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Das Naviccrtsystem

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trast the old with the new in objective depth. While Mr. Hindus shuns sensationalism, he did obtain evidence of a brutal repression of a worker revolt in Rostov as late as 1964, indicating that the state continues to retain such action options in spite of a surface increase in personal liberty. The author concludes that the Communist Party will continue its absolute power over the Soviet citizens but predicts a near-future "palace revolution" within the Party, resulting in a shift toward Yugoslavia-type socialism with its closer marriage of ideology and reality. We live in an era where it is patently impossible to know too much about our major military adversary. *The Kremlin's Human Dilemma* fills a large void in a need-to-know area efficiently and interestingly. Accordingly, it is highly recommended to all.

R. C. WATT
Commander, U.S. Navy

Nghiem-Dang. *Viet-Nam: Politics and Public Administration*. Honolulu:

East-West Center Press, 1966. 437 p.

Author Nghiem-Dang has endeavored to provide the American reader with a comprehensive and systematic study of public administration in Vietnam. In this political science treatise the opposing elements in the author's background as first, a practicing public official in what is now North Vietnam, and later an educator and scholar, are clearly evident. Unfortunately, the civil servant side of Mr. Dang's two careers is apparently the more dominant and seems to have compelled him to describe the inner workings of governmental institutions and bureaucratic procedures in needlessly minute detail. This descriptive maze required several evenings of disciplined concentration to traverse and digest and is considered generally unrewarding in terms of gaining additional insight

into the politico-military problems currently besetting South Vietnam. On the other hand, the author's years as a scholar occasionally shine through the pedestrian account and illuminate such important aspects as the contributions made by the Chinese, Indian, French, and American administrative traditions to the advancement of government in Vietnam. The passages regarding the flexibility and durability of the mandarin system of civil service and the differences between outright graft and corruption and ritualistic gift giving are particularly deserving of close attention. In all, it is doubted that *Viet-Nam: Politics and Public Administration* will ever become a classic in its field, but it can furnish the professional military officer with a useful guide to contemporary government in South Vietnam.

W. J. WHITE
Lieutenant Colonel,
U.S. Marine Corps

Steinicke, Dietrich. *Das Navicertsystem*. University of Hamburg: Research Group for International Law and Foreign Civil Law. 1966. 2 vols. 368 p.

The "Navicert System" (abbreviation of "Navigation Certificate System") was created and developed by the British Government during World War I and World War II as a system of effecting contraband control over neutral merchant shipping. The study has been divided into two parts:

Part I contains a systematic presentation of the special measures of the navicert system and their historical development during World Wars I and II based on numerous unpublished documents.

Part II is devoted to the study of the navicert system as it relates to international law. In this research a differentiation has been made between the voluntary and the compulsory na-

vicert system, and between the different means of implementation at the neutral country of shipment, on the high seas, and at the neutral country of destination.

The study tries to answer the question as to whether the navicert system conforms to international law or has been recognized as an institution of customary international law. The importance of the subject of this study and its currency is evident, because the United States made use of the navicert system method under guise of a "clearing system" during the Cuban Crisis in 1962, and because the developments in Southeast Asia might force the United States to take similar actions in respect to the South China Sea. In this connection, part II (pages 265 ff.), which deals with the Soviet attitude and practice of customary international law, will be of extraordinary interest. However, the assumptions and conclusions stated therein should be read with highly critical eyes. Although the Soviet Union has always stuck to the principle of *pacta sunt servanda*, and in spite of the Soviet attitude during the present phase of "peaceful coexistence" as it appears in the cited explanations of Tunkin (Soviet Professor for International Law), there is no evidence that the Soviet Union — in case of international crisis or of hot war — would not interpret customary international law according to her school and ideology of dialectic materialism!

Both parts are written in the German language, but because the author has been using a juridical terminology, which is linguistically of Roman origin (Latin), and because all citations of British or United States sources are printed in English, there will be no major difficulties in reading and understanding the publication. Moreover, part II includes a Summary and a List of Contents (for both part

I and part II) in the English language.

Henrich Grote

Captain, Federal German Navy

Wylie, Joseph C. *Military Strategy*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1967. 111 p.

This book sets forth Rear Admiral Wylie's plea for recognition of strategy as a legitimate and important public concern. He feels that current thinking with regard to strategy is disorganized, superficial, and inadequate. His treatise is directed toward achievement of more creative intellectual activity in this area from both the military and the educational/institutional levels. Rear Admiral Wylie presents in succinct terms the generally accepted theories of strategy and explains their limitations. These include the maritime theory proposed by Mahan and Corbett, the air theory of Douhet, and the continental theory as postulated by Clausewitz. To these he has added his thoughts on the theories of Mao. The point is made that these are all specific theories, each valid under specific circumstances, with diminishing value as they depart from the basic conditions. What is needed, then, is a general theory, applicable to all phases of warfare. The author proposes that in this general theory the primary aim of the strategist should be to conduct war with a degree of control of the enemy. This would be achieved by control of the pattern of the war through manipulation of the center of gravity of the war to the advantage of the strategist and to the disadvantage of the enemy. This book carries a thought-provoking message in very readable form and is highly recommended for all students of naval warfare.

J. G. FIFIELD

Captain, U.S. Navy