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## **COMMUNIST PARTY CONTROL IN THE SOVIET NAVY**

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*(This paper was prepared for The George Washington University education program offered at the Naval War College. Ed.)*

### **INTRODUCTION**

A United States naval officer, who  
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recently spent three years in Moscow  
as an Assistant Naval Attaché, ob-

served what he believes to be a slight but perceptible change in the demeanor of Soviet naval officers, particularly those of the post-World War II generation. He describes them as having a "blue water look" and an aura of professionalism which is in contrast to most of their seniors. He believes they are capable professional naval officers who will perform commendably, particularly in defense of their homeland. He concludes, however, that the primary obstacle standing in the way of this new professionalism is ". . . the stifling effect of Party control in the Navy — the same factor which has impeded [its] personal and professional progress to date."<sup>1</sup>

It is the purpose of this paper to determine the extent of Party control in the Soviet Navy as revealed by the professional writing of Soviet naval officers during the period between the 22nd and 23rd Party Congresses.<sup>2</sup> From this determination, certain conclusions will be drawn concerning the effect this control has on the Soviet Navy's professionalism.

Consider the plight of the Soviet Navy captain third rank (lieutenant commander) commanding a destroyer or submarine on a long cruise. He is probably a Communist Party member or a Komsomol (Young Communist). He may have on board a political officer who is nominally a subordinate. There will be both Communist Party and Komsomol cells in his ship, with elected secretaries reporting to the political officer. If there is no political officer, the secretaries will report to the political officer on the staff of the division or squadron commander. Like the political officer, if he is present, the secretaries report in their own command chain and are not required to make reports known to their commander. The commander and his officers have spent a significant portion of their on-duty time studying Marxism-

Leninism and must devote valuable training time to weekly Party and Komsomol meetings. More on-duty time is taken by the Party periodically to test officers and men in their political knowledge. Because he is not of flag rank, the commander and his orders are open to criticism at Party and Komsomol meetings presided over by the elected secretaries. As if this were not enough control, the commander may also have a counterintelligence officer on board who represents the Committee on State Security (KGB), or secret police, who also has a private communications link to his headquarters.

The object of these structures within the Navy is to insure complete Communist Party control. But control of the Soviet Navy is but one facet of the overall mechanism used by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to insure complete domination of the State by the Party. To study the control mechanism in the Navy in isolation is unrealistic. It must be related to the Party-State system and explained by the history of its development. There are many excellent studies of the Soviet Party-State system of government; consequently, only major points pertinent to this study will be noted in the introduction. The historical development of the Navy control mechanism will be treated in more detail in Chapter I.

**Party-State Structure and Party Control.** How can the 11½-million member Communist Party minority of the Soviet Union control the 225 million people and their government? In the Soviet Union the Party decides who will be elected, makes government policy, directs implementation, and checks to see that policy has been implemented according to Party desires. This control is exercised through an intimate association between government and

Party structures. A short description of this dual organization will show how the smaller Party organization controls the larger constitutional government organization and, through it, the Soviet Union. Figure 1 is a simplified diagram of the Party-State structure.

**The Party Structure.** The Soviet Constitution guarantees the right of all citizens to unite in organizations "... to develop the organizational initiative and political activity of the masses." Specifically,

... the most active and politically-conscious citizens in the ranks of the working classes, working peasants and working intelligentsia voluntarily unite in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which is the vanguard of the working people in their struggle to build Communist society and is the leading core of all organizations of the working people, both public and private.<sup>3</sup>

This passage not only formalizes the Party as the only political organization of the Soviet Union; it establishes the constitutional basis for Party infiltration of every facet of Soviet life, including the military.<sup>4</sup>

Party organization begins with a primary unit, or cell. A cell is formed whenever three or more Communists find themselves in association. The cell elects a secretary who represents them at the next higher level, a council for an area much like a U.S. election precinct. Representation by elected officials continues from level to level through the provincial conference, then to the republic congress to the All-Union Party Congress. At each level there is an administrative-executive structure which, though varying in detail according to needs, is similar to that of the top Party organs.

The All-Union Party Congress elects members to a Central Committee which in turn elects a Politburo and a first

secretary. The first secretary has several assistants and a huge bureaucratic structure known as the Secretariat.

**The Government Structure.** The constitutional government is elected by the masses. This structure, like that of the Party, has administrative and executive organs at the county, provincial, and republic levels and culminates in the Supreme Soviet at the federal level. Unlike the Party, deputies to the Supreme Soviet and intermediate organs are elected by the people directly. Although the myth of free elections is kept alive, many government positions are filled by appointment from above. Also, even though deputies to the Supreme Soviet are elected by the people, there is only one choice, made by the Party.<sup>5</sup>

The Supreme Soviet, a bicameral organization, elects a Presidium and Council of Ministers. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet acts for the Supreme Soviet when it is not in session; this is about 350 days of the year.

**Party Control: The Interlocking Directorates.** Control over the complex Party-State structure begins in the Party. Although Party rules call for the election of officials at each level by its members, they are, in practice, appointed from above. In less important posts appointments are made or elections approved by the next higher level of the Party or by the Central Committee. More important appointments are approved by the Party Presidium. In the words of the Party rules, "... the decisions of higher bodies are obligatory for lower bodies."<sup>6</sup>

Since Party members are naturally part of the electorate, Party control of the Government structure starts at the bottom. According to Party rules, they are "... the more advanced, the more




Figure 1. The Party/State Structure

politically conscious section of the . . ." electorate,<sup>7</sup> and as such are members of the community who would seek public office under any political system.

Party members at every level are briefed daily on Party policy through publications such as *Pravda*. By persuasion where possible and by coercion where necessary, members ". . . put Party decisions firmly and steadfastly into effect . . . explain the policy of the Party to the masses . . ." and ". . . take an active part in the political affairs of the country; in the administration of state affairs, and . . . set an example for the fulfillment of . . . public duty."<sup>8</sup> It should not be a surprise then to find that almost all members of the top governmental organs are Communists.

The most interesting and effective portion of this control is its implementation at the federal level where Party members are placed in key government posts. This principle, called the interlocking directorates, is similar in many ways to the practice of "double-hatting" U.S. military commanders. There is a key difference, however. In the United States, double-hatting promotes coordination and economy while in the Soviet Union it is done for control and, in many instances, to the detriment of economy and efficiency. Thus, most government positions are filled by members of the Party Central Committee, the Politburo, and the Secretariat. These interlocking positions, as they existed in March 1964, are illustrated in figure 2.

As an additional check on government operations, each member of the Politburo is assigned responsibility for one or more broad areas of national life over which he exercises policy control. Policies, once made by the Party, are implemented by the government structure through the Council of Ministers. The details of control are seen to by the Party Secretariat which

is organized into bureaus with areas of responsibilities paralleling, to a degree, Ministry assignments. The Secretariat is the executive agency for Party policies and, as such, has wide authority over government agencies.

No control system is complete without an inspection and enforcement group to insure that edicts are fulfilled. The secret police (KGB) fulfill this requirement in the Soviet system and, although now in relative eclipse in comparison to the power it wielded at the time of Stalin's death, it is still present, effective, and potentially powerful.

**The Military Application.** Just as the interlocking Party-State structures insure complete Party control over the government, so a similar arrangement within the Soviet military establishment assures Party leaders of complete control over the military. The nature of this control mechanism, and the effect it has on morale and combat effectiveness, is of prime interest to any of the Soviet Union's potential enemies.

## I — THE PARTY IN THE ARMED FORCES

The history of the Soviet Armed Forces reveals a conflict between professional military men and their political supervisors over the principle of one-man command<sup>1</sup> - whether the military commander is to have both military and political responsibility for his unit or share it. At times one has been favored over the other but the dispute has never been the cause of a coup or even a major change in Party or government leadership.<sup>2</sup>

**The Background.** The military situation in October-November 1917 was desperate. The armed might of the

Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR	<b>BREZHNEV</b>	*	Chairman		
	Abramov	*	Members of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR		
	Akhunova	*			
	Budenny	*			
	<b>DEMICHEV</b>	*			
	Gamzatov	*			
	Kartavykh	*			
	Kavun	*			
	<b>KOZLOV</b>	*			
	Kunaev	*			
	<b>MAZUROV</b>	*			
	Nuriev	*			
	<b>PODGORNY</b>	*			
	Smirnova	*			
	Tabeev	*			
Tolstikov	*				
Voroshilov	*				
GOVERNMENT	Heads of Ministries	Patolichev	*	Foreign Trade	
		Bakaev	#	Merchant Marine	
		Beshchev	*	Railroad Communications	
		Elyutin	*	Education	
		Kurashov	#	Health	
		Gromyko	*	Foreign Affairs	
		Furtseva	*	Culture	
		Malinovsky	*	Defense	
		Psurtsev	#	Post and Telecommunications	
		Volovchenko	*	Agriculture	
		Garbuzov	*	Finance	
		Council of Ministers of the USSR	<b>Ustiniv</b>	*	Economic Planning
			Dymshits	*	Deputy Chairmen
Leschko	*				
Lomako	*				
Novikov	*				
<b>POLYANSKY</b>	*				
Rudnev	*				
<b>SHELEPIN</b>	*				
Smirnov	*				
<b>KOSYGIN</b>	*		First Deputy Chairmen		
<b>MIKOYAN</b>	*				
Ustinov	*				
<b>KHRUSHCHEV</b>	*	Chairman			

Secretariat of the Central Committee	KHRUSHCHEV * First Secretary		
	ANDROPOV * Secretaries		
	BREZHNEV *		
	DEMICHEV * (Also Chemical & Light Industry)		
	ILICHEV * (Ideological Commission)		
	KOZLOV *		
	KUUSINEN *		
	PODGORNY *		
	POLYAKOV *		
	PONOMAREV *		
	RUDAKOV * (Industry & Construction)		
	SHELEPIN * (Secret Police)		
	SUSLOV *		
TITOV * (Party Organizational Commission)			
PARTY	Presidium of the Central Committee	Members	BREZHNEV *
			KHRUSHCHEV * (Chairman, CC Bureau for RSFSR)
			KIRILENKO * (D. Ch., CC Bureau for RSFSR)
			KOSYGIN *
			KOZLOV *
			KUUSINEN *
			MIKOYAN *
			PODGORNY *
			POLYANSKY *
			SHVERNIK * (Chairman, Party Commission)
			SUSLOV *
	VORONOV * (D. Ch., CC Bureau for RSFSR)		
	Candidates	EFREMOV *	
		GRISHIN * (Trade Unions)	
MAZUROV * (Head, Belorussian SSR Party)			
MZHAVANADZE * (Head, Georgian SSR Party)			
RASHIDOV * (Head, Uzbek SSR Party)			
SHELEST * (Head, Ukrainian SSR Party)			

*Legend: Names of members and candidate members of the Party Presidium, and of members of the Party Secretariat, are shown in all capital letters wherever they appear. Government positions are shown above, Party positions below. Positions not shown elsewhere on the chart for political leaders are shown in parenthesis following their names in the Party organs. '\*' indicates a Central Committee member. '#' indicates a Central Committee candidate member. '.' indicates a military officer.*

Figure 2. The Interlocking Directorates



Bolshevik regime “. . . consisted of armed workmen recruited in Petrograd and Moscow factories and organized into so-called Red Guards, sailors of the Baltic Fleet, and a few army units of the Petrograd garrison.”<sup>3</sup> The Tsarist army had disintegrated as a result of the Bolshevik’s “democratic” principles.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, service in the Red army was limited to politically reliable volunteers who served for three months.<sup>5</sup> This soon proved unsatisfactory, a situation first recognized by Leon Trotsky.

