Naval War College Review

Volume 19
Number 2 *February*

Article 1

1966

February 1966 Full Issue

The U.S. Naval War College

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

VOL. XVIII, NO. 6 FEBRUARY 1966

CONTENTS

FOREWORD

The *Naval War College Review* was established in 1948 by the Chief of Naval Personnel in order that officers of the service might receive some of the educational benefits available to the resident students at the Naval War College.

The material contained in the *Review* is for the professional education of its readers. The frank remarks and personal opinions of the lecturers and authors are presented with the understanding that they will not be quoted. The remarks and opinions shall not be published nor quoted publicly, as a whole or in part, without specific clearance in each instance with the lecturer or author and the Naval War College.

Lectures are selected on the basis of favorable reception by Naval War College audiences, usefulness to service-wide readership, and timeliness. Research papers are selected on the basis of professional interest to readers.

The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the lecturers and authors, and are not necessarily those of the Navy Department or of the Naval War College.

C. L. Melson

C. L. Melson
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

ISSUED MONTHLY
U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R. I.

EDITORIAL BOARD

A STATEMENT BY THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS ON THE ROLE OF THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE IN THE PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL OFFICERS

The continuing security of our country and the achievement of worldwide peace have seldom been more dependent upon the wisdom and judgment which professional military leaders can contribute to the highest councils of our nation. The several joint and service colleges, designed to prepare selected officers for positions of higher responsibility, have thus assumed an importance greater than ever before.

The functions and mission of the Naval War College are defined in OPNAV INSTRUCTION 1520.12B of 3 April 1965. To prepare officers for higher responsibilities by increasing their knowledge continues to be the goal of the Naval War College. This unchanging task has had an expanding base of required knowledge as the rapid growth of science and technology encompasses all of the Navy's efforts.

In the course of a career, officers of the Navy develop a professional competence in naval science as a result of: (1) operational experience at sea, (2) service in the Navy Department and in the Shore Establishment, and (3) completion of professional and technical studies. To develop more fully this acquired competence and to prepare selected officers for positions of higher responsibility, an understanding of sea power combined with naval warfare and the interrelation of military, political and economic factors of national security is essential. As a part of the study program, the stimulation of intellectual curiosity and the development of a capacity for independent and objective reasoning are of primary importance. The Naval War College presents a course of study which, in combination with and building on the acquired experience of officer students, seeks to develop a scope and depth of understanding of the principles of naval warfare and national security which will equip these officers to serve in positions of high responsibility.

At the career point at which naval officers attend the Naval War College, they have been working very hard at sea and shore. Our career progression is such that the pace is intense. A year at the Naval War College offers an opportunity for a needed change of pace, a change in perspective and in pressure. In addition to formal matters of substance and procedure, the Naval War College opportunity to think in relative tranquility, to research against the largest backdrop, to exchange searching broad ideas and ideals, to weigh comparatively the ideas of distinguished speakers and stimulating classmates, and to argue alternatives through to meaningful conclusions are indeed energizing processes of the first order. How to think clearly, then, is as important as what to think.

The Chief of Naval Operations occupies a unique vantage point from which to view the products of the War College. This scrutiny includes senior officers at all levels of important commands as well as staff officers serving on service, joint and combined staffs. By every standard, our naval officer graduates of the Naval War College meet the acid test of fulfilling burdensome, trying, and sensitive duties with more than expected facility and dedication.

DAVID L. McDONALD

LEGAL ASPECTS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 14 December 1965

by

Professor J.F. Hogg

I think you will agree that the title for this morning's talk is to say the least, odd. You have studied, thought, talked about and listened to various facets of the problem of counterinsurgency–the political factors, the sociological, economic, and even the military factors. But what on earth does law have to do with this subject?

Some of you will have remembered your experience during the International Law Study earlier this year and perhaps have jumped to the conclusion that, without lawyers, the subject of counter-insurgency would be too clear–it needs someone to muddy the waters, to cast doubt and confusion where understanding and clarity existed before.

Let me illustrate. Take the definition of insurgency provided you last Wednesday from the *Dictionary of [United States] Military Terms.*[1] "Insurgency–A condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection against a constituted government which falls short of civil war. In the current context, subversive insurgency is primarily communist inspired, supported, or exploited." Notice that we are supposed to be talking about a revolt or insurrection which falls short of civil war. What is a civil war, about which we are not to talk? A search of the same dictionary provides no definition of these two words. Do you suppose that the man on the street would describe what Mr. Castro engaged in Cuba as a "civil war"? How about Ho Chi Minh's efforts–aren't they a civil war? Are North and South Vietnam two different countries, or different segments of the one country? Further, are there not sizable numbers of South Vietnamese fighting with the Viet Cong against the South Vietnamese

government forces? Are those not elements of a civil war? Could we not describe the Santo Domingo situation as a civil war? In short, doesn't the exclusion of civil war from consideration in the subject of "counterinsurgency" exclude much of the most important material to be considered? And, in any case, what reason could the authors of the definition have had for drawing a distinction between an insurrection and a civil war? Isn't the problem one of subversive aggression or wars of liberation? And can't you have a war of liberation taking the form of a civil war just as well as some other form?

There, you see, I told you that a lawyer and a legal analysis would make no positive contribution to your study of the subject of counterinsurgency. Only a lawyer could be so distracted and fail to see the real problem. As with the case of Mike the burglar who was caught red-handed and hailed into court, help from lawyers should be declined. When the judge asked Mike why he had refused to be defended by a lawyer, Mike said: "It's too late now—the time when I needed a lawyer was when I was making my plans to rob the joint. If I had had a good lawyer then, you would never have caught me with the goods."

Now therein doth lie a moral. It is frequently forgotten that one of the most significant functions that a lawyer can perform is to counsel his client and advise him about the plans and conduct which his client intends for the future. Another important function is to serve as an advocate of his client's position—to present the case in the best and most favorable light possible.

If this morning's subject were to send us off in pursuit of abstract rules of international law, derived from treaties or customary law, in the fond hope that by adequate research of the precedents at the same time so plausible and so convincing that even Mr. Lin Piao or Ho Chi Minh would recognize the justice of our cause—then indeed, law has no useful function to perform in this area. If, however, we start looking for a consistent framework in which to couch our response to the concept and practice of wars of liberation, if we start looking for the most persuasive arguments in which to dress our policies of counterinsurgency, if before taking counterinsurgency action we pause to consider the relative plausibility and persuasiveness of arguments in support which, after the act, it will be possible to make—then indeed, legal analysis may have a more useful function to perform in this area.

But, you will be saying, if that is the function to be served by legal analysis as applied to counterinsurgency, how does legal analysis differ from psychological warfare? How indeed! Look again, at the military dictionary definition of "counter-insurgency." Law isn't mentioned, but psychological action is. To whom is that psychological action to be addressed?

Part of my case to you this morning is that the Russians and Chinese are attempting to make significant use of legal-type arguments for psychological purposes. These legal-type arguments are being addressed to a wide variety of audiences–first to their own citizens, then to the citizens of countries to be subjected to "wars of liberation," then to the citizens of uncommitted countries, and last but certainly not least, to our very own citizens. Within our own country there is considerable debate concerning the legality of our policies. The casual reader of *The New York Times* and other papers cannot fail to have noticed the significant emphasis in editorials as well as in full-page advertisements of arguments addressed to the legality or illegality of our position in Vietnam. Arguments as to the legality or illegality of our actions in Santo Domingo have touched off a considerable debate in our own Senate.

Provision of a legal framework for our policies of counter-insurgency has become, then, a serious task. We need to present our own policies as clearly, persuasively, and forcefully as possible to our own people. Lack of persuasive argument supporting our actions will only lead to detraction from our political and military effort within our own country. *A fortiori,* we need a persuasive legal framework in which to set our actions for the benefit of other states, and even for the benefit of people behind the iron curtain. Psychological warfare is important, and I am suggesting to you, that the existence of a persuasive legal argument in support of our political and military actions is an important element in that psychological operation.

Khrushchev, Che Guevara, and Lin Piao have not created a concept devoid of appeal and superficial justification in this plan of "people's war" or "wars of liberation." The concept is carefully calculated to appeal to the notion, historically so important to us, that the right of revolution belongs inherently to every people against an unjust government. Just look at the way in which the military dictionary attempts to distinguish between insurgency and subversive insurgency. We cannot, with any degree of plausibility, reject the concept of the freedom of a people to revolt. Immediately therefore, the concept of "war of liberation"

puts us somewhat on the defensive. Revolution per se cannot be uulawful. What then, are the other identifiable elemeut or elements which, when added to revolution, make it unlawful or subversive?

We may be tempted to respond with the military dictionary—that element is "communist inspiration." But such "communist inspiration" may be hard to define, and even harder to prove and verify as a matter of factual report. Furthermore, to many peoples of the world, and perhaps to a number of our own people, freedom to choose a goverument, or the right of self-determination, may well involve the right of a people to choose if they wish, and that wish is democratically established, a government communist in form. For us simply to take a position, therefore, that all revolution is lawful, save only that which is communist inspired, may be a position substantially devoid of plausibility or persuasiveness, not only for world audiences but also for some of our own. Perhaps we must look further for those elements which, iu addition to revolution, are to make such revolution into subversion or subversive aggression. If the world were free of lawyers, you may say, anyone could tell me that the distinctive factor making the revolution subversive is intervention from outside, the export of revolution by one country to another. Exported revolution is just one specific form of aggression.

Bnt is the problem quite that simple? What actions constitute the "export" of revolution? Consider for a moment a few among the possible wide range of activities which China, Russia, or Cuba might take in relation to a country ripe for revolution. First might come a propaganda campaign—in the presses, over the radio, at diplomatic conferences, perhaps in the United Nations. Perhaps part of this program, possibly separate and distinct from it, might be threats as to what action might be taken if the revolution is not allowed to blossom. Next might come the receiving and training of revolutionaries, nationals of the country involved. Is the training of "students" in Cuba "Interventionary aggression" towards Venezuela? Next, might come the supplying of materiel to the revolutionary group, varying from literature and food to arms. Next might come the sending of a few "volunteers" to help organize and train the rebels—next, permission to use Cuba as a haven for the indigenous rebel forces—and so on. Where, in this list of actions, does subversive aggression begin?

Let us pause for a moment, and look briefly at the teachings of classical international law. Has a practice developed which can be appropriately used today as a yardstick in our battle with wars of liberation?

The cornerstone of traditional international law is the concept of state sovereignty—that is to say that, for the most part, a state is entitled to manage its own affairs free from direction or intervention from outside states. This particular concept is enshrined in Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state . . .." At the very next level of abstraction, this principle requires that each state and the people of that state be free to determine their own form of government, free from any such external interference. Said Professor Friedmann, one of the most prestigious writers on international law in this country, only last year: ". . . any attempt by a foreign power to interfere with internal change, either by assisting rebels to overthrow the legitimate government, or by helping the incumbent government to suppress a revolution is contrary to international law."[2] Now I want you to note this statement carefully. First, it makes clear what the consensus of writing for centuries has made clear—that for an outside state to lend assistance to a group of rebels is to interfere illegally in the internal affairs of the state in revolt. Second, it makes assistance to the government in power resisting such revolt equally illegal as interference or intervention. Third, what is proscribed is "interference with internal change," a phrase pregnant with triplets of ambiguity. What this particular quotation does not say is that while states and state departments for centuries have been uttering these propositions, many of the same states have, with some degree of regularity, been conducting their practice against very different criteria. The authors of the Holy Alliance in 1815, the Emperors of Russia, Austria, and the King of Prussia, essayed a somewhat more practical statement of policy by claiming the right to interfere in the internal affairs of any country threatened by revolution against the legitimate sovereign. You will recall that the Monroe Doctrine was formulated as a response to that policy.

Now let me illustrate what some of our own American authors are currently doing with this material. Says the same Professor Friedmann in another recent article:

> Since many of the internal conflicts, such as the internal disorders in Cyprus or the Congo, have international implications and may lead to the intervention of antagonistic powers on different sides of the conflict, nonintervention on the part of outside powers is the most desirable international policy which should, as far as possible,

> be ensured by nonintervention agreements between those concerned. The role of the United Nations in these conflicts will essentially be that of a neutral forum for mediation. In case of major intervention by outside powers, the U.N. may have to be called in to keep the opposing interventionists at arm's length . . ..[3]

Says Professor Falk of Princeton University:

> . . . internal war rages in South Vietnam, initiated by a series of rather clandestine North Vietnamese guerrilla interventions and countered by strident American military intervention in apparent violation of the 1954 Geneva Accords. Interventionary policy accounts for the most intense forms of violent conflict present in the world today.
>
> The point is not to condemn these interventions, but to suggest that a foreign policy that depends upon unilateral military interventions by one nation in the affairs of another usually violates clear norms of international law . . .. The willingness of the United States to adopt illegal interventionary tactics, under the pressure of the cold war, jeopardizes our moral commitment to a foreign policy of law-abidance, a commitment abstractly reiterated by our statesmen from many rostrums.[4]

Instead, he suggests this solution:

> But international peace is not only threatened by internal warfare. Peace is also endangered by certain repressive social policies which, if allowed to remain unaltered, will produce serious outbreaks of domestic violence. This prospect prompts the central contention of this essay–that the United Nations should be authorized on a selective basis to coerce domestic social changes. This authorization is what we refer to throughout as legislative intervention.[5]

It is interesting that, according to his argument, what would be prohibited intervention by one state becomes legal when done in the name of the United Nations.

The reason for giving you these lengthy quotations is this: With respect, I suggest that these scholars are striving for some

"neutral" principles by which the affairs of the world can, in the future, be peacefully regulated. The search for such scholarly principles may be important, but it fails substantially as an exercise in psychological warfare, just as it apparently fails in an estimate of political motivation in the world today.

But notice how this search for neutral principles can distract attention from a point of cardinal importance. If intervention in internal affairs of a state is illegal, what facts must be established to constitute proof of such intervention, and what remedies are available once a case of such intervention has been established? Given a clear plan of action for wars of liberation as described by Lin Piao, surely the obvious psychological counter, and surely a point of scholarly concern, focuses on development of criteria or standards for measuring external meddling, and on remedies for violation of those standards.[6] And I may say that the search for a remedy that does not at the same time kill the patient, is a task of monumental proportions.

Let me say again, however, that it is important that such criteria be developed and argued, not in the belief that Lin Piao will be convinced and will change his mind, but rather as necessaries to answer foreign propaganda, or for that matter, for our own domestic consumption. Given the threat as defined by Khrushchev, Guevara, and Lin Piao, I would also suggest that our psychological response must involve the reworking of the classic statement made by Friedmann. We cannot afford endorsing a policy which may preclude assistance to a government in power in an effort to combat incipient stages of subversion. At the same time, the statement of criteria for such assistance again involves a monumental problem—to give such support for the purpose of countering subversion may at the same time have the effect of impeding a truly indigenous movement for social reform.

