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Subversive Insurgence: An Analytical Model


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SUBVERSIVE INSURGENCY:

An Analytical Model

A Research Paper prepared by

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INTRODUCTION

Subversive insurgency is characterized by instability and change. Ill-defined cause and effect relationships are generated by the violent interaction of political, military, social, psychological, and economic factors. The real base of insurgent strength is uncertain. Within this context, finding a proper response is difficult. The counterinsurgency task is complicated by the presence of multiple potential targets.

As a result, the direction and emphasis of the counterinsurgency effort are considerations of vital importance. The primary and secondary

factors giving rise to insurgent strength must be clearly identified so that they can be attacked directly and side excursions avoided. The purpose of this paper is to provide that identification and direction.

What factors constitute the basis of insurgent strength? Which of these are primary? Which are secondary? What is their relationship with the total power potential of the insurgent movement? Can the success or failure of an insurgent movement be predicted? These are the questions for which answers are sought.

The search will follow the sequence of questions. First, certain factors will be proposed as those having a vital or primary importance to the success of a subversive insurgency. These factors will be analyzed in some detail. Next, the secondary factors will be treated in similar fashion. Finally, an analytical model will be constructed, depicting the relationship between the factors and the total power potential of the movement.

The final result, total power potential, will then enable a prediction to

be made concerning the likelihood of the insurgency to move from a self-sustaining level to a probable success level. The goal of this approach is twofold: first, to point out the proper targets for counterinsurgency action, and, second, to demonstrate the inherent limitations on such actions.

Model construction is undertaken with qualifications, the term "model" being used in a modest sense. No attempt is made to include all of the complex factors operative in subversive insurgency situations. The model is intended to provide a framework for greater insight to reality, not a detailed and cumbersome theory. The model will be examined by two tests: (1) Are the proposed relationships compatible with the logic of subversive insurgent behavior? (2) Are they supported by application of the model to case studies of subversive insurgencies?

Subversive insurgency — meaning revolt that is Communist controlled, directed, or inspired — is a modern phenomenon, and it differs from ordinary insurgency. The paper will begin by examining those differences.

I — NEW STATUS FOR AN OLD WEAPON

The traditional concepts of war changed under the impact of the modern industrial and scientific revolutions. So-called unconventional methods of warfare evolved to find ready applications as instruments of violence and insurrection. The methods were largely those of opportunism adjusted to the peculiar conditions existing. One was subversive insurgency — marriage of a new and powerful ideology with a proven weapon. The result was a new and significantly enhanced instrument of war that, in our time, has become "systemized as a weapon of the dis-

affected for the seizure of power."¹

Insurgency — a Dynamic Concept. Insurgency, as a form of warfare, is neither new nor unique. Karl von Clausewitz, the spiritual father of modern military analysts, gave the subject short treatment in an uncompleted chapter of his classic work *On War*, but a significant characteristic did not escape his attention: "but especially," he averred, "that peculiarity repeats itself on a small scale, which a people's war possesses on a great one, namely, that the spirit of resistance exists everywhere, but is nowhere tangible."²

Historically, insurgency has been the weapon of the weak.³ Guerrillas (insurgents) were traditionally used in three ways: as adjuncts to regular forces, as agents of foreign powers, and as insurrectionaries.⁴ It is only since the advent of mass society, however, that this latter form of unconventional warfare has come into its own.

Improvements in mass communications, the existence of a cadre source in the growing group of "thinking elites," and the inherent vulnerability of modern society to disruptions in its processes are cited as causatives of this new importance.⁵ With the addition of the Communist ideology, the most formidable modern form of insurrection has become subversive insurgency.

Subversive insurgency roughly corresponds to the condition existing during unconventional war, irregular war, and guerrilla war. Additional descriptive phrases are protracted war, internal war, and war of liberation. For purposes of this paper, subversive insurgency is defined as an illegal movement which seeks to mobilize mass support for politico-military actions whose goal is the overthrow and replacement of the existing government.

Modern View — Paradox and Dilemma. The reemphasis of a historically familiar weapon has presented both a paradox and accompanying dilemma. The paradox exists in the overwhelming technological strength possessed by modern states coupled with their seeming inability to deal effectively with the politico-military techniques of subversive insurgency.⁶

The dilemma is found in the search by the Western World for acceptable alternatives for combating subversive insurgencies which lie between the undesired ultimate reaction of general war on one hand and the equally undesired surrender of vital areas on the other.

The political scientist, Robert Strausz-Hupé, views the present situation as one in which we are caught up in a far-reaching "systemic revolution" engendered by a host of dimly-perceived forces. The root causes of this revolution are only partially to be explained by the growth of science, the spread of industrialization, the increase in population, and the all-pervasive influence of improved communications. Reactionary forces existing in the uncommitted areas of the world are observed as the visible manifestations of the delayed impact of westernization — carrying within itself both creative change and concomitant dissension.⁷

The situations created during this "secular and universal systemic revolution" were perceived by the master revolutionary, Lenin, as those pre-eminently suited to the Marxist doctrine of dynamic historical change.⁸ Following this lead, both the Russian and Chinese Communist movements have traditionally supported subversive insurgency, viewing it as a legitimate recourse to force by "oppressed" peoples. Premier Khrushchev, speaking in 1961, declared that "liberation wars will continue to exist as long as

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

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Lieutenant Commander Ward has served as Engineering Officer of the U.S.S. *Royal* (DD-872) and Executive Officer of U.S.S. *Courtney* (DE-1021). He commanded U.S.S. *Whitehall* (PCER-856) and U.S.S. *Adroit* (MSO-509).

