

1967

## Book Review

The U.S. Naval War College


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## PROFESSIONAL READING

The evaluations of recent books listed in this section have been prepared for the use of resident students. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these books of interest in their professional reading.

The inclusion of a book in this section does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein.

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Barnett, A. Doak. *China After Mao*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967. 287 p.

Much of the current writing on the subject of Communist China is either historical or reportorial. Professor Barnett, however, attempts analysis. He looks at the situation as it is and has been in order to speculate upon that which might be coming. He bases speculation upon Chinese Communist documents, the history of the Communist Party in China, and knowledge of the people and history of China.

The struggle for succession to leadership in Red China has begun. Mao cannot long endure. The leadership which he has provided to the Communist Revolution on the mainland of China is nearing an end. What lies ahead? This question is of interest not only to the world outside China, but also to the leaders within China. Many of the latter, according to Professor Barnett in *China After Mao*, propose answers which are different from those which Mao would like to hear. This difference is behind much of the current unrest in China. Mao is trying hard to insure that the regime which succeeds him will adhere to the policies which brought him success in his revolution. He is accused of looking backward, of being a "revolutionary romantic," of trying to cure present ills with past remedies. Those who oppose Mao take the position that circumstances in China have changed to such an extent that past remedies must be modified to fit the changed conditions. Whoever the successor to Mao may be, he will face deep-seated and enduring problems. Central to these will be the need to promote economic development. How this can be done while maintaining the momentum of the revolution will be the most difficult problem of Chinese Communist leaders. What can the United

States and the Western World do in this transition period in China to influence the outcome in a way favorable to the free world? Very little, says the author, other than to insure diplomatic flexibility to respond to opportunities as they occur and to insure that the Chinese leaders know that moderation is likely to be rewarded, violence is likely to be punished.

This short, readable book is divided into two parts. The first, a lecture series, is the meat of the nut. The second, a reprint of Chinese documents, Professor Barnett selects as sources of Maoist prescriptions for the future. *China After Mao* gives insight into the problems that will face China in the immediate future. It is solid food in the diet of those who would partake of the banquet of material now available on China.

K. H. LYONS,  
Captain, U.S. Navy

Davidson, Eugene. *The Trial of the Germans*. New York: Macmillan, 1966, 636 p.

*Trial of the Germans* is an account of the 22 defendants tried by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1946. The precision and minuteness of detail concerning the private and public lives of each individual tried at Nuremberg reflect 7 years of research and writing by the author. Each defendant is presented in case-study style. Following the neat arrangement of biographical material on each defendant individual and organization tried, the author attempts to analyze the factors that resulted in the creation of the International Military Tribunal. His conclusions are vague and unclear. Although he clearly intends his final chapter entitled "Two Decades Later" as a sharp rebuke of the trials themselves, he nevertheless states that, "In a certain

sense the trial succeeded in doing what judicial proceedings are supposed to do: it convinced even the guilty that the verdict against them was just." This book is recommended for those who are interested in obtaining some insight into the character of the Nuremberg defendants. It is not recommended for those interested in a critical, analytical book on the legal basis for the Nuremberg trials and the precedents they established.

J. M. BATTAGLINO

Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Fall, Bernard B. *Hell in a Very Small Place*. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1967. 515 p.

The courage, frustration, agony, hope, and sacrifice of the French military forces during the 1955 siege of Dien Bien Phu are the concern of this volume. The late Bernard B. Fall has written a superb day-to-day description of the events leading to, during, and after this tragic battle.

*Hell in a Very Small Place* represents Dr. Fall's extensive research of all available official and nonofficial documents pertaining to this historic battle and his interrogations of many of the participants of both sides of the conflict. The book opens with an account of the initial 1954 French airborne landing at Dien Bien Phu during the French Indochina War. It then describes the daily buildup of, and fighting between, the French and Viet-Minh forces. The reports of the French attempts to resupply the fortress are excellent as is Dr. Fall's description of the individuals participating in the battle. The book concludes with a spellbinding recountal of the last agonizing hours of the gallant French defenders and their demolished fortress. In addition, the reactions of French, American, and British officials after the fall of Dien Bien Phu are reviewed. This book is highly

recommended for the student of military history and should be a part of every military library.

G. H. KAFFER, JR.

Commander, U.S. Navy

Farago, Ladislav. *The Broken Seal*. New York: Random House, 1967. 439 p.

