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
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SOVIET DISARMAMENT POLICY-- WHAT LIES AHEAD?

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INTRODUCTION

Disarmament has not been achieved in the world today because each of the major nations involved is influenced by certain differing pressures and goals. In the center of this stalemate stand the United States and the Soviet Union. This paper is a study of the disarmament policy of one of these two main adversaries — the Soviet Union.

The purpose of this study is, first, to determine the goal of Soviet disarmament policy through an examination of this policy and its interrelation with her foreign policy since World War II, and, second, to determine how current considerations will possibly influence future Soviet disarmament policy.

Soviet disarmament negotiations since the mid-1940's are reviewed in the

opening chapter. During the review the interrelation between Soviet disarmament and foreign policies is revealed, and the primary goal of Soviet disarmament policy is derived. That this interrelationship and primary goal have remained unchanged through the years is then documented. Six current considerations which influence Soviet disarmament policy are presented and examined in the next two chapters. The degree of their influence is carefully analyzed. The material developed in the paper leads finally to conclusions concerning future Soviet disarmament policy and they are discussed in the closing chapter.

I — SOVIET DISARMAMENT POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR II

At the end of World War II the Soviet Union and the United States were the world's two major powers. This unique situation of bipolarity later proved to have an adverse effect on world politics. Nevertheless, at this time the Soviet Union and the Western Allies were in agreement that the United Nations organization was needed to help keep the peace. The Kremlin rulers could hardly afford to be cynical or indifferent regarding an international organization that was deemed desirable by the entire world, especially since Soviet propaganda cast them in the role of the most sincere champions of peace and security. (6:96) Also, there is little doubt that the Soviet leaders believed that an international organization, if it were kept ineffective in opposing Soviet interests, might possibly be a useful instrument of Soviet policy. Finally, this organization could serve to prevent or hinder a renewal of the diplomatic and political isolation from which the Soviet Union had suffered throughout most of her history. (6:97)

One of the major issues to be faced by the United Nations was the problem of disarmament. In the aftermath of World War II, world public opinion called for an international attempt to achieve disarmament — not disarmament in the sense that it had been thought of before — but disarmament designed to bring about the abolishment of the atomic bomb as a weapon of war.

The elimination or control of the atomic bomb was not easily approached as the United States and the Soviet Union did not share the same attitude toward atomic energy. On 10 August 1945, just 4 days after the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, the Emperor of Japan offered to surrender. (8:28) This action undoubtedly helped to foster the widespread belief held by U.S. authorities that the atomic bomb had changed previous concepts of war.

On 9 August 1945 President Truman had said, "The atomic bomb is too dangerous to be loose in a lawless world." (86:108) Several writers of the time put similar thoughts into words when they wrote:

If one side can eliminate the cities of the other, it enjoys an advantage which is practically tantamount to final victory, provided always its own cities are not similarly attacked. (11:47)

All of us must recognize that in another three years the United States of America may not stand alone as a possessor of atomic bombs and that in another five to seven years' time, it is entirely possible that another country will possess a number of atomic bombs sufficient to destroy us. (12:26)

Thanks to the possession of the atomic bomb and an air force of overwhelming strength, we are today far stronger than the Soviet Union and could destroy it. (13:174)

The Soviet attitude toward atomic energy showed a decided contrast to that of the United States. It was at Potsdam on 24 July 1945 that Stalin was informed that the United States had an

atomic bomb and planned to use it against Japan unless she promptly surrendered. Stalin registered no particular interest and merely indicated his satisfaction over the fact that the United States had an atomic weapon and expressed a hope that it would be used. (15:263) This general attitude was reflected in official and unofficial sources.

To complicate further the disarmament picture, the first signs of a cold war struggle appeared in late 1945 while preparations were being made for the initial meeting of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC).

Disagreement had developed over the reconstruction of the Polish Government, the oppressive Soviet rule in Bulgaria and Rumania, the disposition of Trieste, the issue of reparations, and the Allied administration of Germany. (59:204) It should not have come as a surprise to anyone as the shadow of postwar Soviet foreign policy was much in evidence in the political concessions granted by the United States and Great Britain at Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam.

In order that the interrelation between Soviet disarmament and foreign policies can better be understood below, a brief discussion of Soviet foreign policy is appropriate at this time. Soviet foreign policy after World War II can be viewed as a methodical attempt to exploit the wartime achievements of the Soviet Union, to expand the territory of the Soviet Union, to increase the number of her dependent territories, and to raise the power and influence of the Communist Parties throughout the world. (42:59) As a means of accomplishing these goals, the Soviets set about to prevent or delay the construction of united non-Communist military systems. In addition, they worked toward fracturing Allied unity and stripping the United States of her power and influence. The Soviet Union employed a use of force or a threat of force, sub-

version, and political, economic, and psychological methods. (42:31)

The Soviets capitalized on United States demobilization after the war and on the West's desire for peace when they put their foreign policy into action. By 1947 Russia had control over Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. She was gaining control of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Albania. In addition, she had extracted economic benefits from Italy and Finland and had made a serious effort to conquer Greece and institute civil war in France. (9:123) These Soviet actions seem to verify the fact that Stalin was not intimidated by the United States possession of the atomic bomb.

The Beginning (1946).

On 14 June 1946 the Baruch Plan on atomic control was presented to the UNAEC. Although the plan impressed many Westerners as an offer of unparalleled generosity, it created serious misgivings among Soviet leaders because it would have deprived Russia of her veto over Security Council enforcement of the treaty, breached the Iron Curtain through its provisions for inspection and control, and failed to provide a deadline for the destruction of the U.S. atomic weapons. (8:55, 60, 72) Andrei Gromyko presented the Soviet plan at the very next meeting. He advocated the signing of a convention which would prohibit the production and use of atomic weapons and provide for the destruction of all existing atomic stockpiles within three months. (83:21) He further proposed the establishment of a committee to prepare a draft agreement for the outlawing of the use of atomic and similar forms of weapons of destruction. (83:23)

The Soviet proposals were not much more than mere statements of prin-

ciples. The plan was quite vague on the control problem as it contained no mention of inspection, international ownership, or other techniques, of control. The plan was not vague, however, on what it was designed to accomplish. It was an appeal to the world to bring pressure on the United States to stop production of atomic weapons and destroy her atomic stockpile. The United States had demobilized rapidly after World War II, and her only strength rested in her atomic weapons. (83:182-183) The Soviets, realizing the significance of this, tried to capitalize on it. If the Soviets could cause the United States to destroy her atomic stockpile or accept a ban on its use, the United States would be weakened to a point at which she could offer no effective resistance to Russian aggression. Thus, the Soviets hoped to achieve this further weakening of the United States through a disarmament measure in order to carry out their foreign policy of expansion throughout Eastern Europe.

On 31 December 1946 the UNAEC submitted its first report to the Security Council. (83:50) The report constituted approval of the Baruch Plan and an international control system that was completely unacceptable to the Russians. The Soviet ministers launched a deliberate effort to delay Security Council action on this report. The Soviets fought a delaying action for approximately 17 months before they were finally forced to veto the Security Council resolution to approve the reports of the Atomic Energy Commission. (8:106)

Gromyko's speech on 5 March 1947 was typical of the delaying tactics employed. He proposed an immediate convention outlawing atomic weapons and condemned the control system of the U.S. plan as constituting interference with international sovereignty. (83:65, 69) However, the main objec-

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tive of his speech was to prove that the United States did not want to relinquish control over atomic weapons but rather was trying to secure for herself world monopoly in the field of atomic energy. (83:75) The entire speech was an excellent example of the Soviets' use of disarmament discussions to delay action on the Baruch Plan rather than to seek areas of agreement through negotiations.

The Security Council's delay in acting on the UNAEC reports provided time for the Soviets to develop a nuclear capability while the feasibility of international control was dissipating. (30:22)

Thus, during the time when it had no atomic weapons, the Soviet Union was interested in avoiding foreign interference with its internal affairs, in using disarmament negotiations to embarrass the United States, in inducing the United States to turn over her stockpile to international control or to destroy it, and in dragging out negotiations in the hope of speaking before long from the position of a nuclear power. (16:73)

Appearance of New Issues.

Two other disarmament issues were introduced in late 1946 that furnish some insight into the connection between Soviet disarmament and foreign policies.

The first issue had to do with a troop census requested by the Soviets initially in a letter to the Security Council on 24 August 1946. (58:1) The Soviets requested all members of the United Nations to report to the Security Council the number and location of their armed forces in foreign territories except those in former enemy states. This request served to reinforce the Communist agitation to speed up the process of "bringing the boys home." (8:85) The Soviets possessed superior conventional forces, and any disarmament measure that would hasten the reduction of Western forces in Europe would contribute further to the success of the Soviets' foreign policy of expansionism.