Upon graduation from the School of Naval Command and Staff, Naval War College, Class of 1967, Lieutenant Commander Ward was assigned to the Department of Mechanics at Johns Hopkins University.

imperialism exists, as long as colonialism exists . . . Communists fully support such just wars and march in the front rank with the peoples waging liberation struggles."⁹

Responsive Environment. In the newly emerging nations, attempting to modernize without adequate equipment or tools, subversive insurgency finds a fertile field for exploitation. Historically, disruptions in society have always invited attack. When Lenin declared that partisan operations occur because they "are created by powerful economic and political causes"¹⁰ he was only stating the obvious. Today's subversive insurgency is considerably more organized than the combination of banditry and terror that Lenin termed partisan operations. In a similar fashion, however, its thrust is opportunistically directed toward the weaknesses in the framework of society. Most of the areas threatened by insurgency at the present time stand in actual need of economic, social, and political reform: "Communism exploits real aspirations and convictions."¹¹

A resort to insurgency usually occurs when the legitimate govern-

ment becomes separated from the masses both politically and socially. In this situation a counterelite develops, which, when it fails to gain a place in the legitimate governmental structure, turns to revolution "from the bottom."¹² The counterelite, or cadre, develops a parallel government whose ultimate purpose is to realize an illegal transfer of internal political power through a two-pronged attack aimed at neutralization or elimination of government armed forces and control of the people.¹³ The *quid pro quo* for ending the conflict becomes the handing over of the reins of government, or, in the case of colonies, the granting of independence.¹⁴

Ernesto Guevara emphasized how important it is for the resistance to initiate separation and stated that as "a necessary minimum . . . people must see clearly the futility of maintaining the fight for social goals within the framework of civil debate."¹⁵

Communist insurgents have been quick to note that when conditions are not favorable for insurrection, they may, in some instances, be implemented. This practice obtains when the proper background conditions exist but requires a "spark." The initiation of insurrection will serve to crystallize existing discontent and enable the movement rapidly to gain strength.¹⁶ The real basis of this strength is the indigenous people.

The Target. The ultimate goal — control of the government — can be realized in subversive insurgency, or revolution from the bottom, only through gaining the support of the masses. Full help from the people is an "indispensable condition."¹⁷

Converts to the insurgent causes are gained largely through persuasion. Psychological methods assume great importance. The struggle by the insurgents to gain popular support

is viewed as one for "the minds of men." To this end, the two sides in the struggle are carefully portrayed by the insurgents as the people and the aggressor (government). Once gained, adherents are retained through the success of the movement.¹⁸

Support by a majority of the people, while a condition that would obviously guarantee the success of an insurgent movement, is not required. The organizer of Arab resistance in World War I, T. E. Lawrence, claimed that a revolution could succeed with only 2 percent of the populace actively supporting the movement — provided that the remainder were "passively sympathetic." Figures from a recent study of seven insurgencies seem to support his contention. In this study, it was found that only about 6 percent of the indigenous populations were directly involved in the insurgency, the majority being evidently indifferent or selectively neutral.¹⁹

Summary. Insurgency, as a method of warfare, has been used throughout recorded history. In this century it has undergone a significant transformation that has effectively coupled it with political actions and has produced an enhanced revolutionary weapon — subversive insurgency.

In the world of the newly independent and developing nations, subversive insurgency has found a fertile field for revolution from the bottom. The challenge presented to the Western World is both serious and long-term. Finding a proper response is difficult and must be viewed as a part of the overall political, economic, and social struggle between the Western World and the Communist bloc.

In this situation, economy of resources assumes grave import for a long-term struggle. Counterinsurgency actions must strike at the real sources of subversive insurgent

strength. Unproductive side excursions must be avoided. The factors which constitute the primary sources of subversive insurgent power will next be proposed and discussed in detail. The foundation for the model of subversive insurgency will be laid with consideration of these primary power factors whose common characteristic is the all-pervasive concept of methodical preparation.

II — INTRODUCTION TO THE MODEL; PRIMARY POWER FACTORS

General Considerations. The simplest and most direct approach in compiling factors to use in building an insurgent model seems to be that of making a division between the small group of factors considered vital to subversive insurgent success and a second group containing factors which are important but not critical.

The first group, or primary power factors (PPF), is specified as containing "the nonmeasurable components of power," i.e., those embracing vital intangibles such as morale and spiritual capacity.¹ The second group will then contain the "measurable" elements of power — those which can be defined as material capabilities or instruments of force. This second group is that of secondary power factors (SPF).

The first, or primary, power factors will be an *a priori* requirement, necessitating the conclusion that the movement cannot exist without their

presence. Conversely, the secondary power factors may or may not be present in any one given insurgent situation. This stipulation will enable allowance to be made for uniqueness and will admit a certain degree of complexity in assessing an insurgent situation. After these preliminary considerations, a gross concept of an insurgent model can now be introduced.

The first proposition is that the decisive determinants, or Primary Power Factors (PPF), constitute the basic strength of the insurgent movement. A movement which possesses these mutually supporting elements is self-sustaining and potentially capable of increasing its strength.

The second proposition, and a corollary to the first, is that the total strength of the insurgent movement is determined by the multiplying effect of the Secondary Power Factors (SPF) upon the Primary Power Factors. This means that the total strength of the insurgent movement, or its Total Power Potential (TPP), depends directly on the ability of the nucleus (Primary Power Factors) to develop and harness Secondary Power Factors as multipliers. It also infers, as will be demonstrated later, that the insurgent movement can sustain itself at a low power level, even if it has not captured any SPF, provided that it maintains the PPF.

To fix this concept graphically, consult figure 1. Here, the Total Power Potential of the movement is seen to be the product of the Primary and



Secondary Power Factors.

Before proceeding further with the development of an analytic model, the primary power factors of subversive insurgency will be identified and discussed.

Primary Power Factors. Three factors are proposed as being mutually supporting, interdependent, and vitally necessary to a subversive insurgent movement. These factors are a cadre, an ideology, and leadership.

Cadre. The formation of a nucleus of disciplined, trained, and highly motivated members is a central tenet of Communist organization technique and is particularly required for successful insurgent operations. The cadre forms a tight organizational frame for the insurgent movement and enables a close control of the masses to be maintained by occupying leadership positions at every level. This method of control has been called the "master weapon of modern warfare."²

Mao Tse-tung, the lifetime revolutionary, prescribed certain rules for the employment of cadres. The practice of favoritism was to be resisted and a strict policy followed of "employing only the worthy." Cadres were to be firmly guided, but at the same time allowed to display initiative. They were to be elevated through education and their work supervised in order to encourage achievements and to correct mistakes. The problems of cadres were also to receive extensive attention. They were to be helped when faced with difficult conditions such as illness or family problems. "The Chinese Communist Party," Mao emphasized, "is a party at the head of a great revolutionary struggle . . . and cannot fulfill its historical task without a large number of leading cadres . . ."³

One of the functions of the cadre is to keep an insurgent movement

alive while preserving its unique character and identity. The protracted nature of the struggle necessary to achieve success in revolution from the bottom means that the insurgents must possess a durable core of thoroughly committed members who will sustain and direct the operation. As the fortunes of the movement rise and fall, the cadre will expand and contract as necessary — always viewing the situation as one in which the life of the movement is the paramount consideration.⁴

One of the major principles of communism is the concept of protraction — the idea that a Communist organization grows in size and power through repeated contact with other organized elements of society.⁵ The cadre serves as the cutting edge for this contact, relentlessly and patiently eroding the opposition of others and gathering the residue for use in further expansion.

