way in which computations are done; it has changed the way in which we look at physical, social, military, and economic processes entirely, and I think it has changed the way in which all warfare is done, at least because of the way it has changed hardware. It is the key idea that has made the revival of rocketry sensible, because it is the essential element in all modern guidance and control systems: take the output of the system and put it back in to correct the input so that the next output will be better.

The second idea that is extremely important, and I'm not sure these last four are in any particular order, is the idea of "system": the idea that lots of things working together are an entity that has to be thought of as an entity for a total purpose: it makes no sense to deal completely properly with each of the pieces unless you look at the overall entity and tie it together to be a total object to do a particular job.

The third is the systematic treatment of signals and noise, and signals in noise, along with the systematic ideas that flow from the signal-to-noise concept: the ideas of detection, detection rate, missed detection, and, most important, the idea of the false-alarm rate. This last is the idea that the ability to detect is intrinsically tied to the number of false detections--detections of targets that are not there. Previous to having this concept we went questing after impossible systems--for example, systems with perfect detection probabilities--because we did not understand the connection between our ability to detect things and the fact that we would automatically be fooled by detections of what is not there. This is a very general idea that goes beyond specific sensor equipment systems. It is an important general idea in thinking about how we deal with the world.

Finally, the idea of systematic eco-

conomic choice--which is the real idea of systems analysis--has had an obvious impact on warfare and technology. This has had a very direct effect which has been obvious to all of us. To some extent many people feel it has had a directly deleterious effect. I think that problem is the result only of the birth-pangs of the idea and its use. In the long run, when we get better methodology and a better understanding of how to use study results in context, it will prove to be one of our most important intellectual tools.

All of these things that have happened contain the seeds of what will happen, so that the things I will now talk about are built directly on those past events.

I come to the things that will make a difference. Perhaps I should call them things that would make a difference, in the sense that they require work; we must work on these problems if they are really to make a difference.

The first is one to which I have already referred. The change that might make the greatest difference in future warfare, and in fact in future technology, would be to shorten the time it takes to develop something new. It now takes anywhere from 5 to 10 years to take a development from the idea to production and into the Fleet. Whether you think it's 5 years or 10 years depends in part on when you define the process as starting and ending; there is quite a lot of variance from development to development.

This change would make a difference because it would make it possible for us to respond more rapidly to change in the world. The time that we have to take to predict, develop and produce a Navy is now so long that we have a concern that we may, at the end of the process, have the wrong Navy and the wrong weapons for the true technological and political-military circumstances in being by the time we actually have that Navy and those weapons. This is

frequently expressed by saying that everything is obsolete by the time it is produced, and is a natural consequence of the time it takes to develop. Any piece of electronics that goes into the Fleet uses technology which is at least 5 years old the day it goes into the Fleet. If we try to update that technology in the course of the development, we never complete the development, and/or we have terrible logistics problems with the weapons system. If we could make a radical decrease in the time it takes to do development, say, from 5 to 10 years down to 2 years, then we would be much more responsive and much more able to change the Navy to track the way in which the world changes. This could have the consequence that, at any given time, we would actually need to have a smaller inventory of actual hardware without the smaller inventory being a danger to us, should we have to use it. I mean this in the following sense: currently we have to maintain a collection of navies aimed at a collection of possible wars and possible circumstances, and at possible technologies that a potential enemy might develop. If we actually were more responsive, we could diminish the necessity to keep in being some things--the trouble is we do not know which things--that we will never use or which, because circumstances have changed, would be useless if we had to use them. We would have to build fewer interim systems; systems we know are not right, but had better build, or patch together, because we might need them before we can get around to developing what we really ought to have. We do a large number of developments on an accelerated, make-shift, 2-year scale, because what we really want takes 5 to 10 years but we cannot wait. With a valid 2-year schedule, for example, we would be able to adjust our weapons better to the precise circumstances for which they would be required.

The second area which will grow in

importance--it has already begun to do so--is the methodology for doing analyses of hypothetical situations, for analyzing warfare situations, and for understanding what they mean in terms of hardware which we should develop and tactics which we should use. We are just really at the beginning of the methodology for looking at war and at various scenarios for war. Better analytical methodology will make an important difference.

The third problem has very much more general application than warfare, and that is the development of the ability to think about nonlinear situations. Almost all of our analysis, almost all of our thinking about warfare, economics, hardware situations, and tactical situations is linear. We look at a large problem, and we are appalled at the size of the problem; we rapidly cut it up into pieces, each of which we can solve independently; and we then make the blithe assumption, because we must, that having put the problem into subproblems we can put the subproblems back together again, add up all the solutions, and thus have the correct solution to the overall grand problem.

This assumption is true for almost no real-world problems. One of the most important problems we are on the verge of solving, that will make a major difference in warfare, will be the ability to think about large nonlinear problems. If we are able to do this, then we will be able to measurably reduce development time by improving our capability to predict the results of large nonlinear situations. Improvement in analytical methodology and in nonlinear techniques together might change the whole time scale of our ability to change the Navy and to make predictions about how the Navy should be changed. If we can lengthen the time into the future for which we can make a good prediction and shorten the time it takes to respond to that prediction by changing the Navy, we would be in a much better

position for future warfare.

The next area which is most important--and more important than any of the hardware--is a change in how we can learn about using people. By this I am referring to the vast expansion of solid knowledge in physiology, psychology, and in behavioral and social sciences in general. We are just at the very beginning, on the shadowy edges of knowing how to fit people and machines together; how to build the machines so that the people can really use them; and we have scarcely begun to work on how to fit people together, in a systematic, scientific, technological way.

People have been tackling these problems more or less by intuition for a long time. We usually encapsulate existing knowledge in this field under the name of leadership, and we do fairly well without knowing anything technologically and systematically sensible about it. A systematic understanding in this area could help us in the detailed matching of people together, in groups, to their jobs and to the machinery they use to do those jobs.

I mentioned the idea of deterrence earlier and will now return to that subject to say what I think is happening to the idea of deterrence, what it has done to warfare, and what it is likely to mean in the future. The first thing the idea did was to lead to the invention of the escalation ladder, a systematic recognition of the fact that two boys in a schoolyard start by yelling at each other and end up pummeling each other by a simple, straightforward series of steps. Once nuclear deterrence actually came into being it had an effect which was not originally anticipated--that is, it decapitated the escalation ladder. Instead of having an escalation ladder that goes all the way up to an ultimate conflagration in smooth stages, what has now happened is that we have an escalation ladder truncated somewhere about the middle. It is a little fuzzy there. Everybody starts getting

frightened that instead of going up the next couple of steps smoothly, there will be a sudden jump up the ladder to a global war. This has meant that it gets harder and harder, and there is more and more reluctance to engage in warfare above a certain level. Without arguing the question of whether this is a good or a bad thing, I think it is psychologically real, and something with which we will have to go on dealing. I think there is a research problem here which could change the whole nature of the problem.

We understand almost nothing systematically about the psychology and social forces that operate in deterrence. We really do not know why deterrence works, except in the general sense that people are afraid of what might happen and therefore they stop. We simply have no quantitative understanding of the problem. I am not sure it is possible to have one, but I think it is very important to look for one. For example, when we work out force levels for strategic war, we start out with assumptions that always read something like: "To deter an enemy nuclear weapons attack, we must have a force that is surely capable of destroying one-third of the enemy population and 50 percent of their industrial technology." These numbers are quite literally pulled out of the air, and nobody has the faintest idea of whether one-third is 10 times the necessary deterrence level or one-tenth the necessary deterrence level.

For example, how much deterrence must the Soviet Union provide to deter the United States? From the way they seem to have gone about it, they seem to think they need 90 percent destruction. I assert that we must consider—I am perfectly willing to treat this merely as a hypothesis for discussion—that the suitable level for destruction by the Soviets on the United States, to provide quite complete political deterrence, might be as low as 1 to 10 percent. That is, the absolute capability to destroy

one reasonably major U.S. city may be perfectly good political deterrence against the United States, because in our present political state and frame of mind, one which I think will continue, it may be that no President could be other than deterred by such a threat. In fact, since we have not planned and are not likely to plan an attack on the Soviet Union under foreseeable circumstances, the required level of Soviet deterrence force is really zero, but they do not believe this.

I don't think we fully understand the situation; I think it is most important to try to understand it better, and I think that such understanding might change many aspects of future foreign policy in general, as well as future warfare.

The problem of political restraint on tactics and doctrine is also related to deterrence in relationship to the decapitated escalation ladder. I mean the kind of political restraint we have witnessed in Southeast Asia and which many of you, I imagine, have experienced in actual tactical operations there. There is a tendency to regard this as an imposed irrelevance, an error, as something that we just simply should not be doing to ourselves. I do not agree with this view. I regard these restrictions as intrinsic to the situation, as restrictions and doctrine that are not going to vanish. These changes are going to change the nature of naval warfare. I think this because there is reason to believe that a large portion of naval warfare in the next 30 or 40 years is likely to be relatively small action—small action in the sense that it will not be global, it will not involve all the maritime powers, and, in fact, it need not even involve all of the countries in a local area.

Just consider fighting a naval war in the Mediterranean in which the Soviet Union, for example, was not an overt participant; although some of her satellites, or even countries that nobody was quite comfortable about calling satel-

lites of the Soviet Union, were involved with Soviet assistance. We are not fighting hand-to-hand or within sight, we are fighting with radar; we are fighting with long distance systems, with systems that don't always identify targets perfectly; we are fighting in situations where we never have known absolutely which submarine fired the torpedo; we have no way of knowing which submarine will fire the torpedo or who owns it. We cannot even be sure who owns the airplanes which fire at us, even though we may identify them as *Badgers*, because countries have *Badgers*. In fact, we have come to a state of confusion whereby we cannot even be sure if an F-4 fires on us, who it may be. We are in a state in which we may not know precisely the politico-military scenario; where naval battles are likely to be fought in a situation in which there are neutrals who want to be regarded as neutrals, but become involved in a naval battle, as they have been occasionally in Vietnam; in which some of the adjacent countries are participants, some are not; where we want to restrict our actions because we do not want these countries to become participants; where we do not want to kill the innocent, and yet we do not want to take action to keep the innocent out by force, because this might adversely change the character of the war. I think this is intrinsic to this type of situation.

Furthermore, in peacetime maneuvers with navies we are doing what amounts to inadvertent combined exercises with the Soviets and with other navies, so that we do not even have the freedom to manipulate a naval force in absence of other naval forces and to hold completely independent operations. These difficulties are intrinsic and will perhaps have the greatest effect on what we can or what we must do with technology.

Partly for this reason I think we must and will move in the direction of a completely integrated Navy-wide and

national global command control and communication system in which there will exist a complete surveillance system. In order to make any sense out of the kind of political-military situation outlined above, the fleet commander or the unit commander has to have full knowledge of his political and operational environment. He must know where all the other forces are, and not only the purposeful forces, but the inadvertent actors, the merchant ships and fishermen. He must know where they are and who they are. His actions must either be directed by central authority, based on information available globally to the central authority, or, possibly more sensibly, he must at least have available to him, on the local scene, the information which can only be available through central authority because it comes in from global information sources. The commander on the scene really needs to know the world-wide political and military situation before he can decide whether he wants to take the risk of firing at the unidentified submarine, because there may be information elsewhere in the world that would help him with the identification of that submarine. Not only is 'hard' sensor generated information, like surveillance information, important, but also 'soft' information, such as political intelligence that says that Party C, who is not involved in the battle between Parties A and B, probably sent a submarine there to keep track of what was going on, and the last thing in the world we want to do now is to involve Party C; therefore, prudence is required. The world has gotten complicated militarily in a way which we are just beginning to comprehend. This requires massive changes in technological requirements.

One obvious increasingly important technological requirement is IFF—the ability to identify at least your friends completely, unambiguously, and continuously. IFF has always been a hard problem; it has not gotten any easier

with time. I think we are beginning to have some handles on it, at least for aircraft, possibly for ships.

That brings me to the question of the use of the electromagnetic environment, which I mentioned earlier as one of the great things that has happened in the past 30 years-the ability to see and to talk continuously. I calculate that we are now in the third era of the use of the electromagnetic environment; the future holds the fourth era. I count the zero era as being the time in which we had no radar and no electromagnetic communications. Then there was a period in which there was a massive qualitative change. There was radar and we could talk on the radio, but there were no artificial countermeasures. The second stage was the halting invention of countermeasures. The third stage has been the halting invention of counter-countermeasures-the things that will make you immune to what the other guys do. I think that what will have to happen next amounts to complete management of what happens electromagnetically, at least locally and possibly more than locally. We can no longer distinguish between the measures, the countermeasures, and the counter-countermeasures. We will have to be able to play the whole electromagnetic environment continuously as a single systematic operation.

I think we will have to move into an era where ships and aircraft do not just radiate when convenient or as they please, but they will radiate only as part of a symphony of radiation which is thought out and operated in a sensible and coherent manner.

This is more than just the ability to turn everything off. There are lots of situations in which (a) you cannot turn everything off and in which (b) you don't want to turn everything off; and you really want to use the electromagnetic spectrum. We may get into an era where, instead of being quiet except when you want to talk, you are always

noisy, except sometimes you are noisy in a significant way, and sometimes you are noisy in a way which is not significant. We may also need to go to an era in which those who are noisy are not always in the same place, in which the use of electromagnetic radiation jumps around the task group, around the fleet, in a way which is confusing. We may have to fake, to make sure there are plenty of things that are radiating and look perfectly sensible, that have nothing to do with the fleet or are even someplace else. This is going to be complicated.

I want to comment a little more on the system idea. I think we have come into an era in which the system idea, which I earlier classified as one of the great inventions, has now gone mad in the sense that we have optimized and systematized and tied everything together so well that if the system is not quite right for the operational situation, we are faced with serious trouble. We cannot change it because it is all tied together so well we cannot pull one piece out without disrupting the whole thing. I said this to a group of technologists the other day, and they said, "Well, that's just bad system design," to which my reaction is that we have not designed any other kind.

The difficulty is that we are not designing systems to include the time dimension. We are designing a system to solve a problem at a particular time, whereas we should be designing a system with the idea of change with time built into it intrinsically. We should not be physically building the avionics into the airplanes, wiring it in and riveting it in, so that we must take the aircraft to a rework facility in order to change anything in the airplane. We should be able to change the avionics of the aircraft just as we change the weapon loading of the aircraft to suit the next day's tactics, and just about as easily. If the airframe is made for it, we should be able to change it from fighter-con-

14 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

figured avionics and weapons, to attack-configured avionics and weapons. We should be able to change to any attack avionics system that the airframe can carry just as easily as we can hang the weapons on it. One of the significances of solid-state electronics and digital techniques is that they will permit us to do this.

I am afraid, however, that we will not do this. I am afraid that what we will do is take advantage of the space and weight improvements of solid-state electronics by packing in more electronics rather than making it interchangeable. We will again fill the airplanes with systems that will be so well tied together that we cannot change them. However, building avionics that can be changed easily could mean flexibility, the ability to make modular changes in tactics and weapons. The use of more unified solid-state components to accomplish this could mean a major improvement in reliability--up several orders of magnitude. The electronics can get to the point where, from the point of view of the people who have to operate with it, it is effectively as inert as the metal in the airframe. We would then have to maintain the electronics not at 35 flight hours, but on whatever cycle we use to worry about wing spars.

There is an important additional point about weapons--the air-to-ground weapons business, particularly, is now splitting. It used to be that all weapons were dropped using sensors in the airplane. They were all what I call "area weapons," that is, you can hit a football field with them. We have continued improving that accuracy, and we are still improving it, and I think that is a waste of time. We can go down that line for another decade, and, instead of being able to hit a football field, we will be able to hit half a football field, and the cost will have gone up fantastically. Fortunately we have split, and we have now gone to putting the brains into some of the weapons using this idea of

extensors; that is separating the sensor from the operator so that the eyes or the ears or the radar are in the weapon. The weapon tells the operator where it is and what it is doing, and the operator controls it so that the weapon is worked by the man all the way into the target. By this means one can get terminal accuracy to split the goalposts instead of just hitting the football field.

This changes air attack, and it changes it particularly for situations like insurgencies. This was best expressed to me by a colleague when he said, "The ideal for air attack in a counterinsurgency situation is to be able to kill the mortar operator in the schoolyard without breaking the windows in the school," and I think we may be on the edge of doing this. It would make a great difference between just crushing at random and being able to destroy selectively.

I would like to make one last point which I think is of general importance--that being the idea of mobile basing on a vastly larger scale. It has become clear

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



The Honorable Robert A. Frosch, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development, holds a B.A., an M.A., and a Ph.D. from Columbia University. From 1951 to 1963 he was a Research

Physicist, Assistant Director (Theoretical Division), Associate Director and Director at Hudson Laboratories. He was Director for Nuclear Test Detection, Advanced Research Projects Agency, Office of the Secretary of Defense, from 1965 to 1966. In 1966 he became Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development and Chairman, Interagency Committee on Oceanography of the Federal Council for Science and Technology.

Mr. Frosch is the author of numerous articles which have appeared in many scientific publications.

that the politics and economics of overseas bases are beginning to be very difficult. Their expenses are politically difficult, even if we count just the direct costs. When we count the indirect costs, such as the related economic and military assistance program aid, then overseas bases become even more expensive. There is further evidence that the mere establishment of a base in an area for the purpose of being responsive to an insurgency has had the effect of increasing the probability of the insurgency for which the base was established to cope with. That is the kind of self-defeating result that we can only control by lessening the use of foreign land bases. There are implications here worth noting. First is the ability to move forces rapidly from the United States. Since we cannot do the total logistics for that

by air, it further suggests the development of major mobile sea bases. I think that is another important step that will change the Navy in a very profound way in the next 30 years.

I am sure that the lists I have discussed have somewhat the sound of a random selection, but I think they are all tied together, in my mind at least, by the idea of integration and coordination. We have moved into an era of warfare situations where, whether we like it or not, everything affects everything else. The only way in which we can cope with that development effectively is to join it and to integrate our response so that our abilities to fight as a Navy are integrated in the same sense that our problems seem to have integrated themselves.



The air fleet of an enemy will never get within striking distance of our coast as long as our aircraft carriers are able to carry the preponderance of air power to sea.

*Rear Admiral W.A. Moffett, USN:
While Chief of Naval Bureau of Aeronautics,
1922*

COLD WAR OPERATIONS : THE POLITICS OF COMMUNIST CONFRONTATION



Part XII--Communism in World Affairs

by

Professor Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr.

(This is the last of the series of lectures by Professor Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., of the Political Science Department, Brown University, given at the United States Naval War College as a part of the Electives Program. These lectures have been selected from those in a course entitled *Cold War Operations* which Professor Kirkpatrick presents at Brown University.)

One of the very important aspects in discussing communism at the present time is to put it in proper perspective. We are so deeply concerned with our own affairs, both domestic and foreign, that we are inclined to overlook the fact that there is almost as deep, if not deeper, turmoil in the Communist world as there is in the non-Communist world. In fact, the events in Eastern Europe, the events in China, and the competition between and among the Communist Parties in the various parts of the world are so intense today that had we

no problems of our own, we might take a great deal of satisfaction in their particular problems.

The best way to analyze communism in world affairs is to briefly discuss the status of communism in the two major areas, China and the Soviet Union, and then to do a brief global survey of the more important developments from the Communist viewpoint in the other parts of the world.

The Soviet Union is undergoing major changes in many different respects: economic, social, and political.

Their entire system has been in the process of dramatic developments in the past several years which indicate that there is going to be a difference in the type of communism that the Soviets are trying to export and a difference in their appeal for other Communist Parties.

One of the principal criticisms that the Chinese make of the Russians in the ideological field is that they are revisionists, meaning that they are changing some of the basic philosophies of Marxism, Leninism, and Stalinism. This indeed is true, from almost any point of view. One of our national news magazines termed the 23d Party Congress of the Soviet Union held in March 1966 a "do nothing Congress."

Under the Constitution of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union there is supposed to be a Party Congress every 4 years. The Party Congress is the supreme ratifying body in the Communist system. A great deal goes on in the interim 4 years, but the Congress is presumed to be called together to ratify what has taken place since the last Congress. In the interim the Central Committee is the dominant body, and the daily working committee is the Politburo. The Communists switch back and forth between calling this body Presidium and Politburo. It is now Politburo, but for the 23d Congress it was the Presidium. It means the same thing. Politburo is an easier name for political scientists because they also have a presidium in their governmental structure, as distinct from their party structure. In any event, the 23d Party Congress in March 1966 came at a time when one of the most critical issues, as far as communism was concerned, was the deepening split between the Soviet Union and China. Consequently, the necessary preparation for this Congress was rather intensive.

Prior to any national Party Congress in the Soviet Union all of the republics have their party congresses. These

bodies review the material the national Congress will consider and after a "democratic discussion" ratify it. In preparation for the 23d Congress, the party issued to all of the lesser party units various documents, some of which found their way to the Western World. Among these were criticisms of the party structure itself in the Soviet Union; criticism of the Komsomol, the youth organization, for being too lax in reviewing applicants—that is, not being selective enough, and not being sufficiently disciplined in the handling of the personnel. This was quite interesting. In other words, they were saying that it was not strict enough from an ideological point of view—not expelling those youths who did not follow the party line strictly or who were not good Communists—and consequently inclined to recommend to the party itself candidates for admission not properly qualified.

Another document criticized the party on several different grounds, most important of which was an identical criticism to that of the Komsomol. In other words, the party too was lax in its discipline and control. From our point of view, perhaps more interesting was a stern indictment of the party for interfering too much in governmental activities.

From an international point of view, the most important document circulated before March 1966 was a study of Sino-Soviet relations, particularly inter-party relations. This was a severe indictment of China. The indictment denounced China for disrupting the international Communist movement, sowing seeds of distrust between Russia and China, and elevating an ideological dispute into a national dispute. This now was becoming an issue between nations, and not just between the so-called fraternal socialist parties.

When the 23d Party Congress met, it ratified all of the prepared reports. (It is assumed that it will ratify all that is

presented to it. If it did not, there would be some drastic changes in the Party Secretariat.) It publicized the Sino-Soviet split to a degree that had not been previously reached except in the continual propaganda barrage which both of these countries level at each other. It discussed economic problems in the Soviet Union. These are matters of concern to us as we watch Moscow trying to run a vastly expanding economy with diminishing success.

Khrushchev used to periodically harangue the world on how Russia was overtaking the United States in gross national product. In 1963 my former organization, the Central Intelligence Agency, presented to the President and the National Security Council a study of the Soviet economy which showed that Khrushchev's statements were a blatant lie for propaganda purposes. The Soviets had been gaining on us in the period of the late fifties, but they had leveled off very sharply in the early sixties and were starting to drop behind.

The result of this was an episode which was a little difficult for those of us in CIA, but the press enjoyed it. The President directed that this document be published, that it be released to appropriate vehicles in the press. Obviously, it was more valuable and would have a greater worldwide impact if it did not bear the CIA label. It was released to various important media in the press, but one representative thought it had more appeal if it had the CIA label on it, so one lead said, "CIA reports that the Soviet economy was falling behind that of the U.S." This caused a great amount of discussion, especially among the economists of the world. The original reaction of some economists was that the CIA was wrong. Within the space of a year most acknowledged that this report had been precise and accurate. (Parenthetically, there was no question in the minds of the CIA analysts in the Economic Section that this report was accurate.) The informa-

tion on which it was based was voluminous.

It is pertinent that the Soviet planning system has been less than successful. They had found that it is difficult to control production without responding, at least superficially, to a basic law of supply and demand. One Soviet economist recently described their system by claiming that if the number of planners in the Russian system continues to increase at the present rate, by the turn of the century everybody in the Soviet Union would be planning, and nobody would be doing anything else. The same economist revealed the fact that it took 100,000 blueprints to build one hydroelectric dam in the Soviet Union.

The gist of this is that obviously the Soviet Union has been overcontrolled and overplanned. Planning has not been directly related to requirements or needs of the system, and, consequently, they have to change something. We have been studying with great interest in recent years the fact that Russia is reverting to an economic system of supply and demand which seems to be almost elementary in its simplicity; second, an incentive motive; and third, even an element of profit. Moscow last year created a new motion picture production concern in which there is a profit-sharing device so that the producers and actors will actually benefit if the films are successful and obviously will suffer if they are not successful.

There is more and more evidence of the decentralization of the Soviet system, of putting the industrial complex on a basis where both the quality of its production and the volume of its production must be directly related to the demand. This is important because many of the Soviet aid programs in various underdeveloped parts of the world were not practical or effective. This is not just Russia alone. It has been true of a great deal of Communist aid. For example, the Czechoslovaks sent

busses to Communist Cuba, not many years ago, which did not last because they were not built for the tropics. Castro had to junk those and is now buying busses from Great Britain. When Nkrumah was running Ghana with a firm but rather indiscriminate hand, he had Russian technicians there by the hundreds. They built a plant for prefabricated housing. There were several problems with this multimillion dollar plant. The Ghanaians could not operate it, it was too complicated. Since the Russian technicians have been expelled, it has been rusting as a monument to Russian aid. Secondly, the houses it built, the Ghanaians could not afford.

The Soviet Union has had to respond to the pressures of consumer demand. The simple fact of life in Russia today is that a family of four with the father and mother working earn more money than they can spend. They end up the year with the equivalent of about a thousand dollars which they have been unable to spend because consumer goods are not available. There were not enough automobiles to buy, or television sets, washing machines, or other items that we take for granted. Perhaps the best indication that they had to succumb to this demand is that they are importing automobile plants. Fiat has a contract to build a plant in Russia that will produce about 800,000 cars a year which, together with their production of about 200,000 motor vehicles, is going to give them an annual output of about a million cars for the next 5 years.

As Adolf Hitler found, greatly to his dismay, the Russians do not have many hard-surfaced roads. A reporter from *Izvestia* went to Rostov to the auto factory last winter to pick up his car. It took him several days to drive the 600 miles back to Moscow. It is interesting that *Izvestia* let him print his article because of what he said about the Russian traffic system and the Russian roads. In many areas he had to wait

hours for one-way traffic to come through the snowdrifts. It is indicative of future traffic jams for the socialist system.

There apparently are some very serious head-to-head discussions in the Politburo between the faction led by Kosygin and the faction led by Brezhnev over how much industrial capacity should be devoted to consumer goods production and how much to the development of capital production.

We have witnessed the periodic trials of literary figures such as Sinyavsky and Daniel with sentences of 5 years at hard labor, not because of what they wrote, but because they exported what they wrote, and it was critical of the Soviet system. It is significant that their trial was protested by individuals, including Litvinov's son-in-law and a retired major general of the Soviet Army. In the 23d Party Congress, 40 of the leading literary figures in the Soviet Union urged that the Congress allow a return to Stalinism.

The Soviet Union has had to relax some of the controls and to allow greater freedom. Humor in Russia makes this evident.

There is the story of the old farmer who is brought into Moscow to sit on one of the Leningrad hills to watch for the coming of communism. He is approached by an American tourist who said that he would like him to come to the United States for a better paying job to stand on the hand of the Statue of Liberty and watch for the arrival of complete freedom in the United States. The old Russian says, "No, I would like to stay here where I know the job is permanent, rather than coming someplace where it might be temporary."

Or there's the other, a little more earthy type of humor which was prevalent during the Khrushchev regime, that reflects some of the cynical comment about overtaking the United States in the field of industrial production. One Russian says to the other, "Well, how

does Comrade Khrushchev think we are ever going to overtake the United States when we're running without shoes," and the other Russian says, "Well, it isn't that as much as the fact that if we overtake the United States, they'll see that we've got bare behinds." These, incidentally, are the type of jokes that are printed in *Krokodil* and some of their other journals.

My friend, Professor James Billington of Princeton, one of our foremost historians of Russian culture, visits the Soviet Union about every other year. He is bilingual in Russian and goes as a visiting lecturer to the University of Leningrad and the University of Moscow. He tells the story about a recent visit when he was talking to a student saying that he thought he would go to the ballet that night. The student said, "Professor, don't go to the ballet. That's for party members, 13-year old girls, and American tourists. Instead of that, go to one of our dramas. In fact, there is a new one being introduced tonight, and let's go together." So he went with a group of students. It was an interesting drama which analyzed the Communist system from a metaphysical viewpoint rather critically, at the end of which a man stood up in the audience to critique. This is a Russian tradition. The audience discusses the drama with the cast, and the first man that stood up started to be critical in strictly Communist ideological terms, and he was whistled down by the audience with such catcalls as, "Go tell it to the Central Committee." He finally sat down, after which Billington says there was a very serious discussion back and forth between the audience and the cast on an interesting and politically motivated play.

That is some of what happens inside the Soviet Union today. Now, let us look at the Communists outside briefly. It is interesting to note that since the Czechoslovak Revolution of 1968 took place, just 20 years after the Communist

coup of 1948, there have been seven visits in the space of a little over 2 months between Czech and Soviet leaders, either in Moscow or in Prague. Participants included the Premier of the Soviet Union, the Chief of Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, and others. These and the subsequent events in Czechoslovakia most certainly substantiate the grave concern of the Russian leadership over the liberalization that has been taking place in Eastern Europe.

The Russians are concerned about the world Communist movement. It is not simply the competition from China. It is more fundamentally the fact that the international Communist movement is fragmenting; that no longer is Marxist ideology, which has been called the cement that holds communism together, looked upon with the same interpretation in various parts of the world. In fact, there are probably no two Marxists who use the same interpretation of the founding father of communism.

The Russians are especially concerned about the countries of Eastern Europe shaking off the shackles of Soviet controls. The most drastic and dramatic example in recent years has been that of Czechoslovakia. It was 20 years ago that the Russians thought they could purge the Yugoslavs, or at least Tito, out of the Communist movement. He turned the tables on them. The Russians went to the extent of organizing an international Communist structure called the Cominform, the Committee of Information, which replaced the Comintern, the Third International, which Stalin had unilaterally abolished in 1943.

Some historians claim that Stalin abolished the Comintern as a sop to the British and Americans, then Russian Allies in war. It is more likely that he abolished the Comintern because the party structure of the Soviet Union had reached the point where it could take over all of its functions and carry on just as effectively. Stalin never did like

the international or non-Russian aspects of the organization. By abolishing it, Stalin placed the controls of the international movement under the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

In 1948 Stalin organized the Cominform. Russia, the six European Communist Parties, and Italy and France were the only members. At its opening meeting the Italian and French members confessed some of their sins and said their parties had erred and strayed. The Yugoslavs were critical too, but within a matter of weeks the Cominform expelled Yugoslavia even though its headquarters was in Belgrade.

This must have been one of the most fascinating struggles between secret intelligence services in modern times. The Cominform headquarters was located in Belgrade for obvious reasons—better control over the Yugoslavs. The Russians put one of the top KGB operatives in charge of the Cominform, took over half of the *Bobra* printing plant (*Bobra* is the Yugoslav ideological journal), but all work had to be approved in Moscow. There then apparently ensued an intense struggle between Rankovich's secret police of Yugoslavia and the Soviet secret police.

Tito refused to obey Russian orders. The Cominform expelled Yugoslavia and moved its headquarters to Bucharest. Tito, in effect, told the Russians that he was not going to accept Russian control. It is apparent in studying this period that the Yugoslavs did a better job penetrating the Russian service than vice versa. Tito for 20 years has made clear his independence of Russian control.

Czechoslovakia is trying to do the same thing, and there is one basic common denominator. Neither country has gone anti-Communist, and neither of them has indicated hostility to the Soviet Union. In my opinion, the key to Soviet relations in Eastern Europe is that these countries may be independent, may pursue an independent path

to socialism; but if they become anti-Russian or pro-Western, then the Soviets will probably go to the extent of using force to bring them back in line.

Czech independence apparently, at least as far as an external observer can see, is even more extreme than what has taken place in Yugoslavia. There is freedom of the press. The Russians filed a specific protest with the Czechoslovak Government over anti-Russian articles being picked up from the Western press by the Czech press. Some very strong anti-Russian articles have appeared implicating the Soviet Union in the overthrow of the Benes government, accusing them of defenestration of Jan Masaryk, the Czech Foreign Minister who apparently was thrown out of a window to his death, accusing them of all types of involvement in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia.

Rumania has told the Soviet Union that they are going on their own path; that they will not submit to economic control by Russia.

On the other side of the Soviet Union, no one can presume to speak with authority or accurate knowledge of precisely what is happening in China. It seems that what is taking place is a very severe intraparty struggle to choose Mao's successor. Mao is now an elderly man and has lost control of the party in the most dramatic sense of the word. The Peking-city Communist Party, some of the provincial Communist Parties, and even the army were anti-Mao.

For more than 2 years there has been an intraparty struggle which, at times, has reached the violent stage. It has caused an almost complete breakdown in most of the major elements of Chinese economic life. Schools in China were closed for more than a year. The many foreign students returned to their homes, so the Chinese lost that international impact. Some of the xenophobic practices in Peking, such as harassing the Indonesian diplomatic representative until the Indonesians closed their em-

bassy, lost a tremendous amount of impact with the Indonesians and with all of the other underdeveloped countries.

The situation in China today is one where they are trying to get the Red Guard back to school, the Red Guard being the youths who were brought out to enforce the discipline Mao wanted to impose upon the country because he did not want to use the army. He tried to use the youth. The youth got out of control, obviously abused many members of party who were Maoists as well as others.

In the meantime, the China of 3 years ago has lost a great deal of its impact in the underdeveloped world. This is not saying that China is not a military threat. The Peoples Army today is in control in the governments of at least 14 of the 26 Chinese provinces.

The Communist Parties of the world, whether in Africa, Latin America, Asia, or Europe are all badly split. Most Communist Parties of the world have a Russian faction and a Chinese faction.

Belgium, for example, has two Communist Parties with identical names. Japan has four Marxist groups. The Japanese socialists have a broader appeal. The Communist role is principally stirring up trouble, rioting, stimulating the students, and so on.

