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## Basic Tactics

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enclaves and stay there until the Communists decide they have to negotiate to get rid of her. Finally, the Senator feels that the real problem in Southeast Asia is not the dispute between North and South Vietnam but the contest over dominance of the area between the United States and China. He believes that China must be recognized and brought into the community of nations, but that this can be accomplished only after a long period of disengagement between China and the United States. A neutral Southeast Asia is the sole way to accomplish that.

The reviewer believes that the Senator's position can be defended only if one accepts certain assumptions that have not been validated by his arguments. These assumptions are as follows: 1. The international Communist conspiracy is dead and indeed may never actually have existed. 2. The domino theory is invalid. 3. The Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam — and, in consequence, the Front for the Liberation of \_\_\_\_\_ (fill in the blank) — is a spontaneous, locally organized, developed, and supported, true voice of the Vietnamese (or, fill in the blank) people. 4. The Geneva agreements of 1954 were not a victory for Ho Chi Minh in which he gained half a country, but a defeat in which he was denied half of what was legally his. 5. The antiwar activity in the United States has not given Ho Chi Minh reason to believe that he will ultimately get exactly what he wants simply by waiting for American-based support for his cause to force the government to capitulate. 6. Although the National Liberation Front is free of Hanoi in the decision-making process, the Government of South Vietnam is not free of the United States. 7. While the government in Hanoi is a completely legitimate government which

cannot be questioned at this point by an internationally controlled referendum, the Government of South Vietnam is illegal and must be subjected not only to an internationally controlled referendum on self-determination, but to an internationally controlled referendum on reunification, with the North. 8. Mark Twain is America's foremost philosopher.

This book is important — especially to all who formulate, execute, or influence national policy. It should particularly be read by those who would try to understand the "New Left," the antiwar dissenters, and Senator Fulbright.

The Senator must be applauded for going beyond criticism and proposing a solution. This is indeed a refreshing trend which the New Left could well espouse. But again, like so many who tackle this problem, the Senator has failed to go to the root. He speaks of things that are vital to the United States, but he does not attempt to define them — to define her vital national interests — and to go from there to a solution.

R. W. BATES  
Commander, U.S. Navy

Mao, Tse-tung. *Basic Tactics*. New York: Praeger, 1966. 149p. (M 240 .M28 1966)

Mao Tse-tung has produced three works on guerrilla warfare, all of which were written during the first half of 1938. English translations of two of these, *Strategic Problems of the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War* and *On Protracted War*, have been available to the Western world for many years. The third, *Basic Tactics*, has just been translated by Stuart R. Schram and published by Frederick A. Praeger. *Basic Tactics* was originally presented as a course of lectures. The lectures were given at the Anti-Japanese Military-Political Uni-

versity as part of a course to train guerrilla leaders. Unlike Mao's other writings, this volume deals almost exclusively in concrete terms with problems of military tactics, rather than larger political and ideological issues. The emphasis is on practical matters of guerrilla warfare, expressed in simple and easily understood terms. The level of presentation was ideal for his intended audience. Dr. Schram has included a lengthy introduction that not only places *Basic Tactics* in the proper context, but also provides the reader with a lucid and scholarly account of Mao's political beliefs and his rise to power. The author goes on to relate the book to the current Red Guard movement and the war in Vietnam. *Basic Tactics* is highly recommended as a short, comprehensible introduction to Mao Tse-tung.

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Hiscocks, Richard. *The Adenauer Era*. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1966. 312p. (DD 259.7 .A3H5)

This volume, written by British Professor Hiscocks in 1965 and published as *Germany Revived* in England, is an objective, informative, and well-written summary of 1949-1963 events relating to the Federal German Republic and its Chancellor, Dr. Konrad Adenauer. The author, in examining Adenauer's achievements, discusses the Federal Republic's winning of diplomatic recognition and grudging admiration from the international community and the German statesman's major part in establishing organizations that have been leading contributors to European integration. His giving of a new ideal to the younger generation of Germans is set forth, as is his role in convincing West Germany's people that a democratic constitution could work effectively despite his own shortcomings as a democratic

leader. The author points out the *Der Alte*, by associating his country with the Atlantic Alliance, increased the West's economic and military strength and helped limit Communist encroachment, whereas, by his domestic policy, Adenauer created conditions necessary for economic recovery and was largely responsible for his country's subsequent prosperity.

The author explores in detail establishment of the political system, contrasting it with the Weimar Republic, and analyzing the Chancellorship, Presidency, Bundestag, Federal Constitutional Court, Landtag, and major provisions of the Basic Law. Aspects of German society such as nonpolitical trade unions, comprehensive social legislation, government influence on press and radio, and inadequacies of secondary and university education are discussed. Rearmament problems and the theme of "citizen in uniform," viewed from internal German and external viewpoints, are considered, and limitations of Adenauer's foreign policy (his rigid anti-Communist line and his submission to De Gaulle's influence) are examined. The slips and backsliding that accompanied the achievements receive attention and point up the frailty of West German democracy, the prevalence of political apathy among its citizenry, and the doubtful esteem in which honesty and truthfulness are sometimes held by its highly placed leaders when political power is at stake. The author observes that Adenauer's current reputation would have benefited had *Der Alte* resigned around 1958, since thereafter he lost his grip as a statesman and was exerting his political skill to remain in power rather than to "further great purposes."

In concluding, Britisher Hiscocks maintains that there are grounds for measured optimism in the outcome