A potential for very rapid expansion of cadres exists and is derived from two interrelated conditions. First, the men who are trained by the cadre can, in turn, indoctrinate and teach others. Second, the growth rate of the organization approaches that of a geometrical progression, growth rate being a function of span of control and indoctrination time.

Using an average figure for span of control — say six — one cadre member can indoctrinate $72/n$ men per year, where n represents required indoctrination time in months. Assuming an indoctrination time of one year, it can be readily seen that in the short space of two years an organization could theoretically realize a 4,300 percent gain in members.

This potential for growth indicates the magnitude of the problem faced in attempts to eradicate insurgent movements which have enjoyed a building period of several years. The cancerlike growth of these move-

ments is "an open sore that annoys today, is a nuisance tomorrow, weakens in a month, and may cause death if not properly treated."⁶

A third function of the cadre is the role of leading propagandizer and interpreting agent of the unifying ideology. This duty has been particularly stressed by leading Communist theoreticians. Lenin declared that "the task of social democracy is to create organizations most suitable to leading the masses . . ."⁷ and Mao Tse-tung saw as a corollary role of the cadre the task of creating ideology through a constant purification process which was generated by the struggle to survive.⁸ Stalin also emphasized repeatedly the dynamic mission of cadres in this area. In January 1934 he declared: "Furthermore, after the correct political line has been laid down, organizational work decides everything, including the fate of the political line itself, its success or failure"; and in his "Address to the Graduates from the Red Army Academies," delivered in May 1935 at the Kremlin, Stalin again put forward and elucidated the slogan, "Cadres decide everything."⁹

Ideology. While the cadres constitute the building blocks of the movement, ideology is the unifying mortar. Some kind of an ideology is vitally necessary to the success of an insurgent movement. History provides many examples of bandits and roving bands of insurgents who were able to prevail temporarily or locally but who ultimately failed. The reasons for these failures, as contrasted with successful insurgent guerrilla actions, are grounded in the lack of the sustaining and largely self-imposed discipline with which an ideology equips its followers.¹⁰

The relationship between a guerrilla and the indigenous people is necessarily close. The guerrilla, in order to survive, must develop and maintain a firm psychological as

well as a material, base of support. Ideology is the all-important element in the foundation; it provides the unifying force which maintains the cohesiveness of the movement and attracts the support of the people.¹¹

Ideologies are usually present in an internal and external form. The internal ideology is that of the cadre and in subversive insurgency this ideology is communism. The external ideology may be, and often is, completely different. This ideology is the one utilized to gain popular support. Land reform, nationalism, government corruption, external poverty, and similar issues can be effectively exploited as external ideologies by insurgents to win support.

Che Guevara, in his handbook for revolution, provides the clearest example of the use of an external ideology. Guevara terms this ideology an "ideal," and states that it should be "simple" but "firm and clear." He then cynically points out that the ideal should be suited to the class of people it is designed to recruit. Land is suggested for the peasantry, adequate wages for the workers, and "abstract ideals of liberty" for intellectuals.¹²

Coincidence of the internal and external ideologies, while not important in the first stages of the movement, assumes a primary importance if the movement hopes to succeed. Methodical indoctrination and teaching by the cadres is often employed to redirect an external ideology as necessary during the course of the struggle.¹³

This means, in turn, that a significant political effort must accompany guerrilla actions. Mao, addressing the problems of the Chinese revolution, emphasized this dependency in a speech delivered in 1938. "The organizational work of the Party," he argued, "and the mass movement in most parts of the country are directly linked with armed struggle,

and there is not, and cannot be, any Party work or mass movement that is independent and isolated."¹⁴

A new social and economic order is customarily presented as the goal of the insurgent movement. It is towards achieving this order that a suitable external ideology is (apparently) directed. Mao makes this highly significant observation on the subject: "Without a political goal," he writes, "guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must fail if its political objectives do not coincide with those of the people, and their sympathy, cooperation, and assistance cannot be gained."¹⁵ Winning the support of the people is a job for the cadres of the insurgency.

Leadership. Leadership, the third essential element of subversive insurgency, should be drawn from the ranks of the cadre and, ideally, should be representative of the ethnic and geographic group that is predominant in the area.¹⁶ The latter requirement is particularly important to the survival of an insurgent movement. Popular support, the *sine qua non* of an insurgent movement, depends to a great extent upon the effectiveness of the leadership appeal of the organization.

In addition to helping secure vital logistic support from the people, the insurgent leadership plays a major role in maintaining the morale. The morale of a guerrilla unit is enhanced when the members have an exalted view of their leader.¹⁷ On a wider basis, a nationally known leader will have the same effect. When, as in most instances, the subversive insurgent movement is also nationalistic, a leader who is equated in the popular view with that nationalism is an overwhelming asset. Ho Chi Minh, for nearly 40 years, has been such a figure to the Vietnamese. This figure-head type of charismatic leadership is highly effective in underdeveloped countries where the economy is largely agrarian-based.

Besides assisting in the attainment of material and moral support, leadership functions to provide direction in all vital spheres of operations. Military direction is perhaps the most obvious, with political direction being almost as conspicuous. These two areas are combined when the political and military leadership of the subversive insurgent movement as a whole is provided by the armed forces. This concept of the revolutionary fighter's being the standard bearer in the vanguard of the struggle is best exemplified by the writings of the chief spokesman for the militant Chinese school. In one of Mao Tse-tung's earliest writings he stated the purpose of armed struggle:

*When the Red Army fights, it fights not merely for the sake of fighting, but to agitate the masses, to organize them, to arm them, and to help them establish revolutionary political power; apart from such objectives, fighting loses its meaning and the Red Army the reason for its existence.*¹⁸

The Communists thus see war as a means to build political support that will sustain power.²⁰ Leadership in this struggle is provided by the armed cadres.