In the United States the CPUSA is generally described as composed of an Albanian faction and an FBI faction, the FBI faction being indicative of the fact that some factions writer once said that the chief source of financial support of the Communist Party of the United States was the FBI because they penetrated it with so many dues-paying members. In any event the Communist Party of the United States has not made very much progress despite race and urban problems in this country. Probably they recruited a few more members in recent years. Undoubtedly they are stimulating trouble here and there, but

they do not have appeal here because we still have our own dynamic social evolution. Where this takes place the Communists cannot make headway.

Let us look at Africa. In 1960 the U.S. Government was concerned that as African areas acquired independence they would also become susceptible to controls induced by aid and assistance from various parts of the world. My last trip to Africa was in 1959. This was just prior to the independence explosion, and in those areas that by then had achieved independence, such as Ghana, the lineup of people offering aid and assistance was quite formidable to see. My colleague and I stayed in the Ambassador Hotel in Accra; the only other two Americans were two representatives of Kaiser Industries working on the Volta River project. All others in the hotel, with the exception of the Israelis, were from Communist countries. Nearly every Eastern country was represented there. The Russians were offering the Ghanaians a great deal of aid and assistance which Nkrumah happily bought and which his successor government threw out and, incidentally, shot 25 Russian intelligence aides who had organized the palace guard. This was to become the pattern in Africa after 1960.

In 1960 the independence explosion started by the abrupt decision of Belgium to give the Congo its independence. What happened in the ensuing 8 years had not been anticipated in Washington. The Communists are there in large numbers. Of the 38 new African nations today, the Russians have representation in about 30; the Chinese in about 15. But, like Ghana, they have been in and out, and the Africans have not hesitated to expel them. The Soviet Embassy has been closed twice in the Congo because of interference in internal Congolese affairs. The Ghanaians threw out both the Chinese and the Russians. Burundi has thrown out the Chinese. Seven African countries have

expelled the Chinese and even some of the presumably good friends, such as Guinea, expelled the Russians. The Guineans not only threw out the Russians, but the Soviet Ambassador at the time was formerly the chief of the African bureau of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. He was expelled for dabbling in the Guinean Teachers Union which he was trying to organize against Sekou Touré, who controls Guinea with an iron hand and does not want either the Russians or anybody else dabbling internally.

Today there is only one legal Communist Party on the continent of Africa. There are probably somewhere in the neighborhood of 100,000 card-carrying Communists in Africa and probably 10 times or more than that number of Communist sympathizers. Communism has not made major inroads into Africa because of simple factors. First, the African people are not politically sophisticated.

The second factor is that the Africans have their own form of socialism indigenous to the area. The best way to describe this is to quote the Minister of Planning of one country who announced that he was a Marxist, but he did not believe in state ownership of production because African countries have to have Western investment in order to develop, and if they had state ownership of production they would not attract much investment. He did not believe in collectivization of land because the African native has to have his plot of land. He has always had land, and it is important to him. If they took the land away, the natives would be restless. He did not believe in the abolition of religion because the African native has to have some form of religion, regardless of whether it is Christianity, pagan worship, or Islam. Despite all these exceptions, he considered himself a Marxist.

So the point that I wish to illustrate is that a number of African leaders,

Senghor of Senegal and Nyerere of Tanzania and many of the others describe themselves as socialists, but what they actually put into practice is a form of socialism that uses capitalism where it is necessary and accepts aid from all and is determined to resist efforts at control, whether it comes from communism, the former colonial powers, or the United States.

There is one interesting aspect about the competition in Africa for influence, and this has been the competition between the Chinese and the Russians. Aid from the Communist countries-economic aid-has not been a complete success in Africa. They sent the wrong type of equipment. Some of it has been inferior in quality. This was especially notable in Guinea which was cut loose by France when they had the temerity to vote "no" to joining the French union. De Gaulle cut them off without a cent, literally. In fact, the French even took the light fixtures out of the buildings when they went, so Guinea had to turn to the East for assistance. De Gaulle told the United States that if we gave assistance, he would leave NATO. He did leave NATO anyway, but we did not give them assistance at that time.

In any event, the Chinese and the Russians have been fighting with each other in Africa to the degree that the *Ghanaian Times*, after a meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Algiers, described the discussions between the Chinese and the Russians as disgraceful evidence of hatred and lack of cooperation. The Chinese attack the Russians on a racial basis-they are white like the Americans and the Europeans, and that the Chinese are the people the Africans should tend to work with because they are non-Caucasian and can work with them. They attack the Russians on all of the various revisionist and deviationist bases that they can and, in every instance, do their best to undercut the Russians. In fact, in many areas the Chinese and the Russians are fighting

24 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

each other harder than they are the United States.

Trouble spots that bear watching in South Africa include Brazzaville, the capital of the former French Congo, which is a key center of Communist activity. The Cubans, incidentally, are the palace guard in Brazzaville. There are about 400 Cubans training Africans in guerrilla warfare and all other types of subversion. Brazzaville is a major center for Communist activity and is viewed suspiciously by the Congolese in Kinshasa.

Dar es Salaam, the capital of Tanzania, is also a major center of communism activities, both Chinese and Russian. It is also the base of operations into Mozambique where there is guerrilla warfare between the liberation forces and the Portuguese Army, just as on the other side of the continent there is guerrilla warfare in Angola. This is a war which is occupying about 40,000 Portuguese troops and about 7,000 to 8,000 guerrillas on both sides. The Communists are pouring arms into these areas to try to wrest these colonies from Portugal.

Khartoum in the Sudan is a key Communist center of activity. Khartoum is a key because of its geographical location. The horn of Africa will see some bloody wars because Somalia aspires to parts of Ethiopia, Kenya, and all of French Somaliland. The Communists are active in stimulating that.

Despite my comment that communism is a minor force in most African countries, the Communists are going to make just as much as they can of the troubles that Africa will face. For the rest of this century, at least, there will be tribal warfare, fragmentation, and national frictions in Africa.

Let us take a quick look at Latin America. We have Castro's Cuba, 90 miles from us. Castro's Cuba no longer has the tremendous appeal in the rest of Latin America that it had in the days immediately following his takeover on 1

January 1959. But Castro still has aspirations of grandeur. His sending Che Guevara down to Bolivia to try and raise a revolt there, contrary to Russian urgings, incidentally, is indicative of what he is likely to do. Guevara could

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., was born in Rochester, N.Y., educated in public schools there and at Deerfield Academy, Deerfield, Mass., and graduated from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and

International Affairs of Princeton University in 1938.

After graduation he worked for the U.S. News Publishing Corporation in Washington, D.C., as an editor and personnel director. In 1942 he joined the Office of Strategic Services and served in Europe with that organization and as a military intelligence officer on the staff of Gen. Omar Bradley's 12th U.S. Army Group where he was the G-2 briefing officer. He left the military service with the rank of major, and for his service received the Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, French and Belgian Croix de Guerre, and the European Theater Ribbon with five battle stars.

After the war he returned to the U.S. News as an editor of *World Report Magazine*. In 1947 he went to work for the Central Intelligence Agency where he served in a variety of positions, including Division Chief, Assistant to the Director, Assistant Director, Inspector General, and from 1962 to 1965 was Executive Director-Comptroller. In September 1965 he resigned from CIA to accept an appointment on the faculty of Brown University in Providence, R.I., as Professor of Political Science and University Professor. His courses at Brown University include one on *Communist Cold War Operations* and one on *American Security Policy*.

In 1960 he received the National Civil Service League annual award as one of the 10 outstanding career employees of the Federal Government. In 1964 he received the President's Award for Distinguished Service, the highest award that can be given a civilian in the Federal Service.

He is the author of *The Real CIA*, published by Macmillan in January 1968, of numerous articles, and has contributed to the *Encyclopaedia Britannica Yearbook*.

not get anybody to fight with him, and the Bolivians were able to eliminate his band. This is what Fidel would like to do in many spots of Latin America. He is sending active aid to guerrillas in Guatemala at the present time. He still tries to stir up trouble in Venezuela. He would like to stir up more trouble in Colombia and anywhere else it seems opportune. Russia is trying to keep the hand on Fidel and trying to quiet him down.

At least three evolutionary or revolutionary governments in Latin America have made considerable strides in reforms and, at the same time, blunted Communist appeal; the governments of Frei in Chile, of Leoni in Venezuela and Belaunde in Peru. Frei is having a very difficult time and whether he is going to be able to succeed and whether his party will win the next election or whether we might see a Socialist-Communist alliance come in is difficult to say.

And lastly, but not least, let me commend to your attention, Mexico. We tend to overlook Mexico because it has acquired a degree of stability since its revolution of 1910. Since the Communist revolution of 1917 in Russia there have been, almost continually, anywhere from one to three Marxist parties in Mexico. Even today the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City operates in the University of Mexico, trying to recruit and develop students. The reason that the Communists have not had a greater success there is because the Mexicans have kept their reforms going and because the Communists have been fragmented.

In the Italian elections of 1968 the Communists picked up a million additional votes, 8.5 million, which is a significant amount of the Italian electorate. The Italian and French Communist Parties are two of the major Communist Parties in the world—very active from an electoral point of view. In both of these countries the Communists have

been trying for respectability from a parliamentary point of view.

In Indonesia we saw one of the most dramatic and horrifying revolutions in modern times, in October 1965, when apparently there was either a major miscalculation on the part of Sukarno, the Indonesian Communists, or the Chinese. Sukarno was giving a speech and had some sort of a seizure. It is possible that somebody misjudged and thought that he was having a fatal attack, and therefore it was the time to make a move because with him dead, the army would take over. Nasution, Suharto, and the other generals would definitely establish control the moment Sukarno passed from the scene.

What happened was that apparently Sukarno had a fainting spell of some nature. He came back to the platform, but in the interim whether he gave the orders or the Indonesian Communists or the Chinese gave the orders is unclear. A battalion of the palace guard revolted, killed five generals, shot General Nasution's 5-year old daughter but forgot to go around to the back of his house. Nasution escaped out the back door, and in the events that followed, Suharto and the army were able to gain control. Somewhere between 300,000 and 500,000 people were killed. This destroyed the Indonesian Communist Party at the moment. It did not destroy communism in Indonesia. It did not eliminate all of the Communists. All of the leaders have been captured or killed, but communism may come back someday in Indonesia. This, of course, was a major setback for the Chinese.

India is one of the major nations in the world; a nation whose survival in the democratic tradition, based upon a strong development by the British of the capacity of self-government is exceedingly important. India's Government has been by the Congress Party up to the last election. The Congress Party lost control of nearly half of the state government in 1967. The Communists

succeeded in gaining, at least, control or coalition control of about half of that half, and control in Kerala. The Congress Party, right at the moment, seems to be staging a comeback. Here the Chinese lost an advantage. The Chinese were the major element among the Indian Communists until they attacked India. China is unpopular in India today, and the so-called right wing Communists have the major influence.

Let me conclude with this comment. Communism is fragmented throughout the world. All the Communist Parties are fragmented, but Marxism has not lost its appeal. There are still tens of millions of Marxists in the world today. Secondly, the Communist apparatus is still in existence. This is not simply the Soviet apparatus but the apparatus of all of the different Communist Parties which have tentacles out of their immediate centers: Castro out of Cuba; China out of Peking; Russia out of

Moscow. This includes espionage, the capacity for subversion, the capacity for guerrilla warfare, propaganda, and a public media that is even greater in volume than the vast American press system. The apparatus will continue to be a threat even though the movement is fragmented. It will prey upon the inequities and the trouble spots of the world. But the most driving force in the world today is nationalism. All over the world the nationalists want to control their own destinies. They will continue to look for assistance. They will continue to watch us, to see what we do internally.

What we do *inside* the United States to handle our problems today—our problem of unrest, our problem of lawlessness, our problem of the cities, our problem of poverty, and our problem of equal rights—will have the most decisive effect upon the way the rest of the world goes.



Initiative means freedom to act, but it does not mean freedom to act in an offhand or casual manner. It does not mean freedom to . . . depart *unnecessarily* from standard procedures or practices of instruction.

Ernest J. King: A Naval Record, 1952

SET AND DRIFT



The New Chief of Staff. Capt. Eugene B. Henry, Jr., U.S. Navy, relieved Rear Adm. J.C. Wylie, Jr., U.S. Navy as Chief of Staff of the Naval War College on 23 September. Besides an extensive operational background in destroyers, including Command of DesRon 24 in the Atlantic and DesFLOT 5 in the Pacific, he brings to this position varied experience gained as Chief of Staff, Middle East Force, and in duties with the Office of the Chief of Naval Operation (OP-60) and with the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs (J-3). Capt. Henry has had previous duty at the Naval War College in both a student and staff capacity, and has served as Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans, since 1966.

Fall War Gaming Activities. The fall of 1968 found the War Gaming Department of the Naval War College heavily engaged in that part of its mission calling for support of the fleet. Such support took the form of the conduct of two games, BLUE SKY VII and ESCORT BLAZER II.

BLUE SKY VII is a SACLANT-sponsored headquarters training exercise (CPX). The exercise made use of the Navy Electronic Warfare Simulator's (NEWS) remote play capability, a feature which permitted SACLANT's watchstanders to play out a situation involving increased international tensions and contingency operations right from SACLANT's own Strategic Direction Center (SDC), the most significant advantage of this being that it permitted the player to perform the exercise in familiar surroundings and with the same facilities that would be used in the corresponding actual situation. This technique employed duplex teletype secure circuits between SACLANT headquarters in Norfolk, Va., and the NEWS in Newport for reception and transmission of exercise traffic. A Control Group made up of SACLANT and War Gaming Department personnel located at the NEWS acted as subordinates of the remote players, responding to their message directives and utilizing the display features of the NEWS to simulate the movement of NATO naval units and aircraft. In addition, the Control Group played the opposition to NATO based on a SACLANT-created special opposition operation order setting forth forces involved and the conduct of their use.

BLUE SKY VII served to improve the readiness of SACLANT headquarters to respond to a cold war contingency, exercised the NATO Alert System, and provided for the strategic direction of NATO Forces at sea. Actual current plans, instructions, NATO publications, and standard operating procedures were used. Heading the SACLANT Directing Staff at Newport was Capt. John Fennema, Royal Netherlands Navy.

ESCORT BLAZER II, a 1968 version of last year's original amphibious war game, was sponsored by Commander Amphibious Group FOUR (Rear Adm. David Welch). The purpose of this game was to examine a recently developed contingency plan dealing with a nation experiencing the upheaval of insurgency supported from outside that country and threatening the interests of the United States and its allies.

The manner of conduct of ESCORT BLAZER II encompassed three distinct phases. Phase I examined the problems of embarkation of troops and material at CONUS ports and their sorties toward the Amphibious Objective Area. The second phase dealt with the latter stages of the transit and the opposition encountered at sea during that period in


the operation. Simultaneously, the problems of evacuation of U.S. nationals present in an area of unrest and threatened by the associated violence were examined by subjecting them to game play. The final phase of the game centered about the ship-to-shore movement of the embarked Marine Expeditionary Brigade and its exercise in controlled response to an insurgency situation in an urban environment. Members of Fleet Marine Force Atlantic staff contributed to the game and received benefits from it by providing players and control group personnel to augment the COMPHIBGRU FOUR and War Gaming Department personnel.

The original ESCORT BLAZER War Game, proposed by Rear Adm. C. Edwin Bell, Commander Amphibious Group FOUR in 1967, contributed heavily to the development of an important contingency plan. ESCORT BLAZER II provided a means of testing that plan by subjecting it to thorough examination and review by operational staffs under a demanding simulated situation. Both games stand out as excellent examples of the use of war gaming, and the NEWS in particular, for support of the fleet.



PRISONERS OF WAR:

**Prescriptive
Conduct and
Compliance**



**in Captive
Situations**

A research paper prepared by
Commander Philip R. Holt, U.S. Navy
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INTRODUCTION

The issue of the conduct of prisoners of war is an emotional one. Against a backdrop of international agreements which provide that the captive will be removed from the chessboard of the battlefield like a captured pawn to await the next game, lurks the very real possibility that the captor will exploit the captive to further his own ends. Moreover, history has demonstrated that the prisoner may assist the captor in this exploitation, in the face of national legend and codes which presume his loyalty and allegiance to the death and resisting such entreaties. The

defector's conduct is frequently explained away by his own nation with such terms as "treachery" on the one hand, or "brainwashing" on the other.

The first term is odious and the latter suggests a rationale that inveighs the sinister, serving at the same time to preserve the national conception of strength of its own ideology. All captor nations may attempt to realign national allegiances of captives, but the process is usually described as "education" or "indoctrination." The pejoratives and the mystical in describing captor conduct are rhetorical ammunition reserved for the opposing ideology.

Discussion of the treatment of pris-

oners of war—and their conduct—is fraught with pitfalls. First, while present agreements dictating the conduct of captors with prisoners are well defined, the empirics of war rarely see such moral models fulfilled. Secondly, national legend sustains an image that recognizes—in fact, demands—a heroic performance by the captive in the face of an opposing ideology that carries its own moral conviction, whether “right” or “wrong.” The possibility that exigencies of captive life may effect ideological reorientation has not been overlooked, but when such defection takes place it is frequently legitimized by positing occult and demoniacal processes to effect conversion. Third, captive lore is focused on physical stress and interrogation, and while both are of vital concern in any prisoner-of-war discussion, there is a tendency to lapse into thinking which sees physical duress as the effective cause of ideological change; lastly, such attention to stress tends to place overemphasis on intelligence exploitation of the captive while neglecting a goal that frequently has a higher priority for the captor: that of ideological reorientation. Recognition and comprehension of these factors are necessary for any meaningful presentation on conduct of prisoners of war.

The object of this paper is to examine the nature and possibility of exploitation or ideological reorientation of a prisoner by a captor and possible defenses that the captive may have recourse to in order to resist such overtures. Examination will show that captor goals are important in determining his methods in handling the prisoner; nevertheless, many of these methods may be accidental or non-purposive to a realignment process. Stress—both physiological and psychological—is an important consideration in arriving at a model which allows meaningful exploration of compliance and ideological realignment processes. Lastly, identity and role theory provides

a working and dynamic basis upon which to judge the consequences of varying captive responses to situational challenges. Certain conclusions and recommendations are drawn in the light of present-day Code of Conduct training for U.S. military forces. Discussion will pose as many dilemmas as positive courses of action for policymakers attempting to formulate an effective prescription of conduct and training for military personnel who run the risk of capture.

The complexity of the problem has already been suggested; space limitations force certain documentary ellipses, and it is presumed that any interested reader is well versed in present U.S. Armed Forces Code of Conduct training. The extensive and discursive treatment of physiological stress is an outgrowth of the author's impressions, daily confirmed by conversation with military pilots, that the average military man views not only captive compliance, but collaboration with the enemy and belief change, as a process caused by such stress. It will be demonstrated that such a misunderstanding, compounding with others, serves as an agent to hasten the delivery of a compliant captive into the hands of an indoctrinator. To dismiss such coercion as relatively ineffective and propose, instead, that the captive talks to the interrogator or indoctrinator in order to preserve his will and threatened sanity would invite catcalls. That the latter is closer to reality has not dissuaded policymakers who have devised training programs oriented more to the former.

Although no distinct lines can be drawn, the word *interrogator* is used here to indicate an enemy who has as his primary goal the extraction of tactical intelligence from the captive. An *indoctrinator* seeks ideological belief change. *Compliance* exceeds the usual connotation of adherence to institutional routine and indicates a departure in conduct by the captive that might

reasonably be construed as aiding and abetting the enemy. A prisoner-of-war compound, like a prison, an asylum, or a monastery, is a *total institution* whose inmates have little or no control over the ordering of their lives. Delimitations of meanings of other words of art are noted, when necessary. Objective or legalistic definitions are not attempted in a subject such as this where rhetoric is a major element.

The most comprehensive and searching analysis of captive conduct appears in the unclassified literature, and no reference has been made to any classified source in the preparation of this paper. Care was taken to use *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* reports which were not only unclassified, but also did not carry the "Official Use Only" caveat. Actual names of servicemen broadcasting or making "confessions" or statements from North Vietnam or North Korea have been deleted. Including their names would serve no purpose, and the interested reader will find the necessary citation to pursue the reference, if he desires.

The author is well aware of current Department of Defense and Navy policy which proscribes the introduction of "defeatist treatises" into training programs designed for potential captives. In fact, the dilemma which forces policymakers into this position is examined in the concluding chapter of this paper. Although certain conclusions reached here might be construed as defeatist by some, they are positive conclusions with recommendations for training which must acknowledge and exploit reality. The developed model indicates, for instance, that present Code of Conduct training, to the extent that it caricatures the captive environment and misstates the real forces working on the captive, is *counterproductive*.

It is the author's personal view that eventual American repatriates from North Vietnamese captivity will testify to the disparity between expected stress

and the realities of the captive situation. Rigid approaches and interpretation of the Code of Conduct may prove to have been a great disservice to these prisoners. A less rigid approach is possible, while preserving national legend of the heroic, as the conclusions and recommendations will show.

I-IDEOLOGY, PROPAGANDA AND RHETORIC

Truth does less good in the world
than its appearances do harm.

-La Rochefoucauld.

The fate of the prisoner of war has rarely been fortunate. Opposed to an evolution of progressively more humane concepts in dealing with captives—an evolution that dates back only 200 years¹—is a history replete with exceptions disturbing the moralistic conception affirmed by international covenants which call for the complete neutralization of the captive. Very recent history, in fact, indicates that the captive in future conflicts involving opponents proclaiming an ideological "right" will be the target of an increasingly sophisticated effort by his captor to dissuade him from his national allegiances and loyalties.

Ideology. International agreements culminating in the Hague Conventions of 1907 and the Geneva Conventions of 1929 and 1949 progressively had formalized a neutral status for prisoners of war. Beyond the usual prohibitions against physical duress or exploitation of the captive, articles of the 1949 Convention proscribed "mental torture" and made educational activities voluntary on the part of the captive.²

The Korean war episodes of refusal of repatriation by Chinese and North Korean captives held by the United Nations forces and Communist use of Allied prisoners for propaganda purposes presented issues which the inter-

32 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

national agreements had not anticipated, or, at best, could not handle in the face of overriding national interests in this confrontation of conflicting ideologies before world public opinion. With no clear-cut military victory for either side and truce negotiations stalemated largely over the issue of repatriation, examination of alleged "war crimes" was shuttled aside as any serious issue to effect agreement.

The attempted indoctrination and propaganda exploitation of American captives by the Communist forces in Korea came as a surprise to American policymakers and the military. The nature of the Communist movements and revolution in communication and propaganda techniques might have augured such a turn of events. At the same time the ideological alignment among the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea was at best ill-defined, as it is today, and it was consequently not unnatural that many cast the exploitative attempts into a framework of a centrally controlled, worldwide effort of Communist subversion.³ A succinct, albeit cynical, remark on the mood of the 1950's is Robert B. Daniel's comment, "To keep one's own ideology intact, it is easier to believe in the consistency of the other side's as well."⁴

This simplistic approach assumed such hegemony within the Communist world and, to a large degree, tended to submerge the real possibility of national interest as the prime operative in such propaganda efforts. The resultant errors in such thinking are with us today, and the literature on "brainwashing" tends to imply a congruency in the methods and goals of exploitation, thought reform, and propaganda by Communist powers.⁵ Training the military for possible captivity thus presents the very real pitfall of caricature of captive pressures and environment. Typical of such caricature is the emphasis placed on training seeking to inculcate resistance

factors to be used against intelligence interrogation or the already mentioned common ideology. At the same time little attention is devoted to the nature of propaganda or to the fact that exploitative attempts need not necessarily contravene international law or that nations subscribing to different forms of Communist ideology will legitimize such exploitation for varying reasons.

In the problem at hand the simple commonality among totalitarian states is their willingness to sacrifice the individual to national policies to a greater degree than "democracies"; secondly, there is concern with and reliance on propaganda to shore up their political structures. To generalize further, in relating these features to POW matters would be to miss the mark.

Propaganda. Propaganda as a tool of power in international politics is a fairly recent innovation. In tracing its modern evolution E.H. Carr finds the most obvious reason for the increasing importance of control of opinion in "the broadening base of politics, which has vastly increased the number of those whose opinion is politically important."⁶ Handmaiden to this control has been the development and widespread dissemination of communication devices—the printed word, the transistor radio, television, and movies—coupled with a speed that has revolutionized the conduct of both internal and external relations of nations and made propaganda an instrument of national policy.

Prior to World War I, nations might bring pressure on each other through diplomatic channels, but appeals to a foreign constituency would have been considered amoral by all except Marxian revolutionaries. The fact that the Marxist brought propaganda to its full flower in both national and international relations has a logical basis. On the one hand, the basic wellsprings of the Communist movement found strength in

neither organized political nor economic bases, and lacking these, the main animus for the movement came rather from a concerted appeal to the masses. In the international sphere, Marxism has been proclaimed from the start as a worldwide movement, the "repository of international truths," as Carr puts it, with an international message requiring an apparatus for its proclamation.⁷

Although many Communist societies have today achieved the political and economic base they formerly lacked and sought to achieve through information control, they must now resort to such methods in order to insure the continuation of power. One writer notes that

... the whole hierarchial structure of totalitarian movements, from the fellow-travelers to party members, elite formations, the intimate circle around the leader, and the leader himself, could be described in terms of a curiously varying mixture of gullibility and cynicism with which each member, depending upon his rank and standing in the movement, is expected to react to the changing lying statements of the leaders and the central unchanging ideological fiction of the movement.⁸

Addressing the 18th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1939, Joseph Stalin spoke of the cardinal importance of party propaganda and outlined a new program for its accomplishment. Noting that the party had been infiltrated by persons who were seeking to utilize the badge of the party for their own personal ends, Stalin stated

... the Party succeeded in weeding out chance, passive, careerist and directly hostile elements, and in selecting the most staunch and loyal elements. It cannot be said that the purge was not accompanied by grave mistakes. There were unfortunately more mistakes than might have been expected... the purge of 1933-36 was unavoidable and its results, on the whole, were beneficial.⁹

Accompanying these purges in the mid-thirties was another aspect of the

Marxian not seen since the Inquisition: the compulsive concern with the legal trappings of trial and confession. Western audiences were given one of their first insights into the nature of these proceedings with the publication in the West of Arthur Koestler's famous book, *Darkness at Noon*, which recounted his own and friend's experiences in the Soviet Union during the purge period and showed the government's overriding concern with the maintenance of an outward appearance of legality: the main actors—the judges, the police apparatus, the prosecutors—were fully aware of the fictitious nature of the confessions elicited.¹⁰

If the real meaning of the callous and openly admitted sacrifice of the individual and truth to state policies was somewhat submerged by World War II and the accompanying alliance with the Soviet regime, it became the subject of a renewed examination after the war and served as a basis of at least one popular fiction piece which depicted future society as openly amenable to such values.¹¹ With the appearance of "brainwashing" in the Korean war, writer Aldous Huxley was able to re-examine his novel written in 1932 which portrayed a future society of the 25th century¹² and find that advances in science and the nature of totalitarian regimes had accelerated his predictions of the individual's ultimate dehumanization and loss of autonomy in societies which purposefully sought such ends.¹³

Rhetoric. Couple the foregoing background with atomic spy trials, the Hiss-Chambers affair, the highly publicized alleged misconduct of American prisoners of war in Korea,¹⁴ and charges by Senator Joseph McCarthy in Wisconsin of wholesale Communist subversion in the U.S. Government, and a backdrop for American political temperament in the middle 1950's emerges. "Brainwashing" found its way into the vocabulary.¹⁵ In an attempt to stymie any

34 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

future efforts at thought reform, U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower appointed a special commission which, with the aid of consultative assistants, produced a "Code of Conduct" for members of the U.S. military who might become prisoners of war in the future.¹⁶ The Code, according to the Department of Defense, was formulated to aid the captive to resist collaboration in a new Communist aim: "to make the prisoners serve the cause of international communism."¹⁷ The explanatory paragraphs which accompany the Department of Defense booklet on the Code point out that the methods used to elicit information and compliance in Korea "were not new, unique, mysterious, or irresistible."¹⁸ Understandably enough, the booklet frequently fails to make distinctions between the Communist nations and their past history of treatment of prisoners, portraying, rather, a monolithic and evil international communism seeking world domination.* As previously mentioned, however, such tracts are still in circulation.

In the prisoner-of-war area there is a tendency to place international law on "our" side and overrate its effectiveness. In the United States the proscriptions of international agreement are popularly believed to be broader than they are in fact. Thus, the Geneva Conventions tacitly allow interrogation of prisoners for intelligence purposes. The onus in this situation lies with the captive, who is bound to give only "his surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and [serial number], and failing this, equivalent information."

In a scene between an indoctrinator or interrogator and his prisoner, where

obvious coercion is not an issue, the only operating sanction is the proscription of the captive's nation which may outlaw any form of compliance. Thus, U.S. training policy states that "... once a man is placed in a position where it is beyond his ability to resist answering further questions, further responses are made entirely on his own responsibility." Further, "The Uniform Code of Military Justice applies at all times."¹⁹ McDougal has argued that a claim by the captive's state against the captor is "for maintenance and protection of the lives, well-being, and loyalties of such [captured] personnel."²⁰ The pragmatics are that assaults on loyalty are frequent and that there is no contravening law. Bluntly put, rhetoricians may inveigh "brainwashing" and demons, but a captor can respond with "war criminal" or assert voluntariness on the part of the captive, and a standoff results at the bar of international public opinion. Most Communist countries for instance, including the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, North Korea, and North Vietnam have taken exception to article 85 of the Geneva Convention and assert the option of finding a prisoner of war guilty of "war crimes" committed prior to his capture.²¹

The Westerner accustomed to the depiction of the occult, inscrutable, and cruel Oriental will discover an interesting inversion of impressions in reading the early 1950 writings of Ho Chi Minh of North Vietnam. Ho finds it is the Western colonial-the French, and later the Americans-who have devised unheard of tortures and are capable of any cruelty or nefarious psychological ploy to gain their ends. Stating that the Vietnamese people harbor no hate for the French, but only for "aggressors," Ho gives directions for the careful treatment of prisoners of war, and great emphasis is placed on the importance of propaganda, including the proper exploitation of the prisoner as a convert to

*The author does not disallow that such may still be a possibility. The point is the fact that the problem will never be put to the prisoner on that basis-black and white as it is-but rather in such a context that his feelings about such a thing as "Godless communism" will appear largely irrelevant.

the Vietnamese cause.²²

French captives of the Vietnamese were surprised at the conviction of their captors.²³ Contrary to a belief that the enemy was little more than an Oriental ragtag bandit, the captive found himself a prisoner of a well-disciplined military man and an excellent fighter.²⁴ The French, taking their cues from the Korean experience of the United States, as well as their own trials in Vietnam, adopted a program during the Algerian conflict unashamedly tagged "brainwashing" (*lavage de crâne*) which was followed by a process of "brainfilling"

mese Army (NVA) to come over to the side of the Republic of Vietnam.

Second, to convert as many VC and NVA as possible into useful citizens through fair treatment, reindoctrination, and training.²⁶

Paradigms of rhetoric shown in table I are suggested by the foregoing. If the table seems obvious, it is also fruitful in the exploration of any attitude change process undergone by a captive. For, as will be seen, the new captive may find himself participating in a discursive process with the captor wherein *we*

TABLE I--POSSIBLE PARADIGMS OF RHETORIC

"People"	"We"	"They"
Controlled information	Information	Propaganda
Induced attitude change	Reeducation	Brainwashing
Culturally conditioned beliefs; conviction	Loyalty, allegiance	Fanaticism
Realignment of beliefs	Treason, collaboration	Conversion
Military man	Defender of liberty	War criminal
Conflict	War, "police action"	Aggression
Discuss	Persuade	Coerce
Exchange	Deal	Ransom

(*Bourrage de crâne*) aimed at reorienting ideology. As with any reorientation program, the French found that once a "changed" captive was released, he was immediately caught in the crossfire of warring ideologies, and politics forced the captive to opt for the side most practical at the time.²⁵

The United States presently has its own psychological warfare program in Vietnam geared primarily to meet the problems of local insurgency. The U.S. Department of Defense cites as some of the more specific aims of the *Chieu Hoi* (Open Arms) program:

First, to induce military and civilian VC and members of the North Vietna-

become *they*, *they* become *we*, and *they* insist *we* become *people*. Present training for possible captives relies on the hope that no prisoner will be tempted into this excursion. Such a hope is indeed, a vain one.

II--CAPTOR GOALS

Men employ law; beasts use force. The prince must have recourse to the latter not because it is more admirable, but because the former is often insufficient.

--Machiavelli.

Captor goals are the primary determinant of the treatment of the captive. Moral and legal sanctions rarely intrude

36 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

and, if they appear, may more likely serve purposive rhetoric than spring from conceptualizations of a universal morality. History discloses the diverse nature of these goals, and all may be intuitively perceived. However, emotion again clouds the issue of definition and fails frequently to take note of the complexity of captor designs. Rhetoric would attempt to bury its own undertaker, truth, for it must suppose that the opposing captor ideology is "immoral" with a political existence assured only by oppressive means and dealt with only on that basis. Cultural conditioning and ideological conviction are discounted as ineffectual forces operating on the captor; at the same time, like forces are called down as the strongest armor for the captive whom the enemy may attempt to subvert. A new paradigm emerges: the enemy buys had armor, we buy good.

Captor Goals. Captor goals against the captive can be diverse and complex. Theoretically limited to neutralization, they are more likely to include exploitative processes to gain *reprisal*, *intelligence*, *propaganda*, *legal justification*, *concession* and *ideological conversion*.

Reprisal.* Reprisal is an inevitable issue in every conflict, whether or not publicly acknowledged. "Quick justice" proceedings in South Vietnam have led the North Vietnamese to publicly announce reprisal executions and have drawn protest from the International Red Cross.¹ A committee of well-known U.S. clergymen has published a 482-page document of compiled press clippings and interviews in an attempt to document the immorality and atrocity aspects of the U.S. presence in

Vietnam.² Atrocity, a subspecies of reprisal, is a loaded term and sees such variants as the killing of the enemy wounded in the field or the "primitive" custom of the Balubas who, during the Congo crisis, operated on a warrior code which called for death of all prisoners and the boiling of their sexual organs, to be eaten to give them, the victor, strength.³ Atrocities carried out by the Viet Cong in South Vietnam require no documentation here.

