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CURRENT SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY

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by

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Earlier this year the former chief of staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, Marshal Vasili Sokolovskii, made the following statement at a news conference which was held on 17 February 1965. I quote: "The Soviet Union is armed with intercontinental and global missiles whose nuclear warheads are equal to 100 million tons of TNT." This announcement was amplified by the current Soviet defense minister, Marshal Rodyon Malinovskii, who is cited by the official organ of the Soviet armed forces, *Krasnaya Zvezda,* as having boasted that these Russian ICBMs, with their 100-megaton warheads, "will sweep from the face of the earth all industrial and administrative-political centers of the United States." About the same time that these words appeared in print at Moscow, a leading American intellectual wrote here in the United States that he had found great hope for peace during a visit to Russia when he saw hanging in the old country estate of Tolstoi a picture of William Lloyd Garrison inscribed, "Liberty for each, for all, and forever." Gentlemen! When the cobwebs of a deserted manor house, dating back to pre-1917 Russia, excite otherwise useful minds of our day, I submit that we should face with increased anxiety the greatest seduction of our time.

I would like to discuss in my introduction the evolution of Soviet military doctrine in three phases since the end of World War II. I will speak very briefly of the first and second phases and then concentrate on the current phase. Initially, between 1945 and 1953 while Stalin was still alive, a struggle by conservative tendencies in USSR strategic thought was apparent against the process of growth required by the military revolution. This period, if we read

Soviet writings published during these years, was dominated by Stalin's concepts of the five permanently operating military factors to achieve victory: a stable rear, high morale, divisions adequate in quantity and quality, good weapons, and skillful command. Obviously, this is not something that Stalin himself had thought up; these were basic principles of warfare. Any Soviet author writing in the field had to give lip service to them, quoted them, and apparently was intimidated from introducing any innovation.

On 5 March 1953, Stalin died and that was the end of the first postwar phase in Soviet military doctrine. The second phase lasted roughly from 1954 to 1958, and here we note a liberation of Soviet military thought from Stalinist dogmatism and the beginning of strategic planning for the nuclear age. The greatest momentum in this modernization process was achieved, while Marshal Georgi Zhukov held the office of defense minister between the years 1955 and 1957.

The noteworthy aspect about this period is that it was initiated apparently by the military and not the political leadership. Secondly, no major revision actually occurred in doctrine, but rather what one witnessed was an adaptation of nuclear weapons and jet aviation to traditional World War II concepts of warfare. Finally, this period was also characterized by an unusually high expenditure of funds for the training of skilled personnel, for military hardware, and for research and development.

I would like to tell you a story which may not be true, but it makes a good story, about Marshal Zhukov. He had helped Khrushchev maintain his position and indeed eliminate the anti-Party group in June 1957, from the Presidium of the Communist Party. A few months later, in October, Khrushchev thought that this man perhaps might be infected with Bonapartism and that he represented a potential threat. Hence, Zhnkov was sent on a good-will mission to Eastern Europe. He went to various capitals and finally arrived in Belgrade. Now, from Belgrade Zhukov took a plane back to Moscow. He sent a radio message to indicate when he would land. But when his plane landed, there was nobody at the airport to meet him. He thought that perhaps the radio message had not been received. No band, no marshals, no members of the Presidium. He stepped off the plane, wearing his resplendent uniform. These Soviet officers just have to be endowed with double-barreled chests to wear the medals that hang from both sides of their jackets.

Carrying his baton, Zhukov walked off the airplane. A civilian stepped up toward him and handed him a copy of *Pravda.* Zhukov thought, "What is this? Doesn't he understand that I am a Marshal of the Soviet Union and Minister of Defense?" You know, they have seven stars for rank in the Soviet Union: one star for a Major General, two stars for a Lieutenant General, three stars for a Colonel General, and four stars for a General of the Army. Finally, of course, they have no more place for these small stars on their epaulets, so they make big stars. The Marshal of type forces, of course, has a big star. Then comes a Chief Marshal of type forces (armor, aviation, etc.) who has an intermediate star. Finally, a Marshal of the Soviet Union has the biggest star.

So this man Zhukov walks down from the airplane in all of his regalia, takes the newspaper, and looks at it. Soviet papers, if you have noticed, usually run only four pages and are very simple to read. Zhukov ran through pages one, two, and three. At the bottom of page four he noticed a brief item, saying that he had resigned his position as minister of defense. Nobody heard of Zhukov for a number of years, but finally he emerged, not taking the salute but standing on the podium in Moscow, during the 20th anniversary parade of the victory over Germany this past May of 1965.

During that second period, the fundamental strategic concept had remained unchanged. Soviet armed forces were to represent an effective combination of all services capable of conducting both total war and the limited variety. That concept was upset by Khrushchev himself by means of a shift in the concentration of USSR military power in favor of strategic missile forces. This third phase, a new doctrinal revision, opened with the secret debate held at a plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. We know that this debate took place. Since it was secret, obviously we do not have a transcript of it. But later on Khrushchev made a public speech before the Supreme Soviet in January 1960, in which he indicated what had happened. Apparently, dnring the secret debate a compromise had been reached between the professional military leadership and Khrushchev. The military wanted to maintain a large standing army (they were concentrating on snbstantial theater forces), whereas Khrushchev desired to retrench by reducing the armed forces by one third and relying to a greater extent on missile deterrence as well as counterdeterrence. What is meant by counterdeterrence, of course, is the countering and neutralizing of the American use of deterrence to meet indirect Soviet challenges.