Leadership is also all-important in the psychological struggle which ferments side-by-side with the armed struggle. Communists well know that groups do not spring into being or move by themselves — they must be both created and led.²¹ Activating concepts as well as paralyzing ideas are required. One of the principal aims, therefore, of Communist activities is to develop an iron-willed leadership group that is capable of providing this psychological direction.²²

This practice of having absolute direction furnished by the leadership has been part and parcel of classic Communist technique. A Communist Party theoretician, writing in *Kom-*

munist in December 1953, stated that: "Lenin and those who agreed with him fought for a Party functioning as the combat staff of the working class, an organization working under a single plan."²³ Subversive insurgency as a present-day tool of communism, is part of a massive and coordinated effort in which (correct) leadership is a paramount requirement.

Summary. The basic strength of subversive insurgency is found in its nonmeasurable elements. These elements are made up of the cadre, ideology, and leadership of the movement. In building a model of subversive insurgency, these elements will be termed primary power factors. The insurgency which possesses only these factors can exist at a certain self-sustaining level, but in order to multiply this basic power, the movement must capture or utilize some of the measurable elements of power also. The measurable elements of power are termed secondary power factors and will be considered next.

III — SECONDARY POWER FACTORS AND THEIR ROLE

General Considerations. The measurable components of power, or secondary power factors, are the tangibles through which the insurgents multiply their basic power. In one sense, they are levers of political, military, psychological, economic, and social advantage. Through use of these tangible levers, the insurgents raise their power potential far above the self-sustaining level to which they are reduced when denied such tools.

In order to make use of secondary power factors, a power base must exist. In subversive insurgency, this base consists of the primary power factors. It is exactly that characteristic, the existence of a previous organization, that serves to distinguish subversive insurgency from re-

sistance movements. The latter usually originate as spontaneous uprisings, while an insurgency first organizes and then commences the uprising.¹

A subversive insurgent movement, then, requires careful timing and coordination. Political and military strength must be built by capitalizing on the situation at hand. This is a perfectly legitimate tactic, rigidity being recognized as fatal, and was advocated by Lenin when he declared that "the struggle may assume the most variegated forms . . . due to changes in social conditions."²

Such a deliberate and pragmatic pattern has traditionally dictated the Soviet approach to the problems of formulating military strategy and ideology. Careful calculation of the "relation of forces" together with the criteria of risk and expected cost — these elements are consistently employed to form the basis for decisions of strategy and to shape a supporting party line. Stalin's famous "permanently operating factors," held to be paramount in war, are one example. These factors were important to the Soviets in that they indicated the main tasks on which strength was to be concentrated in order to achieve victory.³

The necessity for such detailed direction did not escape the attention of the Chinese Communists. Mao's theoretical treatment of the successive stages of protracted war had a similar purpose. Central to Mao's theory was the concept of the struggle's being a continuing effort to adjust the relative power balance between oneself and the enemy. This was to be achieved by utilizing and manipulating the particular conditions existing.⁴

A persistent question in the calculation of forces problem has been that of determining exactly which secondary power factors or conditions

were necessary to success. One of the first military strategists to address this problem was Karl von Clausewitz. He listed five conditions under which a people's war could be effective:

- (1) The war should be carried on in the interior of the country.
- (2) It should not be capable of being decided by a single defeat.
- (3) The war should embrace the whole of the country.
- (4) The national character of the people should be capable of supporting the measures taken.
- (5) The country should be of a broken and inaccessible character.⁵

Lenin, Stalin, Mao, and Clausewitz thus all recognized the necessity for a pragmatic approach to the problems of war and conflict. The tactical and strategic plans, points of desired emphasis, methods of procedure, and similar matters which they considered are the means through which power is multiplied and consolidated. They are what may be termed secondary power factors.

Secondary Power Factors. Four secondary power factors will now be examined in detail and in the order of their relative importance to subversive insurgent success. The movement that lacks one or more of these factors has little prospect of rising above a self-sustaining level or multiplying its basic power and, consequently, little chance of realizing success. This does not deny the existence of additional secondary power factors; it merely gives notice that out of a long list of possibilities a certain order of merit is suggested.

The secondary power factors that have been selected are popular support, outside (third party) support, sanctuary, and political and military intelligence. The first factor, popular support, is the single element that could, by itself, guarantee success to an insurgent movement.

Popular Support. Insurgent fortunes depend heavily upon the degree of popular support which they command. While a *coup d'état* can effect a transformation of government overnight with involvement of only a handful of people, revolution from the bottom is a fundamentally different proposition. The protracted nature of the latter struggle requires *a priori* a wide base of support in order that it may capitalize upon its unseen ally — time. This base is found in the support rendered the movement through control of the indigenous masses. They become the source of the "immediate necessities of war — food, clothing, shelter, funds, cover, and intelligence."⁶

A recent analysis of the unhappy French experiences in Southeast Asia and North Africa repeatedly emphasizes this vital relationship:

. . . the *sine qua non* of victory in modern warfare is the unconditional support of the population.

The goal of modern warfare is control of the populace.

Modern warfare requires the unconditional support of the populace.

. . . the stake in modern warfare is control of the populace . . .

. . . modern warfare asserts its presence on the totality of the population.⁷

Successful insurgent leaders have also grasped the essential nature of this relationship. Mao, with his aptness for the striking simile, pictured the people as an immense sea and the guerrillas as fish depending upon that sea for their life. Conditioned by his early experiences, Mao saw in the peasantry the "deepest source of the immense power of war," and his guerrilla armies were guided in their relations with the peasants by a strict code of conduct elaborated as "three rules and eight remarks."⁸

One of Mao's most apt pupils, General Vo Nguyen Giap, the principal military leader of the Vietminh, also stressed the importance of correct treatment of the people. It was Giap who formulated one of the basic rules of insurgent struggle — that revolutionary war is waged for people instead of for territory.⁹

Another admirer of the Chinese school of insurgency, Che Guevara, referred to the insurgent band as the "armed vanguard of the great popular force that sustains it."¹⁰ Insurgents, according to Guevara, should conduct intensive work to explain the motives and ends of the revolution to the populace and should demonstrate by their actions a "moral superiority."¹¹

That the ordinary working people could form the power base for a revolution is a relatively new idea. Once grasped, however, the concept appears obvious. Another source of insurgent support, not as evident in its workings as popular support, is support originating external to the country, provided by a third party to the struggle.