Intelligence. Popular legend supports an image of excruciating torture of the captive in an attempt to induce him to divulge secrets. The use of physical duress does not go unrecorded, of course, but its frank use poses problems for the captor. Almost every captive will be exploited for intelligence, but the nature of the exploitation will frequently take avenues not anticipated by the captive. Expectation is most frequently along the lines spelled out by Robert Trinquier, veteran of Indochina and Algeria and generally considered France's leading authority on counter-insurgency tactics. Displaying what Bernard Fall has called a Cartesian rationale for the use of torture in revolutionary war, Trinquier finds that torture is the particular bane of the terrorist, just as antiaircraft artillery is that of the airman.

... But he must be made to realize that, when he is captured, he cannot be treated as an ordinary criminal, nor like a prisoner taken on the battlefield... No lawyer is present for the interrogation. If the prisoner gives the information requested, the examination is quickly terminated; if not, specialists must force his secrets from him. Then, as a soldier, he must face the suffering and perhaps the death he has heretofore managed to avoid. The terrorist must accept this as a condition inherent in his trade.⁴

Trinquier's approach to insurgency is the explicit understanding that the insurgent, without distinctive uniform and anonymously practicing indiscriminate

*Reprisal here is used in its most common meaning of vengeful acts and not in the more proscribed meaning of the international lawyers where the use of reprisal, otherwise illegal, may be justified against international delinquents.

terror, has forfeited any rights that might have been accorded him by international law or custom. One of his points is well taken: insurgency is a type of military activity which requires immediate exploitation of tactical intelligence which may call for physical measures. Even in "regular" military confrontations, the infantryman, rather than his higher ranking and more highly paid airman compatriot, is more likely to possess tactical information which might call for such measures from the enemy. While present-day prisoner "confessions" from both Vietnam and North Korea contain information that may be considered intelligence, indicating that the prisoner (or some prisoner) has exceeded national injunctions, there is the likelihood that such information is included in the propaganda broadcasts as much in an attempt to lend it authenticity as for any other purpose.⁵ It is logical to assume that any derived *critical* intelligence would not be broadcast throughout the world. The question becomes then, in such broadcasts, what did the compromised prisoner really know, examined in the light of what the enemy purports he said, against what the enemy would probably know without assistance from the captive. Other complications in extracting intelligence information from the prisoner will be examined in Chapter III.

Propaganda. Known captor treatment, good or bad, has a marked effect on a prisoner in his precapture status. Anticipated good treatment by an enemy will cause many to throw down their arms rather than fight to the death. The other extreme-advertised sure death to all prisoners-was used by Nazi generals in World War II who advised their soldiers that the Russians summarily killed all prisoners.⁶ The American *Chieu Hoi* efforts in South Vietnam are partially based on advertised good treatment of those surren-

dering. During both the 1956 and 1967 Arab-Israeli conflicts, both sides went out of their way to insure treatment of war prisoners in accordance with the Geneva agreements-mutual adherents to the rules that otherwise have been disproved with exceptions.⁷

Once captured, the prisoner becomes a new target for the captor who has any concern for public opinion, either national or international. He will meet with entreaties to make statements, sign documents, or otherwise conduct activities against his own cause and for the captor. The approach is hardly new, is practiced by both "moral" and "immoral" sides, and "treason" has its equivalents in all languages. The present-day revolution in communications has brought the practice of using captive statements to aid the enemy cause to a new pitch, however. While Korean war statements were based largely on alleged criminal activity and bacteriological warfare "confessions," present-day practice from North Vietnam is centered on two issues: the admission by prisoners of "war crimes," with an accompanying allegation of general criminal aura surrounding the U.S. presence in Southeast Asia, and an entreaty by the captives to their comrades to cease their military activity which is said to be designed in Washington by a warmongering leadership, and not truly an expression of the will of the American people.⁸

If either of these two elements are lacking in a purported confession, one will usually find pleas for action that will lead to the prisoner's return to an idealized environment of peace, to be accomplished by the retirement of the U.S. military from Southeast Asia.⁹ The broadcasts and statements frequently quote the captives asserting the good treatment they are receiving at the hands of their Hanoi captors.¹⁰ Although such broadcasts can be quite properly termed "propaganda," the rhetorical loading of the term should not mislead one to discount the possibility

38 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

that some of the statements may, in fact, be made with conviction.

Legal Justification. Some of the mentioned propaganda statements allege the criminality of the captive's personal participation in the war, as well as the U.S. presence in Asia. The rhetoric explosion is seen in Bertrand Russell's discussion of U.S. "racism" in the Southeast Asia conflict. In the introduction to his recent book charging the amorality of the U.S. presence in Vietnam, Russell states

... Racism not only confuses the historical origins of the Vietnam war; it also provokes a barbarous, chauvinist outcry when American pilots who have bombed hospitals, schools, dykes, and civilian centres are accused of committing war crimes. It is only the racist underpinning of the American world-view which allows the U.S. press, the Senate, and many public figures to remain absolutely silent when 'Vietcong' prisoners are summarily shot; yet at the same time these bodies demand the leveling of North Vietnamese cities if the pilots are brought to trial for their crimes. American violations of the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the treatment of prisoners of war have long been a matter of public record.¹¹

Like Russell, captured pilots' statements from Hanoi are focused on universally regarded reprehensible acts such as the bombing of hospitals and schools. A Hanoi proclamation of intent to try captured American pilots in mid-1966 brought violent protests by the U.S. Government and appeals for restraint by UN Secretary General U Thant, American Socialist Norman Thomas, and Pope Paul VI. Hanoi did not hold the trials, but it continues to emphasize the criminal nature of the activities of the American "pirates"¹² while stressing the forgiving nature of the North Vietnamese people and the National Liberation Front, forgiving at least to those captives who have repented. The continued Hanoi emphasis on the criminality of the American venture indicates their position that the captive has lost his

protection guaranteed under article 85 of the Geneva agreements, as was previously noted. A captive "confessing," therefore, could be presented with a new turn of events: he has delivered to his captor legal justification for trial, at least in the captor's eyes.

Soviet Union compulsion with the legal trappings of confession, trial, expulsion, purge, or sentence has been noted. The most recent experience with the Soviets in this sphere has come largely from Soviet dealings with internal threats to the security of the state. In two international *causes célèbres*, Americans held prisoner in the Soviet Union in the early 1960's were not the objectives of an indoctrination program, but, rather, after state trial and exposure with attendant propaganda, were released to the U.S. Government for a consideration.¹³ Two less fortunate Americans have detailed a more protracted confinement in the Soviet Union and East Germany, and their testimony indicates little change in the past Soviet enchantment with confession, sentence, and expulsion.¹⁴ Although propaganda is a secondary consideration in many of these Soviet incidents, it has frequently been so heavy-handed as to invite disbelief. Such was the trial of self-confessed spy Oleg Penkovsky; not enough that he was a traitor, Penkovsky was portrayed at the trial as a rake, drinking champagne from the slippers of ladies. His moral dissolution was presented as the rationale for his defection as a spy to the West.¹⁵ In sum, legal justification is a keynote in Soviet handling of prisoners, and ideological reorientation goes almost unremarked in recent history. The unmaking of history and unconscious acceptance of the untrue, in order to produce a version of happenings consistent with the party's neurotic version of a threatening environment, continue to be accepted fare.¹⁶

Most recently, purported confessions by American crewmen of the U.S. Navy

intelligence ship *Pueblo* are centered around alleged illegal intrusion of the ship into North Korean waters in January 1968. The statements of the three officers on the ship, allegedly attesting to the fact that the *Pueblo* was operating inside North Korean waters when seized, were introduced in the forum of world opinion. Surviving members of the crew, reaffirming the illegal nature of the operations, purportedly have asked for forgiveness of the Korean people.¹⁷ The main issue in the matter was the legal one of the position of the ship relative to international and territorial waters.¹⁸

Concession. The use of captives for extortion, for ransom, or to obtain concession is as old as recorded history. Most recently—in 1961—it was revived by the Cuban Government of Fidel Castro who wrested, after 20 months of negotiations, \$53 million in drugs, baby food, medical equipment, and other supplies from voluntary sources in the United States in exchange for over 1,000 prisoners captured during the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion inspired and supported by the U.S. Government.¹⁹ A few prisoners were pressed hard to deliver statements tying the plot to the former Batista regime as well as to the United States, and the Castro government wrung propaganda out of the event by trying the prisoners in the Havana Sports Palace, the event covered by live television. The captives were treated relatively well—for two probable good reasons—the United States had admitted its complicity in the affair, and the hand wringing in the American and foreign press served the purposes generally sought by prisoner confessions and propaganda. Additionally, Castro's asking price per prisoner averaged \$50,000, and he had every reason to insure that they all enjoyed some modicum of good health. The captives, kept together, established effective discipline and organization which kept morale

relatively high. A crude indoctrination program was attempted, but failed, according to the participants, when the prisoners' disenchantment with the United States handling of the matter was exceeded by their disenchantment with their captors.²⁰

Judging from the Korean war experience, the Cuban deal, and present North Vietnamese and North Korean deafness to overtures concerning repatriation negotiation for captives, it would appear optimistic to believe that prisoners will not again become coins in settlements to be worked out in the future.

Ideological Conversion. A complex of captor requirements may dictate on his part a concerted effort to realign captive beliefs and attitudes, to expose the prisoner to "thought reform" or "brainwashing." A prisoner who switches allegiances is obviously more tractable; he will write his own propaganda broadcasts or letters with sincerity; he may deliver up to the captor the intelligence information he desires. Activities on the part of the captor to entice the captive to do these things are illegal; the captive who allows himself to be so enticed is guilty of aiding and abetting the enemy at least, and of treason, at worst.

But the rhetorical and sinister frequently enter here to becloud another possible enemy goal: a sincere and deeply held conviction of the righteousness of his own cause which presses him to convey its "rightness" to the captive: to show him how he can mend his ways. This is not to deny that the captor may use such a realigned captive for his own devious ends, or, in fact, that in some captors the realignment itself may be viewed as a devious process.

The concerted Chinese efforts at exploitable thought reform in Korea in the early 1950's, as well as attempts mounted against Western missionaries and other Americans in China proper, presented an already familiar tableau of

40 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

the Communist ethic attuned to the Machiavellian. It is interesting to note that it was the Chinese programs aimed at thought reform that gave birth to the term "brainwashing." The English term springs from the Chinese colloquialism *hsi nao* (literally, "wash brain"), and does not carry with it the pejorative sense Westerners infer. To wash clean the brain tainted with impure thoughts becomes not only desired, but desirable.²¹

Although these Chinese attempts incorporated the familiar Soviet methods of confession, trial, and propaganda exploitation, they introduced methods fostering captive disintegration that displayed a philosophy and sophistication centering around guilt exploitation and conversion to the dogmatic "right" that goes almost unremarked in the literature dealing with Soviet treatment of prisoners. The Soviets rarely parade a resurrected deviationist who has performed atonement through punishment and is ready to take his place in society uttering *mea culpas*. It might also be remarked that although the policies of China today are proclaimed to function on a strictly Marxian-Leninist basis, this too is an oversimplification of the matter, for the concept of a totalitarian authority functioning under a law designed not to preserve individual rights but to control the inherent evil in man through punishment dates back to the legalist school of the second century in Chinese thought.²² Thus, not only the captive in China but Chinese society as a whole are objects of an authoritarian system whose philosophical tenets see the criminal in all and find salvation in the exploration of guilt, subsequent confession, and ultimate recrudescence through selfless submission to group service oriented toward the needs of the state.

The experience of the French in Indochina in 1954 and before indicated the conviction of the North Vietnamese to their cause. Most recently, Americans

are treated anew to revelation of the doggedness of the North Vietnamese and belief in their position.²³

Perspective. A complex of captor goals will determine his treatment of the captive. To achieve certain goals, the most "moral" captor may resort to torture; the most "immoral" to exemplary treatment. Reprisal is an inevitable issue in every conflict, and propaganda has now become the touchstone for analysis of handling of captives. Intelligence exploitation is suppressed neither by custom nor by law. Legal justification, when it becomes an important requirement, may be a primary captor goal. The American *Chieu Hoi* program in Vietnam, French *lavage de crâne* in Algeria, as well as Chinese "brainwashing" are open attempts at thought reform and political indoctrination.

Exempting reprisal and concession, all of the above goals will be best attained by inducing change and compliance in the captive: a change in his determination to cling to old values, to adhere to legend, and to act out injunctions of his nation which require that he resist the enemy. Popular conception sees physical stress or such sinister processes as "truth serums" or hypnosis as effective agents to induce such change. All such stresses bear investigation.

III--PHYSIOLOGICAL STRESS ON THE CAPTIVE

RIO DE JANEIRO (UPI)—Criminals in the Rotafofo district are complaining of the Police Department's new lie detector. Prisoners brought into the presence of a jaguar held on a loose chain "not only confess the present and the past, but sometimes their plans for the future," a policeman said.

--*The New York Times*.

Recent history has demonstrated that the prisoner is rarely neutralized when taken captive. More likely, he will

be looked upon as an exploitable commodity to be used in an attempt to further the goals of the captor. The captor faces a barrier in the almost universal proscription that enjoins the captive from giving aid and comfort to the enemy in time of war. Equally universal has been the captor's resort to stress on the captive in an effort to induce compliance and collaboration in the face of such resistance.

Were the captive not subject to some stress, he would be content to sit out the conflict in the hopes of eventual repatriation. True enough, he would endure the simple situational stress of captive privation-cut off from his loved ones, the familiar, from useful activity. For the reasonably well adjusted, however, these vagaries would not be sufficient to induce a radical departure from expected conduct by the captive. Depending on his goal[s], the captor may seek to introduce a particular stress and process to meet the requirements necessary to induce change in the captive. However, there can be tremendous situational stresses placed upon the captive which may be accidental to the situation and are not contrived by the captor for any exploitative purpose. The Bataan "Death March," Americans held captive by the North Koreans, and the French experience in Indochina are three examples. In the latter case, it was as much a case of the exigencies of prison life-inadequate and unfamiliar diets, poor medical care, extremes of heat-which accounted for a large mortality of French captives, for in many ways the Vietnamese captors had provided treatment and food at a level compatible with their capabilities.

Here, stress will be examined under two headings: physiological and psychological. This is a highly arbitrary and false division, but provides a productive framework for discussion. The psychological effect attending the use of "truth" drugs, for instance, may vastly outweigh their physiological effects.

To discuss the effects of various stresses, each must be dealt with separately, insulated from its brothers. Sight is not lost of the fact that the prisoner may, at one time, be cold, hungry, fatigued, and sick. The principle to be developed, however, will show that such combinations will have little or no input to an attempt to induce belief change, and can result in other exploitation only when such stresses are perceived by the captive as a *threat* to sanity or biological survival. Some detail is required to allay the almost universal belief that such stresses can somehow account for belief change. This misunderstanding is shored up by the law of the matter, which may excuse the delict of a prisoner facing threat of death or excruciating physical pain, but frequently does not recognize some of the more subtle and compelling processes which account for compliance and attitude and belief change.

In the present discussion, various elements of stress are discussed in a model which has as an actor a captive (prisoner, target individual) who subscribes to his native country's policies and doctrines; his allegiances demand that he perform no action which would give aid or comfort to the enemy. Moreover, he is required to actively resist any attempts to force him to collaborate with the captor. The captor (enemy) views the captive as exploitable for any of the goals already discussed, and the captor has virtually unlimited resources to gain his ends. These resources would include interrogators and indoctrinators and physical facilities most conducive to bring about a particular captive's downfall. He has, in addition, access to modern science: lie detectors, drugs, and hypnosis.

Physiological Stress Generally. Factors which prompt, by their use or deprivation, a measurable physiological response in the target individual will be discussed in this chapter. Captor goals may be diverse: the more obvious are

compliance, reprisal, interrogation, and efforts to induce collaboration. All of the processes occasioning physiological stress are available at the design of the captor; nevertheless, some may be accidental to the prisoner status and not be of the captor's purposeful design to enhance captive submission and co-operation. That accompanying psychological responses occur is not denied. Major physiological stresses of concern here are *physical duress, fatigue, sleep deprivation, perceptual isolation, drugs, hypnosis, polygraphy, and untreated injury and disease.*

Physical Duress. Purposeful infliction of excruciating physical pain upon the captive has been amply and emotionally recorded throughout history. Stories of successful resistance to noxious stress imposed by an enemy have found their place in the heroic literature of almost all societies; the warrior code of even the most primitive explicitly or implicitly presume bravery and allegiance in the face of such adversity. Although recent popular literature has tended to emphasize such captor goals as processes of compliance, intelligence exploitation, and the sadistic, the issues of reprisal, punishment and the religious exorcistic are no strangers to the lore. Historical circumstance rather than progressive evolution of more sophisticated captor goals becomes the rule. Even before Christ the Jews were tortured in an effort to induce them to renounce their religion. Very recent history provides instances of deliberate physical duress on prisoners to serve a complex of captor requirements. In World War II, Nazi Germany used such duress as reprisal, especially against Soviet and Polish captives, as a method of intelligence interrogation and condoned the use of prisoners of war in medical research.¹ Torture was used for a variety of goals against United Nations forces in Korea.² More recently the United States has been embarrassed by

reports published alleging use of torture by their South Vietnamese allies for purposes of both interrogation and reprisal.³

Methods of torture are as diverse and devious as men's minds, and it appears that as early as the first century victors had a catalog of devices to which little could be added today: the only contribution of modern science has been electricity.⁴ Most Westerners were strangers to Oriental methods of physical constraint which confined the body in a space or position restricting flexion; such methods were widely used in Korea where prisoners were forced to stand at attention for long periods of time or placed in boxes which limited movement. Restriction on muscular movement, however induced, incorporates an effective psychological factor: the victim initially feels little or no pain and is left to his own devices. As time passes, the position becomes increasingly uncomfortable, but movement to ease the discomfort only heightens it. The captive becomes his own torturer.

Experiments have shown that, within a rather narrow range, all persons have about the same pain-threshold level and that there are a limited number of discernible steps of sensation beyond the threshold to a point beyond which discrimination of more intensity cannot be made. Nevertheless, individual reaction thresholds vary enormously within themselves and from others, due to such factors as concurrent sensation, feeling, mood, attitude, and adaptive reactions to pain sensation in which cultural factors are pertinent.⁵

Because of these subjective implications, no precise definition of torture is provided here. Kinkead, writing about treatment of prisoners of war in Korea and ostensibly speaking with Army support, reported that

... the Army defines torture as the application of pain so extreme that it causes a man to faint or lose control of

his will. The bastinado, the iron maiden, the rack, water dropping unceasingly on the head, bamboo splinters stuck under the fingernails and ignited--these are forms of torture.⁶

Current Defense Department statements underwrite a policy which seems to be aimed at less objective standards: while noting that the Uniform Code of Military Justice continues to apply to prisoners, the Report by the Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War stated that examinations of a prisoner's conduct while a captive would be made with "due regard for the rights of the individual and considerations of the conditions of captivity."⁷ Infliction of physical pain would be only one of the "conditions of captivity" which might drive the captive to less than honorable conduct.

Of concern here is the question whether torture can serve captor goals such as thought reform or intelligence exploitation. From earliest times, physical duress as a means of reorienting ideology has been viewed as usually arousing rebellion and resistance in the victim.⁸ English and American common law concepts of "voluntariness" of confession have long served to protect defendants from coercion that has been called the "third degree."⁹ The rationale in evidentiary matters has been as much one seeking reliability of the content of the extracted statement under such conditions as a consideration

of moral niceties.⁹

It cannot be denied that men have and will comply under the threat of, or actual infliction of pain. Barring the effective intervening response by the captor to international law or adherence to a proscribing morality, it is almost certain that such methods will be used in the future, especially for the purpose of gaining immediate tactical intelligence, where time considerations govern the mode and do not allow for discursive exploitation. The survey in chapter II of recent POW history demonstrates this possibility.

Recognition must be given to the fact that treatment described by the captive as "torture" may represent captor measures to effect simple compliance to ease administrative problems, e.g., "punishment" to ensure the prisoner's adherence to institutional routines. The use of solitary confinement and other forms of coercion in U.S. prisons has long been a practice to effect the compliance of recalcitrants, although its overuse can rapidly become counterproductive.¹⁰ Effective prison routine is based on a tacit agreement between captor and captive regarding prisoner license, and transgression of the license limits implies punishment.

The emotion which surrounded investigation of charges of "brainwashing" in Korea added little perspective to allegations of use of torture only as a means for the captor to achieve thought reform. If the Orient had always meant the occult to some Americans, who still had proof of Japanese atrocities during World War II fresh in their minds, sheer physical brutality might have been accepted too quickly as a primary tool in the hands of an enemy seeking ideological reorientation.¹¹ There is ample evidence that many prisoners in Korea suffered brutal and barbarous treatment, especially when held captive by North Korean forces rather than by the Chinese.¹² Nevertheless, there is general agreement that coercion pro-

*Origin of the term "third degree" has implications to an analysis of a compliance situation. During the period of the Inquisition, an accused was processed in three steps: he was arraigned and informed that simple recantation was all that was demanded; this constituted the first degree. Failing submission, the impenitent was taken to the torture chambers where all the devices were explained to him, with another exhortation to recant: the "second degree." Obdurate proceeded to the final phase, the "third degree." Threat and fear were thus considered valuable tools to elicit compliance, or perhaps to frighten out the devil that had possessed the soul.

cesses used in the Korean war which had as their goal ideological change had, as their base, elements far more complex than outright physical duress.¹³

Wolff reports laboratory experiments with induced high-intensity pain wherein the subjects, brought to a threshold of moderate to severe pain and bitter complaining, are given mentation tests consisting of learning procedures, mental arithmetic, and block design tests. One subject, with extensive experience in pain, showed relatively little change in mentation even when the experiment was repeated after a sleep loss of 24 hours. In other subjects the mentation tests were performed well during the pain. Subjects performed the tests slightly less well when pain was experienced during excessive fatigue and following sleep loss. Wolff concludes that physical duress in total institution circumstances plays only an indirect role in indoctrination, serving more to bolster the captives' conviction of isolation and the hostile attitude of their captors. Humiliation, degradation, and a feeling of being cut out were frequently seen which, in turn, made the captive more receptive to any human being who approached him in a friendly way. Pain then becomes only one of the means of so altering the target individual in order to make him dependent upon the friendly approach of another person.¹⁴

Hinkle notes that the most intense pain will incapacitate men for any sort of complex function during its duration; nevertheless, there are exceptions when men, with their own life or other's lives at stake, endure the most intense pain while carrying out complex tasks. Reaction to pain, as with hunger and threat, can impair the higher integrative functions of the brain, however.¹⁵

The value of physical duress, or its rhetorical twin, torture, becomes problematical then, as an effective means of attainment of captor goals. If the goal is ideological reorientation, frank use of physical duress is of dubious value,

except where it may be used to "soften up" the target; in those instances where the duress is perceived to be antithetical to the values the captor seeks to inculcate, its use could be counterproductive. On the other hand, prison life exigencies, the prisoner perhaps living in the specter of the "second degree," real or imagined, and an alternating harsh and friendly approach to the prisoner can combine or act singly to place the captive in a more receptive frame of mind for cooperation. This transfer is largely unrecognized and involuntary on the part of the captive, and the prisoner may resort to the rationalization of "torture" to preserve identity* even though subsequent investigation may reveal that, in fact, purposeful physical abuse to effect collaboration was not utilized.¹⁶

It is held here that frank, excruciating physical pain will continue to be employed against captives by a captor when circumstances warrant the risk in the hopeful gain of immediately exploitative tactical intelligence, despite the proscriptions of international agreements. The nature of "war of national liberation" underlines the probability of such treatment being employed. Hit-and-run guerrilla type operations, relying on surprise as a major element of tactics, place a high premium on intelligence of enemy positions and intentions. At the same time, legal retribution for "war crimes" and contravention of international agreements in handling prisoners are not likely to put forth as major terms for peace in the present era of negotiated settlement.

Lastly, that the captor nation entertains such sophisticated programs as ideological reorientation to be attained without the use of physical duress does not vouchsafe the captive from such treatment. There is no guarantee that an

*The workings of this complex process are largely psychological, and are treated in chapter V.

enemy on the battlefield or a group of civilians capturing a descending airman, for instance, are fully cognizant of their own government's humanitarian policies and programs.

Hunger. Hunger, malnutrition, and even starvation are frequently the lot of the prisoner of war. Rarely does the captive have control over his diet, and a well-meaning captor may himself be constrained to provide less than adequate nutritional intake for captives due to the vagaries of war. Late in the Pacific campaigns of World War II, caloric intake fell to starvation levels in almost all Japanese camps as the islands were blockaded and rations sharply curtailed throughout the country.¹⁷

Captive experience may range from absolute starvation to malnutritional deficiencies up to an intake that is adequate in all respects, even if not palatable and familiar. Food is of vital concern to the prisoner, for its absence is an immediately recognized threat to survival, underscored by a physiological reminder: hunger pangs.

Whether present or absent, food is also a reminder to the captive that he has surrendered initiative and choice in a vital life process; moreover, the very type of food provided the captive is a reflection of values foreign to the captive, familiar to the captor. The captive must accept these values, for survival is at stake.

Malnutrition, the insufficiency of one or more nutritional elements necessary for health and well-being, is a probability in a prisoner-of-war situation. Whether the insufficiency results from restricted intake, or secondary causes such as diseases of the gastrointestinal tract and diarrhea, there can follow weakness, anemia, scurvy, beriberi, and pellagra in those cases where the deficiency condition is not only caloric but one reflecting an inadequate intake of vitamins and minerals.¹⁸ Other manifestations include decreases

in blood pressure and body temperature, impotence, general apathy, and decline of concentration power and memory.¹⁹ Investigators have found that where progressing starvation implies the threat of death, behavior may cease to be governed by social restraints such as "honor" and "pride."²⁰

Brozek and his fellow investigators at the University of Minnesota reduced the daily caloric intake of 36 young men, free of physical and mental disease, from 3,500 calories to 1,600 calories as a daily input over a period of 24 weeks. No other stress factors were introduced into the group, all volunteers, who also had the option to withdraw from the test program at any time. Adequate mineral and vitamin intake was insured. Noting that food restriction caused a large drop in sweat rates, the study found that such restriction could be a beneficial rather than a detrimental factor in situations where water deficiency was present. Most important, Brozek found a distinct trend from critical appraisal of events to a definite docility as semi-starvation progressed in time and in the magnitude of its impact on the organism. Also noted were increased apathy, irritability, moodiness, and depression; decreased ambition, mental adequacy, and sex and activity drive. Frustration was not marked, but the investigators concluded that a situation in which food would be offered or withdrawn on certain occasions would constitute a more intensive psychological stress than restrictions alone, resulting in severe frustration.²¹

Reaction to hunger is not always the same, and, so far as it is known, a greater ability on the part of some individuals over others to stand hunger has neither a constitutional or genetic basis. Hinkle notes that some persons are able to withstand hunger for considerable periods of time with little evidence of disorganization. It is felt that many of these people are able to direct their thoughts and activities in

46 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

directions unallied with food.²²

Fatigue, Sleep Deprivation, and Perceptual Isolation. Factors of environment, captor requirements, and prison routine are among the variables which produce those physiological responses in the captive occasioned by these factors. The degree of fatigue and sleep deprivation is a matter of simple external control by the captor, while the more exotic routines of perceptual isolation require elaborate environmental controls. A simple constraining cell may induce in some captives those clinical manifestations seen in experimental subjects' reactions to perceptual isolation.

Fatigue may be produced in many ways. The performance of a repetitive task, the strains of combat, injury, and prolonged muscular exertion usually result in fatigue. The fatigue occurring during prolonged and unrelenting interrogation is likened to that produced in stressful military operations, according to Hinkle.²³

Despite extensive research in the area of sleep deprivation, efforts to establish homeostatic disturbance relating to brain function have not been successful. That the brain cannot continue to function without occasional periods of sleep is well established; experiments have demonstrated that man can go as long as 100 hours without sleep; in the majority, however, a marked decline is noted after 72 hours. Tyler, working with 350 volunteer young Marines and conscientious objectors, found unremarkable homeostatic changes in the group, some who went as long as 112 hours without sleep. Changes were essentially psychological: 70 percent of the subjects complained of auditory and visual hallucinations, although almost all reported insight. Disturbances in thought processes included rambling and garrulous speech and little indication of coherent structure or logical construction of ideas. Some showed more severe reactions, including persis-

tent hallucinations and manifestations of paranoia. All the noted psychological changes disappeared after a night's sleep.²⁴

Oswald, the British psychologist, notes that in both Soviet and Chinese interrogation procedures the captors frequently questioned at night when normal diurnal rhythms favored lowered cortical resistance.²⁵

Reviewing the literature, Hinkle finds a great deal of commonality of symptoms in both fatigue and sleep deprivation: deterioration in speech, dress, and behavior, as well as emotional lability, defects of memory, hallucinations, delusions, and impaired judgment and intellectual functions, all increasing in severity with the passage of time. In fatigue he also catalogs profound anxiety in those who have been in prolonged combat or undergone terrifying experiences.²⁶

The term isolation, loosely used, covers a spectrum ranging from almost complete sensory deprivation to the "social" isolation some researchers have seen as operative in the Chinese thought-reform process. Captor alternatives could include purposeful withdrawal of sensory stimuli, solitary confinement, segregation of the captive from captive peers, and insulation from familiar cultural contacts. There has been a great deal of work performed in Canada and in the United States in sensory deprivation; experiments usually attempt to attain situations wherein the subject is denied, to the extent possible in the laboratory, all sensory stimuli as well as opportunity for purposeful activity. Within a few hours some subjects experience hallucinations, delusions, and anxiety and a desire to terminate the experiment.²⁷ Experiments at Princeton, while unable to induce hallucinations reported in other studies, did note a possible compensating need to communicate once the subject was freed from isolation.²⁸

Sensory deprivation has received

more than its share of publicity in the popular literature with a concomitant image of the mystical; continued experimentation has changed some of the initial estimates of its effects. Brownfield notes that, overall

... whatever the requirements of the adult human organism for external and varied stimulation, reduction or monotonous patterning of stimulus input will not alone produce major disruptive psychological effects; such results are the product of a complex interaction of personality, anxiety, expectation and situational structuring as well as amount and patterning of external sensory input.²⁹

Isolation, whatever its form--sensory deprivation, solitary confinement, ostracism, or any other variant--thus becomes a complex phenomenon both in the range of its possible forms and the variety of effects it may produce on different individuals. Schizoid personalities seem more readily adaptable to contrived isolation than normal subjects.³⁰ Meltzer noted that certain prisoners in solitary confinement at Alcatraz prison could slip into regression with fantasy gratification and not be "touched."³¹

Unlike sleep deprivation, drugs, or fatigue, the various forms of isolation do not lend themselves to qualitative generalizations about their effects, for there is not the narrow range of reaction predictable among subjects that one sees with other forms of possible contrived debilitation. Isolation in its many forms--purposeful or accidental--can serve the captor in many ways. These processes are considered largely psychological, however, and will be treated in the following chapters.

Drugs, Hypnosis, and Polygraphy. Thus far, discussion has centered on purposeful or accidental incursions into the normal bodily processes of the captive, leading to physical and mental dysfunction and resulting in some impairment of rational thought processes, apathy, and submissiveness. The use of

drugs, hypnosis, and the "lie detector" falls into a different category: use by a captor signifies a frank attempted expedition into the mental processes of the captive.* Cultural conditioning is likely to impart to the captive a feeling of threat occasioned by an aura of the scientific and mystical that surrounds these devices. The prisoner may believe that they do not *lower* resistance: they *overwhelm* it.

The use of drugs in thought-reform processes goes almost unremarked. Meerloo states that drugs were used in early "brainwashing" attempts but discarded because of their ineffectiveness, in relation to other techniques.³² Hunter details the forceful extraction of a confession from a China-born American lawyer who told Hunter of Chinese Communist use of some unspecified drug which caused him to sign a confession "unknowingly."³³

Truth serums are no strangers in popular Western literature dealing with intelligence interrogation processes. Gottschalk finds that although a captive's resistance can be broken down with drugs, the captor is faced with the same problem he found in extracting information using torture: he can have no easy assurance as to the accuracy and validity of the information he obtains. At the same time, the questioner has no guarantee that he has elicited all the vital information he seeks.³⁴ Schein concurs that the unreliability of the information obtained would probably dissuade most interrogators from using drugs.³⁵ It is a settled point in U.S. military law that confessions or admissions obtained in this way are not admissible as evidence before a court martial.³⁶

*One exception: the captive undergoing drug therapy as medical treatment concurrently with an interrogation process. It is unlikely, however, that the drug would be a "truth serum," although the captive might perceive it as such.

A priori, drugs are discounted as an effective instrument for long-term captor goals of thought reform. For the sincere captor there are better ways to achieve ideological realignment, and any effect they might have in inducing attitude change is problematical, except as a device to furnish the captive with a rationale for "breaking." For short-term goals such as intelligence exploitation, their use is questionable. However, one could easily underestimate their psychological effectiveness when posed as a *threat* to the naive captive. The administration of a placebo becomes a possibility. Lastly, the insidious or frank introduction of habit forming drugs to the captive by a captor seeking complete psychic dependence of the prisoner on the supplier should not be discounted as a possibility. Neither of these processes, however, can account for sincere ideological reorientation.

