

1967

Book Reviews


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PROFESSIONAL READING

The evaluations of recent books listed in this section have been prepared for the use of resident students. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these books of interest in their professional reading.

The inclusion of a book in this section does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein.

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Fulbright, J. William. *The Arrogance of Power*. New York: Random House, 1966. 264p. (E 744 .F886).

Senator Fulbright's beliefs have made him the nation's chief dove or, in the words of Max Frankel, "a hero of the New Left." In his own words, the Senator believes that "there are two Americas. One is the America of Lincoln and of Adlai Stevenson; the other is the America of Teddy Roosevelt and the modern superpatriots" and "the inconsistency of American foreign policy is not an accident but an expression of . . . [these] two distinct sides of the American character." He holds that America must now decide which side is to predominate. He says that the "superpatriots" are now in control and that the United States is therefore guilty of what he calls the "arrogance of power." This collective phrase the Senator uses to express "a psychological need that nations seem to have in order to prove that they are bigger, better, or stronger than other nations." Force, as the proof of superiority, is seen by the Senator as implicit in this drive. Although he does not see the United States embarked on an imperialistic campaign to dominate the world, he fears that she will overcommit her great strength in secondary and nonvital areas and disputes leading to her ultimate destruction through exhaustion. It is this idea that the United States is the world's policeman that the Senator criticizes in his short, but far-ranging, text. With regard to domestic policy, the Senator fears that the continued immersion of the United States in foreign affairs is denying Americans at home their fair share of the nation's wealth. Foreign nations might better be influenced to the United States' way of life by examples of what can be done at home.

As a central issue of his text, Senator Fulbright's eight-point solution

for the war in Vietnam deserves careful analysis. Before presenting this solution, he specifies three rather important conditions: first, Americans must accept the fact that a nationalistic revolution is not necessarily unacceptable just because it has been captured by communism; second, because of America's great power she can afford to be — and indeed must be — magnanimous in her settlement of disputes; and third, the Vietnam situation must be settled quickly because of the unacceptable "fallout" it causes both at home and in areas of real or prime foreign policy interest, such as Europe and NATO. His solution, very briefly, is as follows: 1. The Government of South Vietnam must seek bilateral peace negotiations with the National Liberation Front. 2. Simultaneously, the United States and the Government of South Vietnam must seek quadripartite cease-fire negotiations between the United States, the Government of South Vietnam, the Government of North Vietnam, and the National Liberation Front. 3. The United States must terminate all bombing, freeze force levels in Vietnam, and unilaterally reduce the scale of military operations. 4. The United States must pledge the ultimate removal of all her forces from Vietnam. 5. In addition to the cease-fire negotiations, the four-party effort must be directed toward plans for self-determination in South Vietnam. 6. When cease-fire and self-determination plans have been completed, a multination conference should be convened to guarantee the referendum and to plan for a future referendum on unification of the North and the South. 7. This international conference should then neutralize South Vietnam and make plans for the neutralization of all of Southeast Asia. 8. Finally, if the first seven steps don't work, then the United States must retreat into

enclaves and stay there until the Communists decide they have to negotiate to get rid of her. Finally, the Senator feels that the real problem in Southeast Asia is not the dispute between North and South Vietnam but the contest over dominance of the area between the United States and China. He believes that China must be recognized and brought into the community of nations, but that this can be accomplished only after a long period of disengagement between China and the United States. A neutral Southeast Asia is the sole way to accomplish that.