External Support. The importance to an insurgent movement of external or third party support, has received increasing emphasis in recent years. The climate of world opinion, the position of an insurgent struggle within the framework of the bipolar power conflict, and the physical conditions bearing on outside aid all interact in a significant manner to determine the extent and type of external support that an insurgent movement can command. Such assistance is critical. There is little historical evidence to support the proposition that guerrillas can succeed without outside aid when the opponent is politically and militarily strong.¹²

In today's world, mass communications help to focus world attention on any type of contention. Outside aid

in some form will probably be received if an insurgent struggle can be "internationalized." The leaders of postwar insurgent movements have been quick to recognize and exploit this situation. One of the goals of the Algerian Nationalist Movement (1952-1960) was to make the Algerian "problem" an international one, and the Vietminh in 1954 undertook a costly and uncertain military campaign against the fortress of Dien Bien Phu in order to influence international opinion regarding a settlement of the conflict.¹³

In addition to the prospect of aid from the world community at large, liberation movements can rely on explicit promises of aid which have been made by the two leading Communist countries, the U.S.S.R. and Red China. The degree and nature of support to be rendered subversive insurgencies have been influenced by the intensity and level of the Sino-Soviet split. This split has not been resolved.

The Soviets, whose traditional "two camps" view of the world underwent a revision after the death of Stalin, recognized that the emergence of many new nations and the concurrent downfall of colonialism presented a changed cast of performers on the world scene.¹⁴ Accordingly, the Russians enunciated the policy of peaceful coexistence in 1956. Following a bitter internecine verbal battle with the Chinese Communists regarding the compatibility of this policy with support of internal wars, the policy was finally declared in 1961 to be one that "facilitates the struggle the people wage against aggressive military blocs, against foreign bases. It helps the national liberation movement to gain successes."¹⁵

Despite such pronouncements, the Soviets today lack the missionary zeal and dogged aggressiveness of their Chinese brethren in the field of sub-

versive insurgency.¹⁶ The belligerent Chinese not only have produced a widely known theorist on the subject of guerrilla warfare in Mao Tse-tung, but also can cite three decades of insurgent experience as further evidence of their expertise.

Mao's strategy can claim twin successes: his victory in the struggle for China and the "classic" setpiece, follow-on victory achieved by Ho Chi Minh in Indo-China. These two triumphs have created impressive precedents for Chinese leadership to utilize in their struggle with the U.S.S.R. for domination of the international Communist movement.

Peking's clearest statement of policy, delivered on 2 September 1965 by Liu Piao, Mao's Defense Minister, gave the "rural areas of the world" a blueprint to follow in emulation of these successes. Entitled "Long Live the Victory of the People's War," the document proved to be a dogmatic rejection of the "Khrushchev revisionist" doctrine of peaceful coexistence and a clear appeal for world revolutionary war.¹⁷ Outside support, then, appears to be explicitly promised to insurgents by the two leading Communist countries. Another advantage is often obtained from third party assistance. This is the existence of an external sanctuary for the movement.

Sanctuary. A sanctuary provides the insurgent with a secure base from which the movement can grow. The sanctuary can be used as a supply dump, a training and indoctrination zone, a hospital, a rest area, and the potential site of vital industry, as well as for many vital functions, including that of providing a haven for escape and regrouping in the event that the movement suffers defeat.¹⁸

A sanctuary may assume different forms and have several locations. It may be situated either within a country or in a previously mentioned

external to it. The most common physical location is one deep within inaccessible terrain, such as mountainous and hilly country, or in deep jungle. One could be equally well established, however, in a large metropolitan area as a function of the underground structure. Another example is seen in the case where the movement enjoys wide popular support. Then it could be said that the masses provide the sanctuary for the insurgents.¹⁹

One of the most effective sanctuaries results in the case where the insurgents enjoy the support of a neighboring country. This particular combination of outside support coupled with provision of a sanctuary presents a formidable challenge. Only by effectively sealing its borders can an incumbent government attack such a combination. This freedom of action enjoyed by insurgents beyond the frontiers of the target country has been termed a key factor in determining the duration of the conflict.²⁰ Effective and accurate intelligence is perhaps an equally important advantage.

Political and Military Intelligence. The possession of political and military intelligence is a decisive factor in insurgent operations. The intelligence nets of the subversives are tightly organized, closely controlled, and all-pervasive.

Organization and control follow, of necessity, a dual military and political command structure. This is required by the inevitable interaction of the military and political spheres. The pervasive character of the intelligence net contributes to one of the most pressing counterinsurgency problems. That problem is the simple one of recognizing the enemy.

Every merchant, farmer, student, beggar, or passing child — in fact anyone and everyone — may be a member of the insurgent intelligence-

gathering net. Under these circumstances, the counterinsurgent moves about on a lighted stage feeling, but not seeing, the pitiless stare of thousands of unfriendly eyes. His every move is instantly known. His attempted blows at his elusive enemy land on empty air. Demoralization occurs.

On the other side, successful insurgent operations are made possible by this possession of near-perfect intelligence. Guerrilla strategy is based upon deception, dissimulation, and obtaining temporary superiority of forces. Surprise is always sought. Because of his far superior information net, the guerrilla can choose the time and place of attack or, when necessary, evade superior forces. Mao described this vital information as the "quick intelligence that constantly watches the ever-changing situation and is able to seize on the right moment for decisive action."²¹

An allied requirement which influences insurgent strategy is the task of denying all intelligence to the enemy. This endeavor is usually quite successful. Total inability to develop information regarding the insurgents is a characteristic of guerrilla wars. One of the variations of the insurgent effort is the use of counteroffensive intelligence operations which spread rumors to promote fear and instability in the enemy ranks.²²

While military intelligence is important, its value usually is felt in tactical applications. Political intelligence, on the other hand, assumes a potentially greater significance in that it usually affects strategy. One of the most striking examples of the use of political intelligence was seen in the Vietminh campaign against the French forces at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. In this instance, the Vietminh unhesitatingly committed large numbers of troops to the struggle because they realized (and this was borne

out) that a victory would greatly improve their bargaining position at the forthcoming Geneva Conference. Political intelligence proved extremely valuable in that instance.

Summary. Subversive insurgency multiplies its power through use of the material elements of power. These elements depend upon the particular conditions existing and vary in importance as conditions change. These elements may be termed secondary power factors since they (1) act as power multipliers for the primary factors in insurgent strength, and (2) may or may not be present in any given situation.

Four of these secondary power factors deemed the ones most important to insurgent success are popular support, outside support, sanctuary, and political and military intelligence. These factors will now be combined with the primary power factors of cadre, leadership, and ideology to form the insurgent model.

