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THE MEANING AND IMPLICATION OF THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT

A lecture delivered to the
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by

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This morning we take up the Sino-Soviet split, looking at it partly as a doctrinal disagreement (which it is), and partly as a disagreement about practical politics (which it also is).

I think you are well aware that there are several points of view as to how

ideology and foreign policy relate and fit together. There are two extreme points of view and then a moderate or in-between point of view. In American academic circles, until very recently, one of these schools of thought has really predominated. It was frequently

argued (as, for example, by Professor William G. Carleton in 1947 in his "Ideology or Balance of Power?") that nationalism and the balance of power in the traditional sense was being replaced by ideology as the chief element in international relations. He argued that up until World War II national interests, the balance of power — this type of traditional thinking — had dominated the foreign policies of nations. But now we were in a new era. Now we were in an era when what would probably count was really ideology. It would no longer be of the same importance that Chinese were Chinese or Russians were Russians. What would make the difference in the time ahead — the period with which we have now 20 years of further experience — would be the common bond of ideology. And so what he and many others were talking about is the kind of thinking which, in less careful formulation, you have encountered in that familiar but, for many purposes, outmoded dichotomy between "the democratic bloc" (or whatever you want to call it), and "the Communist bloc."

Professor Carleton was saying that what would really count in the post-World War II world, weighing national interests against ideology, would probably be ideology. This was the dominant school in American intellectual thinking. Many writers expressed the same belief in even stronger terms. So, also, this view came to provide the philosophical background which dominated much of the formulation of U.S. foreign policy. We thought they were a bloc and we acted as though we were a bloc.

All during this period there was also a "backlash" reaction, another school which tended to argue quite the reverse. Crankshaw is a good example of this in terms of the Russians. Crankshaw always argued that the Russians were

Communists, to be sure, but that we were in danger of forgetting that, even more importantly, they were Russians. We would forget the fact that they were Russians at our peril. For whatever the significance of communism or ideology might be in their foreign policy, what was much more fundamental is the fact that they are Russians, they live in Russia, they have to protect Russia, they have to deal with traditional Russian problems. While they would certainly be doing this in a new setting, it was still a setting filled with Russian problems.

Now these were two extreme schools, the dominant one saying, "Ideology is mostly all that counts, and nationalism is dead, or dying, or less significant," and the other argument, in the minority, saying, "Communism may have some importance in understanding foreign policy, but it is not the prime element. The prime element is the national character, the national setting, the traditional objectives, and the national interests of the country involved."

I have sometimes been thought to have been arguing the second point of view. But I have never really quite associated myself with the second point of view as I have just put it. I would classify myself in a midposition between those two extreme schools of thought. And I would argue that, as one approaches the problem of communism in Russia or China and their relations to each other, one certainly doesn't want to ignore the elements of communism. One wants to ignore even less the element of national interests. But, it is perfectly apparent that the existence of communism has an effect upon how the Communist nations perceive their national interests. Now if one approaches the question in this way, one wants to see what effect being Russian has on the Russians, what effect being Chinese has on the

Chinese. But one also wants to see what effect communism has on the way they conceptualize their national interests and attempts to carry out that conceptualization in actual foreign policy.

If we're going then to look at the Communist aspect along with the national interest aspect, it is useful to see what contribution each makes and whether the balance in contribution has changed now that the Soviets and Chinese no longer see eye to eye.

Many people, who do not profess to any profound knowledge about it, think of communism and its effects and influence on foreign policy in a more elementary way. They think of it as providing a sort of detailed master plan for how to go about carrying on foreign policy. In this simplest of formulations, it is seen as sort of a rule book. You look up page 16 and it tells you, once there is a Middle Eastern war, just exactly whether to send arms aid and more economic aid to the Arab Republic or not. Of course, communism doesn't do this sort of thing at all. It is a set of doctrines; it is above all a system of ideas. Ideology can be defined as an interlocking system of ideas. And as a system of ideas it is above all else a philosophy.

What we must never forget is that every nation has something of a philosophy, although it may be less formal or more formal than communism. We talk about the American way of life, for example — whatever that rather amorphous term means — and there is argument about it. It certainly does have some conceptual centrality to it. We have ideas about how politics ought to be organized in the United States, what is fair play, the kind of goals and objectives that we want to see come of it all, the kind of world we think is the world of the future. These are all bound up in the idea of the Ameri-

can way of life. In fact, if we believed that our ways were quite uncommon, quite unique, quite foreign to the innate nature of man, we would have very definite difficulty in mustering the courage and doing the hard work of pushing forward our foreign policy. If we thought that what we stood for was unique and obsolete, we'd have very great difficulty in facing the future. But, of course, the picture we see is quite the reverse. In our thinking, what we stand for is really very close to the innate nature of man. We believe in the freedom of the individual, and we believe in the freedom of individual nations to find their own destiny, to prosper, and to move forward to a material and also a spiritual abundance — each in its own way. I think this is very central to the concept of the American way of life. So this is a philosophy; it's an outlook and it's based, as all ideologies are, upon assumptions as to what man is like and what the universe is like.