The reviewer believes that the Senator's position can be defended only if one accepts certain assumptions that have not been validated by his arguments. These assumptions are as follows: 1. The international Communist conspiracy is dead and indeed may never actually have existed. 2. The domino theory is invalid. 3. The Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam — and, in consequence, the Front for the Liberation of _____ (fill in the blank) — is a spontaneous, locally organized, developed, and supported, true voice of the Vietnamese (or, fill in the blank) people. 4. The Geneva agreements of 1954 were not a victory for Ho Chi Minh in which he gained half a country, but a defeat in which he was denied half of what was legally his. 5. The antiwar activity in the United States has not given Ho Chi Minh reason to believe that he will ultimately get exactly what he wants simply by waiting for American-based support for his cause to force the government to capitulate. 6. Although the National Liberation Front is free of Hanoi in the decision-making process, the Government of South Vietnam is not free of the United States. 7. While the government in Hanoi is a completely legitimate government which

cannot be questioned at this point by an internationally controlled referendum, the Government of South Vietnam is illegal and must be subjected not only to an internationally controlled referendum on self-determination, but to an internationally controlled referendum on reunification, with the North. 8. Mark Twain is America's foremost philosopher.

This book is important — especially to all who formulate, execute, or influence national policy. It should particularly be read by those who would try to understand the "New Left," the antiwar dissenters, and Senator Fulbright.

The Senator must be applauded for going beyond criticism and proposing a solution. This is indeed a refreshing trend which the New Left could well espouse. But again, like so many who tackle this problem, the Senator has failed to go to the root. He speaks of things that are vital to the United States, but he does not attempt to define them — to define her vital national interests — and to go from there to a solution.

R. W. BATES
Commander, U.S. Navy

Mao, Tse-tung. *Basic Tactics*. New York: Praeger, 1966. 149p. (M 240 .M28 1966)

Mao Tse-tung has produced three works on guerrilla warfare, all of which were written during the first half of 1938. English translations of two of these, *Strategic Problems of the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War* and *On Protracted War*, have been available to the Western world for many years. The third, *Basic Tactics*, has just been translated by Stuart R. Schram and published by Frederick A. Praeger. *Basic Tactics* was originally presented as a course of lectures. The lectures were given at the Anti-Japanese Military-Political Uni-

versity as part of a course to train guerrilla leaders. Unlike Mao's other writings, this volume deals almost exclusively in concrete terms with problems of military tactics, rather than larger political and ideological issues. The emphasis is on practical matters of guerrilla warfare, expressed in simple and easily understood terms. The level of presentation was ideal for his intended audience. Dr. Schram has included a lengthy introduction that not only places *Basic Tactics* in the proper context, but also provides the reader with a lucid and scholarly account of Mao's political beliefs and his rise to power. The author goes on to relate the book to the current Red Guard movement and the war in Vietnam. *Basic Tactics* is highly recommended as a short, comprehensible introduction to Mao Tse-tung.

L. R. LESTER, JR.

Commander, U.S. Navy

Hiscocks, Richard. *The Adenauer Era*. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1966. 312p. (DD 259.7 .A3H5)

This volume, written by British Professor Hiscocks in 1965 and published as *Germany Revived* in England, is an objective, informative, and well-written summary of 1949-1963 events relating to the Federal German Republic and its Chancellor, Dr. Konrad Adenauer. The author, in examining Adenauer's achievements, discusses the Federal Republic's winning of diplomatic recognition and grudging admiration from the international community and the German statesman's major part in establishing organizations that have been leading contributors to European integration. His giving of a new ideal to the younger generation of Germans is set forth, as is his role in convincing West Germany's people that a democratic constitution could work effectively despite his own shortcomings as a democratic

leader. The author points out the *Der Alte*, by associating his country with the Atlantic Alliance, increased the West's economic and military strength and helped limit Communist encroachment, whereas, by his domestic policy, Adenauer created conditions necessary for economic recovery and was largely responsible for his country's subsequent prosperity.