If some of our writers have been more concerned with standards for a law-abiding world than with developing a psychological response to the concept of people's war and wars of liberation, what have the Russians been doing? In a text on international law written in Moscow and obligingly translated by the Russians into English and distributed here in 1962, is to be found a discussion of the so-called Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. The Principles represent the latest Russian use of legal analysis for psychological purposes. You may, for instance, be surprised to learn that:

> Important principles of International Law such as the sovereign equality of States, the self-determination of nations, noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries, territorial integrity, peaceful coexistence and cooperation between States regardless of their social systems and the conscientious observance of obligations assumed became the guiding principles of the world's first socialist State in its international relations.[7]

You may also be surprised at the following expansion on this theme:

> The recognition of each people's right to be master in its own country—that is, its unconditional right itself to decide its own social and political system and to determine its internal and foreign policy without any interference whatsoever by other States—offers wide opportunities for fruitful peaceful and mutually advantageous cooperation between States, regardless of differences in their social systems. In this lies the importance of the principle of nonintervention in the present-day world.[8]

Professor Lipson of Yale has offered an especially shrewd evaluation of the psychological use by the Russians of these concepts of peaceful coexistence.[9] He suggests that they are skillfully blended to appeal first to the nationalist aspirations of colonial and underdeveloped countries to make their own way free, not only politically, but also economically. Next they are designed to appeal to audiences in the United States and other western countries who would like to see a lessening of tension, accompanied probably by disarmament or reduction in military effort. Again, they appeal to the Russian audience because of the ideological split with China. These are words of peaceful competition with the West, rather than headstrong willful risk of nuclear war. In short, the Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are a masterful concoction of psychological warfare. But notice the gap between the promise and the fact. Again, our counter seems to lie in formulating the extent of that gap and giving it factual documentation.

Of course, the authors of this Russian text could not foresee that Lin Piao would get a little out of step in his speech, "Long Live the Victory of the People's War." Says he:

> In the final analysis, the whole cause of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggles of the Asian, African, and Latin American peoples who make up the overwhelming majority of the world's population. The socialist countries should regard it as their internationalist duty to support the people's revolutionary struggles in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.[10]

None of this, I take it, is intended to amount to interference in the internal affairs of another state.

But enough of these relative abstractions. Let us come down to a couple of specific illustrations of the importance of legal argument in support of our political and military decisions and actions. Let us see something of the use to which argumentation, both foreign and domestic, puts legal-style analysis and something of the kind of response which is required of us. In the mail the other day, I received an "Appeal to the Lawyers of the World" from the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, whose headquarters is in Brussels. This constitutes:

> . . . a solemn appeal to our colleagues in the whole world urging them to condemn the numerous and grave violations on international law by the war waged against the Vietnamese people by American imperialism.
>
> (1) International law is violated by the systematic intervention of the U.S.A. in the international affairs of South Vietnam; by the installation of governments of their choice, that are neither enjoying the confidence of the people, nor being appointed democratically, in contravention of point 12 of the final declaration of the Geneva Conference held in 1954 which was solemnly agreed to by the representative of the United States, Mr. Bedell Smith, in the name of his government.
>
> (2) International law is violated by the military aggression launched by the United States against Vietnam; by the landing in South Vietnam of foreign troops that include U.S. nationals and units from S.E.A.T.O. or A.N.Z.U.S. countries, committing acts of war also against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, equally in contravention of point 12 already mentioned.

(3) International law is violated when in the course of this aggressive war the United States is destroying schools, libraries, pagodas, churches and hospitals under the false pretext of pursuing military aims; when the American troops are making use of horrible and prohibited weapons such as noxious gases, napalm, yellow phosphorus bombs, dumdum bullets. All these inhuman methods were banned by the Hague Conventions of 1899 and by other international norms, e.g., the Versailles Treaty of 28 June 1919 (art. 171), or the Geneva Agreement of 17 July 1925.

(4) International law is violated when prisoners are submitted to humiliating and degrading treatment by the American troops, or are savagely killed without judgment nor the legal guarantees recognized as obligatory by all civilized nations as well as by art. 3 of the Geneva Agreement of 12 August 1949; or when the same American troops massacre the civil population and submit them to barbarous tortures.[11]

And so on—the hand behind the pen is clear.

Now, you are probably saying, that is a concoction of lies to which our response should be simply that—answering such a document involves no exercise in legal analysis and applied psychology. To a considerable extent you would be correct. But notice the subtlety with which some of the issues are woven in. Let us just take as an example, the first paragraph I read you. That we have a large army in Vietnam is clear, and that the presence of such an army has a substantial effect on the internal affairs of Vietnam is equally clear. Is this "intervention"? Well, you say, our response rests on the fact that we were requested to help by the Vietnamese government. But then notice that the same paragraph suggests that our host or inviting government is in fact our own puppet, which has not been "democratically appointed" in accordance with the Geneva Accord of 1954. You suspect that the Ky regime was, in fact, not appointed by a 51 percent or better majority of every adult entitled and willing to vote in South Vietnam. So to counter this, you begin an argument that, in an underdeveloped and undereducated country or community, full-flowered democracy is a factual impossibility. Besides, you say, look at Ho Chi Minh. Now this second argument is interesting. With the audiences to which this material is presented, the argument that the other side is doing the same bad things, is peculiarly

unpersuasive. The first argument is the one which needs to be presented, but notice the technique. The charges are so framed, that an accurate response becomes so detailed, intricate, and tied in with legal argumentation that the audience may be lost in the middle of the answer.

The aim of this material is to confuse. And the answer or psychological counter is not a point by point refutation of their thesis–rather, it should or even must be found in a coherent policy. We should be in a position to explain what that policy is–that it has a measure of objectivity–that is to say that it is not an action adopted ad hoc, but is the application of principles established as such and consistently advocated and followed by us in our foreign relations. Such a policy requires focusing on the concept of "war of liberation," upon the fact of external interference with the political balance in South Vietnam by Ho Chi Minh and the Chinese–this involves the development of criteria, mentioned earlier, against which we can judge and establish such interference, and it requires the development and advocacy of remedies to be taken in the face of such interference violative of our proclaimed standards. Law is the antithesis of arbitrary action –and legal analysis and argumentation, to be persuasive, must be founded in consistency of principle and, as far as possible, in application of such principle.

Now, you are probably saying, who needs to respond to a position like that of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers? It is, and this must be patent to the reader, a tissue of lies. First, you are on notice that the Russians are a careful, calculating group, who do not do many things without apparent object. They think this kind of propaganda is worthwhile–be careful of underestimating their judgment. Remember the message of this counterinsurgency program–that the battle is one for people, and the people of that phrase are being exposed to this kind of argumentation. That it needs answering in foreign audiences can best be illustrated by referring to the extent to which some of the arguments therein advanced have received a measure of support and sympathy within our very own country. Let me read to you a short passage from a speech delivered on September 23, 1965:

> In Vietnam, we have totally flouted the rule of law, and we have flouted the United Nations Charter. This lipservice given by the United States to the United Nations and its international law provisions and procedures has done our country great injury among many international lawyers

> around the world. Our waging an undeclared war in southeast Asia in flagrant violation of our oft-expressed pretense that the United States stands for the substitution of the rule of law for the jungle law of the military claw in meeting threats to the peace of the world, has done great damage to our reputation for reliability in international affairs. Our good reputation in world affairs previously held by millions of people in the underdeveloped areas of the world has been tarnished by our unjustified warmaking in southeast Asia.[12]

These are words of the Honorable Wayne Morse spoken on the floor of our Senate. It seems we have something of a missionary job to do in our own country!

Now, for a second illustration of the importance of legal analysis, let us look at another recent counterinsurgency situation—the Dominican Republic. Remember that the thesis is this: Our political and military actions need to be explained by an argument of their legality presented as persuasively as possible.

What we had, obviously, in the Dominican Republic, was an incipient political revolution. I take it that there was and is little doubt that substantial numbers of citizens of the Dominican Republic were so dissatisfied with their existing government that they proposed to resort to revolution as an answer. Our problem was equally obvious. The existence of a fighting civil war provides an excellent opportunity for communist trained, and perhaps even exported, leaders to penetrate and then take over one of the forces in the revolution. The communist handbook is simple and direct in ordering party members to capitalize, however and whenever possible, on issues that are politically divisive. Their ability to so capitalize can be illustrated all the way from Cuba, even to perhaps some of our university campuses. But, and this is important, we were not in a position to deny that there was an indigenous revolution—that people of the Republic were asserting their freedom, as a last resort, to revolt against what they considered to be an unfair and unrepresentative government. What then, could we make by way of legal argument to explain that our intervention was not inconsistent with or destructive of this inherent right of revolution, while still taking steps of military intervention deemed by our government necessary to prevent communist subversion of this indigenous revolution? Said Mr. Meeker, the Legal Adviser to the State Department:

> We landed troops in the Dominican Republic in order to preserve the lives of foreign nationals—nationals of the United States and many other countries. We continued our military presence in the Dominican Republic for the additional purpose of preserving the capacity of the OAS to function in the manner intended by the OAS Charter—to achieve peace and justice through securing a cease-fire and through reestablishing orderly political processes within which Dominicans could choose their own government, free from outside interference.[18]

Now this statement of our position is not without its difficulties, in terms of psychological persuasion. Notice first, its apparent inconsistency with the concept of ultimate freedom of revolt. This appears to say that if you revolt, we reserve the right to step in and prevent the fighting so that a new government may be chosen democratically, i e., by supervised voting, after debate and discussion of the problem and the proposed party platforms. This indeed, is the advocacy of a principle considerably adapted from that of the ultimate freedom to revolt. Notice also, that any such "police" intervention may have a significant effect on the relative strength in any subsequent election of the government previously in power and the rebel group.

The cornerstone of our political and military decision is clear. We are all too well acquainted with the communist pattern of infiltration and subversion, and for our purposes, it does not much matter whether that infiltration is effected by Dominicans or by communist operatives brought in from other countries. The thing that counts in the end is simply this: Does the government ultimately achieving power answer directly to communist centers? Is it subservient to communist control, and will it take communist steps to prevent any future unfortunate revolt or attempt at democratic selection of government? In short, will the establishment of such government preclude for the future a free demonstration of political choice by the people of the country?

The selection of a cornerstone of legal analysis, of the most persuasive argument in explanation of this policy, is much more complex. Our statement and repetition of patterns of communist behavior fails to persuade many of our own citizens, let alone many Latin American audiences. Moscow says they did not have anything to do with a take-over of any revolution, and we, as the active intervening parties, are suddenly cast with the burden of

proof to establish as the price of legalizing our position, that, in fact, the revolution was being substantially affected or controlled by infiltrated communist operatives. That is no mean burden of proof.

On the other hand, if (and I am not necessarily saying we should), we adopted the following proposition as our neutral principle or policy, we could avoid the foregoing burden of proof problem. That principle might be: Wherever possible, widespread civil war and bloodshed should be forestalled by intervention of a police force designed to keep the peace while at the same time laying a basis for future democratically organized and supervised elections. We could then rely simply on the outbreak of substantial civil war and widespread bloodshed and breakdown of the essential processes of government. For such a principle to be effective, however, we have to be in a position to argue that this is not a policy conceived on the spur of the moment to take care of this specific incident–in short, that it is a policy we plan on adhering to consistently. And if this policy were to be selected as such principle, it must be capable of withstanding analysis and criticism.

Without looking up any official document or statement, I could give you the gist of a Russian response. But, in this instance, that is unnecessary since we have vocal criticism of the policy in the Dominican Republic right here at home. Our policies or principles are being put to the test of analysis and criticism right here, let alone before foreign audiences.

Senator Fulbright has said of our actions there:

> The prospect of an election in nine months, which may conceivably produce a strong democratic government, is certainly reassuring on this score, but the [fact] remains that the reaction of the United States at the time of acute crisis was to intervene forcibly and illegally against a revolution, which, had we sought to influence it instead of suppressing it, might have produced a strong popular government without foreign military intervention.
>
> Since just about every revolutionary movement is likely to attract Communist support, at least in the beginning, the approach followed in the Dominican Republic, if consistently pursued, must inevitably

> make us the enemy of all revolutions and therefore the ally of all the unpopular and corrupt oligarchies of the hemisphere.[14]

In contrast, Under Secretary of State Mann has said:

> When, in other words, a Communist state has intervened in the internal affairs of an American state by training, directing, financing, and organizing indigenous Communist elements to take control of the government of an American state by force and violence, should other American states be powerless to lend assistance? Are Communists free to intervene while democratic states are powerless to frustrate that intervention?[15]

From the point of view of legal analysis and persuasive argument, both these statements are interesting. The Senator's statement brands our action as "illegal," without amplification. That such amplification could be provided is clear. The introduction of our army into the country of another state calls for the clearest of supporting arguments to escape the charge of illegality. And the fact that a political faction in the Dominican Republic decided to invite us adds a little, but not very much in the circumstances, to our position. On the other hand, Secretary Mann's analysis assumes that communist "indoctrination" of certain political rebels, who might very well have been natives of the Republic, constituted intervention which, impliedly, authorized us to take a counterremedy in the form of an armed landing. Perhaps, in the long run, the most persuasive argument runs along lines suggested by Mr. Mann, rather than along lines of a principle of preventing bloodshed and facilitating free elections.

Suffice it to say that we need a coherent and consistent policy. Senator Fulbright underlines the importance of such a policy consistently applied when he says that potential revolutionaries in Latin America may regard our action in the Dominican Republic as an explicit declaration of our position in favor of status quo government, no matter how bad it may be, and against revolution. And so, we come back full circle to the problem: how to formulate a policy to best support our political and military decisions taken in the context of counterinsurgency—how to distinguish in that policy between freedom of revolution and proscription of wars of liberation and people's war.

That problem is reported to be under consideration in our discussions with Latin American countries, as late as last Thursday. *The New York Times* of that day[16] carries a story of Mexican views on a proposal for collective Latin American action in the event of complete breakdown of order and authority in one of the OAS states.

Fortunately, this morning, I have the luxury of criticizing the statements and writings of others, without any accompanying responsibility for defining policy goals in this area. There are, however, several factors which will, in my opinion, continue to affect the search for most effective policies and legal analyses to counter the threats posed by wars of liberation.

First, the persuasiveness of any legal analysis is important to our domestic population. The ability to offer a clear and consistent purpose, rationale, and demonstration of its application to any current fact situation will have significant impact on the domestic support which political and military decisions receive from our own population. For this reason, such purposes and policies must be consistent with our domestic governmental ethic. That ethic clearly believes in a right of revolution, and in the right of a people to choose their own form of government. This means freedom from communist subversion, but it also means freedom from United States support of unpopular and dictatorial regimes. Our counterinsurgency policy deals with stability of governments, but it must be so framed as to distinguish, as far as is possible, between indigenous revolution and communist subversion. Not every act of subversion can be allowed to taint a revolutionary group and we must refine a policy tailored to identify and brand those aspects of wars of liberation which seek to climb on the back of an indigenous movement.

