

1967

Halfway to 1984

J. E. Godfrey
U.S. Navy

Gladwyn Jebb

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review>

Recommended Citation

Godfrey, J. E. and Jebb, Gladwyn (1967) "Halfway to 1984," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 20 : No. 5 , Article 12.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol20/iss5/12>

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

coequal partner of the United States, and the Gaullist Europe as a third power in competition with the United States and the Soviet-dominated Eurasian grouping. He indicates that none will prevail in pure form and that the only true form of world security still requires a balance of power between superpowers.

R.W. BATES
Commander, U.S. Navy

Gladwyn, H.M. Gladwyn Jebb, Baron. *Halfway to 1984*.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1966.
89 p.

Lord Gladwyn, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, assisted in drafting the United Nations Charter and was acting Secretary-General in 1946. He subsequently became Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations, then British Ambassador to France. Currently, he holds a number of positions, including those of President of the Atlantic Treaty Association and Chairman of "Britain in Europe," and he is the Liberal representative to the Council of Europe and the Western European Union. This short, fascinating book is based on lectures that he delivered under the auspices of the School of International Affairs at Columbia University. In broad but related strokes, Lord Gladwyn paints a picture of the centers, conflicts, and responsiveness of power since World War II. He writes from the vantage point of a participant, active analyst, and observer, and does so with great candor--leaving the reader to agree or dissent from his clear interpretation of events of the period. The world is indeed about halfway from the end of World War II to 1984, a date made famous in the title of a 1949 work by the late George Orwell, who described and prophesied the state of the world 35 years in the future. Gladwyn disregards some of Orwell's sociological predictions and other "nightmarish" facets of it, but also claims that the distance already covered toward fulfillment of the remarkable prophecy is incredible. The three parts of the book--past, present, and future--are entitled: "The Struggle for Power since World War II," "The Present Nuclear Stalemate or Balance of Terror," and "The Superpowers of the Future." The first two chapters are essentially historical fact enhanced by interesting interpretations. In the third chapter, Gladwyn turns to the great problems of the future: regional power blocs, automation, industrialization, population growth, and food production. Although

generally optimistic, he expresses concern about the capacity of industry to produce an ever-increasing leisure class. On the optimistic side, he says that everything since World War II might well have been very much worse and that we can say with satisfaction, in the words of D.H. Lawrence, "Look, we have come through." On the other hand, he surveys today's world as a curious period of which it can be said, "We are between two worlds: one dead, the other powerless to be born."

J.E. GODFREY
Captain, U.S. Navy

Warburg, James P. *The United States in the Postwar World*. New York: Atheneum, 1966. 327 p.
(E 744 .W287)

James P. Warburg is a harsh judge of the wisdom of American foreign policy in the post-World War II period. He contends that the United States has had a "myopic and unbalanced view" of the world situation which made for distortion of her foreign policy. Fear of communism and Soviet Union ambitions are singled out as the dominant factors behind the U.S. world outlook. This obsession with fear is considered to be the cause for serious U.S. mistakes both in what she did and what she failed to do. The most serious error was to use the wealth of American resources in an attempt to contain militarily the Communist threat of world conquest. Other identified errors brought on by the Communist scare are the failure to reach a peace settlement in Europe, failure to bring atomic energy under effective control and thereby head off the nuclear arms race, overcommitment of American power in Asia, the neglect of Latin America, and the bungling of intervention in the Middle East. Mr. Warburg devotes about 85 percent of his book to outlining U.S. foreign policy failures and their causes. Each presidential administration is scored for the oversimplification of its analysis of the postwar crisis, which made the Soviet Union the devil, and for overlooking all too often, opportunities to capitalize to U.S. advantage by meeting needs in connection with the worldwide revolution of rising expectations. Only the Kennedy Administration is spared. It is credited in its short reign with changing the whole direction of U.S. foreign policy.

While the skill of Mr. Warburg in the construction of his case against the course of American foreign policy is admirable, the reader found him short