Historically, the record of use of hypnosis* as a means of ideological reorientation, or as an aid to interrogation, is ambiguous. Hunter³⁷ and Meerloo³⁸ both believe that repetitive interrogation and indoctrination as practiced by the Chinese Communists, are sufficient to induce a trance state that is essentially hypnosis. Meerloo, moreover, is forthright in his declaration that the confession of germ warfare by Marine Col. Frank H. Schwable during the Korean war was obtained by a process of subtle hypnosis.³⁹

Dr. Martin T. Orne, Harvard psychiatrist and Director of Studies in the Hypnosis Project at the Massachusetts Mental Health Center, has remarked on the general paucity of available material relating to the subject.⁴⁰ Reviewing the literature he concluded that trance induction in resistant subjects is extremely doubtful, and while trance might be induced without the subject's

awareness, this seemed possible only with the existence of a positive relationship between the hypnotist and the subject. Such a relationship would best be described as a rapport, with the subject assigning some prestige values to the hypnotist. Acts contravening social norms of the subject are seen only in those cases where an intense emotional bond between the hypnotist and the subject exists. Orne found that even in the face of hypnotic suggestion, subjects are perfectly capable of deception and lying.⁴¹

Other experiments have demonstrated that subjects under trance are, to a great degree, role playing expectations conceived in a nontrance state, acting out their perceptions of what a mesmerized subject should do.⁴² Schein sees the mass hypnosis characterized by Hunter and Meerloo as esoteric aspects of the far more complex psychophysiological stress mechanisms debilitating the captive.⁴³

Hypnosis as an effective tool in either thought reform or as a coercive in interrogation appears improbable then, except in those cases where a highly personal and emotional bond is brought about between the captive and his interrogator or indoctrinator, or where it might become operative as a threat or device for captive rationalization.

The possible use of the polygraph, or "lie detector," against a captive cannot be discounted. The Chinese thought-reform program is interwoven with a deep concern with confession, with falsity, with truthfulness, and with guilt.⁴⁴ A demagogic view of the captor as one who has little concern for the truth in achieving his ends of ideological conversion is the largest and most probable pitfall for the captive. In the thought-reform process a prisoner might easily be tempted to put his "truth" up against that of the indoctrinator. For the captive to voluntarily submit to a polygraph examination for a scientific determination of the "truth" could be

*As used here, the term designates the familiar trance state and not barbiturate or animal hypnosis.

the height of folly. The polygraph measures emotional response, not truth or falsity; submission to a polygraph tacitly commits the subject to both verbal and emotional communication.

The previous discussion on the reliability of information obtained through other means leaves little doubt that the captor might well resort to the use of the polygraph in tactical intelligence interrogation. The success of the polygraph depends on many variables—the subject, the operator, the milieu, and content of the interview. Within these variables, professionals have quoted reliability figures as high as 95 percent; controlled laboratory tests have indicated that the figure is more likely about 70 percent.⁴⁵ The attitude of the examinee is quite crucial to the results; surprisingly, they are better when he does not believe that the instrument is infallible, i.e., when he thinks he has a chance of winning the game.⁴⁶ Voluntary submission by the captive to the polygraph or the threat of its use by the captor to “get at the truth” are both effective coercive mechanisms. The prisoner has silence available as a defense, but this is limited, for reply to the polygrapher’s questions is not absolutely essential. Simple questions by the interrogator could elicit physiological and nonverbal responses indicating areas that are emotionally loaded for the subject.

Untreated Injury and Disease. There is a high probability that the prisoner will be injured when captured. Inadequate diet, unsanitary conditions, and exposure to disease vectors are commonplace in the POW compound. In spite of the injunctions of the Geneva Conventions which specify that medical treatment must be available,⁴⁷ there are many recent examples of inadequate medical care for prisoners of war.⁴⁸ Whether the reason is lack of medical facilities and supplies or a disregard of the humanitarian prescriptions of the

Conventions, the effect on the captive must always be debilitating. Moreover, serious disease or trauma could bring to the captive the very real threat of the loss of a limb, of eyesight, or of death. A captor willing to withhold medical treatment pending a prisoner’s more compliant attitude would have a powerful weapon to induce motivation for change in the captive.

Perspective on Physiological Stress Processes. Familiar processes available to a captor for use against a captive to achieve goals of collaboration, compliance, attitude change, and intelligence exploitation have been considered. Some of the processes may be accidental and not purposefully contrived to enhance prisoner cooperation or submission. Excepting the polygraph and hypnosis, the factors considered have been standard items in the repertoire of the captor for centuries; the more exotic drugs are also a recent innovation. And, unlike polygraphy and hypnosis, the others are capable of producing, either directly or indirectly, clinically observable deterioration in the highest integrative brain functions of the captive. The deterioration becomes progressive if the stress is unrelieved.⁴⁹

It is the abstractions—the socially conditioned norms—that are usually the victims of induced dysfunction of the cerebral thought processes: abstractions such as honor, bravery, loyalty, and patriotism. As the higher integrative functions are impaired, the individual may become more susceptible to behavioral dictates that respond to pain, fear, and threats to physical survival. However, this is considered a largely psychological process and must be dealt with in those terms.

Note has been made of varying individual reaction to pain and other stress. Although basic measurable physiological reaction to many of these noxious intrusions falls within predictable limits, varying scenarios, in-

dividual psychological reaction, and cortical impairment complicate prediction. History is replete with martyrs who braved the pyre to unconsciousness and death. Although physical stress endured by American and British prisoners in the Korean war would undoubtedly qualify as sufficient to induce disintegration of some of the higher functions,⁵⁰ there is no evidence of wholesale dishonorable conduct that has been implied by some authors.⁵¹ Referring to socially conditioned codes, Hinkle notes that the evidence suggests that a learned reaction pattern, if sufficiently reinforced, can sometimes govern a specific aspect of behavior as long as a man retains the capacity to carry out that behavior.⁵²

To these complex aspects of response to stress must be added a further complication: the difficulty of any meaningful demarcation of capitulation by the captive. The concept "to break a man," common in the popular literature, is misleading, signifying to most a dramatic reversal of captive attitudes--an either/or process.⁵³ Even in intense exploitative circumstances employing focused stress on the victim, the term descriptively is improper except in rare cases understood to imply that some stress mechanisms are at work which debilitate the victim over some period of time, and that the "break" isn't occasioned by an almost instantaneous role reversal process wherein the defiant captive becomes submissive and compliant. Moreover, if the word is used to describe the much more likely possibility of role realignment by the captive, it becomes completely inappropriate and should be dropped from the vocabulary.

The captive, under less than trying circumstances, will be quite easily persuaded to give up information that he *believes* is not vital, despite contravening culturally conditioned expectations.⁵⁴ A pilot, for instance, may be persuaded to acknowledge to a Vietna-

mese captor that he was flying a certain type of aircraft. To elicit information from the same prisoner who perceives that certain information endangers the life of a friend, as an example, presents quite another problem to the interrogator. In a felonious prison community of thieves, murderers, and rapists, a "rat" or "squealer" is stripped of all status by his peers.⁵⁵ The principle is that the captive will frequently trade off what he considers unimportant acquiescence or compliance for the relief of frank physiological stress, real or imagined. Outright collaboration with a captor, which threatens the most closely held values of a captive and is recognized as such by the captive, is another matter and cannot be legitimized by the captive, even under the most stressful circumstances, except in the context of a rational biological choice for survival overriding all else.

Summary. In interrogation matters there is great room for doubt whether any physiological stress mechanism, by itself, can force the captive to produce information sought by the captor within any reasonable time limit; secondly, if such information is obtained, its reliability is questionable. The interrogator does not know the answers to the questions he asks, and the captive may answer consciously or unconsciously, in terms of what the interrogator wants to hear. Impairment of higher brain functions are difficult to evaluate, and the victim may respond in a fuzzy or confabulating manner that is undetected by the interrogator, or, if detected, may still prove to be the most reliable, if inadequate, information the interrogator can extract considering the physical condition of the captive. Nevertheless, time constraints themselves may force the captor to resort to outright physical force, despite his knowledge that the interrogation product is likely to be degraded.

One must look elsewhere than physi-

ological stress for any meaningful explanation of ideological reorientation or thought reform. The processes of physiological stress--barring permanent brain damage or irreversible physical trauma--are all short-term excursions into the normal functioning of the body. Such stresses may serve as hand-maidens in a debilitating and threat role which can speed the downfall of the captive. Their frank use, however, is just as likely to heighten resistance in the captive and be counterproductive to the goals the captor seeks.

The nature of psychological stress and its interactions with the factors outlined above must be considered before a meaningful hypothesis can be developed which would explain belief changes in a captive attempting to resist.

IV--PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESS ON THE CAPTIVE

"Take off your hat," the King said to the Hatter.

"It isn't mine," said the Hatter.

"Stolen!" the King exclaimed, turning to the jury, who instantly made a memorandum of the fact.

"I keep them to sell," the Hatter added as an explanation. "I've none of my own; I'm a Hatter."

Here the Queen put on her spectacles and began staring hard at the Hatter, who turned pale and fidgeted.

"Give your evidence," said the King, "and don't be nervous, or I'll have you executed on the spot."

--*Alice in Wonderland.*

Forces working on the prisoner beyond those of physiological stress must be present to explain continuous compliance and attitude change. The effects of such physiological stress can be counterproductive: useful perhaps for obtaining immediate (and dubious) information from the prisoner, but antithetical to the captor's long-range hopes of a compliant or collaborating captive. His main assault, then, must be a psychological one, attacking the prisoner's value system itself. Neither

mysterious nor demoniacal, his approach will be an open and frank attempt to realign the attitudes and allegiances of the prisoner. Such a change implies as a precondition, a redetermination of the captive's own conception of his self-image and role.* Such a change is a psychological process.

That such debilitating effects as hunger, pain, and sleep deprivation can be accelerators in the process of image and role realignment is not denied. Rather, such processes--frequently not purposeful elements of a contrived program by a captor seeking compliance--will cause the victim to seek some sort of relief. More often than not, the very seeking of this relief will occasion guilt in the captive, debilitating in itself to the captive's self-esteem. Guilt, seeking expiation, and other psychological stresses generated by the captor or by the facts of captivity itself, can combine to bring the prisoner to compliance.

Humiliation, guilt, dependence on the captor, and social isolation and "overstimulation" are some of the psychological forces over which the captive has little control, given a captive environment. He must simply respond to such stress. More insidious are threat, reward and punishment, and frank attempts directed toward attitude change by appeal to reason which call for the captive to make a choice, to exercise an option. The captive does not have the third (and pleasant) choice of opting out of the "game" except by a real or undetected contrived psychotic state or by malingering, whereby the captor may elect to end the game.

**Self-image* is here defined as the individual's conscious perception of his own immediate attitudes, behavior, and values. *Role* is the individual's perception of the legitimate expectations of rights and obligations imposed upon him concomitant with a particular status; the word has dramaturgical implications.

52 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Suicide becomes a real possibility.¹ The predicament is that whatever course the captive elects, he loses, for an option for the captor's wishes will instill guilt, against them, possible pain, frustration, and hostility.

Humiliation. Exigencies of prison-camp life are in themselves humiliating and degrading to the prisoner in comparison to his precapture status. Goffman finds what he calls a "stripping" process through which mortification of self becomes almost standard in all total institutions.² Nakedness, denial of privacy, deprivation of facilities or materials for personal hygiene, insult, and filthy confinement conditions can all serve as tools in the hands of the captor.³ West finds in his study of U.S. Air Force prisoners in Korea⁴ that such coercive methods for eliciting individual compliance had the long-term effect of making continued resistance seem more threatening to self-esteem than compliance and reduced the prisoner to concern with animal values.

Guilt. The feeling of responsibility or remorse for some offense, crime, or moral wrong, whether real or imagined, will eventually descend upon every prisoner. Guilt is a complex phenomenon; its sources may be external pressure or internal disposition. The external view of guilt—such as was perceived by Chinese captors in the middle 1950's—included guilt by association, guilt for incorrect attitudes, guilt for incorrect thoughts, and guilt for having dangerous social origins. The prisoner experiences, among other things, identity guilt for failing to live up to image of self, loyalty guilt in behaving outside of the expected culturally conditioned norm, and situational guilt as he comes to accept the norms and standards of evaluation held by the captor and others.⁵

Today's captive is likely to be plunged into an atmosphere alleging war crimes wherein he plays the part of an

innocent dupe of an aggressor.⁶ The nature of imprisonment itself will place some stress on the captive which occasions recognition that he has failed to live up to his own image of himself. Members of all societies daily deal with concepts of shame, of guilt, and of punishment, of course, and the individual's prior experiences, understanding, and integration of such concepts may be a key to successful resistance to a captor whose persuasive efforts highlight guilt. Thus, two of the most successful stories of resistance to Chinese "brainwashing" attempts have come from Catholic priests.⁷ Biderman speculates that it would be difficult to conceive of effective resistance without some mobilization of guilt feelings in support of it.⁸

As has been noted, Soviet handling of prisoners has revolved about a system involving confession to serve legal ends. The Korean experience of germ warfare "confessions" can be viewed as primarily a propaganda thrust by the captors. More recent experience with the Chinese thought-reform programs has underlined the special role of guilt, "where one is expected to feel guilty, must learn to feel guilty, and where confession becomes not only a means of atoning for guilt and shame, but also a vehicle for making 'progress' and bettering one's understanding."⁹ Authentic or not, U.S. prisoners' statements from North Vietnam and Korea today are riddled with confession, requests for forgiveness, and repentance indicating, at least, the captor's concern with external guilt.

Whatever the basis, Schein finds that once guilt is felt, the captive will be more prone to accept one or more of the arguments of the captor attempting to define an objective guilt. Subsequent confession is dependent upon the captive's willingness to attach experienced guilt to "crimes" sanctioned by the captor.¹⁰

Dependence on the Captor. It is the characteristic of a total institution that the inmates involuntarily deliver to the captor many of the rights and freedom of choice they enjoyed prior to their confinement. Certain role supports are lost to the prisoner, with new barriers erected by virtue of his captivity. The captor controls the extent of this dependence to a large degree, for it is upon him that the captive relies for food, for water, and other necessities; the captor is also free to regulate periods of sleep, recreational activities, communication with the outside world: in sum, the entire range of physical activities of the inmate or prisoner.¹¹ The extent of this regulation is the option of the captor. It could vary from the almost permissive attitude the United States took toward some Italian prisoners designated "trustees" in World War II to what has been described as the "total control of environment" exercised by the Chinese over U.S. POW's in Korea.¹² The captive may perceive such tactics as nothing more than the concomitants of the situation, and learn to accommodate, or perhaps even frustrate, the "rules" where possible; on the other hand, such circumstances, if viewed by the victim as complete loss of control over his own fate, could lead to a sense of futility and powerlessness in the face of an omnipotent captor.¹³

Social Isolation and "Overstimulation." Implicit in the captive status is the loss of many social contacts and role confirmation enjoyed in precapture status. The prisoner must now find such confirmation within group associations designated by the captor, not by himself. Moreover, the controlled dissemination of news of the outside world reading materials and mail are likely options to be exercised by the captor. The ultimate in isolation is solitary confinement with its extreme variant, perceptual isolation, discussed in the previous chapter. "Social isolation" can

include situations wherein the captive is isolated, not from other persons, but only from others who can confirm his present self-image. In Chinese thought-reform programs, the prisoner was surrounded by cellmates who were already "converted" and sought constantly to disconfirm the antagonistic identity of the captive.¹⁴

In simple, everyday matters which are essential to survival the captor can contrive to set one group off from another: there are those who will eat turnip soup and fishheads and those who will not, and some captives will identify as collaboration with the enemy activities which other prisoners may feel to be less meaningful accommodations to ease the stresses of day-to-day survival. Whatever the nature of the fractioning of a once larger group, it can be interpreted by the prisoner as a breakdown in his inculcated values of military discipline.

Reviewing the theories of coercive persuasion, Schein speculates that a given social self or identity requires reinforcement and support from only *one* significant other, i.e., that such support is not a function of number, but a qualitative one. Moreover, he postulates that if physical isolation is comparable to understimulation, then the Chinese method of denial of any privacy whatsoever to the individual ("overstimulation") can have an equally disorganizing effect on the personality.¹⁵ Historically, the Soviet Union has relied on physical isolation as a primary tool of the interrogator, whereas examination of Chinese methods discloses a marked tendency toward group activities and thought-reform sessions bordering on the revivalistic, aimed at attitude conversion.¹⁶ Present Vietnam experience seems to indicate an emphasis again on isolation.¹⁷

Isolation is, then, a complex force which lends itself to both quantitative and qualitative applications. Value judg-

ments relating to its effects on captives are restricted by the wide variance of any predictable reaction among individuals. Previously noted, there are those who thrive on imposed solitude, although they are generally considered outside the norm; more generally, "understimulation" deprives the individual of social support and impels him to activity generating role and identity realignment seeking confirmation.¹⁸ A theory of "overstimulation" sees as operative an input of social cues at a rate which cannot be handled by the individual, leading to complete disorganization of the cognitive processes. Success of such a program would rely on a constant stream of inputs which would not allow the victim to withdraw and compose himself. Modern science has furnished the loudspeaker to provide the isolated prisoner with "company."

Threat. Sometimes open, often implied, frequently inferred threat is a powerful weapon of the captor. It brings with its perception an immediacy calling for identity definition by the target. The anxiety occasioned by its use stems from three possible determinations that the target must make: the sincerity of the threat (bluff or real?); the choice of alternatives presented (live or die? comply or resist?); and, if the threat is effective in the manner the captor hoped, the rationalization and identity realignment by the captive that must accompany such a choice which opted against conditioned values (martyr and hero or one who capitulated in the face of overwhelming stress?).

Threat is a universal concept which requires little elaboration. Its uniqueness lies in its gamelike attributes and the emotion invoked by its use. Allegiances and role compliance may require the captive to place his life on the line in the face of demands for tactical information or submission. The re-

sponse will reflect the cultural conditioning and self-image of the target individual. The interrogator must rely not only on trying to impart a sincerity to the threat but, if wise, will also provide the captive with a rationalization for compliance.

Despite the implied proscription of the use of threat by the Geneva Conventions, its use does not go unrecorded in the history of the past two decades.¹⁹ Aside from its frank uses, threat always carries with it a convenience of explanation: it was never implied by the captor, on the one hand, or was wrongly inferred by the captive, on the other. In evaluating threat, one cannot overlook the fact that the capitulating captive may face a counterposing threat: that presented by his own national interests and conditionings that deny him recourse to overt compliance, underwritten by implied punitive action in the event of such defection.²⁰

Past experiences, psychological makeup, the immediate situation--are all determinants in the individual's perception and interpretation of threat. Hinkle notes that when men's reactions are characterized by anxiety and other intense emotions, their reactions may disorganize their brain functions.²¹ Anxiety by reason of threat is a universally experienced phenomenon. In the face of threat physiological dysfunction, especially disturbed function of the gastrointestinal and cardiovascular systems have been noted by both former prisoners and, of course, the polygraph.

Reward and Punishment. A prisoner-of-war compound obviously does not operate in a democratic manner. For administrative purposes there must be rules; the captive status of the inmates of a total institution implies a character defect which has allowed a contravention of the rules of society in the past and the possibility that such may occur in the future.²² Inherent in most insti-

tutions, then, will be a complex of rules (the "house" rules) whose observance may be enforced by the simple expedient of reward (privilege) and punishment. On a grander (and ostensibly more sophisticated) operative level, reward has its pejorative partner, bribery.

The captor makes the rules and metes out the rewards and punishments. Inmates generally will respond to many of the rules, for they are conditioned from childhood that social graces include such obeisance to some stipulated norms to preserve the civil and curb the primitive. At the same time, many of the new rules to be learned by a prisoner-of-war are likely to be antagonistic to his sense of logic and, failing that, at least to an inculcated sense of duty which requires that he continue to resist even after capture.²³

Like threat, reward and punishment is a powerful weapon. It reinforces the values sought to be taught by the captor; it discourages those considered to be antithetical or inimical to the captor's role and image, as well as easing his administrative burdens. Its uneven use-occasional indulgences, the enforcement of trivial demands, and petty rules-develops in the prisoner the habit of compliance and impairs adjustment to deprivation.²⁴ Promise-reward in the future-can be effective when it is convincing and of consequence: the promise of repatriation, food, mail, or better treatment. Bribery-here thought of as reward for consideration extending well beyond promise to adhere to mere rules-is not unknown but places both the captor and captive outside the normal rules of the game of compliance or thought reform and into the emotional arena of rank collaboration. What constitutes promise, reward, bribery, and compliance in the legal sense is beyond the scope of this paper. Their objective definitions are vital ones for the repatriated captive, however. The rhetorical complications are obvious.

Frank Attempts Directed Toward Attitude Change by Appeal to Reason.

An open appeal to reason is an obvious tactic of the captor who seeks compliance. It is frequently slighted as a weapon of any consequence, possibly for two reasons. First, if it is effective, there is the implication that the logic of the reasoning is superior to that logic which supports the captive's attitudes. Secondly, the prisoner won over by reason and subsequently repatriated must define his defection in terms acceptable and compatible to role expectation of his own country. He may describe the causes for attitude change in rationalizations exaggerating stress, and the repatriating country may consciously or unconsciously aid him in this diversion, in part, because the propriety of national values is put in question. The confusion in this matter is only heightened with a blanket indictment of defection as "brainwashing," for such a loaded term imputes subliminal or mysterious forces, submerging and obscuring the effectiveness of the captor's overtures to reason.

By now an operative rule of compliance and ideological reorientation emerges: any deviation from previously held conditioned values must be accepted by the captive as a rational, if difficult, choice.²⁵ There are four alternatives: adherence to precapture values and role; compliance and attitude change, with concurrent role realignment legitimated; death; and psychosis. This is not to deny that many attitude changes may occur in a Kafkaesque environment or under intolerable stress. But it is the captive, after all, who determines that the stress is intolerable and opts for "survival."

The captor will be most successful when his entreaties are couched in a logic that seems most reasonable to the captive, at the same time providing the prisoner with motive and acceptable rationale for change. The police interrogator solicits a confession not on the

basis that such a legal document is required for conviction, but "because we know all about it already and would like to get this thing cleared up, just like you would." It follows that the indoctrinator of American pilots in Hanoi, seeking an attitude change, would meet with more success pushing an "Asia for the Asians" line than by presenting theoretical ideological exhortations. Not only is the argument more easily perceived by the captive, but carries with it an accusation which could result in guilt.

Many American prisoners in Korea could find no interest in the Chinese ideological approach and considered it "political crap."²⁶ However, a thought-reform program aimed at younger and less intelligent captives from backward or rural areas, or minority groups, might be more effective if it is an ideological appeal cast in terms of oppression by the wealthy or of race discrimination. Such was the case in Korea: all of the American prisoners who defected to the enemy side came from relatively poor, underprivileged backgrounds.²⁷

Summary. An arbitrary selection of some of the more common psychological stresses facing the captive has been examined. Almost all are guaranteed the prisoner, whether or not a part of a consciously contrived program by the captor. The prisoner will, for instance, perceive a threat to his health because of malnutrition, even though the prison fare, strange and unpalatable, may be adequate to his needs.

To an almost total degree, the captor has control of the environment of the prisoner. Accidental or purposive, the captive will perceive anxiety, guilt, frustration, and hostility which will either be integrated or may drive the captive to find a role which occasions less stress. The psychological constitution of the prisoner himself and the sophistication of the interrogator or indoctrinator will be the major determinants in the pris-

oner's resolution of his predicament. The nature of this interplay is critical to any compliance model or approaches to prescriptive conduct or training for possible captives.

V--INTERACTION: CAPTIVE, SELF, AND CAPTOR

I have never seen anyone die for the ontological argument . . . A world that can be explained even with bad reasons is a familiar world. But, on the other hand, in a universe suddenly divested of illusions and lights, man feels an alien, a stranger. His exile is without remedy since he is deprived of memory of a lost home or the hope of a promised land.

--Albert Camus.

Thus far, discussion has centered on forces working on nations to induce them to resort to coercive persuasion techniques, and some of the stresses available to the captor to elicit compliance or belief change in the captive. The psychological and physiological stress chapters point toward factors which intuitively might be deduced as profitable tools to provide *motive* for attitude change. Empirical examination of effects of such stresses, however, has provided what appears to be little more than a conglomerate of forces acknowledged universally capable of impelling the target individual to seek relief. The problem becomes one of selecting a model which will provide prescriptive hypotheses for both the captor seeking attitude change and for policymakers who would devise a program to defy such attempts by inculcation of values and understanding in a prospective future captive which would frustrate such subversive attempts by an enemy.

It would be fatuous to contend that a simple hypothesis could adequately describe and explain the forces at work in the thought-reform or coercive persuasion process. First, varying psychological makeup of the captives immediately complicate any generaliza-

tion; second, the method of assault upon the captive's value system--both quantitatively and qualitatively--does not lend itself to prediction. Third, the very nature of the coercive thought-reform process has not allowed extensive laboratory experimentation by Western science, by which more than a generalized theory could be constructed.¹ Used alternatively has been the relatively small amount of empirical data derived from the Korean war and Chinese thought-reform experiences. Supplementing such data have been Western total institution experiences, research in the areas of physiological stress discussed in chapter III, and various theories of personality current in the Western literature.

Compliance and Change Models. Schein provides one of the broad over-looks on compliance theory,² incorporating the work of Hinkle, Wolff, Meerloo, Lifton, Festinger, Kelman, Biderman, and others in order to provide a frame of reference for productive exploitation of coercive persuasion data, as well as a hypothesis which can explain attitude change in a resisting captive. For analysis, he adopts a socio-psychological model which assumes that the beliefs, attitudes, values and behavior patterns of an individual tend to be integrated with each other and organized around a person's self-image. Such integration is a dynamic equilibrium resulting from a great many forces acting on the individual--forces both internal and external, perceived at both a conscious or semiconscious level--pulling and pushing him in some direction. Day-to-day, the variations of forces are either too small to affect the equilibrium, or stability is preserved by compensatory mechanisms.

If belief, attitudes, values, and behavior patterns are dynamic equilibria which tend to remain stable, then the alteration of the balance of forces must be of such intensity that compensation

is not effective and forces a change in the equilibrium by a change in intensity of belief, its abandonment, or redefinition. The utility in the model can be seen at two levels: it underlines the many forces which support beliefs and suggests that many strategies may be employed to upset the equilibrium and that the process of change or influence occurs over time and consists of progressive stages or steps. Such considerations also steer analysis away from oversimplified explanations of the influence process.

Schein identifies the stages of change as *unfreezing*, *changing*, and *refreezing*. In unfreezing, the precapture equilibrium of the captive is no longer stable. This is seen as the induction of a need or motive to change. In changing, the captor provides the captive with arguments, models, and information which provide a direction of change toward a new equilibrium sought by the captor. Refreezing consists of reintegration of the new equilibrium sought in the changing process into ongoing personal relationships by the provision of reward and social support for any changes made by the captive.

In the absence of any unified theory to explain the mechanisms above, psychophysiological stress, learning, psychoanalytic, cognitive, and social influence formulations are incorporated and rarely contradict one another. The more salient points are outlined below.

Stress in itself can do little more than provide motivation for change, but allegations concerning its effectiveness in producing an uncritical, highly suggestible captive is open to question, especially in those matters suggesting that in itself it is sufficient to *cause* the change.³ Learning models, along with the simpler Pavlovian formulation, offer explanations of how a new response comes to be learned and state principles which govern strength and stability of the new response; responses are sought which will reduce anxiety and guilt, and

the captor can control the situation in the direction of those values and beliefs which he wishes to be reinforced.

Resistance is largely unfrozen, however, by the denial to the captive of support for professional and personal roles and self-images while hammering away at the prisoner with allegations that impute an entirely new role: that of spy, of saboteur, of criminal. Implicit in the working of such tactics is that the captive must be denied any confirmation or self-perceptions of innocence.⁴ Thus, he must be removed from the influence of "significant other[s]" who share his precapture beliefs and attitudes. As identity disintegration proceeds, the captive is brought to one of two states: one of confusion, strongly motivated to find something with which he can identify himself, or one of complete dependence, assuming the role of a completely dependent person or child.

The basis and mechanism of change, once the unfreezing process is underway—i.e., the captive is ready to change and motivated to do so—is a function of the cognitive processes which recognize that the premises held by the now significant other[s] form a framework within which he is guilty. That is to say, the standards of evaluation of his significant others do indeed make him guilty in their eyes, and the captive perceives that their standards are quite rational and defensible.⁵ Guilt* and crime come to have an entire new meaning to the captive, and the acceptance of such new standards by the captive is occasioned by three forces: the need to explain meaningfully the events of imprisonment; the need for a cognitive mechanism which makes further adaptation to the prison situation possible, and the

continuous need for social reinforcement. Schein points out that this process is not to be confused with one wherein the captive merely grants to someone with whom one is in conflict his definition of terms, but rather be recognized as a conscious reorganization of thought by the prisoner who comes to see that such a way of thinking has validity for him.⁶

Theoretical explanations of captive compliance behavior using dissonance reduction analysis are not unlike the learning formulations outlined above. Not in conflict is an analysis in terms of compliance, identification, and internalization wherein behavior is described in terms of social effects and individual desire to maintain a satisfying self-defining relationship to another person or group and finds content of new behavior as intrinsically rewarding and providing a solution to a problem. Much the same approach has been used in exploring the transformation of the "boot" in Marine Corps training camps to a full-fledged Marine.⁷ While the formulation might be disavowed by Skinnerians, the hypothesis lends itself to comparison and integration with David Riesman's well-known American prototypes: the tradition-, inner-, and outer-directed personalities of our time.⁸

If the above hypothesis seems complex and overlaid, it also meets the criteria of a meaningful and useful model while avoiding the exceedingly complex psychoanalytical theory which must be structured on detailed psychosocial history of the captive. Moreover, the model accounts for both motive for change and explanation of the processes of change where a theory of stress with no predictive parameters falls short. Moreover, it places in perspective those stresses explored in chapters III and IV and lends a frame of predictability of their effects that is meaningful to compliance analysis. Lastly, it alerts the analyst of probable ramifications of the

*"Guilt" is used here in a broader sense than mere criminal guilt. In the Communist parlance, for instance, one is guilty of being from a capitalist society, of oppressing the masses, et cetera.

rhetorical and ideological concepts mentioned in chapter I. For it is here that the wily captor will find his captive's Achilles' heel.

The Legitimation of Role. Present U.S. policy for prisoners is directed in the main at role playing; in fact, it explicitly dictates roles and hierarchical relationships that would ordinarily be considered self-evident among military personnel:

I am an American Fighting Man . . . If I am in command . . . If I become a prisoner of war I will . . . If I am senior . . . I will take command . . . I will never forget that I am an American fighting man, responsible for my actions, dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and the United States of America.⁹

It has been demonstrated that the cognitive processes of change would not proceed prior to an unfreezing process which was conditioned on some amount of stress, motivating role realignment. In the model, equilibria must be upset to some unspecified large degree which could not be counterbalanced. The Code of Conduct correctly underscores, as an important counterbalance to unfreezing, strong supporting mechanisms to a role coinciding with national interest, inculcated prior to capture. In order to properly evaluate the effectiveness and utility of the Code, consideration of role is required.

Even in everyday life there is a discrepancy between one's own conception of his role and how he plays it and the role support he earns from audiences for his performance. The individual's empirical performance will depart from the idealized, and he must deal with this discrepancy. Small, everyday discrepancies can be handled, but a large one which interrupts or seriously threatens one's self-image calls for the mechanism of legitimation, which can be accomplished by several means. Selective perception of one's own action

allows us to select out that fraction that is most favorable to one's own self-conception. We may selectively interpret the audience's response to our action. If these two fail, a number of alternatives are available. One is the well-known strategy of leaving the field-withdrawal by more passive performance or abandoning the spotlight to another. The individual may handle threat by switching to another role identity he judges to be more successful in the situation. Rationalization is a possibility. Scapegoating is well known. A gross discrepancy between identity and support may lead to disavowal of the performance's serious relevance to self-image. Finally, lacking support from his audience, the performer may choose to reject or deprecate the audience which withholds role support.

The individual's most important self-images-like those involving the opposite sex, his career, his children-cannot be taken lightly, and the more involved he is, the more he has to gain, but a corollary of this assertion is that he also has more to lose.

If an important role-identity [self-image] has been unequivocally threatened by loss of role support from an important audience, one is likely to experience misery and anguish. He may attempt partially to alleviate this reaction by shifting his identity hierarchy, by giving higher salience to his more successful role identities. He deprecates the threatened identity- chiding himself for being so obsessed with it and derogating the audience that holds it to be so important. That is, he tries to maintain a going concern psychologically by reducing his investment in the threatened role-identity. In a sense, he thus sacrifices a role identity in an attempt to save the standing of the self as a whole.¹⁰

The captor, then, will find withdrawal of role support an effective means of bringing the captive to the unfreezing stage. The model suggests that isolation from significant others is a key to this process. The form of stress to induce

motive may become incidental but is chosen by a wily captor who would seek to provide the captive with the most palatable form of legitimation. Frank physical duress is the least palatable form of legitimation precisely because it confirms precapture expectations of an evil captor. Cultural conditioning by legend and myth has inculcated in the captive strong images of role performance in the face of such stress. The captive has every reason to want to believe that "brainwashing" is a mysterious and largely successful process.

What is the standard of role performance? It is *expectation*—in evaluating events the approach is empirical: they did not live up to expectation, they exceeded it, and so on. Individuals have their own self-expectations as guides to performance conditioned both by their self-image and supported by social cues of their audience. One "social cue" for the U.S. prisoner of war is a categorical declaration of an expectation of performance on his part made by an external party: his own nation with the Code of Conduct. The Code probably reinforces culturally conditioned values which may have existed as *a priori* conceptualizations before the individual was exposed to the Code. The important issue, however, will become the individual's perceived discrepancy in role performance and expectation.