Designated the People’s Commissar for War in March 1918, Trotsky set about to make the Red Army and its naval component a viable organization.<sup>6</sup> He centralized command and logistics functions, established compulsory military service, lengthened tours of duty, and rebuilt the command structure. But the only source of command experience was the officer corps of the Tsarist Army. “For Trotsky the moral was clear. The Red Army had to enlist the knowledge of the old officers and utilize them until the Red Army produced its own trusted cadres.”<sup>7</sup>

Since the need for political control was evident, Trotsky supplied this by assigning a trusted Party member as a political commissar to each unit, responsible for political health and required to countersign each order. He could countermand an order only if it were counterrevolutionary.<sup>8</sup> Control was further ensured by a system of hostages, by rapidly promoting Bolsheviks with military talent, and by instructing political commissars that they would pay with their lives should their commanders defect or dabble in counterrevolutionary activity. Communists were inducted into the armed forces in great numbers — a third to a half of the total Party strength.<sup>9</sup> Party cells were established wherever there were Communists, and political com-

missars enjoying a separate chain of command were directed to lead and supervise Party organizations in their units. As a result of Trotsky’s efforts, the Soviet Union emerged from the civil war with a politically reliable army and a group of battle-tested young Bolsheviks on which to build an officer corps.

**From Civil War to Bloody Purge.** The end of the civil war found the military and the Party leadership in an argument — not over command but over the continuation of a strong centralized army. The Party favored a local militia because it precluded a large national armed force capable of overthrowing the Bolshevik Regime and because it seemed to be more in the Communist tradition. However, the 10th Party Congress decided in 1921 that, in view of the large-scale peasant uprisings, a militia was unworkable.<sup>10</sup> The Party compromised for a standing army of about a half-million men supplemented by local militia.

With the Red Army secure, the argument over one-man command returned. The post-civil war period was one of Party consolidation. In May 1919 the political administration of the Red Army was established under the direct supervision of the Central Committee of the Party. It chose, trained, assigned, and received reports from the political commissars. The number of Tsarist officers was reduced from 48,000 in 1920 to less than 5,000 in 1930. Party-dominated training camps and schools were opened which turned out military men of a high level of Party loyalty. Stalin supporters were placed in key military positions, thus making the military a vast training ground for Communists. This period also saw great fluctuations in the fortunes of political officers.

In 1925 an order promulgated by the Orgburo<sup>11</sup> provided for unity of

command. As interpreted by the Central Committee, the Orgburo order altered Trotsky's strong political commissar system considerably.<sup>12</sup> If the military commander was of unquestionable Party loyalty, he was given both military and political responsibilities without the presence of a political officer. The dual reporting chain remained and the military commander wearing the political hat was required to make his political reports to the next higher political commissar — not to his military commander.

**The Bloody Purge.** The end of Tsarist presence in the armed forces came in 1937-38 with Stalin's bloody purge. But the elimination of ex-Tsarist officers was not the prime reason for the purge in the military. More basic were the ever-increasing professionalism of the military, the lessening of the influence and reliability of the political activists in the military, and divergent views of internal and international policies between the military leadership and Stalin. The short-range effect of the purge was near disaster. Its long-range effect on the Soviet Armed Forces is far less noticeable and has been called beneficial in some areas by some observers.

The military had been touched by purge before but with less force than the Party as a whole or other groups in society.<sup>13,14</sup> Of course the "purges" of 1921, 1924, 1929, and 1933 were not bloody, rather they were a "cleansing" accomplished by collecting Party membership cards for reissue, then not reissuing the cards of purged members. Also, the military was untouched by the first phase of the bloody purge, during which Stalin methodically eliminated his opposition from the Party and government apparatus. The military has been touched by purge since 1938. H. B. Liddell-Hart points out that the *military* purges which followed

the disasters of Finland and the initial skirmish with Hitler were, in some cases, bloody and had a longer range effect on the military than did the bloody purge, which was primarily *political*.<sup>16</sup> Post-World War II purges have seen heroes of that war deposed as Marshal Zhukov was after Khrushchev gained a position of unchallenged power. But the thing that distinguished the bloody purge from all others was its timing, its ferocity, and its extent.

Perhaps the leniency with which previous purges had treated the military lulled the high command into a feeling of false security, but it should have been obvious to them that what Stalin was doing to his Party colleagues he would eventually have to do to the military. Indeed, this may have finally seeped through to the Army Chief of Staff, Marshal Tuchachevsky, for according to Erich Wollenberg one charge brought against the marshal in 1937 was that he was plotting a coup.<sup>17</sup> Wollenberg indicates he believes there was such a plot, although later writers tend to discount it. At any rate, the immediate indicators were unmistakable — the mention of Tuchachevsky's name by Karl Radek in his trial in January 1937, the removal of Tuchachevsky from the list of those scheduled to attend the coronation of King George VI and the reinstatement of the all-powerful political commissar system in May, extensive reorganizations and reassignments through the first months of 1937, and the actual disappearance of several senior officers as early as April and May.<sup>18</sup>

Even today the details of the bloody purge are unclear. Suffice it to say that when Stalin felt his purge of Party and Government had run its course, he attacked his powerbase, the Red Army. The purge began in earnest with the June trial and execution of Tuchachevsky and seven of his most senior officers, including his political officer Ger-

manek. Before it had run its course, 35,000 officers had been executed. The higher ranks bore the brunt of the purge. Of all commanders of brigades and above, 61 percent were executed. All 11 vice-commissars of war and all military district commanders fell. Seventy-five of the 80 members of the Supreme Military Council, 90 percent of all generals, and 80 percent of all colonels were murdered."<sup>19</sup>

Such a catastrophe could not help but have an extreme effect on the Red Army. There is no doubt that it was a cause of the Russian failure against Finland and against Hitler in the initial phases of the Second World War. Liddell-Hart says that ". . . as regards leadership, it is clear that the 1937 *political* purge had very damaging effects on the capacity of the Red Army to meet the test of war."<sup>20</sup> Erich Wollenberg, writing at the time of the purge, said that it was the end of the Red Army and of the revolution.<sup>21</sup> Obviously he was wrong. Writers with the advantage of perspective have even found that some benefits accrued to the Soviet Union from the purge. J. N. Westwood points out that it eliminated an officer corps with no particular tie to Stalin and the rest of the Party-Government leadership, and created a military leadership indebted and loyal to Stalin.<sup>22</sup> He goes on to say that the net result of this and other purges was to remove reactionary thinkers and make way for more modern concepts. Edgar O'Ballance follows reasoning similar to Westwood's, and then points out that the Japanese, assessing the purge as a vital blow to the Red Army, attempted to occupy a disputed bit of territory near Vladivostok but were soundly beaten.<sup>23</sup>

John Erickson notes some very specific effects of the bloody purge on the Army and the Navy. It caused foreign nations to lower their estimate of Soviet capabilities and precluded any

real Russian help for France and Britain against Germany over the Czechoslovakia affair. Russian military advice to Chiang Kai-shek suffered, and there were technical losses in the naval shipbuilding and aviation industries. Discipline in the Navy went from "good" to "indifferent" according to the British Military Mission in Russia. Erickson also speculates that one reason Stalin extended the purge to the Navy was a disagreement with the navy high command over the future. Stalin wanted an offensive, high seas fleet—the high command wanted a navy built around the seaward flank strategy and a large submarine force.<sup>24</sup>

According to D. Fedotoff White, an assessment made by Walter Duranty said that the purge was shocking to Russians and to foreign military organizations, and undoubtedly impugned the loyalty of the Red Army. White also quotes U.S. Ambassador Davies as saying that the purge did not degrade the loyalty of the Red Army.<sup>25</sup>

Other writers have seen so little long-range effect of the bloody purge on the Soviet Armed Forces that they either do not mention it, or mention it only in contexts unrelated to morale. French Army General Augustin Guillaume does not mention it in his discussion of Red Army morale and condition at the outbreak of the Second World War.<sup>26</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, writing about political controls in the Red Army does not dwell on it.<sup>27</sup> Raymond Garthoff, discussing morale and attitudes of the high command, does not mention the purge or its effect except to say that perhaps one of the demands Zhukov may have made on Khrushchev was to denounce the purge.<sup>28</sup> Roman Kolkowicz dismisses the purge by saying that the Red Army ". . . dramatically proved its crucial role by successfully defending the state against German aggression despite the handicaps under which it suffered as

a result of the 1937 purges.”<sup>29</sup> Kenneth R. Whiting, in a short history of the Soviet Armed Forces, notes that mention of the secret police still sends a chill down the spine, but in the context of the Soviet Union as a whole — not only the armed forces.<sup>30</sup> In this respect it is well to note that after Stalin had successfully purged the military — using the secret police as his power base — he then turned on the NKVD in the final phase of this era which all Russians now apparently see as a remote, unrepeatable horror. This assessment is reinforced by the current Russian attitude toward the excesses of the Chinese Red Guard.

### The “Great Patriotic War.”

When the Russo-Finnish War proved the Soviet Armed Forces command structure to be ill-prepared and unable to make command decisions because of the duality of command, the political commissar was downgraded to an assistant commander for political affairs. His responsibility was limited to political propaganda and education, but he still maintained a separate communications link to the Central Committee of the Party through the political administration of the Army. Except for a short period between mid-July 1941 and October 9, 1942, when an alarmed Stalin reestablished the coequal political commissar, the system of assistant commanders for political matters has remained.<sup>31</sup>

In recognition of growing loyalty shown during the war, Stalin rewarded his officers with rank insignia, reintroduced the title, “officer,” and established land grants for general and flag officers.<sup>32</sup> So the Soviet Union emerged from World War II with a relatively modern armed force, Communist in spirit and control, with added prestige and a minimum of political control.

### The Post-Stalin Era. When Stalin

died the Army found itself involved in a Kremlin power struggle for the first time. Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov, whom Stalin had relegated to a minor post after the war because his public image was encroaching on Stalin’s own, was returned to the Ministry of Defense.<sup>33</sup> As a First Deputy Minister of Defense, Zhukov chose to support Khrushchev because he saw a threat to the size and strength of the armed forces similar to that which had occurred after the civil war. Khrushchev’s rival, Malenkov, talked of more consumer goods which meant less emphasis on heavy industry and a smaller military budget as opposed to Khrushchev’s support of heavy industry. Zhukov soon became the Minister of Defense, and his position became more secure, but secure only so long as there was collective leadership in Russia.

With this relative security, Zhukov attacked the problem of dual command. He abolished political leaders at the lowest echelons. Officers were allowed to follow Marxism-Leninism studies on a voluntary basis. In April 1957 a Central Committee decree made military commanders responsible for both military and political training and forbade criticism of commanders’ orders at Party and Komsomol meetings but maintained the dual military-political reporting systems. Zhukov was nearly successful in his attempt to establish a thoroughly professional, technically competent, patriotic armed force with a minimum of political control.