IV — AN ANALYTIC MODEL OF SUBVERSIVE INSURGENCY

Model Construction. General models, such as the one here proposed, suffer from varying degrees of imprecision. They tend to omit commonly occurring factors which have small effects, as well as those having large effects but occurring only rarely. In addition, in general models it is found that there must be a certain vagueness concerning the exact form of the employed mathematical functions. This is required in order to stress qualitative properties. Bound up in this vagueness is a loss of detailed information from lower levels caused by the use of parameters possessing a many-to-one property.¹

In the sense that the general model here proposed suffers from these defects, it admittedly leaves out a lot.

The validation of a model, however, is that it provides meaningful distinctions and a demonstrably faithful reproduction of the reality it seeks to portray. The model, which is essential to understanding reality, should not be confused with the reality itself.

Actual model construction should be preceded by consideration of the desired characteristics that the model is to display. In this instance the following characteristics were sought:

(1) The model should reflect the interdependence of the primary power factors. There are two boundary conditions of this characteristic:

(a) The model should yield a power potential of zero in the special case where one of the primary power factors is zero (i.e., not present).

(b) The model should yield a power potential equal solely to the product of primary power factors in the special case where no secondary power factors are present.

(2) The total power potential, as calculated by the application of the model, should be the product of the primary power factors and the secondary power factors.

With these background considerations, initial construction of a model can be attempted. For the first approximation a simple linear relationship between the various factors will be assumed. The following equation results:

$$(P_B) (P_S) = P_T$$

Here, the term P_B is the product xyz where the symbols x, y, and z represent cadre, leadership, and ideology, respectively.

The term P_S is the form $(1+a+b+c \dots +n)$ where $+n$ indicates that any number of secondary factors may be present, depending on the circumstances, to serve as multipliers of the basic power factors. The inclusion

of unity as an element in this term provides for the case in which no secondary power factors are present. In that instance, the total strength of the insurgent movement consists solely of the product of the basic power factors and unity. This instance represents the one in which the insurgents have been unsuccessful in capturing secondary power factors as multipliers and are reduced to a low power level, here termed the self-sustaining level. This could occur when the movement was relatively weak, such as upon inception, or as a result of a major defeat at a higher power level, which removed support.

The right side of the equation, which contains the single term P_T , represents total power potential. Total power potential is a relative unit of measurement. Theoretically, it would have no measurable limit. In applying the model, however, the total power potential has a maximum value, one determined by maximizing all of the primary and secondary factors (four in this instance) in the equation.

Another way of writing the first equation is:

$$(P_B) (\text{Constant}) = P_T$$

This notation demonstrates the basic concept that the primary power factor term (the independent variable), and the total power potential term (the dependent variable), are related by the secondary power factor term — the latter having, by definition the nature of a constant.

In expanded form the first equation appears as:

$$(x.y.z.) (1+a+b+c \dots +n) = P_T$$

In this form the equation is more easily examined and its basic characteristics illustrated: First, note that in accordance with previous stipulations, the total power potential P_T is reduced to zero whenever either the first term P_B or the second term P_S is zero. As P_S can never be zero

(due to inclusion of the unity element), it is easily seen that this can only occur when P_B is zero. This, in turn, requires that one of the primary power factors — leadership, cadre, ideology — be zero. The model thus meets the first, and primary requirement, that it demonstrate the basic dependency of the movement upon the existence of the primary power factors.

Secondly, it is apparent that total power, P_T , will be the sum of terms of the form (xyz xyza xyzb . . . xyzn). This satisfies the further desired characteristic of the model that it indicate the multiplying effect of secondary power factors upon the basic power factors.

The interdependence of the basic power factors, while suggested by their arrangement as the product P_B , is not explicitly indicated. The present arrangement gives this term the nature of a cubic. Considering the necessarily close relationship of the elements of P_B , a presumption of their near equality does not appear to be unjustified.

When the elements are equal, the term behaves exactly as a cubic, and any change in magnitude exerts a dynamic influence upon the total power potential. To illustrate, if a subjectively evaluated weight of five is assigned to each of the three elements, a P_B of 125 is thus available for multiplication by the secondary power factors. A weight of seven, representing a 40 percent increase over the level of five, yields a P_B of 343.

This nearly threefold gain in the basic power potential is directly reflected as a similar gain in total power potential, assuming that P_S would remain the same. This result merely illustrates the fact that when the efficiency of the basic power factors increases or decreases, a significant effect is seen on the total

strength of the movement. This result appears to be reasonable and in accord with observed facts.

Finally, while the exact form of the individual terms comprising the equation is probably not linear, and some of the terms may be more important than others, there emerges no objective method of introducing this information as a corrective factor which would have consistent validity. Nevertheless, one gross exception to this observation will be attempted. This will concern the secondary power factor of popular support. The overwhelming importance attributed to popular support by all writers on the subject, including successful practitioners of insurgency, appears to justify additional weight for that factor. Accordingly, a constant with a weight of two will be inserted in order to give this term a double weight vis-a-vis the other secondary power factors. In final form then, the basic equation looks like this:

$$(x.y.z.) (1+2a+b+c \dots +n) = P_T$$

How this equation can be applied in specific instances will now be indicated.

Case Studies. Six cases of subversive insurgency which have occurred since World War II have been analyzed and their calculated power potential determined using the final equation. In applying the model, the determinants were subjectively weighted on a scale of 0-10. See table I for the detailed calculations for each case.

Two of the cases have been divided into periods of time considered to represent significantly different circumstances. These are the Greek insurgency of 1946-49 and the Indochina insurgency of 1946-54. In each of these instances the total power potential was altered by changes in the secondary power factors of outside support and sanctuary. In Greece, these factors were removed

	GREECE		CUBA	PHILIPPINES
	(1946-48)	(1948-49)	(1953-59)	(1946-54)
LEADERSHIP	6	5	6	5
IDEOLOGY	8	7	6	6
CADRE	8	7	5	7
P_B	384	245	180	210
POPULAR SUPPORT	4	3	7	5
OUTSIDE SUPPORT	8	2	5	1
SANCTUARY	8	2	5	5
POL/MIL INTELL.	8	5	7	5
P_S	33	16	32	22
P_T	12,672	3,920	5,760	4,620
	INDOCHINA		CHINA	MALAYA
	(1946-49)	(1949-54)	(1945-49)	(1948-60)
LEADERSHIP	8	9	9	5
IDEOLOGY	9	9	9	7
CADRE	8	9	9	7
P_B	576	729	729	245
POPULAR SUPPORT	7	7	5	3
OUTSIDE SUPPORT	3	7	6	2
SANCTUARY	3	7	8	3
POL/MIL INTELL.	7	8	8	2
P_S	28	37	33	14
P_T	16,128	26,973	24,057	3,430

FACTORS ARE ARBITRARILY WEIGHTED ON A SCALE OF 0-10

TABLE I
CALCULATIONS OF TOTAL POWER POTENTIAL




Figure 2 — Total Power Potential For Selected Case Studies*

*The Cuban Revolution is included, using as a basis the final character of the movement, even though it was not clearly oriented in that direction upon inception.

from the insurgent power potential, and in Indochina, they were added. With this arrangement, the total power potentials for eight cases were calculated and are displayed in figure 2.