The second issue had to do with the introduction of a discussion on general disarmament. (59:327) The Soviet resolution was nothing more than a vague notion of general disarmament coupled with the "ban the bomb" theme. This type of proposal served the purpose of distracting attention from the Soviets' foreign policy of expansionism and focusing attention on the Soviet Union as being the true proponent of disarmament.

The major goal of Soviet disarmament policy is considered to have been established during 1946-1947. The Soviets sought to obtain a relative disarmament of the West; they were willing to disarm but their disarmament proposals were so designed as to disarm the West to a greater degree by elimination of atomic weapons and drastic reduction of Western conventional forces. If the West could be weakened through disarmament, the Soviets would be vir-

tually unhindered in their spread throughout Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

End of Baruch Plan Era (1948).

The Baruch Plan era closed in 1948 without agreement being reached on any major issue. During the initial negotiations, the Soviet Union developed certain negotiating techniques that have been employed throughout their disarmament talks. One technique consisted of the habit of attempting to gain specific strategic and tactical military advantages through disarmament proposals. An example of this technique in action was contained in the Soviets' proposal for a troop census which was designed to create pressure on the Western powers to withdraw their forces from foreign territories. If this proposal had been accepted, the resultant withdrawal of Western forces would have improved the 1947 Soviet attempts to establish a Communist regime in Greece and to isolate Turkey. (8:85)

The Soviets introduced a second technique that was geared to gain certain concessions from the Western powers before they would agree to discuss related issues. For example, Soviet proposals called for the United States to eliminate her nuclear weapons; then the Soviets would engage in an effort to reach accord on international controls to guarantee observance of commitments. (8:126) These techniques, if successful, would have resulted in a weakening of the West through disarmament measures, thereby reducing Western ability to oppose the execution of Soviet foreign policy.

Vyshinsky Proposal (1948).

On 25 September Andrei Vyshinsky presented a proposal which, in varying

forms, was to set the Soviets' theme for the entire period from 1948 to the close of 1954. He accused the United States and the United Kingdom of preparing for aggressive war against the Soviet Union and introduced a resolution that called for a ban on atomic weapons, reduction of conventional forces by one-third, and international control subject to the veto in the Security Council. (83:176-177) To reduce conventional forces by one-third was the first concrete statistical arms reduction proposal of the postwar era. However, the reduction was not acceptable to the West as it would have created a still greater balance of power in favor of the Soviet Union. (83:185)

The chief characteristic of Vyshinsky's proposal was its ready adaptability to propaganda uses. (8:130) This proposal was introduced before various United Nations committees and assemblies several times and defeated on each occasion. (8:131) Continued reintroduction could not have been prompted by any hope that the proposal would eventually be accepted but rather by the desire to get the Western countries on record time and again as rejecting "concrete" disarmament schemes proposed by the peace-loving Soviet Union. This image was being projected to the world to demonstrate that no one had anything to fear from the Soviets and that Western agreement to disarm was lacking. In so many words, the Soviets were attempting to allay Western fears of Soviet expansionism by presenting themselves as staunch advocates of peace and security through disarmament.

Three Major Events.

Three major events occurred during the period of 1949 to 1950 that had a greater effect on the disarmament picture than did actual negotiations and

discussions in the United Nations. These were the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Soviet atomic bomb explosion, and the Korean war.

On 4 April 1949, 12 Western nations formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) designed to provide mutual security in the face of post-World War II pressures. (42:28) This constituted a partial defeat of the Soviet policy to prevent the formation of such collective security organizations. NATO now stood as another obstacle in the way of Moscow's program to weaken Western resistance.

Perhaps the most powerful influence on Soviet disarmament policy during this period resulted from her first successful atomic explosion in September 1949. (83:207) At this time the Soviets abandoned their stand that the possession of nuclear weapons was prima facie evidence of aggressive intentions and began to stress the prevention of the use of atomic weapons rather than their destruction. In addition, the Soviets commenced to advocate the peaceful uses of atomic energy. This shift in emphasis was apparently designed to keep the Soviets in the role of the peace lovers by advocating peaceful over military use of atomic energy.

The third event, the Korean war, began with the Communist attack on South Korea in June 1950. (42:46) The war occurred during the course of the Soviets' "peace campaign" and represents an example of Soviet disarmament propaganda hypocrisy. This Soviet action is partially explained by the fact that in 1949 and 1950 war was bringing good results in China, Burma, Malaya, Indochina, and Korea. (42:64) Therefore, while the Soviets could wage a campaign for peace in Europe, they could wage war in Asia.

This so-called peace campaign had been launched in 1949 at a time when

Communist emphasis began to shift to the Far East following a tapering off of gains in Europe. Its objective was first to check and then to disintegrate the West's gradual awakening to the dangers of Soviet and Communist expansion. (9:135) The 1945-1948 militant Soviet policy of threats, subversions, and military force had genuinely alarmed the Western Powers and precipitated countermeasures on their part. This new Soviet foreign policy was thus aimed at reducing world anxieties toward Russia and delaying non-Communist rearmament programs as well as disrupting the establishment of firmer anti-Communist foreign policies.

Vyshinsky Proposal (1954).

Vyshinsky's speech on 30 September 1954, at the Ninth Session of the General Assembly, provides an excellent example of the interrelation of Soviet disarmament and foreign policies. Vyshinsky introduced a proposal the most significant feature of which was to suggest that the Soviet Union would accept the British-French memorandum of 11 June 1954 as a basis for discussion and negotiation. (30:26) The British-French memorandum had offered a comprehensive set of disarmament steps, beginning with prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons except for defense against aggression and proceeding stage by stage to total elimination of bomb stockpiles and total control. (30:25) Mr. Vyshinsky set forth his proposal in such a manner as to create the impression that the Soviet Union had accepted practically the entire Western position and that little stood in the way of a final agreement. Western spokesmen engaged Vyshinsky in an intense probing operation in order to determine exactly what kind of disarmament system the Soviet Union envisioned. The disappointing discov-

ery was that the differences between the Soviet Union and the West had narrowed in that there was agreement on the basic principles of a step-by-step approach to the nuclear problems and numerical ceilings on manpower instead of a percentage cut, but not to the extent claimed by Vyshinsky. (8:232) The Soviet Union and the West were still far apart on the question of inspection, and the Vyshinsky proposal did not constitute agreement with the Western position. Yet, it seemed that recent Soviet actions and statements in the fall United Nations debates and the manner in which this proposal was presented were meant to indicate that the arms race was soon to be settled. What was the explanation? The answer appears to be that Russia was hoping to achieve a foreign policy goal of defeating the buildup of non-Communist collective security systems by endeavoring to convince the world that she was sincerely negotiating for a disarmament agreement. By making it appear that the East and West were close to an arms agreement, the Soviets hoped to prove to non-Communists that military preparations vis-a-vis Russia were totally unnecessary. The fact that the Soviets had attempted to deceive public opinion in regard to their 30 September disarmament plan and the entire theme of the Russian campaign to defeat the European Defense Community support this. (18:58-59)

Soviet Foreign Policy Change (1955).

Prior to the spring of 1955 the foreign policy of the Kremlin leaders could generally be characterized as hostile to all sections of the non-Communist world. Khrushchev took steps to alter this. The guidelines of post-1955 Soviet foreign policy were revealed at a stormy session of the Central Committee of the

Communist Party held in early July 1955 (18:228) and further delineated at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956. (18:322) In this the Soviets departed from their belief that a Communist revolution in the Western countries was imminent and indicated that a Communist-inspired upheaval would not be successful at this time (18:228) and that war in the nuclear age was no longer inevitable. To effect this new policy, the Soviet Union inaugurated steps to prove her peaceful motives. She relaxed her harsh attitude toward Communist governments which did not slavishly follow Moscow communism; (18:345) she departed from the "two camp" theory, implying that there was room for neutralism, and set about to create a belt of neutral nations; (18:228) and she acknowledged that violent revolutions are not the only road to socialism. (59:282) In this latter regard she attempted to establish good relations with the Socialist Parties of Western Europe and sought accommodation with non-Socialist governments in other European states. Through these various moves, the Kremlin leaders sought to prove that Russia had no aggressive aims and that the strengthening of NATO was not necessary.

This new courting of neutral nations extended to the southern and eastern parts of the world. It was pursued by conferences, Soviet state visits, and the feting of neutralist leaders in Moscow. (18:302)

This brief comment on Soviet foreign policy reveals the degree to which Soviet tactics and strategy had altered in relation to earlier periods. However, the primary goal of 1945-1955 policy, to weaken the ties between the United States and other nations and to strengthen the relationship of these nations with Russia, remained unchanged.

10 May 1955 Soviet Proposal.

These changes in foreign policy tactics and strategy were reflected in the Soviet disarmament policy. The militancy of previous Soviet foreign policy and the general belief that all non-Communists were anti-Communist precluded any possibility of success with earlier Soviet disarmament policy. Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" and "three camps" philosophy changed this. He believed that a new disarmament policy could be devised that would work perfectly with other Soviet moves to convince the world that it had nothing to fear from the Soviet Union.

