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## The Barometer

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
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# BAROMETER



## READERS' COMMENTS

This section has been established to provide a forum for the useful exchange of ideas between *Naval War College Review* readers and the Naval War College.

Unofficial comments by the readers on articles which appear in the *Review* are encouraged and will be considered for publication in subsequent issues.

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I certainly enjoyed the article by Colonel Heinl, "The Inchon Landing: A Case Study in Amphibious Planning," but the comments submitted by LCDR Wise (Summer Issue 1967) on the use of amphibious operations in Vietnam can probably stand closer scrutiny.

Victory as proclaimed by General MacArthur and by our present policy planners for Vietnam has really two different meanings, and the indiscriminate use of the word in present day military policy can lead to wrong conclusions. The paramount concept be-

hind World War II and Korean War (Inchon) amphibious operations was of occupying land for future explorations. Vietnam presents an entirely different problem. The land is there for a base camp but the question remains — for what further exploration? In this case will attacks on Vinh or Haiphong as alluded to by LCDR Wise be any different than the amphibious operations conducted in 1965-66 off the coast of South Vietnam where in most cases the enemy usually had disbanded and merely vanished into the environment? What will occupying this real estate really accomplish? The Allied military machine raced to capture Berlin with full knowledge that this would mean the collapse of the Third Reich and the end of the war. Will the capture of Hanoi be tantamount to North Vietnam's collapse or will the enemy "show up" somewhere else intact? Is the unquestionable escalation and the questionable results worth the venture? So far policy planners don't think so.

Defeat of the enemy will only come at the hands of the South Vietnamese and not by some imaginative amphibious operation that will cut off the lines of communication.

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On page 128 of the *Naval War College Review* (Summer Issue) mention is made of "numerous landing parties of blockading ships" by Marine Reconnaissance and UDT personnel. [The exact words of the author are: "In addition to the numerous landing parties of the blockading ships, a Ma-

rine Reconnaissance Company and UDT personnel aboard APD's . . . made many raids. . . ." Ed.] I think, for the purpose of historical accuracy and to recognize the role of the British (Royal Marines) and South Korean Commandos who were, by far, the major participating military units in these special operations, the record should be set straight.

As Commanding Officer of an APD during the Korean War (November '51- July '52) and Tactical Commander of several of these special operations, I find it difficult to agree with the author in this respect. It is possible that there were some isolated raids conducted by Marine Reconnaissance companies or UDT detachment. I know of none. Of course, UDT-1 performed brilliantly during the invasion of Inchon, but this was "no landing party."

Although I don't consider myself a student of the Korean War at Sea, I feel reasonably certain that this particular statement concerning Marines and UDT participation is misleading and incomplete as written. I'm not sure that commando operations during the Korean War have been completely declassified; I would hesitate, therefore, to discuss these unusual operations to any extent. However, I do feel that the article performs a disservice to those who participated so valiantly and with considerable effect. Generalizations such as this short paragraph may help in summarizing all naval operations which were covered, but they do not do justice to those who went ashore to conduct these raids.

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