The author explores in detail establishment of the political system, contrasting it with the Weimar Republic, and analyzing the Chancellorship, Presidency, Bundestag, Federal Constitutional Court, Landtag, and major provisions of the Basic Law. Aspects of German society such as nonpolitical trade unions, comprehensive social legislation, government influence on press and radio, and inadequacies of secondary and university education are discussed. Rearmament problems and the theme of "citizen in uniform," viewed from internal German and external viewpoints, are considered, and limitations of Adenauer's foreign policy (his rigid anti-Communist line and his submission to De Gaulle's influence) are examined. The slips and backsliding that accompanied the achievements receive attention and point up the frailty of West German democracy, the prevalence of political apathy among its citizenry, and the doubtful esteem in which honesty and truthfulness are sometimes held by its highly placed leaders when political power is at stake. The author observes that Adenauer's current reputation would have benefited had *Der Alte* resigned around 1958, since thereafter he lost his grip as a statesman and was exerting his political skill to remain in power rather than to "further great purposes."

In concluding, Britisher Hiscocks maintains that there are grounds for measured optimism in the outcome

of the struggle for democracy in West Germany, but that the elements of German culture and education have yet to face up to the challenge of the 20th century. This volume can be evaluated as a worthwhile reference for the individual possessing a general knowledge of modern Germany and desiring a concise reference of the 1949-1963 period of German history.

B. E. KEITH

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

Chowdhury, Roy. *Military Alliances and Neutrality in War and Peace*. Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1966. 280p.

The norms which govern the involvement of states in hostilities are presented in a technical and rather legalistic manner. As Mr. Chowdhury is committed to the proposition that neutrality, non-alignment, and impartiality are desirable, he significantly overestimates the potentiality of the rules and procedures of international law to secure such non-involvement successfully. Similarly, he fails to support those principles of individual state responsibility and involvement which are indispensable for an effective system of collective security.

D. M. O'CONNOR

Chair of International Law

Lockwood, Charles A. *Down to the Sea in Subs*. New York: Norton, 1967. 376p. (N 63 .L6A3)

Vice Admiral Lockwood's career spanned many interesting eras: from tiny subs of 107 tons to fleet boats and beyond; from the Class of '12 at the Naval Academy to Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, in World War II; from the lessons of Tsushima to the lessons of Midway and Okinawa; from minuscule gas engines in subs to nuclear power. His fascinating memoirs tell of the education of a captain, the

evolution of submarines, the growth of a navy, and the winning of a war. Admiral Lockwood saw the mutation of submarines from a coastal defense weapon to a true fleet partner, and his own participation was extensive and fruitful. This autobiography is both his and the submarine's. Admiral Lockwood is a master of smooth narrative and clear writing. His book is a story well told. In addition, he is not afraid to let his opinions, founded in long experience, show through. The reader cannot fail to have his thinking jogged by Admiral Lockwood's concept of a proper Naval Academy education (emphasis on naval matters and easy on the humanities) or his final chapter on the genesis of nuclear power for submarines and where the credit for it should lie. This book will be of consuming interest for anyone interested in submarines, maritime history, or naval policy — in short, to most officers. It is a valuable companion piece to Morrison's volumes or other works of naval history.

D. R. STEFFERUD

Lieutenant Commander,
U.S. Navy

Heinrichs, Waldo H., Jr. *American Ambassador*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1967. 460p. (E 748 .G835H4)

Joseph C. Grew, the only known diplomat to close three diplomatic missions as a result of hostilities, spanned an era of American history in which he played an increasingly important role. His career was hurt by failure after failure — Washington even ignored his final warnings that the United States and Japan would soon be at war unless compromises were made. Yet he initiated what perhaps has already proven to be one of the wisest post-World War II decisions — agreement to permit the Japanese people the right to select their own government.