Second, to be as persuasive as possible, our policy must seek to share counterinsurgency, responsibility, as far and as widely as possible. By way of illustration, the function of a lawyer in the Department of State would have been fantastically easier if the force which went into the Dominican Republic had been an OAS force, sent there pursuant to a resolution of that organization, and in implementation of a stable and consistent policy against insurgency formulated by that organization. Such a sharing of responsibility requires that our policy be consistent then, not only with our own domestic ethic, but consistent, as far as is possible, with corresponding ethics outside the communist

countries. We must recognize that in these other countries which, in many cases are backward and underdeveloped, revolution continues to play an important function in change and reform of government. Our policy cannot condemn revolution as such, even when accompanied by bloodshed, nor can it condemn revolution merely on the grounds that communist groups have joined in with it.

Third, that policy must bring sharply into focus not only the problem of identifying what constitutes illegal intervention through communist subversion, but also the ingredients of appropriate remedies for any such violation of the established policy.

Fourth, we must recognize that consistent application of this policy is important, and that departures from it, to meet the stresses of ad hoc situations of the moment, may be very costly in the long-run effectiveness of the psychological purpose.

Fifth, we must continue to recognize that such a policy does serve a psychological purpose of importance both with our own people and abroad. But the object of having the policy is not to seek abstract standards to govern in a perfect law-abiding world, but rather to meet the practical day-to-day threats posed, and to be posed, by wars of liberation.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor James F. Hogg, born in Wellington, New Zealand, is a Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota. He received B.A. and LL.M. degrees from the University of New Zealand in 1949 and 1951. He was admitted to the Bar as a barrister and solicitor and for a short time practiced law with a firm of attorneys in Wellington. From 1953 to 1955 he was a student at the Harvard Law School and received an LL.M. in 1954 and an S.J.D. in 1959. He taught at Victoria University College in Wellington for the academic year 1955 and has been a member of the Minnesota Law School faculty since 1956. He has also taught as a visiting professor at Columbia University Law School and the University of Chicago Law School. He is the author of several law review articles on subjects of international law, including treaties, their interpretation and the International Court of Justice. He is a member of the American Society of International Law and of the International Law Association.

For the academic year 1965-66 he is on leave from the University of Minnesota and is occupying the Chair of International Law, Naval War College.

FOOTNOTES

1. *Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage,* 1 Feb. 1964, JCS Pub. 1.

2. *The Changing Structure of International Law,* Columbia University Press, 1964, at p. 265.

3. "The Role of International Law in the Conduct of International Affairs," *20 International Journal,* 1965, p. 158 at p. 167.

4. "The Legitimacy of Legislative Intervention by the United Nations," in *Essays on Intervention,* ed. by Roland J. Stanger, Ohio State University Press, 1964, at p. 34.

5. *Id.* at 33.

6. See, for instance, Fisher, "Intervention: Three Problems of Policy and Law," *Id.* at 7 et seq.

7. *International Law,* Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1962(?) at p. 9.

8. *Id.* at p. 114.

9. "Peaceful Coexistence," *29 Law and Contemporary Problems,* p. 871 (1964).

10. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 3 September 1965.

11. No attempt is here made to identify and correct the numerous false statements, misrepresentations and half-truths contained in the above statement.

12. 89th Congress, 1st Sess., September 23, 1965.

13. "The Dominican Situation in the Perspective of International Law," Vol. 53, *Dept. of State Bulletin,* 12 July 1965 at p. 62.

14. As reported in *The New York Times,* 16 September 1965.

15. "The Dominican Crisis: Correcting Some Misconceptions," Vol. 53, *Dept. of State Bulletin,* 8 November 1965 at p. 731.

16. 9 December 1965.

NEW DIMENSIONS IN EXTENSION

DID YOU KNOW THAT . . . the Naval War College Correspondence Courses are being taken by numerous Coast Guard Officers? One recent graduate of the International Relations Course had this to say:

> In addition to the certificate of completion, I would also like to express my appreciation for the course. I feel the subject matter selected was excellent and I personally learned much. I am looking forward to attending the Naval War College if and when the Coast Guard favorably considers my application.

DID YOU KNOW THAT . . . upon completion of the Naval War College Correspondence Course in Military Planning, a Lieutenant, USN, stated:

> I feel that the course in Military Planning has given me a new understanding and appreciation of the whole planning process. I shall never again view an Op Order or Op Plan as a simple matter, easily arrived at. I realize now the thorough and careful planning that should be behind each word of a directive.

DID YOU KNOW THAT . . . a Captain in the Naval Reserve had this to say concerning the Naval War College Course in Counter-insurgency:

> I consider this is the most interesting, provocative, and stimulating course I have taken . . .. I think the reason is that there is as yet, no real solution. We have no record of wins as we have in general wars. This is a disturbing factor. We probably really don't know what wins or loses a counterinsurgency action. Consequently the criticality of the topic is more extreme than any topic I have tackled. It is too easy to arrive at a solution one night, and the next morning read in the newspapers why it was a weak solution. Thus, current events surround the course with an air of intensity almost never found elsewhere. I enjoyed the course, and feel I gained a great deal from it.

DID YOU KNOW THAT . . . the following officers have recently completed the Correspondence Course of Naval Command and Staff, and have been awarded a diploma for this achievement? This package plan consists of the following four courses (or their equivalent): National and International Security Organization, Military Planning, Naval Operations, and Command Logistics. Completion of these four courses closely parallels a command and staff level of education.

LCDR James R. Green, USN (Ret.)
CAPT Lewis W. Metzger, USN
CDR Harry R. Moore, USN
CDR Titus Branchi, USN

MAHAN IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

A Research Paper written by
Lieutenant Commander Bertram Shrine, Jr., U.S. Navy
School of Naval Command and Staff, 1965

INTRODUCTION

MAHAN QUESTIONED

"The formation of strategic concepts had to take place in what was close to a historical void," laments William W. Kaufmann in describing the problems faced by United States planners after World War II.[1] This is a most significant judgment, considering the worldwide impact of the decisions reached by these policy makers. Going further with his secession from the past, Mr. Kaufmann strikes close to the naval officers's heart in saying that "Admiral Mahan, pondering the lessons of Trafalgar, would have found nothing there to inform him about the outcome of a conventional engagement between two nuclear powers . . .." [2] These passages are from *The McNamara Strategy,* a book which outlines, in the eyes of the Navy Department, "the basic issues which have molded the strategic concepts of the present administration." [3] As such, the views expressed therein exert a bearing upon the destinies of all professional naval officers, and are certainly demanding of the closest study by these vitally concerned individuals.

There is, however, another school of thought concerning the relationship of history to current events which differs somewhat from that expressed by Mr. Kaufmann. Clemenceau summed it up thusly: "Those who would ignore the lessons of history are bound to repeat its mistakes." Alfred Thayer Mahan, the patron saint of naval historians, was of this mind. He strove to "wrest something out of the old woodensides and 24-pounders that would throw some light on the combinations to be used with ironclads, rifled guns, and torpedoes." [4]

This paper will attempt to determine whether the principles of Mahan have fallen victim to the advances of 20th century technology as Mr. Kaufmann suggests, or whether there might be some guidance in the Admiral's writings about dreadnoughts and coaling stations which could throw light upon the strategic problems of the nuclear age. Particular emphasis will be placed upon those of Mahan's theories which have to do with overseas military expeditions.

In attacking this problem, the spectrum of Mahan will be reviewed first to give a feeling for the broad scope of his writings. Next, strategic principles will be extracted from his various publications, condensed, tabulated, and codified. The importance of command of the sea in contemporary strategic relationships will be scrutinized to see whether this basic cornerstone of Mahanism has survived the onslaught of science. Finally, attention will focus upon the problems of projecting a military presence across vast bodies of water. Mahan's maxims governing such ventures will be examined to determine their applicability to the United States' particular situation in the world today.

Is Mr. Kaufmann correct in discounting so completely the lessons of history, and the teachings of bygone philosophers? Do the maxims of Alfred Thayer Mahan have continuing relevance to naval warfare waged with weapons beyond his comprehension? This paper seeks a judgment between these two positions.

FOOTNOTES

Introduction

1. William W. Kaufmann, *The McNamara Strategy* (New York: Harper, 1964), p. 7.

2. *Ibid.*

3. U.S. Naval Bureau of Personnel, *Officer Personnel Newsletter* (Washington: October 1964), p. 16. The article added that the Secretary of the Navy considered it "important that all officers be conversant with the thinking and philosophy expressed in the book."

4. Alfred T. Mahan to Samuel Ashe, January 1886, W.D. Puleston, *Mahan* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946), p. 77.

CHAPTER I

THE BROAD SPECTRUM OF MAHAN

Alfred T. Mahan had completed 31 years of commissioned service in the U.S. Navy uncrowned by special distinction when his book, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783,* was first published in 1890. Initially, this book aroused very little enthusiasm; in fact, Mahan experienced considerable difficulty in finding a publisher for his manuscript. However, his book earned wide acclaim abroad, and subsequently received attention in the United States as well. Mahan published 20 more books as well as contributing a large number of magazine articles, essays, and letters to the press.[1] His subject matter covered every facet of naval affairs, dealt with many aspects of international relations, and on occasion even wandered far afield into areas completely divorced from the seas.

Essentially though, Mahan remained the apostle of sea power. Sea power was to him a phrase which included "not only military strength afloat . . . but also the peaceful commerce and shipping from which alone a military fleet naturally and healthfully springs, and on which it securely rests."[2] Mahan was the first naval historian to use this phrase *sea power,* which connotated a new, broader approach to the problem than naval power and gave him the perspective to view the seas with respect to their general use to mankind and to nations. Nothing that Mahan uncovered in his study of history was new or unique; what he did provide was a different perspective, a regrouping of old facts around a new theory. By so doing, he earned, according to one biographer, "the honor, among American historians, of being the creator of a new philosophy of history."[3]

Mahan's inspiration "came from within, [with] the suggestion that control of the seas was a historic factor which had never been systematically appreciated and expounded."[4] He began to "investigate concurrently the general history and naval history of the past . . . with a view of demonstrating the influence of the events, one upon the other."[5] From this, Mahan concluded that "control of the sea, by maritime commerce and naval supremacy, meant predominant influence in the world." This predominance came about because "however great the wealth product of the land, nothing facilitates the necessary exchanges as does the

sea."[6] But Mahan went further into his investigation of the successes and failures of various nations to gain or maintain international preeminence. Having concluded that sea power was vital to national growth, prosperity, and security, Mahan set about to examine the "natural conditions" which affect its development, despite the "wise or unwise action of individual men [which has had] a great modifying influence upon the growth of sea power." These he listed as follows:

I. Geographical Position.
II. Physical Conformation, including, as connected therewith, national productions and climate.
III. Extent of Territory.
IV. Number of Population.
V. Character of the People.
VI. Character of the Government, including therein the national institutions.[7]

Mahan started his historical career as an anti-imperialist; however, his studies of the elements of sea power, the various policies implemented to capitalize upon maritime resources, and the results in terms of national stature achieved by the various nations, soon changed his point of view.[8] His studies centered upon the 17th and 18th centuries; in concluding that "three things—production, with the necessity of exchanging products; shipping, whereby the exchange is carried on; and colonies, which facilitate and enlarge the operations of shipping and tend to protect it by multiplying points of safety—[provide] the key to much of the history, as well as of the policy, of nations bordering upon the sea," Mahan was essentially restating the theory of mercantilism prevalent during that period.[9]

He deduced that production required both markets and raw materials, which could be most easily provided by colonies. There a maritime power "won a foothold in a foreign land, seeking new outlet for what it had to sell, a new sphere for its shipping, more employment for its people, more comfort and wealth for itself."[10] But, Mahan said, "to affirm the importance of distant markets, and the relation to them of immense powers of production, implies logically the recognition of the link that joins the products and the markets—that is, the carrying trade."[11] In order to protect this shipping a navy was necessary, one "of a size commensurate with the growth of its shipping and the importance of the interests connected with it."[12] In other words,

a navy, should be strong enough to protect a nation's interests at sea, if these interests are of any value to the nation concerned.

This created another interrelationship. Colonies separated from the home country by water could be defended, in the long run, only if a strong navy could maintain sea lines of communication between the two; at the same time, colonies provided the bases essential to naval operations in distant seas. This need for bases led to the acquisition of posts whose value was strategic rather than commercial (for example, Gibraltar and Malta) lest the ships of war "be like land birds, unable to fly far from their own shores."[13] In the final analysis, "sea power, however, is but the handmaiden of expansion, its begetter and preserver; it is not in itself expansion . . . ."[14]

Having determined what he felt was the considerable and demonstrable influence of sea power upon history, Mahan went on to show that "proper military control of the sea was based upon certain laws of strategy which had been fully established as a result of long years of naval combat."[15] Closer examination of these fundamental strategic principles will follow in the next chapter.

Mahan branched out from his initial work in the field of history and naval strategy to counsel his country on all matters for which he felt a concern. He was an ardent supporter of efforts towards the early completion of an isthmian canal, and a vocal spokesman for establishing a naval presence in the Caribbean where "the interest of the United States is particular and supreme to a degree which may reasonably expect recognition from other countries."[16] Mahan deplored the efforts exerted by coastal factions within the country to tether the navy to an exclusive coastal defense role, urging deployment of a concentrated navy whose mission would be to defend the coastline by controlling the seas.[17] An uncompromising advocate of military preparedness, the Admiral wrote that "the clear expression of the national purpose, accompanied by evident and adequate means to carry it into effect, is the surest safeguard against war."[18]

Mahan revised his early opinion that "European politics are scarcely to be considered as a part of the Naval War College course," coming to the conclusion that "diplomatic conditions affect military action, and military consideration diplomatic measures. They are inseparable parts of a whole . . . ."[19] He used this new insight as a springboard for comment upon a wide

spectrum of subjects, ranging from the viability of alliances through international law, the arbitration of treaties, and finally to international relations and U.S. foreign policy. Some of his writings exhibit an uncanny prophetical ability. For example, he wrote before the war with Spain, "Whether they will or no, Americans must now begin to look outward . . .. To take her share of the travail of Europe is but to assume an inevitable task, an appointed lot . . .."[20] Forty years before Pearl Harbor, the Admiral warned that "with Germany on one side, and Japan on the other, both nations necessarily aggressive . . . a large navy is now our only security."[21] The civilized world felt "with an instinctive shudder the threat . . . in the teeming multitudes of central and northern Asia," he said, fifty-five years before Mao gained control of the Chinese government.[22]

During his lifetime, Alfred Thayer Mahan enjoyed the unique recognition as the foremost naval authority in the world. The British revival of interest in their navy was stimulated by his writings; Kaiser Wilhelm II 'devoured' his *Influence of Sea Power upon History* and placed copies on board every ship in the German Navy. Mahan's books served as texts for officers and midshipmen of the Japanese Navy. In the United States, his theories were a part of every congressional debate upon naval matters.[23]

Since his death in 1914, many (but not all!) of Mahan's views on international affairs have been outdated by new outlooks in the world social order. Tactics have, as he predicted, changed completely to conform with technological advances, invalidating his emphasis on the dreadnought and other turn-of-the-century weapons. But it is what Mahan termed the "fundamental truths which, when correctly formulated, are rightly called principles, [and] are in themselves unchangeable"[24] that are the concern of this paper, and they shall be treated next.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter I

1. See Puleston, p. 359-365 for a complete chronological summary. Many magazine articles were later incorporated into his published books.

2. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783* (Boston: Little Brown, 1917), p. 28.

3. William E. Livezey, *Mahan on Sea Power* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1947), p. 35.

4. Mahan, *From Sail to Steam. Recollections of Life* (New York: Harper, 1907), p. 276.

5. Mahan, quoted in C.S. Alden and R. Earle, *Makers of Naval Tradition* (Boston: Antheum Press, 1942), p. 235.

6. Mahan, *The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future* (Boston: Little Brown, 1897), p. 124.

7. Mahan, *Influence,* p. 28-29.

8. Puleston, p. 67, quotes Mahan as saying "The very suspicions of an imperial policy were hateful," and Charles C. Taylor, *The Life of Admiral Mahan (*New York: George Doran, 1920), p. 26, quotes Mahan's self appraisal as ". . . an anti-imperialist who . . . looked upon Mr. Blaine as a dangerous man." Both quotations are descriptive of his views prior to commencing his historical studies.

9. Mahan, *Influence,* p. 26. Walter LeFeber, *The New Empire* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), p. 85-94, acknowledges Mahan's philosophy as 'mercantilistic imperialism.' He states that early mercantile empires had heavily influenced Mahan's thinking, but pointed out the differences between the United States of the 1890's and previous mercantilistic views.

10. Mahan, quoted in Alden and Earle, p. 241.

11. Mahan, *Interest,* p. 6.

12. Mahan, *Influence,* p. 82.

13. *Ibid.,* p. 83.

14. Mahan, *The Problem of Asia and Its Effect upon International Policies* (Boston: Little Brown, 1900), p. 7.

15. Mahan, quoted in Louis Hacker, "The Incendiary Mahan," *Scribner's Magazine,* April 1934, p. 312.

16. Mahan, *Naval Strategy, Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practices of Military Operations on Land* (Boston: Little Brown, 1911), p. 102.

17. *Ibid.,* p. 152, 249.

18. Mahan, *Interest,* p. 157.

19. Mahan, quoted in Puleston, p. 287.

20. Mahan, *Interest,* p. 21, 123.

21. Mahan, quoted in Puleston, p. 321.

22. Mahan, *Interest,* p. 123.

23. Livezey, p. 59, 63; Harold and Margaret Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1942), p. 220; George T. Davis, *A Navy Second to None* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1940), p. 140.

24. Mahan, *Strategy,* p. 2.

CHAPTER II

MAHAN'S PRINCIPLES OF NAVAL STRATEGY

"Naval strategy has for its end to found, support, and increase, as well in peace as in war, the sea power of a country." [1] So saying, Mahan placed into a nutshell the raison d'être of organized naval forces. Mahan was not quite as tidy with his precise ideas of just how these naval forces should be employed in the support of the sea power of a country; instead of neatly tabulating his strategic principles (as he had the elements of sea power), he scattered his fundamentals throughout the length and breadth of his writings. Nevertheless, Mahan's "formulated principles" which "have their root in the essential nature of things" can be extracted from his works, since he repeated the same general theme throughout.[2]

Restated then, Mahan's fundamental thesis emphasized the necessity for a maritime power to gain and maintain control of the seas.[3] This control was to be exercised by the concentrated power of a fleet used in an offensive and decisive manner. The mobility of this fleet had to be assured by strategically positioned bases, each with secure lines of communication to its individual source of strength. Control of the sea, so achieved, would grant the possessor the ability to operate along interior lines, thereby earning for itself the initiative to project its power to advantage against an enemy. Further, only naval preponderance could effectively eliminate the commerce of the enemy, "thereby intercepting its nourishment . . . cutting the roots of its power, the sinews of war."[4]

Seventy-five years after the publication of Mahan's first book, a reader of the above paragraph might be tempted to ask, "Why all the excitement? That's sort of obvious, isn't it?" Perhaps so. That being the case, it might be well to determine whether Mahanian strategic concepts served some worthwhile purpose in his own day and time before examining their validity today. To do this, one must look to the state of the art of maritime strategy in the 1890's.

Mahan himself recognized that "the common sense of all men has early indicated some of the recognized principles of war," but until his time, no one had attempted to systemize and coordinate, to formulate principles to facilitate the understanding of naval strategic questions.[5] In using the lessons of history for his

codification, Mahan was addressing an American audience firmly committed to utilizing its navy as an extension of its army in the event of war. As such, the navy's primary mission was coastal defense, to be accomplished by stationing warships at the entrance to every harbor along both seaboards to prevent access by the enemy. In an 1887 Congressional debate over a bill for the construction of monitors, one Senator expressed the majority sentiment when he said that "he was not interested in pursuing [an enemy fleet] . . .. If we drive the hostile navy off we have accomplished the purpose of this bill."[6] As a secondary role, the navy would engage in guerre de course, splitting the fleet even more widely into solitary raiders of the enemy's commerce. To make matters worse, naval vessels were scattered around the world in peacetime on what Mahan termed "police duty," with no regard for their deployment should a war be declared.[7]

It was against this backdrop that Mahan's strategic views first appeared. His studies in history had convinced him that the sea conferred victory in war, as well as riches in peacetime, and all his strategic dogma stemmed from this one cardinal axiom.[8] As a primary corollary he insisted that only through supremacy of the battle fleet, the only means for gaining complete control of the seas, can success be assured. "In naval war, the fleet itself is the key position of the whole . . . decisive defeat [of the enemy] suitably followed up, alone assures a situation." Positive, conclusive use of the battle fleet was necessary; even in a defensive operation, a navy must "stand ready for immediate offensive action, and threaten it . . .."[9]

Mahan's emphasis was geared towards demonstrating to his countrymen the advantages of "concentrating great combinations to control the sea" as opposed to commerce raiding, which he termed "frittering away effort." He pointed out that despite the fact that Confederate cruisers had driven the sailing commerce of the Union from the seas, it was the "immense–nay, decisive" Union blockade which was the telling factor in the Civil War. So also, despite the somewhat successful activity of Frensh privateers, it was the British "far-distant, storm-beaten ships" maintaining their constant control of the seas which were decisive in the victory against Napoleon. "Such injuries," he said with reference to guerre de course, ". . . are slight wounds, not mortal blows."[10]

Napoleon is quoted approvingly in stating that "exclusiveness of purpose is the secret of great successes"–which, to Mahan, meant "concentration of the will upon one object to the exclusion

of all others." He cited numerous examples throughout the ages of the dire consequences of disregarding this maxim. "The principle is that of keeping a superior force at the decisive point . . .. This again is concentration, timely concentration." But he guarded against dogmatic insistence upon close, direct contact; concentration must be "applied in spirit, not in letter only; exercised with understanding, not merely literally. The essential underlying idea is that of mutual support." Each part of the force relieves, and is relieved by others, of a part of the burden, while the overall disposition facilitates timely concentration in mass. "A very considerable separation in space may be consistent with mutual support so long as there is no attempt to straddle, to do two things at the same time, unless one's force is evidently so supreme that [there is] clearly more than enough for each." [11]

It followed that the most effective scheme of coastal defense was "a navy strong enough either to drive the hostile fleet away . . . or to keep it away, from one's own shores." On this point Mahan was vehement; nothing pained him more than the dispersal of the battle fleet into a series of fortress-like dispositions, thereby wasting the potential of massed mobility for a mission much better accomplished by army artillery. "A ship can no more stand up against a fort costing the same money than the fort could run a race with the ship." [12]

The basic ingredient of Mahan's recipe for victory upon the seas was "the utilization of position by mobile force." He added that "naval strength involves, unquestionably, the possession of strategic points, but its greatest constituent is the mobile navy." Nevertheless, "the fleet with strong points . . . is stronger than the fleet alone." [13]

This relationship between fleet and strong points led Mahan to communications, "the most vital and determining element in strategy."

> Communications dominate war . . .. All military organizations, land or sea, are ultimately dependent upon open communications with the basis of national power . . .. This has peculiar force on shore, because an army is immediately dependent upon supplies frequently renewed. It can endure . . . interruption much less readily than a fleet can . . .. So long as the fleet is able to face the enemy at sea, communications mean essentially . . . those necessities . . . which the ships

cannot carry in their own hulls beyond a limited amount.

In either instance, "free supplies and open retreat are two essentials to the safety of an army or a fleet." [14]

The axioms of fleet mobility, strategic position, and communications, were followed by a series of corollaries concerning overseas expeditions, which are by their nature governed by the closely interwoven relationship between fleet, position, and communications.

Concern for overseas expeditions follows the assumption that "a nation wishes to exert political influence in . . . unsettled or politically weak regions . . . which armies can reach only by means of navies." This being the case, the nation "cannot afford to be without a footing on some strategic points to be found there," leading Mahan to comment upon the "inevitable tendency . . . to proceed to the gradual acquisition of such bases as soon as national policy impels a navy to a new scene of activity." Lacking this toehold, he pointed out that a navy is dependent upon friendly harbors which are, unfortunately, "inconvenient and uncertain." [15]

"If war . . . extends to [these] distant parts of the globe, there will be needed . . . secure ports for shipping, to serve as secondary bases of the local war." The unhappy alternative to local bases involves an expedition over long distances burdened by the "tactical embarrassment" of a train of transport and supply ships and "the difficulty of ships laden for long voyage." With or without local strong points, it is axiomatic that "once severed from its base an army languishes and dies." This serves to reemphasize the vital nature of communications. As Mahan put it, "between these secondary . . . and home bases there must be reasonably secure communications, which will depend upon military control of the intervening sea." [16]

"Secure communications at sea," he went on, "means naval preponderance" which can be maintained only through the fleet's "power of movement upon the open sea, and by assuming the initiative suited to its strength whenever opportunity offers; for the initiative is the privilege of the offense." "Where a navy is largely preponderant over . . . an enemy, overseas expeditions by large bodies of troops proceed in security, either perfect or partial." Where a navy cannot maintain control of the seas,

disaster threatens. Mahan illustrated this point with numerous examples from history, the most classic being Napoleon's Egyptian debacle in 1798 where "the issue of enterprise . . . depended upon keeping open the communications with France. The victory of the Nile destroyed the [French] naval force, by which alone the communications could be assured, and determined the final failure." [17]

The importance of secure communications brought about as a result of decisive fleet action brings strategic thought back to bases, "the indispensable foundation upon which the superstructure of offense is raised. Fortified bases of operations are as needful to a fleet as to an army," Mahan said. Furthermore, these "afford some control over communications . . . as well as serving as operating bases for the fleet." In fact, for long lines of communications, such as Britain's to India, he felt it necessary to have a string of bases, such as were established at Gibraltar, Malta, Suez, and Aden. [18]

Mahan measured the strategic value of any position in terms of: (1) its situation, with respect to communication lines; (2) its strength, inherent and/or acquired; and (3) its resources, natural or stored. He emphasized the necessity of adequately fortifying those bases which did not possess an internal source of strength, lest they be captured (by sea or by land) before they could be utilized in time of war. He went on to warn that "a fleet charged with the care of its base is a fleet by so far weakened for effective action." Furthermore, he cautioned that "fortified places, however strong, although indispensable as supports military operations, should not be held in great number." To do so wastes force, and their defense leads to the forbidden "straddling," the dangerous dispersion of effort. Only those which are clearly essential should be maintained, and these must then be well fortified. [19]

Mahan made the important point that "military positions . . . however strong or admirably situated, do not confer control by themselves alone . . .. The occupation of harbors militarily secure, although valuable and even necessary, is secondary to the fleet." "The value of a position is not in the bare position, but in the use you make of it," he said, completing the full strategic cycle with the reminder that "the supreme essential condition to the assertion and maintenance of national power in external maritime regions is the possession of a fleet superior to that of any probable opponent." [20]

If these principles seen somewhat basic to us today, then perhaps the extent of the change in strategic outlook since the days of coastal defense and guerre de course is the clearest proof of the need, in 1890, for Mahan's systemized approach to naval warfare.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter II

1. Mahan, *Influence,* p. 23.

2. *Ibid.,* p. 4.

3. Mahan used the term 'naval preponderance' more often than 'control of the sea,' although he applied them synonymously. They will be so interchanged in this chapter, although later reference will be made to present-day distinctions between the two.

4. Mahan, *Interest,* p. 32.

5. Mahan, *Strategy,* p. 112.

6. Davis, p. 51.

7. Mahan, *Strategy,* p. 4.

8. See Appendix I for Mahan's strategic principles, as extracted, condensed, tabulated, and restated by this writer.

9. Mahan, *Strategy,* p. 176, 191, 234.

10. *Ibid.,* p. 132, 129.

11. *Ibid.,* p. 6, 8, 43, 74.

12. *Ibid.,* p. 148, 234.

13. *Ibid.,* p. 127, 276, 291.

14. *Ibid.,* p. 166, 167, 282.

15. *Ibid.,* p. 68, 87, 121, 122, 200.

16. Mahan, *Influence,* p. 514; *Strategy,* p. 228; *Interest,* p. 132.

17. Mahan, *Strategy,* p. 200, 208, 235; *Influence,* p. 10.

18. Mahan, *Strategy,* p. 87, 144.

19. Mahan, *Interest*, p. 283, 284; *Strategy*, p. 191.

20. Mahan, *Interest*, p. 53; *Strategy*, p. 191.

CHAPTER III

SCIENCE AND COMMAND OF THE SEA

Now that the broad spectrum of Mahanism has been quickly explored and his principles of naval strategy have been codified, the time has come to focus upon the applicability of Mahan's naval strategy to the world of the 1960's. [The first step in equating his philosophy to the present is to consider the master axiom, "a maritime power must command the seas in order to be successful in war."] If this is no longer true, then very little else of Mahan's is of much significance–this is the root of all that is pertinent in his entire thesis, yet, nowhere in his contemporary strategic dissertation does Mr. Kaufmann mention control of the seas, *per se,* as a basic fundamental of military planning in the "sixties."

It is highly unlikely that Admiral Mahan had any idea in 1914 of the technological progress which would take place in the next fifty years. It is doubtful that anyone could have visualized the changes which would take place in the instruments of war. The task of trying to tabulate the advances, even in retrospect, is staggering enough! Nevertheless, there seem to be five general areas where science has created tactical weapons systems or strategic capabilities which threaten the validity of Mahan's principles. These are: (1) rapid means of mass transportation, (2) the long-range missile, (3) the airplane, (4) nuclear weapons, and (5) the submarine. These will be examined in the order listed. The question is: Have these five negated the master axiom, or is control of the seas still a vital factor in planning wartime strategy today?