Then in October 1957, Khrushchev felt secure enough to drop Zhukov for “. . . having sought to reduce Communist control over the armed forces.”<sup>34</sup> Marshal Rodion I. Malinovsky became Minister of Defense, and Colonel F. I. Golikov was appointed Political Administration Head. Retribution against political freedom was swift and sure when most of Zhukov’s gains were nulli-

fied.<sup>35</sup> The October plenum of the Central Committee not only sealed Zhukov's fate, it "... caused an historical development in the life of the Army and Navy . . ." restoring Party control and "... having in view a thorough-going improvement of Party-political work in them."<sup>36</sup>

The plenum also began a strategy debate which subdued the dialogue over one-man command but which eventually brought on its next phase.

### **Khrushchev's Nuclear Strategy.**

In 1958, with thermonuclear weapons in the Soviet military inventory, Khrushchev was encouraged to negotiate from what he thought to be a position of strength. He offered complete disarmament on Russian terms. In January 1960 he disclosed his nuclear strategy to the Supreme Soviet and announced further reductions in military manpower.<sup>37</sup>

Military leaders were alarmed because they felt Khrushchev was putting excessive reliance on one weapon and would wreck the Armed Forces with his drastic reductions.<sup>38</sup> Military leaders' fears were soon put to rest by the refusal of the United States to be intimidated over Berlin in 1961. Military personnel reduction was halted, then the trend reversed, and the need for more than intercontinental ballistic missiles was emphasized.

Khrushchev's new nuclear policy also caused some concern among the Party leadership with regard to Party control over the military. This concern became evident in October 1961 at the 22nd Party Congress. The program adopted there is the document under which Party control of the Navy is currently working and will be discussed in Chapter III.

### **Political Structure in the Navy.**

Party control in the Navy is based on four closely related organizations which

parallel the command structure down to the lowest echelons. The Main Political Administration of the Army and Navy (MPA) is, at the same time, a department of the Ministry of Defense and a part of the Military Department of the Central Committee. A Communist Party cell is organized in any navy unit where three or more Communists serve.<sup>39</sup> The same is true of the Komsomol, which, because lower echelons are composed of larger numbers of young men, is most active at the military "grass roots." Finally, the secret police and a net of informers infiltrate the military structure from top to bottom. Figure 3 is a graphic simplification of the political control structure in the Navy.

Party regulations say that "... chiefs of the political administrations of . . . fleets . . . must be Party members of at least five years standing, and chiefs of political departments of military formations must be Party members of three years standing."<sup>40</sup> The correlation between "military formations" and navy organization is not spelled out, but in any major staff there will be a political department, or *politichast*, headed by a political officer, or *zampolit*. Minor staffs will probably have a political officer, but, if not, they will have political instructors assigned by superior staffs. The *zampolit* is assisted by a secretary of the Regional Party Bureau. While first- and second-class ships have full-time political officers, small ships of the third and fourth classes (destroyer escorts and smaller) have only political leaders, or *politruki*, who combine political and military duties.<sup>41</sup>

The Party and Komsomol structure in the Navy is patterned after that discussed in the introduction. It is separate from the civilian structure in the region where the unit is stationed and reports directly to the Central Committee through the MPA.<sup>42</sup> Military cells




Figure 3. The Political Control Structure in the Soviet Navy

are required to maintain “. . . close contact with local Party committees and keep them informed about political work in the military units. The secretaries of military Party organizations and chiefs of political hodies participate in the work of local Party committees.”<sup>43</sup> Party secretaries of military cells function as a part of the MPA, but below the major staff level they perform their duties in addition to their military duties. The MPA has a Komsomol section which directs Komsomol activities. Komsomol secretaries of cells of ships of the first or second class must be Communist Party members or candidate members.<sup>44</sup> Secretaries of Party and Komsomol cells report directly to the *zampolit* of their organization.

Secret police activity in the Navy is presently subdued but always present. The KGB organization parallels party and command and constitutes the Party's disciplinary and punitive arm. Formal organization goes down to the major staff level. The KGB representative, normally the counterintelligence officer, is nominally subordinate to the commander but maintains a separate communications link to the Committee on State Security. He is responsible for physical and personal security and loyalty. In small units and ships of the Navy the KGB relies on a net of informers recruited from among party and Komsomol members and others who can be blackmailed.<sup>45</sup>

## II — THE PARTY IMAGE OF THE SOVIET NAVY TODAY

The Soviet Navy is and does what the Communist Party decides. In 1958 an unsigned editorial in an official journal stated that “. . . the Communist Party and its Central Committee go

deeply into all the important problems of strengthening the maritime defense of the country.”<sup>1</sup> In 1960 Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, Navy Commander in Chief, said that “in . . . a Leninist manner the most complicated problems of a military build-up are being decided. The Communist Party and its Central Committee are allotting unremitting attention to the perfection of the Navy and to training its cadres.”<sup>2</sup> At about the same time another senior officer noted that Marxist-Leninist precepts guide the use of the economic potential of the State and military science in developing weapons and methods of conducting combat operations.<sup>3</sup> These are but three examples of the homage paid to the Party by the military and illustrate the extent to which current naval strategy, doctrine, and tactics stem from Communist Party dogma.

Because of this intimate concern with all aspects of military power, Party leaders were stimulated into reappraising their theories of control over military personnel by Khrushchev's disclosure of his new nuclear policy to the Supreme Soviet in 1960. It became crystal clear to Khrushchev and his cohorts that it was now possible for one man in uniform, either through design or madness, to trigger a nuclear weapon in such a manner as to set off a general East-West nuclear exchange. It further occurred to them that this one man could be relatively junior in rank and position.

**The New Communist Sailor.** The specter of nuclear war by mistake brought into the debate over the principle of one-man command an entirely new idea. The Party decided that it needed a Soviet military man with self-discipline and initiative, who maintained this discipline out of desire to serve the nation and the Party rather than from fear of punitive action.<sup>4</sup> This new Communist military man —

or "new Communist sailor" for our purposes — is the military counterpart of the "new Communist man" envisioned by the party rules and program adopted by the 22nd Communist Party Congress in October 1961. The new Party program was to launch the Soviet Union on the road to true communism. The program also foresaw the "new Communist man," a citizen completely the product of communism, educated according to the code of Communist ethics, who would support the Communist State, not because of the harsh control exercised from above, but because of an inner conviction that the Communist State was good.

At first reading it appeared to the military that the application of this program to military problems would enhance the principle of one-man command. But the Party did not see it that way, and through methods chosen to achieve the "new Communist sailor," the Party further curtailed the principle of one-man command.

**The 22nd Party Congress.** The 22nd Party Congress was recognized as a major and dramatic event in Soviet history. The agenda called for a new Party program and new Party rules. It was to be "... the Congress which would illuminate the future, outline the road to Communism, and celebrate the triumphal march of Soviet power to a dominant position in the world."<sup>5</sup> The new rules and program were introduced by Frol Kozlov and Nikita Khrushchev but did not get the headlines.

The highlights of the Congress were the open exposure of the rift between Communist China and the Soviet Union and the full-scale attack on Stalin. These explosive issues overshadowed the new program and rules which, by themselves, would have made the Congress a very significant event. The new program and rules have had,

and continue to have, considerable impact on the Navy.

**Military Aspects of the Communist Party Program.** The Communist Party Program, adopted by the 22nd Party Congress, recognized the need for a strong Soviet armed force to "... be keenly vigilant with regard to the aggressive intrigues of the enemies of peace, always to protect peaceful labor, and to be constantly prepared to take up arms in defense of their country." The Party stated that "... the strengthening of ... the might of the Soviet Armed Forces ..." is the "... sacred duty of the Party and the Soviet people as a whole." The Party pledged to help equip the Soviet Armed Forces with the latest weapons and to maintain them in the highest level of preparedness. The Party also undertook to educate the people "... in the spirit of constant preparedness ..." and "... love of their armed forces." The program also spoke of discipline.

The CPSU is doing everything to ensure that the Soviet Armed Forces are a well-knit and smoothly operating organism, that they have a high standard of organization and discipline, carry out in exemplary fashion the tasks assigned to them by the Party, the Government, the people, and are prepared at any moment to administer a crushing blow to imperialist aggressors.<sup>6</sup>

Significantly, the Party recognized that "... one-man leadership is a major principle of the organization of the Soviet Armed Forces." Implementation of the program was to be accomplished by a massive education effort. Hence the thrust of the Party program, as it applied to the Navy, was in organization and training. The Party saw an "... increasing role and influence ..." in the "... entire life and activity ..." of the Armed Forces and cast



itself as “. . . the bedrock of military development.”<sup>7</sup> While the Party had always exercised considerable control over the military, professional soldiers and sailors saw in this new program a threat to their hard-won gains toward one-man command.

One observer says the importance of this threat is illustrated by the replacement of Marshal Golikov, a professional soldier with extensive battlefield and political experience, by a political appointee, General Yepishev, as head of the MPA in May 1962. Apparently Golikov was not removed because of poor health, as announced, but because of a dispute between himself and Khrushchev over the implementation of the 22nd Party Congress program. This observer summarized the military portion of the program as follows:

. . . (1) re-education with the view to removing “capitalist survivals” and promoting the execution of the directives of the Twenty-Second Party Congress; (2) the need to instill a spirit of self-discipline in the armed forces instead of a discipline produced by merely imposing orders or inflicting punishments; (3) the role of the Party and Komsomol committees or, to use the official phrase, of “military public opinion” in running and re-educating the armed services; and (4) criticism and public condemnation, by means of definite examples, of serious offenses among all ranks except general officers.<sup>8</sup>

He believes that, in effect, this transferred disciplinary and training responsibility to the Party but left it “officially” in the hands of the commander. In the experience of military professionals like Golikov, this not only threatened one-man command, it weakened operational control. The application of these Party principles is amply illustrated in current professional writing in the Soviet Navy.

### The Party Program and Soviet

**Navy Strategy.** Traditional employment of the Soviet Navy has been as the seaward flank of the Red Army. Stalin apparently realized the potential of the Navy as a means of projecting Soviet policy and presence, for it has been said that one of the purposes behind his extending the purge of the late 1930's to the Navy was to rid himself of those who held to the seaward flank strategy.<sup>9</sup> Sending the Navy on extended cruises posed a problem of defection since the Navy has been the least reliable supporter of communism in the Armed Forces, even though sailors of the Baltic Fleet were among the vanguard supporting the Bolshevik revolution. This early aura of Navy reliability was tarnished by the Kronstadt revolt and compounded by extensive use of Tsarist personnel. As a result, the deployment of naval units outside the coastal waters of the Soviet Union has, until recently, been limited. An editorial in the *Soviet Naval Digest* took note of this change and the problems it brought to the Navy.

Our new fleet is operating further than ever from our shores. It is constantly concerned with how to solve its main problems in the various theaters of naval operations. During distant and long cruises, the commanding officer needs greater self-reliance, skill to handle situations correctly, exceptional accuracy and good organization of the entire crew. This makes it incumbent upon officers, petty officers and seamen to perform watch duties vigilantly and knowledgeably.

For a successful long cruise it is particularly important to prepare and check the technical phases, remove defects and relate the experiences of those who have already made long cruises. . . . It is here that we have one of the important tasks of the political workers, Party and Komsomol organizations, namely, to create on board ship an atmosphere of general enthusiasm among seamen, helping them to understand their immense responsibilities to the motherland and

mobilize their will for perfect execution of assigned tasks.<sup>10</sup>

Training in the Navy is supporting this new concept.