Military personnel will find that portion of the book which covers the Ambassador's ten years in Japan of particular interest. After a period of uncertainty and indecision, Ambassador Grew concluded that Japan was in the throes of a social upheaval led by Army officers determined to readjust the lot of the impoverished Japanese farmer. The resources that Japan would need were to be had for the taking in the "co-prosperity sphere." While the Japanese Army worried about the Russian Bear's interfering with its plans, the more cautious (and jealous) Navy worried about the American Eagle. Diplomatic personnel will read with nostalgia or incredulity, depending on their generation, what it was like in the "old days." Private income, a "good background," and a facility for languages were essential requirements for entering the elite diplomatic service. Salaries were low and allowances non-existent (some positions paid \$600 per annum), and hence the young diplomatic had to maintain a fairly high standard of living out of his own pocket (or his family's). The consular service, on the other hand, was more remunerative. Consuls promoted American business and were generally considered more representative of the broad American public, even though they were a bit lower down on the international social scale.

Ambassador Grew had risen to the position of Under Secretary of State when public opinion forced an amalgamation and "Americanization" of the two services in 1924, but he successfully resisted their actual integration for several years. He quite openly favored those in the diplomatic corps with promotions and appointments as heads of mission. The author does not spare the Ambassador: again and again, he seems to take Mr. Grew to task for failure to penetrate to the core of a problem

or situation. "In the first place, Grew had neither the broad intellectual curiosities, passion for detail, or sophisticated techniques of the modern analyst. He depended more on feel than on fact." Again, the author chides him for his inability to deal with the "steerage passengers." Grew felt sure of himself only when dealing with "gentlemen" of his own station whom he could trust. This book is highly recommended for those who seek to know more about our country's immediate past and the role of this very distinguished Ambassador.

THE HON. T. S. ESTES
State Department Adviser

Moore, Ruth. *Niels Bohr: the Man, His Science, & the World They Changed*. New York: Knopf, 1966. 436p. (QC 16 .B63M6)

Niels Bohr, whose genius indicated the avenue into the nuclear era, emerges as a farseeing humanitarian as well as a physicist in this enthralling and lucid biography. Miss Moore's talents and experience as an author and science news reporter are clearly displayed as she melds the reminiscences of Bohr's associates, family and students with the thinker's own writings into the most complete book written about Bohr since his death in 1962. Clearly delineated is Bohr's intellectual ability to predict the next discovery as the minutiae and mechanics of the atom were uncovered in the first half of this century. While the brilliant contributions of physicists the world over are reported in this volume, Niels Bohr is acknowledged as their intellectual leader. Equally fascinating is the recounting of the 30-year Einstein-Bohr dialogue over quantum mechanics.

Niels Bohr: the Man, His Science, & the World They Changed does have its deficiencies. Since the book was obviously written for the reader

with little background in physics, replacing the inadequate line drawings with some of the marvelous explanatory drawings found in any modern high school physics textbook would enhance the reader's understanding of the main character's concepts and achievements. Although the author includes a few pages outlining her resource material, her glib use of quotation marks and assertive statements without citing their source degrades the usefulness of the book as a serious historical work. This reader was appalled by the multitude of typographical errors and examples of awkward sentence construction which any self-respecting editor would have remedied. Errors of fact regarding nuclear physics could not be judged to a great degree due to the reviewer's limited background in the discipline. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to expect that the description of a classic light

spectrum experiment by Isaac Newton normally explained in any elementary physics book could have been reported accurately.

Of current interest, the last third of the book illuminates the Danish physicist's deep concern about the future of the nuclear energy he helped to release. His thesis for limiting nuclear weapons proliferation and expanding civil uses of nuclear energy, advanced in 1944 to President Roosevelt, were cast aside by the statesmen. Only now are Bohr's proposals being reevaluated by the nuclear superpowers. This section of the book may prove revealing to students of the arms control and disarmament problems and can shed some light on the history of the unproductive nuclear proliferation talks at Geneva.

I.E.M. DONOVAN
Lieutenant Commander,
U.S. Navy



Aggression unchallenged is aggression unleashed.

Lyndon B. Johnson: Statement to the nation after North Vietnamese torpedo attacks on U.S. warships in international waters, Gulf of Tonkin, 4 August 1964

It is invariably the weak, not the strong, who court aggression and war.

General Thomas S. Power, USAF: Design for Survival, 1965