The Soviets' first disarmament proposal under this new policy was made on 10 May 1955. The first part was closely in line with the program that the Soviet Union had introduced year after year in that it called for an end to propaganda, the settlement of outstanding problems through international negotiation, withdrawal of all troops from German territory, liquidation of foreign military bases, fostering of peaceful uses of the atom, settlement of Far Eastern problems, and removal of barriers to trade. (8:290-291) This first part represented a clear-cut demonstration of the Soviets' presenting foreign policy goals in a disarmament proposal. However, the overall proposal did show that it was in agreement with disarmament measures outlined by the Western powers, except on three important points. First, it called for early elimination of foreign military bases. Second, the Russians insisted that a complete prohibition of the use of atomic weapons would become effective at the time 75 per cent of the total reductions of armed forces and conventional armaments had been accomplished. Third, the Soviets proposed completion of their disarmament proposal in two steps within a 2-year period. (83:461-463) Con-

sideration of these points again clearly shows that the Soviets still were continuing the attempts which they began in 1946 to accelerate the reduction of Western strength through disarmament measures.

With relatively minor variations, Russian chief disarmament proposals from 10 May 1955 to the end of 1957 contained provisions which called for (1) a reduction of occupation forces in Germany, (2) substantial reductions in NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, (3) inspection and limitation of arms in a trial zone in Germany and "adjacent states," (4) complete prohibition of nuclear weapons in the above zones, and (5) a nonaggression pact between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. (83:752)

Change in Emphasis (1958).

In comparison to previous periods, the only noticeable differences have been those of emphasis rather than complete shifts in policy. The Russians continued to interrelate their peace and disarmament themes while emphasizing their military and economic power. Beginning as early as the time of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile launching in 1957, the Russians have endeavored to convince the West that it cannot beat the Russians in the arms race; there is no reason to try because the Soviet Union obviously supports peace and disarmament as witnessed by her many disarmament proposals and her stress on peaceful coexistence. In this regard, a statement of world Communist policy issued in Moscow in December 1960 indicated the belief that the East-West power struggle was being won by the East. (74:191) If this be true, then Moscow certainly did not want substantive disarmament negotiations. What the Soviets would employ in this situation are intimidation (extreme

propagandizing of Eastern strength) and persuasion (appealing disarmament proposals).

"Peaceful Coexistence" (1961).

The Soviets entered this period with a policy established by Khrushchev in his declaration that "peace is inevitable" and that "war will not help us reach our goal." That Khrushchev seemed anxious to carry out this policy was evidenced by his reaction to the Cuban Bay of Pigs incident. In a message to President Kennedy in April 1961 he stated that he would not allow the Cuban attack to interfere with United States-Soviet negotiations on easing cold war tensions "and all other questions the solution of which would promote peaceful coexistence." (46:376) However, the Russians did not religiously adhere to this line.

The Soviets demonstrated great agility in handling the soft and hard sell. One example of their taking advantage of every opportunity to appear in a good light occurred on 20 September 1961 when, following a series of some 10 nuclear tests, Nikita Khrushchev endorsed Pope John XXIII's appeal for East-West negotiations to end world tension. (47:318)

Once their tests were satisfactorily completed, the Soviets began to advocate a ban on nuclear testing with at least a moratorium on underground testing. This immediate reversal of attitude was directed at undermining U.S. preparations to resume testing. To keep the pressure on the United States, Mme. Nikita S. Khrushchev issued a call for peace and a general disarmament program in a February 1962 short-wave radio broadcast to the women of America. (48:253) And Nikita kept things stirred up with a series of statements intended to coerce some and calm others. He declared on 16 March that

the Soviet Union had an invulnerable "global" rocket not detectable by the U.S. early warning system. In addition, he stated that Russia would work for a disarmament agreement at Geneva and warned the West that a settlement must be reached in the Berlin situation. (49:317-318) The balance of the year was devoted to similar utterances.

The year 1963 opened with the Soviet Union calling for the liquidation of foreign bases. It closed with the signing of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (LNTBT) on 5 August 1963. In a message to Red Chinese leaders on August 21 Khrushchev referred to the LNTBT as "our victory." He stated that the treaty will "perpetuate not the American nuclear monopoly, but the fact of its liquidation." (2:25)

Modified "Peaceful Coexistence" (1964-Present).

On 11 February 1964 the Soviet Union proposed early elimination of submarine-based missiles, a move that would have placed the nuclear balance of power in her favor. (43:245) Throughout the year the Russians continued to insist that nuclear delivery systems must be eliminated at the outset of an arms pact (44:181) and that an early German peace settlement must be negotiated to improve East-West relations. (50:250) The year closed with a pledge from Brezhnev and Kosygin to continue the policy of peaceful coexistence established by the deposed Khrushchev. (51:374)

The Russians have continued to work to get the United States out of Europe and weaken the ties between the United States and her Western Allies. This was the point of Soviet delegate Tsarapkin at the 18-nation Geneva disarmament talks in August 1965, when he informed the conferees that the Geneva negotiations could make no progress until the

United States withdrew her overseas troops and dismantled her bases in foreign territories. (45:247)

The Chinese Communists have challenged the Soviets for leadership in the Communist world and with a newly developed nuclear capability pose a real physical threat to the Soviet Union. The Soviets are caught in the middle. They need to back North Vietnam if they hope to be acknowledged as leaders of the Communist camp. (76:41) But they cannot back Hanoi to the degree that escalation will bring about a clash between the United States and Red China. This would present Russia with a difficult choice: whether to remain neutral and jeopardize Soviet influence in the Communist world, or to come to the aid of Red China in accordance with the Sino-Soviet Agreement of 1950 and risk a nuclear confrontation with the United States. (20:39-41)

Developments in 1966 indicated that the Soviet Union is not maneuvering to obtain a major détente with the United States but appears more interested in indirect maneuvers for exploiting the disagreements within the Western Alliance. The Soviets have been concentrating on probing the weak spots of the Western position, both in Europe and among the new nations. They had apparently decided that a breathing spell could be obtained in the arms race without maneuvering for an overall détente, and that they could continue undermining Western positions in various parts of the world. (40:30) A deviation from this approach appeared in late 1966 when it was revealed that the Soviets were deploying an antihallistic missile defense. (72:1) However, even this move does not seem irreversible as discussions were being held in early 1967 between the United States and Russia concerning possible agreement on the abandonment of development and deployment of such systems. (62:

10) Further evidence to indicate that the Soviets may be seeking a breathing spell in the arms race is possibly contained in the United States-Soviet Union treaty to ban nuclear weapons from outer space signed on 27 January 1967. (82:3)

II — INTERNAL CONSIDERATIONS

Various internal considerations exercise an effect on the Soviet Union's disarmament policy. Among the most influential of these are the economic situation in the Soviet Union, the Soviet deep-seated objections to inspection and control in conjunction with disarmament proposals, and the possibility of the Soviets gaining a military advantage over the Western World. The first of these influences could cause the Russians to seek relief from the arms race, while the last two might militate against agreement in disarmament negotiations. These three considerations will now be discussed.

The Soviet Economic Situation.

In the field of economics the greatest problems appear to lie in agriculture and industry, in improving the standard of living, and in defense and space spending.

Agriculture and Industry. In January 1959 Premier Khrushchev's keynote speech to the 21st Soviet Communist Party Congress contained a timetable for a Soviet economic victory over capitalism. By 1970, Khrushchev claimed, Soviet agriculture and industry both would be out-producing the United States on a per capita basis and in total output. (61:122) Khrushchev's boast has turned out to be a gross miscalculation. Based on current trends, per capita Soviet production in 1970

may be no more than 30 percent of the United States output. (37:2)

The critical predicament of Soviet agriculture is confirmed by the fact that the Soviets have been forced to import grain in 1963, 1964, and 1965. Reliable reports show that they bought a total of 1,100,000 tons of grain from Canada, Belgium, and France between October 1964 and February 1965. In addition, the Soviet Union made huge purchases of soybeans in the United States, of wool in Australia, and of cattle in various European countries. (22:223) In June 1966 they signed an agreement with Canada to obtain 800 million tons of grain and another agreement with France to obtain 200 million tons of grain. The grain is to be received over the next 3 years. (29:1)

Moreover, one must consider the fact that an adverse change in nature may combine with inherent Communist inefficiency to prolong the agricultural difficulties. During the past 15 years, cooler and wetter summers have been unfavorable to wheat and rye in the northern part of Russia, while other areas have been plagued by droughts. Studies have indicated that these conditions could prevail for the next 200 years. (37:2)

However, agriculture still suffers most from the resentment of peasants on collective farms. In recent years small, peasant-owned private plots, which make up only 3 to 4 percent of the arable land, accounted for 30 to 40 percent of total Soviet agricultural production. (91:1018) Additional agricultural difficulties can be traced to a failure to emphasize production of fertilizer and pesticides, the overcropping of new lands which exhausted their moisture, and an attempt to grow certain crops on land not suited for them. (91:1021)

In industry, plants built in the 1930's are still being operated. Money is badly

neced for retooling and capital investment, but it is in short supply. (65:1) Industrial output has been hampered by bad management, wastefulness, and an ineffective use of the country's labor force. For example, every year millions of industrial workers move from one plant to another on their own initiative, and about one-third of these transferees change their profession. In 1963 these movements were estimated to cost the economy two billion rubles in lost man-days. (67:623)

The Soviets are making every effort to overcome their economic difficulties in the area of agriculture and industry. In the new Five Year Plan, 205 billion rubles (\$227.5 billion) are being invested in agriculture, industry, transportation, and communications. Two-fifths of this amount have been allocated to industry. (67:623) This and other efforts will be necessary to achieve a vitalization of Soviet agriculture and industry and may cause the Soviets to become more genuinely interested in disarmament negotiations to slow down or eliminate the arms race.