In the same general way, but in a more articulated, more structured fashion, communism provides an idea system, a set of parameters within which to view what is going on. Communism describes to its adherents how things have been, how they are, and how they're going to be. And in doing so it makes assumptions about the nature of man and the nature of the universe, about the nature of the contemporary system of states, about the past, and about what is to come. So, therefore, what communism most importantly provides — in the past and even now that they differ — to both the Russians and the Chinese is two things which they have shared and still share. One of these is their common language of discourse and the other is their common view of the nature of man.

The common language of discourse is a somewhat fancy term which simply

means that they are used to talking communism. Communism has its own language. You must study it if you would know what it is they are communicating to each other, just as we use terminology all the time in the Armed Forces which does not immediately convey the idea to an outsider. We have a specific meaning we attach to terms which sometimes is far from the common usage. When we talk we use this language, and when the Communists talk they use their specific language. When they say "peaceful co-existence of states" or "the inevitability of war," it is not just a set of words by itself to be understood within their ordinary English meaning. You have to understand the whole substructure of concepts that are associated with it, how they glue these concepts together in their thinking and outlook. So communism has its own language; we have to know what the language means when they use these phrases. We have to understand what the implications are to them. And so when they have an argument over doctrine (which is one important aspect of the Sino-Soviet split), one thing they're arguing about as they use this language is what those phrases mean today in today's conditions. What is the requirement if one is to have peaceful coexistence of states, for example? This common language of discourse, this common lingo of communism, persists today despite the Sino-Soviet split, and when they argue their opposed views, they argue in this very language of communism.

The second thing that they share despite the split, as I've already suggested, is the common view of the nature of man and bound up in it a perspective on the evolution of world society from the past and that glimpse of the future which is highly important to them. They share the same theory as to how the world came to be the

way it is now. And when they argue, they argue somewhat opposed viewpoints of how they are going to proceed from this point in time to the ultimate Communist world Utopia which, again, they agree, will surely in the fullness of time come into being.

So in order to approach our topic I think we must talk a little of their language, understand a little of their concept. We want to point that discussion specifically toward those doctrines over which they have most vehemently disagreed and which have a fundamental impact on the nature and the progress and the future of the Sino-Soviet split. In doing this we shall gradually weave our way, as this argument becomes acute, to where we are also discussing the practical, nonideological reasons that give them a difference in viewpoint in their argument. To accomplish this, and look at the doctrinal disagreements as a prelude to examining the practical disagreements, I think we can most usefully take the Communist "father philosophers" in sequence and look to see what it was that they contributed to the doctrines over which the later disagreements occur.

If we start with Marx and Engels we quickly find that Marx and Engels contributed very little to what the Soviets and Chinese are currently arguing about. Marx, contrary to most people's assumptions, really said relatively little about the attributes of capitalism as against socialism (or communism) in past times and not very much about future times. He really concentrated much more upon the age in which he himself was living. He was particularly interested in the British industrial system and noted its abuses. He thought that the rich would become richer, the poor become poorer, that antagonism and class conflict would continue, and out of this would come violent revolu-

tion, some form of socialism. But the crux of his concern was on the present system and what was wrong with it. Engels, his close collaborator, was really more responsible for giving this a broader frame of reference, and since the two of them worked very closely together, sometimes it's hard to cut their contributions apart. As a matter of fact, some of the tracts published under Karl Marx's name were really written by Engels. But Engels is the one who really inserted into this concept the historical sweep, talking about the dialectic progression in history which he distinguished as beginning once there were settled groups instead of nomadic, wandering tribes. At this point class conflicts or "contradictions," tensions between the classes could be observed. Master versus slave, for instance, marked the first real classes and then, when this tension came to a head, you got a new synthesis, a new division of the classes. The new feudal system of feudal lords versus serfs was again, in its turn, replaced by a three-cornered struggle between the kings, the bourgeoisie, and the proletariat. Out of this came emerging capitalism to be replaced by socialism, with socialism itself eventually to be replaced by genuine communism.