*The Broken Seal* is the story of military and diplomatic cryptology and its place in the events that ended in World War II. The breaking of the Japanese codes prior to World War II is household knowledge and has led to considerable allegation and much hindsight prophecy. Mr. Farago has treated this subject completely, starting with the first breaking, in 1915, of an American code by an ambitious American code clerk. From this point he follows the fortunes, in terms of success, failure, and indifference periods, of U.S. military and diplomatic cryptology involving the Japanese. Mr. Farago has a background of World War II ONI service and was an intimate of many of the primaries in this story. His research into the Japanese side of the story was immense and complete. The footnotes, reference notes, and bibliographic material provide a complete and interesting supplement and will fan the reader's further interest in this intriguing subject. It is this material, in part, that makes the *Reader's Digest* condensation of this book pale compared to the full work.

The event-by-event, personality-by-personality, national-reaction and international-counteraction coverage of the United States-Japanese relations from 1918 through 1941 weaves an incredible story. It is a story replete with daring plans, the dull cryptanalysis spade-work, the good and the bad luck, and the humorous and the saddening stories. Cryptology came of age in 1921 during the Washington

Disarmament Conferences when, by virtue of the "Yardley Black Room," the Americans gained access to the Japanese diplomatic codes. This gave the United States a virtual monopoly at the conferences and assured her achieving her goals. The flush of this victory brought the "Black Room" and interest in cryptology to the fore and seemed to assure its position in military and diplomatic circles. Events and personalities were later to cause great fluctuations in the interest and support, preventing a steady achievement in the field. Because of the dedication of a few, however, the art was never lost, but did pass back and forth from the Navy to the Army as various influences affected the individual services. It is amazing to read how the inner few were able, by combining hard work and intrigue, to continue to break the code systems and duplicate the machines used by the Japanese up through the advanced "purple" machines current at the start of hostilities in 1941. The work of the "purple" machines had the code name "Operation Magic" and those cleared to read magic messages were referred to as "ultras."

The individuals involved in this work on the Japanese codes and the part that each played in this drama which climaxed on that morning of 7 December 1941 are, in the opinion of the reviewer, the vital message of this book. The relating of how it all happened is important, but the devotion of some, the indifference of some, and the disbelief of others in this tense drama of national security stand as beacons to those that follow. Mr. Farago does not make heroes, nor does he make "goats," but the reader will sense the "if" situations and can make the judgment of how a bit more openmindedness, less complacency, less compartmentation, and fewer worries about protocol could have changed the

course of events. This intensely interesting and informative book is recommended for all naval officers and all others who have positions of responsibility in national security. Of great historical interest, it is a dramatic testimony to the cost of being complacent and routine at any level of responsibility in Federal Service.

F. C. GILMORE  
Commander, U.S. Navy

Hindus, Maurice, *The Kremlin's Human Dilemma*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967, 395 p.

*The Kremlin's Human Dilemma* provides a fascinating approach to viewing life in the Soviet Union. Author Maurice Hindus feels that the increase of individuality among Soviet citizens poses a development of major proportions and proceeds to investigate the thesis over a broad cultural spectrum. The book is divided into three main parts. The first two contrast life in the city with life in the village, while the last looks at the ideology-individuality conflict in more specific areas. Anything but dull, this latter group of subjects includes atheism, anti-Semitism, literature, Russification, and a novel facet entitled "Rediscovery of Sex." Mr. Hindus, a Byelorussian-born American, is a keen observer of the Soviet scene who writes with the authority of one who has traveled throughout the country over a period of many years. While carefully documented, the book avoids dryness through extensive use of novellike dialogue between the author and the wide range of Russians that he encounters. The author seems particularly adept in addressing the agricultural sector and its inherent incompatibility between a proven need for profit incentive and ideological altruism—work for work's sake. Indeed, his own peasant heritage provides an ideal base from which to con-

trast the old with the new in objective depth. While Mr. Hindus shuns sensationalism, he did obtain evidence of a brutal repression of a worker revolt in Rostov as late as 1964, indicating that the state continues to retain such action options in spite of a surface increase in personal liberty. The author concludes that the Communist Party will continue its absolute power over the Soviet citizens but predicts a near-future "palace revolution" within the Party, resulting in a shift toward Yugoslavia-type socialism with its closer marriage of ideology and reality. We live in an era where it is patently impossible to know too much about our major military adversary. *The Kremlin's Human Dilemma* fills a large void in a need-to-know area efficiently and interestingly. Accordingly, it is highly recommended to all.