Regarding conventional forces, Khrushchev stated in his speech to the Supreme Soviet in January 1960, and I quote: "Military aviation has been almost completely replaced by missiles." Then, about the navy: "Surface ships can no longer play the role that they played in the past." In this same address, Khrushchev expressed confidence that the USSR would achieve a decisive technological breakthrough. He did not say in what way, but this was the gist of his idea. One of the chief motives for retrenchment involved the cost of this mammoth standing army, while also adding to offensive and defensive weapons systems. In other words, the Soviets did not have the resources to allocate for both the strategic missile forces and maintain a large standing army.

The strategic missile forces apparently number about 200,000 men, according to a West German magazine, *Soldat und Technik*. The Institute for Strategic Studies in London, which is probably the best unclassified source, indicates 130,000 as the strength. At any rate, I think that the relevant point here is that the "New Look" trend in Moscow precipitated an extended debate among senior officers which has resulted in a more penetrating analysis regarding the nature of modern warfare.

One should note that there existed strong conservative tendencies throughout the military hierarchy. This conservative inclination brought about the release of two senior officers. These individuals had never openly or publicly announced their support for Khrushchev's new policy. One was Marshal Sokolovskii, whom I quoted above. This man, chief of staff for many years, was relieved in April of 1960. The other person was Marshal Ivan S. Konev, commanding officer of the Warsaw Pact Forces or the East European alliance system. He was replaced in July of 1960 by Marshal Andrei Grechko. Both of these individuals had been first deputy ministers of defense. In other words, they ranked as Number Two and Number Three in the military hierarchy, just below the defense minister. I think it is noteworthy that both of these individuals were the last hold-overs from the Zhukov military administration. In other words, they had been in power in these respective positions while Zhukov was minister of defense.

Since that time, eleven of the fourteen key positions in the Soviet hierarchy have been held by members of the so-called Stalingrad clique. What was the Stalingrad clique? This comprised a group of generals and marshals who had fought on southern fronts during World War II. Many of them participated in the Battle

of Stalingrad. For example, Malinovskii himself who is defense minister belongs to this clique. It is interesting to note that Malinovskii, between 1945 and 1955, directed Soviet forces in the Far East. It was his headquarters in Siberia, we know today, which planned the invasion by North Korea against South Korea. The first deputy minister and commanding officer for the Warsaw Treaty forces, Marshal Andrei Grechko, is a member of the Stalingrad clique. The chief of staff, Marshal Zakharov, was with the 64th army at Stalingrad. He is also a member of that clique.

It should be mentioned that the man who replaced Khrushchev last October, Leonid Brezhnev, had the military rank of colonel. He was actually a political commissar with the 18th army in the Caucasus, so he also fought in the south. All of these individuals are members of the Stalingrad clique. They had much more in common with one another (after all, they were fighting) than with the men who were back at supreme headquarters in Moscow or elsewhere far behind the front—the people who were making the decisions for the entire war. We know that differences existed, and we know that a compromise was reached. However, this compromise did not last very long, primarily because certain developments took place within the Soviet domestic arena, and there were fluctuations in the level of international tension. So let us now consider how Khrushchev's new military policy came to be modified.

Khrushchev had announced a cut of 1.2 million men. He said that the Soviet armed forces at that time numbered 3.6 million, and they would be reduced to some 2.4 million. This process was to take place over a two-year period, presumably during 1960 and 1961, so that by early 1962 the reduction would be completed. International developments and domestic problems changed this policy. First came the crash of the U-2 near Sverdlovsk, right in the middle of the Soviet Union on 1 May 1960. This afforded the military an opportunity to request reconsideration by Khrushchev and the other Party leaders of their avowed policy. Then, there arose the internal problem of integrating these thousands of officers who were being released. Obviously, if a man is a field grade officer, he does not want to drive a tractor in the Virgin Lands. He would rather do something that his background had prepared him for, and it has not prepared him for driving a tractor. So this created a problem.

Then, in the summer of 1961, came the serious political-military confrontation in Berlin where American tanks moved right up against Check-Point Charlie and Soviet tanks came up from the other side of the iron curtain. This series of demonstrations by both sides raised the level of international tension. In July of 1961, the Soviet Union suspended further reduction in its armed forces. Next, it held in uniform additional men who were due for routine discharge. Thirdly, a sizable number of reserves was called up. Finally, overt defense expenditures jumped by almost fifty per cent, to be specific 44.9%, from 9.2 to 13.4 billion rubles. These were overt expenditures. This is not what the USSR actually spends. It has something called the ministry for medium machine building industry, which is the atomic energy program. The Soviets have six different ministries that actually work for defense. So the best available calculations are that the Soviet Union spends not twelve or thirteen billion, but somewhere in the neighborhood of thirty billion dollars each year. The United States spends fifty billion, or in that neighborhood. But actually, thirty billion dollars in the Soviet Union is proportionally more than fifty billion dollars in the United States. Why? Because the American gross national product is more than double that of the USSR, so really the latter is spending at the rate of about sixty billion dollars per year on defense.