This phenomenon of recurring class conflict was not conceived in the sense that history goes through a very broad sweep and repeats itself. Nothing could be further from the assumption of the Communists. The interesting thing about the Communist assumption from this point of view is that history is seen as a straight line progression, with each successive conflict marking the spreading of power to a progressively broader mass base. Every one of those stages represents a broader power base, even though the exploiting class still remains until the ultimate end when you get socialism and communism. By

this point all power has passed to the largest, most inclusive group of all, the proletariat.

Now you didn't hear a word in all of this about international relations. Marx wrote a little about this, but very little. As I say, Marx and Engels were looking at a particular moment in time. You have to wait until Lenin, really, before you get much international relations aspect to communism. Lenin comes along and he contributes two very important theories to supplement what Marx and Engels had said. For either contribution he probably would have gone down as a theoretician of the first magnitude even if he hadn't achieved power himself. These two contributions represent quite different propositions. One was the theory of how to organize a revolution; the other was the theory of imperialism as the cause of war among nation-states. Let's look at these in turn.

First, as to the theory of organization. Marx and Engels had spoken of "inevitable" revolution, inevitable because of great historical forces whose ultimate consequences could be predicted. This is the philosopher in his study speaking, although Marx also dabbled in the practical politics of the international worker's movement from time to time. Essentially he was speaking philosophically: It would come, it would happen, it was bound to happen. But Lenin had a real problem, because Lenin was a leader in a revolutionary movement that actually hoped to seize power, and Lenin couldn't quite believe that it just would happen of its own volition. It's comforting to know something one wants is going to happen, but always in the end somebody has to make that something happen. Lenin, being of a very practical turn of mind, wrote a book — one with a very American-sounding title — *What Is to Be Done? What Is to Be Done?*

outlined an action program. It tried to answer the question, how do you organize a revolution that is bound to happen, and who specifically is going to have to do what? Lenin was the "organization man" of the Russian revolution. Lenin proposed, and then actually organized, what he called "the vanguard of the workers' class." He saw quite clearly that it was all very well to say, here are all these workers, they are bound to rise up and revolt because the poor are getting poorer and the rich are getting richer; they'll get tired of getting exploited. But Lenin knew that somebody had to take the lead. Who could take that lead? Not certainly the whole workers' class (because they are amorphous, unorganized, and of many minds) but the leaders, the vanguard, the "most mature cadre" of the workers. These are Communist terms, and they recur frequently later. The cadre would be organized into the leadership group who would constitute the Communist Party. They would establish the dictatorship of the proletariat on behalf of the mass proletariat.

Lenin also wrote — and this is extremely interesting — that a vital reason why good organization on a permanent basis of a dedicated group was essential was because it is relatively easy to perpetrate a revolution in the first place. You do it within conditions of turmoil, you do it in conditions of great strain on the social and national fabric, and if you organize and you have a minority group who know what they want, they can be successful. They can achieve a revolution, especially because under conditions of strain the other elements in the society are at odds. But once you have achieved the Communist revolution, you encounter, he said, something else. (I think this next observation of Lenin's took real imagination and that he was quite

right.) He said that once the revolution was an accomplished fact, the opposition to the revolution would increase tenfold. All the opposition elements, seeing now very clearly where things were heading, would combine to try to create a counterrevolution, and at this point the cohesion, the unity of the Communist Party becomes extremely vital. Lenin's contribution as "the organization man" is very interesting indeed.

In turning to Lenin's theory of imperialism, we get to a meaningful international relations aspect for really the first time in communism. Lenin wrote another book called *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*. In it he updated Marx. Marx had been describing the development of capitalism at the mid-19th century point. Marx did not quite observe what the Communists call "the monopoly stage" of capitalism. As a matter of fact, in historical terms it is about after the Franco-Prussian War, about 1873 or so, that what is generally called the great second wave of imperialism occurs. In the first period, the colonial period, the United States, for instance, was colonized. This period we are quite familiar with in our own history. One of the things that came of that, of course, was that it did not work very well. It had a bad ending from the point of view of those who had done the colonizing, because the colonists rose up almost everywhere and established their independence — with us as a prime example. So, by the middle of the first half of the 19th century, it was commonly said that, "Colonies are like ripe fruit, and when the tree matures, they drop off the mother branch." So, in other words, colonialism had little point, one might just as well not colonize, because when colonies are able they break away.