That the Navy is aware of its shortcomings is illustrated by a recent editorial from the *Soviet Naval Digest* which notes that an increasing number of Soviet ships, naval and merchant, are using the high seas.<sup>11</sup> It deplors the lack of knowledge displayed by Soviet seamen of the normal practices of international law and, in some respects, indicates a change in Soviet attitude toward international law from the traditional Leninist concept of noninvolvement.<sup>12</sup>

Soviet strategy no longer views the Navy as only an extension of the Army but assigns it tasks in the destruction of aircraft carrier strike forces and nuclear missile-firing submarines.<sup>13</sup> A general officer of the Soviet Air Force, writing for the *Soviet Naval Digest*, discusses the Navy role in worldwide nuclear rocket war.<sup>14</sup> He describes the newly created rocket forces as the ultimate shield against Western imperialist aggression but recognizes that the use of the "world oceans" under these conditions becomes extremely important. This recognition of naval warfare as of prime importance to the survival of the Soviet Union in nuclear war places added importance on Soviet long-range naval striking forces.

The following two chapters will discuss in some detail the status of the Navy training, development, and employment in the period between the two most recent Party Congresses with emphasis on the implementation of the new Party program. But first, in order to set the stage for changes which are and have been taking place during the almost six-year interim period, a look at the 23rd Party Congress is in order.

### The 23rd Congress of the Com-

**munist Party of the Soviet Union.** Just as Messrs. Kosygin and Brezhnev are dull and uninteresting alongside Khrushchev and his cohorts, so the 23rd Party Congress was as undramatic as the 22nd was explosive. The difference is illustrated by comparing the flamboyance and unpredictability of Khrushchev's regime with the stolidly bureaucratic methods of his successors. Little of real interest came out of the most recent congress held in Moscow the last days of March and the beginning of April 1966. Analysts have dug hard and speculated to idiotic extremes in efforts to extract something startling from the record of the congress and, so far, have come up with nothing that was not expected.<sup>15</sup>

This is particularly true of the military statements made at the Party Congress. Two items of interest, but certainly not of startling significance, can be mentioned at this time. General Yepishev spoke of the necessity of strengthening discipline in the Armed Forces.<sup>16</sup> Marshal Malinovsky spent a significant portion of his report on the condition of the Armed Forces talking about the Navy.<sup>17, 18</sup> It is too early to speculate at length on the significance of these developments, but they can be tied to trends noted recently in Soviet Navy literature.

As will be pointed out in the following two chapters, in the period between the Party Congresses there has been a gradual change in attitudes towards discipline. After the 22nd the implementation of the Party program called for more inner discipline fostered by political indoctrination and—hopefully—example from the officer corps.<sup>19</sup> Unfortunately, the officer corps looked on the new Party program as license to hand over the responsibility for training and discipline to the Party organs, and their writing early in the period—particularly before Khrushchev's fall in 1964—showed this. Recently,

however, and before the 23rd Congress, attitudes and official statements began to change.<sup>20</sup>

Thus the call for stronger discipline by the political head of the Soviet Armed Forces was not unexpected. In short, things are becoming more conventional. Since the new regime is one which believes in routine, bureaucratic methods, a swing back to the normal Communist idea of absolute control from the top is not surprising. It would appear, then, that this portends a tightening of political control over the Navy—and the rest of the Soviet Armed Forces—and more emphasis on things political, probably to the detriment of the principle of one-man command. The extent of this tightening cannot be judged, but it will probably be slight—almost imperceptible.

Of great interest to the Soviet Navy, and of passing interest in this paper, is the emphasis given the Navy by Malinovsky's remarks. This and other occurrences indicate a growing awareness in the Soviet Union of the importance of seapower and its potential. An upgrading of the position of the Soviet Navy may be in the offing.

### III — PARTY INFLUENCE AND INVOLVEMENT IN TRAINING

Because the Soviet Navy is now a force to be deployed far from Russian shores, carrying weapons of mass destruction, it must be reliable. The Navy is a prime target for political training, particularly in its long-range forces. In all cases, officers are given special attention.

**The Submarine Force.** All long-range submarines have political executive officers on board. A captain third rank speaks of Party groups being organized in departments of one sub-

marine, indicating a well-organized Party structure.<sup>1</sup> A Soviet captain discussing submarine Arctic operations extolls the exceptional skill and “. . . high moral and political qualities . . .” of atomic submariners.<sup>2</sup> Another captain third rank notes that long periods on patrol, detached from fleet headquarters, on independent duty, and under conditions of poor communications make problems and responsibilities of submarine commanders unique. According to him, the most successful commanders understand the “. . . great importance of political education, and the ideological maturity of each sailor.” Successful submarine commanders are:

. . . closely connected with the Party and Komsomol organizations on the submarine, and each relies on them in resolving problems concerned with combat readiness. Each listens carefully to the opinions of Communists and Komsomol members, asks for their advice on problems connected with the improvement of educational and training methods.<sup>3</sup>

In an example, the author speaks of Party influence and responsibilities with regard to scheduling training. In this instance “. . . at the end of each month, when the next Party-political measures are being drawn up . . .” this submarine commander would invite the political officer and the secretaries of the Party and Komsomol organizations to discuss the results achieved in the previous month's training program and to help devise a better program for the next month. The commander demanded that his department heads personally direct the activities of the Party groups and rely on them in departmental work.

Komsomol members are expected to participate in every phase of regular and afterhours training and in competitive exercises. When such is the case, says an engineering captain lieutenant, the general excellence of the

crew in evolutions such as damage control improves.<sup>4</sup>

More recently, in the lead editorial of the *Soviet Naval Digest* of March 1965 previously referred to, note is taken of the great differences between a modern nuclear submarine and the older, conventional types. In discussing the necessity for iron discipline in these and other types of naval units, the authors note that “. . . In a future war, even isolated instances of breaches of discipline could result in irreversible harm.” Submarines, they note, are particularly vulnerable to such isolated errors of great consequence and, they say, “. . . Only excellently trained, organized, and highly disciplined men can effectively employ modern ordnance and combat equipment.”<sup>5</sup>

#### Political Training of Aircrews.

Long-range aircraft are potential defection vehicles, as well as carriers of weapons of mass destruction, under the control of relatively junior officers isolated from command and control. Consequently, training of aircrews has not been neglected by the Party.

A senior aviator, Lieutenant General Gulyayev, gives considerable emphasis to the role of the Party in an article on navigation and leadership.

Due to continuous attention paid by the Party and Government . . . our Armed Forces were radically re-organized to comply with the demands of modern warfare. Higher commands, staffs, and Party-political bodies are confronted with a serious task: to indoctrinate and train qualified military specialists — passionate patriots of the Soviet Fatherland, unquestionably loyal to the great cause of the Communist Party.<sup>6</sup>

He goes on to say that, because their jobs are technically complicated, airmen must possess self-discipline, be able to react quickly, and have great feeling of responsibility to the state. “Consequently, air commanders, staffs,

political as well as Party and Komsomol organizations, must carry on daily the serious work of further perfecting the instruction and educational methods of air personnel.” He concludes by noting that “. . . Party and Komsomol organizations render substantial assistance to commanders, staffs, specialists and all aviation personnel in instruction and education as well as in securing safe navigation.” General Gulyayev notes that,

. . . a constant contact with Communists is the major duty of commanders. . . . A commander lacking a strong personal contact with Communists will never be able to obtain and use fully the Party organization's authority for any improvement in combat readiness, for securing safe navigation, for raising educational and instructional levels or for strengthening combat discipline.<sup>7</sup>

The article implies that the term “safe navigation” may relate to bringing the aircraft and crew safely back rather than defecting, and that any officer who wants to get ahead should be a Party member.

The method used for postflight critiques in one naval air force regiment is based on five principles. The first two, standardization and timeliness, are normal. The last three, self-criticism, specific criticism of individuals before their comrades, and command responsibility are unique to Communist usage.

Self-criticism and criticism of juniors and seniors before one's comrades is called a valuable tool in post-flight critiques and is in keeping with the Party program.<sup>8</sup> The motivation for making complete and honest criticisms is not necessarily based on Communist zeal or real desire to gain from an exhaustive review of the facts, but also on the full knowledge that Party actives in the crew will certainly air any aspect of the flight they feel should be criticized. If a Party active makes

such a criticism, it will probably become a matter to be reported up through the political chain.

With regard to command attention, commanders “. . . appraisals should embrace all aspects of performance, taking into account Party-political activities during preparation and execution of flight operations, as well as the state of military discipline.”<sup>9</sup>

Obviously, the official Soviet Navy attitude toward training of flight crews is that it is a joint responsibility of command and Party-political organs.<sup>10</sup>

**The Party in Surface Units.** Much emphasis is placed on Party and Komsomol participation in training, discipline, and patriotic manifestations as examples to non-Communist members of the crew. An unsigned article in the *Soviet Naval Digest* in early 1964 addresses the problem:

In order to achieve real success in combat training involving wide cruising areas, it is necessary to conduct daily purposeful Party-political work in developing in seamen a faultless discipline and a boundless love for the motherland.

Only the joint activities of the command and Party-political organs will make it possible to unite the efforts of all the crew and to insure proper solutions of all combat training problems.<sup>11</sup>

Party and Komsomol members are given credit for specific activities, such as teaching crew-members to swim.<sup>12</sup> Party actives must also pay particular attention to training and “. . . take a continual interest in how the instructors are improving their own skills . . .” and “. . . to assist them on a daily basis.”<sup>13</sup> This attention to training the trainers is in direct support of the Communist Party program.

Good organization for training and superior knowledge on the part of officers and political workers is emphasized in a *Soviet Naval Digest* editorial:

Under such an organization of combat training, special responsibility is placed on the commanding officer, his political officer, executive officer and all other officers. New and greater demands are made on Party-political organs and Party organizations.<sup>14</sup>

While the above indicates the presence of a political officer in the ship's organization, junior to the commander but senior to his executive officer, many smaller units have no such position.<sup>15</sup> Political work on small ships is carried on by secretaries of the Party or Komsomol organizations on board who are supervised by the division or squadron political officer through regular training sessions.<sup>16</sup>

Party and Komsomol members must also bring “Communist presence” into all phases of shipboard life and offset any low level of education, training, or attention to duty which may exist among non-Communist crew members.

It is especially for this reason that a correct and timely assignment of Communists and Komsomol members to watches, shifts and compartments is essential, as well as a properly thought-out political education program.<sup>17</sup>

Whether a unit has a full-time political officer or not, it is given its full share of Party attention.

**Officer Training.** The loyalty of a military organization depends upon its officer corps. Realizing this, the Party pays particular attention to officers, enticing those who are not Party members to join, and encouraging Communist Party and Komsomol members to seek commissions. But until such time as all officers entering the Navy are Party or Komsomol members, precautions are taken to insure their loyalty.

Training of officers is given attention in every phase — precommissioning, shipboard, in service schools, in off hours, and through professional publi-

cations. Each officer takes an active part in the political training of his subordinates and in the political life of the civilian community.

A Soviet rear admiral recently voiced concern about the lack of educational skills of young officers. He feels that such skill must be acquired at academies, not on the job.

The solution to these problems is being studied thoroughly and successfully by commanding officers, the Party Committee, the Chair of Marxism-Leninism and by officers of the training and combatant subdivisions of the Caspian Higher Naval Academy. . . .<sup>18</sup>

The solution discussed is a detailed schedule of each student's entire academic course called the ". . . Diary of a Student," in which progress is noted daily. There are practical as well as academic requirements.

