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GENERAL VO-nguyen-GIAP



Insurgent Theorist or Leader of a People?

A thesis prepared by
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INTRODUCTION

In his well-known essay "On Contradiction," Mao Tse-tung uses the words of another famous Chinese leader to stress a point which he considers to be vitally important in waging successful military campaigns. Quoting from Sun Tzu, Mao says: "Know your enemy and know yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster."¹ Successful military men down through the ages have similarly stressed the importance of intelligence of the enemy as essential to success in warfare.

Conversely, one could deduce, denial of intelligence concerning one's own forces, personnel, and intentions would deprive one's enemy of an important asset and, thus, would enhance the probabilities of one's own forces succeeding in combat.

Anyone who has objectively considered the successes of the Viet-Minh in their campaign against the French from 1946 to 1954 and who has followed the current insurgency in South Vietnam becomes immediately cognizant of the degree to which both the Viet-Minh and the Viet Cong have employed the weapons of secrecy and stealth in the conduct of warfare. While the employment of these tactics is not in itself startling, the successes realized are indicative of a discipline and organization that are seldom matched in the world's history and that constitute a factor that forces of the free world must honestly admit and prepare to combat on a knowledgeable basis if such combat is to be successful.

In attempting a determination of the causes of this organization and discipline, one is immediately at error in seeking to credit total responsibility to a single concept or individual. Such phenomena seldom occur in such sanitized fashion in the "real world."

Nevertheless, total assessments are logically made by analyzing and evaluating the separate elements of a total environment before venturing an overall determination. This paper will endeavor to assess and evaluate one person closely associated with the Vietnamese insurgent movements.

One of the key factors in the successes of the Viet-Minh and, undoubtedly, one of the important guiding forces in the current conflict in Vietnam is General Vo Nguyen Giap. General Giap was not the only factor which made the Viet-Minh resistance to the French effective and successful. He is not the most important man in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam today, any more than he is the total guiding force for the Viet Cong. His contributions to all of these organizations are immediately suspected of being very significant, however, when one considers that it was Giap who assembled, led, and trained the first organized Viet-Minh armed force; who is acknowledged as the founder of the Vietnamese People's Army; whose victory over the French at Dienbienphu climaxed the first defeat of white armed forces by nonwhite armies in a war; and who is currently Commander in Chief of the Vietnamese People's Army, Minister of National Defense and Deputy Premier of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and a member of the Central Committee of the *Dang Lao Dong* (Vietnam Workers' Party).

One is immediately impressed with the mystery surrounding General Giap. Little of a factual nature is known about him in the Western World. Even statistical data concerning General Giap are in conflict among "authoritative" sources. It would seem that his personal life is a model for the secrecy and security which have been so successfully employed by the movement with which he is associated.

The purpose of this paper, then, is to consider General Vo Nguyen Giap as a man, a leader, a military strategist and tactician, and a politician and to draw conclusions regarding his contributions to the art of guerrilla warfare and, particularly, regarding his role in the past two decades of Vietnamese history. From these conclusions, a prognostication of the future role of this man in the world scene will be made.

I — GIAP, THE MAN

Biographical Sketch. Vo Nguyen Giap was born in 1912 in the village of An Xa, Quang Binh Province, in the part of Indochina called Annam by the French. This general area, consisting of the central part of the Vietnamese land, (North and South), also lays claim to being the birthplace of Ho Chi Minh. Giap has been described as born of peasant stock¹ and as being the son of a scholar who was himself a revolutionary.²

In any event, it seems certain that Giap attended high school at the Lycee Quoc-Hoc in Hue and that while there he became active in the *Tan Viet Minh Dang* (Revolutionary Party for a Great Vietnam) at about the age of 14. Professor Bernard B. Fall's description of the Lycee Quoc-Hoc is very graphic and enlightening:

That school had been created at the initiative of Ngo Dinh Kha, a high official of the Hue imperial court and father of South Vietnam's Ngo Dinh Diem, for the express purpose of perpetuating in Vietnam a type of education that, providing the young Vietnamese elite with Western knowledge, would be untainted by French views. . . . a list of the students who graduated from it or were dismissed from it over the past forty years reads like a "Who's Who in Vietnamese Revolution" on both sides of the 17th parallel; to name a few: Ho Chi Minh, Vo Nguyen Giap, Pham Van Dong and Ngo Dinh Diem.³

Thus, it seems apparent that Giap was exposed to strong nationalistic concepts early in life. He first attracted the attention of the French colonial *surete* in 1930 when he led anti-French student demonstrations in Hue to protest French brutality in suppressing a starving peasants' march on the French administrative center of Nghc-An. For this escapade Giap was sentenced to 3 years in jail but was released on good behavior after serving only a few months.