But by 1870 or so all this had been

forgotten and there was a great new wave of enthusiasm for going out and building foreign empires. The statistics involved are impressive. Millions of square miles were taken between that time and the first four or five years of the 20th century. This is when the British achieved the position reflected by the map of Africa they used to have in my boyhood—you don't see it anymore—showing the tremendous area in red, Cape to Cairo. On those maps the French also had a tremendous, usually green, area. So all of Africa was divided among three or four powers, along with Southeast Asia and all the rest of it. This second era of colonial imperialism is the era of monopoly capitalism from the Communist point of view.

What did Lenin say about this? He said that in the nature of capitalism, a capitalist attempts to produce for the maximum profit. To do this he puts his price as high as possible, but he cuts his costs as low as possible. His prime cost is labor, and therefore he exploits labor. The consequence of this is that labor is unable to purchase the fruits of its own activity. But the capitalist has the need to continue maximizing his profits, and therefore he must broaden his market. And therefore to find both sources of cheap raw material and a sufficiently extensive market, he must reach out and grab it. And this, says Lenin writing in the early years of the 20th century, is what has been happening. Now what will come of it? He argues that most of the land of Africa has been taken, most of what is there to be seized has been seized. And when the day comes (and he was writing just about the time it was to come) when there is nothing left to take except to take from each other, there will be war among the capitalist (i.e., imperialist) powers. So

the cause of war is ultimately capitalism.

Now the interesting thing about these thoughts is that from that day forward there has never been any real disagreement among Communists that this is indeed the cause of war between states. The cause of *international* war, the single cause of international war to a Communist, is the existence of capitalists who are bound to foment war with other states for the reasons described. This has been a consistent dogma in Communist thought and doctrine. ("National liberal movements" are in another category altogether, in Communist thinking.)

Let's turn to Stalin. Stalin was much less original. He was not an innovator. But, contrary to what is sometimes said about Stalin, he was a very good Leninist when it came to these basic doctrines. Stalin frequently was able to make a more lucid statement of Leninism than Lenin sometimes did. If you read Lenin's books, the last one I mentioned in particular is atrocious in its style. Stalin, on the other hand, could write quite well. He knew his Leninism well. And so far as these points are concerned, Stalin was an orthodox Leninist. The very last important work Stalin ever wrote was called *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.* Bear in mind, now, that if Communists talked about "economic problems" we would really translate that into "political problems." Because to the Communists, politics *are* economics. So Stalin's book, ostensibly on economics, was really about politics. That is why you shouldn't be surprised that the sixth chapter in this last book of his is entitled "The Question of the Inevitability of Wars Among Capitalist Countries." In there he spoke of "some comrades" who thought that war was no longer inevitable between capitalist states. Why? Because these comrades,

unnamed, unspecified (but we of course now know who they likely were) said that the real contradictions in the contemporary world were between the socialist bloc and the capitalist bloc. Stalin said bluntly: "These comrades are mistaken."

Now if you have listened to this very carefully, you realize that what "some comrades" were arguing was that there was a cold war going on. This is 1952. Some comrades are arguing there's a cold war going on, that there is a Communist bloc and a capitalist bloc, and that any thoughts about the capitalists falling out were romantic. The danger of war, say these comrades, is that these blocs are going to tangle with one another. Stalin says, quite to the contrary, these comrades mistake the fundamental realities for the appearance of things. Obviously it is true that Germany, Japan, England, France all appear to be following American leadership, that they have subordinated their economic conflicts and tensions to that American leadership. But, he said, if you think this is going to last, comrades, you are very mistaken.

The view which Stalin was advancing, while orthodox, also took some imagination. This is the middle of the cold war. Yet here is Stalin saying that one must not assume that there will not again be tensions among capitalist states. Stalin, although he didn't mention De Gaulle or the specific troubles soon to show up in the NATO Alliance, is quite clear that the capitalist states will again fall out with each other. The real danger of war, Stalin argued, still comes from the existence of these capitalist states and the fact that they will foment war with each other, that some may attack the socialist countries, or that their actions will bring the socialist countries into war as a result of their

getting into war with each other, just as in World War II.

What Stalin really thought about the maintenance of "socialist camp" unity is not very clear. It is noticeable that Stalin, although he took a lot of territory under his wing, was very careful to draw the line over territory that he could directly control. You know, for instance, that when Mao came to see him and asked for aid in terms of furthering the Chinese revolution, Stalin told him he did not have a chance, Chiang Kai-shek was bound to win and he would get wiped out. Mao went back and it did not turn out that way. Part of what was almost certainly in Stalin's mind was the conviction that he could not control China. Similarly, he did not make a real effort to control Greece. (This is not to underrate the efficiency of our efforts there.) Stalin tried to control areas he knew he could dominate. If this implied limitations on extending the "communist bloc," Stalin could not well express them too bluntly; but he did make clear his conviction about the "capitalist camp." When Stalin talks about some comrades who took an opposing view, they are unnamed, they are anonymous.