The Soviets also broke the three-year informal moratorium on testing nuclear weapons in September 1961. This was climaxed, as you will recall, by the 57-megaton monster H-bomb explosion. All of these moves were clearly favored by the military, but the decisions were made by the political leadership as measures to meet Soviet deterrence policy. At the most recent 22nd Communist Party Congress (there is supposed to be another one in the spring of 1966), defense minister Malinovskii justified the retention of a large standing army by accusing the United States of building up conventional forces and preparing for local wars.

In view of the high priority and alleged superiority of strategic missiles claimed by Khrushchev, observers in the West considered that the USSR probably would press for political advantage. The groundwork for such moves had been laid through clever propaganda projecting the image of a missile gap from which the United States was likely to suffer through the mid-1960s. In fact, America has always been superior to the Soviets in this respect and today has at least a 3½ to 1 superiority just in ICBMs and Polaris missiles not counting SAC bombers which are capable of delivering a nuclear payload. (TABLE 1) Soviet military leaders apparently

TABLE I

U.S. STILL WAY OUT FRONT IN THE MISSILE RACE

In the past year virtually no over-all change in America's 3½-to-1 strategic lead over Russia. While Soviets added to ICBM force, U.S. kept pace with heavy additions to its atomic-submarine fleet.

	U.S.	U.S.S.R.
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles	854	270
Submarine-Borne Missiles	544	120
Total	1,398	390

Source: Adopted from "The Military Balance, 1965-66" by the Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

800 MINUTEMAN I ICBM'S. Instant-firing solid-fueled missiles, able to reach Russia from these bases: 200 at Warren AFB near Cheyenne, Wyo. 150 at Malmstrom AFB near Great Falls, Mont. 150 at Minot AFB in North Dakota. 150 at Whiteman AFB near Knob Noster, Mo. 150 at Ellsworth AFB near Rapid City, S.D. Coming: 200 Minuteman II's at Grand Forks AFB in North Dakota and at Malmstrom. Eventually, entire force of 1,000 will be the "second generation" Minuteman II with range of more than 9,000 miles.

54 TITAN II ICBM'S. Fast-firing liquid-fueled missiles, in position at these bases: 18 at McConnell AFB near Wichita, Kans. 18 at Little Rock AFB in Arkansas. 18 at Davis-Monthan AFB near Tucson, Ariz. Removed: 180 Atlas and Titan I missiles, now obsolescent.

544 POLARIS MISSILES. 16 aboard each of 34 nuclear-powered submarines. Half are on patrol at any one time well within range of Russia's most vital targets. Planned: 112 more Polaris missiles aboard 7 submarines. Eventually, all will be refitted with superaccurate, more-powerful Poseidon missiles.

Source: U.S. Department of Defense.

had always realized their inferiority and became concerned about the growing United States missile superiority. They did not, of course, believe Khrushchev who once had said in a speech that missiles were coming off the assembly line like sausages. This was not happening, because missile production is a very sophisticated problem.

The situation also must have coincided with Khrushchev's great frustration. I can just conjure up an image of him in his office at the Kremlin, down on his hauds and knees chewing on the rug, becanse he could not achieve any political payoff, despite the increase in Soviet military power by a factor of approximately four. Khrushchev could not achieve any political payoff, despite the artificially created tension and various ultimata that were being handed to the United States regarding Berlin. Hence, it was decided to offset the real missile gap, that is Soviet inferiority, by a daring placement of ICBMs in Cnba.

Nobody knows precisely with whom this idea originated and, naturally, no one has come forward since it proved to be a fiasco in order to claim post facto credit for the idea. But there is a twenty-nine-point, forty-page indictment of Khrushchev (I have not seen it, bnt am sure our intelligence organizations have the document) released to all Soviet agitation and propaganda personnel. The latter then went to the Primary Party Organizations, the lowest ranking units, with the official explanation why Khrushchev had been thrown out. Reportedly, of the twenty-nine points one indicted Khrushchev for pntting the missiles into Cuba initially and a second for taking them out.

Successful implementation of this Cuban project would have complicated, if not degraded completely, the defense of North America. The prospects of such a dramatic and sudden improvement in the Soviet military strategic posture vis-á-vis the United States by means of a so-called quick fix, would have given the USSR immense prestige. Even more important, by reducing Western confidence and cohesiveness, Moscow would have attained increased leverage in particular for a new confrontation over Berlin. It would have been also most satisfying to Khrushchev himself, if he could emulate the United States by placing a base close to our borders which paralleled American missile bases around the periphery of the Soviet Union. Suffice to say that while Khrushchev cut his diplomatic losses fairly effectively (he claimed that the missiles had only been in there to protect Cuba, and after we promised not to invade Cuba he took them out), he had certainly

not met either the political or military aims which led to the Cuban missile gambit. This may have, indeed, played a part in Khrushchev's ouster almost exactly two years later.