Improved Standard of Living.

The Soviet leaders have been faced for some years with the perennial choice of investing in heavy or light industry. For some time the decision has been in favor of producer goods and raw materials at the expense of consumer goods. However, after Stalin's death in 1953 Georgi Malenkov tried to bring about substantial increases in consumer durables. Although the attempt was not successful, the idea was retained by Khrushchev, Bulganin, and others. The Soviet's Seven Year Plan for 1959-1965 promised increased quantities of milk, butter, meat, sugar, vegetables, and fruit. Further, good and attractive clothing and shoes were to be available, and the people's housing situation was

to be improved. (61:122) Khrushchev made extravagant promises of dramatic improvements in living standards in the late 1950's and sparked a revolution of rising expectations among the populace that has not been fulfilled. In addition, 1959 saw Khrushchev promise higher real wages, increased minimum wages, a shorter workweek, and abolition of the Soviet income tax. These promises either have not been met or have only been partially realized. (61:176)

Following the removal of Khrushchev, the new Soviet leaders, Brezhnev and Kosygin, continued efforts to raise the standard of living of the Soviet people. At the 23rd Party Congress Premier Kosygin declared that consumer goods industries will grow by 43-46 percent during the years 1966-1970 as compared to a 36 percent growth for 1961-1965. (90:225) Significantly, these industries are to grow almost as rapidly as heavy industry. Kosygin's statement also contained a promise of higher quality consumer goods and a greater variety.

Some European experts argue that the Soviet Union has gone beyond the point of no return in her efforts to improve the standard of living. These experts believe that a consumer-dominated economy is inevitable. (14:174) The Soviet leaders are now faced with the problem of providing this higher standard of living, and it probably will be achieved only at the expense of other Soviet endeavors, possibly the arms race.

Defense and Space Spending.

The pace of future Soviet economic expansion is a great unknown. One of the key variables in determining that pace is the burden of defense and space expenditures that the Soviet Union will have to bear in the coming years. Expenditures on defense and space ex-

ploration may be considered together since both have military implications and require similar kinds of inputs. (90:225) Defense and space production place a serious demand on research and managerial personnel and material resources. Russia invests a high proportion of such talent on nuclear and rocket research and on weapons development. (91:1021) A reduction in these expenditures could enable the government to shift large quantities of resources to help meet the needs of the civilian economy. (61:239)

In the area of monetary expenditures, Premier Kosygin announced a 500 million ruble (\$550 million) reduction in the Soviet Armed Forces budget in December 1964. (91:1023) However, one year later, in December 1965, Kosygin announced that his country was forced to increase the military budget for 1966 by 600 million rubles because the United States is "whipping up military psychosis." (55:1) Still one year later, in December 1966, the Soviet Government announced an increase in its defense spending for 1967. The increase will create a 1967 defense budget that will be 8 percent greater than it was in 1966. (70:1) These annual increases seem to bear out J. M. Mackintosh when he wrote: "As seen in 1960, the priorities of Soviet economic policy appear to be: first, defence and science; and second, the standard of living required to give the Soviet Union 'model' status. . . ." (42:329) No one seems to know where it will end. Evidence can be presented to show that such defense spending does not severely strain the Soviet economy. However, in a very real sense any amount of defense spending places a "burden" on a nation's economy. (90:225) In support of this, one may note that Kremlin economic planners have protested against the installation of an antimissile-missile system in the Soviet Union

on the basis of the cost involved. (69:59)

As noted above, defense and space programs place a large demand on scientists, technicians, and specialized production facilities. These resources are needed to achieve success in increasing industrial productivity and efficiency, boosting agricultural output, and expanding consumer goods output. (90:241) It is fairly well accepted that the more that is spent on defense now, the lower will be the growth rate. The Soviet Union seems to be faced with a difficult choice between trying to win the economic growth race with the United States and retaining her position as champion of world communism. (90:241)

Objections to Inspection and Control.

Of all the major issues involved in disarmament negotiations, the Soviet bent on secrecy in inspection and control has been one of the most stubborn and most persistent issues frustrating disarmament agreement. (17:142) The Soviets registered their first objection in this regard when they opposed the comprehensive international inspection and control measures of the Baruch Plan. (30:21) We will now examine three prime determinants of the Soviet stress on secrecy with regard to inspection and control.

Political Factors. In the time of the Tsars, secrecy was used as a screen between the Russian autocratic system and the industrial revolution. The Russian rulers deliberately preserved the backwardness of their country in order to safeguard their power. As Russia's industrializing Western neighbors gradually pulled ahead of her, the need for secrecy increased. The Russian masses could not be allowed to compare their

miserable condition with that of their more fortunate neighbors. (26:726)

Stalin used secrecy as a device to maintain the regime's grip on the social order. Secrecy was achieved by segregating all social groups through the erection of communication barriers between Russian rank and file and the elite, and between different elites. (17:145) In this regard, the maintenance of internal barriers to the flow of information helped secure the status of the top leaders and reduced the possible influence of the rank and file on policy formulation. (17:146)

Soviet leadership has been equally intent on protecting its political control structure from outside influences as well. An object of Soviet concern is the very existence of alternative loyalties, appeals, and ideologies. (17:146) An illustration of how strong this feeling is can be found in Stalin's refusal to allow Allied planes or troops to be stationed in the Soviet Union in 1942-44, even though such forces could have rendered valuable assistance.

In addition, the Soviets have employed secrecy as a weapon in both domestic and international political warfare. The occurrence of accidents, disasters, or disorders within the Soviet Union are rarely reported in Soviet news media. This may stem from a policy to minimize adverse information and not to disturb confidence in the Communist system of government. (17:147) Essential to internal and external Soviet politics is the image of progress -- the image of communism, as the "wave of the future." A careful manipulation of information supports this image through the accentuation of positive accomplishment and the dissimulation of failure. (26:733)

Economic Factors. The Soviet Union has been reluctant to open the country to outsiders for fear of expos-

ing economic weaknesses. Many production facilities, laboratories, and some of the armaments in stockpiles are admitted to be below Western standards. The Soviets do not wish to exhibit such items, especially to Westerners. (39:53) It is possible, however, that improvements in material conditions might reduce their reluctance to accept reasonable inspection proposals out of fear of exposing "shameful" spots to foreign observers. (64:419-420) One Soviet official is credited with saying that the attitudes of the United States and the Soviet Union toward secrecy will change in the future. This will occur when socialism is on the top and capitalism on the bottom. At that time the Soviet Union will allow inspection "of everything" and the United States will be the party to refuse entry to foreigners. (39:53)

Military Factors. In a military sense it is quite probable that the Soviet Union regards secrecy as an important asset. In fact, it is not too hard to conclude that secrecy may be an integral part of Soviet doctrine:

If the 1961 American estimates of the relatively modest scale of Russian strategic capacity are correct, we have a ready explanation of the Russians' unwillingness to allow their territory to be inspected to this degree (required by the West). For it is undeniably likely that teams of inspectors visiting several times a year any part of Russia in which a shock wave has been recorded, might locate one or more of the Russian ICBM sites. And if there are indeed less than fifty of these missiles in existence -- grouped probably in sites containing several missiles -- the discovery of even a few of these sites would begin to destroy the invulnerability of the main Russian strategic deterrent. Such are the awkward consequences of the Russians' having adopted a policy of the "minimum deterrent" dependent for its invulnerability upon secrecy. (79:171)

Secrecy serves both to cover weaknesses and to keep a potential enemy guessing about elements of strength. Further, secrecy obscures the direction and rate of military research and development. For example, Soviet secrecy was responsible for the myth of the missile gap in the 1960's. (17:147) Secrecy also prevents an accurate estimate of Soviet capabilities. Many times in the past the United States has credited the Soviet Armed Forces with greater strength or combat readiness than was warranted. (17:148)

Finally, it is quite possible that Western determination that inspection systems must be established before disarmament takes place only serves to revive Communist fears that capitalist disarmament proposals are designed for espionage.