We come now to Khrushchev who very clearly either must have been one of these comrades or soon became a convert.

Here we begin to get into the realm of the innovators and the revisionists. This is also where doctrinally the Sino-Soviet split centers. Khrushchev's great revisionism begins in 1956 when he argued that war was no longer inevitable between capitalist and socialist states because the socialist camp, he said, was "invincible." Note that Khrushchev is virtually using the actual language Stalin condemned. Khrushchev thinks there is indeed a socialist camp or bloc and a capitalist bloc, and Khrushchev says that war is no longer

inevitable between these two blocs because the socialist camp is invincible. He went on to say, and this is even more revisionist, that in some capitalist states power might even come into the hands of the workers, into Communist hands, peacefully, without a violent revolution, that it was conceivable here and there. And he also said that in any event what he called "progressive bourgeois elements" and strong workers' groups in various industrial countries still under capitalism were having a restraining effect on the helligerent tendencies of capitalism.

Now these are all very interesting propositions. You must have noticed in my discussion of the evolution of Communist doctrine before Khrushchev that there is a pronounced two-dimensional effect running through the whole set of concepts. There are not any real nuances; it's very clean-cut, very simple. For instance, there are capitalist states which must act in a certain manner, because they are run by capitalists who must follow built-in behavior patterns. You know how the play is going to turn out, and the question is merely who is going to organize the pieces of it? But the scenario is all very clear, and it is foreordained; there is no tampering with it; there is no way of changing the course of history.

Now consider: Khrushchev is presiding over a nation, the Soviet Union, which went through much turmoil, terror, trouble — beginning with, of course, the Russian revolution, which was no junket. There is a famous film of newsreel shots of the Russian revolution which particularly stands in my mind as an illustration. In the course of this newsreel there are two film clips taken near the same village during the Russian civil war. They are almost identical shots — you see the soldiers with their rifles slung on their backs and they're smoking cigarettes in the

most casual way, a few have guns pointed toward these poor fellows who are digging a trench, and when they've got the trench deep enough the guards take their rifles down and rather boringly shoot them. That is the Reds shooting the Whites. And then about 20 minutes later in this film one sees the same village, the same scene. The only difference between the two scenes is that the roles are reversed. This time it is Whites shooting the Reds. Some villages changed bands three times!

Russia went through this ferocious civil war and period of turmoil with large-scale intervention in its aftermath. This whole period was heavy in human cost. Then the liquidation of the kulaks cost them a lot of population, a lot more were confined in concentration camps. The great Stalinist terror, too, killed off much of the high command and officer corps. Then came World War II itself, the wholesale invasion of Russia by the Germans, and the great physical devastation that went with it. There have been estimates that the Russians lost 20 million lives. There are no firm figures on this at all, but most of the estimates range from 11 to 20 million. If you add all of this up, a tremendous number of Russians lost their lives during the first half century of communism. But, by the time Khrushchev had come into power, a better future is discernible. There is some tentative possibility of tranquility around the corner; they have made some tangible progress. The question is whether all of this is to disappear in the holocaust of an atomic, a nuclear war?

Recall that in Khrushchev's time, in the British Isles (and here a little bit too), some people were talking about total nuclear disarmament, arguing, like Bertrand Russell, "Better Red than dead." Recall, too, that the impact of traditional Leninism on the implica-

tions of what was going to happen to Russia and China and all the rest is that all the world inevitably will become Communist. Such a result, according to Communist thinking, would follow at least one more great war. And in this war the capitalists, being capitalists, inevitably would fight. Being capitalists they would use whatever weapons were at their disposal. They would devastate Russia, and Russia would devastate them. In the end they would all be Red *and* dead. So here you come up against the real rub in Communist theory as it had evolved up to this point. Because, if it is all this inevitable, if it is indeed two-dimensional, and if there is no turning aside from the final cataclysm in which over the radioactive heap of rubble a few people wander around, then that is the way the future will be. Not very appealing as a manner of gaining converts; not very appealing as a doctrine; not very appealing as a philosophy. Therefore, Khrushchev says, these very interesting things: that there are not just nasty old capitalists who come in a single model and all alike; there are also "progressive bourgeois elements." These are the good guys. Or at least better guys. And then there are the workers who haven't yet been "liberated." They, too, are certainly progressive elements even though their reforming or revolutionary effects upon the social structure have not been fully realized yet. So Khrushchev pictures a whole spectrum. He described a pluralist society in capitalism — he didn't use the word, I do, but that is his meaning — pluralism existing within the capitalist world. Described this way, capitalists also have a mind, a brain in their heads, and can objectively evaluate a situation. They are capable of understanding that the socialist camp is invincible (meaning that they cannot really wipe them out without getting wiped out too), they