The matrix for performance, thus, is not a simple thing. It is multidimensional in the captive's mind and only partially perceived. In terms of role, the prisoner must try to integrate his situational self-image (and concomitant expectations), his identity as perceived by his cellmates and captor, the role his captor demands he accept, and role performance demanded by his nation. The situation is further complicated in that significant others may themselves be seeking new role definition; moreover, the demands of the captor may be so ambiguous-purposefully so—that the captive will be driven to attempts to

define the role that the captor seeks.¹¹

For the "unfrozen" communicating captive who indulges in ideological comparison with his captor, an additional set of conflicting identities emerges. In defense of his own ideology, the prisoner is challenged with the definition of his own cultural conceptions of his nation, the different and legendary patriotic conception, and the disparities of these two to real-life performance. The captive is thus drawn into the arena of the *realpolitik* which finds a sharp distinction between the moral and social behavior of individuals and nations, a distinction that "justifies and necessitates political policies which a pure individual ethic must always find embarrassing."¹² The prisoner will find his world convulsed, for the skillful indoctrinator will place the captive into the role of "they" or "people" seen in table I.

Role Performance and Compliance.

The detailed investigation and analysis of the cases of 235 U.S. Air Force prisoners of war in Korea provide evidence of the validity of captive role theory. The prisoners were subjected to more intensive interrogation than any other group of captives held in Korea, and apparently the Chinese Communists considered them particularly valuable for propaganda purposes and for intelligence exploitation. The most persistent objectives of the Chinese coercive measures were attempts to obtain bacteriological warfare confessions for propaganda use. Factors previously discussed here were common pressures experienced by the prisoners. Accusation of criminality denying the captive the protection of the Geneva Conventions was made soon after capture. Segregation and isolation were universal in all cases wherein a centrally directed attempt was made to elicit the germ warfare confessions. The writing of biographies in an attempt to get the prisoner to confess to some past misdeed or social injustice was common,

with an attendant effort to focus the attention of the prisoner on his problems, his predicament, his case. Lastly, pressures drawn from the gamut of physiological and psychological stress induced what has been tagged "DDD": debility, dependency, and dread.

Of 83 prisoners interrogated on bacteriological warfare, 59 were subjected to systematic "confession" extortion, 48 were clearly involved in centrally directed Chinese Communist propaganda efforts, and 36 gave some confession. Adapting Biderman, West traces a series of responses to demands for false confession which start with complete resistance and trace their way through defensive resistance, defensive compliance, active compliance, and finally complete compliance. The Air Force cases cited never came to the point of complete compliance, and West notes

...cases of incredible fortitude and attachment to principle in the face of overwhelming pressure [and] a few cases of surprising inability to withstand coercion. Depending upon how one chooses to draw the line, it is possible to say truthfully that all personnel resisted, or that all complied, for the behavior of every man involved at some point a mixture of compliance and resistance. We think it is fair to say that in most cases, including those who signed confessions, resistance was the dominant ingredient.¹³

The Korean experience in these cases, then, could be cast into the Schein formulation which would make "DDD" the motive for role change and subsequent response role realignment, representing both rationale and rationalization. In the hypothesis, it is hardly startling that stress occasions motive to relieve stress; such a fact is a universal empirical perception. Current cultural conceptions of stress are likely to be tied to common experience and find response explainable when such response apparently is occasioned by physical pain, hunger, or lack of sleep.

Most surprising then, is the finding of

Biderman and his team who have shown that prisoners rarely conform to silence in interrogation because of more compelling requirements they experience in the actual situation: namely, the maintenance of a viable social role and esteemed self-image. Biderman found in the cited Korean cases that behavior was frequently more inconsistent with the "name, rank, serial number, date of birth only" injunction in situations wherein overt threats or violence were *not* employed than in situations in which coercion was reported. Moreover, prisoners rated interrogator tactics involving physical assault or threats of violence less effective than "non-coercive" tactics. Self-inflicted pain and other tactics which led to debilitation were rated as more effective than "non-coercive" tactics, however.¹⁴

Pointing out that the improvisation of role and responses is particularly difficult in situations which arouse anxiety, the study notes that the prisoner needs to behave in accordance with a coherent role; this very attempt to preserve esteemed self-image forms the more basic source of his vulnerability to the manipulations by the interrogator. The interrogator (and indeed, the indoctrinator) will use the prisoner's attempt to play a consistent role in a manipulated and stressful situation in such a way that guilt, frustration, hostility, and contradiction will overwhelm the captive. The captive's moment of truth arrives with his first confrontation with the interrogator. Goffman, discussing social interaction, states that

The individual's initial projection commits him to what he is proposing to be and requires him to drop all pretenses of being other things. As the interaction among the participants progresses, additions and modifications in this initial informational state will of course occur, but it is essential that these be related without contradiction to, and even build up from, the initial positions of the several participants.¹⁵

Biderman's analysis of the 235 Air

Force eases points up some of the problems of individual role definition in a situation where national policy has delimited the responses available to the prisoner by such stricturing injunctions as a Code of Conduct. Biderman notes that "refusing to interact" is a form of interaction itself, and relinquishes to the interrogator the opportunities for fixing further the meaning of the prisoner's behavior; silence is interpreted as incriminating. Learned patterns of behavior ("civility") make it difficult for some to outrightly decline to answer a question, and their continuous effort in refusal is stressful in itself. The session with the interrogator may be, in a carefully contrived situation, the captive's only opportunity to engage in meaningful behavior and to find outlet for his frustration. A frequently cited reason for yielding was the need for the captives to reassure themselves that they were not being deprived of their "will." Biderman finds the latter a pervasive factor in much of the compliance that takes place in the interrogation situation, a response wherein the need to reassure the captive that he is, indeed, himself.

... On his return home, and even earlier, the prisoner can justify compliance to himself and others by his having been "forced" to comply, if the more obvious forms of coercion have been used against him. During the interrogation itself, however, being "forced to" do something can be a greater blow to self-esteem than that stemming from the transgression of a norm of resistance. Not only can the same or guilt of defeat in the encounter with the interrogator be involved, but also the more fundamental injection to protect one's self-autonomy or "will."¹⁶

Many prisoners, upon repatriation, adhered to this rationale for compliance even in the face of evidence which would have allowed their exculpation on the grounds of coercion.

Expectation. Role performance standards are cast in the light of expecta-

tion. Expectation may be conceived of in terms internally generated by the captive and integrated with such concepts as self-esteem. Cultural conditioning and social interaction contribute to the individual's conception of himself, and legitimation becomes a vital force to preserve the equilibrium in stressful situations. Externally derived and inflexible expectation, such as the Code of Conduct, is amenable to acknowledgeable legitimation only in the face of threat of imminent death or of serious and immediate bodily harm. Such was the case in the returning captives from Korea, at least.¹⁷

If Code of Conduct training has as its main objective the instillation of the virtues of noncompliance, then the speculation arises that the captive, in departing from this conditioned role expectation, has further to fall. To the extent that the departure can be legitimated, the more disintegrative forces working on the equilibrium can be neutralized. Guilt dispelling factors become critical.

Expectation has a more common meaning: anticipation, the individual's conception of events in the future. To the extent that the captive's expectation is disturbed by real events, the more dissonant the effect will be on the prisoner who must assume a role and interact in such a situation.

The Chinese, to our great bewilderment, would greet each captive with a smile, a cigarette, and a handshake. This was a policy for which we were not prepared, and our men, without exception, were surprised at this maneuver. It puts them off balance, right then and there.¹⁸

Previous note was made in chapter II of the French surprise at the conviction with which the Vietnamese indoctrinators carried on their duties. French experience in Indochina in many ways coincided with the Vietnamese declarations concerning prisoners.¹⁹ Whether false propaganda or authentic, captured

Americans' statements in the present Vietnamese conflict are replete with statements concerning surprise at their good treatment at the hands of the North Vietnamese,²⁰ and the alleged statement of the *Pueblo* crew seeking presidential apology to the Korean Government declared that "the treatment we are receiving is clearly beyond expectation."²¹

The truthfulness of the latter two statements is not subject to verification; the point is that good treatment, when unexpected, can immediately put the captive off balance in an interacting role. It is less surprising, of course, that in the rhetoric of ideology carried on by both sides the captive should suddenly divine that the enemy has conviction and a sense of moral right. When he not only perceives this fact, but the values that support it as having some logic, the prisoner has arrived at the cognitive integrative stage. He is now ready, in the best sense of the word, for "brain-washing."

Cultural conditioning in most cases would lead the captive to focus on the expectation that physical duress would lead to his downfall. The previous three chapters have been devoted to demonstrating that this is not likely, except when such anticipation comes to be self-confirming. Another expectation commonly held, but proved in Korea not true, is that imminent threat of death or serious physical trauma will more likely occasion capitulation than vague threats. The testimony of the Air Force prisoners in Korea, as well as psychological theory, indicates that threats indefinite in time and nature are much more likely to be disorganizing than those types of immediate threats which the law sees as an excuse for compliance or collaboration.²²

Resistance to Compliance. In a paper such as this dealing with compliance, discussion is loaded in a direction emphasizing collaboration and successful

persuasion. Although the present effort hopes to provide conclusions which might suggest improvements in the present U.S. Code of Conduct training, the previous discussion and model indicate a truly successful stand by a captive pitted against a sophisticated captor is unlikely, barring the most discriminating selection of would-be captives and prohibitively expensive training for captivity and resistance. On the other hand, the captor's resources are also limited: limited skillful interrogators or indoctrinators, limited time to gain ends, and a limited theory or proscribing ideology on which to proceed.

It is lamentable that those elements most likely to carry the individual through a stressful situation--pride, self-esteem, allegiance to friends, to country, to a higher being--are difficult, if not impossible to inculcate in even the most ingenious educational environment within any reasonable period of time. It is on this level that the enemy must eventually train his guns if he hopes to succeed in ideological change. Legend and myth attest to the effectiveness of these forces; in fact, legend and myth can themselves become self-confirming influences. The principles of military leadership and discipline were not arrived at overnight, and may be viewed as contributing a consistent role definition and guidelines for the captive; the Code emphasizes the continued military role after capture. Continuing leadership and discipline in the captive environment will serve to insulate such forces as pride, self-esteem, and allegiance against the enemy's attempt to undermine these role supporting processes.²³ Isolation, however, can quickly strip the captive who lacks insight of such support, and the wise captor will see that "significant other" contact is limited to those who are thinking "correctly." Present-day Code of Conduct training, as well as the Code itself, devotes a great deal of attention to prisoner peer group interaction, but fails to come to grips with

what is probably the *single largest threat* to the captive-isolation-even though a number of defense measures are possible, insight being one of the major ones.²⁴

Indoctrinating the military man subject to risk of capture in his own and captor's ideologies, and demonstrating the superiority of his own, poses some risk and becomes problematical. The captive may be tempted to indulge in a colloquy with an indoctrinator because he feels he has been "pumped up." This is sheer folly, a game that the most skilled rhetorician would have difficulty winning. An excellent Air Force film vividly portrayed this point; the film was never released, however, for it did not portray "success" for the captive in the situation. Department of Defense policy states specifically that "Defeatist treatises, writing, and materials will not be used in training programs."²⁵

Previous note has been made of the lack of success of the Chinese against U.S. military personnel who described their ideological reorientation lectures as "political crap." The captives were not only describing the Communist ideology as such, but politics in general. They just weren't interested. The captive who is apolitical or negative about such issues, then, has a barrier built in which no amount of exhortation will remove. The wily captor must redesign his approach, or such pleas will only heighten resistance. Firm resistance to ideological persuasion in Korea also found a firm base among those prisoners who had personal experience with Communist atrocity; no amount of indoctrination could erase from their minds such vivid imagery. Airmen, on the other hand, who had no contact with the enemy prior to capture, were more amenable to suasion.

It is not contended here that the U.S. Armed Forces should cease whatever training programs they may have concerning ideologies. To the extent that such indoctrination meets the real-life

expectations of the captive, it will be role-supporting. Two probabilities exist however: the unwitting caricature of the enemy in the training sessions, and the captor's contrived reversal from such a caricature, upsetting the captive's expectations with attending dissonance. The rhetoric game of table I comes into full play in these circumstances. The suggestion lends itself that a more fruitful policy to pursue would be one that shunned abstract political considerations and emphasized documented, down-to-earth, unsavory images of the enemy.

Attending all of the previous considerations has been the underlying concept that maintenance of a viable role is the key to prisoners' adjustment to captivity. The captor will facilitate an "adjustment" by opening only those doors which lead to compliance, providing all the while legitimation to facilitate role switching and belief change; the complying captive will be forced to accept all of the captor's values and, in the end, will attempt to dispel the guilt which will accompany the contravention of national expectations. The loyal captive cannot maintain a viable role while completely adhering to precapture expectations, for strict adherence to such expectations is incompatible with the realities of the captive situation, and failure to adjust will mean failure to maintain equilibrium. To preserve a viable role and national allegiances, he will be aided most by insight into the implications of role realignment and switching, of guilt, and legitimation by himself and his captor. Finding outlets for frustration and hostility becomes a critical process.

Expendability. A military man's contract with his government tacitly admits that his role must be played to the death if national interest requires.²⁶ Correctly, POW conduct training should emphasize the positive aspects of captivity, such as eventual repatriation and

efforts by the government in behalf of the prisoner's next of kin. Precapture training must attempt to bring the trainee face to face with the concept of expendability. If the word seems harsh, it reflects the nature of the contract. Expendability will be thrown in the captive's face by the enemy, and all other resistance training will be for naught if the prisoner cannot accept the concept. Legitimation comes from two sources: simple allegiance to a national cause, supported by legendary conditionings, and the equally simple (and perhaps more meaningful) contractual concept--"I gave my word"--a matter of personal honor. Many *have* died for the ontological argument.

Summary. Situational stress induces motive to change in a model which sees viable role performance keyed to an equilibrium which is maintained by role modification and legitimation of self-image. The standard of performance is expectation which arises from cultural conditioning, social cues, and such dictates as the Code of Conduct and captor-imposed rules. The dissonant effects of captivity are best met by the captive with insight who can adopt a role or roles which situationally channel or utilize guilt, frustration, and hostility in his own role support, while maintaining national allegiances. Radical disparities in expectation can lead to role switching which must be legitimated; ideological reorientation is a cognitive process which can attend such switching, and is, indeed, a form of legitimation itself. The model lends some predictability to various stress measures to be employed by a sophisticated captor and their effectiveness.

Despite well-inculcated national injunctions against discursive conversation or collaboration with the enemy, there is considerable evidence that they are more the rule than the exception in cases where the captor proceeds carefully. The captive may seek such com-

munication to preserve viable social role and esteemed self-image even in the face of acknowledged national policies supported by legal consequence. Coercion is not required to stimulate this response, and attendant guilt is as much a function of the nature of departure from national policy as is the departure itself.

VI--CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

... A soldier and a priest are different characters, in all nations, and all ages; and this difference is founded on circumstances whose operations are eternal and unalterable.

--David Hume.

The complexities of providing a prescriptive code for captive conduct become apparent. Policymakers are faced with providing a simple, easily understood guide for prisoner conduct in the face of a multidimensional matrix which must consider national goals as well as those of the captor. To this is added the most complex dimension of all--the variance of individual personality.

In dealing with the latter a heroic ascription is necessary for any meaningful policy--the positing of an abstract ideal, the legendary--coupled with a concept of expendability, which presumes that a soldier will lay down his life for the national honor. The heroic was hardly devised in America, no more than was its departure from advertised national expectations. Both are historic universals. The adoption of the Code of Conduct in 1955 was largely the formal statement of principles of soldierly conduct understood and accepted by all nations for centuries. The Code may be viewed most objectively as a reaction to something new--the use of the captive to serve the political goals of propaganda which the Communists had brought to new heights during the Korean war.

Dilemmas. Major dilemmas become obvious in devising a prescriptive Code

of Conduct. The rhetoric of the heroic and the legendary, which disclaims the possibility of defection, is hardly in harmony with the contention of chapter V which predicts the defection of any captive under the proper circumstances. The dilemma posed is simple: in training a possible future captive for resistance to captor entreaties, training which furnishes the captive with the knowledge that defection may be more the norm than is his continued resistance could become a self-confirming process. The captive would be provided with a rationalization which would ease his legitimation and attendant guilt in role change. On the other hand, failure to disclose to the captive the likely possibility of eventual defection premises an approach which must disallow, at worst, or tend to suppress, at best, realistic training in that gray area when the captive has gone beyond the "name, rank, serial number, and date of birth" injunction. As we have seen, a captive progressing to this stage of role realignment is left to his own devices, beset by guilt, and now a criminal in not only the rhetoric of his captor, but in the legend and law of his own country.

A second dilemma is presented in the area of ideology and "moral right." Patriotism and belief in a just cause are powerful forces to support the resisting captive if he can accept them with insight and without absolute rigidity. Without such insight, however, a skillful indoctrinator will upset the rhetoric table, then guide the captive in its restructure. The typical American-bred in an aura of "fair play," of images of democratic participation to arrive at solutions-brings his poorly concealed self-image of superiority into a "game" wherein the "other-directed" aspects of his personality must seek confirmation by a captor who needs only to contrive to confirm the Niebuhr thesis: the individual is more moral than the state.¹ The present confessions coming out of North Vietnam are rife with such an

approach. The paradox lies in the rhetoric and pathology of "holy" war, the fact that national policymakers are hardly ready to endorse a training program for its fighting men which acknowledges that at certain times and certain places, the exigencies of power politics and war on the battlefield may give the appearance that we are less "moral" than "they."

A third dilemma is the variation of individual intelligence and personality. The dilemma is seen on two levels: training for captivity and compliance in captivity. A national policy has been devised which is easily understood, and it follows that training programs must be aimed at the lowest common denominator. On the compliance level it has been seen that national injunctions against transgression are wrapped in terms that are universals and ill-defined, once the simple "name, rank, serial number" barrier is breached. The only excuses which authorize such a departure-threat of imminent death or serious bodily harm-are paradoxically not frequently called upon for legitimation in such circumstances, for psychologically, the prisoner finds more compelling reasons not to comply. On the other hand, legal retribution has little restraining effect on a complying prisoner in much less stressful circumstances who finds an even more powerful reason to comply, rather than resist. Most surprising and tragic, it is possible to construct circumstances in the model wherein the more valiant, the more intelligent, the "straighter shooters," will *defect*, while in an identical situation, the less intelligent, the more cowardly, the "goldbricks," will *resist*. The wise policy of the Department of Defense in approaching each case on its individual merits and circumstances, when considering possible prosecution or administrative action against former captives, is affirmed by this paradox. This, however, does little for the psychological scars which the defectors

will carry throughout their lives.

Uncharted the rocks that surround thee,
 Take heed that the channels thou learn
 Lest thy name serve to buoy for another
 That shoal, the Courts-Martial Return.
 Though Armour, the belt that protects her,
 The ship bears the sear on her side;
 It is well if the court acquit thee;
 It were best hadst thou never been tried.²

An elemental appreciation of these dilemmas underscores the difficulty in devising a Code of Conduct and implementing training to support it. Recognizing some of the problems which the United States had encountered in the Korean war, one Navy admiral made the recommendation that in all future conflicts with Communist states that might attempt "brainwashing," the United States should announce to all the world that such was to be expected and to discount any confession or propaganda statement that emanated from a Communist country which used captives for this purpose.³

The author of this paper is aware that once again this recommendation is circulating, at least among some potential captives. Unfortunately, such an approach overlooks some of the more important problems which might arise: (1) National rhetoric and ideology must suppress such a concept of an omnipotent captor; (2) the Communist states have declared their exceptions to article 85 of the Geneva Conventions, and to affirm to a possible captive that signing a confession was "all right" could be tantamount to a recommendation that he sign his own death warrant admitting criminal complicity; (3) there is ample evidence to suggest that statements which the United States had forecast to be "bogus" would actually be made with conviction; (4) the policy itself serves as an invitation to open the conversational door between captor and captive. This would only hasten the exploitation of the captive by the contriving captor; (5) such a policy amounts to tacit admission that our

men are incapable of resisting Communist exploitation; its announcement would, in itself, hand the enemy a major propaganda advantage and, at the same time, constitute a weapon to be used against the prisoner ("your government has no confidence in you"); (6) a national policy directing our men, in effect, to *tell lies* is morally repugnant and offers the enemy the same two-pronged advantage just mentioned; (7) pressure on the prisoner to refute this policy is likely to be intense; efforts to make the statements by prisoners appear sincere and not the frivolous products resulting from adherence to the policy are bound to be strenuous.

Conclusions. There is no need to restate subsidiary conclusions which underlie the compliance and resistance models developed. Appreciation of the effects of physiological and psychological stress and their place in the model reduces the emotion in any discussion dealing with captivity compliance.

Compliance and Thought Reform Model. For a captor seeking tactical intelligence from a resisting captive, threat suggesting overwhelming physiological or psychological intensity is likely to be the most productive, followed by actual trauma for the noncomplier. The use of such measures greatly degrades the product-information-or makes it incomplete and usually strengthens the captive's will to resist, or further comply.

For thought reform-ideological re-orientation--deliberate use of physical force or frank threat is counterproductive. Situational stress, induced by the mere exigencies of prison life, is reinforced with isolation from "significant others." The captor will play on the prisoner's precapture caricatures and conception of the enemy and attempt to place the captive's expectations in bold relief with "reality." The captive, driven to seek image confirmation, will enter into discursive exploration with a

68 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

captor; the ensuing colloquy and subsequent soul searching by the isolated captive force him to sort out individual and national identities and images—that of the captor as well as his own. With inputs supplied by the captor, the prisoner, step by step, realigns to the captor's beliefs as he accepts the captor's way of "seeing things." Hastening his change is the conviction with which the captor presents his case and degree of divergence which the captive witnesses between his precapture expectations and captive reality. Isolation is the key, and other stresses will be introduced to the captive only in the context which reasonably imputes that the *captive himself*, or more effectively, *the captive's nation*, is responsible for the hardship of the prisoner. Frank, purposive stress is thus contraindicated.

The model above is a conceptual model, and not a universally acknowledged or applied process. Noted earlier, the Chinese form of "thought reform" has roots in early Chinese history and not in the Soviet Union. The "backward" north Vietnamese acknowledged penchant, like that of the Chinese, to reform and refurbish the convictions of the captive while enlisting the aid of an image of a David and Goliath struggle, may be presumed to be more than a little effective with their attempts at thought reform and elicitation of statements to shore up their propaganda efforts. In fact, if the model above has any validity, then it can be forecast that many American captives in North Vietnam have been "brainwashed." Isolation has been reported in many cases; the propaganda broadcasts consistently deal in individual versus national identities and images and not in ideology; the prisoners constantly remark on their unexpected good treatment; the conviction of the North Vietnamese is supported by both past and present history.⁴

Resistance Model. Insight and ac-

ceptance of the concept of expendability are two key factors in a resistance model. Ideology supports and legitimates acceptance of expendability, but can prove counterproductive in the hands of a wily captor who will twist it and use it against the captive. It is suggested that personal honor and bond has more meaning than such nationalistic concepts. Appreciation of the disparities of ideological rhetoric is supporting, but will probably not be effective on a long-term basis. Insight into the workings of "involuntary" role alignment, of guilt, frustration, and hostility, and their mobilization to work for the prisoner, rather than against him, are necessary. Given a choice, the prisoner must never opt for an isolating environment and should resist any discursive explorations with the interrogator or indoctrinator. Caricature of the captor, or of the realities of prison captivity, confound expectation, especially when the prisoner receives better treatment than he anticipated. The captive must have insight into the collaboration process and understand the fact that compliance is a step-by-step evolution which can be reversed: that collaboration is hardly the precipitate "break a man" process that myth alleges. Lastly, the prisoner must understand that neither physiological stress or unknown, demoniacal, or sinister influences are capable of inducing change in beliefs.

Resistance to tactical intelligence exploitation which uses either frank dress or threat requires acceptance of expendability: national allegiances and individual honor and pride, and knowledge of the workings of physiological and psychological stress provide support. Training for future possible captive situations featuring highly stressful experiences is a questionable procedure, and can be counterproductive by generating false expectations—including the expectation of *capitulating*, rather than successful resistance. If stress is

employed in training, its effects should be very carefully explored with the trainee. Otherwise, the effect may be exactly opposed to what is sought.

Recommendations. The following recommendations relating to Code of Conduct training are made:

(1) While tacit admission of the fact that the captive is likely to indulge in activities which exceed or contravene the national code cannot be made, the training of possible future captives must apprise them of the possibility of such defection and prepare them for such an eventuality. To do otherwise only reinforces the stresses working on the captive: he broke a code (with all the moral approbation the word carries); moreover, he was trained by his government to insure against such a possibility. In the hands of a wily captor this transgression is likely to occur early in the game, although the departure may be slight. His world convulsed, the captive has met neither his own expectations nor the inculcated ones of his nation and now must search for new guideposts. If they are not provided, he will view himself as either "broken" or wrongly trained or both. In any case, such an attitude can only compound what he now believes is his imminent capitulation. The captive must be given some maneuvering room in such a situation and provided guidance that advises him that all is not lost, that he is not "broken," and that he can use his original transgression to support a position that will allow no further collaboration. In short, a policy which fails to provide such guidelines will, when contravened, prove to be counterproductive to what is sought.

(2) Training must dispense with the bugaboo of "brainwashing" and the sinister. The workings of physiological stress--and its limitations--must be understood. Otherwise the prisoner will be delivered into the indoctrinator's hands for the wrong reason. The captive will

seize upon the use of drugs, hypnosis, fatigue, or "brainwashing" as legitimation for collaboration, when more subtle and unrecognized influences are the reason for his compliance.

(3) As a corollary to (1) and (2) above, the trainee would be best prepared for the realities of captivity if provided with an insight into the psychological stresses which occur in the captive situation. Frustration, guilt, and hostility all lend themselves to such exploration and, with intelligent insight, can frequently be used to support the captive in resisting. The trainee must understand that the wily captor will eventually bring him to the point where the enemy's entire argument looks appealing and entirely reasonable, while his own appears inadequate. Training must acknowledge this fact. Forewarned is forearmed.

(4) Training must be included on isolation and its effects. Past training has emphasized overt and covert prison camp organization. While the value of this approach is not disputed, the model suggests that a captor who hopes to be successful in achieving attitude change will have his own ideas of camp organization, and they will not include more

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than a nominal invitation for the formation of either open or secret organizations by the prisoners. Present programs tend to emphasize such an "organizational" approach, while paying little or no attention to the nature of isolation. Paradoxically, that area where instruction is given-organization-will take place, whether trained for or not, while the nature of the *single largest threat* to the captive-isolation-rarely rates more than passing comment.⁵

(5) Captive pressures and environment should never be caricatured. Disparity between expectation and realization must be minimized. If in doubt,

error should be made to the side which posits a less evil, a more sophisticated, and understanding captor. In the area of ideology, caricature which conjures up an image of the fanatic, the "backward," the "amoral," the unscrupulous, the cunning, the godless is all self-serving rhetoric likely to confuse expectation. A training program which premises "amorality" or "godlessness" in the interrogator or the indoctrinator only invites the captor to prove the disparity between the captive's beliefs and the "truth." The "soft sell" (or alternatively "soft" and "hard" sell) will overwhelm the captive, already driven to the captor to preserve his self-image.

FOOTNOTES

I-IDEOLOGY, PROPAGANDA, AND RHETORIC

1. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 4th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1967), p. 230. For an historical account, see Albert D. Biderman, "Internment and Custody," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, v. VIII, p. 139-147.

2. Diplomatic Conference for the Establishment of International Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War, Geneva, 1949. *The Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1950), art. 13, p. 90; art. 17, p. 92. Article 94 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, p. 194, provides that "the Detaining Power shall encourage intellectual, educational and recreational pursuits, sports and games amongst internees, whilst leaving them free to take part in them or not." Unless otherwise specified, future reference to "Geneva Convention" in this paper will designate the 1949 Conventions relating to treatment of prisoners of war. The Conventions are carried, with annotations, in U.S. Dept. of the Army, *The Law of Land Warfare*, FM 27-10 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1956).

3. See, for example, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, *Communist Interrogation, Indoctrination and Exploitation of American Military and Civilian Prisoners*, Report (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1957).

4. Robert V. Daniels, "What the Russian Means," Norman A. Graebner, ed., *The Cold War* (Boston: Heath, 1963), p. 63.

5. Two current examples: William P. Lyons, "Prisoners of War and the Code of Conduct," *Naval War College Review*, December 1967, p. 60-96; Edgar O'Ballance, "Brainwashing," *Military Review*, March 1968, p. 89-92.

6. Edward H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939* (London: Macmillan, 1939), p. 133.

7. Carr, p. 137f.

8. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966), p. 382.

9. J.V. Stalin, "Further Strengthening of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," Chicago, University, College, *History: Selected Readings; the Russian Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 361-365.

10. Arthur Koestler, *Darkness at Noon* (New York: Macmillan, 1941).

11. George Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1949).

12. Aldous Huxley, *Brave New World* (New York: Harper, 1932).

13. Aldous Huxley, *Brave New World Revisited* (New York: Harper, 1958), especially chapter VII, "Brainwashing." Huxley sees as a primary tool of thought reform the Pavlovian conditioned reflex. Cf. chapter V, this paper.

14. Eugene Kinkad, *In Every War but One* (New York: Norton, 1959) is a book which took the tack that American POW's had conducted themselves with honor in every war but one: Korea.

15. The term was unknown to Korean captives. "This Red label makes us feel like criminals. We are all completely innocent. I never even heard the term 'brainwash' before I got home."—AP dispatch, 4 May 1953, quoting a returning Korean captive, cited in Harold Wentworth and Stuart B. Flexner, eds., *Dictionary of American Slang* (New York: Crowell, 1960), p. 60.

16. U.S. President, "Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States," Executive Order 10631, (Washington: 17 August 1955). Cited hereafter as "Code of Conduct."

17. U.S. Office of Armed Forces Information and Education, *The U.S. Fighting Man's Code* (Washington: 1959), p. 4. Cited hereafter as *U.S. Fighting Man's Code*.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

19. U.S. Dept. of Defense, *Training and Education Measures Necessary to Support the Code of Conduct*, DOD Directive 1300.7 (Washington: 8 July 1964), §11(3), ¶2, 7. Articles of the UCMJ most directly aimed at the problem are Articles 104, "Aiding the Enemy," (MCM 183), and Article 105, "Misconduct of a Prisoner," (MCM 184), 10, USCA, §904, 905.

20. Myres S. McDougal and Florentino P. Feliciano, *Law and Minimum World Public Order* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 38.

21. *U.S. Fighting Man's Code*, p. 90-91. Such a finding strips the prisoner of any protection afforded by the Conventions under this scheme.

22. Ho Chi Minh, *On Revolution: Selected Writings, 1920-1966* (New York: Signet Books, 1968). See, for instance, "French Colonization on Trial," p. 73-115 (n.d.); "The Imperialist Aggressors Can Never Enslave the Heroic Vietnamese People," (1952), p. 213-224; "Eight Point Order Issued by the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, (1 October 1952), p. 230-232; "Instructions Given at the Conference Reviewing the Second Le Hong Phong Military Campaign," (1950), p. 184-188; "Closing Speech at the Public Appearance of the Viet-Nam Workers' Party," (1951), p. 209-224.

23. Peter Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria* (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 54.

24. Bernard B. Fall, *Street without Joy*, 3d rev. ed. (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 1963), p. 300f.

25. Paret, p. 62-66. Cf. Albert D. Biderman, *March to Calumny: the Story of American POW's in the Korean War* (New York: Macmillan, 1963), p. 260. Hereafter cited as *March*.

26. U.S. Dept. of Defense, *Open Arms: Amnesty for Viet Cong Who Choose Freedom* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1967), p. 2-3.

II-CAPTOR GOALS

1. "Red Cross Assails Executions in War," *The New York Times*, 11 February 1968, p. 2:7.

2. Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam, *In the Name of America: the Conduct of the War in Vietnam by the Armed Forces of the United States as Shown by Published Reports* (Annandale, Va.: Turnpike Press, 1968).

3. Edward Hymoff, *Stig von Bayer* (New York: Heineman, 1965), p. 91-98.

4. Robert Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: a French View of Counterinsurgency* (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 21-22.

5. For example, "U.S. Navy Pilot on Bombing of Civilians," p. jji 1, 23 February 1967; "[Name]'s Statement," 7 March 1967, p. jji 6; "[Name] of Pueblo Crew Confesses," p. ggg 12-15, 5 February 1968, all *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Report, Asia and Pacific*. Hereafter cited as *FBIS*.

6. Wilfred O. Reiners, *Soviet Indoctrination of German War Prisoners, 1941-1956* (Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for International Studies, 1959), p. 52.

7. "Israel and Egypt Begin POW Trade," *The New York Times*, 13 January 1968, p. C6:3. Note should be made, however, of Israeli reorganization of Arab school systems in Jordan, which the Arabs regard as a thrust toward ideological reorientation. See "Israel's Administration and Arab Refugees," by Don Peretz, *Foreign Affairs*, January 1968, p. 336-346.

8. Literally scores of examples exist. See, for instance, "U.S. Captain [Name]'s Open Letter," 3 June 1966, p. kkk 2; "Depositions of Two Captured U.S. Pilots," 8 July 1966, p. jji 1; "Captured U.S. Marine Writes Letter to Troops," 3 May 1966, p. kkk 2; "Quan Doi Nhan Dan on Pilot's Confessions," 26 July 1966, p. jji 9-11. All *FBIS*.

9. *Ibid.*, "French Journalist Interviews U.S. Pilot," 16 September 1966, p. jji 1; "Downed Pilot Surprised at Captor's Treatment," 23 August 1967, p. jji 11. Also, David Schoenbrun, "Journey to North Vietnam," *The Saturday Evening Post*, 16 December 1967, p. 53ff.

10. "Captured U.S. Pilots Hail Ho's 'Kind' Policy," 23 May 1966, p. jji 25; "Downed Pilot Surprised at Captor's Treatment," 23 August 1967, p. jji 11. "Polish Correspondent Interviews U.S. POW's," 7 July 1967, p. jji 6, all *FBIS*. Also, "East Germans Say Hanoi Treats U.S. Captives Well," *The New York Times*, 15 October 1967, p. 1:4. The verification problem of captor treatment is, of course, the fact that the North Vietnamese will not allow inspection by neutral groups.