Admiral Mahan saw "the sea [as] an nnfruitful possession . . . except as a system of highways joining country to country."[1] It was this highway system which was vital, commercially and militarily, because of the relative ease with which men and material were moved along its briny trails. Writing as early as 1907 Mahan noted that "it has been urged that the conditions have so changed, through the numerous alternatives to sea transport now available, that the former efficacy can no longer be predicted." He recognized that railroads and roads had improved markedly, but that "for reasons of cheapness and of facility, water transport sustains its ascendency. It may carry somewhat less proportionately than in old times; but water remains . . . the great medium of transportation."[2]

Today, merchant vessel tonnage has more than doubled its pre-World War II high. More than 9,000 ships ply the sea-lanes every day of the year, floating testimony to the ever-growing economic interdependence of the global community of nations.[3] How does this commercial activity affect naval strategy? As Theodore Ropp puts it, "The navy's role in a given war varies with the importance of water transportation."[4] While the United States economy is not as totally dependent upon sea commerce as Britain's or Japan's during the last war, Vice Admiral Ralph E. Wilson assesses the situation as follows: "It is a cold, hard fact that America is no longer self-sufficient . . .. The great arteries of international commerce are essential to our security and to our very existence."[5] How, then are these vital materials to be transported to and fro? Despite the tremendous strides made in air transportation, it still costs forty times as much to ship bulk goods by air than by sea, and many cargos cannot be adapted for air carrying. As a consequence, almost 99 percent of American overseas commerce is transported by ship along the sea highways espoused by Mahan.[6] More than fifty years after Mahan's death, Admiral Robert Carney could still claim that "the sea is, and for the farthest foreseeable future will be, the avenue for the movement of the vast majority of the things and stuff and men that must be shuttled around in the prosecution of a war."[7] It follows by definition that this utilization of water transportation for the movement of the nation's economic sustenance requires command of the sea in the full sense of the phrase!

From a strictly military standpoint, American experience during World War II, as Mahan might have predicted, was that neither land nor air offensives could be undertaken until these forces were deployed overseas. Since this was accomplished almost entirely by ships, it served to emphasize the navy's role by making water transportation not only an economic but military necessity for the conduct of the war. However, the technology of the past twenty years has modified this position with respect to both land and air offensives. It is theoretically possible to mount both without the seas, and it is this basic change in strategic relationships which promotes the contemporary denial of Mahan and his "sailing ship strategy."

"Water remains the great medium of transportation," said Mahan, but he added a very significant qualification: ". . . unless we succeed in exploiting the air."[8] Remarkable progress has been made in this exploitation since Mahan's day, and its impact upon naval strategy has been immense. Perhaps no facet of air

power has struck a more challenging blow to the importance of sea control than its ability to move men and materials from point to point in a very short period of time. In discussing the China-Burma theatre of operations in World War II, Geueral John F.C. Fuller said, "These campaigns showed that the aeroplane was not primarily a bomb-carriage, but instead a new means of transportation around which warfare could be reshaped."[9] Similarly, General Marshall stated that for almost a year "there were at all times between 25,000 and 100,000 troops involved in fighting, and dependent largely or entirely [upon air communications]."[10] Furthermore, the air ferry route over the 'Hump' into China has been given much of the credit for sustaining China's continued participation in the war.[11] In equating this remarkable feat to the demise of sea control, however, one important facet of the over-all supply problem must not be overlooked–namely, from whence did the supplies originally emanate? The answer, of course, is from the bases of national power, the United States and Britain. How did these supplies make the journey from their source to the Indian and Burmese airfields for final delivery to Generals Stilwell, Wingate and Chiang? One path was via Operation Fireball, the air route through South America, Africa and the Middle East, and then on to India. The bulk of the cargo, however, was trausported to Calcutta by ship. Even more significant is the fact that all of the aviation fuel was delivered to Eastern India and to the intermediate stops by tanker vessels. As the then Assistant Secretary of War for Air described it, "On one of our principal well-established routes . . . we have to send about one ton of fuel by sea to enable the planes to carry approximately one ton of freight."[12] Even "Fireball" owed its existence to the navy which made possible the en route bases, and to the ships which delivered the aviation gasolines essential to the operation.[13] So World War II experience showed the necessity of command of the sea as a prerequisite to air supply of sustained ground operations far removed from the national base; in that war, Mahan's "master axiom" was a full partner in the concept of air communications.

Transport aircraft have come a long way from the workhorses of "the Hump," with far greater ranges and increased cargo-carrying capacity. This has given airlift a much enhanced capability and earned for it a larger share in strategic planning; Secretary McNamara plans to increase airlift capability some 400 percent between 1961 and 1967.[14] The recent success of Operation Big Lift in air transporting an entire army division from the United States to Germany has elicited much favorable comment. Before dismissing sea control as a necessary facet of

this capability, however, it is necessary to pause over several limiting factors of present-day airborne super-transports and airlift concepts. In the first place, the long-distance fuel to payload ratio has not improved with newer, high-powered cargo planes. The present workhorse of the Air Transport Service consumes two tons of fuel for every ton of cargo delivered from the United States to Europe, and four for each ton to Japan.[15] It would seem, then, that airlift as the sole means of supply over short routes, such as the Berlin Airlift, is one thing—it is quite another on a transoceanic scale.

Another facet of air communications is the need for control of the sky along the entire route. Included in this is a friendly runway and fighter protection at the far terminus. Both of these imply bases overseas which are dependent upon sea delivery of aviation fuel and other supplies. Furthermore, an air highway across oceans dominated by hostile carrier-based interceptors can be considered tenuous at the very best. Control of distant skies thus becomes a function of command of the intervening seas.

As for Operation Big Lift, despite its success as a means of moving large numbers of people in a short time, it was necessary to have prepositioned combat equipment long before these troops arrived. According to Secretary McNamara, two extra division sets of equipment are presently in Europe.[16] This gives way to three pertinent points: (1) the bulk of the division equipment arrived at its prelift position by sea transport; (2) it is not feasible to position army equipment ar every site in the world where policy might require a strong military presence; and (3) the problem of sustaining by air an army which has been placed into combat *à la* "Big Lift" is subject to the same limitations previously enumerated.

From this short examination comes the conclusion that air transportation has introduced an element of mobility into warfare never before experienced. This capability is ideally suited to the movement of small loads long distances or intensive supply over short distances. However, as long as air transport cannot do the entire job, sea transport will remain important even though more and more of the logistics of future conflicts will be handled by air transport. So, for sustained support of combat forces far removed from the United States, command of the seas is still a necessity, and will continue to be so for the foreseeable future.

Rapid land transportation has, to some extent, pre-empted sea movement of combat forces and strategic materials within the boundaries of any given continent (or continent system, such as MacKinder's "world island" of Europe, Asia and Africa). Intra-continental communication, secure from assault from the seas, has become rapid enough to permit a continental power to operate along interior lines against a sea power arraigned about its borders.[17] But this makes control of the seas more important, not less vital. A maritime power such as the United States, a geo-political island, cannot organize its military strategy on the basis of rapid transportation of troops from east to west along the Union Pacific Railway system; instead, it must be prepared to project its presence outward, away from its insular position. It must be remembered that the land power has no pressing need to transport either instruments of war or materials for its economy by the seas, whereas the maritime power has no alternative. The ability of a possible continental antagonist to deploy his forces by land at a speed more favorable, measured against sea transport, than in Mahan's day only emphasizes the need for sea control in order to combat this capability.

The intercontinental ballistic missile and the long-range super bomber have made it possible to launch a strategic air offensive against any nation in the world directly from United States territorial soil. This offensive might consist of nuclear weapons, or it might be of the World War II conventional variety; in either case, determining the impact of these weapon systems upon the importance of sea control is a function of several common considerations. One, it seems, is whether the weapons are of themselves decisive, eliminating the need to deploy ground forces across the seas. The other is whether the probability of employing these systems is of a high enough order to warrant discarding all other strategic concepts, thereby relying solely upon internally based air power for the military solution to all problems of national policy. If both of these considerations are valid, if United States based air power is both decisive and usable in all instances, then control of the seas is indeed secondary; if neither is valid then the essentials of geography remain unaltered, and Mahan's water highways will have to be transited, somehow or other.

The decisive nature of strategic bombing using conventional weapons can be measured from the experiences of World War II. Bombing raids accomplished considerable destruction of industrial capability, transportation facilities, and population centers. Yet postwar analysis revealed that the results of the bombings failed

in many ways to measure up to expectations. War industries were not critically deterred from producing instruments of war nor was the morale of civilian populations significantly diminished by their ordeal. Nevertheless, official postwar analysis concluded that ". . . even a first class military power . . . cannot live long under full scale and free exploitation of air weapons over the heart of its territory." [18]

It is possible that, with more resources and better direction, allied strategic bombing might by itself have defeated Hitler's Germany, as some air enthusiasts avow. On the other hand, perhaps bombing alone would never have done the job without assistance from the soldier with his rifle. Bernard Brodie sums it up by regarding the question as "neither proved nor provable. Assertions to the contrary, on either side of the argument, can only be declarations of faith." [19] It is not the intent of this paper to debate this point–it is not necessary. The pertinent fact is that a conventional air offensive of such magnitude as to be by itself decisive against any likely enemy cannot be effectively launched solely from bases within the United States. The limited results which could be reasonably expected from such an attack do not warrant the costs, measured in terms of resources expended and casualties sustained, which such a venture entails. One does not expend an intercontinental missile or deploy a manned bomber halfway around the world to deliver a handful of World War II "block busters"! Even if conventional strategic bombing is selected as the single weapon system in some future conflict, the participating aircraft are almost certain to be employed from overseas bases–which will have to be supplied over oceanic routes.

History provides no yardstick for measuring the decisiveness of the atomic bomb. The Hiroshima and Nagasaki experiences are not conclusive, since Japan was a defeated nation before the bombs were unleashed; no conclusive evidence exists to show that the explosions did more than hasten the final decision to surrender.[20] But it is a matter of record that these detonations destroyed two cities almost completely, and produced a quarter of a million casualties. It is not easy to gainsay the decisive nature of such a weapon, especially since later tests have been conducted with a weapon 750 times as powerful.[21]

Again, it is not germane to argue the merits of nuclear projectiles as an absolute weapon system. Both recent history and current policy clearly argue the need for choice, for a wide range of armed forces in order to permit national policy to respond to challenge with a flexible response.

As Secretary McNamara put it, "in order . . . to provide us with a greater range of military alternatives, we will need more nonnuclear strength than we have today . . .. We feel very strongly that the United States . . . must have a greater degree of flexibility in responding to particular situations."[22] He also said that despite the superior strategic power which the country possessed, this was "not a universal deterrent to all forms of . . . aggression."[23] Since the first atomic explosions, American armed forces have been deployed to almost every corner of the globe despite the possession of this powerful weapon. Confrontations have occurred in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Cuba, Korea, and Viet Nam, with no resort to nuclear weapons as an instrument of policy. It would appear that the very awesome power of this weapon has precluded, rather than encouraged, reliance upon atomic bombs and missiles as the only line of our nation's defense.

Strategic plans cannot discount a war in which the combatant forces are exclusively based on national soil, a conflict decided rapidly and conclusively by airborne exchanges of mass destruction in the classical Douhet manner. Nevertheless, quite wisely, strategy cannot be based solely upon such a holocaust. The capability must exist to exert a military presence anywhere in the world, and this situation seems to be assured for the reasonable future. This implies the proximity of armed forces, physical or potential, which can only be accomplished by transiting over water. Since this in turn is assured only by command of the seas one must conclude that neither strategic bombing nor nuclear missilry has diminished the importance of sea control to a maritime nation such as the United States.

Returning to the airplane, General Billy Mitchell backed his claim that bombing planes could "sink or damage the strongest battleships in existence" quite graphically by sending the old German battleship *Ostfriesland* to the ocean floor off Virginia Capes with two one ton bombs dropped from the air.[24] This vivid demonstration of the impact of air power upon battle fleets had "reverberations heard around the world."[25] Admiral Sims recognized the new relationships in short order; he declared that "command of the air gave command of the surface, whether it be sea or land."[26] The annals of World War II abound with confirmation of this point of view: Taranto, Pearl Harbor, the Repulse and Prince of Wales, Crete, Midway—it is a difficult argument to dispute!

This thesis does not attempt to dispute the point, be it expounded by Admiral Sims or General LeMay. Rather, it returns to Mahan's concept of the value of the oceans and what its control bestowed upon the nation exercising command of the sea: namely, secure lines of sea communication, freedom to use the water highways at will. Neither General Mitchell's one ton bombs nor all the maritime tonnage lost to airborne ordnance in World War II nor today's supersonic bombers have changed that one iota. What the airplane has changed are the corollaries to the master principle. Absolute control of all the seas can no longer be achieved by naval preponderance of ships of the line in the classic tradition of the British Navy after Trafalgar. Instead, local control of waters adjacent to the shore can be exercised by land-based air to a distance unimaginable in Mahan's time. The sea frontier is no longer the geographical coastline, but extends out to the limit of land-based air's ability to maintain supremacy in the skies. A seaborne invasion must first establish an aerial beachhead on this extended frontier to win control of the skies before it can use the water underneath to assault terra firma. A superior surface force no longer insures secure sea communication if a particular route happens to trespass the enemy's air frontier, as was tragically illustrated by the Murmansk convoy PQ-17 in the summer of 1942. But a change in the means of exercising control does not in any way diminish the importance of control itself, which is the subject under examination at this time.

The submarine has had much the same impact upon Mahan's strategy as airborne attack—the axiom remains, but the corollaries must be modified. If the aircraft effectively challenged the battleship for control of the off-shore waters, the submarine did the same for command of the ocean centers. The capability of this underwater commerce raider is clearly indicated by the history of the two world wars. In 1917 Britain's First Sea Lord, Admiral Jellicoe, said, "They will win, unless we stop these losses—and stop them soon." Admiral Sims concurred, telling the Secretary of the Navy that England's position was desperate.[27] Winston Churchill expressed his concern thusly: "Amid the torrent of violent events, one anxiety reigned supreme . . . . The U-Boat was our worst evil."[28] In the Pacific War, General Tojo called attrition of shipping by United States submarines one of the three principal factors which led to Japanese defeat.[29]

This wartime experience is sufficient to illustrate the potential of the submarine as a means of decisively disrupting sea

communication by commerce destruction. It does not matter whether the submarine is considered an instrument of guerre de course in the old privateer tradition, or whether a successful, coordinated submarine campaign against sea commerce constitutes naval preponderance. The key point is that technology has overtaken Admiral Mahan once more, and command of the seas as he saw it can no longer be assured by surface preponderance alone. By the same token, however, it should be remembered that use of the "water highways" cannot be exercised in the teeth of enemy surface preponderance, as German experience in the world wars clearly indicated.