Let me now briefly go into Soviet writings on war. Everything that I am giving you comes from unclassified sources. It is interesting to note that it was not until 4 April 1962, that *Krasnaya Zvezda,* the Soviet daily newspaper put out by the defense ministry began to use for the first time the term "military revolution." This was done by publishing a letter from a certain Lieutenant E. Martynov, who had asked the editors to explain the concept. Gentlemen, this was nine years after the first H-bomb, five years after the first Soviet ICBM and *sputnik.* The mere fact that nobody asked this junior officer where he had slept away all of these years indicates to me at least that the question may have been inspired. In other words, perhaps the lieutenant never existed. This is a favorite technique of the Soviets when they want to launch some kind of an enlightenment campaign. Ever since April 1962, a series of articles has appeared in the USSR armed forces press by prominent military leaders and specialists. They all are published under the same heading: "The Revolution in Military Affairs, Its Significance and Consequences."

These are all didactic materials and intended for instructional purposes among officers, generals, and admirals. As a recent illustration, on 15 January 1965, a Rear Admiral F. Sizov, stated in an article which appeared in *Krasnaya Zvezda:* "A new world war will definitely become the last decisive clash between two contradictory social systems–capitalism and socialism [what he means by socialism is communism]. Such a war will be conducted with unheard of ferocity according to the principle of *Kto Kogo* [who will bury whom]:" In other words, a war to the finish.

Although these writings do say that war is no longer inevitable, they also indicate that it can break out in five different ways: The first situation envisages a surprise attack by the United States against the USSR, when we see that our sources of raw materials are disappearing within an expanding world communist camp. Then, America strikes at the Soviet Union as an act of desperation. To quote the former chief of staff, Marshal Sokolovskii who incidentally, even though he was relieved, has been holding press conferences and writing articles. In *Krasnaya Zvezda* for 28 August 1964, he states: "The aggressive imperialist bloc of NATO is holding, on an alert basis, large numbers of ground troops and tactical aviation which are equipped with nuclear weapons. These units are being

prepared to launch military operations with the use of such weapons." And probably if these people dream, this is the nightmare that wakes them up in a cold sweat.

TABLE 2

COMPARATIVE STRATEGIC STRENGTH, 1965

CATEGORY	NATO	WARSAW PACT
MISSILE AND AIR POWER:		
ICBMs	854	270
Navy Missiles	544	120
IRBMs & MRBMs	----	750
Heavy Bombers	630	200
Medium Bombers	580	1,400
SEAPOWER:		
Carriers	37	----
Cruisers	33	20
Escorts	593	130
Submarines:		
Conventional	181	443
Nuclear	54	30
LAND POWER:		
On active duty	3,121,000	3,145,000

It would appear that Khrushchev himself had come very close to accepting the principle of mutual deterrence. However, even he stopped short of complete agreement on this point because of the second way in which war might break ont: by accident or miscalculation through human or mechanical error that involve two dangers, according to Soviet writers. An irresponsible leader might come to power in a country that possesses both nuclear weapons and delivery systems. A misreading of intelligence or a faulty warning system or even a temporarily deranged pilot on air patrol could precipitate a nnclear exchange. If we look

at some of the movies that have appeared recently, such as "Doctor Strangelove" or "Seven Days in May," I sometimes wonder where these scripts are written: in Hollywood or in Moscow.

A third way in which war might break out, according to the Soviets, is where a limited or a civil war escalates into a global conflict after intervention by a nuclear power. For example, the Arab states backed by the USSR attack Israel, and Israel is supported perhaps by France. A civil war in Iraq or perhaps even the war in Vietnam today, with volunteers comprising regular armed forces coming in from the outside. And, of course, most recently the Pakistan-Indian conflict which according to the news apparently has ended in a cease-fire. Most of these sites mentioned in the foregoing remain outside of the NATO, CENTO, SEATO, or the Warsaw Pact areas. In other words, they are not covered by any one of the various alliance systems.

Not all causes of war are beyond Moscow's control. There are two other conditions or circumstances under which war might break out, where Moscow itself would control the circumstances. One might involve a preemptive strike by the USSR against the United States or against an ally of the United States. A discussion of a preemptive strike we find in Soviet literature as far back as 1955 to 1957; in other words, ten years ago. Major General N.A. Talenskii, and General of the Army, P.A. Kurochkin, were writing during this period. Of course, that was the time when strategic bombers could have been detected in time enough to launch a preemptive strike. These two authors claimed this would not really consist of preemptive war, because the Soviet strike would depend upon accurate intelligence of an imminent attack against the USSR. Ten years later, just the other day, this same man Kurochkin, who is now commandant of the M.V. Frunze Military Academy in Moscow complains, and I quote: "Ever more frequently one hears [American] voices about the right of the United States first to launch a nuclear strike against the USSR." So now, the Soviets are claiming that perhaps we are the ones contemplating this right. They do not cite any literature on this, and there are no footnotes given, so I do not know who the alleged American source may be.

Now that ICBMs are operational and in significant quantities, with a warning of only four minutes if launched from Western Europe and twenty minutes at the most from North America, I think the situation has not radically changed because of the development of space satellites. These detect and warn against operational

launching, and this would appear to make a Soviet preemptive strike even more applicable in the future.