11. Bertrand Russell, *War Crimes in Vietnam* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1967), p. 9.

12. Despite the well-established definition of piracy as acts of violence committed on the high seas against persons or property by the crew of a private vessel with intent to plunder, Soviet international lawyers have come to the aid of Hanoi in redefining piracy to include activities of aircrewmen operating as agents of their government. A Kolodkin, "Piracy and International Law," *International Affairs* (Moscow), October 1967, p. 75-78; B. Teplinsky, "The Air War over Indochina," *International Affairs* (Moscow), February 1967, p. 40-47. Cf. Hans Kelsen, *Principles of International Law*, (New York: Rinehart, 1952), p. 124.

13. David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, *The U-2 Affair* (New York: Random House, 1962); William L. White, *The Little Toy Dog* (New York: Dutton, 1962). The books detail Soviet treatment of captured U.S. military reconnaissance pilots McKone and Olmstead and CIA contract pilot Gary Powers, taken prisoners while flying missions against the U.S.S.R. Cf. Oliver J. Lissitzyn "Some Legal Implications of the U-2 and RB-47 Incidents," *The American Journal of International Law*, January 1962, p. 135-142.

14. Erica G. Wallach, *Light at Midnight* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967); John Van Altena, Jr., *A Guest of the State* (Chicago: Regnery, 1967).

15. Oleg V. Penkovskii, *The Penkovsky Papers* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), trial transcripts, p. 360-365.

16. George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925-1950* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), p. 245; *Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1961), p. 189.

17. "[Name] Confesses," p. ggg 5-8; "[Name] of Pueblo Confesses," p. ggg 12-15; "[Name] of Pueblo Crew Confesses," p. 16-19, all *FBIS*, 5 February 1968. "Pueblo Crewmen Submit Letter of Apology," p. ggg 1-5, *FBIS*, 19 February 1968.

18. "Excerpts From Security Council Debate on Pueblo," *The New York Times*, p. 30:2; "North Korean Statements," p. 30:7, both 28 January 1968.

19. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 838ff. Also, Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 307.

20. Haynes B. Johnson, *The Bay of Pigs: the Leaders' Story of Brigade 2506* (New York: Norton, 1964), p. 215-217, 264. For another view of life in the Cuban prisons, see John Martino, *I Was Castro's Prisoner* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1963).

21. Cf. Mu Fu-sheng, *The Willing of the Hundred Flowers* (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 208-247.

22. Dun J. Li, *The Ageless Chinese* (New York: Scribner, 1965), p. 92f.

23. Schoenbrun, p. 21. Also, Harrison E. Salisbury, *Behind the Lines-Hanoi* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967).

III-PHYSIOLOGICAL STRESS ON THE CAPTIVE

1. Germany (Territory under Allied Occupation, 1945--U.S. Zone), Military Tribunals, *Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1946), p. 1-357. See also Elie A. Cohen, *Human Behavior in the Concentration Camp* (New York: Norton, 1953), p. 81-114. Changes in the 1949 Geneva Convention attempted to deal with this problem by expressly prohibiting scientific experiments on prisoners of war; nevertheless, defenses raised and upheld during the Nuernberg trial could easily be used by an unscrupulous captor to perform experimentation under a more palatable guise. Cf. R.C. Hingorani, *Prisoners of War* (Bombay: Tripathi, 1963), p. 124-125.

2. *U.S. Fighting Man's Code*, p. 27-34.

3. "Prisoners of War and Wounded in the Field," *In the Name of America*, p. 59-90 carries examples of many such reports published in the U.S. press.

4. Paret, p. 75; Henri Alleg, *The Question* (New York: Braziller, 1958), p. 39-90.

5. Harold Wolff, "Pain," Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, *Factors Used to Increase the Susceptibility of Individuals to Forceful Indoctrination: Observation and Experiments*, Symposium no. 3 (New York: 1956), p. 123-129. Hereafter cited as *Symposium no. 3*.

6. Kinkead, p. 112. Cf. Biderman, *March*, chapter VIII. Biderman's thesis, in contrast to Kinkead, is that American captives in Korea performed remarkably well in the face of torture, coercion, and indoctrination attempts by their captors.

7. U.S. Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War, *POW: the Fight Continues after the Battle* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1955), p. 58f.

8. Biderman, *March*, p. 136. Also Abraham M. Meerloo, "Brainwashing and Menticide," Maurice R. Stein, et al., eds., *Identity and Anxiety* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960), p. 511. For one philosophical view on the use of torture, see Jean Paul Sartre's introduction to Alleg's *The Question*.

9. Joe H. Munster and Murl A. Larkin, *Military Evidence* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), p. 190.

10. Gresham M. Sykes, *The Society of Captives* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), p. 48f.

11. See, for example, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, *Communist Interrogation, Indoctrination and Exploitation of American Military and Civilian Prisoners*, Hearings (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1956), p. 56-58.

12. Biderman, *March*, p. 131-135. Also, Great Britain Ministry of Defence, *Treatment of British Prisoners of War in Korea* (London: H.M. Stationery Off., 1955), *passim*.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 136; Louis J. West, "United States Air Force Prisoners of the Chinese Communists," Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, *Methods of Forceful Indoctrination: Observations and Interviews*, Symposium no. 4 (New York: 1957), p. 269-297. Hereafter cited as *Symposium no. 4*.

14. *Symposium no. 3*, p. 127f.

15. Lawrence E. Hinkle, Jr., "The Psychological State of the Interrogation Subject as It Affects Brain Function," Albert D. Biderman and Herbert Zimmer, eds., *The Manipulation of Human Behavior* (New York: Wiley, 1961), p. 36-40.

16. Albert D. Biderman, "Social Psychological Needs and 'Involuntary' Behavior as Illustrated by Compliance in Interrogation," *Sociometry*, June 1960, p. 131f. Hereafter cited as "Social Psychological Needs."

17. *POW*, p. 58f.

18. "Deficiency and Metabolic," *The Merck Manual*, 11th ed. (Rahway, N.J.: Merck Sharp and Dohme Research Laboratories, 1966), p. 262-290.

19. Cohen, p. 77-79.

20. Biderman and Zimmer, eds., p. 35.

21. J. Brozek, "Semi-Starvation," *Symposium no. 3*, p. 116-123.

22. Biderman and Zimmer, eds., p. 35f.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 57.

24. D. Tyler, "Sleep Deprivation," *Symposium no. 3*, p. 103-112.

25. Ian Oswald, *Sleep* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1966), p. 61.

26. Biderman and Zimmer, eds., p. 30-32.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

28. J. Vernon, "Physical and Social Isolation," *Symposium no. 3*, p. 93.

29. Charles A. Brownfield, *Isolation: Clinical and Experimental Approaches* (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 90.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 90; 127-129.

31. M. Meltzer, "Solitary Confinement," *Symposium no. 3*, p. 102.

32. Stein, et al., eds., p. 511.

33. Edward Hunter, *Brainwashing* (New York: Bookmailer, 1960), p. 232-235.

34. Louis A. Gottschalk, "The Use of Drugs in Interrogation," Biderman and Zimmer, eds., p. 96-135. Cf. Alleg, p. 91-101.

35. Edgar H. Schein, *Coercive Persuasion* (New York: Norton, 1961), p. 201.

36. As well as evidence obtained through the use of the polygraph. *United States v. Massey*, 18 CMR 138.

37. Hunter, p. 236.

38. Abraham M. Meerloo, *The Rape of the Mind* (Cleveland: World, 1956), p. 143-148. It should be noted here that both Meerloo and Hunter use the terms "mass hypnosis" and do not describe a trance state which would be clinically perceptible. Cf. Andrew Salter, *Conditioned Reflex Therapy* (New York: Creative Age, 1949), p. 15f.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 31-35.

40. Dr. Orne is presently head of the Unit for Experimental Psychiatry at the University of Pennsylvania.

41. Martin T. Orne, "The Potential Uses of Hypnotism in Interrogation," Biderman and Zimmer, eds., p. 169-213.
42. Orne, "Problems and Research Areas," Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, *Medical Uses of Hypnosis*, Symposium no. 8 (New York: 1962), p. 676-679. Hereafter cited as *Symposium no. 8*.
43. Schein, p. 196f.
44. Robert J. Lifton, *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism* (New York: Norton, 1961), p. 30, especially "Father Simon: the Converted Jesuit," p. 207-221. Also, Schein, p. 140-144.
45. Alan F. Westin, *Privacy and Freedom* (New York: Atheneum, 1967), p. 211-213.
46. R.C. Davis, "Physiological Responses as a Means of Evaluating Information," Biderman and Zimmer, eds., p. 166. Cf. Burke M. Smith, "The Polygraph," *Scientific American*, January 1967, p. 25-31.
47. Geneva Conventions, articles 29-31.
48. Biderman, *March*, p. 91-113; Fall, *Hell in a Very Small Place*, p. 238, and *Street without Joy*, p. 294f. Present-day Hanoi propaganda broadcasts continuously allege good medical treatment of captives.
49. Biderman and Zimmer, eds., p. 41.
50. Biderman, *March*, p. 131-135.
51. Kinkad, p. 15ff.
52. Biderman and Zimmer, eds., p. 43.
53. Biderman, "Social-Psychological Needs," p. 138f.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 125.
55. Sykes, p. 87-90.

IV-PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESS ON THE CAPTIVE

1. Cf. Biderman, *March*, p. 19-21; William F. Dean, *General Dean's Story* (New York: Viking Press, 1954), p. 159-161. An interesting formulation in one psychoanalytical approach: the captive most driven to evade capture initially, or escape after capture, is also the one most likely to choose suicide in the event of failure of the first two. J.C. Moloney, "Psychic Self Abandon and Extortion of Confession," *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, v. XXXVI, p. 53-60, cited in Schein.
2. Erving Goffman, "Characteristics of Total Institutions," Stein, et al., eds. p. 454. Also, Schein, p. 271.
3. For an insight into what this may mean to a middle-class American, the reader is referred to Alexander Kira, *The Bathroom*, especially chapter I and the section, "Social and Psychological Aspects" (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, Center for Housing and Experimental Studies, 1966).
4. Louis J. West, adapting Alhert D. Biderman, "United States Air Force Prisoners of the Chinese Communists," *Symposium no. 4*, p. 279.
5. Schein, p. 140-156.
6. See any one of the confessions cited in the Vietnam history of prisoners, *supra*, chapter II.
7. John W. Clifford, *In the Presence of My Enemies* (New York: Norton, 1963); Kurt Becker, *I Met a Traveller: the Triumph of Father Phillips* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, 1958). Father Phillips details how his thoughts of capitulation provoked a guilt which was used in turn against giving in. Also, Biderman, *March*, p. 138f.
8. Biderman, *March*, p. 236f.
9. Robert J. Lifton, "Psychiatric Aspects of Chinese Communist Thought Reform," *Symposium no. 4*, p. 246.
10. Schein, p. 156.
11. Cf. Sykes, especially "The Pains of Imprisonment," p. 63-83.
12. Edgar H. Schein, "Patterns of Reactions to Severe Chronic Stress in American Army Prisoners of War of the Chinese," *Symposium no. 4*, p. 257.
13. *Symposium no. 4*, p. 279.
14. Schein, *Coercive Persuasion*, p. 130f.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 223-227. For a classical approach in terms of id, ego, and superego, cf. Eric Erickson, *Identity, Youth and Crisis* (New York: Norton, 1968), p. 216-224.
16. *Symposium no. 4*, p. 250; Biderman and Zimmer, eds., p. 286-288.
17. *Supra*, chapter I; "U.S. Prisoners in North Vietnam," *Life*, 20 October 1967, p. 21ff and cover.
18. *Symposium no. 4*, p. 259; Schein, *Coercive Persuasion*, p. 225-228.

19. Clifford, p. 93-112; *Symposium no. 4*, p. 274-278, Van Altena, p. 37-50. Also, William Tuohy, "A Big 'Dirty Little War,'" *The New York Times Magazine*, 28 November 1965, p. 32ff. Cf. article 13, Geneva Conventions, ¶189, *The Law of Land Warfare*. The Conventions use the term "intimidation."

20. 10 USCA §904,905.

21. Biderman and Zimmer, eds., p. 37-39.

22. Stein, et al., eds., p. 456f.

23. *Code of Conduct*, article III.

24. *Symposium no. 4*, p. 279. "Spy" literature is replete with the opposition's resort to sex as an effective coercive agent to gain collaboration. In the case of POW's, the record is remarkable in the agreement that exigencies of the captive situation bring about an almost total apathy toward this powerful drive. Bettelheim notes, however, that in Nazi prison camps regression to masturbatory and, to a lesser extent, homosexual practices by many prisoners represented an effort to sustain a self-image of potency, whose loss was feared. Bruno Bettelheim, *The Informed Heart* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960), p. 198f.

25. Cf. Schein, p. 202f, 233-237; 117-139; *Symposium no. 4*, p. 234-249.

26. Biderman, *March*, p. 258.

27. *Symposium no. 4*, p. 260; Biderman, *loc cit*.

V-INTERACTION: CAPTIVE, SELF, AND CAPTOR

1. The reasons for this state of affairs are discussed in Biderman's "Interment and Custody."

2. Schein, *Coercive Persuasion*, p. 117-139; 195-256. What follows here is derivative of Schein's model and exposition of a composite theory of coercive persuasion.

3. Biderman and Zimmer, eds., p. 285-293.

4. This approach finds some substantiation in history. Considering the large-scale attempts at "brainwashing" in Korea, a remarkably small number of captives was ideologically won over by Communist overtures. In such cases the POW's almost always had contact with fellow resisters. Mainland China's thought-reform programs saw the captive placed in a cell with prisoners who had already been converted and the captive was not allowed intercourse with any who would confirm his resisting role. Chinese attempts at thought reform was strikingly successful, those of the Chinese in Korea, not. Cf. Lifton, *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism*, *passim*; Biderman, *March*, p. 142.

5. Schein, *Coercive Persuasion*, p. 235.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 236. Cf. Lifton, *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism*, p. 65-85.

7. Arthur J. Vidich and Maurice R. Stein, "The Dissolved Identity in Military Life," Stein, et al., eds., p. 493-506.

8. David Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950).

9. *Code of Conduct*, articles I-VI.

10. George J. McCall and J.L. Simmons, *Identities and Interactions* (New York: Free Press, 1966), p. 95. The outline of the various modes of legitimation are taken from pages 95-101.

11. Biderman, "Social Psychological Needs," p. 130.

12. Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (New York: Scribner, 1960), p. xi.

13. *Symposium no. 4*, p. 281-283. Also, Harold G. Wolff, "Every Man Has His Breaking Point," *Military Medicine*, February 1960, p. 85-104. Cf. Morris Janowitz, *Sociology and the Military Establishment*, rev. ed. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1965), p. 94-97.

14. Biderman, "Social-Psychological Needs," p. 120-147.

15. Erving Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1959), p. 10, cited in Biderman, "Social-Psychological Needs."

16. Biderman, "Social-Psychological Needs," p. 127-132. Cf. Bettelheim, *Informed Heart*, *passim*, especially chapter V, "Behavior in Extreme Situations: Defenses," p. 177-235.

17. *Ibid.*, citing "Misconduct in the Prison Camp: a Survey of the Law and an Analysis of the Korean Cases," *Columbia Law Review*, 1956, 61, 709-794. Cf. article V of the Code. While the Code recognizes the possibility that some may go beyond the name, rank, serial number, date of birth proscription ("evade answering further questions to the best of my ability"), the injunction against disloyal oral or written statements is absolute. Cf. DOD Directive 1300.7.

18. Kinkad, p. 86ff. Cf. Albert D. Biderman, *Captivity Love and Behavior in Captivity*, U.S. Air Force Research Report 65-0577 (Washington: 1965), p. 223f.

19. Paret, p. 59-64. Cf. Vo-nguyen-Giap, *People's War, People's Army* (Hanoi, n.p., n.d.), p. 127f.

20. See, for example, "Letter from Lieutenant Commander [Name] to Mrs. [Name]" dated 1 March 1966, cited in Russell, p. 158; "Captured U.S. Pilots Hail Ho's 'Kind Policy,'" *FBIS*, 23 May 1966, p. jji 25.

21. "Text of Letter Attributed to Pueblo Men," *The New York Times*, 5 March 1968, p. C5:3.

22. Biderman, "Social Psychological Needs, p. 141. Also, K. Riezler, "The Social Psychology of Fear," Stein, et al., eds., p. 150f.

23. Janowitz, p. 95f. Also, S.L.A. Marshall, *The Officer as a Leader* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 1966), p. 37-50.

24. See, for instance, P.E. Kubzansky, "The Effects of Reduced Environmental Stimulation on Human Behavior," Biderman and Zimmer, eds., p. 90.

25. DOD Directive 1300.7, ¶V, §C; U.S. Dept. of the Air Force film, *Communist Indoctrination Techniques*, Air Force Training Film SFP-1170, n.d.

26. "He Who Dies Resisting," *U.S. Fighting Man's Code*, p. 78f.

VI-CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The disparities in national and individual images vis-a-vis identities explored in Daniel Boorstin, *The Image* (New York: Atheneum, 1961), suggest the type of insight that might be required in the dialectic mentioned.

2. Ronald Hopwood, R.N., "The Laws of the Navy," Leland P. Lovette, ed., *Naval Customs, Traditions, and Usage*, 4th ed. (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1959), p. 314.

3. Daniel V. Gallery, "We Can Baffle the Brainwashers," *The Saturday Evening Post*, 22 January 1955, p. 20-94.

4. See Vietnam footnotes, *passim*, this paper. Also: coverage of Hanoi-released interview with captured U.S. Navy pilot, *CBS Evening News with Walter Cronkite*, 13 February 1968; "U.S. Prisoners in North Vietnam," *Life*, 20 October 1967, cover and p. 21-34b; Hanoi-originated film depicting good treatment of prisoners, *The Huntley-Brinkley Report*, *NBC News*, 16 October 1967. For the protesting reader who discounts such reports as propaganda, the charge may be turned upside down. Rhetoric should not discount the possibility that they are also partially true. The model suggests that they are.

5. DOD Directive 1300.7 provides that the serviceman will be instructed "... in Prisoner of War Camp Organization, to include a need for overt and covert systems of organization; the physical and mental aspects of captivity with respect to survival techniques and well being." ¶II, §B.(4).

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
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To endure is greater than to dare; to tire out hostile fortune; to be
daunted by no difficulty; to keep heart when all have lost it . . .

W.M. Thackeray: The Virginians, 1857

DEFINING AGGRESSION-- UNITED STATES POLICY



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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the position of the United States in opposing the adoption by the United Nations of a definition of aggression.

Several related factors are considered germane to a discussion of the problem as it is stated. First, the position of the United States regarding the criminality of aggressive war is examined in order that the moral position of the United States can be determined. It is not considered within the scope of this treatment to address the question of the legality of aggressive war, but merely to

consider the policy espoused by the United States on the subject.

In an attempt to provide an overview of the multitudinous definitions extant in the world community, a short resume of the early definitions is presented together with representative examples of the two major types of definition. No attempt is made to deal extensively with the vagaries of the many definitions promoted by the individual nations of the world.

The Soviet definition presents the greatest departure from the norms of current practice in the United Nations and appears to be currently favored by a rather large percentage of the United

Nations membership. In order to appreciate the potential effect upon U.S. policies, past and present, the substance of the definition is considered in juxtaposition to both the general nature of U.S. foreign policy actions and to specific examples of past episodes involving the international use of force by the United States.

Finally, an attempt is made to illustrate how the application of the elements of the Soviet definition in cases of suspected aggression may operate against the interests of the United States within the United Nations.

I--AN OLD ISSUE REVISITED

The Soviet Resolution. In December 1967 the 22d United Nations General Assembly considered a resolution, submitted by the Soviet Union, which again placed the question of defining aggression before the United Nations:

Convinced that a primary problem confronting the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace remains the strengthening of the will of States to respect all obligations under the Charter,

Considering that there is a widespread conviction that a definition of aggression would have considerable importance for the maintenance of international peace and for the adoption of effective measures under the Charter for preventing acts of aggression,

Noting that there is still no generally recognized definition of aggression,

1. *Recognizes* that there is a widespread conviction of the need to expedite the definition of aggression;

2. *Establishes* a Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, composed of thirty-five Member States to be appointed by the President of the General Assembly, taking into consideration the principles of equitable geographical representation and the necessity that the principal legal systems of the world should be represented;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the Special Committee with the necessary facilities and services;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its twenty-third ses-

sion the item entitled "Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression."¹

A letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. had proposed inclusion of the resolution on the agenda. This letter contained a series of statements that smacked of the usual Soviet propaganda, but to many nations of the world community the proposals seemed to reflect an accurate exposition of the problems weighing upon the conscience of the "law-abiding" nation-states. The Soviets proclaimed "... of late, there have been increasing instances of the use of armed force to commit acts of aggression against sovereign States and to crush peoples struggling against colonialism and for freedom and independence." The Russians continued by stating that acts of aggression were undermining peace and security and increasing the danger of the outbreak of a new world conflict. "In conjunction with the vigorous condemnation of aggression and the adoption of measures preventing it, the formulation of a definition of aggression could, particularly in the present international situation, make an important contribution to the cause of peace." The proposed definition would be "a stern reminder to the forces of aggression and war that they bear responsibility for violating international peace."²

In the debate that followed, the Soviet delegate noted with regret that in previous United Nations sessions the adoption of the Soviet draft definition of aggression had been blocked by the United States and added, "Had there been a universally recognized definition of aggression, the American interventionists would find it far more difficult to mask their crimes in Viet Nam ..." since Vietnam was in no position to pose a threat to the security of the United States. The Soviet representative pointed out that his country had been a champion of a clear-cut definition of aggression since the Dumbarton Oaks

Conference. Several countries, he continued, had thwarted the good intentions of the Soviet Union in order to further their own selfish interests of intervention in the affairs of other countries and trying to suppress the people's wars of liberation.³

A total of 28 nations entered the subsequent debate on the subject. The Soviet satellites added their usual iteration of the party line, but, in addition, many other delegates to the assembly spoke out in favor of the Soviet resolution. A brief summary of some aspects of the debate illustrating typical arguments is presented below.

Africa. Algeria argued that it was essential to define the general principles of the Charter more closely and added that international tension had been artificially created to block the advance of colonial peoples to independence. This situation had led to major conflicts such as in the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, and the Middle East. Any policy which rewarded the aggressor, according to the Algerian delegate, would spell the suicide of the United Nations. The Algerian argument ended by pointing out that the definition of aggression would complete the listing of principles of international law dealing with and governing friendly relations and cooperation.⁴

The Democratic Republic of the Congo also favored definition, but they felt that any attempt would be inadequate unless it included prohibition of forms of aggression such as propaganda and assistance to armed rebel bands operating against another State, as well as pressure on the State and passive or active assistance to armed rebel bands operating against the political or economic institutions of the State or against its natural resources.⁵ The Soviet definition, discussed in Chapter III, provides criteria referred to by the Congolese delegation.

Liberia, too, favored a definition,

even though past efforts had proved fruitless. The delegate added that since the last attempt was made, in 1957, the membership of the United Nations had increased appreciably and should provide a better environment for defining aggression.⁶

The Middle East. The representative of Iran argued for the definition and enumerated two principles that had prompted the earlier quests for definition: first, to universalize the principles of the Nuremberg trials; and second, to strengthen the basis of judgment employed by the organization for the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security. He continued by noting that although the search for definition had lain dormant for several years, the General Assembly and Security Council had both entered upon paths which were more likely to lead to an acceptable and feasible definition.⁷ The Iraqi delegation adopted a policy of wholehearted endorsement of the Soviet resolution which could provide a key to preventing the erosion and collapse of international order, if it might lead to an acceptable and precise definition of aggression. The Syrian Arab Republic voiced similar sentiments, adding that arguments against the proposal were a reflection of the desire for certain powers to safeguard their selfish interests and to ensure that force would prevail over law.⁸

The representative of Afghanistan said that a definition would help the Security Council in its deliberations.

Asia. India welcomed the initiative of the Soviet Union in bringing the matter before the United Nations, pointing out that collective security was vital to the smaller nations, and everything possible must be done to strengthen the system. The definition of aggression would be, according to the Indian delegate, a worthwhile step in that direction. The Indians felt that the reason the 1957 definition was not adopted was to pro-

vide the many new members of the organization an opportunity to consider the matter and offer their views. The time had now come for resuming work on a definition of aggression.⁹

Cambodia presented an argument similar to that of India, but noted that the lack of a definition enabled the United States to perpetrate crimes all over the world against those who dared to reject its domination.¹⁰ The Philippines favored adoption of an objective definition and urged the Assembly to move ahead with the task. Thailand indicated that a definition would be beneficial but doubted that the time was right for an attempt, and China also spoke out against definition.

Western Hemisphere. The representative of Mexico said his government had always held that a definition of aggression was legally and technically feasible, and the result would be useful and appropriate. The delegation announced that a definite decision on the question could be taken up at the 24th Session.¹¹ Cuba echoed the Soviet contention that a definition was being blocked by states engaged in aggression and who were not interested in anything which might contribute to its condemnation.

The United States Stands Alone. The U.S. representative argued that since his delegation surmised that the Soviet item was pure propaganda, he had opposed the proposal. The delegate then pointed out that our involvement in Vietnam was in the role of a defender against aggression and that the United States had proposed that the matter be debated in the Security Council. In contrast to its stated benevolent concern for world order, the U.S.S.R. had embarked on a program of aggression commencing in 1933 with the incorporation of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia into the Soviet Union. This was followed by the subversion of Czechoslovakia in 1948, the aiding and abetting

of the Korean invasion of 1950, and the suppression of a free government of Hungary in 1956. All of these aggressive actions were perpetrated by a nation which had since 1933 favored an international definition of aggression. The United States closed its argument by stating that it would be glad to discuss the Soviet proposal in the proper forum, which was not the General Assembly, but in the Sixth Committee.

Considering the entire debate, a total of 22 nations spoke out in favor of the Soviet proposal to pursue the quest for defining aggression and were generally in favor of the Soviet draft definition. Of those who entered the debate, an additional eight favored definition but preferred a broader abstract definition, and one preferred a more comprehensive version of the Russian proposal. A total of only six nations, the United States, United Kingdom, China, Norway, Canada, and Australia spoke out against definition.

In the General Assembly vote on the Soviet proposal an overwhelming majority of 90 nations voted for the resolution--18 abstained from voting--and a single nation, the United States, voted against adoption of the measure.

The implications of this vote, although dramatic, do not necessarily suggest that the United States is unequivocally opposed to discussions of the definition of aggression, but emphasize the fact that the U.S. policy has generally been oriented against the Soviet policy of pressing for a definition of aggression.

This latest incident in the General Assembly does serve to revivify the continuing clash of Soviet and United States interests in the political and legal aspects of defining aggression and again opens the question of whether the U.S. policy, in the context of the current world situation, is valid in opposing, almost singlehandedly, the proposed Soviet definition of aggression.

II-CRIMINALITY OF AGGRESSIVE WAR-- THE UNITED STATES POLICY

In addressing the question of formally defining aggression in the context of the larger foreign policy of the United States, it is first necessary to examine the question of aggressive war and the U.S. policy on that subject. In general, United Nations actions are recommendatory in nature and not binding on the parties involved. This is particularly true in the case of permanent members of the Security Council, since the only action that could be taken against them, assuming the use of the veto power, would be by the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution:

[The United Nations] provides for the organization of collective force to frustrate aggression whenever the great powers are unanimously disposed to support such action; but it does not create an enforcement mechanism capable of being used to control great powers or states backed by great powers.¹

Even though sanctions could not be forced on the United States by the Assembly, the U.S. Government has consistently maintained the position, at least on the surface, that it must be "morally" correct in international dealings. As the principal driving force in the founding and nurturing of the organization, the United States must maintain an appearance of allegiance to the principles and goals of its Charter. Secretary of State Rusk defined our concepts of U.S. policy in the United Nations by stating that our goals, in part, were "Security through Strength: to deter or defeat aggression at any level, whether of nuclear attack or limited war or subversion and guerilla tactics," and "Community under Law: to assist in the gradual emergence of a genuine world community, based on cooperation and law . . ."²

President Johnson enunciated the

official view of the United States when he stated, "We support the United Nations as the best instrument yet devised to promote the peace of the world . . ."³

Since the United States is firmly committed to upholding the purposes of the United Nations, a definition of aggression could have serious implications in the conduct of its foreign policy if, in fact, the United States has established a firm policy on the outlawing of wars of aggression. Although many individual statements of Government officials have alluded to a denunciation of aggressive war, a brief examination of the background and chronology of events germane to the matter will establish a more definite determination of U.S. policy. The criminality of aggressive war is a subject of continuing discussion by the world legal community, and the legal aspects of a definition are not within the scope of this treatment. The subject can be approached, however, from a discussion of the record of the United States in matters involving aggressive war and as evidenced by policy pronouncements.

Prior to the 20th century, the United States maintained a relatively dormant posture on the consideration of the criminality of aggressive war. The lack of early interest was not founded on a lack of experience in warfare. As pointed out by Quincy Wright, "The United States, which has, perhaps somewhat unjustifiably, prided itself on its peacefulness, has had only twenty years during its entire history when its army or navy has not been in active operation during some days, somewhere."⁴

Perhaps the first steps in the manifestation of official U.S. policy on the subject were the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the Geneva Conventions of 1929. These conventions made no attempts at delimitation of the legal aspects of war itself. But the nations did agree "before an appeal to arms . . . to

have recourse, as far as circumstances allow, to the good offices or mediation of one or more friendly powers."⁵ The humanitarian principles set forth in the treaties were definite first steps toward the eventual prohibition of aggressive war as an element of U.S. policy.

In 1928 the United States made two significant moves toward the denunciation of aggressive war. In February a resolution of 21 American Republics, including the United States, resolved at the Sixth (Havana) Pan-American Conference that "...war of aggression constitutes an international crime against the human species."⁶ More importantly, the Pact of Paris, better known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact, signed on 27 August 1928 by the United States, Great Britain, Germany, France, Japan, Italy, Poland, Belgium, and later by a total of 63 nations, provided a seemingly definitive concrete condemnation to war and called upon all parties to "renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations to one another."⁷

Henry L. Stimson, U.S. Secretary of State and an internationally respected lawyer, in 1932 enunciated the American interpretation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact:

War between nations was renounced by the signatories of the Briand-Kellogg Treaty. This means that it has become illegal throughout practically the entire world. It is no longer to be the source and subject of rights. It is no longer to be the principle around which the duties, the conduct, and the rights of nations revolve. It is an illegal thing. Hereafter when two nations engage in armed conflict either one or both of them must be wrong-doers-violators of this general treaty law. We no longer draw a circle about them and treat them with the punctilios of the duelist's code. Instead, we denounce them as law-breakers. By that very act, we have made obsolete many legal precedents and have given the legal profession the task of reexamining many of its codes and treaties.⁸

The legislative branch of the United

States had previously committed itself to the outlawry of war when on 12 December 1927 the Senate adopted a resolution introduced by Senator William E. Borah which contained the dictum, "that is the view of the Senate of the United States that war between nations should be outlawed as an institution or means of settlement of international controversies by making it a public crime under the law of nations."⁹

The interpretation of Secretary Stimson and Senator Borah was by no means universal. The world legal community did not unanimously consider the pact as an international criminal code. Mr. Kellogg implies that the treaty bearing his name gives the nations involved the right to determine their own guilt or innocence in matters involving a violation of the treaty: "Every nation is free at all times and regardless of treaty provisions to defend its territory from attack or invasion, and it alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in self-defense."¹⁰

The general disagreement over the viability of the pact as a source of law centered on the lack of sanctions in the system to deal with violators of the pact. The sanction of world opinion was not considered adequate in giving the pact the characteristics requisite of a substantive element of the law of nations. Lauterpacht held that "This 'epoch-making' document [the Kellogg-Briand Pact] thus could not really be of any legal significance for the future validity of the law of neutrality; there were not even any technical difficulties arising from it in this connection."¹¹

The International Law Association, in recognition of the divergent opinions of international legal scholars and, in particular, the concern of the United States over the lack of definitive enforcement measures intrinsic to the pact, adopted a series of resolutions at its conference in Budapest on 10 Sep-

tember 1934. These resolutions are known as the "Budapest Articles of Interpretation." They read in part:

(2) A signatory State which threatens to resort to armed force for the solution of an international dispute or conflict is guilty of a violation of the Pact.

(4) In the event of a violation of the Pact by a resort to armed force or war by one signatory State against another, the other States may, without thereby committing a breach of the Pact or of any rule of International Law, do all or any of the following things:-

(a) Refuse to admit the exercise by the State violating the pact of belligerent rights, such as visit and search, blockade, etc.

(b) Decline to observe towards the State violating the pact the duties prescribed by International Law, apart from the pact, for a neutral in relation to a belligerent;

(c) Supply the State attacked with financial or material assistance, including munitions of war;

(d) Assist with armed forces the State attacked.¹²

These interpretations tended to solidify the substance of the pact and enforced the U.S. policy proscribing international use of force.

Prior to the advent of World War II, the policy of the United States regarding the criminality of war was well established, and the legal content of the policy was extended to the addressing of the legal ramifications of aid to victims of aggression. Naturally, the United States adopted the philosophy that since wars of aggression were repugnant to the international community, aid to the victims was a logical reaction of the government. The general policy as stated by Robert H. Jackson, then Attorney General of the United States, was:

Present aggressive wars are civil wars against the international community. Accordingly, as responsible members of that community, we can treat victims of aggression in the same way we treat legitimate governments when there is civil strife and a state of

insurgency--that is to say, we are permitted to give to defending governments all the aid we choose.¹³

Mr. Stimson, Secretary of War at that time, testifying before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs with respect to the proposed lend-lease bill, pointed out that the United States was primarily responsible for the increasing recognition of the criminality of aggressive war, but added that "... It has not been recognized ... by these Houses of Congress here that were the parents of it, what a vital change was made in the system of international law by that action." The significance of the U.S. leadership against aggressive war was not largely appreciated by Congress or the public.¹⁴

World War II and its widespread destruction gave renewed impetus to the need for a true international world legal system with potent international organization to maintain the force of law over the law of force. The loss of life from all sources during World War II was estimated to be over 60 million.¹⁵ Certainly the advent of nuclear weapons assured a potential population destruction increase of at least an order of magnitude in the "next" general war.