In addition, a student should be able to analyze correctly the state of discipline and disciplinary practice in a sub-unit, conduct a Party or Komsomol meeting, prepare a draft for decisions taken at a meeting and a monthly plan of work of a Komsomol organization.<sup>19</sup>

Notations in the student's diary are analyzed by the Chair of Marxism-Leninism to determine where the student needs additional help.<sup>20</sup> Practical work includes speaking before Party and Komsomol organizations in industrial and youth groups and in ships of the Red Banner Caspian Flotilla where the students' efforts are observed by officers and men of the Fleet and by instructors and political workers of the Academy.

The five instructors of the Chair of Marxism-Leninism also prepare instructors of the Academy to see that they ". . . grasp the fact that a future officer has to possess a clear understanding of all forms of Party-political and educational work with subordi-

nates." Conferences are held to assist instructors on such subjects as ". . . The commanding officer's ability to rely on Party and Komsomol organizations and on petty officers is an important prerequisite for his successful activities." They teach that a good officer must address ". . . fiery speeches to subordinates . . . discuss the burning issues of the day . . . and possess firm ideological convictions."<sup>21</sup>

Ship commanders are encouraged to pay great attention to each young officer. On reporting, each is interviewed to determine his abilities, desires, and weaknesses, and particular attention is given to integrating him into the local community. In all these tasks Party and Komsomol members have an equal responsibility with the commanding officer.<sup>22</sup>

The Party is certainly not neglecting the young officer. His life is well-ordered, in the Party sense, from the time he enters training until he retires. He can also expect to be openly criticized by his comrades until he reaches flag rank. With the political control and observation system as effective as it is today, it would seem very unlikely that an officer who is not politically reliable would ever reach flag rank.

#### IV — THE PARTY IN DEVELOPMENT AND EMPLOYMENT OF THE SOVIET NAVY

Communist Party influence is particularly strong in technical development, discipline, leadership, and morale. Conflict shows in such areas as the acceptance of political control by the military, the way military officers use the political structure, participation by military personnel in the Party outside the military structure, and indications of opposition to, or disregard for, the political structure.

**The Party in Technical Aspects of Military Life.** The 22nd Party Congress was conscious of the impact of technology. In his lengthy report to the Congress, Khrushchev had much to say about increasing production through better use of technology.<sup>1</sup> The program adopted by the Congress called on the Party to train Army and Navy officers that they “. . . master Marxist-Leninist theory . . . and possess a high standard of military-technical training.”<sup>2</sup> The Party adapted these words to its rules by saying, “. . . the Party organization of the Soviet Army . . .” will “. . . rally servicemen to . . . acquire skill in the use of new techniques and weapons . . .” thus making it the duty of Party and Komsomol members of the Armed Forces to concern themselves with technological advances.<sup>3</sup>

Left on their own, it is probable that Soviet naval officers would have followed a course towards technological perfection without direct Party intervention. In early 1964 the *Naval Digest* said editorially that, because of the increasing complexity of naval units, each cruise at sea must be more fully used for equipment familiarization.<sup>4</sup> In discussing training of flight crews, Lieutenant General Gulyayev notes the Party's part in research and the advancement of technical skills.<sup>5</sup> Vice Admiral Zakharov, Chief of the Political Department of the Pacific Fleet, encourages commanders and Party workers to popularize technical and scientific subjects. He encourages particularly well-qualified officers to participate in lectures and seminars at universities and academies on technical and scientific subjects. He notes that failures are reviewed by Party and Komsomol organizations and are corrected, sometimes by providing a training team as part of the propaganda organization, *agitpropkollektiv*, to supervise training and give lectures. Admiral Zakharov indicates that all technological advance

in the Soviet Navy is inspired by the Party, all technical training is approved by the Party, and most such training is given by political workers and Party and Komsomol members.<sup>6</sup>

On the whole, however, scientific and technical articles in the *Soviet Naval Digest* — and there are an ever-increasing number — are straightforward and professional. Seldom do they contain political references, and when they do it is almost automatic and probably not even noticed by Soviet readers. A good recent example was the lead editorial in the August 1965 *Digest*. It enjoined officers to use scientific methods in their work and to improve scientific capabilities. Political reference was confined to including the Party-political organs along with commanders, staffs, and military-scientific societies in the group responsible for fostering scientific awareness.<sup>7</sup>

**Discipline.** It has been shown that military discipline is considered by the Party to be the responsibility of political cadres.<sup>8</sup> A captain first rank gives guidance in disciplinary matters to political workers in carrying out the dictates of the June 1963 plenum of the Central Committee. He notes that Marshal Malinovsky said to an all-Army meeting of Party organization secretaries:

While the very existence of an army is unthinkable without strict military discipline, new combat weapons require such precise execution of all orders and instructions, and such a high level of discipline as has never been known in the history of armies.

The captain goes on to say:

Commanders, political workers, Party organizations of military units are given increasing attention in the strengthening of discipline, organization, and military order. How is this work being organized in the unit? What are the most effective forms and methods used?

It is generally known that it is the commanders of single type commands who play the main role in instilling and maintaining strict discipline. The degree of discipline on a ship, in a combat unit, or in a command depends on (1) the demands these commanders make on their subordinates, (2) their skill in organizing the service, and (3) their use of the Party and Komsomol organizations. Therefore, the main attention in Party and political work directed toward strengthening discipline in a unit is concentrated on education and instruction.<sup>9</sup>

Agreeing that discipline is the backbone of combat readiness and the responsibility of command, the captain points out that without full support of the political worker it cannot be gained.

Marshal Malinovsky's remarks underscore the great concern of the Party over the possibility of nuclear war by mistake and the then new requirements for an inner discipline through desire and understanding rather than through fear of retribution. It is not surprising that the Party should choose not to leave discipline in the complete control of nonpolitical commanders. Just as they choose to keep Party and government disciplinary functions in Party organs, Communists choose to use the Party to watch over discipline in the military.

While discipline is spoken of in many contexts in many articles in the *Digest* — hardly an issue is published without some reference to discipline and the Party's responsibility therein — periodically an article devoted to the subject appears. Captain Fisyun's article of December 1963 was one. Another appeared in April 1964 which treated the problem of teaching young officers the correct approach to disciplinary matters.<sup>10</sup> This article, written by Captain First Rank G. F. Ditskiy, starts out by justifying the necessity for strict discipline in the Soviet Navy by quoting Lenin as saying that

“. . . an ironclad military discipline is necessary in order to win.” This, of course, is quite a change from the first days of the Red Army when the teachings of Lenin were used to justify the complete destruction of military discipline by calling for the election of officers and decision-making by vote. (See above, Chapter I.) But Captain Ditskiy's ideas are a little puzzling. He appears to favor one-man command and the abolition of the political deputy, although he gives lip service to the Party's role in discipline. He does chide Soviet commanders for allowing the political organs to take over disciplinary functions. He also criticizes a staff political officer for disciplining a commanding officer “. . . for his careless preparation of a Komsomol meeting.”<sup>11</sup> In summary, Captain Ditskiy's article is political, establishes the Party's prime position in military discipline, but can also be interpreted as mildly critical of Party and political interference in disciplinary matters and as encouraging professional officers to take stronger hold of the disciplinary reins.

But all this seems to be definitely cancelled out by the March 1965 editorial already extensively quoted above.<sup>12</sup> It must be concluded that discipline is still a Party function — not a military one. While commanders may execute discipline, they look to the Party organs for guidance and as their source of authority.

**Military Acceptance and Use of the Political Structure.** There is little doubt that officers of the Soviet Navy now accept the political structure since they have little choice. Moreover, as more of them are now products of the Soviet era, in many cases acceptance is a matter of ideological conviction. Commanders are urged to use political actives as planners, educators, examples, and informers. Military leaders



are also quick to use upheavals in the political structure to their own advantage. Marshal Zhukov used the uncertain period of collective leadership after Stalin's death to lessen the power of political officers and to gain prestige and promotions for military officers.<sup>13</sup> Recently, the commander of Soviet tank troops blamed Stalin for the slow development of Soviet armor and its not being ready to meet and defeat the German attack of 1939.<sup>14</sup> Early this year Marshal Matvei Zakharov, Soviet Chief of Staff, accused Nikita Khrushchev of harebrained scheming in military strategy.<sup>15</sup> There will doubtless be more such failures laid on Khrushchev's doorstep.

Party guidance is obvious in major public addresses given by Soviet military leaders. In his speech at the 1964 May Day parade, Marshal Malinovsky introduced his remarks by saying,

In the name of and upon the instructions from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government, I welcome and congratulate you on May Day, the international holiday of the working people.<sup>16</sup>

While Party and military professionals disagree over the extent of political control, there is little to indicate that the military seeks complete disengagement. The recurrence of statements supporting Party involvement in official navy publications indicates acceptance. Editorials in the *Soviet Naval Digest* continually credit close political-military cooperation with the current high state of combat readiness. A January 1964 editorial set down future military and political tasks for political workers, commanders, and all hands. Individuals are called on to accept the "... moral code of the builders of Communism ..." and to develop the "... propaganda of combat and revolutionary traditions." Commanders are told that they must "... rely heavily on

Communists and Komsomol members ... " to achieve a high level of discipline and combat readiness. Political workers have "... the duty to probe deeply into all details of combat and political training ... to support and propagandize all patriotic actions, to act as organizers of socialist competition ... " and to be outstanding examples of the ideal Communist sailor.<sup>17</sup>

If the *Naval Digest* is accepted as the voice of the Navy high command and addressed to all Navy men, then it follows that the Navy has accepted Party functions in their midst.

**Leadership and One-Man Command.** There is ample evidence, however, that the fight for one-man command continues in the Navy and that it is practiced to a considerable extent, particularly in smaller units.

As mentioned above, Marshal Zhukov came close to achieving one-man command. Shortly before his dismissal the Ministry of Defense issued new "Instructions to Organizations of the CPSU in the Soviet Army and Navy," which gave the commander supervisory responsibility over the political organization and its activities.<sup>18</sup> An editorial in *Soviet Fleet* in September 1957 spoke of the victory for the principle of one-man command by saying that the Party and the Government had entrusted commanders with the complete responsibility for training their subordinates.<sup>19</sup> Then, in late October, a Central Committee decree deposed Zhukov and made it clear that he was dropped because he had developed his own "personality cult" and had undermined Party control of the military.<sup>20</sup>

Under Malinovsky there has been a continual improvement in the status of commanders from the nadir reached as a result of Zhukov's dismissal. The tack taken was to develop a new class of officers — a combination of com-

mander and political officer — by “. . . enrolling commanders in political work and political workers in command work . . .” so that eventually there would be truly one officer in charge, both politically and militarily.<sup>21</sup>

The success of this cross-fertilization process was assessed in 1962 when Vice Admiral Grishanov, Head of the Political Administration of the Navy, stated that 43.8 percent of all political workers had been given command experience but that the Navy was still exercising caution in assigning them to command billets. At that time none of them had been given command of ships of the first or second class.<sup>22</sup> By 1964<sup>23</sup> at least four political captains second rank (commanders) in the Pacific Fleet had been given ship commands.<sup>24</sup> Current Navy publications indicate that all officers eligible for command will soon also be acceptable political workers.<sup>25</sup>

Some officers mildly support the principle of one-man command in their writings.<sup>26</sup> In December 1963 a rear admiral published a definition of one-man command:

The Soviet single-command system means that military and political leadership is handled by one person. . . . the function of single command is not simply to demand, but by personal example to draw all officers into training programs and teach them this honorable and responsible skill. The success of an officer in maintaining a high state of combat readiness, discipline and order depends to a large degree upon his political activity and his skill in relying on Party and Komsomol organizations.<sup>27</sup>

Other writers recommend that commanders use their political activities in accomplishing their mission, particularly in training, by regularly discussing problems and their solutions with Party and Komsomol members.<sup>28</sup> In sum, the Navy seems to be trying to achieve one-man command by encour-

aging commanders to usurp political responsibilities by superior leadership and political acumen, thereby negating the necessity for a separate political officer.<sup>29</sup>

**Morale.** According to official Soviet Navy publications, morale is good, particularly among Party and Komsomol members. In fact, the Navy has reached a position of strength and prestige never before known to Russian sailors, which by itself would increase morale. But, invariably, the sailor who is singled out for praise is a Party or Komsomol member.