Whatever the reason or incentive, Giap seems to have embarked at this point on a concentrated effort of self-improvement and education. He is described as "finishing school at Hue with high marks in the *baccalaureat*"⁴ and as "a brilliant and precocious student who fought his way through school with energy and brilliance, topping every class."⁵

Following high school and a year of precollege studies at Hanoi's Lycee Albert Sarraut, Giap attended the University of Hanoi. About the only thing that is certain of his accomplishments at this institute of higher learning is that he was awarded his *licence en droit* (license to practice law) in 1937. He took a position that year as a teacher of history at Thang Long High School in Hanoi. Among other scholastic credits attributed to him by various sources are a Doctorate in Political Economy⁶, a Doctorate in Law⁷, and a Doctorate of Philosophy in History.⁸ Hoang Van Chi, states flatly that Giap did not achieve a Doctorate of Law.⁹

Giap probably became a member of the Communist Party early in 1937 at the time when the French Communist Party sent a special representative to help organize the Indochinese Communist Party. After he married the daughter of Professor Dang Thai Mai, with whom he had lived while an undergraduate student in Hanoi, she too

soon embraced the Communist ideology and became an ardent and active member of the party.¹⁰

When the Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939 was signed and the Nazis attacked Poland, the French Government was motivated to outlaw the Communist Party in France and in her colonies. She followed this action with scores of arrests of known members of the party. Giap, along with many other Vietnamese Communists, fled the major cities for refuge in the country or in China. Giap's wife, however, was arrested, along with her sister, and was sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor for life. She died in a French prison in 1943.¹¹

From this point, even less information of a specific nature is known regarding Giap's whereabouts and activities than was known during the first 27 years of his life. His first meeting with Ho Chi Minh probably took place at a May 1941 gathering of the Indochinese Communist Party at Ching-hsi in Kwangsi Province.¹² It was at this meeting of the Indochinese Communist Party that the *Vietnam Doc Lap Dong Minh* (Viet-Minh), the *League for Independence for Vietnam*, was formed¹³ and here that Giap was probably assigned responsibility for organizing a Communist military force inside Vietnam.¹⁴

Between May 1941 and December 1944 Giap concentrated on learning the art and methods of warfare and in organizing the first unit of the Viet-Minh armed forces. Where he undertook his studies is the subject of diverse speculation. It has been said that he gained his knowledge from studying historical accounts of the battles and techniques of the world's greatest military leaders.¹⁵ Others claim that he owed a great deal of the credit for his successes to his study of the works of Mao Tse-tung.¹⁶ It is also maintained that Ho Chi Minh

had arranged for selected individuals to go to Yen-an to work with Mao's Communists prior to the May 1941 meeting and that Giap, having been designated along with Truong Chinh, went there for his training immediately after the meeting closed.¹⁷ Hoang Van Chi claims that Giap never went to Yen-an but received his only formal military training from American Army officers at a military training course conducted in Tsin-tsi.¹⁸

In any event, by the middle of December 1944 Giap had recruited, organized, and trained the first regular unit of the Viet-Minh forces — a 31-man platoon. The date when this unit started on its first action against a French outpost — 22 December 1944 — is still celebrated in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as the official birthday of the Vietnam People's Army. By August 1945, when the Japanese capitulated, this force had grown to an army of some 10,000 men, which marched into Hanoi early in September to proclaim the independence of Vietnam.¹⁹ That same army, now matured in size and professionalism by more than two decades of combat experience, has been continuously, and still is, led by Vo Nguyen Giap.

