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The Hollow Alliance

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points out that when the first team of Japanese carrier pilots was depleted there was no pipeline of trained replacements. This factor insured defeat of the Japanese Navy and eventual American triumph in the Pacific. He also heavily stresses the poor capability of the U.S. Navy for night surface engagements despite the great advantage conferred by surface search radars. He generalizes that this was due to hastily trained, inexperienced crews of ships, which were assigned to task groups on short notice and had little opportunity to learn to work together. The superior performance of Japanese torpedoes was also a contributing factor. In summary, the book is easily read, entertaining, and of value to those not familiar with the air-sea battles in the Pacific. However, there is nothing new or different in the author's analyses of these battles. It is regretted that he did not include the Battle of Midway in order to present a more complete picture of the Pacific actions.

B.V. AJEMIAN
Captain, U.S. Navy

Meskill, Johanna M. *The Hollow Alliance*. New York: Atherton, 1966. 245p. (DD 120 .J3M4)

"Alliances between sovereign states are surely among the least stable of political associations." Thus begins this almost incredible history of the relations between the two most powerful signers of the Tripartite Pact. The incredible part was the near-total absence of combined planning between Germany and Japan during the operation of the pact. The deficiency in coordination is known through postwar records and interviews that reveal the fact that Allied planners credited more combined capability to the Axis partners at every turn of the war than the partnership warranted. In light of today's knowledge, there is difficulty in finding any aspect of the partnership that produced truly coordinated action. On the political plane, Germany and Japan had divergent objectives with respect to the Soviet Union. Economically, Germany needed the raw materials of

Asia, and Japan needed the arms and technical assistance of Germany, but the difficulties of effecting this exchange could not be worked out even in the best days of the alliance. On the military plane, the planning of grand military strategy was hindered by different governmental structures, and contrary to the Anglo-American accommodation under similar circumstances, here no new machinery was devised to overcome the difficulty.

The Tripartite Pact, at the time of signing, was generally accorded to be a diplomatic victory for Germany. Secret addenda to the pact, however, completely changed the Japanese treaty obligation from that indicated in the published version. The interpretation of the secret addenda contributes very heavily to the significance of this book. Other significance lies in the reminder that alliances thrive only in mutual understanding. Mrs. Meskill has provided an extensively documented and interesting tale which can be read as an example of the failure of an alliance. Why did the alliance fail? "The German-Japanese failure resulted, to a large extent, from the discordance of their political goals and of the means necessary to attain them."

K.H. LYONS

Captain, U.S. Navy

Pickerell, James H. *Vietnam in the Mud*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966. 129p.
(DS 557 .A6P53)

It seems a shame that a man with the obvious talent that Mr. Pickerell possesses has to resort to axe-grinding in an effort to prove his point. In *Vietnam in the Mud*, he uses the basic tactics of the United States military in Vietnam as his blade, while the reader is forced (if he cares to finish this tirade) to play his stone. The reviewer is convinced that this book was written in the foxholes of Vietnam with all the bad taste of hate, blood, and death fresh in the author's mouth. It is aimed at the un-discerning dissidents who will accept anything so