The submarine and the aircraft have had one other modifying influence upon control of the seas as Mahan envisioned it. Subsurface missile launching systems and carrier-launched attack aircraft have given sea power the ability to deliver lethal blows far beyond the range of turn-of-the-century shore bombardment batteries. Sea power can now strike at the heart of land power, and also attack sea power at its heretofore sheltered bases and industrial production centers. As Secretary McNamara describes it, "There are many potential trouble spots in the world where the attack carrier is and will continue to be the only practical means of bringing our air striking power to bear." This new relationship has served to balance the extension of land power to seaward, and added a new dimension to the advantages of sea control unforeseen by Mahan.[30]

What would the Admiral have thought about this flagrant outflanking of his strategic thinking by the forces of science? Why, Mahan would not only have accepted it, but did in fact predict it! "None but a hopeless doctrinaire would deny that circumstances powerfully modify the application of the most solid general principles," since "the methods of successive eras will differ with the character of the instruments each has." He added, "it follows that . . . by experience in war, new light may . . . be shed upon the principles, and new methods introduced into their application . . .. People are prone to think that with . . . modern inventions the past cannot recur in essential features; all of us concede that it cannot recur in details." But details notwithstanding, Mahan felt that the basic principles would remain the same.[31]

The impact of technology upon command of the seas has borne Admiral Mahan out on both counts. The essential element, necessity of sea command for a maritime power, is as important

as ever. Application of this command must be changed, as he foresaw, to allow for scientific advances and recent combat experiences. With due respect to the great sea philosopher, the following modifications are offered to update his maxims on control of the sea:

(1) Control of the sea now means more than just transportation. It implies the ability to use the seas for whatever purpose is desired, although secure communications over water highways is still perhaps the seas most fruitful gift.

(2) Absolute control of all the seas is no longer possible; nor may command of a local area be assured by surface forces alone. Instead, control of a sea area is achieved by providing therein a superior force which is balanced to meet any probable threat to its command.

(3) The primary objective of a navy is to destroy not only the opposing fleet, but all the means whereby the enemy might contest control of the seas.

(4) Guerre de Course, when prosecuted by an organized force of commerce destroyers, can effectively challenge sea communication in a decisive manner. Therefore, this strategic employment of naval forces can no longer be considered as separate from the traditional Mahanian battle fleet confrontations, but is a very real, integral part of the overall struggle for sea supremacy.[32] But through all these modifications, the essential principle stands: A maritime power must retain the capability to command the seas, by whatever means are necessary, or its security is very much threatened!

FOOTNOTES

Chapter III

1. Mahan, *Strategy*, p. 139. Emphasis added.

2. Mahan, *Some Neglected Aspects of War* (Boston: Little Brown, 1907), p. 175.

3. American Merchant Marine Institute, *Merchant Fleets of the World* (Washington: 1959), p. 1-16.

4. Theodore Ropp, *War in the Modern World*, rev. ed. (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 61.

5. U.S. Office of Naval Operations, *U.S. Life Lines* (Washington: 1959), illustrates this in terms of strategic materials. Admiral Wilson's remarks are on p. 2.

6. Vice Admiral W.V. Davis, quoted in Anthony E. Sokol, *Sea Power in the Nuclear Age* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1961), p. 46. Cost computed ton/mile for ton/mile.

7. U.S. Naval War College, *Elements of Strategy* (Newport: 1958), p. V-42.

8. Mahan, *Neglected Aspects*, p. 175.

9. John F.C. Fuller, *The Second World War* (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1949), p. 216.

10. General George Marshall, *Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army*, 1 July 1941-30 June 1948, quoted in Fuller, p. 70.

11. Herbert Feis, *The China Tangle* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953). The author points out that initial tonnage delivery was quite small, and the 'Hump' served primarily as a political token of support and morale booster. Monthly tonnages tripled during 1944, and by 1945 significant amounts of war material were being delivered to China.

12. Robert Lovett, quoted in Sokol, p. 48.

13. William H. Tunner, *Over the Hump* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1964), and U.S. Air Force Historical Division, *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, v. VIII (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), describe Operation Fireball.

14. Robert S. McNamara, address in New York City, November 18, 1963, quoted in Kaufmann, p. 307.

15. Based upon performance figures for C-135B aircraft taken from U.S. Dept. of the Air Force, Standard Aircraft Handbook, v. 2 (Washington: 1964). As an illustration, Secretary Lovett presented these statistics comparing sea and airlift of 100,000 long tons from San Francisco to Australia (figures rounded off for clarity):

	Aircraft Required	Fuel Required (bbls)	Ships Required
Sealift:	0	165,000	43 cargo types
Airlift:	1,000	9,000,000	85 tankers

Although these figures are valid for 1944, recent improvements would diminish the number of aircraft needed, but *not* the total *fuel* requirement. Quoted in Sokol, p. 47.

16. Robert S. McNamara, address in New York City, November 18, 1963, quoted in Kaufmann, p. 307.

17. This has been amply demonstrated by the German railroad systems in two world conflicts. Obviously, this holds true only with the existence of well-developed transportation facilities.

18. U.S. Department of War, *The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report (European War)* (Washington: 1945), p. 16. Foregoing conclusions based upon analyses by J.F.C. Fuller, p. 384-391 and 220-231; Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 101-144; Ropp, p. 321-328; P.M.S. Blackett, *Studies of War, Nuclear and Conventional* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1962).

19. Brodie, p. 127.

20. *U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific),* as interpreted by Brodie, p. 138-143 and Fuller, p. 390-397.

21. Fuller, p. 395 and Ropp, p. 393-394.

22. Robert S. McNamara, testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee, July 27, 1961, quoted in Kaufmann, p. 66-67.

23. Robert S. McNamara, testimony before House Armed Services Committee, 1963, quoted in Kaufmann, p. 96.

24. William Mitchell, testomony before House Naval Committee, February 21, 1921, quoted in Harold and Margaret Sprout, *Toward a New Order of Sea Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946), p. 219.

25. *The New York Times,* July 22, 1921, quoted in the Sprouts, *New Order,* p. 221. See this and next page for details of bombing itself.

26. William S. Sims, quoted in the Sprouts, *New Order,* p. 222.

27. Jellicoe to Sims, and Sims to Secretary Daniels, quoted in E.E. Morison, *Admiral Sims and the Modern American Navy* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1942), p. 342.

28. Winston S. Churchill, *The Grand Alliance,* p. 111, and *The Hinge of Fate,* p. 125, both (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1950).

29. General Tojo, quoted in Samuel E. Morison, *Strategy and Compromise* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1958), p. 93.

30. Robert S. McNamara, testimony before House Armed Services Committee, 1962, quoted in Kaufmann, p. 286.

31. Mahan, *Strategy,* p. 2, 178, 184, 240.

32. Appendix II contains this writer's version of Mahan updated; when compared to Appendix I it provides a concise summary of this chapter.

CHAPTER IV

TECHNOLOGY AND OVERSEAS MILITARY EXPEDITIONS

"The supreme essential condition to the assertion and maintenance of national power in external maritime regions is the possession of [command of the seas]." [1] So spoke Admiral Mahan concerning the projection of a military presence across the seas, a matter of the utmost concern to American policy makers. The United States is presently committed to security partnerships with 45 sovereign states around the globe.[2] Only two of these share common land borders with this country, leading to the obvious conclusion that the great majority of United States military interests are indeed to be found across the seas. It is to these countries and to others less friendly, which armies can reach only by means of navies, that the power of this insular nation must be projected.

Much of Admiral Mahan's attention was concentrated upon this facet of sea power. It was to him the military reason why command of the sea was so important; dormant, and unharnessed, it conferred nothing, but properly utilized for the outward projection of national power it conferred upon its possessor the rewarding harvest of prosperity in peace and success in war. The principles which governed Mahan's concept of how to properly project national power will he examined to see whether he can provide any valid guidelines for the problem which is now, as it was 50 years ago, foremost in the minds of military strategists.

"Communications dominate war," said the Admiral in 1911, and nothing has happened since to disprove these words. For example, the sea highways across the Mediterranean Sea which provided Mahan with so many vivid historical examples again played a vital role in the North African campaigns of World War II. The hotly contested issue of command of this sea was essentially a struggle to establish sea communications. The importance of this was graphically reflected in the desert war, where "the ebb and flow of fortune was a direct result of supplies received by the opposing commanders." [3] American ground and air forces are able to exert their influence in Viet Nam today because sea control assures their communications, stretched securely across thousands of ocean miles to the national base.

If technology has had any effect upon the basic need for secure communications, it is to amplify rather than diminish its importance. The complexity of modern weapon systems has virtually eliminated field improvisation, and their complicated construction makes it harder to maintain adequate replacement parts close at hand. The wider selection of ordnance makes it more difficult to guarantee the immediate availability of the proper ammunition for a given tactical task. In general, the fighting forces have been shackled more closely to their source of supply despite the improved and expanded logistic methods which have been created to resolve this problem. This is true of the combatant forces of the land, sea, and air in equal measure. Never before has the spectre of the ancient lament, "for want of a nail . . ." hung heavier over the heads of military leaders than right now. Until science finds some means of building modern warships which are entirely self-supporting, and some method for embodying task forces with such invincibility that retreat through hostile environment is no longer a matter of concern, secure communications continue to be an indispensable element of modern strategy. The question then becomes: if, as Mahan said, military organizations need secure communications with their national base, and if this comes only as a result of sea command (as discussed in the previous chapter), then what is necessary to gain and maintain control of the distant waters through which a maritime power must project its power? Searching for the answer leads to the next of Mahan's maxims, the necessity for overseas naval bases.

"Naval forces deployed in waters distant from their national base for extended periods of time require advanced bases near their area of operations."[4] Without these, ships of war would be tied to the waters adjacent to their home shores, like "land birds" unable to venture far out to sea in time of war. It remains to be seen whether there exists a need for the bases envisioned by Admiral Mahan in order to maintain control of the distant seas today, or whether the technology that outdated his coaling stations eliminated the base requirement in its entirety.

The extent of sea control exercised by a nation over a particular body of water is a function of the power which can be directed to and sustained thereon. This in turn, can be equated to (1) the radius of action of the power-providing force, and (2) the distance of the strategic center from the force's base of operations.[5]

Fred T. Jane, writing in 1904, expressed it thusly: "In all history of naval construction, one ideal has remained constant–the desire for radius."[6] Taking note of the loss of radius imposed by the transition from sail to steam, Mahan said ". . . fuel is the life of modern naval war; it is the food of the ship; without it the modern monsters of the deep die of inanition." At that time, an operational radius of 3500 to 4000 miles was considered to be "an impediment to maritime operations well-nigh prohibitive."[7]

Nuclear science has returned to the warship the freedom of movement which it lost in the switch from sail to steam. The recent round-the-world sortie by the carrier *Enterprise* and her two nuclear powered escorts, accomplished without refueling, stands in stark contrast to the ships of Mahan's time! It is not at all difficult to envision a world where all warships will be nuclear powered and no longer dependent upon base support for propulsion. It would be a drastic mistake to consider the problem solved; indefinite cruising range is by no means the panacea for naval warfare. Radius is not necessarily a function of steaming capability, but a matter of the first critical shortage which must be replenished in order to meet the enemy.[8] The science which emancipated the *Enterprise* from the fetters of black oil burdened her with new strictures in the form of a weapon array of complex, gas-devouring aircraft and a defense system of complicated missiles and radars. Range has been extended somewhat, and this trend will continue–but the basic need for support has not been eliminated by scientific progress.

What has been discussed so far is the *dependence* of a naval force upon some degree of support, and the existence of a limiting radius of effective action from that base for a given force. It is quite obvious that the most powerful force imaginable is but a sterile apparition if the contested body of water falls outside its operational radius. It follows that the closer the radius' focal point lies to the strategic center, the greater the strength which can be exerted with a given military force. As Admiral Ernest J. King put it, "A base to supply or repair a fleet 5000 miles closer to the enemy multiplies the power which can be maintained constantly against him . . .." He reported in 1945 that "in order to maintain the fleet and air forces in the forward areas where there is fighting to be done, . . . advance bases have played a vital role. The 1940 navy had no properly equipped advance base other than Pearl Harbor. More than 400 have since been established."[9]

That was twenty years ago, and much has happened since then. The crux of the current validity of all Mahan's theories on this subject hinges upon one question: Are overseas bases needed to support fleet operations or has science increased fleet radii to the point where distant seas can be controlled by naval forces supplied from the national base? "A currently widespread opinion is that naval bases have lost much of their former importance as one of the essential elements of sea power" according to Anthony Sokol in 1961. "It is argued that with growing radius of ships, better mobile logistic support, and more nuclear power the need for strategically located sites for refueling . . . is inevitably shrinking." [10] True indeed–new tools and techniques have been created to free war ships from direct dependence upon their bases of support. As important as the extended steaming range mentioned earlier is the ability to sustain the force beyond its normal limit of endurance by replenishment at sea. General Tojo listed this attribute of the Essex class carriers as the second factor in the Japanese loss of World War II. [11] This technique has since been developed to the point where few people will dispute the capability of underway replenishment units to keep fighting vessels at sea to the endurance of their crews and machinery. [12] What is doubtful is the ability to maintain a pipeline of supplies from the continental United States to our far-flung fleets using underway replenishment ships alone, without the assistance of some form of forward base structure.

Two obstacles to this capability exist which are not easily overcome. The first of these is purely mathematical. Without bases, there are barely enough supply ships with proper equipment and trained navy crews to satisfy the underway replenishment needs of American combatant vessels presently on duty in overseas stations. This fact of life considers only the peacetime deployment of forces in the Mediterranean and the Western Pacific; no provision is made for other forces assigned missions in different waters. It is no task to project the handicaps which a baseless logistic system would place upon the navy's ability to control the seas in time of war. While it is physically possible to overcome this deficiency by constructing enough logistic vessels to satisfy any possible requirements, the tremendous cost in men and materials which this would involve, all at the expense of some other facet of national defense, makes this course of action infeasible. The second problem is the strategic vulnerability of this sort of communication line. Deploying a military force at the end of so long a supply line places it in the most tenuous position possible. One slight interruption and the effective mobility of this fighting

unit is seriously impaired, its very existence severely threatened. No responsible commander will place his forces in such a position unless there is no reasonable alternative.