The legal aftermath of the Second World War was initiated by the precedent-setting Nuremberg trials. It should be noted, however, that the punishment of defeated leaders was not "illegal" or without precedent. In 405 B.C. the Lacedaemonian Admiral Lysander, after the destruction of the Athenian Fleet, called his allies together to determine the fate of his prisoners. The council of allies was similar to a court which heard witnesses and examined the evidence before arriving at a judgment and sentence. All prisoners, except one, were sentenced to death.

The precedent of the Nuremberg trials was the attempt to establish a substantive rule of law, making aggressive war a crime for which individuals could be held accountable and pun-

ished. This had the effect of establishing in world opinion the principle that justice and law had triumphed over the law of force. The promise of Winston Churchill, made on 8 September 1942, was destined to be consummated by the Nuremberg trials:

... Those who are *guilty* of Nazi *crimes* will have to stand up before *tribunals* in every land where the atrocities have been committed, in order that an indelible warning may be given to future ages and that successive generations of men may say, "So perish all who do the like again."¹⁶ [Emphasis supplied]

The Nuremberg tribunal and its charter provided the United States with an impressive step forward in its quest to codify the criminality of war. The United States chose as its chief representative Robert H. Jackson, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and former Attorney General, who had long been a proponent of increased emphasis on codification of the criminal aspects of war. In an address to the Inter-American Bar Association at Havana on 27 March 1947, Mr. Jackson as Attorney General said:

... No longer can it be argued that the civilized world must behave with rigid impartiality toward both an aggressor in violation of the treaty and the victims of unprovoked attack. We need not now be indifferent as between the worse and the better cause, nor deal with the just and the unjust alike.¹⁷

Mr. Jackson had rather broad official guidelines for his task as U.S. Representative to the International Conference on Military Trials which commenced in June 1945. The guidelines included (1) The Moscow Declaration, which formed the immediate basis for the establishment of the International Military Tribunal, and the charter. This declaration established the general guidelines for the trials and made provisions to try major war criminals, not in national courts, but by "joint decision" of allied governments; and (2) the Yalta Memo-

randum, addressed to the President of the United States, which established U.S. overall policies and guidelines in the conduct of war crimes trials. It included delineation of the crime to be considered by the tribunal and provided a base date of 1933 as the beginning of German criminal actions. The memorandum also included guidelines for selecting and identifying those to be punished and the difficulties that might be encountered in identification. The document ended with a recommended program for trying the criminals. Of particular importance is the emphasis on the aspect of making an authentic record of German crimes.

In the proceedings of the conference the U.S. representative adopted a singular policy: to make the charter of the International Military Tribunal and the proceedings of the trials themselves stand as a massive framework for the development and codification of substantive international criminal law. The Russian delegate, Gen. I.T. Nikitchenko, adopted the philosophy that trials were of a purely ephemeral nature, designed to inflict summary punishment on the beaten Nazis. In the deliberations on the language of the charter, Nikitchenko made the following pronouncement regarding the U.S. proposal for the definition of war criminals: "In my opinion we should not try to draw up this definition for the future..."¹⁸

His general opinion regarding the legal substance of the charter, so important to Justice Jackson, is indicated in this statement of the Russian: "The fact that the Nazi leaders are criminals has already been established. The task of the Tribunal is only to determine the measure of guilt of each particular person and mete out the necessary punishment--the sentences."¹⁹

Professor A.N. Trainin, of the Soviet delegation, also believed that the consideration of the conference should be limited to the task at hand and not be concerned with providing future guid-

ance for international lawyers: "There might come a time when there will be a permanent international tribunal of the United Nations organization, but this tribunal has a definite purpose in view, that is, to try criminals of the European Axis powers . . ."20

The French delegation, headed by Judge Robert Falco, generally adopted a policy of not accepting the principle of law that aggressive war constituted a defined criminal action. Professor Andre Gros, the assistant representative of France, set forth the basis of the French position when he said, "We do not consider as a criminal violation the launching of a war of aggression."²¹ In contrast to the United States, the Frenchmen did not desire to be associated with an attempt to formulate international law. The French representative pointed out that "We are not declaring a new principle of international law. We are just declaring we are going to punish those responsible for criminal acts."²²

The British representative, Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, succinctly stated the position of his government in this statement,

The question comes to this: whether it is right or desirable to accept the position that a war of aggression is a crime. It seems to be agreed that it is. The fundamental difficulty is the lack of sanction. More strictly it may be said that it is accepted as a crime without declared punishment or any declared sanction against it.²³

This position was essentially parallel to that of the United States, and this parallelism was generally observed throughout the whole of the deliberations.

Mr. Justice Jackson, during the forming of the charter, maintained his insistence that the results of their efforts would fulfill the dual role of establishing the guilt and setting the punishment of the Nazi hierarchy and of providing future legalists with a carefully prepared source of law reflecting the policy of

the United States. He further emphasized the orientation of the United States by noting, "Our attitude as a nation, in a number of transactions, was based on the proposition that this [war] was an illegal war from the moment that it was started . . ."24

In his report to President Truman, Justice Jackson summarized his position concerning the development of law using the charter as a vehicle for establishing the criminality of aggressive war:

This Pact constitutes only one in a series of acts which have reversed the viewpoint that all war is legal and have brought international law into harmony with the common sense of mankind, that unjustifiable war is a crime . . . Any legal position asserted on behalf of the United States will have considerable significance in the future evolution of international law.²⁵

The United States, a major participant in the drafting of the United Nations Charter, continued its position as a salient force in the quest for establishing a legal basis for the outlawing of aggressive war. The provisions of the charter very nearly approach, at least theoretically, the complete subjugation of aggressive war to the international community. Signatories to the charter are bound to "settle their international disputes by peaceful means" and to "refrain in their international relations from the threat of use of force . . ."26

The Security Council was entrusted with the power to react, with the use of force if necessary, to "any threat to the peace, breach of peace or acts of aggression."²⁷

In summary, the policy of the United States during the 20th century has been one of continuing to press for recognition of the initiation of wars of aggression as an international crime. Our position was particularly strong during the deliberations for the development of the charter for the International Military Tribunal, even though other partici-

pants in the negotiations--Russia and France--adopted a philosophy that the universal denunciation of aggressive war as an international crime was not in consonance with the "facts of life" extant in the world political community.

III-DEFINITIONS OF AGGRESSION

In Chapter II the policy of the United States regarding the illegality of aggressive war was surveyed, disclosing a continuing effort to preclude the legal use of force in the cause of aggression. The difficulties in characterizing the concept of aggression and in defining exactly *who* is the aggressor in a singular episode have paralleled the development of the concept of outlawing aggressive war.

The paradoxical nature of the problem can be illustrated by considering that in spite of apparent agreement among world leaders on the principle that aggressive war is a crime to be condemned by international law, the buildup of arms throughout the world has continued at an unprecedented pace, and an almost continuous parade of armed conflicts have transited the pages of history in recent decades. The imbroglio has arisen from the fact that the effects of agreement on the principle have been negated by a widespread disagreement as to the meaning of "aggression." No definition of the term has ever been accepted by the policymakers of the international community, and each "side" believes the other will couch its aggressive overtures in terms of repelling the aggressive designs of the "other side."

It is not a case of failing to attempt to arrive at a universal agreement on the exact definition of aggression, but is rather that the continuing process has met with frustration because of the wide divergence of opinion on the avenues of approach to the final product. Generally speaking, the world com-

munity is polarized on the subject, one camp being the "definers," the other the "nondefiners." The "definers" are further divided within their own group, as will be discussed in Chapter IV. In the critical matter of defining aggression, the policy of the United States has been of an ambivalent nature, initially on the side of the "definers" during the pre-United Nations period, then leading the "nondefiners" in the United Nations deliberations. A review of the development of the circumstances leading to the current stalemate among diplomats and jurists must necessarily precede an attempt to establish the desirability of a definition of aggression in the context of the U.S. position as a world "super-power."

Early Views on War and Aggression.

War and the use of force have been an integral part of life on this planet since before the appearance of man and have only recently been considered to be violations of legal order. Animal warfare probably began well before the Paleozoic Era as competition between the cytoplasmic cells for the necessities of survival. As the sophistication of life forms rose to the higher levels of true animal life, so did the methods and techniques of warfare. The use of force in the animal world can generally be considered to arise from rivalry for possession of some external object, from intrusion of a stranger in the group, or from frustration of activity.¹ These basic causes of "war" among animals remain in the legacy of man, but the arrival of man and his amazing intellectual capacity have added to the causative factors leading to the use of violence. Primitive man generally fell into four degrees of militancy:

... [1] the most unwarlike peoples who fight only in defense; [2] the moderately warlike who fight for sport, ritual, revenge, personal prestige, or other social purpose; [3] the more warlike who fight for economic purposes (raids on herds, extension of

grazing lands, booty, slaves); and [4] the most warlike of all who, in addition, fight for political purposes (extension of empire, political prestige, maintenance of authority of rulers).²

As man became more civilized, the causes of war remained rather stable, but the techniques improved, and the impact of war became more universal in nature. In addition, war became the subject of intellectual exercises peculiar to the human race, which leads to the consideration of the problem of defining aggressive war and formulating rules for the identification of the aggressor in a particular conflict.

Early Definitions. The question of differentiating the "guilty" and the "innocent" parties in cases involving the use of international force has been considered by jurists of the world for centuries. Belli, in 1563, considered war illegal "unless there is need for defense."³ Grotius, in his definition, considered an aggressive attack one "...launched with criminal objectives, e.g. murder, pillage, robbery, etc."⁴

In 1650, 25 years after Grotius enunciated his definition, Richard Zouche said of war, "...a lawful contention, that is, a contention moved by legitimate authority and for a lawful cause."⁵ He then delineated the causes which he considered lawful, "A lawful cause is an injury which it is allowed both to avenge and to repel, whence a war is said to be either of offense, or of defense; as Camillus in a declaration to the Gauls said, 'All things which heaven allows us to defend, it allows us to reclaim and to avenge.'"⁶

Toward the end of the 18th century, Christian Wolff in his book *Jus Gentum Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum* considered the question of establishing a rule for making a distinction between a "just" and an "unjust" war. He described three basic situations, any one of which could provide the basis for a "just" war. They were "(1) The attainment of one's own or that which ought

to be one's own, (2) the establishing of security, (3) the preventing of threatened danger or the warding off of injury,"⁷ thus providing the perennial "loophole" for a potential aggressor to wage war in the guise of "preventing threatened danger." Bynkershoek, a contemporary of Wolff, wrote that in his view only two causes could be considered grounds for labeling a war nonaggressive, "...defense or the recovery of one's own."⁸

In the same period other writers considered that any attempt to define the "aggressor" or unjust party to a war was meaningless. In particular, Hobbes said "in a war of all against all it is logical that nothing can be called unjust,"⁹ and Hall contended that "...both parties to every war are regarded as being in identical legal positions, and consequently as being possessed of equal rights."¹⁰ The comments of Hall generally reflected the mien of the 19th century when war and aggression were generally considered to be outside the realm of justice and international law.

Modern Definitions. Contrasted to the early writers, who attempted to define the just party in a contention involving force, the 20th century legalists have approached the problem of determining the unjust party--or the "aggressor." Probably the earliest example of a large group of states agreeing upon restrictions to war was the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Conflicts at the First Hague Conference of 1899, where the signatories agreed to attempt mediation measures before recourse to arms.¹¹

League of Nations. Only one reference to "aggression" was made in the Covenant of the League of Nations, in article 10, which provided:

The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence

of all members of the League. In case of any such aggression the council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.¹²

The covenant, although calling upon its members to preserve the integrity of other members against aggression, did not specifically prohibit war if the correct "procedures" were followed. More specifically, war was allowed if certain delays, specified in article 12, had been observed; if the council could not attain unanimous agreement under article 15; or if the war were waged against an adversary who had not accepted the unanimous recommendation of the council.

Even though the League of Nations did not provide a blanket ban on aggressive war, member states were called upon to suppress aggression under the advice of the council. The interpretation of exactly what constituted the aggression of the covenant became the subject of concern in the international community. As professor Sohn has written, "No civilized system of law is satisfied with a general prohibition of 'acts violating the interests of other persons,' but tries to enumerate the prohibited acts [trespass, larceny, murder] and to define in more precise terms the aggravating and attenuating circumstances resulting in higher or lower punishment."¹³

The Pact of Paris (Briand-Kellogg Pact) for the Denunciation of War as an Instrument of Policy decisively outlawed, by implication, aggressive war and provided additional impetus to the moves toward defining aggression.

During the League's later years several attempts were made to formally define aggression, beginning with the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which in its definition of aggression included "a resort to war in violation of the undertakings contained in the Covenant." A different and more rigorous form of a definition was introduced by the Soviet Union at the Disarmament Conference

of 1933. This definition, with very minor variations and additions, survived the succeeding 35 years with neither complete rejection nor adoption by the world community. This Soviet definition of 1933 is almost identical to the one submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1953 and will not be quoted in detail at this point. It did, however, list five acts that would be considered as branding the first to commit as an aggressor--(1) Declaration of war against another State, (2) Invasion of another State without a declaration of war, (3) Bombardment of another State or attacking its land or sea forces, (4) Landing of forces within the territory of another State without permission or if permission was granted, failing to withdraw on request, and (5) Naval blockade of another State. This early definition failed to include the sixth act, which did appear in postwar Soviet definitions--the support of armed bands organized in its own territory which invade the territory of another State.

Following the listing of aggressive acts, a series of situations were listed which could not be used as an "excuse" for commission of the forbidden actions. This included attempts to protect either capital investments or a nation's own citizens in backward countries.¹⁴

The League of Nations did undertake the question of defining aggression during the preparation of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance by the Permanent Advisory Commission. The report did not directly address the problem of defining aggression but did contain remarks which characterized infiltration and invasion as acts of aggression and provided guidance on "signs which betoken an impending aggression" which were determined to be:

- (1) Organization on paper of industrial mobilization;
- (2) Actual organization of industrial mobilization;
- (3) Collection of stocks of raw materials;

- (4) Organizing of war industries;
- (5) Preparation for military mobilization;
- (6) Actual military mobilization;
- (7) Hostilities.¹⁵

In the prewar period the United States was a signatory to several treaties which alluded to a definition of aggression. Typical of these were the provisions of the Declaration of Principles of Inter-American Solidarity and Cooperation adopted at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace at Buenos Aires on 21 December 1936. In this declaration the following principles were adopted by the American Community of Nations:

(a) Proscription of territorial conquest and that, in consequence, no acquisition made through violence shall be recognized;

(b) Intervention by one State in the internal or external affairs of another State is condemned;

(c) Forceful collection of pecuniary debts is illegal; and

(d) Any difference or dispute between the American nations, whatever its nature or origin, shall be settled by the methods of conciliation, or non-restricted arbitration, or through operation of international justice.¹⁶

Post War Policy. The U.S. delegation proposed that a definition of aggression be included in the text of the Charter for the International Military Tribunals. This definition closely paralleled the Soviet 1933 version:

An aggressor, for the purposes of this Article, is that state which is the first to commit any of the following actions:

(1) Declaration of war upon another state;

(2) Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration of war, of the territory of another state;

(3) Attack by its land, naval, or air forces, with or without a declaration of war, on the territory, vessels, or aircraft of another state;

(4) Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another state;

(5) Provision of support to armed bands formed in its territory which have invaded the territory of another

state, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded state, to take in its own territory, all measures in its power to deprive those bands of all assistance or protection.

No political, military, economic or other considerations shall serve as an excuse or justification for such actions; but exercise of the right of legitimate self-defense, that is to say, resistance to an act of aggression, or action to assist a state which has been subjected to aggression, shall not constitute a war of aggression.¹⁷

An intriguing interlude in an international paradox was the insistence of the United States delegation on the inclusion of the Soviet definition and the insistence by the Russian delegation *not* to provide a definition of aggression in the charter of the tribunal, albeit their own!

Definitions in the United Nations. The Charter of the United Nations includes such terms as "threats to the peace," "breach of the peace," and "act of aggression," but does not attempt to further define or amplify these ambiguous and comprehensive terms. This was not an oversight, but the result of a deliberate action by the drafters, in spite of intensive pressure to define aggression. The primary proponent of this move to include a definition in the charter was Bolivia. This delegation submitted a proposal which would have required the Security Council to apply sanctions "immediately by collective action" when it found a state to be an aggressor in accordance with the following terms:

A state shall be designated an aggressor if it has committed any of the following acts to the detriment of another state;

(a) Invasion of another state's territory by armed forces.

(b) Declaration of war.

(c) Attack by land, sea or air forces, with or without declaration of war.

(d) Support given to armed bands for the purpose of invasion.

(e) Intervention in another state's internal foreign affairs.

(f) Refusal to submit the matter which has caused a dispute to the peaceful means provided for its settlement.

(g) Refusal to comply with a judicial decision lawfully pronounced by an international court.¹⁸

Similar amendments were submitted by Czechoslovakia and the Philippines.

The Bolivian proposal was supported by Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Uruguay, Egypt, Iran, New Zealand, and the Philippines. All permanent members of the Council, except China, were opposed to the proposal and were supported by Czechoslovakia, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, White Russia, Chile, and Paraguay.¹⁹ The general argument against the proposal was that while a definition of aggression was complex and difficult, "recognition of an act after it had been committed would be simple."²⁰

The final debate on the subject ended when a clear majority of the committee decided that a definition "... went beyond the possibilities of this conference and the purpose of the Charter." The original text was retained, sans definition, and the Council was left with "the entire decision as to what constitutes a threat to peace, a breach of peace or an act of aggression."²¹

The question of defining aggression lay dormant in the United Nations for several years, primarily since the "super-powers" both had opposed the inclusion of a definition in the charter. The break in the definitional silence occurred in 1950 following the paralysis of the Security Council and the subsequent "Uniting for Peace" resolution. Since the Assembly had no power to compel measures against a convicted aggressor, but depended upon the consent of the United Nations membership, an easily applied, clear-cut definition of aggression was considered by some of the members to be necessary to assure unanimity in the Assembly decisions. The Soviet Union revitalized the subject

of definition by submitting the substance of its draft definition of 1933 for consideration by the International Law Commission.²²

The Assembly, responsive to the widening demand for a formal approach to the problem of definition, appointed a special committee of 115 members on the "Question of Defining Aggression" and instructed the committee to produce "draft definitions or draft statements of the notion of aggression."²³

The report of this committee established the existence of two basic approaches among those who favored definition—the "general" definition and the "enumerative" definition.

The Soviet draft of the enumerative definition is practically identical to the 1933 version espoused by the United States in 1945 during the IMT Charter negotiations. The Soviet delegate, noting that aggressors perennially utilized the concept of "preventive war" or "self defense" as an excuse, proposed a listing of examples of direct aggression:

The State which first commits one of the following acts:

(a) Declaration of war against another State;

(b) Invasion by its armed forces, even without a declaration of war, of the territory of another State;

(c) Bombardment by its land, sea, or air forces of the territory of another State or the carrying out of a deliberate attack on the ships or aircraft of the latter;

(d) The landing or leading of its land, sea or air forces inside the boundaries of another State without the permission of the government of the latter, or the violation of the conditions of such permission, particularly as regards the length of their stay or the extent of the area in which they may stay;

(e) Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another State;

(f) Support of armed bands organized in its own territory which invade the territory of another State, or refusal, on being requested by the invaded State, to take in its own territory any action within its power to

deny such bands any aid or protection.²⁴

The Soviets then list a series of episodes which are considered to be forms of indirect aggression which would condemn a state which first:

- (a) Encourages subversive activity against another State (acts of terrorism, diversion, etc.);
- (b) Promotes the outbreak of civil war within another State;
- (c) Promotes an internal upheaval in another State or a reversal of policy in favor of the aggressor.²⁵

Economic aggression included the following acts:

- (a) Takes against another State measures of economic pressure violating its sovereignty and economic independence and threatening the basis of its economic life;
- (b) Takes against another State measures preventing it from exploiting or nationalizing its own natural riches;
- (c) Subjects another State to an economic blockade.²⁶

and ideological aggression:

- (a) Encourages war propaganda;
- (b) Encourages propaganda in favor of using atomic, bacterial, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction;
- (c) Promotes the propagation of fascist-nazi views, of racial and national exclusiveness, and of hatred and contempt for other peoples.²⁷

The U.S.S.R. also proposed acceptance of a series of common "excuses" used by aggressors in past incidences, but which would no longer be considered as justification of aggression. These criteria were divided into two categories. One was the internal position of the State under coercion and these included:

- (a) The backwardness of any nation politically, economically or culturally;
- (b) Alleged shortcomings of its administration;
- (c) Any danger which may threaten the life or property of aliens;
- (d) Any revolutionary or counter-revolutionary movement, civil war, disorders or strikes;

(c) The establishment or maintenance in any State of any political, economic or social system.²⁸

The acts or legislation within a State were also removed from possible consideration as justification for aggression. These acts included:

- (a) The violation of international treaties;
- (b) The violation of rights and interests in the sphere of trade, concessions or any other kind of economic activity acquired by another State or its citizens;
- (c) The rupture of diplomatic or economic relations;
- (d) Measures in connection with an economic or financial boycott;
- (e) Repudiation of debts;
- (f) Prohibition or restriction of immigration or modification of the status of foreigners;
- (g) The violation of privileges granted to the official representatives of another State;
- (h) Refusal to allow the passage of armed forces proceeding to the territory of a third State;
- (i) Measures of a religious or anti-religious nature;
- (j) Frontier incidents.²⁹

In conclusion the Soviet definition provided:

In the event of the mobilization or concentration by another State of considerable armed forces near its frontier, the State which is threatened by such action shall have the right of recourse to diplomatic or other means of securing a peaceful settlement of international disputes. It may also in the meantime adopt requisite measures of a military nature similar to those described above, without, however, crossing the frontier.³⁰

This Soviet definition is the archetype of the so-called "enumerative" definition which catalogs a wide range of aggressive situations. The Soviet format has remained stable since 1933, but the list has been expanded from the original five overt military acts to the current list of 15 which includes the indirect, economic, and ideological categories of aggression.

The second type of definition ap-

proaches the subject on a different tack. The abstract definition attempts to express the meaning of aggression in the broadest possible terms. An excellent example of the abstract definition is that submitted by Mr. Ricardo Alfaro to the International Law Commission:

Aggression is the use of force by one State or group of States, or by any Government or group of Governments, against the territory and people of other States or Governments, in any manner, by any methods, for any reasons and for any purposes, except individual or collective self-defense against armed attack or coercive action by the United Nations.³¹

In this definition the "first to commit" concept is absent, and it does little to provide decisionmakers with specific guidance.

A third variant is a "mixed" definition which includes an abstract interpretation of aggression, followed by an illustrative, but brief, list of specific instances of aggression.

IV--THE SOVIET DEFINITION VS. UNITED STATES POLICY

In debates on defining aggression a large proportion of the "definers" alluded to at least guarded approval of the Soviet draft definition. It is apparent that if a definition is adopted the substance of it will not operate automatically on the facts of a particular case, and, indeed, the "facts" are not usually known in early stages of any United Nations debate. It would nonetheless be useful to address the effect of an objective application of the definition to specific episodes of past U.S. foreign policy machinations. In addition, the broad implications of the definition to the larger policies will be briefly examined.

Broad Implications. The Charter of the United Nations states that the purpose of the organization is "to take effective *collective* measures for the

prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace." [Emphasis supplied.]¹ The charter further provides, under article 51, for collective or individual self-defense against an armed attack until the Security Council takes "measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."² The United States has frequently resorted to measures outside the framework of the United Nations through our "security" agreements. This trend in American policy was mentioned in a speech by Secretary of State Dean Rusk in 1966 when he pointed out that the trend in U.S. policy when the machinery of the United Nations proved inadequate was to reinforce it with other measures.³

In this context most of our involvements are concerned with episodes in which we have a direct interest in the outcome of action against a government in power, either in overthrowing a government unfriendly toward the West or retaining in power one oriented against communism. These operations generally involve "the landing or leading of its land, sea or air forces inside the boundaries of another state . . ." ⁴ in order to promote "an internal upheaval in another State or a reversal of policy in favor of the aggressor."⁵

In contrast, the Soviet Union, which amassed the greatest territorial gains in the World War II period, has largely refrained from exporting her armed forces to areas of conflict. In areas where conflicts requiring force may occur, her armies are prepositioned and do not require the invasion denounced by her own definition. Instead, the resident Soviet forces can handle any internal difficulties which usually arise between the Soviet puppet government and a nonpuppet faction with dispatch, and the entire affair can be retained in the realm of an internal affair.

Following is a brief investigation of the consequences of applying the sub-

stance of the Soviet definition to a series of foreign policy incidents in which the U.S. involvement precipitated a charge of "aggression" being leveled at this country in the United Nations. In examining these cases the basic facts of the case will be considered objectively against the definition with no attempt to "legalize" the U.S. position by applying the rationale adopted by the United States in defending her actions.

Hungary. "That State shall be declared to have committed an act of indirect aggression which: (a) encourages subversive activity against another State; (b) promotes the outbreak of civil war within another State. The following may not be used as justification [for the acts listed]: alleged shortcomings of its administration; any revolutionary or counterrevolutionary movement."⁶ Although the Soviet Union could probably be found guilty under her own definition, clause (d) "landing or leading of forces inside the boundaries of another State without the permission of the government of the latter," the question of whether the Nagy regime was in actual fact the head of government in Hungary is beyond the scope of this treatment. In any event the Soviets claimed that their entry was in reaction to "indirect" aggression being committed in Hungary by the United States.

The campaign conducted by Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America had a decided effect on the revolution. For instance, Tibor Meray, a participant in the events, described the effect of the broadcasts as follows: On 24 October, Premier Nagy called for "order, calm, discipline" and immediately thereafter "... a vehement radio campaign was launched from abroad against Nagy—a campaign that had a fatal effect on all that followed." On 31 October, Radio Free Europe made the following pronouncement: "The Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior are still

in Communist hands. Do not let this continue, Freedom Fighters, do not hang your weapons on the wall."⁷ When considered in the context of the substance of the Soviet definition, the encouragement from the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe had considerable impact on the initiation and continuation of the revolt. The Radio Free Europe broadcasts verifying America's willingness to help, coupled with the U.S. inclination toward the liberation of Europe, undoubtedly raised false hopes and had at least a secondary effect on the events. Applying the Soviet definition in its most literal sense, the United States could be found guilty of "indirect" aggression.

China. The attacker is that state which "first commits the following act: Bombardment by its land, sea or air forces of the territory of another state..."⁸

The U.S.S.R. charged that the United States had committed aggression and violation of Chinese airspace by bombing Chinese territory. A total of 87 flights had been made over Red Chinese territory. The United States claimed that 61 of the flights were reconnaissance missions, and no bombs were dropped, and on other occasions bombs were dropped on Yalu River bridges that were not in Chinese territory. Two accidental attacks on the Chinese mainland were acknowledged by the United States. In the light of the Soviet definition, the United States would have been found guilty of aggression.

Formosa. "... that State shall be declared the attacker [aggressor] which first commits one of the following acts: ... naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another State. The following may not be used as justification: Any ... civil war; or the establishment or maintenance in any State of any political, economic or social system."⁹

In 1950 the U.S.S.R. alleged that the United States was committing aggres-

sion in the blockade of ports belonging to Red China,¹⁰ and in 1954 charged us with committing acts of aggression by attacking Red Chinese vessels on the high seas.¹¹ Early U.S. policy enunciated by President Truman declared

The United States has no predatory designs on Formosa or any other Chinese territory . . . nor does it have any intention of utilizing its armed forces to interfere in the present situation. The United States government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil [emphasis supplied] conflict in China.¹²

Our subsequent action in ordering the 7th Fleet to act in restricting Chinese naval operations and effectively "blockading" Chinese ports, in what we had previously acknowledged as a civil conflict, would have placed us in the position of a convicted "aggressor" when viewed in a strict interpretation of the Soviet definition. The United States contended that the blockade was not, *per se*, a blockade, since commercial ship traffic was not interfered with.¹³

Cuba: Quarantine. An aggressor is the State which first commits the following act: "Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another State."

On 14 October a U.S. reconnaissance flight over Cuba detected the presence of medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba.¹⁴ The President, in a radio address, accused the Soviet Union of deceiving the United States and announced plans to establish a naval quarantine of Cuba in order to prohibit the influx of additional offensive weapons.¹⁵ Prior to the speech a fleet of 98 ships, including eight aircraft carriers, was prepositioned for immediate implementation of the President's announced course of action.¹⁶ The first encounter with the incoming Soviet ships occurred on the second day of the quarantine. The ship entering the quarantine zone was a tanker, obviously not carrying weapons. All other Soviet ships reversed course or halted short of

the quarantine zone. The result of the naval action and political pressure was the promise of the Soviet Government to withdraw missiles from Cuba.¹⁷

Under the Soviet definition of aggression, the preemptive first-strike type of warfare is specifically prohibited, and our action, under this definition, would have easily qualified as an act of aggression.

Cuba: Bay of Pigs. The State which first commits the following is guilty of aggression: "Support of armed bands organized in its own territory which invade the territory of another State." The following may not be used as excuses for aggressive acts against another State: "Alleged shortcomings of its administration or any revolutionary movement."¹⁸

In 1960 the U.S. Government embarked on a plan to invade Cuba and overthrow the Communist government of Fidel Castro. A group of Cubans had been recruited by the CIA in Miami and trained by CIA and U.S. military personnel in Guatemala.¹⁹ The United States was charged by Cuba in the United Nations with bombing Cuba, organizing, financing, and arming bands of Cubans in order to commit aggression. An anti-United States resolution was introduced by Rumania and was adopted by the First Committee with a vote of 42 for, 31 against, and 25 abstentions. This resolution was rejected by the General Assembly by a very narrow margin—41 for, 35 against, and 20 abstentions.²⁰

On the morning of 17 April 1961, 1,400 men of the American-trained Cuban brigade landed at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba. Although the brigade consisted primarily of American-trained Cubans, the first man ashore in the landing was an American.

In this case our action was specifically listed as an element which could brand a nation the aggressor, and again the United States would have been

potentially guilty under the Soviet definition.

Iran. The State will be guilty of indirect aggression which first: "Promotes the outbreak of civil war within a state" or "Promotes a reversal of policy in favor of the aggressor." A State will be guilty of economic aggression who "Takes against another State measures of economic pressure violating its sovereignty and economic independence and threatening the bases of its economic life" or "takes against another State measures preventing it from exploiting or nationalizing its own natural riches."²¹

Iran, a destitute country struggling for survival, had a singular source of large-scale income: oil. Largely because of the unfavorable split of royalties between the Anglo-Iran Oil Company, which monopolized oil resources in the country, and the government, Mohammed Mossadegh, a newly elected Prime Minister, on 1 May 1951 nationalized the company. Iranian control of the company was frustrated by a Western boycott of Iranian oil products. As Fred Cook stated in his article "The CIA," "The international oil cartel held firm--and Iran lost all its oil revenues."²² The loss of income had a severe effect on the regime of Prime Minister Mossadegh, and within 7 months he was overthrown by a coup d'état planned and executed by the CIA with rather wide public knowledge of its activities. Over and above the CIA involvement, much covert military assistance was provided the rebels. In congressional hearings conducted in 1954, a Defense Department official declared that:

When the crisis came on and the thing was about to collapse, we violated our normal criteria and among the other things we did, we provided the army immediately [with material] on an emergency basis . . . the guns that they had in their hands, the trucks they rode in, the armored cars that they drove through the streets, and the radio communications that permitted

their control, were all furnished [by the United States].²³

The result of the coup was a government favorable to the West and the internationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Again, viewing the U.S. involvement in retrospect and in relation to the Soviet definition, the United States would have been guilty of aggression on several counts.

Dominican Republic. The State which first commits the following acts is guilty of aggression: Invasion by its armed forces, even without the declaration of war, of the territory of another State. The following may not be used as justification for the aggressive acts: Any danger which may threaten the life or property of aliens or any revolutionary or counterrevolutionary movement.²⁴

On the afternoon of 24 April 1965, a radio station in Santo Domingo was seized by a group of revolutionaries attempting to overthrow the regime of Donald Cabral in favor of the pro-Communist Juan Bosch. The rebels were attempting to inspire a general uprising from the populace.²⁵ That same evening a task group of U.S. Navy ships, headed by the carrier U.S.S. *Boxer* with five support ships, was alerted for possible action in the revolt. As the fighting developed the tide seemed to be turning against the rebels, and the task group was ordered into position.²⁶ The U.S. officials proposed to evacuate civilians from the embattled city and were promised immunity by both sides, the rebels and loyalist government. By the evening of 27 April, about 1,200 evacuees, U.S. citizens, had been moved from the beach to units of the task force.²⁷ On that same day the rebel position improved by their capture of the Presidential palace and stiffening resistance in other parts of the city.²⁸

The next day Ambassador Bennett reported that there were "leftist forces" opposing a three-man military junta acceptable to both rebels and

loyalists.²⁹ This report also requested troop assistance prompted by a request from the junta for assistance in "preserving the peace." The President, after receiving reports of possible danger to U.S. citizens, gave an order to land troops in the Dominican Republic. The task group commander stated during a news conference that the Marines were sent ashore to protect American lives and "to keep this a non-Communist government."³⁰

Our troops, with a maximum strength of about 20,000, actively cooperated with the loyalist government in suppressing the rebel movement and effecting a cease-fire. The United States was subsequently accused of violating both the United Nations Charter and the OAS Charter. The resolution, introduced by Russia, would condemn the United States for its action and call for immediate withdrawal of troops.³¹

If the U.S. actions were considered, using the precepts of the Soviet definition, the United States would have been found guilty of aggression.