A short news item in the *Soviet Naval Digest* described the great upsurge in patriotism in Black Sea Fleet units after a visit by Khrushchev. It speaks of the keen “socialist competition” these units have shown. It credits Party and Komsomol members of the crew, not the commanding officer.<sup>30</sup> Socialist competition is encouraged and rewarded by the Party. An award to a Pacific Fleet submarine appears at first reading to be an operational efficiency award similar to the U.S. Navy “E” for general excellence. But it is actually a Party award. The “Challenge Red Banner” was awarded by the Komsomol for high qualities in combat and political training. The submarine was identified only as the one where “. . . Comrade Shatravin is Secretary of the Komsomol organization.”<sup>31</sup>

Much has been done since 1917 to establish good morale in the Armed Forces. Morale in this sense must always be coupled with political reliability, and a good gauge of the current high level of “morale-political reliability” in the Navy is the increasing role and area of responsibility given the Navy by the Communist Party and the Government. Unless Party leaders were convinced they were reliable, units of the Red Fleet would remain in port.

**Military Participation in Non-military Political Activities.** "People-to-people," Soviet Navy style, was exemplified by Pacific Fleet sailors in Irkutsk who participated in local Komsomol meetings, put on amateur shows, and taught the local youngsters parachute jumping.<sup>32</sup> They also take part in local Party work, for ". . . seventy-nine Communists are members of the district, city, regional and territorial Party committees," indicating dual membership on the part of sailors. Nor does the Soviet Navy frown on its officers and men standing for local government elections, since ". . . one-hundred and forty seamen, petty officers, officers, generals and admirals are deputies of the local Soviets."<sup>33, 34</sup>

Of greater interest is military participation in the Party Congress, Central Committee, Presidium, and Secretariat. Military representation to the Party Congress is at the same ratio as for nonmilitary primary Party organizations and is determined by the Central Committee. Representation to the 22nd Congress was at the ratio of 1 deputy to 2,000 members and candidate members. By count, there were 305 voting delegates and 45 nonvoting delegates to the Congress from the military, indicating 610,000 Party members and 90,000 candidate members in the Armed Forces. This places Party strength in the Armed Forces between 17.5 percent and 20 percent. Four years before it had been only 11 percent. In comparison, only 4.5 percent of all Russian citizens are Party members. Komsomol membership is much higher—estimated to be 63 percent in 1962 in the Armed Forces—a natural result of the great number of young men in the organization.<sup>35</sup>

While Party rules guarantee the Armed Forces equal representation at Party congresses, the number elected to the Central Committee is proportional to military influence in the Party

hierarchy. Because rulings from above are obligatory, elections to the Central Committee are as the Presidium desires. There has been speculation that the percentage of military members on the Central Committee is indicative of stress within the regime.<sup>36</sup> Finally, it should be noted that the military, which represents less than 2 percent of the population of the Soviet Union, has 10 percent of the seats in the Central Committee.

More significant than statistics is the kind of officer selected to serve on high Party organs. In the pre-Khrushchev era it was common to find the Minister of Defense—successor to the Commissar for War—in the Presidium or its predecessor, the Politburo. Malinovsky is not a member nor a candidate member and, since Zhukov was dropped, no military man has been on the Party Presidium or its successor, the Politburo.<sup>37</sup> (See footnote 11, Chapter I.) The military has done better on the Central Committee as we have seen, but even here there are certain criteria. The significant ones are loyalty to the Party and an inherent lack of potential for high political position. A popular officer with significant Party support and an ambition for national power would be unacceptable to the Party leadership.<sup>38</sup>

Over the years, military participation in high Party organs has decreased, indicating a trend away from military adventure as a Soviet foreign policy tool. Military power remains a threat to be used by the Party and Government but controlled by the Party. The military is still a powerful force for internal control, and, just as Khrushchev used it to maintain his position in 1957, it will be the key to the outcome of any struggle for power within the Kremlin.

**Indications of Opposition to, and Disregard for, Party Control.** While

the majority of articles written by and for the Soviet Navy contain extensive reference to political guidance, many do not. A majority of the articles on which this study is based, including those giving extensive space to Party dogma, contain highly professional military thinking. Many of them, with the political dogma removed, could appear in Western naval journals and be accepted.

A companion article to Admiral Zakharov's highly political piece on technical training<sup>39</sup> called for closer supervision of junior officers by their seniors and intimated that the duties of junior officers were often too numerous for them to learn their profession properly. The article made only passing reference to political education.<sup>40</sup> The lack of reference to political duties supports the long-standing dislike for the excessive time taken ". . . by the endless Party and Komsomol meetings, the classes in Marxism-Leninism for both officers and enlisted men, the periodic examinations held to test the political knowledge of military personnel."<sup>41</sup> Another instance of a contradiction was a companion piece to Admiral Drozdov's article on political training in officers' academies,<sup>42</sup> which deplors the lack of basic seamanship knowledge displayed by junior officers reporting to their first assignments and complains that too little attention is being paid to the subject in academics.<sup>43</sup> Already mentioned was the suggested organization for small ships with no reference to political involvement.<sup>44</sup> In mid-1963 two articles appeared in the *Naval Digest* with only passing reference to the part played by Party and Komsomol organizations in training.<sup>45</sup> One of the articles, on damage control training, contained the reference to political training, while the second article, on methods of improving training in general — a natural for Party participa-

tion — contained no reference to political help at all. Lieutenant General Gulyayev's article on aircrew training is an example of what appears to be purposely placing political flavor in an article in order to make an otherwise straightforward discussion acceptable to the political officer. This article, like others in its class, begins and ends with political dogma which almost reads like something added by the editors.<sup>46</sup> And, not to be forgotten is that political actives come in for some criticism, although not as much as nonpolitical personnel.<sup>47, 48</sup>

It is true that political dogma appears occasionally where it really has no place, and does not appear in places where it is particularly appropriate. There also appears to be some malicious planning in the scheduling of articles which seem to be contradictory or, when taken together, show opposition to political control. It is also obvious that at times only lip service is given to the Party and its control. But, on balance, it is fairly obvious that Party dogma is accepted and is included by military writers because they are convinced, ideologically, that Party control is a necessary part of Soviet Navy life.

## V — CONCLUSIONS

These conclusions, based on the primary source material reviewed and broadened by secondary source material written by qualified observers, seem to have a good measure of validity. They are drawn on the effectiveness of political control, its acceptance by the Navy, its utility to professional officers, its extent, and results as they appear today. Finally, a look into the future is ventured.

**Effectiveness.** Communist Party control over the Soviet Navy is almost

completely effective. The only instance of a Navy unit challenging the Soviet Regime, the Kronstadt revolt, occurred so early in its history as to be more a part of the revolution than an attempt to overthrow an established government. Military power has been a factor in Kremlin power struggles, but it has been useless to politicians who did not couple it with broad Party support. Today, military leaders have less a place in high policy organs than ever before. The Soviet Navy, as a unit, is not, nor has it ever been, a threat to Party power.

**Acceptance.** There is little doubt that professional Navy men chafe under Party control but not because they dislike communism or the Party. The prime complaint is the inference that they are not politically dependable. There is a running dispute over the allocation of national resources. It is not anti-Party but a basic difference of opinion between politicians and military professionals over the interpretation of the threat to the Motherland and the manner in which the threat is to be met. Another source of friction is the excessively large amount of time Party-political matters take from normal naval activities which Navy men feel is detrimental to combat readiness. In sum, it appears that Party control is accepted, but the manner of implementation is in dispute.

**Utility.** The usefulness of Party control to Communists is obvious, but its utility to the commander is less clear. While Navy leaders may feel it to be a burden, they have accepted it and are beginning to use it for their own ends. If a commander is as good a Communist as his political officer — and this is often the case — and is also a professionally competent leader, he can control both the military and political structures in his command. If

he controls them, he can use the political actives as informers, as a control net in implementing commands, and in training and competitive evolutions. The usefulness of this system, initiated to support Party requirements, is slowly being usurped by good Communist commanders for military command purposes.

**Extent.** The extent of political control in the Navy seems to be less today than in the past, not because the Party fears the power potential less, but because Navy officers are now more politically dependable. At the top it is evident in the very strict control the Party exercises over naval strategy. In training, the political structure seems to have coequal responsibilities with command. In operational evolutions and in exercises, commanders exercise control. Political training for those officers and men involved in extended cruises and who have control of weapons of mass destruction is emphasized. Party training is primarily concerned with producing Navy men with an inner discipline based on patriotism rather than fear of retribution by either command or the Party. No individual is allowed to believe that the Party is not present and that it is not observing his every move. It is part of every day's work. But discipline remains a Party function.

**Results.** Party control over the Soviet Navy has accomplished what Trotsky and Lenin set out to do when they established the first political commissars in the military. Party control has produced a Red Navy — a Red military establishment — which is unquestionably loyal to the Soviet State and to that state's leaders' definition of communism. In the current context, naval officers are, as a group, as well indoctrinated in Soviet political ideology as any professional group other

than the Party apparatus. As a matter of fact, military officers in the Red Army particularly and the military in general are, from a Party historical viewpoint, senior to the current crop of Party and Government leaders.

These factors have lent sharper emphasis to the still-running battle for one-man command. As pointed out above, military officers see no reason why they should be treated as politically suspect when, in fact, their Party credentials are as good as, and in some cases better than, those of the political leadership.

Nor has this fact gone unappreciated by the new leadership. Leonid Brezhnev, Party Secretary, speaking at the graduation ceremonies of the Soviet military academies on 3 July 1965 said:

Further measures to strengthen single command and to raise the authority of the commanders must be the object of a constant concern to all commanders, political organs and Party organizations.<sup>1</sup>

Noting that 90 percent of the officers of the Armed Forces are members of the Party or of the Komsomol,<sup>2</sup> Mr. Brezhnev went on to say that ". . . Party and political work is an integral part of the activities of the Soviet Officer . . ." and so gave support to the military view of one-man command.

While this may be interpreted as a victory for the Zhukov, *edinonachaliva* school, it is really a victory for the Party. The Party control and educational system has been so successful that the onerous political executive officer may soon be a thing of the past. Furthermore, Party attention given to the needs, prestige, equipment, and training of sailors overshadows anything the government structure produces. The Party never lets the Navy forget that all good things come from the Party.

## BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Commander Richard W. Bates, U.S. Navy, holds a B.S. from the U.S. Naval Academy and is a graduate of the Naval War College.