The advance base serves to overcome these impediments. First, it acts as a slush tank, absorbing the brunt of temporary pipeline severences without restricting the fighting forces. Next, it assures efficient use of shipping by employing different types to their best advantage: cargo vessels transiting the long distances to maintain an adequate level of stores at the overseas base, and underway replenishment ships shuttling over short distances to insure fleet mobility. Technology has not diminished this relationship between forward bases and fleet mobility at all—quite the contrary. According to Mahan, "advantages in mobility mean rapidity in time; and this . . . means expansion in the scale of distance which can be covered, in order to overcome a dispersed or unwary enemy." [13] Lebanon bore out the sagacity of his belief that navies must be mobilized and disposed at the instant a conflict breaks out, however unexpected. Recent scientific reductions in the scale of time required for movement across a given distance have only highlighted the importance of mobility in modern warfare. Where this can be enhanced by sustained presence and instantaneous reaction made possible only by proximate logistic support, the overseas base must be considered to be as important as ever, if not more so.

To Mahan, a naval base was a permanently established, heavily defended position which supported certain fleet units on a full-time basis, and which could provide supply and repair facilities for additional warships in an emergency. This base enabled the fleet to exercise the mobility which was necessary to command the seas. The fleet in turn protected the bases and the two in concert assured the use of the nearby sea highways.

During World War II, a concept of base support was developed which added a new dimension to advance positions. This was the mobile floating base, a compound unit which could be transported to any sheltered anchorage and was able to provide supply and repair services to the floating forces soon after its arrival. This technique was developed until the question of the facilities inherent (or their absence) in a potential base site were no longer of any consequence. According to the Service Force Commander, "If we wanted to use a place, we sailed in with the necessary logistics afloat and ready for service." [14]

This capability has been updated during the last 20 years, and is more than ready for use if called upon today. The current practice of prepositioning stocks of war materials in strategic locations around the world is in itself a refinement of the temporary base concept tailored for a cold war posture of constant readiness. The degree of American reliance upon these bases is emphasized by Secretary McNamara, who told Congress that "we have substantial amounts of equipment and supplies prepositioned in Europe and the Far East and aboard . . . 'floating depot' ships." [15] It is established Navy policy that "logistic support of deployed afloat combat forces be provided, to the maximum extent possible, by mobile logistics support forces." [16] Nevertheless, the Chief of Naval Operations recognizes that "storage facilities ashore overseas will be required to meet requirements for ammunition and [petroleum products] which cannot be provided by [these forces]." [17]

It is impossible, though, to completely dismiss the Mahanian position of strength from contemporary thinking. The positions which the Admiral held to be most valuable were those which could command a restricted passageway between two major bodies of water, or in some other way control a major "sea highway." The effect which the valiant forces stationed at Malta during World War II had upon the North African campaign bears witness to the importance of strategically placed strong points. It goes without saying that the possession of Gibraltar by a hostile power would certainly have a direct and immediate effect upon the ability of the United States to project a military presence in and around the Mediterranean Sea. Carried to its ultimate conclusion, complete disregard for permanent positions of overseas naval strength might confront the United States with "the threat of being defeated by land power not on its own element, the sea, but simply by systematic exclusion from the continent." [18]

It would seem, then, that the lessons of World War II, which "brought out our dependence on both shore bases and mobile floating bases," still hold true today. "Each had its advantages, and neither alone could have done the job." [19] Mahan's principle insists that *some* bases must exist if a maritime power is to project its presence overseas; surely the Admiral would approve of new concepts of base construction just so long as the fleet was effectively supported. Mahan did, however, indicate certain specifications which governed the makeup of a base structure.

The Admiral's first requirement of a naval base is that it must be close enough to properly support operations where required. Again, this must be a relative measurement, based upon the technology of the time with regard to times and distances. Mahan's mileages have little relevance to today's base requirements, but the principle itself was borne out over and over again in the two world conflicts. The success of allied efforts against the submarine threat in the First War can be attributed, in part, to the availability of an escort base at Queenstown. By the same token, German commerce warfare in the Second War was made far more effective because the base at Brest gave submarines ready access to their strategic center. Perhaps the best example is the case of the *Yorktown's* participation in the battle of Midway, which was made possible by the yard facilities at Pearl Harbor. *Coral Sea* damages were repaired and she was underway within 72 hours, just in time for the battle.[20] This need for bases close to the strategic center is manifested today in the presence of the carrier task forces in the South China Sea, whose continued operation therein is made possible by the support facilities in the Philippines, in Japan, and in Guam.

Mahan considered it important that a base have access to as much resource as was possible. A base so endowed was that much stronger because it was not reliant for its usefulness upon supplies which had to be transported to it across disputed seas.[21] While Mahan used Martinique as an example of the shortcomings of a resourceless base, the experience of Malta stands out as a recent confirmation of this principle.[22] All other things being equal, a naval base in Japan would be stronger than one in Guam because the materials necessary to support naval operations are available without outside support. This is as much a consideration in selecting base sites today as it was 50 years ago.

In either case, these bases are ". . . essentially dependent for their usefulness in war upon control of the sea," Japan to a lesser extent than Guam.[23] A major factor in the Japanese defeat, according to General Tojo, was the ability of the American navy to cut the communications to strongholds such as Rabaul and Truk and render them useless.[24] Bases established without reasonably secure communications to the homeland, such as the Philippines in 1941, can easily become "hostages to fortune". The Russian experience with their Cuban venture in 1962 is an updated example of the validity of this Mahanian principle.

"Important naval stations," said Mahan, "should be secured against attack by land as well as by sea."[25] Britain could supply Singapore by sea but could not defend it from land assault, and consequently lost it to the Japanese before it could be used to anchor her sea power in the Eastern Indian Ocean. Sokol admits that aircraft, missiles, and nuclear weapons "make protection of . . . bases a more difficult task," but says that it "nevertheless must and will eventually be solved."[26] Defense of a base, like almost everything else in war, is a relative consideration. There is little doubt that a nuclear attack would destroy the naval facilities at Guam completely, rendering it impotent. At the same time, such an attack could have an equally damaging effect upon San Diego. Compact Gibraltar was the epitome of strength to Mahan, but strategists today consider dispersion and nearby air bases more important indices of security. Selection of bases today is governed by the same *need* to choose defendable sites as before; only the criteria of security have changed.

"As regards stations external to the home country," said Admiral Mahan, "the number and choice of them depends upon the national policy." Since he felt that bases were needed in order to maintain a power presence in an overseas area, "it follows that when a government recognizes that the national interest in a particular region may become of such a character as to demand military action, it should be made the business of some competent body of men to . . . [select strategic points for establishing bases]."[27] This principle, if not more valid, is certainly granted wider credence now than it was in the early part of this century. Today, the vast network of bases supporting the worldwide commitments of the United States Navy stands as testimony to the belated recognition of this Mahanian principle. The mixture of this base structure consists of permanent positions of strength, prepositioned supply points, and the mobile base capability which makes every harbor along the world island a potential naval base. Together these would more than satisfy the Admiral's requirements for suitability, proximity, defendability, and economy.

President Kennedy told the country that "if we are to retain for ourselves a choice other than nuclear holocaust or retreat, we must [be] ready to fight a limited war for a protracted period of time anywhere in the world."[28] This involves, of course, the projection of American military might across the oceans. If this is to be accomplished, control of the sea will be required to guarantee secure lines of communication for these forces. This

command of overseas waters can be maintained only by mobile forces whose freedom of action is assured by advance bases in the area of concern. This, in short, is the crux of Admiral Mahan's strategic theory of overseas military expeditions.

A review of the history of warfare since Mahan's death indicates that these principles have withstood the examination of experience. A study of United States strategic thinking in the sixties shows that despite the recent achievements of science, present concepts of projecting military presence abroad follow the essential outlines of Mahan's guidance for such undertakings.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter IV

1. Mahan, *Strategy,* p. 191. Bracketed portion substituted for 'a fleet superior to the enemy' as per the last chapter.

2. U.S. Department of State, *Treaties in Force,* Dept. of State pub. no. 7817 (Washington: 1965).

3. Potter and Nimitz, p. 540. Fuller, and Churchill, *Their Finest Hour* (New York: Houghton, Mifflin, 1950) provide more detail.

4. As interpreted by this writer in Appendix I.

5. This refers to staying power as opposed to disruptive sorties such as Dolittle's sea-launched bombing of Tokyo: "Such a rapid dash has someting of the nature of a raid, which characteristically disregards communications." Mahan, *Strategy,* p. 286.

6. Fred T. Jane, *Heresies of Sea Power* (London: Longmans, Green, 1906), p. 19.

7. Mahan, *Interests,* p. 26, 48.

8. Mahan, *Strategy,* p. 166.

9. Ernest J. King, *U.S. Navy at War 1941-1945* (Washington: U.S. Navy Department, 1946), p. 197, 198.

10. Sokol, p. 161, 170.

11. Samuel E. Morison, p. 93.

12. During the Okinawa campaign, for instance, the entire battle fleet was sustained in the combat area for a three month period. Worrall R. Carter, *Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 331.

13. Mahan, *Strategy,* p. 126.

14. Carter, p. 404. Captain Carter commanded Service Force, Pacific.

15. Robert S. McNamara, testimony before House Subcommittee on Military Airlift, July 29, 1963, quoted in Kaufmann, p. 98.

16. U.S. Office of Naval Operations, "Mobile Logistic Support Policy," OpNav Instruction 4000.13A (Washington: 1957).

17. *Ibid.*

18. Herbert Rosinski, "The Role of Sea Power in Global Warfare in the Future," *Brassey's Naval Annual,* 1947, p. 110.

19. Admiral Raymond Spruance, in Forward to Carter, p. vii.

20. Potter and Nimitz, p. 673.

21. Mahan, *Interest,* p. 287.

22. Potter and Nimitz, p. 535, contains a chart which illustrates the direct correlation between outside supply for Malta and the effectiveness of effort exerted by that base.

23. Mahan, *Interest,* p. 287.

24. Samuel E. Morison, p. 93. King, p. 197, concurs.

25. Mahan, *Strategy,* p. 144.

26. Sokol, p. 176.

27. Mahan, *Strategy,* p. 196, 200, 202.

28. U.S. Government, *The Budget of the U.S. Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1963* (Washington: 1962), p. 12.

CONCLUSION

MAHAN VINDICATED

When Mahan began his search for a contemporary naval strategy to present to his Naval War College classes, he found that the major obstacle in his path "lay in the fact that all naval history hitherto had been made by ships and weapons . . . wholly different from those [in use at the time]." [1] Mr. Kaufmann describes a current situation not unlike that which confronted Mahan in 1886: today's strategists must also solve problems for which there is no direct historical precedent.

In seeking his solution, Mahan found that there were lessons of the past which could be moulded into guidelines for the present and signposts for the future. The result of his historic probing was the strategic principles enumerated in this paper—the success of his efforts to provide guidance for the future from lessons of the past has been borne out by the passage of time. Mahan's basic doctrine of naval strategy has retained its validity through the years; certainly it must be interpreted against the backdrop of the scientific sixties, but Mahan himself predicted that this would be necessary. He knew that the art of war was far from static, and yet recognized that it contained some fundamentals which do not change, no matter what the state of weaponry. As testimony to the validity of this belief, much of today's strategic thinking is based, wittingly or not, upon Mahan's fundamental principles.

Mr. Kaufmann is correct in stating that "the process of forming workable strategic concepts has turned out to be extraordinarily complex." [2] A modern planner's life is certainly not a simple one. The recent "takeoff" of science and technology into a period of rapid and accelerated growth has created many new problems for the strategist, all of them perplexing and many of them crucial. However, it would be a mistake to forget that each generation, in its time, has been faced with new problems. Mahan demonstrated that a formidable planning tool was to be found in the established principles of the past: not followed blindly, but applied to present circumstance. As one historian summed it up, "The classicists have much to teach us . . . we are not adrift in an uncharted sea. If we apply and modify the classic concepts of strategy to the needs of today, we can develop modern strategies to serve us well." [3]

Mr. Kaufmann laments, "The new Admiral Mahan has yet to emerge from his study" to assist in planning new strategies.[4] Perhaps not–but the writings of the first Alfred Thayer Mahan are standing by on the library shelves, ready and willing to shed the light of time honored fundamentals across the problems of today!

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Commander Bertram Shrine, Jr., USN, (M.S., George Washington University) upon graduation from the School of Naval Command and Staff, Naval War College in 1965, was assigned to the staff of the Commander Antisubmarine Warfare Force, Atlantic Fleet. Commander Shrine entered the Navy in 1951 after graduation from Tulane University and served in destroyers prior to entering flight training. After completing flight training he specialized in Antisubmarine Warfare, serving two tours in Antisubmarine Squadrons and as ASW Training Officer on the staff of Commander Fleet Air Wing, Quonset Point. Other duties have included instructor duty in Training Squadron One and the NROTC Unit at Rice Institute.

FOOTNOTES

Conclusion

1. Mahan, letter to Samuel Ashe, January 1886, Puleston, p. 77.

2. Kaufmann, p. 8.

3. Gordon B. Turner, "Classic and Modern Strategic Concepts," Lecture, U.S. Naval War College, Newport: 19 September 1957.

4. Kaufmann, p. 8.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alden, Carroll S. and Earle, Ralph. *Makers of Naval Tradition.* rev. ed. Boston: Ginn, 1942.

American Merchant Marine Institute. *Merchant Fleets of the World.* Washington: 1959.

Ballantine, Duncan S. *U.S. Naval Logistics in the Second World War.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947.

Blackett, Patrick M.S. *Studies of War, Nuclear and Conventional.* New York: Hill and Wang, 1962.

Brassey's Naval Annual 1947. New York: Macmillan, 1947.

Brodie, Bernard. *Sea Power in the Machine Age.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941.

_____. "Strategy As an Art and a Science." Lecture, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I.: 18 September 1958.

_____. *Strategy in the Missile Age.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959.

Butler, James R.M. *Grand Strategy.* London: H.M. Stationery Off., 1957.

Carter, Worrall R. *Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil.* Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1953.

Carter, Worrall R. and Duvall, Elmer E. *Ships, Salvage, and Sinews of War.* Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1954.

Churchill, Winston L.S. *The Second World War.* v. II-IV. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949-1950.

Clausewitz, Karl von. *On War.* Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1950.

Davis, George T. *A Navy Second to None.* New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1940.

Earle, Edward M., ed. *Makers of Modern Strategy.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943.

Feis, Herbert. *The China Tangle.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953.

Fuller, John F.C. *The Second World War, 1939-45.* New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949.

Gilliam, McCluer. "Mahan." Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation. Princeton University, Princeton, N.J.: 1961.

Great Britain. Admiralty. *East of Malta, West of Suez.* Boston: Little, Brown, 1944.

Hacker, Louis. "The Incendiary Mahan." *Scribner's Magazine,* April 1934, p. 263-268.

Hewes, James. "Mahan and Management." *Marine Corps Gazette,* January 1965, p. 41-46.

Jane, Frederick T. *Heresies of Sea Power.* London: Longmans, Green, 1906.

Jane's Fighting Ships, 1963-1964. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963.

Jomini, Antoine H. *The Art of War.* Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service, 1947.

Kaufmann, William W. *The McNamara Strategy.* New York: Harper & Row, 1964.

Knox, Dudley W. *A History of the United States Navy.* New York: Putnam, 1947.