R. C. WATT  
Commander, U.S. Navy

Nghiem-Dang. *Viet-Nam: Politics and Public Administration*. Honolulu:

East-West Center Press, 1966. 437 p.

Author Nghiem-Dang has endeavored to provide the American reader with a comprehensive and systematic study of public administration in Vietnam. In this political science treatise the opposing elements in the author's background as first, a practicing public official in what is now North Vietnam, and later an educator and scholar, are clearly evident. Unfortunately, the civil servant side of Mr. Dang's two careers is apparently the more dominant and seems to have compelled him to describe the inner workings of governmental institutions and bureaucratic procedures in needlessly minute detail. This descriptive maze required several evenings of disciplined concentration to traverse and digest and is considered generally unrewarding in terms of gaining additional insight

into the politico-military problems currently besetting South Vietnam. On the other hand, the author's years as a scholar occasionally shine through the pedestrian account and illuminate such important aspects as the contributions made by the Chinese, Indian, French, and American administrative traditions to the advancement of government in Vietnam. The passages regarding the flexibility and durability of the mandarin system of civil service and the differences between outright graft and corruption and ritualistic gift giving are particularly deserving of close attention. In all, it is doubted that *Viet-Nam: Politics and Public Administration* will ever become a classic in its field, but it can furnish the professional military officer with a useful guide to contemporary government in South Vietnam.

W. J. WHITE  
Lieutenant Colonel,  
U.S. Marine Corps

Steinicke, Dietrich. *Das Navicertsystem*. University of Hamburg: Research Group for International Law and Foreign Civil Law. 1966. 2 vols. 368 p.

The "Navicert System" (abbreviation of "Navigation Certificate System") was created and developed by the British Government during World War I and World War II as a system of effecting contraband control over neutral merchant shipping. The study has been divided into two parts:

Part I contains a systematic presentation of the special measures of the navicert system and their historical development during World Wars I and II based on numerous unpublished documents.

Part II is devoted to the study of the navicert system as it relates to international law. In this research a differentiation has been made between the voluntary and the compulsory na-

vicert system, and between the different means of implementation at the neutral country of shipment, on the high seas, and at the neutral country of destination.

The study tries to answer the question as to whether the navicert system conforms to international law or has been recognized as an institution of customary international law. The importance of the subject of this study and its currency is evident, because the United States made use of the navicert system method under guise of a "clearing system" during the Cuban Crisis in 1962, and because the developments in Southeast Asia might force the United States to take similar actions in respect to the South China Sea. In this connection, part II (pages 265 ff.), which deals with the Soviet attitude and practice of customary international law, will be of extraordinary interest. However, the assumptions and conclusions stated therein should be read with highly critical eyes. Although the Soviet Union has always stuck to the principle of *pacta sunt servanda*, and in spite of the Soviet attitude during the present phase of "peaceful coexistence" as it appears in the cited explanations of Tunkin (Soviet Professor for International Law), there is no evidence that the Soviet Union — in case of international crisis or of hot war — would not interpret customary international law according to her school and ideology of dialectic materialism!

Both parts are written in the German language, but because the author has been using a juridical terminology, which is linguistically of Roman origin (Latin), and because all citations of British or United States sources are printed in English, there will be no major difficulties in reading and understanding the publication. Moreover, part II includes a Summary and a List of Contents (for both part

I and part II) in the English language.

Henrich Grote

Captain, Federal German Navy

Wylie, Joseph C. *Military Strategy*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1967. 111 p.

This book sets forth Rear Admiral Wylie's plea for recognition of strategy as a legitimate and important public concern. He feels that current thinking with regard to strategy is disorganized, superficial, and inadequate. His treatise is directed toward achievement of more creative intellectual activity in this area from both the military and the educational/institutional levels. Rear Admiral Wylie presents in succinct terms the generally accepted theories of strategy and explains their limitations. These include the maritime theory proposed by Mahan and Corbett, the air theory of Douhet, and the continental theory as postulated by Clausewitz. To these he has added his thoughts on the theories of Mao. The point is made that these are all specific theories, each valid under specific circumstances, with diminishing value as they depart from the basic conditions. What is needed, then, is a general theory, applicable to all phases of warfare. The author proposes that in this general theory the primary aim of the strategist should be to conduct war with a degree of control of the enemy. This would be achieved by control of the pattern of the war through manipulation of the center of gravity of the war to the advantage of the strategist and to the disadvantage of the enemy. This book carries a thought-provoking message in very readable form and is highly recommended for all students of naval warfare.

J. G. FIFIELD

Captain, U.S. Navy