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The United States in the Postwar World

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generally optimistic, he expresses concern about the capacity of industry to produce an ever-increasing leisure class. On the optimistic side, he says that everything since World War II might well have been very much worse and that we can say with satisfaction, in the words of D.H. Lawrence, "Look, we have come through." On the other hand, he surveys today's world as a curious period of which it can be said, "We are between two worlds: one dead, the other powerless to be born."

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Warburg, James P. *The United States in the Postwar World*. New York: Atheneum, 1966. 327 p.
(E 744 .W287)

James P. Warburg is a harsh judge of the wisdom of American foreign policy in the post-World War II period. He contends that the United States has had a "myopic and unbalanced view" of the world situation which made for distortion of her foreign policy. Fear of communism and Soviet Union ambitions are singled out as the dominant factors behind the U.S. world outlook. This obsession with fear is considered to be the cause for serious U.S. mistakes both in what she did and what she failed to do. The most serious error was to use the wealth of American resources in an attempt to contain militarily the Communist threat of world conquest. Other identified errors brought on by the Communist scare are the failure to reach a peace settlement in Europe, failure to bring atomic energy under effective control and thereby head off the nuclear arms race, overcommitment of American power in Asia, the neglect of Latin America, and the bungling of intervention in the Middle East. Mr. Warburg devotes about 85 percent of his book to outlining U.S. foreign policy failures and their causes. Each presidential administration is scored for the oversimplification of its analysis of the postwar crisis, which made the Soviet Union the devil, and for overlooking all too often, opportunities to capitalize to U.S. advantage by meeting needs in connection with the worldwide revolution of rising expectations. Only the Kennedy Administration is spared. It is credited in its short reign with changing the whole direction of U.S. foreign policy.

While the skill of Mr. Warburg in the construction of his case against the course of American foreign policy is admirable, the reader found him short

on insight. He goes to considerable length to identify the causes for U.S. failures, including Truman's Baptist religion which gave him a conviction of revealed truth as to "right" and "wrong," and Eisenhower's hatred of war which was influenced strongly by his mother, a member of the pacifist sect of River Brethren. Yet, his sharp dissenting views on American foreign policy are made with full benefit of how things have come to be in 1966, without acknowledgment of his advantage. He does not attempt to deal with the meager knowledge available in the United States during the early postwar years to help her leaders and people to understand and evaluate the Soviet Union and communism. Likewise, he omits mention of the vast amount of study that there has been in the ensuing years on the language, history, culture, economics, and sociology of the Soviet Union, making for far more sophisticated American understanding today. To the credit of Mr. Warburg, he does go on record at the end of the book with what he sees as needing to be done in the future to improve U.S. foreign policy, and his proposals are not as far out of line with current Washington trends as the reader might expect on the basis of the earlier criticism. Likewise, he demonstrates his ambivalence by acknowledging that, with all her shortcomings, the United States has done more for other nations and peoples in the last 20 years than any other country has done in the long history of man.

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Linden, Carl A. *Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership 1957-1964*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. 270 p.

After researching a wide variety of Soviet published material, Carl A. Linden has chronologically listed an analysis of the major issues faced by Khrushchev from 1957 to 1964. That he was never a "totalitarian" leader in the real sense becomes obvious as the author assesses the interactions within the oligarchy. Although his denigration of Stalin, his pro-consumer, pro-agriculture economic concepts, and the "dogmatism-revisionism" issues form major portions of this work, it is the less tangible but continuous struggle between Khrushchev and his challengers that was most illuminating to the reviewer. In Linden's portrayal, Khrushchev's efforts to implement his policies formed a pattern. His method was to ask