Character. Giap has been acknowledged to be an extremely intelligent individual, on the basis of his performance in all the schools he attended. Although his principal formal scholastic accomplishment seems to have been the acquisition of a license to practice law in colonial French Indochina, it is firmly established that he had a great interest in the world's history and that he surely pursued this interest, in addition to his studies in law, while at the University of Hanoi.²⁰ Considering his exposure to Vietnamese traditionalism at the Lycee Quoc-Hoc, his studies of the centuries of Vietnamese struggle

and sacrifice for freedom and independence, and his firsthand observance of French domination, it is not surprising that this energetic young man developed strong nationalistic sentiments early in his life.

His studies of Vietnamese history most certainly brought to Giap's attention the traditional foe of the Vietnamese people — the Chinese. Giap has not permitted this fact to escape his memory; although his armed forces have welcomed training and material support from the Chinese People's Republic, Giap is known to be a leader in the faction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam hierarchy which favors closer alignment with Soviet Russia in the world Communist movement and an arm's-length relationship with China.²¹

It is unclear as to why Giap chose to become a member of the Communist Party in preference to any of the many other nationalistic organizations that abounded in Vietnam during most of the period of French domination. Certainly he was a nationalistic before he became a Communist. It is not unrealistic to surmise, however, that his powers of analysis and deduction saw in the Communist order the organization, strength, and promise of outside assistance that would be necessary to rid his country of the French presence as rulers. None of the other struggle groups in Vietnam had much hope of outside assistance. Most of the non-Communist world either was friendly to France, and thus unwilling to offend Paris by rendering aid to an insurgent movement in one of its colonies, or was likely to seize any appropriate opportunity to displace France as the ruler of Vietnam.

One of Giap's greatest attributes as a man and leader seems to be his willingness to learn from any source or from any event. One might deduce that he

learned a great deal from his arrest by the French. He was arrested only once, so naturally his activities did not cease. They went in a different direction. Much as he may have studied the art of warfare, grave and costly errors were committed under his orders in the early years of fighting against the French. He admits to such errors and goes on to say that in each case lessons were learned which served the future.²² History has recorded the accuracy of this contention.

In addition to being a man of great intelligence, Giap has been described in varying terms as "a sentimental and passionate man,"²³ and "a man filled with hate . . . [with] . . . a native impulsiveness . . ." ²⁴ Jules Roy, who has met and talked with Giap, describes him in this manner: "That broad face consumed by intelligence, that high, powerful brow framed in a stiff, black mane, were stamped with determination. Irony, kindness, cunning and indomitable strength were revealed in it one after the other."²⁵ Giap is quoted by many sources as having said: "Every minute, hundreds of thousands of men die all over the world. The life or death of a hundred, a thousand, tens of thousands of men, even if they are fellow countrymen, really amounts to very little." Mr. Roy reports that he asked General Giap if he had made such a statement and goes on to say: "He denied it indignantly when I asked him. Yet that cruel remark is not out of place in his mouth."²⁶

Thus, one draws a general picture of Giap as an intense, sensitive, and passionate man of great intelligence and deep, strong loyalties. His passion and hate have at times caused undesirable consequences, while at other times his mental acuity, objectivity, and tact have been admired by critical observers.²⁷

Whatever his weaknesses and faults, Giap's energies and full devotion have

consistently been directed along a single path — that of a Vietnam free of foreign domination. His methods have often been costly but to date have been very successful in the face of almost overwhelming odds. In the light of proven ability and unflinching devotion to the country and people he serves, it is small wonder that General Giap is practically a national hero in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

II — GIAP, THE MILITARY LEADER

General. The techniques and methodology that enabled the forces led by General Vo Nguyen Giap to defeat the modern, well-equipped army of a richer and more powerful nation have been studied and restudied. Respected analysts have termed Giap one of the world's outstanding theoreticians of revolutionary warfare. Others claim that he simply followed the guidelines set down by Mao Tse-tung and one of his compatriots, Truong Chinh.