Finally, the fifth set of conditions envisages a war precipitated by a call from an ally on the USSR to honor an alliance obligation. Here, the key provision of the Sino-Soviet treaty of 14 February 1950 is such that an attack by Japan or an ally of Japan (meaning the United States) against Red China would trigger the alliance. If hostilities were to involve the United States, let us say in the Formosa Straits, Peking might demand a Soviet nuclear strike at American bases in the Pacific or even against the West Coast. Then Moscow would be faced with a decision in favor of a preventive war or would refuse to uphold its defense treaty. Although the former appears unlikely, in other words a preemptive blow appears unlikely, it cannot be precluded now that Khrushchev is out of office. Nobody really knows what the future may hold. Peking may have come to the conclusion that the Soviet gnarantee is virtually useless. *Izvestiya,* the official Soviet government newspaper, not so long ago quoted the Red Chinese foreign minister, Marshal Chen Yi, as having cast doubt on the 1950 treaty in these words: "For us [Red China], the Soviet defense has no value." He also described the Chinese People's Repnblic as a nonaligned country. *Izvestiya* went on to comment and stated: "In effect, Chen Yi no longer considers China a part of the world socialist camp." Even more recently, *Radio Belgrade* on 7 April 1965 quoted Premier Chou En-lai as saying that "In a regional, limited war China will ask nobody for help, not even the [communist] Bloc."

The same theoretical situation prevails with regard to Eastern Europe, with the Warsaw Treaty which was signed on 15 May 1955. At the seventh session of its political consultative committee on 19-20 January 1965, NATO was warned against arming West Germany with nuclear weapons. A cartoon in *Krasnaya Zvezda* of 14 September 1965 declares, "In one of the cities in the Federal Republic of [West] Germany, there operates a special military school where enlisted men and officers of the *Bundeswehr* [West German armed forces] are being prepared to conduct warfare with the use of atomic, bacteriological, and chemical weapons." A similar one appears almost daily. The source in parentheses states: "from newspapers." They never give the exact source. The instructor is shown with an Iron Cross decoration, and the enlisted men and officers with the Nazi swastikas.

In the statement mentioned above, the Soviets warn that if West Germany were given access to nuclear weapons, then the Warsaw Pact would take some kind of action. This warning was reinforced by joint USSR-East German maneuvers, held this past 5-11 April 1965, which temporarily closed the expressway between West Germany and Berlin and also harassed certain air corridors into West Berlin. That was followed up by summer amphibious maneuvers that took place off the coast of Bulgaria along the Black Sea. In recent photographs of Soviet troops, men are shown wearing protective masks apparently in anticipation of bacteriological or gas or perhaps even nuclear warfare. A picture from a July 1965 issue of *Krasnaya Zvezda*, depicts an amphibious operation with men equipped with gas masks. These men incidentally were Soviet Marines. I will comment on that later.

What kind of a war then do Soviet military writers foresee? Again, we have to piece this together from various types of information. They envisage an exchange of nuclear strikes which may not annihilate either side. Military operations would then continue on land, sea, and in the air, possibly over an extended period of time until the adversary had been destroyed and his territory occupied. They call this a "protracted war."

The other possibility is a conflict of the *Blitzkrieg* type or lightning warfare. Soviet writers use this term which the Nazis introduced during World War II, although such a war would be of much shorter duration than the military campaigns of that war. If we are to believe a recent authoritative statement (and I say authoritative because it appeared as an unsigned article in *Krasnaya Zvezda* for 28 July 1965, with the notation: "Materials for Lectures and Seminars," i.e., for dissemination), ICBMs are no longer considered decisive. I quote: "Realistically evaluating the high military capability of [USSR] Strategic Missile Forces, Soviet military doctrine considers that victory over the aggressor can be attained only as a result of combined operations by all types of armed forces, all kinds of weapons being used in connection with their military possibilities [and] in close cooperation."

My comment is that this statement probably reflects the influence regained by the senior ground force officers as a result of Khrushchev's fall. Similar statements will probably be unlikely once his successor reestablishes firm Party control in the Soviet Union. We should note here that current Soviet military doctrine on nuclear war envisages the destruction not only of military objectives but also of industrial and political targets. In other

words, everything that feeds the military machine. Again I quote Marshal Sokolovskii from the article cited above who says: "Much discussion in the West has been heard about a so-called controlled nuclear war, about firing nuclear weapons only at military targets and the armed forces. This concept of a controlled [and he puts this word in quotes] 'nuclear war' represents a demagogic hypocrisy on the part of the militaristic circles of imperialism." In other words, they are going to hit everything.

The Soviet armed forces have been reorganized to conform to this concept of unlimited war. I have prepared a chart showing the individuals who are in charge of these various components within the Soviet armed forces. (CHART 1) You have Malinovskii up here. Joint Policy and Control is in the hands of Zakharov, the chief of staff. A.A. Epishev is only a colonel general but heads the Main Political Administration and, although he holds military rank is really a political commissar. Moskalenko runs the Chief Inspectorate. Bagramyan is Chief Directorate of the Rear. Here are the commands of the important force components: Ground Forces under Chuikov; Air Forces under Vershinin; Air Defense under Sudets; Navy under Fleet Admiral Gorshkov; and the Missile Forces under Krylov. All of these people are marshals, except for Gorshkov.