are capable of implementing that understanding. They can make a rational, "flexible response" and they can say, "Well, let's have a détente." Capitalists, says Khrushchev, do not have to behave like capitalists. Capitalists can be human beings too and can sit down and can discuss. There can be peaceful co-existence because it is to the advantage of neither communism nor capitalism for us to wipe each other out. And in 1955 at the meeting at the summit, this is exactly what was said; if you recall, Khrushchev (with Bulganin) came to meet Eisenhower; both agreed that there was no rational point to a nuclear war.

Now there were difficulties with what Khrushchev said. There are advantages, and I have sketched the advantages out, but there were also difficulties. If war is no longer inevitable, as Khrushchev argued, then why should the Communist victory be still inevitable? If the inevitability of capitalists behaving like capitalists ceases, which was the reason why they were going to lose, and the Communists were going to win, how can one be sure that communism will still win? If one inevitability vanishes, why does another remain?

Now we get to Mao. Khrushchev, presiding over a "have" nation, did not want to rock the boat, capsize it; he wanted to stay within definite parameters of risk. The clearest indication of this is when he looks down the mouth of the cannon in 1962, in the Cuban missile crisis. If he really had not cared, if he had wanted to play things to the hilt, he would not have taken the missiles out. By the same token he "proved" he was dealing with "progressive bourgeois elements" for did they not also behave with restraint and give him a way out, promising to refrain from invading Cuba?

Now what about Mao, watching this?

The Chinese had been arguing behind the scenes with the Russians ever since Khrushchev started his revisionism. The first important rupture with Khrushchev really began in 1956, triggered by the quotation I just gave you which comes from his address to the Party Congress in that year: "War is not inevitable because the socialist camp is invincible." The Chinese did not like this. They did not like it doctrinally, and they did not like its implications. The Chinese fear that while they are still far from their own goals, the Russians are going to go into neutral gear and not try nearly so hard any more. Khrushchev's actions in 1962 in the Cuban missile crisis irritated the Chinese no end. In 1963 the Chinese were openly to deride Khrushchev for an initial adventuresome and irresponsible action followed by a cowardly withdrawal. To the Chinese, Khrushchev combined the worst elements of both possible kinds of actions: a reckless move and then a foolish and cowardly withdrawal under pressure. He put the missiles in and he took the missiles out. By this time, 1963, the Sino-Soviet argument over doctrine had become both public and pronounced. It had gone through a phase from 1956 to about 1958 behind the scenes. Then from 1958 to about 1961 there was a second phase in which the argument was quite public but still guarded. (This is the phase in which the Chinese always castigate what "Tito" is doing as revisionism. They don't name the Russians. The Russians, to reciprocate, keep talking about the irritating "Albanians.") But in 1963, in view of these further provocations, the Chinese threw aside all indirection and began to argue with little restraint and less politeness. What seems to have really been the final straw of provocation to the Chinese was the United States-Soviet agreement on the draft Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty in the summer

of 1963 in Moscow. It was just a little after this time that the Chinese took the extraordinary action of having Chinese agents scatter leaflets as they transited the Soviet Union on the Trans-Siberian Express! This illegal and clandestine action is soon brought to a halt by the Russians. So then the Chinese start publishing broadsides at the Soviets, who respond in kind. And these contain very interesting arguments.

In them the Chinese maintain that the Russians are really not good revolutionaries any more. The Chinese say that they themselves are the real revolutionaries. Risks must be taken, but they do not want a nuclear war. You delude yourselves, answer the Soviets, because risks raise tensions and must be carefully considered in an age of nuclear war. The Chinese taunt the Russians with thinking too much of the possibility of nuclear war, pointing out that nuclear weapons are a paper tiger since capitalism cannot resort to their use without reciprocal devastation. The Russians argue in rebuttal that the Chinese would be more impressed with such weapons if they were themselves in possession of them, and that a paper tiger with nuclear teeth has to be treated with care.