One of the difficulties in any inspection scheme is that it is bound to yield information beyond its intended purpose. This is partly because the personnel and techniques of surveillance will simply "see" a lot of things other than the particular objects and activities that they are intended to monitor. It is partly because some of the very knowledge required in order to verify compliance, or in order to safeguard against dangerous military preparations outside the agreement, will itself be "sensitive" information. That is, it will be information that can be misused by the inspecting country, or that is conducive to military instability. The obvious example, and one that is alleged to underlie the Soviet depreciation of inspection and control, is the acquisition of targeting information for a strategic attack as a by-product of an inspection system intended to reduce vulnerability. (28:103)

The Soviet Union undoubtedly recognizes that because of the Iron Curtain any international inspection or control system operating within her boundaries would benefit the West more than an equivalent system operating in the West. There is a strong possibility that the

Soviet Union already has most of the information the system would develop. (10:274) Unless Moscow is given compelling reasons, she is not likely to surrender this strategic advantage.

Potential Soviet Military Advantage.

The third major influence on the Soviet attitude toward disarmament is based on the premise that the Soviet Union is gaining offensive and defensive advantages over the West, and that in the event of all-out war capitalism would be destroyed whereas socialism would survive.

Offensive Advantage. In a report to the Supreme Soviets on 14 January 1960 Premier Khrushchev asserted, "The balance of forces in the international arena is in favor of the peace-loving states." (24:923) Khrushchev assured the assembly that Russia had sufficient nuclear weapons and weapons carriers literally to wipe any aggressor off the face of the earth. He further stated that the Soviet Union has the advantage of an enormous area and of a population which is less concentrated in large industrial centers than are the inhabitants of many other countries. Marshal R. Malinovsky, the Soviet Minister of Defense, echoed the same basic sentiments in 1962. In an interview with *Pravda*, he proclaimed with all of the authority of his office "that we are now the stronger, and of course we are not standing still." (24:924) He stated that the Soviets would rout anyone who attacked them or their allies. A month later he warned the "imperialists" not to touch or threaten the Soviet Union, lest they be consumed without trace in nuclear hell. (24:924) He boasted of Soviet conventional forces, rocket forces, and missile-equipped land forces and proclaimed that Polaris sub-

marines would not be spared from destruction.

Whether or not these boasts were accurate in the early 1960's or are accurate today is not known. What is known is that the Soviet Union is engaged in a massive military research and new weapon development program geared to acquire the equipments necessary to back up their claims.

The Soviets have developed a whole new family of solid-fueled missiles, ranging from relatively short-range battlefield weapons to ICBMs and long-range submarine-based missiles. In the ICBM field the Soviets apparently are concentrating on two types of multi-stage, solid-fueled missiles — one used in silo-launched hardened sites and the other used on a mobile, caterpillar-tracked launcher. Additionally, top Soviet military officials made frequent reference in 1965 to their development of maneuverable warheads for ICBMs designed as a penetration aid. The Soviets are also pursuing significant liquid-fueled rocket developments with indications that these can be used as specialized weapons to boost warheads as powerful as 100 megatons. Further, the Soviets have moved to a Polaris-type submarine and underwater-launched missile with much longer range. Both the submarine and the missile are in large-scale production. (73:90)

In December 1966, Vice Admiral Charles B. Martell, U.S. Navy, announced that the Russians have embarked on an aggressive submarine building program and now have more than 40 nuclear submarines. (87:23) Admiral Martell placed the total Russian submarine force at 400 in all, able to carry 120 missiles.

In contrast to Soviet efforts, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that budgetary cuts to compensate for the war in Vietnam have continually postponed many major U.S. advanced weapons systems.

(34:11) The Joint Chiefs are concerned that the Soviets are accomplishing more in advanced weaponry than Secretary of Defense McNamara is giving them credit for. (89:16) As an example, in the same year that Secretary McNamara told Congress that the Soviets had no solid-fueled missile capability, the Soviets unveiled a whole family of these missiles, indicating second generation development in their solid-fueled ICBM program. (34:11)

Defensive Advantage. The Soviets have been concentrating their antisubmarine warfare program on new detection devices, development of nuclear depth bombs, and hunter-killer type submarines. They apparently feel that detection, tracking, and destruction are feasible tactics against a planned total U.S. force of only 41 Polaris-type submarines. (73:90)

The Soviets are making their major move in the development and deployment of an elaborate system of anti-missile defense. Their nuclear weapon production, which they claim has surpassed that of the United States, is believed primarily devoted now to relatively small nuclear warheads for antimissile weapons. The Soviet anti-missile defense system apparently includes both an extremely high-altitude interception and destruct capability and a medium-altitude capability coupled with a new radar system capable of discriminating between authentic warhead reentry vehicles and decoys. (73:90)

Little is known about the efficacy of this system, but most experts believe it must have at least a fractional effectiveness or it would not have been deployed. (4:E3) However, the new missile sites are believed to be in place or going into place not only around Moscow and Leningrad but also around other major cities. (69:59)

The Soviets' decision to start produc-

tion, after several false starts, was apparently made in 1964 after they had time to analyze the results of their A-bomb tests of 1961-62. Those 1961-62 tests, the most extensive ever conducted, were designed in part to gauge the "kill power" of antimissiles at various altitudes. The tests provided vital information and, it is reported, convinced Soviet leaders that an anti-missile-missile was worth building. (81:31)

What was the vital information that these tests provided? It is quite possible that it was the discovery of the effects of a nuclear explosion byproduct known as electromagnetic pulses (EMP). In their column on 27 January 1963 columnists Robert Allen and Paul Scott wrote:

Several weeks ago this column disclosed that these new Soviet tests have been most extraordinary. They include a number of ballistic missile firings, ranging from ICBMs to anti-missile missiles. In one of these tests, three IRBMs were destroyed by a single nuclear blast from the warhead of what U.S. experts believe is the latest Soviet anti-missile missile.

The U.S. has had no comparable tests. (1:6)

The Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services of the United States Senate reported the following in 1963:

The Soviets have overtaken and surpassed us in design of high-yield nuclear weapons. They may possess knowledge of weapons effects and anti-ballistic missile programs superior to ours. . . . It is prudent to assume that the Soviet Union has acquired a unique and potentially valuable body of data on high-yield blast shock, and electromagnetic pulse phenomena which is not available to the United States. (71:15)

EMP is a phenomenon of physics that can devastate power facilities and communications. When electronics

equipment is hit by a burst of EMP, the effect is like a lightning bolt. The blast can melt wires, burn out transistorized circuits, and break insulation. (54:77) The fear is that the Soviets' antimissile-missile system may be capable of deactivating United States missiles in their silos by EMP from exploding high-yield nuclear weapons. The missiles in the silo would be rendered inert, incapable of being fired or easily repaired. (71:14-15)

The U.S. Defense Department has given a high priority to EMP research at the Atomic Energy Commission's laboratory at Los Alamos. Combined efforts of the AEC and the U.S. Air Force have produced elementary methods for shielding missile launching facilities from EMP effects. (54:77) Other work is being done to develop electronic equipment less sensitive to radiation, but its effectiveness against high-yield explosives will be questionable. (71:14-15)

As this paper is being written the question of the extent and effectiveness of the Soviets' antimissile system continues to be raised in various quarters. An article in the 6 February 1967 issue of *U.S. News & World Report* stated that a Russian breakthrough in missile defense is causing open and serious concern among United States scientists and military men. (35:36) This particular report was discounted by Pentagon officials. (53:7) On 5 February 1967 an examination of the Russian developments and their possible consequences to the United States was clearly presented in a *New York Times* article by Hanson Baldwin. (5:1) Mr. Baldwin cited the U.S. knowledge gap, that the destruction or neutralization of missile warheads might be accomplished by one of several effects, and predicted sweeping strategic, political, and economic consequences for the United States.

III — EXTERNAL CONSIDERATIONS

Just as there are certain internal considerations which must be examined in an effort to understand the basis for current Soviet disarmament policy, there are external considerations as well. Three such considerations appear to be most influential and will now be examined. They are the Soviets' concern over nuclear proliferation, NATO nuclear sharing, and Communist China. The first and third of these influences might be considered as conducive to Soviet agreement to certain disarmament measures, whereas the second appears to be an obstacle in the path of agreement.

Nuclear Proliferation.

The problem of nuclear proliferation has been with us since the early 1940's. Despite strict U.S. security policies and many vigorous protests, the world's "nuclear club" now has five members. (33:1) Russia gained membership in 1949 which spurred the British to produce their bomb in 1952. France, which became the fourth nuclear power in 1960, was followed by Red China in 1964. Just how critical is the problem of proliferation, and how is it viewed by the Soviets? We will now deal with the issues involved in the answers to this question.

An Influence for Evil?