General Observations. With the calculation of total power potential for these cases and the plotting of this total on a suitable scale, some preliminary interpretation can be made. Inspection of figure 2 shows that those instances in which the insurgents achieved either a temporary stalemate² or ultimate success³ fall generally to the right, indicating a relatively high power potential. Conversely, the insurgencies which met with failure⁴ plot on the low end of the scale. These results, while agreeable, are scarcely surprising, particularly in view of the ex post facto application of the model and the necessarily subjective method of determining values to assign to the factors. They do allow, however, the

construction of two rough lines of division on the scale which can serve as guides for further interpretation.

The first of these lines is arbitrarily termed the *probable success level* (PSL) and is indicated by the dashed line on the scale at the value of 1.1.⁵ Insurgencies whose calculated power potential plots to the right of the PSL would then be expected to succeed while those falling to the left would be expected to fail. Two apparent exceptions immediately appear. The Greek insurgency, which ultimately failed, plots to the right of the PSL in the probable success area. Conversely, the Cuban insurgency, which succeeded, plots to the left of the PSL in the area of probable failure. These apparent inconsistencies can be reconciled with the arbitrary placement of the PSL line through the following interpretation:

(1) The Greek insurgency during the period 1945-47 was holding its own, with a good chance of ultimate

success. Changed circumstances, namely the loss in 1947 of not only a sanctuary but of significant material and political support as well, caused the total power potential to decrease drastically to the second level, as indicated for the period 1947-49. This resultant level plots to the left, or below, the PSL and buttresses the proposed PSL location by providing a bracket.

(2) The Cuban insurgency, while not rated as possessing sufficient power potential for success, nevertheless won out. This is explained by considering the case a unique one in that the opposition, in the form of the Batista Regime, was so corrupt and grossly inefficient that the resulting situation permitted success by a small insurgent effort. This view is supported by Brig. Gen. Samuel B. Griffiths, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), whose analysis of the Cuban Revolution follows a similar line.⁷

The second line is the solid vertical line located at the approximate midposition of the values .0064 and .10. This line actually indicates a *range of values* which would represent the power potentials possible for a movement that was unable to capture any secondary power factors.

This range is determined on the upside by assigning the maximum weight of 10 to each of the basic power factors, while considering all of the secondary power factors to be zero. Assigning an arbitrary minimum weight of four to each of the factors then determines a lowside value and indicates a self-sustaining range between the values .0064 and .10.

With the construction of these lines, two general conclusions can now be drawn. The first of these is that an insurgency will have a good chance of success if it can develop even a small percentage of the total power potential possible in the par-

ticular situation. Note that the PSL is indicated as approximately the 20 percent level of the total power potential. The second conclusion is that an insurgency can survive at an extremely low power-potential level even though it has been denied any secondary power-factor multipliers.

V — CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Preliminary Observations. In constructing the model used as a tool to analyze the elements of insurgent power, a basic premise was put forth to the effect that the primary elements of insurgent strength were vital but nonmeasurable, and that the secondary elements were nonvital but measurable. This premise was then applied to the perceived elements of insurgent strength, and they were so divided into vital, or primary, and nonvital, or secondary groups.

Application of the model then ran into the problem of attempting to assign some qualitative value to the primary elements which had been previously declared nonmeasurable. The values assigned to these elements were determined by a subjective evaluation derived from the case study. The rationale for proceeding in the face of this apparent inconsistency is found in the observation that reaction to intangibles is determined, to a large extent, by their perceived form and substance, this perception serving as their actual form since the latter, by definition, defies attempts at quantitative measurement. Therefore, as reaction is based on the perceived form of the intangible, this justifies approximating the immeasurable quantity by its perception or impression on the part of the viewer. Interpretation of results must consider this assumption.

With this qualification, the model presented here is viewed as a useful

descriptive tool which will enable a forecast to be made concerning the likelihood of success for any given subversive insurgency, provided a necessary minimum of information is available. The model also provides a framework within which to direct counterinsurgency strategy and demonstrates the inherent limitations on some courses of action. These concepts will now be expanded upon through specific conclusions.

Conclusions. One of the aims of this paper was to provide a basis for direction of counterinsurgency actions. This goal has been achieved through analysis of the factors contributing to insurgent strength.

The primary power factors of cadre, ideology, and leadership are the most effective targets for counterinsurgency efforts. If a counterinsurgency can succeed in limiting one of these factors, the insurgent movement will be greatly handicapped, and if one of them can be destroyed, the movement will collapse.

Military action is a limited tool for use in defeating subversive insurgency. Military action can limit the insurgency and may reduce it to a mere self-sustaining level but can never, because of the nonmaterial nature of the primary power factors, eliminate the insurgent movement completely. The primary power factors are simply not vulnerable to this type of attack. No amount of military action can hope to destroy an ideology. Neither can it eliminate a leadership that is regenerative in nature or destroy a cadre that has infiltrated the masses.

Military action is indicated as the proper response to the problem of attacking the secondary or material power factors which are acting as multipliers for the basic strength of the movement. Military action can, assuming sufficient force is available, deny to the insurgents the inflam-

pered use of a sanctuary, prevent outside support (in the form of material) from reaching the movement, isolate and confuse political and military intelligence, and separate the insurgents from their ultimate base of support — the people.

Recommendations. The most obvious recommendation is that of attacking the primary power factors by "soft action," i.e., those which are nonmilitary. Psychopolitical and socio-economic operations offer the most promising long-term approach in this area. Examples of this type of action would be as follows:

Defeating the ideology. If agrarian reform is made the basis of insurgent ideology, the proper response would be to correct the existing abuses and disprove the imagined ones, thus defeating the effectiveness of this area as an insurgent strength. In a similar manner, reforms which are required in areas of taxation, representation in the government, economic policies, administration of civil justice, and so forth, should be resolutely implemented. Practical measures that would produce concrete and observable results must be undertaken. If the government is reluctant or even unwilling to adopt such "drastic" solutions, it cannot hope to defeat the enemy ideology and must attempt the destruction of the cadre or leadership.