They argue in this vein back and forth. The Chinese assert that the real significance of Soviet revisionism is not on the nuclear war aspect anyhow. What really counts is that the Soviets are not real revolutionaries precisely because they have acquired a vested material interest by virtue of their own progress, that the Soviets do not want to take risks to further the national liberation movement among the underdeveloped world. Yet there is where one finds the soft underbelly of the capitalist world. This argument is later further articulated in the famous figure of speech of the "countries" versus the "cities." Lin Piao argues that the way victory against the capitalists can be achieved is the way

the Chinese achieved it against the Japanese, a feat repeated by the Chinese Communists later against the Nationalists. Let the enemy hold the cities (i.e., industrialized nations) but cut the train of supply (from the underdeveloped areas). That, argue the Chinese, is strategically what we ought to be doing. There are all sorts of possibilities in the hinterland, in the country, in the underdeveloped world where the national liberation movements exist and can be aided. What were the Russians doing instead? The Chinese argue in effect that they were giving arms aid to Nasser, but Nasser was not a Communist. The Soviets were aiding bourgeois elements in these newly developed states. They were giving arms aid to Sukarno, but Sukarno was not a Communist. They were helping to build the Aswan Dam, but in doing these things the Soviets were bolstering the power of the reactionary—even though not capitalist—elements in these underdeveloped countries. For our part, say the Chinese, we are true revolutionaries, and we are trying to move the national liberation movement forward.

The Soviets return the attack in a very interesting section in this exchange of notes in mid-1963. They correct the text of what they say the Chinese now say they meant about what would happen if there was a war. (The Chinese, out of frustration, had earlier said something, smacking of bravado, to the effect, "All right, suppose there is a war, suppose we lose half the population of China, then so what? We'll still have the other half and if it comes to that a beautiful Communist civilization will arise on the ashes of the bourgeois world.") The Soviets make quite a point of getting the original text of this and giving it prominence in their notes. The Soviets argue that the Chinese are saying in effect, whether they know it or not, let there be war. I don't think this

is quite correct. The Chinese are saying that if you get to the point where you are so afraid of nuclear war that you are afraid now to take risks to move this national liberation movement forward, that you are never going to get anywhere. Once you feel fear, you will not dare anymore.

Now Khrushchev is gone, of course, though Mao is still there, but the succeeding Soviet rulers have not changed Khrushchev's revisionism. The argument has remained essentially the same kind of argument. They are arguing over how much risk ought to be taken and how much advantage can be seen for communism, and whether this can be done with or without a nuclear confrontation. In these exchanges the Chinese are all the time arguing for a risk policy, while the Russians consistently argue for a more conservative policy. This controversy becomes so acute, especially by the time of the Vietnam war, that there are some bitter words exchanged. I have here, for instance, a late 1966 publication of the Soviet Embassy reprinting an article from *Pravda* on the events in China. I'll give you a little sample of its flavor by a direct quotation:

The question arises: with whom then does the Chinese leadership, which is paying lip service to the need of "the broadest united front of struggle against American imperialism" want to unite if it rejects all proposals for joint actions with those forces which are bearing the brunt of the struggle against imperialism? All this actually facilitates the escalation of the United States aggression against the Vietnamese people. The duplicity of the policy of the Chinese leaders is increasingly showing itself in the international arena now. On the one hand they try to impose on the fraternal parties such a course that would lead to a continuous aggravation of the international situation and ultimately to war, allegedly in the name of the world revolution. The Peking leaders themselves

promote such a line that is intended to leave them aside from the struggle against imperialism. While alleging that all contacts of the Soviet Union with the United States are a "collusion" with imperialism, the Chinese leaders at the same time do not miss a chance to develop relations with capitalist countries, including the United States. . . .

The Russians charge that the Chinese are trying to seize control of this movement, move it in their direction, and they are not above dealing with the enemy, the United States. On this point the Chinese argue exactly the reverse. They say that the Russians are too timid to exploit the opportunity but, in any event, are dealing with the enemy, the United States. All this talk of *détente*, the Test-Ban Treaty itself — who is it directed against if it is not directed against Communist China? And what about Vietnam? And here the argument waxes hot and heavy.

I think you will see that there is really nothing much in the doctrines of communism that I have examined as they bear upon this split that really explains the split *per se*. What explains the split (which, of course, is argued in these doctrinal terms and in the "Communist language"), is the difference in their situations. The Chinese never worried anybody until recent years. In fact, we in the United States felt very kindly toward the Chinese. If you recall, in 1945, to the consternation or astonishment of the other powers, we said the Chinese ought to have a permanent seat on the Security Council. The reaction of the others amounted to asking why weak China should have a permanent seat? The answer would seem in large part to be American sentimentality toward China. True, China was very weak. China had been a weak nation since George Washington's time and before. We in the United States never knew a strong China, a united China, or essen-