Nuclear proliferation has long been viewed as being politically, militarily, and morally bad, as it could conceivably contribute to political instabilities and increase the chances of nuclear war. (21:10) This gives rise to fear of accidental war, catalytic war, escalation of small or limited wars into general war, and unstable relations among nuclear nations.

Secretary McNamara registered concern over accidental war resulting from an accidental explosion in his testimony before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in March 1966. (63:18) He ventured that nuclear weapons in the hands of small powers threaten "the almost certain result of an accidental detonation at some time," with difficulties in diagnosing the cause of detonation giving rise to the risk of nuclear war. However, an opposite view holds that it simply is not plausible that an accidental nuclear explosion could stampe a major nuclear power into a general war. (77:4)

The scenario for a catalytic war calls for a minor nuclear power to launch a nuclear attack on one major power and make it appear that the attack came from another major power. (77:5) A variation would be an attack on both while the small power simulates each of the two major powers. United States officials do not give this theory much credibility. They claim that modern radar and other present-day devices would instantly tell where any bomb or missile came from, and cite the Washington-Moscow "hot line" as being available for instant consultation. (57:34) Catalytic war is believed to be a remote possibility only if the retaliatory forces of the major powers are highly vulnerable and if relations between the major powers are already in a high state of tension.

The danger of escalation appears to exist with or without nuclear weapon dissemination. However, the Nth country problem does increase the risk of nuclear wars occurring between small powers. (77:5) There are few who hold that escalation of small or limited wars will result from nuclear dissemination.

That nuclear dissemination will increase the risks of wars between smaller nations seems to have the broadest base

of belief. (77:5) The spread of weapons may generate fear, and when governments become fearful, they are likely to adopt unfriendly and divisive policies. (60:36) Thus, proliferation can increase the number of uncertainties affecting international tensions and add to the problems of managing the world.

Finally, an inherent danger in nuclear proliferation is that as each new country joins the nuclear club, other countries are provided more incentive to join. Secretary McNamara pointed this out when he stated that as each new nation acquires a nuclear capability a larger number of nations are prompted to "go nuclear," and the problem grows. (63:18) This idea is contained in the nuclear "domino theory." The theory operates in this manner: Red China's atomic power will compel India to develop a similar capability to offset the inequality in armed strength. When this occurs, Pakistan will feel obliged to take steps to guard against India's nuclear might. Similar reasoning can infect Israel and the United Arab Republic. The argument continues, and one by one the majority of the medium powers find sufficient reason to acquire a nuclear force. (32:1) However, this somewhat bizarre and slightly fantastic theory is used mostly as a scare technique for promoting disarmament measures.

Where Is The Danger? Would an increase in the membership of the nuclear club be all that bad? There are officials in the United States who would give at least a qualified "no" answer. These people believe that the dangers of proliferation have been overstated and the consequences presented too darkly. (57:34)

There are others who propose that world stability might be enhanced through increased membership. Repre-

sentatives from India, Australia, and Japan gave voice to this view at the International Assembly on Nuclear Weapons in Scarborough, Ont., in 1966. (21:10) They stated that nuclear proliferation among certain Asian and South Pacific states might be desirable in providing an Asian counterbalance to Red China. However, these same people recognized the prohibitive costs involved in nuclear development; this cost factor serves as a brake on them and others who entertain the idea of going nuclear.

An estimated cost for a nation to develop a nuclear force capable of challenging the two major powers has been placed at \$3 to \$5 billion annually for a decade or more. (60:37) Another source has stated that a nation which launches a nuclear power program signs a blank check on her future financial and industrial resources. (7:4) When such costs are considered, it can be argued that the danger of proliferation is not too great. Which of the nations (India, Egypt, or Israel) considered to be leading candidates to join the nuclear club (38:15) is financially prepared to make such a move? For these and other countries, sheer cost alone is a deterrent even if a scientific, industrial, and technological capability is present. (57:34)

The Soviets' View. The Soviet leaders are believed to want a nonproliferation treaty to isolate further Red China and reinforce their own supremacy as the leading Communist power. (57:34) The Soviets have shown a definite reluctance to allow the membership in the nuclear club to grow, as witnessed by their refusal to provide a nuclear force to Eastern Europe and their curtailment of aid to the Red Chinese in 1959. (41:133-134)

Russia is particularly sensitive to the thought of West Germany sharing any

control over nuclear weapons through participation in a Multilateral Force (MLF) or an Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF). The United States has been unsuccessful in her attempts to convince the Soviet Union that such forces are compatible with a nonproliferation treaty. (38:141) The United States and the Soviet Union each presented draft treaties on nonproliferation at Geneva in the summer of 1966. The fundamental and apparently unchangeable objection of the Russians to the United States proposal is the manifest desire of the United States to include an option whereby nuclear sharing with West Germany would be permitted through the NATO alliance. (85:4)

On 9 December 1966 the United States and the Soviet Union agreed on a treaty prohibiting weapons in space. (23:1) The treaty bars the installation of nuclear weapons on celestial bodies and placement of such weapons in orbit around the earth or otherwise stationing them in space. Further, all military bases, installations, fortifications, nuclear weapon testing, and military maneuvers are banned on celestial bodies. (75:18) This agreement is viewed as a step along the way to a pact to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. Thus, Soviet agreement fosters encouragement for the eventual signing of a nonproliferation treaty. If the Soviets are actually this close, what obstacle yet remains? One possible answer is contained in the following:

The major impediment to agreement here is the Soviet position on the NATO Multilateral Force (MLF). Whatever the balance of considerations for and against it in the West, there is no reason to question the fact that Soviet statements on the MLF reflect actual concern about its anticipated effects and prospects—including the eventual acquisition of independent nuclear capability by West Germany. (17:129)

NATO Nuclear Sharing.

In August 1957 the Soviets announced that they had launched intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of carrying thermonuclear warheads. This event had staggering military, strategic, political, and psychological consequences. For the first time the United States homeland was open to devastating attacks by invulnerable weapons launched from Europe. There were misgivings among the NATO nations about the value of the United States guarantee to employ her nuclear sword in the defense of Europe. (31:1030) This marked the beginning of the NATO nuclear sharing problem. Over the years this problem has come to be portrayed as a "German problem." (3:693) The following discussion centers about the three principal nations involved—West Germany, the United States, and Russia.

West Germany. West Germany has made impressive advances in nuclear technology since 1958. These advances have helped initiate the feeling that the Germans are about to launch on a weapons building program. (3:697) West Germany's future in the nuclear field is one of increasing strength and diversity. However, her remarkable advances in this field do not mean that she will endeavor to develop or obtain a military nuclear capability. (3:697)

On the incentive side of the ledger, however, Germany has a more immediate reason for wanting to control nuclear weapons than Britain or France. (56:206) In the event of Soviet aggression, the latter's need for nuclear forces is somewhat remote, whereas Germany could easily be faced with the hunt of the fighting if the Allies displayed any reluctance to use nuclear weapons for fear of expanding the war.

On the other hand, there are various considerations that seem to militate against West Germany's desire for nuclear weapons. West Germany's size is not favorable for a nuclear weapons program. Adequate underground testing sites would be difficult to find, and the requirements for dispersal of a fixed missile system could not be met. (3:697) Further, if West Germany did decide to build a nuclear force designed to threaten the Soviet Union, she would run a high risk of drawing a Soviet preemptive attack in the development stage. (3:698) Another negative consideration is the fact that West Germany renounced the production of nuclear weapons in the Paris Agreements of 1954. (88:656) A revision or violation of the Western European Union Protocol of 1955 is the only path open to West Germany. (7:110) A violation would certainly create strong opposition and uneasiness throughout Western Europe. In fact, the NATO alliance might not survive such a crisis. (56:208)

A peculiar situation is posed by West Germany's desire to obtain nuclear weapons in order to pressure for reunification. In 1964 Amatai Etzioni reported that about one-third of the 25 German generals he interviewed were in favor of West Germany gaining control of nuclear weapons. (25:8-9) These generals viewed such possession as a means of putting pressure on the U.S.S.R. to bring about German reunification. West German Foreign Minister Schroeder stated in July 1965 that his country was not ready to renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons until the reunification of Germany was agreed to by the Soviet Union. (3:698) The remarkable thing about these views is the practical certainty that the usefulness of the nuclear weapons issue in gaining reunification would be shat-

tered once Germany actually acquired weapons.