Commander Bates, an intelligence specialist, has served aboard the U.S.S.

*Juneau* (CLAA-119) and in various intelligence billets. He was Assistant Naval Attaché at Port Said and has been assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Staff of Commander, Naval Forces, Philippines.

A member of the faculty of the Naval War College when this paper was written, Commander Bates is presently assigned to the Staff, Commander First Fleet.

**Future Speculation.** Barring so destructive a power struggle within the Kremlin as would allow an opening for military dictatorship, the control system, in some form, can be expected to continue. As a matter of fact, Brezhnev made it quite clear in his 3 July remarks that the Party would remain dominant in military life as in every phase of Soviet life. However, during periods of intra-Kremlin political strife, as may be in progress today, the military—including the Navy—will make gains toward true one-man command and a lessening of obvious Party control in day-to-day military life.

One may speculate that Brezhnev's bow toward the desires of the military—the reinstatement of Marshals Zhukov and Sokolovsky and former Navy Chief Admiral Kuznetsov<sup>3</sup> to official acceptance from the limbo to which they were exiled by Khrushchev—is a manifestation of such a power struggle. Brezhnev may be bidding for military support as did Khrushchev in 1956 and 1957 in his struggle with Molotov and Bulganin. If this is true,

then we can look forward to another purge when the political struggle has been resolved and all those military leaders who were so bold as to push their advantage against the political apparatus are apt to find themselves joining Khrushchev in forced retirement. This is not to predict a recurrence of the bloody purge of the late 1930's, but rather of the normal, administrative-type purge of which the military has come to know so well through the years. The threat of mass executions, or of personal degradation, or imprisonment in the scale of Stalin's rule is remote and seems to have little if any effect on the Soviet Armed Forces today.

If, on the other hand, the present political leadership truly believes that the current and subsequent crops of military leaders are, on the whole, politically reliable, then the Party control system as it exists today will degrade into what Marshal Zhukov wanted all along — command responsibility for the political health of military formations.

There is evidence to indicate that today professional military officers — as distinguished from the political officer corps — are politically reliable. They are not, as a group, rabid Stakhanovites of the old Marxist-Leninist

stripe, but then neither are the new political leaders — as a group. They are devoted to the Fatherland, they have been reared under a Communist form of government, and they are a privileged group in a society which has worked an industrial miracle in the Fatherland. They have developed what might be called a "new nationalism." While they may not be vocal supporters of communism, they have accepted it as their way of life. But, beyond this, they would like to be truly apolitical — left alone to develop further their already high state of morale, combat readiness, and professional competence.

The rapidity with which military professionalism develops will depend directly upon the Party attitude toward the principle of one-man command. If the Party leadership ignores it, professionalism will suffer and the military machine will waste more time on political education and machinations to gain one-man command. If the Party leadership recognizes the necessity for, and the current workability of, the principle of one-man command, the military will serve the nation and the Party better, will develop more rapidly, and will become a more formidable adversary, better prepared, and more willing to carry out the directives of the Party-State leadership.

## FOOTNOTES

### INTRODUCTION

1. Sumner Shapiro, "The Soviet Naval Officer," Unpublished Term Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I.: 1966, p. 76.
2. The period between the 22nd and 23rd Party Congresses has been selected because it is a well-defined current period; there is considerable translated material available written during this period; it included a major leadership change and was a period in which certain ideological approaches which impinge on political control of the military were attempted and perhaps abandoned. This idea is developed in chapter III.
3. *Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*. (As amended to 1 January 1964.) art. 126. For a complete translation see: John N. Hazard, *The Soviet System of Government* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 221.
4. Giovanni Sartori, "Constitutionalism: a Preliminary Discussion," *The American Political*

- Science Review*, December 1962, p. 853. Mr. Sartori divides constitutions into three types, one of which is a constitution in name only — a translation of the existing form of government into a state document. The Soviet Constitution is such a document. Stalin admitted as much in his address calling for its adoption.
5. "Choice on Ballot Urged in Soviet," *The New York Times*, 22 March 1966, p. 2:4.
  6. Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 22nd Congress, *Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Adopted 31 October 1961* (New York: Crosscurrents Press, 1961).
  7. *Ibid.*, opening par.
  8. *Ibid.*, pt. I, par. 2.

## I — THE PARTY IN THE ARMED FORCES

1. *Edinonachaliya* in the Russian language.
2. M. Kolosov, *Kommunisticheskaia Partiiia I Sovetskaia Armia* (Munich: Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR, 1954). This study, *The Communist Party and the Soviet Army*, unpublished in translation, was made available by Robert W. Herrick of the Naval War College Staff.
3. Merle Fainsod, *How Russia Is Ruled* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 463.
4. "Decree on the Equalization of Rights of All Serving in the Army," Order of 29 December 1917, translated in James H. Meisel and Edward S. Kozera, *Materials for the Study of the Soviet System* (Ann Arbor: Wahr, 1950), p. 37. The decree abolished rank and insignia and called for officers to be elected by the troops.
5. "Decree of January 28, 1918," Fainsod, p. 464.
6. In this chapter, remarks which concern the Soviet Army also include the Navy. At the beginning the Navy was a part of the Red Army. Even today decrees issued by the Party and Government are lax in their terms, often speaking only of the Soviet Army when, in fact, they include the Army, the Navy, and other branches of the service.
7. Fainsod, p. 467.
8. "Decree of 6 April 1918," translated in Erieh Wollenburg, *The Red Army* (London: 1938), p. 255.
9. Fainsod, p. 470.
10. The previous year, the 8th Congress of Soviets (Government) had decided to maintain strong, centralized military forces but not to stand in the way of massive demobilization.
11. The Orgburo (Organizational Bureau of the Central Committee) and the Politburo (Political Bureau of the Central Committee) were merged into the Party Presidium in 1952. Then in 1966 the Presidium was renamed the Politburo.
12. *U.S.S.R. Central Committee Circular of 6 March 1925*.
13. Dimitri Fedotoff White, *The Growth of the Red Army* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), p. 204.
14. John Erickson, *The Soviet High Command* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1962), pt. V.
15. J. N. Westwood, *Russia 1917-1964* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 100-102.
16. Basil H. Liddell Hart, *The Red Army* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956), p. 2.
17. Erieh Wollenberg, *The Red Army* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1938), p. 239.
18. Erickson, p. 449-462.
19. Leonard Schapiro, "The Great Pnrgc," Liddell Hart, p. 69.
20. Liddell Hart, p. 2.
21. Wollenberg, p. 223, 224, 230.
22. Westwood, p. 102.
23. Edgar O'Ballance, *The Red Army* (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 132.
24. Erickson, p. 489-525.
25. White, p. 384-385.
26. Augustin Guillaume, *Soviet Arms and Soviet Power* (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1949).



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27. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Political Controls in the Soviet Army* (New York: Research Program on the U.S.S.R., 1954).
28. Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age* (New York: Praeger, 1958).
29. Roman Kolkowicz, *Soviet Party-Military Relations: Contained Conflict* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1966), p. 21.
30. Kenneth R. Whiting, *The Development of the Soviet Armed Forces, 1917-1966* (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University, 1966).
31. "Deeree: Political Administration of the Red Army," 16 July 1941, translated in Meisel and Kozera, p. 367.
32. "Deeree: Epaulets for the Red Army," Meisel and Kozera, p. 372.
33. The title, Commissar for War, had been changed to Commissar for Defense during the war in keeping with Hitler's treacherous attack. Then, just before his death, Stalin changed the titles of Government executives from Commissar to Minister. Thus, the new title, Minister of Defense.
34. "Zhukov Emerges from Obscurity," *The New York Times*, 11 February 1965, p. 13. After his ouster in 1957, Zhukov remained in obscurity until early 1965 when his signature appeared on the obituary of a high-ranking officer, along with the signatures of several other officers ousted by Khrushchev. It remains to be seen whether or not Zhukov will again become active in military affairs. If he does it may indicate that the new collective leadership is willing to allow more effective one-man command in the armed forces.
35. *Krasnaia Zvezda*, 15 April 1960, an editorial.
36. I. Sytov, "Party Work in the Armed Forces Strengthened," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, no. 3, February 1964, p. 68.
37. K. U. Chernenko, et al., eds., "Law on a Further Considerable Reduction of the Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R., 15 January 1960," *Soviet Foreign Policy, Basic Acts and Documents of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., 1956-1962* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1962), p. 166. Forces had already been reduced from a postwar 5.5 million to a little over 2 million men.
38. For the first time since 1920 it was seriously recommended that the U.S.S.R. use the militia system and part-time soldiers to fill the requirement for a large armed force. Fainsod, p. 489.
39. *Program of the Communist Party*, art. 53.
40. *Ibid.*, art. 65.
41. Zhukov was successful in doing away with *politruki*, and there is evidence to support the conclusion that they have never been reinstated. An editorial in *Soviet Fleet*, 8 December 1957, "The Chief and His Subordinates," does not speak of them but stresses the "single family" concept of a ship's crew with the commanding officer cast in the role of military and political father. However, as will become clear, regardless of what he is called, there is a member of the crew other than the commander who is responsible directly to the Party.
42. *Program of the Communist Party*, art. 65.
43. *Ibid.*, art. 66.
44. Fainsod, p. 493.
45. Interview with a former Soviet naval officer.

II — THE PARTY IMAGE OF THE SOVIET NAVY TODAY

1. "Partiia-Striteiflota, Vospiatel Ego Kadrov," *Sovetskiy Flot*, 25 July 1957, p. 1.
2. S. G. Gorshkov, "Faithful Guard of the Security of the Homeland," *Sovetskiy Flot*, 23 February 1960.
3. A. Lagovskiy, "Economics and Methods of Armed Conflict," *Sovetskiy Flot*, 6 February 1960.

4. Nikolai Galay, "The Significance of Golikov's Removal," *Bulletin, Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R.*, August 1962. Mr. Galay, in developing his rationale for placing considerable significance on the removal of Golikov (discussed below), develops this idea about the military portion of the Party program adopted by the 22nd Party Congress. He credits the desire to produce conscious, self-imposed discipline to practical rather than ideological reasons. He notes that discipline through fear is of little value on today's battlefield where the individual can exert less than his utmost effort without being detected by his seniors. He ties this change in Party policy to an effort to correct the malingerer rather than to preventing war by mistake or to prevent defection.
5. Merle Fainsod, "The 22nd Party Congress," *Problems in Communism*, November-December 1961, Special Supplement.
6. Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 22nd Congress, "The Strengthening of the Armed Forces and the Defense Potential of the Soviet Union." *Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Adopted 31 October 1961* (New York: Crosscurrents Press, 1961), pt. III, sec. 3, p. 112.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 112-113.
8. Galay, p. 37.
9. Robert W. Herriek, "The Evolution of Soviet Naval Strategy and the Effect of the Revolution in Military Affairs," *Naval War College Review*, December 1964, p. 3, 21.
10. "New Successes in Combat and Political Training," *Morskoy Sbornik*, no. 1, 1964, p. 3, an editorial.
11. "A Thorough Knowledge of International Maritime Law for Naval Officers," *Morskoy Sbornik*, no. 3, 1964, p. 3.
12. Alexander Dallin, *The Soviet Union at the United Nations* (New York: Praeger, 1962), chap. I.
13. V. D. Sokolovskii, ed., *Soviet Military Strategy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962).
14. N. A. Sbytov, "The Character and Concepts of a World-Wide Nuclear Rocket War," *Morskoy Sbornik*, no. 3, 1964.
15. Nikolai Galay, et al., "The Twenty-Third Party Congress," *Bulletin, Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R.*, May 1966, p. 10-18.
16. "Speech by Army General A. A. Yepishev at the 23rd Party Congress, 5 April 1966," *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, U.S.S.R. & East Europe*, Supp. no. 76, 20 April 1966, p. 42.
17. Interview with Professor C. Jay Smith, Jr., The Ernest J. King Chair of Maritime History, U.S. Naval War College.
18. "Speech by U.S.S.R. Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya Malinovsky, to the 23rd CPSU Congress," *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, U.S.S.R. & East Europe*, Supp. no. 64, 4 April 1966, p. 57-63.
19. Shapiro, v.p.
20. Editorial, "Iron Military Discipline is the Most Important Requisite for a High Level of Combat Readiness," *Morskoy Sbornik*, March 1965, no. 3, 1965, p. 3-6. (Hereafter referred to as "Iron Military Discipline . . .")