The small dots indicate full members of the Central Committee. One of them, Sudets, is only a candidate member of the Central Committee. Let me comment briefly also on Andrei Grechko, whose name I have already mentioned. He is in charge of the Warsaw Pact armed forces. He is also Commanding Officer of the groups of USSR forces stationed abroad–in East Germany, twenty divisions; in Poland (northern group of Soviet forces), two divisions; and in Hungary (southern group of Soviet forces), four divisions. So here abroad, outside of the USSR proper, you have twenty-six Soviet divisions under Grechko, who ranks Number Two in the military hierarchy, ahead of chief of staff Zakharov who is Number Three.

As far as Soviet troops are concerned, the ground forces obviously have the largest manpower. I have already shown you a table comparing NATO with Warsaw Pact forces. Probably something like two thirds of the 3.3 million total of Soviet troops alone today is in the ground forces. The latter are organized into 160 divisions, ten of these being airborne. The others are mostly either armored or motorized rifle units. They probably dispose of about 30,000 first-line tanks. Soviet troops have been trained under simulated conditions of nuclear warfare. This is why these

CHART I

USSR DEFENSE MINISTRY, 1965



gas masks appear in photographs. The USSR is placing more reliance on smaller autonomous units and, of course, it also possesses tactical missiles with ranges of anywhere from 10 to 450 miles. Any attack that may take place against Western Europe would be launched by these troops, i.e., the twenty-six divisions that are located ontside the Soviet Union proper.

As far as the Air Force is concerned, the USSR has abont 20,000 aircraft. They are grouped into different types. Yon have Front Aviation, and this would involve tactical air support. I would assume that about half of the available aircraft or 10,000 remain in this category. Then you have Fighter Aviation, which is under the Air Defense command. There is also Long-Range Aviation. Finally, you have aircraft which transport airborne troops, tbe ten divisions mentioned above. The thing to remember here again is that these air units would be under control of the ground commander. They would not be under Vershinin in combat but instead under Chuikov in the case of tactical air support. The commander of airborne troops would have direct control over aircraft for the transportation of his paratroopers.

The Navy under Fleet Admiral Giorshkov comprises four main fleets: Black, Baltic, White and Bering seas, and the Pacific Ocean. The surface units include something like twenty-five cruisers, 165 destroyers, 275 frigates, and about 1800 smaller vessels. The most important, obviously, is the Soviet submarine fleet. This totals about 450 units, 300 of these subs having been built since 1949, so they are relatively modern. About three fourths are ocean-going types, twenty-five of them nuclear-powered submarines. The source here is *Jane's Fighting Ships* (1963-1964). Then, finally, there is a Naval Air Arm, with about 4,000 aircraft, half of them being jets, and 1,000 light jet-bombers, as well as somewhere between 800 and 900 seaplanes.

TABLE 3

THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES

BRANCH	NUMBER
Army	2,200,000
Navy	460,000
Air Force	510,000
Security Troops	270,000
Total	3,440,000

Source: Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Communist Bloc and the Western Alliances: the Military Balance, 1964-1965* (London: November 1964).

I did mention but would like to talk briefly about Air Defense under Sudets. This is an organization which has not received too much publicity. Called literally, "Antiair and Antimissile Defense of the Country," it has received coequal status with the other branches of the armed forces and remains under the chief marshal of aviation. *PVO-Strany,* the abbreviation used in Russian, disposes of antiaircraft artillery, ground-to-air missiles, fighter interceptors, and even certain elements of the civil defense organization. The Soviets claimed this past March that they have anti-ICBM complexes around various cities. They were not specific as to which cities, but the claim appeared in *Krasnaya Zvezda.*

PVO-Strany is intended to carry on independently and to lessen the effects of nuclear strikes against the USSR. This objective is supported by the current seven-year plan, which ends on 31 December 1965, and which allocates forty per cent of all investments to such areas as the Urals, Siberia, the Soviet Far East, Kazakhstan, and Central Asia, that is, territories which would be relatively less damaged than European Russia in a nuclear war.

It remains essential, of course, that the bulk of the Soviet armed forces somehow survive and escape annihilation regardless of the destruction sustained by the civilian population centers. Here, I think it is worthwhile noting in an AP despatch from Moscow on 16 March 1965, which quoted Marshal Chuikov, the

man who commands Soviet ground forces as saying that the USSR was just then organizing a nationwide civil defense especially geared to cope with a nuclear attack. In other words, civilian population centers have a relatively low priority.

During phase one of a global conflict, a dispersal would probably take place into three major escape areas. An attempt might be made in the first place to occupy the NATO bridgehead of Western Europe, meaning of course, West Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Here again, the communist parties of France and Italy are relatively strong. They could give the support needed in terms of feeding and housing Soviet troops, because they would take over the civil administration. Also, the USSR presumably considers that the Uuited Srates might be a little hesitant to attack Western Europe with nuclear weapons. So this would be a good place for dispersal and snrvival. This is one good reason also why the Soviets would be frustrated if the plan which was proposed recently by the Inspector General of the West German armed forces, General Heinz Trettner, were accepted by NATO. This, if you recall, involved a plan to establish a nuclear belt along West German borders with Czechoslovakia and East Germany.