In summary, West Germany's acquisition of a nuclear force would probably be politically regarded as a calamitous threat to the peace. (56:207) For this reason and the realization that possession would most likely defeat any possibility of reunification in the foreseeable future, the West Germans do not seem to want their own nuclear weapons. What they apparently want is the bargaining power that the threat of acquiring weapons may bring to them. (3:699)

The United States. The United States has emphasized the establishment of collectively owned and managed nuclear forces for two reasons. The United States desires, first, to discourage national nuclear efforts, and, second, to help create a framework of Atlantic partnership which could be of a major importance to the future of European unity. (3:694)

The United States took her first steps toward the establishment of such nuclear forces when President Eisenhower participated in the NATO Council decision of 1957. The Council decided that "intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM's) will have to be put at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe." (52:29) The Council decision called for a bilateral force composed of two elements: the United States would furnish the nuclear warheads and another NATO nation would maintain the firing unit. Thus, there would be two independent fingers on the trigger. In order to fire a nuclear weapon, authority must come from the President of the United States, and his action must be concurred in by the other partner in the bilateral force. (31:1038)

Although the creation of such forces has been successful from a military

viewpoint, objections have developed on political and strategic grounds. These objections are based upon European national interests, a gnawing fear of overdependence on the United States for nuclear protection, and doubt regarding the credibility of the United States deterrent unless her forces in southern Germany became directly involved in the event of Soviet aggression. (31:1039) Because only IRBM's were involved, concern also arose over a NATO medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) nuclear "gap."

The proposal of an MLF was a United States attempt to provide MRBM coverage without putting strategic missiles in Europe. The MLF was to serve the additional purpose of placating President de Gaulle's insistence on an independent nuclear role for France. (63:15) This force was to be composed of 25 surface vessels. Each ship was to carry eight Polaris missiles equipped with nuclear warheads and crews drawn from all the NATO allies. (19:208)

In her efforts the United States has appeared primarily concerned with assisting West Germany in obtaining "an appropriate share in the nuclear defense" of Western Europe. (36:5) Because of this seeming preoccupation, the general discussion of nuclear sharing within NATO has left the impression that the central problem is how best to satisfy the German desire for further control of nuclear weapons. (3:693)

To many Europeans the United States' real purpose in proposing nuclear sharing within NATO seems simply to provide a convenient way of giving the Germans nuclear weapons. Consequently, the issue of Germany and nuclear weapons tends to dominate talk of nuclear sharing and creates varying degrees of concern. (3:695) The resulting strong opposition has dampened U.S. insistence on the establishment of

an MLF but has not caused her to scrap the plans entirely.

Even in the face of the establishment of a permanent nuclear planning group within NATO, the United States still has not abandoned her idea of a nuclear force for NATO. (80:8) According to the British view, the establishment of this planning group permanently shelved all plans for a multinational nuclear force in which West Germany would have access to nuclear weapons. U.S. officials took an opposite view in their statement that the formation of such a force had not been preempted. Thus today, despite the fact that MLF is considered a dead beast, it has not been buried. (63:16)

The U.S.S.R. James Richardson makes the point that the danger of a violent Russian reaction to German nuclear weapons has been exaggerated. (56:207) He points out that the Russians agreed to West German rearmament, and in 1957-58 Khrushchev responded to the decision of the NATO Council to equip the German Army with tactical nuclear-delivery vehicles with nothing more than menacing language. (56:207) This reaction probably stemmed from two Russian understandings. First, the Soviets are aware that they enjoy an overwhelming military strength against West Germany. (56:207) Second, the weapons in the NATO stockpile are all of relatively short range, unable to reach targets within the Soviet Union. For example, the maximum range of the Pershing missile is 400 nautical miles. (31:1039)

In contrast, the Russians have objected to the formation of an MLF from the very beginning. In 1964 the Soviet representative in Geneva stated that the Russians were ready to agree to a non-proliferation treaty if the MLF hurdle was removed. (63:17) The MLF was proposed as a seaborne nuclear force

equipped with nuclear weapons capable of striking the Soviet mainland; this provides one obvious reason for Soviet objection.

The Soviets objected additionally because they did not want such weapons in the hands of West Germany. The United States explained that the nuclear warheads would remain in the U.S. custody, and U.S.-operated electronic locks would control their release. (31:1041) The United States argued that the MLF was the best way of preventing Germany from ever obtaining national control over a nuclear force. (38:141) The Russians are unconvinced. In fact, as recently as November 1966, the chief Soviet disarmament negotiator, A. A. Roschin, voiced concern in the United Nations that the United States still had not developed concrete measures for keeping nuclear weapons out of West German hands. (68:48) At the same time the Russians have not balked at the establishment of a NATO nuclear planning group which includes West Germany as one of four permanent members. (80:1) This group is to meet periodically to consider nuclear tactics and strategy.

In summary, it appears that any further militarization of West Germany by the establishment of an MLF in which West Germany shares control would preclude Russia's cooperation in the reunification of Germany. (36:5) It would also provide an insurmountable obstacle to agreement on a non-proliferation treaty.

Communist China.

In considering Communist China, the main purpose is to discuss areas which will illuminate the way in which Red China may have influenced Soviet disarmament policy in recent years. This influence should not be exagger-

ated. As we have seen, there are other important influences, so one must not become fascinated by the drama of the Sino-Soviet dispute and accept Red China as the complete or even major explanation of Soviet disarmament policy. The impact of Red China is examined in terms of Soviet conference tactics, Soviet disarmament proposals, and serious Soviet interest in negotiating disarmament agreements.

Soviet Conference Tactics. The first example of possible Chinese influence on Soviet maneuvers in conference tactics can be cited as occurring in August 1957 when the Soviets proposed an end to the London disarmament talks. (41:75) The Chinese were excluded from these talks where issues clearly affecting them, e.g., conventional force levels, had been discussed. From this, one might contend that the Soviets decided to scuttle the conference in order to enhance the likelihood of success at pending negotiations with the Chinese in Moscow. Without denying this possibility, there seem to be other plausible explanations for the Soviets' action. The Kremlin had long objected to this five-power United Nations disarmament subcommittee in which four NATO Allies were aligned against her. The success of her first ICBM and the impending launch of Sputnik I conceivably caused the Soviets to select this time to insist on parity in disarmament forums. (66:124) Soviet withdrawal may have resulted from a judgment that the subcommittee had failed and had run its course.

The Soviet walkout from the 10 Nation Committee on 27 June 1960 provides a second example. (27:41) This maneuver seems explained easily by relating it to the Soviets' threat, following the U-2 incident, to halt further contacts with the U.S. Administration until after the 1960 presidential elections.

Also, the committee was making no progress, and there was a possibility that the West was on the verge of making a proposal which might detract from the significance of Moscow's "general and complete disarmament" (GCD) plan. (66:126) However, there is evidence to indicate that the Soviets did not wish to have disarmament negotiations with the West going on at the same time the 3rd Congress of the Rumanian Workers Party was meeting in Bucharest. (27:41) The likelihood is that Khrushchev, in anticipating increased difficulties with the Chinese and intense introbloc maneuvering, wanted to prepare for the Bucharest meeting undistracted by Geneva and innocent of any Chinese allegations that he was consorting with the West. (66:126)

Another Soviet tactical maneuver occurred with the signing of the Limited Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty in 1963. (84:60) The possibility exists that Khrushchev convened test-ban talks with the United States and the United Kingdom deliberately timed to coincide with Soviet-Chinese negotiations which broke down in disagreement. (27:40) Khrushchev stood ready to sign the test-ban treaty and to use the treaty as a major issue in the Sino-Soviet rift. Clearly, Sino-Soviet relations had a major impact on the Kremlin's attitude toward the test-ban.

Relations with China probably had a good deal to do with Soviet maneuvering to postpone the meetings of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) in the spring of 1965. The Soviets tended to speak very softly on those points of their disarmament position known to be offensive to the Chinese and to make some show of support for Chinese disarmament positions. In this regard, the ENDC may have appeared to be one irritant that could be dispensed with in the Russian-Chinese relationship. (66:127) An-

other consideration was the Soviets' desire to avoid any Chinese accusation that the former were willing to engage in disarmament negotiations while the Vietnam war was going on. (27:41)

From this brief discussion of conference tactics, one might judge that the Russians are prone to hack away from disarmament talks when they are trying to improve relations with the Chinese, as in 1957, 1960, and 1965. On the other hand, the Russians have shown some preference for disarmament talks when they have abandoned efforts to improve Sino-Soviet relations, as occurred in 1963 and 1966. (27:42)

Soviet Disarmament Proposals.