### III — PARTY INFLUENCE AND INVOLVEMENT IN TRAINING

1. Borisov, *Sovetskiy Flot*, 7 May 1960. A book review identifies a captain third rank as the deputy commander for political affairs of a submarine.
2. A. N. Motrokhov, "Soviet Submarine Personnel at the North Pole," *Morskoy Sbornik*, no. 3, 1964, p. 45.
3. G. I. Karnavin, "Submarine Personnel at the North Pole," *Morskoy Sbornik*, no. 2, 1964, p. 30.
4. N. A. Denisov, "Experience in Training Submarine Personnel in Damage Control," *Morskoy Sbornik*, no. 8, 1963.

5. "Iron Military Discipline . . .," p. 3.
6. S. A. Gulyayev, "To Perfect Education and Training Methods of Flight Crews," *Morskoy Sbornik*, no. 2, 1964, p. 56.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 58.
8. A. P. Shul'zhenko, "Post-Flight Critique—an Effective Means of Training Aviators," *Morskoy Sbornik*, no. 3, 1964, p. 59.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 61.
10. "Iron Military Discipline . . .," p. 3. The emphasis placed on submarines in this editorial and noted above is duplicated for aircraft operations.
11. "Each Sea Voyage Should Be More Fully Utilized for Combat Training," *Morskoy Sbornik*, no. 3, 1964, p. 45.
12. R. P. Karpov, "Training the Ship's Crew at Sea," *Morskoy Sbornik*, no. 3, 1964, p. 48.
13. N. V. Ilyasov, "Organization of Shallow Water Diving Training in a Training Detachment," *Morskoy Sbornik*, no. 2, 1964, p. 70.
14. "Each Sea Voyage . . .," p. 44.
15. In ships of the fourth class—smaller than destroyer escorts—no place for a political organization is indicated. R. S. Gurevich, "A Clearly Defined Daily Organization for Small Ships," *Morskoy Sbornik*, no. 2, 1964, p. 71.
16. M. V. Fisyun, "Experience in Party and Political Work in Strengthening Military Discipline," *Morskoy Sbornik*, no. 11, 1963, p. 14.
17. "Each Sea Voyage . . .," p. 44.
18. N. M. Drozdov, "Training Students in the Skills of Educators," *Morskoy Sbornik*, no. 3, 1964, p. 50.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 52.
20. R. V. Basnin, "Training Students in the Naval Schools Raising the Level of Methodological Training," *Morskoy Sbornik*, May 1965, p. 72-74. In this article the author, an engineer captain first rank, also speaks of a student record book. He suggests the following six sections:
  1. The military behests of V. I. Lenin, and pronouncements of outstanding Soviet military leaders.
  2. The moral code of the builders of communism.
  3. The text of the military oath.
  4. The obligations of the student in accordance with the internal service regulations of the Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R.
  5. The assignment of a student to methodological training (for each course).
    - a. Activities in acquiring skills in Party-political work.
    - b. Activities in acquiring command-methodological skills.
  6. Check of the work done.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 53.
22. I. I. Gusnenkov, "Pay More Attention to Young Officers," *Morskoy Sbornik*, no. 1, 1964, p. 8.

#### IV — THE PARTY IN DEVELOPMENT AND EMPLOYMENT OF THE SOVIET NAVY

1. Nikita Khrushchev, "Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," *Documents of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU* (New York: Crosscurrents Press, 1961), v. I, p. 81.
2. *Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, p. 115.
3. Communist Party of the Soviet Union, "Rules of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," translated in Hazard, p. 245.
4. "Each Sea Voyage . . .," p. 43.
5. S. A. Gulyayev, "To Perfect Education and Training Methods of Flight Crews," *Morskoy Sbornik*, no. 12, 1963, p. 1.

6. M. N. Zakharov, "Increase the Effectiveness of Military Technical Knowledge," *Morskoy Sbornik*, December 1963, p. 1.
7. "All Admirals and Naval Officers Must Do Military-Scientific Work," *Morskoy Sbornik*, August 1965, p. 3-7.
8. "Iron Military Discipline . . .," p. 6. This editorial comes about as close as possible to actually saying that discipline is a Party function, not a military function. It enjoins commanders to approach their jobs ". . . from the Party and State point of view; to firmly and responsibly implement the Party's policy, and to have all of his activities on the Party and Komsomol organizations and on society." The editorial goes on to say that ". . . it is the task of the Party and Komsomol organizations to assist the command in maintaining strict order. . . ."
9. M. V. Fisyun, "Experience in Party and Political Work in Strengthening Military Discipline," *Morskoy Sbornik*, no. 12, 1963, p. 14.
10. G. F. Ditskiy, "Skillful Training of Young Officers in Disciplinary Matters," *Morskoy Sbornik*, April 1964, p. 42-46.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
12. "Iron Military Discipline . . ."
13. Raymond L. Garthoff, *The Role of the Military in Recent Soviet Politics* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1956), p. 40.
14. P. Rotmistrov, "September 13 is Tank Troops Day: the Homeland's Steel Armor," *Izvestia*, 13 September 1964, p. 1.
15. "Soviet Staff Chief Assails Khrushchev's Strategy," *The New York Times*, 5 February 1965, p. 3.
16. *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 27 May 1964, p. 29.
17. "New Successes in Combat and Political Training," p. 3.
18. Published simultaneously in *Sovetskiy Flot*, *Sovetskiy Aviatsiia*, and *Krasnaia Zvezda*, 12 May 1957.
19. "The Exactingness and Keeness of the Commander," *Sovetskiy Flot*, 10 September 1957.
20. *Pravda*, 3 November 1957.
21. *Sovetskiy Flot*, 10 July 1959.
22. V. Grisbanov, *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, no. 17, September 1962.
23. In 1964 an article appeared in the *Soviet Naval Digest* which pointed out that Navy Regulations say that the executive officer (first lieutenant) is the commander's principal assistant and that he must be trained to take over in the event the commander is incapacitated. The article sets out a plan for such training. In a footnote the author points out that also included in this requirement is the ". . . Deputy Commander for Political Affairs who is currently required to stand an underway watch and to handle the ship." F. B. Semashkevich, "Training the Executive Officer (First Lieutenant)," *Morskoy Sbornik*, October 1964, p. 54.
24. "Tikhookeanskii Flot," *Krasnaia Zvezda*, 12 November 1964, p. 1.
25. Drozdov, p. 54.
26. Fisyun, p. 15; Ditskiy, p. 42; and "Iron Military Discipline . . .," p. 6.
27. P. I. Vyrelkin, "Personal Responsibility of Officers for Performance of Assigned Tasks," *Morskoy Sbornik*, no. 12, 1963, p. 3.
28. Ilyasov, p. 70.
29. Karnavin, p. 45-50.
30. *Morskoy Sbornik*, no. 3, 1964.
31. "A Challenge Red Banner of the Central Committee of the All-Union Lenin's Young Communist League to the Best Crew of a Submarine," *Morskoy Sbornik*, no. 2, 1964.
32. "Civil Activity of Pacific Fleet Personnel," *Morskoy Sbornik*, no. 1, 1964, p. 80.
33. *Ibid.*
34. "Sailors Study the Decisions of the December Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU," *Morskoy Sbornik*, no. 2, 1964, p. 73. Party Congresses are also held within the Navy as this article reveals when it speaks of the 13th Party Congress of the Pacific Fleet.

35. Nikolai Galay, "The Soviet Armed Forces and the Twenty-Second Party Congress," *Bulletin, Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R.*, January 1962.
36. *Ibid.*
37. A similar trend is noted with regard to secret police chiefs. Beria, who attempted to use the secret police in his bid for power after Stalin died, is the last secret police chief to have been a member of the Party Presidium. This emphasizes the belief that Party chiefs intend to keep both of these instruments of power under their control, not in a position where they can be a threat from within the Party hierarchy.
38. Galay, *op. cit.*
39. Zakharov, p. 10-14.
40. Yu. V. Rotermel', "How to Save and Distribute Time Allotted for Training Young Officers," *Morskoy Sbornik*, no. 12, 1964, p. 40.
41. Severyn Bialor, "The Men Who Run Russia's Armed Forces," *The New York Times Magazine*, 21 February 1965, p. 14.
42. Drozdov, p. 50-54.
43. R. P. Karpov, "Training the Ship's Crew at Sea," *Morskoy Sbornik*, no. 3, 1964, p. 54.
44. Gurevich, p. 71.
45. A. M. Stolyarenko, "Methods for Increasing Participation of Ship Personnel in Training," N. A. Denisov, "Experience in Training Submarine Personnel in Damage Control," *Morskoy Sbornik*, no. 8, 1963.
46. Gulyayev, p. 56, 63.
47. Fisyun, p. 14-18.
48. Karnavin, p. 45-50.

#### V — CONCLUSIONS

1. Peter Grose, "Brezhnev Widens Officers' Powers," *The New York Times*, 6 July 1965, p. 2:3.
2. In Chapter IV, above, it was estimated that only 80 to 83 percent of the Soviet Armed Forces were members or candidate members of the Party or Komsomol at the time of the 22nd Party Congress. Here Brezhnev says 90 percent are members. He probably means members or candidate members of the Party or Komsomol. At the 23rd Party Congress, Marshal Malinovsky said in his speech before the Congress on 2 April 1966 that 93 percent of the officers were affiliated with the Party or Komsomol and that ". . . over 80 percent of the Armed Forces . . ." were affiliated with one of the two organizations. He also said, in the same speech, that in 1965 ". . . more than 80 percent of the Army and Navy recruits were Komsomol members." *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report, U.S.S.R. & East Europe*, Supp. no. 64, 4 April 1966, p. 62.
3. Theodore Shabad, "Navy Chief Khrushchev Ousted Is 'Rehabilitated' by Russians," *The New York Times*, 1 June 1965, p. 8:4.

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You can liken sea power to the human hand where with the greatest delicacy, sensitivity, and perception it can be used to solve the combination of the lock on the safe, or the skilled hand of the surgeon who, with the greatest delicacy, can exercise the cancerous growth from the human body, or again it can be clenched in a fist representing the brute force philosophy of an all-out nuclear exchange.

*Rear Admiral J. S. McCain, Jr.: Testimony to Congress,  
12 April 1962*

The officer should wear his uniform as the judge his ermine, without a stain.

*Rear Admiral John A. Dahlgren, USN: On the night of  
his death 12 July 1870*