V--POTENTIAL DANGER FOR AMERICA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

The Danger of Definition. If a definition of aggression can exert any adverse effect on the goals of the United States and its posture in the world community, it will necessarily result from the definition being applied to our actions by a United Nations majority disenchanted with the U.S. machinations in world politics. In other words, because our policy is particularly susceptible to attack by an objective application of the Soviet definition, it will furnish a more easily identifiable mechanism for indictment of U.S. policies by a hostile United Nations membership. For example, it is possible that in an incident involving the American use of force, the United Nations membership could be

presented with the facts of the case, and an application of the Soviet definition to these facts might indicate a clearly identifiable case of aggression. It is obvious that this procedure would not affect the votes of nations solidly backing the U.S. position, but it could provide the impetus to push borderline cases to the anti-U.S. votes. The borderline nations are those that are becoming increasingly alarmed with the handling of world affairs by the United States and would welcome a bona fide excuse for voting against her. The ability to provide a prima facie case of aggression against the United States could well provide the necessary excuse.

Is the United States in a position to become a target of adverse reaction in the United Nations to acts of violence that are now conducted with impunity in a legal framework?

Early U.S. Dominance. The past history of the United Nations is replete with examples of the United States posting significant political victories over the Communist minority. As the major contributor to the United Nations budget and a primary source of the world's foreign aid supply to smaller nations, the United States has been able to exercise enough influence to assure a favorable vote, during the early years, in any matter of substance placed before the United Nations. In regard to the General Assembly, Ernest A. Gross has offered evidence in the record of the United States:

The American leadership record in this forum is a proud one. In the years 1946 through 1953 the General Assembly adopted over 800 resolutions. The United States was defeated in less than 3 per cent-and in no case where our important security interests were involved. In these eight years only two resolutions supported by us failed of adoption.¹

The early predominance of the United States did not escape note by the Soviet Union. Very early in the

United Nations existence they explained their defeats by pointing out that the imperialists were attempting to turn the United Nations into a branch of the American State Department to implement their plans for "Anglo-Saxon domination."² Many writers at that early stage warned of the steamroller tactics being developed by the United States.

Hints of U.S. Decline. In recent years it has become increasingly apparent that the early dominance of the United States would probably not continue unchecked. The increase in membership of the United Nations has been progressing steadily, with new members consisting primarily of small ex-colonies with a latent hostility toward any colonial power--and the United States was branded a colonial power by association, if not in fact. In addition, U.S. policies in and out of the world organization seemed designed to antagonize the United Nations members and make the task of U.S. "lobbyists" in gathering favorable votes even more difficult. A harbinger of potential trouble for the United States was voiced by Richard Gardner, when he stated:

There is no ironclad guarantee for the United States in the present procedures of the United Nations. All one can say with assurance is that the procedures are extremely favorable to our country and that the authorization of a peace keeping action against our opposition is difficult to imagine, assuming always that the American position is reasonably founded in *justice* [emphasis supplied] and the United Nations Charter.³

Mr. Gardner's statement alludes to the necessity of maintaining a position based on justice, a key point in that a just position would easily become significantly more difficult to maintain under the mantle of the Soviet definition of aggression.

The United States seemed in many ways to earn its reputation as a cham-

pion of colonialism and, in so doing, alienate a large portion of the United Nations voting strength--for example, our support of colonialism during the 15th Session. In his report to Congress, Senator Wayne Morse pointed out that the United States either abstained or voted "no" on all the major colonial resolutions, and, in so doing, it had branded itself as a supporter of colonialism. He pointed out as an example of a typical *faux pas* the American support of Portugal in claiming that her overseas holdings were not territories but metropolitan provinces, thus exempting her from international interference since domestic law would apply. Senator Morse reported that he was confronted with many protests or criticisms of the U.S. vote by members who, although professing a strong desire to maintain friendship with the United States, found it increasingly difficult to do so. Senator Morse summed up our position as follows:

Yet, our vote on this resolution was so irreconcilable with the clear meaning of Articles 73 and 74 of the U.N. Charter and with our professed ideals about supporting indigenous people in their struggle for independence that many of our friends in the Fourth Committee were at a complete loss to understand our vote. They did not want to believe what they feared and suspected, but they didn't hesitate to tell me that they suspected that Pentagon influence, military bases, and the NATO alliance were the controlling factors that dictated the United States vote.⁴

In a similar vote on a resolution calling for South West Africa to permit a subcommittee to visit the country and report on conditions, the United States abstained rather than vote for the obviously anticolonial measure. As Senator Morse reported, "The United States vote of abstention on this resolution was very harmful because once again we appeared to be sustaining policies of a colonial power whose policy in South West Africa has aroused deep resent-

ment among many African Nations."⁵

The influx of new states, each with potentially hostile attitudes toward the United States, changed the complexion of the United Nations rather radically. When the organization was founded there was a total of 51 members, only two of which were from Black Africa: Ethiopia and Liberia. The membership now totals 117, with 33 African States who, combined with the Asian and Mid-East States, constitute over 50 percent of the membership. This "Afro-Asian" bloc, in combination with the Communist bloc, could theoretically command over 60 percent of the vote—close to the two-thirds majority required for substantive issues.

The effects of our policies in the United Nations are obvious. A commonly used indicator of the U.S. influence in the Assembly, principally because it recurs so often, is the vote on the perennial issue of seating the People's Republic of China. As reported in the *International Review Service*,

Until 1955, votes for a postponement of consideration were carried with ease, there being at least three times as many votes in favor of the moratorium as those against. This situation gradually changed with the admission of new Member States, especially from Asia and Africa, after 1953. In 1956, the vote favoring postponement was down to 2 to 1. This gap continued to narrow, and in 1960, the difference became a mere 8 votes. Equally significant was the fact that all newly admitted African States either abstained from or opposed the annual U.S. proposal. A move by Nepal for the inclusion in the agenda of the question of Chinese representation was defeated by the difference of only 4 votes.⁶

In the 20th General Assembly a resolution calling for seating of Red China resulted in a tie vote with 47 for and 47 against, indicating the significant weakening of the U.S. position from its previous position as the mold of United Nations voting patterns. An illus-


tration of this trend against the United States is provided in table I, which is a plot of the percentage of nations voting with the United States as compared to the total number voting.

During the framing of the United Nations Charter the American delegation, in concert with the other great powers, insisted on inclusion of the veto power in the Security Council in order to insure that no peacekeeping action could be initiated against the major world powers. The framers recognized that any such collective security action was not in interest of a stable world situation. In later years the United States, viewing with horror the Soviet use of the veto in the Security Council, introduced the Uniting for Peace Resolution to allow the General Assembly to act, under certain circumstances, in opposition to the veto of a permanent member. Although, at the time of its introduction, the action appeared sound, it was not universally applauded. Among those who professed concern was Louis Claude, Jr., who stated that the United Nations "... should not challenge a recalcitrant great power."⁷

At the time the Uniting for Peace Resolution was adopted, it appeared certain that it could never be turned against its creators because of built-in safeguards. Not only did the United States have a distinct dominance in the General Assembly, but in the Security Council as well. One of the stipulations for implementing the Uniting for Peace Resolution is that the Security Council be paralyzed by a veto and "fails to exercise its primary responsibility" in cases involving threats to peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression. Since the United States has always been able to obtain the support of a majority of Security Council members, it has been able to refrain from using the veto power in cases inimical to U.S. interests, thereby preempting application of the provisions of Uniting for Peace.

An analysis of the voting record in

TABLE I--ISSUE OF SEATING RED CHINA



Source: Yearbook of the United Nations, 1952-1963, 1965.

Security Council cases involving charges of aggression against the United States indicates that although the United States has never been in jeopardy of having to veto a measure, an increasingly narrow margin of votes is cast in favor of the United States. A graph of the voting record in seven complaints against America is shown in table II. Although the voting record of the Council shows only a slight trend against U.S. interests, an analysis of Security Council debates provides an even greater insight into the decline of American influence. In the same seven cases, and in two others where no vote was taken, a tabulation of debating records was made, classifying countries as being in one of three categories: *Pro-United States*, meaning that they participated actively in defending the United States position; *Neutral*, meaning that they either did not participate in debate, or that they were noncommittal in defending U.S. actions; and *Anti-United States*, meaning they debated actively against the U.S. position. The graph, shown in table III, is a tabulation of these results. The pattern shows the marked decrease in active support garnered by the United States in the Security Council during recent years.

An inspection of the record indicates a trend away from the U.S. position in the Security Council. The indications are that in future instances of intervention the United States may well have to exercise its veto power in the Council to thwart action against its interests. In this case the Assembly will be in a position to act under the Uniting for Peace Resolution. Armed with the Soviet definition of aggression, the charge of aggression against the United States could well be sustained by an increasingly hostile United Nations membership.

Public Opinion in the World Arena. The strength of the United States in the United Nations is based primarily upon

the political posture of the member nations, but this political alignment is influenced profoundly by public opinion within each individual member. In a recent article in *U.S. News and World Report*, the shift of attitudes of people in representative nations of the world was found to be away from support of internationalism. As an example, in a public opinion poll only 28 percent of Britons favored helping the United States in a major crisis involving Russia, and only 21 percent favored support of the United States in Vietnam.⁸ Similar loss of enthusiasm for American leadership was reported in Italy. The growing tide of resentment against U.S. foreign policy can be expected to produce an even further decline of American influence in the United Nations during subsequent sessions.

VI-SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The United States has, in recent years, pursued a policy of opposition to the concept of defining aggression for use in determining the aggressor in cases under consideration by the United Nations. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has been instrumental in leading the effort to adopt such a definition and repeatedly submitted its own draft definition enumerating various acts which could be considered elements of aggression. The clash of the two super-powers on this issue raises the question of whether or not the United States has accurately appraised the ramifications of adopting a definition by the Assembly, and if opposition to the Soviet proposal is in the best interest of the United States.

The United States has consistently maintained the position that aggressive war is totally outside its policy aims and has denounced any perpetrator of aggression as an international criminal. This policy was steadfastly maintained

TABLE II—SECURITY COUNCIL CASES OF UNITED STATES AGGRESSION--VOTES

	Number of Pro-United States Votes										
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
30 January 1955 Offshore Islands											
18 April 1958 Arctic Overflights											
15 July 1958 Lebanon Intervention											
18 May 1960 U.S.S.R.--Air Force Intervention											
11 July 1960 Cuba--Aggression Overflight											
8 March 1962 Cuba--OAS Enforcement Action											
28 April 1965 U.S.S.R.--Dominican Intervention											

Source: *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1955, 1958, 1960, 1962, 1965.

TABLE III--SECURITY COUNCIL CASES OF UNITED STATES AGGRESSION--DEBATE

	Members Debating Pro-United States										
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
30 January 1955 Offshore Islands											
18 April 1958 Arctic Overflights											
18 May 1960 U.S.S.R.--Air Force Aggression											
11 July 1960 Cuba--Aggression, Overflight											
21 November 1961 Dominican Republic (Brt. by Cuba)											
8 March 1962 Cuba--OAS Enforcement Action											
10 January 1964 Panama											
16 April 1964 Cambodia--U.S. Aggression											
28 January 1965 U.S.S.R.--Dominican Intervention											

Source: *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1955, 1958, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1964, 1965.

106 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

in the face of opposition of many other nations in the world community. The Russian and French delegations at the conference for development of the charter for the Nuremberg trials adopted a position that a general outlawry of aggressive war should not necessarily be the subject of codification in the charter.

The United States has stood in the van of the movement for outlawing aggressive war but, in recent years, has generally opposed attempts to define aggression, particularly in the United Nations. The policy contrasts with early recognition of various definitions in treaties and conferences. Again, referring to the Nuremberg conferences, the U.S. delegate favored inclusion in the charter of a definition almost identical to an earlier Russian proposal, and, in this instance, the Russian delegate opposed inclusion of a definition that originated with his countrymen in 1933. In United Nations deliberations on the definition, the first of which occurred in 1957, the United States adopted a general policy of opposition to the subject on grounds that the definition was neither possible nor desirable.

This policy was taken even though a majority of the members considered definition both possible and desirable. There was rather widespread disagreement over the form of the definition. Those favoring defining were split into two basic camps: first, those who favored the Soviet definition, the "enumerative" type which categorized several acts that constituted aggression. This tabulation was subdivided into general, ideological, and economic aggression. The list of aggressive actions was followed by a series of situations which could not be used as excuses for aggression. The second group of "definers" favored a rather broad, abstract definition that embraced only general terminology which could be liberally interpreted.

The policy of the United States in

opposing the concept of definition must be considered in the context of how such a definition would affect American foreign policy, assuming that the position held by the United States was generated by valid causative factors, and not simply because the proposal was put forth by the Russians.

The basic tenet of the Soviet definition is that the first party to commit any of the various acts is the guilty one. These acts generally involve moving troops across borders, attacking by other means, establishing blockades, support of armed bands, or promotion of political upheaval in other States. The United States has traditionally intervened in cases where American interests were threatened by overthrow of a friendly government or where establishment of a favorable regime could be effected. In this instance it has generally been necessary to make either overt or covert movements of troops and to attack by sea or airpower, in direct violation of the conditions of the Russian definition.

The current problems besetting the United States in its overseas troop commitments have drastically reduced the in-country strength of her Armed Forces throughout the world and have produced a situation that will require

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Comdr. Rodney V. Hansen, U.S. Navy, holds a bachelor's degree in Naval Science from the U.S. Undergraduate School, Monterey, Calif., and is a graduate of the School of Naval Command and Staff, Naval War College, Class of 1968. As a naval aviator, he has had duty in a variety of carrier antisubmarine squadrons and as assistant navigator aboard the U.S.S. *Randolph*. Commander Hansen is currently serving with Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron 113 in the Pacific Fleet.

even more obvious responses of the United States in crises involving her national interest. In contrast, the Soviet Union, being a major continental power, can maintain Soviet or Soviet-controlled troops in potential trouble areas that can adequately cope with any developing situation. Under such conditions it will be generally unnecessary for her to undertake the troop movements across international borders specifically prohibited in her definition. Russia has instead espoused the principle of waging war through ideological campaigns rather than furthering her national interests through direct military involvement.

In considering specific instances of United States foreign policy episodes against the Soviet definition, a large proportion of the events prove to be in direct conflict with the substance of this definition. A general review of incidents indicates that the U.S. actions could generally result in a finding of "guilty" against the United States.

The implications of the definition are unimportant if the United States maintains her position as mold of world opinion and leader of the majority of the United Nations. The adverse effects of the definition could become operative in cases where the United States stands in a situation where she is opposed in principle by a sufficient number of the member States. In these circumstances many of the borderline States normally amenable to American policies could be shaken from their traditional vote on the side of the United States by the clear violation of the criteria of aggression. This evidence in "black and white" could provide a suitable excuse for casting a vote for world order.

An analysis of the record of the United Nations indicates that circumstances could arise where the U.S. interests would indeed be influenced by declining power over member nations.

In the General Assembly the trend is definitely toward fewer nations voting with the United States on major issues.

During the early phases of United Nations development no action could be taken against the U.S. interests regardless of "guilt" or "innocence" in any particular crisis. The Security Council was the only United Nations body that could enforce sanctions against offending nations, and the United States consistently could muster a sufficient number of votes to defeat any adverse action, even without the use of the veto power given to the five permanent members. The Americans had provided a means for bypassing the Security Council when action was precluded through the application of a veto. This provision, the Uniting for Peace Resolution, was intended primarily to provide for United Nations actions in the face of a Soviet veto. The United States has never had to use a veto in the Security Council, since enough votes could be garnered to defeat any resolution adverse to United States interests. An investigation of the trends exhibited in the Security Council indicates that the leadership of the United States has declined in recent years.

The overall implication is that the United States, in the face of steadily declining popularity in the world community, could be confronted with condemnation by adverse world opinion in a situation involving the use of international force. Under these conditions the existence of a definition of aggression, particularly the enumerative espoused by the Soviet Union, could be used as a lever to swing the vote of the United Nations membership against the United States.

It is concluded that the policy of the United States in opposing the definition of aggression is in the best interests of her larger foreign policy, and that continued opposition in subsequent years will become increasingly important.

FOOTNOTES

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4. *Ibid.*, p. 60-61.
5. "Definition of Aggression," *UN Monthly Chronicle*, January 1968, p. 38.
6. *Ibid.*
7. "Definition of Aggression," *UN Monthly Chronicle*, December 1967, p. 62.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 34,35.
9. "Definition of Aggression," *UN Monthly Chronicle*, January 1968, p. 37.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 37.

II--CRIMINALITY OF AGGRESSIVE WAR--THE U.S.POLICY

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13. *Ibid.*, p. 686.
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16. Winston L.S. Chuehill, quoted in Sheldon Glueck, *The Nuremberg Trial and Aggressive War* (New York: Knopf, 1946), p. 111.
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20. *Ibid.*, p. 333-334.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 295.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 295-296.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 297.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 299.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 14-16.

26. United Nations Charter, Article 2 (3), (4).

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IV--THE SOVIET DEFINITION VS. U.S. POLICY

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2. United Nations Charter, Article 51.

3. Dean Rusk, "Requirements for Organizing the Peace," *The Department of State Bulletin*, 31 October 1966, p. 658-663.

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
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PROFESSIONAL READING

The evaluations of recent books listed in this section have been prepared for the use of resident students. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these books of interest in their professional reading.

The inclusion of a book in this section does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Certain of the books on the list which are not available from these sources may be available from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books are obtainable on loan. Requests from individual officers to borrow books from an Auxiliary Library Service Collection should be addressed to the nearest of the following special loan collections.

Chief of Naval Personnel (C-463)
Department of the Navy
Washington, D.C. 20370

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station (Guam)
Library (ALSC), Box 174
San Francisco, Calif. 96630

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station (Pearl Harbor)
Library (ALSC), Box 20
San Francisco, Calif. 96610

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station
Library (ALSC), Bldg. C-9
Norfolk, Virginia 23511

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station
Library (ALSC)
San Diego, Calif. 92136

Adam, Thomas R. *Western Interests in the Pacific Realm*. New York: Random House, 1967. 246p.

Western Interests in the Pacific Realm is a study of the political, economic, and strategic interests of the major Western powers, and particularly of the United States, in the broad area of the Pacific known as Oceania. The "Pacific Realm" of this study is centered on the island bases of the West in the Western Pacific. Its importance is one of political pragmatism; it is where Western power lies; it is a power base that is decisive as far as Western interests in Asia and Australia are concerned. The author examines and assesses the effects of Western policies on the development of the peoples of this region, both during and since the time of colonial domination. By and large, the metropolises are taken to task for their policies toward their colonies and trust territories in this area. While recognizing that there are many natural obstacles to the social and economic advancement of these scattered peoples, and that few can be overcome in a manner profitable to the economies of the West—in short, more financial and technical aid is needed—the author finds the greatest long-term obstacle to be a shortsighted disunity of the West which makes a common policy toward their Pacific dependencies unattainable. Old jealousies between the former colonial powers are by no means dead; in fact, they have been invested with new life under the name of "strategic considerations." But the unilateral pursuit of

economic and military advantage, which each nation persists in following, works to the disadvantage of the West in general and of the indigenous peoples in particular.

The author's plea for Western unity and a reasonable policy for the political, economic, and social advancement of these peoples is largely unassailable. The courses of action that he advances rest on a recognition and resolution of the existing disunity. While conceding that France might prove recalcitrant in correlating her Asian and Pacific politics with those of the English-speaking nations, he emphasizes that the choice of promoting or disregarding increased Western solidarity in this region rests with the United States. Since the United States possesses most of the actual force in the area and must bear the bulk of the consequent burdens, she must determine the extent of her willingness to share responsibility with her Western allies. This book is a timely discussion of a neglected aspect of Western interests in the Pacific. It is also an interesting primer on the politics, culture, and economy of many of the island states and dependencies in that vast region.

J.D. STEVENS

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force

Alsop, Stewart J.O. *The Center*. New York: Harper & Row, 1968. 365p.

It's easy to agree with Stewart Alsop that *The Center* is not an *Inside Washington*. While containing some facts which may be found elsewhere (including an encyclopedia), *The Center* consists primarily of a series of entertaining stories about the people who inhabit the innermost portion of our Government. Unfortunately, not all of the stories are appearing in print for the first time. However, otherwise this book is so timely that Clark Clifford is recognized as the current Secretary of Defense. After initially brushing off the Civil Service as a "bureaucratic disaster," the

author later notes that "the conservative Republican businessman whom President Eisenhower brought into the government were uniformly surprised by the high quality of the men they found in the upper federal bureaucracy." Despite this "expert" opinion, Alsop continues to belabor the Civil Service throughout this book. Except for the Central Intelligence Agency, the Kennedys and Robert McNamara are the only "heroes" in *The Center*. If there is a real "bad guy" it is the "military bureaucracy" at whom Alsop snipes at every possible opportunity. Accusing them of obeying Parkinson's Law with "more enthusiasm than any other bureaucracy," the author assures his reader that the corridors of the Pentagon are bursting "with majors and colonels and staff sergeants and civilian female secretaries and generals . . . taking in each other's bureaucratic laundry." Overlooked are the 2,157 civilian personnel located in the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the 70,000 civilians employed in agencies directly under that office. One who has plenty of time to spare and enjoys reading gossip about governmental VIP's might enjoy *The Center*. However, it should be read before a new administration changes the personalities located there. Anyone looking for a serious evaluation of the operations of the U.S. Government should not bother with *The Center*.

S.L. BARTH

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army

Elliott-Bateman, Michael. *Defeat in the East*. London: Oxford University Press, 1967. 270p.

According to its publisher, this book was written by a former officer in the British Royal Artillery who recently resigned his commission in order to continue his military studies, and who is now a lecturer in the Department of Government of the University of Manchester. For this reason, probably, the author, while critical of Western mili-

tary philosophy in general, is more particularly and extremely critical of British military thinking, strategy and tactics, training methods, and, in addition, basic British defense policies. In the Introduction the author states that the primary purpose of his book is an attempt to discover a sound military doctrine for the armed forces of the free world which will prevent their headlong rush toward defeat in Eastern Asia—if, indeed, the use of military means for accomplishment of Western political aims in that area is at all feasible in the first place. He maintains that Western military leaders do not understand the significance of Mao Tse-tung's military theories and doctrine and that this has "... resulted in the French defeat in Indo-China; is resulting in the American failure in South Vietnam; and is likely to result in similar failures by British forces in the East." He approaches the study of his stated problem, therefore, through an analysis of the military philosophy of Mao Tse-tung and by a comparison of Mao's strategy and tactics with those of other successful practitioners of the art of mobile warfare, including such individuals as Marlborough, Napoleon, Stonewall Jackson, and Rommel, as well as with the forces of the German Wehrmacht in Europe and the Japanese in Malaya during the early part of World War II.

The author states that the circumstances and conditions of war have changed drastically in recent years and, therefore, the natural laws of war have changed. He argues that the old concepts of positional and linear war are no longer valid but have been replaced by the concepts of guerrilla warfare and modern mobile warfare as developed by Mao and further refined by Gen. Vo-nguyen-Giap. He concludes that unless the West adopts a military philosophy based on his concept of the current realities of war, "defeat in the East" is inevitable. His argument is weakened, however, by some serious flaws in his

own logic. For example, he fails adequately to acknowledge the necessity for positional defense of safe base areas without which mobile counter guerrilla forces would be unable to operate and, furthermore, fails to recognize the greatly increasing mobility of regular forces. In claiming that "Mao stands in time as the man with the most complete set of keys to the secrets of war in this era," the author, it is felt, overrates the "politico-military genius of Mao Tse-tung" and the universality of Mao's doctrines. By his own admission the concepts of mobile/guerrilla warfare are applicable primarily in the space and jungle environment of Africa and Eastern Asia and would be extremely difficult to pursue successfully, for instance, in Europe. He further admits the vulnerability and complete failure of the concepts of Mao against the linear war imposed by General Ridgway in Korea. In addition, the author, by claiming a special understanding of the mind of Mao, leading to a discovery of the secrets of war, also overrates the importance of his book. In spite of its shortcomings, however, this is a very interesting and thought-provoking study which does provide a fresh approach and some new ideas concerning Chairman Mao's thoughts and theories. It is recommended reading for any serious student of counterinsurgency.

J.E. ARNOLD
Commander, U.S. Navy

Falk, Richard A. *Legal Order in a Violent World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968. 610p.

In 15 essays, 10 of which are revised versions of articles published since 1960, the author, Professor of International Law at Princeton University and one of the most distinguished young scholars in the field, seeks to "describe and appraise the relevance of international law to the management of international violence." By examining a series of "concrete circumstances" in-

volving recent threats or uses of violence in international affairs, he successfully demonstrates just what "international law can and cannot do in the existing international environment." His book is an eloquent plea against what he characterizes the "human inertia, bureaucratic rigidity, and vested interests" that today prevent meaningful work "toward the drastic disarmament of states at the national level and toward the evolution of security substitutes for national military power at the supranational level, whether of regional or global scope, or both."

As one who has found himself "progressively alienated from that mainstream of American foreign policy which has culminated in the United States involvement in the Vietnam War," the author is naturally at odds with the low priority generally accorded international law by Government decisionmakers in recent years. Moreover, while acknowledging that "Professor McDougal has made the most significant statement of our time about the relevance of international law to the management of international violence," Falk often disagrees with the "ideological orientation of his former mentor at Yale, which he believes "confirms the auto-interpretative role of national elites so as virtually to nullify the distinction I deem crucial between the impartial application of international law and its adversary use." Although this reviewer does not agree with many of the conclusions reached in these profoundly pessimistic studies, he has used them repeatedly in their previously published forms and welcomes their collection in this convenient volume. Anyone seriously concerned with the management of international violence, both now and in the future, cannot overlook the wealth of ideas contained in this thought-provoking book.

RICHARD B. LILLICH
Charles H. Stockton Chair of
International Law

Harrison, Anthony. *The Framework of Economic Activity*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967. 189p.

The British author Anthony Harrison in his book *The Framework of Economic Activity* covers basic economic theories and practices existing throughout the world since the beginning of the 20th century. He is both complimentary and critical of certain U.S. economic practices during the period. His discussion of the international gold standard and its relationship to pound sterling in the initial chapter is particularly well done. He uses the gold standard as a foundation to support many of the views that he advances throughout the book. Perhaps the best presented portions of the volume are the pre- and post-World War I and II periods and the depression of the early thirties. While Harrison's treatment of the replacement of the United Kingdom by the United States as the center of world finance appears, at times, to be exceedingly caustic, his account of the efforts of the League of Nations and the United Nations toward providing, or attempting to provide, world economic stability is excellently developed. Also, his explanation of economic progress in the Soviet Union while the countries of North America and Western Europe were in the depths of depression is successfully handled. Likewise, he offers a commendable review of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Furthermore, state-controlled or managed economies are discussed for both democratic and totalitarian countries and can generate some thought-provoking concepts for the interested reader.

This book is a comprehensive primer for students of international economics and provides, along with its well-researched charts and graphs, a valuable review for even the most knowledgeable in that field. It permits the career naval officer unfamiliar with the field to

acquire a tremendous appreciation of international economics with minimum expenditure of time and effort.

R.L. O'NEIL
Commander, SC, U.S. Navy

Laqueur, Walter Z. *The Road to Jerusalem*. New York: Macmillan, 1968. 368p.

The sudden and complete victory by the Israelis in June 1967 has overshadowed the events that preceded this unique war. In the Introduction, Mr. Laqueur establishes the focus of his book as the 3 weeks immediately prior to the Israeli-Arab war in June 1967. In dealing with the repercussions of the conflict, the impact on public opinion, and the policies of the various governments, Mr. Laqueur fashions an implied indictment of political coldbloodedness and diplomatic unreality. The intransigence and irrational actions of the Arabs, particularly Egypt and Syria, are clearly displayed. The worsening internal political strife in Israel, De Gaulle's deliberate aggrandizement, the well-intentioned fumbling of the British and American Governments, and Russia's doctrinal rigidity are logically derived from the pronouncements of senior officials of the various governments. The United Nations also acquires a few regretful, but accurately placed thumps on its body politic.

There are a number of assumptions and deductions by the author that are not fully supported by his source material. He admits freely that many of the answers he found were located in radio broadcasts and in the newspapers. This becomes a vital point. The source material for this book was essentially a basis for opinion makers and decision-makers the world over. Mr. Laqueur has, in his own words, "tried to the best of my ability to write a truthful history." If he had been given access to secret governmental documents, would it have changed his description of the truth? The reviewer doubts it, and so does the

author. The alternative requires a hyper-cynical approach to the world real-politik. Remember, the result of all these international maneuverings was a war in the Middle East with all of its attendant dangers to the world. Mr. Laqueur's style is easy to read, and the construction of the story he tells lends both interest and excitement. He has attached an appendix containing speeches by U Thant, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Abba Eban, and Gen. Itzhak Rabin which vividly illustrate the complex issues and emotional atmosphere. Mr. Laqueur has written a thought-provoking analysis that is both enlightening and entertaining.

R.L. DODD
Commander, U.S. Navy

LeMay, Curtis E. *America Is in Danger*. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1968. 346p.

This book is a mirror of its author, gruff and blunt but honest. Underneath the words one feels the frustrations of a senior career military man who has been confronted by the "whiz kids" of the Pentagon. General LeMay provides the reader with the broad military issues that face the decisionmakers in the U.S. Government today. He punches to the gut point of these issues, criticizing past decisions with which he has disagreed. Most importantly, he does not stop with criticism, but offers solutions. Typical of his pungent approach is this statement on Vietnam: "the way to fight the war in North Vietnam is to fight it. Pussy footing with bombing pauses and exempting the vital targets is the way to lose it." He then follows with an eight-step campaign that "aspires to decisive victory." There are times when General LeMay becomes extremely parochial (Air Force) in his proposed solutions of the issues raised, but this does not detract from the value of the book. Rather, it provokes the military reader into thinking of alternatives. Public airing of military points of view of

military strategy is overdue. *America Is in Danger* is strongly recommended for reading by any American interested in the security of his country.

D.L. WARD
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

McKee, Alexander. *Farming the Sea*. London: Souvenir Press, 1967. 314p.

Farming the Sea was not written by the ordinary author who comes strolling down the pike. Alexander McKee is both an author of note and an experienced diver. This book displays a marvelous depth of research on a subject about which little was recorded prior to the 1960's. It is an interesting account of man's progress toward large-scale farming of tributaries, bays, and the open oceans. Although notable advance has been made in underwater diving since an Englishman, John Deane, invented the first really efficient diving dress in 1828, it was not until Jacques Yves Cousteau and Emile Gagnan invented the aqualung in 1940 that man's underwater capability was enhanced by several magnitudes. In 1962 undersea exploration began to perk; by 1966 interest began to boil; today the discussion of the ocean wonders is a routine household pastime.

The initial setting of this book is in the Portsmouth, Southsea area of England, but the author has focused on many parts of the world as he traces man's progress in fish farming. One immediately learns that trout farming in Europe is an old vocation; that the 1953 artificial reefs composed of ear bodies that were laid off the coast of Alabama were so successful that sportsmen and commercial fishermen alike have promoted the building of many more; that the North Sea has been used as a fish-farming laboratory. The reader will be impressed by the extent to which research, theory, and practice have quietly advanced for years in the North Sea. This book is recommended not only for the casual reader but also for

the student who wishes to become versed in man's progress in harvesting the oceans.

R.W. NIESZ
Captain, U.S. Coast Guard

Sheldon, Walter J. *Hell or High Water*. New York: Macmillan, 1968. 340p.

The title of this book would lead one to believe that it is solely an account of the Inchon landing of 15 September 1950. In reality it is an account of the first 90 days of the Korean war. Approximately one-third of the book is devoted to the invasion of South Korea by the North Koreans and the stand at the Pusan perimeter by the United Nations forces under Gen. Walton H. Walker. One-third deals with the planning for, and the conduct of, the landing itself. The remaining third covers the period from the landing up through the fall of Seoul. Sheldon is objective and fairly thorough in his presentation and has been particularly successful in making his book very readable rather than just a dull recitation of the facts. Included is some fine insight into Gen. Douglas MacArthur's character and personality. His insistence on the operation's being held at the time and place which he specified despite the skepticism of almost all concerned (including the Joint Chiefs of Staff) is a real tribute to his genius. Many lessons are to be learned from the Inchon landing, not the least of which is that luck goes with boldness. At any number of points during the entire operation, extreme good fortune turned what could have been a disaster into a brilliant success. However, one should never forget that "good luck" is often the natural outcome of intelligence and hard work. The author covers the friction between Gen. Edward M. Almond, the corps commander of the invasion force, and his two division commanders (one Army and one Marine). He attempts to give an accurate account of the causes of this friction and concludes that it was pri-

marily a matter of three strong, capable officers, each with his own opinions, and each operating under tremendous strain.

In the final analysis, Sheldon's book is one of the most unbiased reports of this Korean action to date. There are some errors and contradictions, but

these are of minor importance and do not really detract from this valuable addition to what has already been written about MacArthur's last, and probably greatest, amphibious operation.

W.S. HATHAWAY
Colonel, U.S. Army



Readers' Comments

This section has been established to provide a forum for the useful exchange of ideas between *Naval War College Review* readers and the Naval War College.

Unofficial comments by the readers on articles which appear in the *Review* are encouraged and will be considered for publication in subsequent issues.

Comments should be addressed to: The Editor, *Naval War College Review*, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island 02840



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The ability of a commander to comprehend a situation and act promptly is the talent which great men have of conceiving in a moment all the advantages of the terrain and the use that they can make of it with their army.

*Frederick The Great: Instructions
for His Generals, 1747*