tially united China up to that point. When it actually came into existence — and, unfortunately, under communism — it confronted the United States with a totally new situation. The same was true for the Soviet Union, because the Soviet Union had never had to cope with a united China in modern times. This China, although it came to be unified, was not able to complete its revolution internally, or to complete its territorial consolidation externally. It felt that it still had not "arrived." It was not admitted to the United Nations. It felt that it was still insecure except for the protection nominally afforded by Russian nuclear weapons. It felt that it was still incomplete territorially — Formosa most obviously, but also the other areas which they once dominated in ancient times. The Chinese felt that they had a long way to go to get where they wanted to go. And they considered that they ought to have the help of their fraternal ally, the Soviet Union. But that fraternal ally, the Soviet Union, had already "arrived," and was not going to take any risks. When the chips were down, as over Quemoy-Matsu in 1958, the Russians — looking at it through Chinese eyes — would assert what wonderful backing they would give as soon as they were positive that they really would not have to pay the penalty.

The fundamental nature of the Sino-Soviet split derives, then, above all else, from the environmental circumstances and the psychological attitude toward these circumstances of these two very different peoples. Their argument is carried on in the "Communist language," but they see doctrine very differently because their environment is so different.

Now what of the future? Is this split a passing phenomenon? No. It has been in the making for a long time. While it is argued in Communist terms, it arises out of more fundamental, geo-

graphical, political, and economic facts. The Soviet Union exists cheek by jowl with an overpopulated, underfed China. They have a long history of border disputes between them. Of all the bones of contention, the historic advantage the Russians took of Chinese weakness in the time of the Tsars is still remembered with greatest bitterness. The Chinese have made no secret of their view that at least 500,000 square miles of the "Soviet Union" is really Chinese.

If one tries to explain the great moderating influence in international politics upon Soviet behavior in the years since Khrushchev first tried his Cuban adventure and also tried to squeeze us out of Berlin, I think one finds the best explanation in the worsening of the Sino-Soviet split. This is another way of saying that Soviet moderation parallels the growing actual or potential ultimate ability of China to cross the land frontiers with land forces. China can cause Russia severe injury, increasingly so as the nuclear arms race continues. This will not go away. There is no way in which I would visualize that the Chinese and the Russians will succeed in overcoming their differences, other than perhaps in a temporary rapprochement if the Western powers, the rest of the powers, play their cards so poorly as to cause it.

One very obvious trap for the United States to fall into in dealing with this Sino-Soviet split is to take sides with the Chinese against the Russians or with the Russians against the Chinese. And so far this is one of the things that we have been very careful not to do. The Sino-Soviet split is one of those situations where by holding aloof, not becoming involved, and leaving nature to take its course without direct pressure by the United States, the advantage will accrue to the United States.



Dr. Frederick H. Hartmann occupies the Alfred Thayer Mahan Chair of Maritime Strategy and is Special Adviser to the President, Naval War College.

The Mahan Chair of Maritime Strategy was established by the President, Naval War College, on 1 July 1966 with the approval of the Secretary of the Navy. The occupant is appointed for an initial term of 3 years. Professor Hartmann is the first occupant.

In recognition that the development of strategic military concepts requires an understanding of political, economic, and sociological, as well as military considerations, the Mahan Chair was established to provide the services of a highly qualified civilian professor on an extended contract. The incumbent actively participates in the conduct of the curricula and, in addition, provides continuous advice to the President, Naval War College, on such matters as curriculum planning, academic methods, the guest lecture program, professorial recruiting, and academic programs. By its title, the Chair appropriately honors Alfred Thayer Mahan, the Navy's most distinguished maritime strategist, whose contributions to advanced education for naval officers and the Naval War College have been inestimable.

Professor Hartmann holds an A.B. from the University of California and an M.A. and Ph.D. from Princeton Uni-

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Since 1963 Professor Hartmann has lectured at numerous military and civilian colleges and universities. He has traveled widely in Europe and Asia. He is a member of the American Political Science Association and the American Association of University Professors and other professional organizations. He is a Captain in the U.S. Naval Reserve.

Professor Hartmann's publications include: *Basic Documents of International Relations*; *The Relations of Nations*; *The Swiss Press and Foreign Affairs in World War II*; *World in Crisis*; *Germany Between East and West* as well as numerous articles in American journals and German, Indian, and other periodicals. He contributed the definition of "international relations" to the *UNESCO Social Science Dictionary*.



It is by combined use of politics and force that pacification of a country and its future organization will be achieved. Political action is by far the more important.

Joseph Simon Gallieni: Marshal Gallieni's instructions to the French forces occupying Madagascar, 22 May 1898