A second major area for dispersal might be the Middle East. This would represent a logical place for troops now located in Turkestan and the Trans-Caucasus military districts. These men could be moved into Afghanistan, where the Soviets are now building roads and giving substantial foreign aid in the form of loans to that country. Up to twenty divisions probably could "settle" in the more fertile parts of the Middle East and establish viable military camps there.

And then, thirdly, I would assume that plans probably exist to disperse Soviet forces into the Far East, where remote areas can be selected which are removed from any potential targets for nuclear bombardment. Here, possibly deployment into Outer Mongolia is being considered, i.e., the so-called Mongolian People's Republic which is definitely under USSR influence and, in effect, remains a Soviet satellite. As a matter of fact, it is even a member of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the East European economic organization. That is phase number one.

Phase two has many unknown factors. For example, what will be the extent of destruction in the USSR compared with the United

States and American bases overseas? The accuracy of the prediction by the Soviets which claims that both sides will continue warfare after phase one is important. Then also whether both sides or only one and which one would have any resources left for continued use in the production of nuclear weapons cannot be foreseen at present.

Current Soviet military doctrine foresees the firing of most, if not all, ICBMs in its first strike. This is a violation, as we all know, of one principle of war; economy of force. If neither side were capable of mounting any further nuclear strikes, then what will be the relationship in conventional forces? In the table on comparative strategic strength in 1965 between NATO and the Warsaw Pact (meaning the Soviet Union and all of Eastern Europe) you will notice that we have almost a thousand ICBMs compared with fewer than 300 for the USSR. In Navy missiles, again we are far ahead of the latter. IRBMs and MRBMs represent the only category where the Soviets dominate. They also have more medium bombers than we do. But again, these can be used only against Western Europe and not against the United States.

In terms of sea power, the Communist Bloc has no carriers as you know. There was a rumor in the *Foreign Report,* published by *The Economist of London* of 1 July 1965, that the Soviets are thinking of building a carrier. On the other hand, when they talk about American carriers, they always downgrade them. They are defined as "sitting ducks." But I think, the Soviet leaders are realizing the tremendous potentiality of carriers for amphibious warfare. In cruisers, escorts, and submarines they have many more than we do, although in nuclear ones we dominate. In terms of ground troops, the relationship is about equal, i.e., just over three million each.

I mentioned that the Soviets are trying to build an amphibious capability. Last July, for the first time, the USSR revealed that it was reestablishing a Marine Corps. The Soviets did have a Marine Corps in the past which they call "Sea Infantry." They had 500,000 men in the Marine Corps during World War II, but this was infantry which fought on the land. They fought as you recall in the defense of Moscow, Leningrad, and conducted only limited amphibious operations. As of July 1964, the USSR has reestablished a Marine Corps. Photographs have depicted some of these Marines. First of all, they are the only troops who wear berets. In a picture which appeared in *Krasnaya Zvezda* on 16 September 1964, they wore black uniforms, sailor-type shirts, and combat boots. In other words, the beret and the combat boots certainly

are meant to show that this is an elite force. When one reads descriptions of Soviet Marines, they are always considered to be the toughest and are called "black death."

What is the USSR's intended use of these Marines? Again, I quote from *Foreign Report* which I think has been relatively accurate in the past. It states that the Soviets are building the nucleus for a strategic bridgehead in Africa; namely, an air base at a place called Tamala in the northern bush conntry of Ghana. It will have an 11,000-foot runway. Well, there are no airplanes in Africa today that require such a long rnnway. The project will take some four years to complete and something like twenty million dollars. The USSR is putting its own labor and equipment into the construction. If this report is true, perhaps it may explain why the Soviet Union is rebuilding a Marine Corps, i.e., to establish amphibious bases in Africa and other areas.

The foregoing reconstruction of possible Soviet military strategy is based on open sources, as mentioned. It shows one thing, I think, namely that the USSR High Command is well advanced in its study of the kind of war that may have to be fought in the future. I think that there is a very practical danger to the USSR (and they realize this) from American bases overseas. The Soviets are making an attempt to reduce the number of these bases. Marshal Andrei Grechko, who was identified previously as the Commanding Officer of the Warsaw Pact forces, stated that United States strategic bases will increase tenfold in number by 1967 in comparison with 1961, according to *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 27 December 1963. It is not really important whether this is true. What remains significant is that the elimination of these bases represents a fundamental element in Soviet political, as well as military, strategy. I would like to run through some of these proposals very briefly.

The Soviet Uuion spousored initially, and somehow this has proliferated, the idea of nuclear-free zones. It started with the Adam Rapacki Plan by the communist minister of foreign affairs in Poland to denuclearize Central Europe. Tben came the East German "Sea of Peace" plan in the Baltic. The USSR suggested the same thing for the Balkans and the Adriatic. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana suggested an atom-free zone for Africa. Finally and most recently, of course, came the ten-nation resolutiou in the UN about Latin America.