LaFeber, Walter. *The New Empire.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1963.

Liddell-Hart, Basil H. *Strategy; the Indirect Approach.* New York: Praeger, 1954.

Livezey, William E. *Mahan on Sea Power.* Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1947.

MacKinder, Halford J. *Democratic Ideals and Reality.* New York: Holt, 1942.

Mahan, Alfred T. *Armaments and Arbitration.* New York: Harper, 1912.

_____. *From Sail to Steam; Recollections of Naval Life.* New York: Harper, 1907.

_____. *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783.* Boston: Little, Brown, 1890.

_____. *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire.* Boston: Little, Brown, 1892.

_____. *The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future.* Boston: Little, Brown, 1897.

_____. *Lessons of the War with Spain, and Other Articles.* Boston: Little, Brown, 1899.

_____. *Naval Administration and Warfare, Some General Principles.* Boston: Little, Brown, 1908.

_____. *Naval Strategy Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practices of Military Operations on Land.* Boston: Little, Brown, 1911.

_____. *The Problem of Asia and Its Effect upon International Policies.* Boston: Little, Brown, 1900.

_____. *Retrospect and Prospect; Studies in International Relations, Naval and Political.* Boston: Little, Brown, 1902.

_____. *Some Neglected Aspects of War.* Boston: Little, Brown, 1907.

Morison, Elting E. *Admiral Sims and the Modern American Navy.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1942.

Morison, Samuel E. *Strategy and Compromise.* Boston: Little, Brown, 1958.

National Military-Industrial Conference. *National Strategy in an Age of Revolutions.* New York: Praeger, 1959.

Potter, Elmer B. and Nimitz, Chester W., eds. *Sea Power.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960.

Puleston, William D. *The Influence of Sea Power in World War II.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947.

_____. *Mahan.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939.

Ropp, Theodore. *War in the Modern World.* rev. ed. New York: Collier, 1962.

Smith, Franklin D. "Supply Logistics in the Sixth Fleet." Unpublished Report. U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I.: November 1959.

Sokol, Anthony E. *Sea Power in the Nuclear Age.* Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1961.

Sprout, Harold H. and Sprout, Margaret T. *Foundations of National Power.* New York: Van Nostrand, 1951.

_____. *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918.* rev. ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1942.

_____. *Toward a New Order of Sea Power.* 2d ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943.

Taylor, Charles C. *The Life of Admiral Mahan.* New York: Doran, 1920.

Tunner, William H. *Over the Hump.* New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1964.

Turner, Gordon B. "Classic and Modern Strategic Concepts." Lecture. U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I.: 19 September 1957.

U.S. Air Force. Systems Command. Aeronautical Systems Division. *Standard Aircraft Characteristics.* 5th ed. Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio: 1961. v. II.

_____. USAF Historical Division. *The Army Air Forces in World War II.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958. v. VII.

U.S. Bureau of the Budget. *The Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending 30 June 1963.* Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1962.

U.S. Dept. of State. *Treaties in Force.* Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1965.

U.S. Naval War College. *Basic Logistics Considerations.* Newport, R.I.: 1964.

_____. *Elements of Strategy.* Newport, R.I.: 1958.

U.S. Office of Naval Operations. *Mobile Logistic Support Policy.* Op Nav Instr. 4000.18A. Washington: 1957.

_____. *U.S. Life Lines–Imports of Essential Materials, 1958.* Washington: 1959.

_____. *U.S. Navy at War.* Washington: 1946.

U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey. *European War; Summary Report.* Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1945.

APPENDIX I

MAHAN'S PRINCIPLES OF NAVAL STRATEGY[1]

COMMAND OF THE SEA[2]

Axiom. A maritime power must control the seas in order to achieve success in war.

Definition. By control of the sea is meant the freedom to transport men and materials across the seas at will, while denying this capability to the enemy.

Corollaries.

1. Control of the sea is achieved only by naval preponderance.

2. Naval preponderance is achieved only through superiority of capital ships-of-the-line.

3. The primary object of a battle fleet is to destroy the enemy battle fleet.

4. Guerre de course can be harmful, but is not decisive.

5. Naval preponderance is the only means of effectively eliminating the maritime commerce of an enemy.

6. Mobility is the greatest asset of a naval force and must not be impaired.

7. The fleet should be concentrated at the decisive point. This implies: Mutual support, rather than physical proximity. Emphasis upon the strategic center rather than peripheral ventures.

---

[1]This list is not all inclusive, but pertains only to those principles having to do with overseas military expeditions.

[2]The terms, command and control are used interchangeably.

COMMUNICATIONS

Axiom: All military organizations are ultimately dependent upon open communications with the basis of national power.

Definition: By communications is meant a route for the free supply of and open retreat by a military force.

Corollaries:

1. Communications over water routes is made secure only through command of the sea.

2. Fighting forces must have secure communication with some base of supply.

3. Advance bases are effective only so long as they have communication with the national base.

OVERSEAS MILITARY EXPEDITIONS

Axiom: A nation which desires to exert military power in a region remote from the national base must possess strategic positions in that region.

Corollary: Naval forces deployed in waters distant from their home ports for extended periods of time require advance bases near their area of operation.

Rules Governing the Advance Naval Base Structure:

1. Bases in outlying regions should be established in sufficient number to support anticipated operations.

2. Bases must be close enough to the strategic center to sustain the fleet presence threat.

3. Bases must have sufficient supply and repair facilities to support the fleet units in the area; the more resource inherent in the base itself, the stronger and more valuable it is.

4. Bases must have secure communications with the national base.

5. Bases must be capable of self-defense without the direct support of the fleet.

6. Bases should not be constructed beyond the number required for essential support.

APPENDIX II

MAHAN UPDATED FOR THE NUCLEAR AGE[1]

COMMAND OF THE SEA

Definition: By control of the sea is meant the ability to use the seas for whatever purpose a nation desires, while denying such use to the enemy.

Corollaries:

1. Control of a sea area is achieved by concentrating therein a force superior to that of the enemy.

2. Forces contesting control of a sea area must be balanced to meet any possible enemy threat, be it surface, air, or sub-surface.

3. The primary objective of naval forces is to destroy the enemy's means of disputing control of the sea.

4. Commerce destruction can be a decisive application of military force if, by sufficient disruption of enemy communication, his control of the sea is lost. (Within the definition above.)

5. This corollary is no longer needed, since elimination of enemy commerce is covered by the revised definition and the restated corollaries above.

---

[1] Items appearing in Appendix I and not herein restated retain their validity without change.

PROFESSIONAL READING

The evaluations of recent books listed in this section have been prepared for the use of resident students. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these books of interest in their professional reading.

The inclusion of a book in this section does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Certain of the books on the list which are not available from these sources may be available from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books are obtainable on loan. Requests from individual officers to borrow books from an Auxiliary Library Service Collection should be addressed to the nearest of the following special loan collections.

Chief of Naval Personnel (G14)
Department of the Navy
Washington, D.C. 20370

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station
Library (ALSC), Bldg. C-9
Norfolk, Virginia 23511

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station
Library (ALSC)
San Diego, California 92136

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station (Pearl Harbor)
Library (ALSC) Box 20
San Francisco, California 96610

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station (Guam)
Library (ALSC) Box 174
San Francisco, California 96630

BOOKS

Bonnet, Georges. *Quai d'Orsay.* Isle of Man, Eng.: Times Press and Gibbs & Phillips, 1965. 492 p.

The student of international affairs will immediately recognize the Quai d'Orsay as the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He will also recall that Georges Bonnet headed this Ministry during very troubled times (10 April 1938 to 15 September 1939), after having served France as its delegate to the League of Nations, its Minister of Finance (1933, and again in 1937), and its Ambassador to the United States (1936). M. Bonnet's frank and intimate account of the Quai d'Orsay during the "complicated happenings" of the period 1919-1964, with an introductory examination of French foreign affairs from 1871 to 1918, is both informative and revealing. It provides an authoritative survey of French politics and political thought during the past century, with a final appreciation of the current situation. Such acknowledgments as Paul Cambon's opinion of the Treaty of Versailles as "an ammunition dump that will explode across the whole world one of these days" manifest an accuracy in French political appraisal. Unfortunately, the recounting of French political maneuvering since that appraisal discloses an inherent difficulty in obtaining agreement of solution and unity of effort. Here are discussed the military aspects as well as the political implications of the events caused and affected by this lack of understanding and cooperation, international as well as internal. The total effect is a historical review from the Treaty of Versailles to the present as seen by an enthusiastic but often frustrated and disillusioned French diplomat.

R.B. BADE
Commander, U.S. Navy

Cowburn, Philip. *The Warship in History.* New York: Macmillan, 1965. 364 p.

The author in this book has traced the evolution of the warship from ancient times to the present. He covers quite extensively the progress in warship propulsion from oar to sail, to steam, to nuclear power; in ship construction from wood to "ironclad"; and in naval weapons from the early ram to ballistic-missile submarines and aircraft carriers with their versatile air arms. Mr. Cowburn doesn't concern himself with all naval innovations in all fields, but he does examine quite thoroughly the change

from sail to steam, the emergence of "iron ships," and the growth of the naval gun and the dreadnought. His recounting of the development of the submarine from its earliest use to its current capabilities is most interesting. He touches very lightly on naval battles of any consequence, but forewarns the reader that his book is not a discourse on tactics, or a history of naval battles, but a treatise on the evolvement of the warship from various revolutionary inventions which caused a change in naval warfare and naval construction. The impact that divers naval leaders throughout the years had on warship construction is mentioned; the most noteworthy, according to Mr. Cowburn, is Lord Fisher's impact on the British Navy. The author, who is Senior Lecturer at the Royal Naval College in Greenwich, England, is of course rightfully oriented toward the British Navy and its contribution to the development of the warship, but he does not slight other contributors. He has drawn heavily on museum prints of ancient vessels and on other pictorial sources which enhance the documentation of his book. For anyone who is interested in tracing the evolution of the warship in history and in a superficial investigation of its influence on history, this volume would be an excellent one-point source.

J.R.M. FISHER, II
Commander, U.S. Navy

Frankland, Noble. *The Bombing Offensive against Germany.* London: Faber and Faber, 1965. 128 p.

Had Mahan wished for backing in his "command of the sea" concepts, he would have found it in this study on the strategic bombing of Germany in World War II. Dr. Frankland, a British historian, describes how "command of the air" became essential, and acknowledges that the advent of the Mustang long-range fighter in early 1944 ultimately saved the day. One conclusion reached was that the war might have been considerably shortened had the Bomber Command concentrated first on disposing of the enemy air force, thereby permitting earlier and more complete destruction of cities, oil refineries, and the like. In this regard, the book reveals that the selection of generally acceptable bombing targets then was as controversial a topic as it is today. Dr. Frankland develops the theory that subjugation of Germany by mass area destruction was a logical military tactic in history, and finds little difference between the effects of strategic bombing on a populace and those produced by early naval blockades. He justifies the massive bombing of central Germany from both

economic and moral viewpoints, finding it a factor vital to the ultimate rupture of Germany's borders by Allied military and naval forces. The author's subject is historical in nature, but the conclusions reached are pertinent now. Therefore, this short, interesting, easy-to-read work is recommended to all students of warfare.

K.C. HOLM
Commander, U.S. Navy

Lyons, Gene M. and Morton, Louis. *Schools for Strategy.* New York: Praeger, 1965. 356 p.

This book is primarily a compilation of empirical data on schools conducting studies in national security affairs. The authors examine the programs of private universities, state universities, military war colleges, State Department schools, and private and government-operated research organizations, with a brief look at the London Institute for Strategic Studies. The approach taken by Princeton, Harvard, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Duke, North Carolina, Wisconsin, Ohio State, the National War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Rand, Operations Evaluation Group, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, Institute for Defense Analysis, and the Council on Foreign Relations in their treatment of national security studies is covered in some detail. Most of the effort is devoted to strictly background information which has been developed since early in the 1940's. This includes, *inter alia*, the organizers of the national security programs, the existing experts–both military and civilian–now participating, and the numerous disciplines within which the subject is entwined. These are almost exclusively the humanities, economics, public administration, and military studies. Selected information is provided on undergraduate, graduate, and advanced research programs.

The need for formal training in national security affairs for government officials who may occupy policy-making positions is discussed. Mention is made of the world events which brought about this need, such as post-World War II realignment, the Soviet A-bomb explosion in 1949, and the initial Soviet sputnik. The difficulties experienced in the recruitment of highly qualified scholars to fill government positions is pointed out. The main theme of the book centers on the piecemeal approach to formal schooling in national security affairs, with a recommendation that the entire program should be given a new sense of direction.

The authors indicate the old dilemma that most institutes of higher learning consider military affairs as too narrow a field to be presented as a separate discipline. While existing schools and programs are useful, a planned formal training program is considered the most desirable. Professors Lyons and Morton suggest full incorporation of national security affairs in the history and social science disciplines of our universities and colleges.

W.D. CLARK
Colonel, U.S. Air Force

Mark, Max. *Beyond Sovereignty*. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1965. 178 p.

The student of political science will find the first four chapters repetitious of much he has already studied. Others will find them easy to read and an orientation for what is to follow. The meat of the book begins with an insight into the split between East and West. This chapter sets forth Mr. Mark's thesis, that there is something for Americans beyond sovereignty. The idea is expertly developed as the reader is drawn through the anti-colonial revolution, the revolution of warfare, and the revolution of rising expectations. This is followed by an analysis of the Communist world and a comparison of this world with the West. The chapter on contemporary international politics is impressive and incisive. In readable language and without tortuous exercises in terminology, the author lays down his thoughts on the decline of the nation-state, transitional ideologies, and the fusion of domestic and international politics. He puts the new diplomacy in its proper place and points out the ambiguous position of physical power reflecting the unsettled character of military doctrine. The United Nations is described as a child of the age of total war; and the philosophical basis for international law is doomed to failure since the rise of the sovereign state. Although the nation-state has become obsolete, world community is still in the distance. Mr. Mark thinks the chances for disarmament should become more promising since wars have become suicidal. But one is forced to the conclusion that in actuality the abstract proposition of disarmament finds itself in a vicious circle. At this point the author offers his perspective of the world scene. This alone could fuel a long debate, but he does not dwell upon it. Instead there follows an excellent appraisal of the American approach to foreign policy –that it lacks the correct understanding of our historical period, that our outlook is narrowly pragmatic. From these corollaries we

are led to the conclusion that we have no capacity to draw long-term policies; the author cites the evidence of our short-term, brush-fire policies providing the momentum to carry us on to another makeshift, equally short-term policy. This shows, he claims, that American foreign policy lacks a working theory of history. In this excellent book Mr. Mark provides us with much intriguing material for discussion. However, it seems that the argument concludes too abruptly, leaving too many answers for the reader to discover, when it becomes clear that there is no solution outside the framework of realism.

G.J. PATTON
Captain, U.S. Navy

— NOTES —