The Soviet GCD proposal of September 1959 is probably the most interesting Soviet action to examine in considering the effect of the Chinese on Soviet disarmament proposals. The Chinese would have been satisfied if the Russians had used the proposal to embarrass and expose the capitalists. However, the Russians chose also to embellish the proposal with certain doctrinal assertions concerning the nature of imperialism and the preventability of war. (66:128) When the Chinese took exception to the notion of a "world without arms, a world without war," Khrushchev seemed readily inclined to dispute them. He apparently looked upon the GCD proposal and its doctrinal trimmings as a profitable issue to pursue with the Red Chinese. He must have been guided by the belief that his stand on this issue would have appeal among the Soviet population, the international Communist movement, and the third world. (66:129) For his purposes, Khrushchev could use the Chinese opposition to GCD as "proof" that the Chinese really wanted nuclear war. (27:38)

In later Khrushchev years, certain Soviet disarmament proposals seemed

clearly designed to demonstrate Moscow's readiness to take positions irrespective of Chinese concurrence or opposition. In fact, the year 1962 appeared to mark a point after which the Russians actually increased their interest in making proposals likely to arouse Chinese opposition. (66:129)

The "nuclear umbrella" plan of September 1962 is a good example of a proposal on which the Soviets expected and were willing to accept strong Chinese criticism. (27:42) This plan called for the retention of a limited quantity of nuclear delivery vehicles by Russia and the United States during the complete disarmament process. (78:160) The Soviet proposal apparently impressed the Chinese as a demonstration of Soviet readiness to establish an atomic monopoly with the United States. (66:129)

Following Khrushchev's fall, Soviet disarmament proposals seemed to show greater concern for the feelings of Communist China. The Soviets' program was more in consonance with Chinese ideas and contained signs of soft-pedaling earlier Soviet advocacy of proposals considered objectionable by the Chinese. However, this pattern changed in the summer of 1965. Quite possibly at this time further deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations caused the Russians to abandon their concern for the feelings of Red China. In any event, the foregoing examination does seem to lead to the conclusion that "disarmament proposals have at various times played a role in Moscow's tactical conduct of the dispute with the Chinese, sometimes as a stick, sometimes as a carrot." (66:130)

Soviet Disarmament Agreements. A favorite and major example of Chinese influence on the willingness of the Soviets to engage in serious negotiations leading to agreement is the

1963 Test-Ban Treaty. (27:43) Soviet signing of the treaty is presented as evidence of Soviet disregard for Chinese disapproval and as providing a weapon to undercut the Chinese position. A second example in this category is the possibility that the Chinese factor may influence future Soviet actions to seek agreements as a means of showing that peaceful coexistence and cooperation with the United States are not only possible, but effective. (27:44)

Another author holds that the Chinese influence in Soviet disarmament policy has been overdrawn. (66:132) Simply stated, an examination of the evidence merely points to the fact that the Soviets concluded certain agreements deemed to be in their best national interest at times when they knew that such agreements would be rejected and the Soviets condemned by the Chinese. In fact, "while it is possible to conclude that the dispute with the Chinese has made the U.S.S.R. more willing to consider arms control agreements in disregard of Chinese objections, it must also be noted that one can trace to the Chinese factor certain inhibitions of Soviet flexibility in disarmament negotiations with the West." (66:135)

IV — WHAT LIES AHEAD?

An examination of Soviet disarmament and foreign policies since World War II has revealed their definite interrelationship. The record shows that Soviet disarmament policy for the most part has been tailored to be mutually supporting of and complementary to Soviet foreign policy. This interrelation has not always produced the desired results, notably during the period 1945-1953. This post-World War II period provided little chance for success because of the militancy of Stalin's international actions. In the face of

Russian expansion the world was not convinced that the Soviet Union was the peace-loving nation she claimed to be. Nevertheless, on two significant occasions Soviet disarmament policy made overt attempts to assist foreign policy goals. One was the 1946-1947 campaign to accelerate Western demobilization. The second instance was the 1949-1950 "peace campaign" which had been launched in an effort to calm the fears of the Western Powers at a time when these nations finally had become alarmed over Soviet 1945-1948 moves on the international scene and were now seeking collective security arrangements.

Khrushchev changed the Soviet foreign policy approach in 1955. He championed the policy of "peaceful co-existence" and modified disarmament policy to support this new approach. The launchings of her first ICBM and Sputnik I in 1957 heralded the beginning of a hardened Russian foreign policy; a corresponding change took place in Soviet disarmament proposals.

The Soviets continued in the 1960's to pursue foreign policy goals through disarmament negotiations by calling for the liquidation of U.S. foreign bases. For example, in August 1965 the Soviet delegate in Geneva announced that the United States would have to withdraw her overseas forces and dismantle her bases in foreign territories before any progress could be made in disarmament negotiations. That this interrelation of disarmament and foreign policies will continue in the future seems to be a most likely prospect.

The goal of Soviet disarmament policy has been the relative disarmament of the West. That is, the Soviets have sought to achieve the elimination or neutralization of Western military strength, political solidarity, and will to resist. This goal is almost implicit in the close interrelationship that has ex-

isted between Soviet disarmament and foreign policies. The Soviets have used their disarmament proposals to create images — the Soviet Union as the advocate of peace and disarmament and the West as the obstructionist. The image of the Soviet Union was contrived to allay the fears of non-Communists and permit Russia to improve her military posture. One must judge that the Soviets have been successful as their military strength has been advanced and their holdings have been consolidated without unduly alarming the Western states.

The Soviets are not going to abandon their disarmament negotiations formula while it serves their purpose so well. They may zig and zag at appropriate times, but they will continue to interrelate their disarmament and foreign policies as a means of achieving the relative disarmament of the West. Even the influence of Soviet internal and external considerations is not considered likely to cause any major alteration in her approach to disarmament talks and agreements.

Unless Soviet policymakers find themselves confronted with a choice between intolerable military inferiority and large new outlays well above current spending levels, economic restraints alone will not force them into arms control or disarmament agreements unless desired for other reasons.

Soviet obsession for secrecy in opposition to inspection and control is too deeply ingrained to be abandoned or appreciably modified. This attitude can be expected to remain. The Soviets will continue to hold out in an attempt to wear down the West in the belief that they will eventually achieve agreement without any meaningful inspection and control requirements.

In her attempt to achieve and maintain a military parity with the United States, the Soviet Union will continue

to engage in the arms race and in disarmament negotiations. She has seldom demonstrated any sincerity in her disarmament negotiations and will continue to propose only that which will advance her military position vis-a-vis the West. For example, in 1958 she proposed a ban on testing that was timed to preempt scheduled testing by the United States and the United Kingdom. In 1961 she violated the voluntary test-ban moratorium when it was advantageous to do so. After she had time to study the results of her 1961 tests, the Soviet Union then earnestly negotiated for a test-ban treaty in 1963. In 1966 the Soviet Union began deploying an antiballistic missile defense. In this case the pattern has been altered somewhat as the United States is proposing curtailment of further development and deployment of such systems. Nevertheless, one can wager that the Soviets will readily agree if they determine the move to be solidly in their best interests based possibly on the fact that they at least have a system installed whereas the United States has none.

There are divergent views on the cause and severity of the Sino-Soviet dispute. The basic cause of the rift has been reasonably established as the determination of the Chinese leaders that China should become a superpower and the equal determination of the Soviet leadership to prevent it. The severity has been expressed as being so great that any permanent reconciliation seems unlikely. However, regardless of the cause or the severity, the Soviets have been unsuccessful in their efforts to prevent Red China from acquiring a nuclear capability. Future attempts at containment will probably be no more profitable. Therefore, the Soviets are faced with the prospect of the possible emergence of Red China as a superpower. In the meantime, the Chinese factor is not likely to influence ap-

preciably Soviet disarmament negotiations.

Russia's greatest area of maneuver appears to lie in negotiating the issue of nonproliferation. By engaging in nonproliferation treaty negotiations, even if agreement is not reached, the Russians are provided the opportunity to separate West Germany from NATO. They have made it clear that agreement on a nonproliferation treaty would probably be achieved if the United States would drop her insistence on seeking a share in the nuclear defense of Western Europe for West Germany. On other occasions, the Soviets have called for all plans for NATO nuclear sharing to be dropped before they would consider any nonproliferation proposals. In any case, the Soviets are keenly aware of how badly the United States wants to reach agreement on the nonproliferation issue, and they may believe that if they hold out long enough the United States will agree to their terms.

In the future the likelihood of the United States and the Soviet Union arriving at any far-reaching disarmament agreement is extremely remote. What one may expect to witness is a continuation of the Soviets' simmering pursuit of and eventual agreement to a nonproliferation treaty as a measure to separate West Germany from NATO. The Soviets conceivably believe that this separation will lead to the abandonment of all plans for a NATO nuclear force, the withdrawal of the United States power from Western Europe, and the eventual collapse of the Atlantic alliance. These goals are desired by the Soviets as steps along the way to their aim of world domination which has never been refuted or modified.

The Soviets' disarmament and foreign policies since World War II are a matter of history. There is no sub-

stantial evidence to indicate that the Soviet philosophy involved from 1945 to the present will not continue for the foreseeable future. The evidence is before the United States and cannot be

forgotten. It must not be forgotten, for as George Santayana has said, "Those who do not remember the past are condemned to relive it."

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When the animals had gathered, the lion looked at the eagle and said gravely, "We must abolish talons." The tiger looked at the elephant and said, "We must abolish tusks." The elephant looked back at the tiger and said, "We must abolish claws and jaws." Thus each animal in turn proposed the abolition of the weapons he did not have, until at last the bear rose up and said in tones of sweet reasonableness: "Comrades, let us abolish everything—everything but the great universal embrace."

Attributed to Winston Churchill, 1874-1965