Destroying the cadre. Form a counterorganization or countercadre that would utilize the people in a network of support for the government. Literal adoption of the insurgent organization and indoctrination techniques would limit the control exerted by the insurgent cadre and hamper its effectiveness and growth.

Countering the leadership. Substitute strong government leadership for that offered by the insurgents. Widely known and respected figures

should be used in key positions in the government, and this action should be coupled with psychological campaigns aimed at discrediting the insurgent leadership. The counter-cadre could be made an effective leadership vehicle by working through it in all contacts with the people.

Final recommendation. The non-military attack on the primary power factors should be paralleled by a military attack on the secondary power factors. The long-term result of this two-pronged attack would be defeat or ineffectiveness for a subversive insurgent movement.

Suggestions for Further Study. Two areas suggest themselves for further study and investigation. The first of these is the area of improvement of the model "fit" or faithfulness of reproduction of the insurgent situation; and the second is the extension of the model to additional case studies, including nonsubversive insurgencies as well.

Model improvement might be attempted by investigation of a suitable nonlinear function to replace the present linear form. A suggested function would perhaps take the form:

$$A = A_0 e^{bt}$$

where A_0 would represent the initial

state of, say, insurgent strength, and A would represent the insurgent strength at any later time t . The quantity A would then increase or decrease according to the algebraic sign and magnitude of b . This quantity, b , would correspond to the left side of the original equation of the model, or the product $P_s P_B$.

In order to limit the growth of this Malthusian curve, a corrective term can be introduced to the equation of the form $-qA^2$ where q is a function representing intergroup crowding. This solution results in a sigmoid-shaped curve with a maximum upper limit of b/q . The curve, which starts up slowly, then steepens sharply, and finally flattens out as it approaches its maximum value, appears to be a reasonable description of insurgent growth and decay characteristics. It would also have application to the factor of popular support as that phenomenon is described by a similar curve.

Extension of the model to other insurgencies would provide more reliable basis for locating a probable success level and should support the preliminary conclusion that insurgencies which may realize only a small fraction of their total power potential can still exert tremendous force.



"Difficulties" is the name given to things which it is our business to overcome.
E. J. King; Address to the graduating class, U.S. Naval Academy, 19 June 1942

To lack intelligence is to be in the ring blindfolded.
General D. M. Shoup, USMC; Remarks to the staff, Marine Corps Headquarters, 2 January 1960

FOOTNOTES**I — NEW STATUS FOR AN OLD WEAPON**

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4. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
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11. Paret and Shy, p. 50.
12. Samuel P. Huntington, ed., *Changing Patterns of Military Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1962), p. 24.
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14. Ney, p. 81.
15. Ernesto Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1961), p. 15.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 15-16.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
18. Paret and Shy, p. 33.
19. American University, p. 16.

**II — INTRODUCTION TO THE MODEL;
PRIMARY POWER FACTORS**

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6. Frederick Wilkens, "Guerrilla Warfare," Franklin M. Osanka, ed., *Modern Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Free Press, 1962), p. 3.
7. Lenin, p. 207.
8. Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr. and Gene Z. Hanrahan, "The Revolutionary Strategy of Mao Tse-tung," Osanka, ed., p. 137.
9. Joseph Stalin, quoted in Mao Tse-tung, v. II, p. 291-292.
10. Peter Paret and John W. Shy, "Guerrilla War and U.S. Military Policy: a Study," *Marine Corps Gazette*, January 1962, p. 32.
11. A. H. Sollom, "Not Yet Everywhere," Osanka, ed., p. 16.
12. Guevara, p. 49.
13. Paret and Shy, *Guerrillas in the 1960's*, p. 37.
14. Mao Tse-tung, v. II, p. 272.
15. Mao Tse-tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 43.
16. Trinquier, p. 107.
17. Merle King, "Cuba: a Case Study of a Successful Attempt to Seize Political Power by the Application of Unconventional Warfare," American Academy of Political and Social Science, *Unconventional Warfare* (Philadelphia: 1962), p. 46.

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19. Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, v. II, p. 106.
20. Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Military Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 217.
21. Stefan T. Possony, "Communist Psychological Warfare," Walter F. Hahn and John C. Neff, eds., p. 138.
22. *Ibid.*
23. Atkinson, p. 311.

III — SECONDARY POWER FACTORS AND THEIR ROLE

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2. Lenin, p. 196.
3. Raymond L. Garthoff, *The Soviet Image of Future War* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1959), p. 33.
4. Alvin J. Cottrell and James E. Dougherty, "The Lessons of Korea," *Orbis*, Spring 1958, p. 46. See also Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, v. II, p. 180-194.
5. Clausewitz, p. 458.
6. Ney, p. 74.
7. Trinquier, p. 8, 16, 19, 29, 35.
8. Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, v. II, p. 239.
9. Vo Nguyen Giap, *People's War, People's Army* (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), p. 48.
10. Guevara, p. 20, 43.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 22, 29.
12. Paret and Shy, *Guerrillas in the 1960's*, p. 37.
13. Ney, p. 76.
14. Garthoff, *The Soviet Image of Future War*, p. 245.
15. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, p. 64.
16. Raymond L. Garthoff, "Unconventional Warfare in Communist Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1962, p. 572.
17. Chalmers M. Roberts, "The Chinese 'Mein Kampf'," *The* (Providence, R.I.) *Evening Bulletin*, September 19, 1965, p. N39:1.
18. Otto Heilbrunn, *Partisan Warfare* (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 44.
19. Ney, p. 76.
20. Trinquier, p. 98.
21. Mao Tse-tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, p. 104.
22. Guevara, p. 100.

IV — AN ANALYTIC MODEL OF SUBVERSIVE INSURGENCY

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2. Greece 1945-49 and Indochina 1949-54.
3. China 1945-49, Indochina 1949-54, Cuba 1955-59.
4. Malaya 1948-60, Philippines 1945-50, and Greece 1947-48.
5. The probable success level is placed at 1.1 on the basis that a movement which achieved a maximum in basic power potential (PB corresponding to [10.10.10] still would require at least 20 percent support in the secondary power factors (a PS equal to [1 + (2) (2) + 2 + 2 + 2]). In this event, the product PB PS equals 11,000 or 1.1 when the scalar corrections 10^{-4} is applied.
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