Another aspect of this is the so-called Pugwash conferences. The fourteenth was held in Venice, Italy in April 1965. What happened here involved Soviet writers, soldiers, and diplomats who met with their counterparts from the West. The former were unanimous and "sincere" in their support of Soviet proposals for universal disarmament. The net result, if we did disarm, would be to paralyze American power through the elimination of armed forces and general staff, as well as their replacement by so-called militias. The term militia is used to mean a domestic police force. The effect would be simply that communist militias in the Soviet Union and the East European countries would rush to the assistance of any armed uprising or even attempted subversion by a communist party in Western Europe. Of course, there would be no United States forces available either on the continent of Europe or any ICBMs to strike back at the USSR.

Let me briefly mention the relationship between strategy and politics in a very few minutes. Chart II shows the probable military policy-making team in the Soviet Union as of 1965.

CHART II

PROBABLE MILITARY POLICY-MAKING TEAM, 1965

NAME	(AGE)	POSITION
1. Brezhnev	(58)	1st Secretary, CPSU
2. Podgorny	(61)	Unofficial 2nd Secretary
3. Shelepin	(46)	Deputy Premier
4. Kosygin	(60)	Premier
5. Mikoyan	(69)	Chairman, Supreme Soviet
6. Malinovskii		Defense Minister
7. Semichastny		KGB Chief (Secret Police)
8. Gromyko		Foreign Minister
9. Smirnov		Deputy Premier (Defense Indus.)
10. Novikov		Chairman, Supreme Sovnarkhoz

You will notice Brezhnev. He is fifty-eight. Podgorny, the Number Two man in the Party, who is in charge of cadres and organization, is sixty-one. Shelepin is forty-six and a man who bears watching. He is the former head of the KGB (secret police) and before that

headed the youth movement. Khrushchev put him in charge of the secret police to give it a good image. This man is currently a member of the Secretariat and of the Presidium, and he was, until recently, a deputy premier in the government and also in charge of the now apparently defunct Party-State Control Committee. Number Three man is Kosygin, the premier, and he is sixty years old. Mikoyan is sixty-nine. These five men are on the Presidium. They are the ones who make the decisions, because of their positions on the policy-making organ. If they need military advice, they call in Malinovskii; foreign policy advice, Gromyko; information on the defense industry, Smirnov; and finally, the economy in general, Novikov.

These are the men then who make the decisions, and you will notice that the military are not really represented in the top five. The military hierarchy in the USSR traditionally has accepted the famous Clausewitz dictum that strategy is subordinate to politics. Several years ago, however, Major General Talenskii, whom I have mentioned, described military strategy as "an active aid to policy, at times exerting decisive influence on its development, which phenomenon manifests itself in our times." Even more recently, the current chief of staff, Marshal Zakharov wrote, and I quote: "In a scholarly atmosphere research workers cannot be tolerated who try to lend weight to their superficial and primitive judgments by making reference sometimes even to somebody [Khrushchev?] who had no direct connection with military strategy." This was a recent article, appearing in *Krasnaya Zvezda* on 4 February 1965.

These people are trying to stake out some influence in the making of military strategy. The above remark probably reflects the ascendancy of the military to a certain extent following Khrushchev's ouster, and it is an ascendancy which certainly will last while the top political leaders are jockeying for power.

In a second edition of the 503-page book *Voennaya Strategiya (Military Strategy)* which was edited by fifteen top officers, the editor in chief being Marshal Sokolovskii, fewer than five pages discuss the relationship between the military and the politicians. Here is what is said, and I quote: "The essence of war as an extension of politics does not depend upon changes in techuology or armaments." In other words, the relationship remains the same. Nevertheless, prolonged and repeated crises in the Soviet Union could lead to an enhanced role for the military. This was the case in June 1957, when Khrushchev sought Zhukov's support against the majority of the Party Presidium. And it seems true to a lesser

extent today. Finally, it remains arguable whether or not further development in this direction (the ascendancy by the military) would increase the chances of war. Certainly, if one looks back at the history of both Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia, it was the Party leaders rather than the professional soldiers who conceived of and implemented the really disastrous policies.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Dr. Richard F. Staar (Ph.D., University of Michigan) is Professor of Political Science, Emory University. As an authority on the governments, politics and the International relations of the Soviet Bloc, Dr. Staar has visited in 18 European countries on both sides of the iron curtain. A professor since leaving government service in 1954 where he served with the CIA and Department of State as an intelligence research specialist, Dr. Staar speaks and reads seven foreign languages including Russian. He has lectured in both France and West Germany, and has been recording tapes for the Voice of America since 1957. In the 1963-1964 academic year, Dr. Staar occupied the Chester W. Nimitz Chair of Social and Political Philosophy at the Naval War College while on leave of absence from Emory University. He is a contributor to many professional journals and is author of *Communist Party Leadership: a Study in Elite Stability*, and *Poland, 1944-1962: the Sovietization of a Captive People*. Dr. Staar holds a commission of Major in the United States Marine Corps Reserve.