It may well be, however, that these efforts at affixing labels simply serve to confuse and confound, or restrict the objectivity of otherwise noble attempts at understanding the enigma posed by Giap and other successful revolutionary leaders of his ilk. Quite truthfully, anyone who succeeds for the first time in a new and specific venture might be classified as an innovator. But equally probable is the fact that the same techniques tried at a different time, under conditions of a different environment, and with different personalities involved might not be successful.

Giap comments frequently upon a fact which becomes very obvious as one examines the general conduct of the Viet-Minh activities: the people are involved in all aspects of the movement — the army, the paramilitary, the logistics, the politics. This was not a

campaign in which a military force simply conducted military operations and defeated the enemy on the field of battle. In examining the army, one is immediately involved in considerations of active civilian support and assistance. In examining the activities and attitudes of the populace, one becomes equally involved in complex considerations of the relationships between the army and the people. In Giap's words:

How could the Vietnamese nation have defeated an imperial power such as France which was backed by the U.S.? They try to explain this extraordinary fact by the correctness of strategy and tactics, by the forms of combat and the heroism of the Vietnam People's Army. Of course all these factors contributed to the happy outcome of the resistance. But if the question is put: "Why were the Vietnamese people able to win?" the most precise and complete answer must be: "The Vietnamese people won because their war of liberation was a people's war."¹

The basic truth in these words has, after many years, been finally realized by the United States in the long course of its efforts to conduct successful counterinsurgency operations in South Vietnam. Efforts to build a powerful army, factories, bridges, and roads for the Government of South Vietnam and its privileged few were on the brink of total failure in mid-1965. The essential aspect that Giap grasped was that strategy and tactics and an efficient army of themselves could not win a war such as had to be fought in Vietnam. The essential element is that the great majority of the people must support, or be in sympathy with, such a movement.

With the People. It appears that three basic truths were recognized by Giap as he embarked upon the task of organizing the Vietnamese people to combat the French. The first and most

important, of course, has already been cited: if the resistance was to succeed, it would have to have the support of the mass of the people. Further, he realized that the mass of the Vietnamese people were peasants — mostly uneducated and certainly unsophisticated. Thus, it was necessary to put forth the aims of the revolutionary movement and the ways in which the masses would benefit from its success in plain, unsophisticated terminology that would be clearly understood.

Giap's experience as a high school history teacher must have been of great benefit to the effort. His explanations of the factors and conditions which led to the wars fought by his people are simple and straightforward. His statements concerning the elements required for success and the ways by which these conditions were achieved are models of plain-words statements in which the essential points are repeated over and over. Anyone familiar, in even limited degree, with the Vietnamese people and language, quickly perceives solid evidence as to why Giap succeeded in becoming an effective leader of these people. In *People's War, People's Army*, he says: "It was . . . not enough to have objectives entirely in conformity with the fundamental aspirations of the people. It was also necessary to bring everything into play to enlighten the masses of the people, educate and encourage them in fighting for national salvation."² He also explains:

We waged a people's war, and that in the framework of a long since colonized country. Therefore the national factor was of first importance. We had to rally all the forces likely to overthrow the imperialists and their lackeys. On the other hand, this war proceeded in a backward agricultural country where the peasants, making up the great majority of the population, constituted the essential force of the revolution and of the Resistance War.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Commander Arthur D. Jackson, Supply Corps, U.S. Navy, was graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy with a B.S. in Naval Science and holds an M.S. in Industrial Management from Purdue University.

Commander Jackson has served aboard U.S.S. *Talladega* (APA 208) and U.S.S. *C.T. O'Brien* (DE 421); he has been assigned to the Navy Finance Center at Cleveland; to the Naval Supply Depot and the Ship Repair Facility at Yokosuka; he was Director of the Data Processing Department at Naval Supply Center, Oakland; and he served as Senior Naval Supply Advisor to the Naval Advisory Group, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

A graduate of the U.S. Naval War College School of Naval Command and Staff, Class of 1967, Commander Jackson is presently assigned to Naval Supply Systems Command Headquarters, Navy Department, Washington.

Consequently the relation between the national question and the peasant question had to be closely defined. . . .³

Appendix I, "A Message from General Vo Nguyen Giap to the Troops at Dienbienphu," provides concrete evidence that the man understood the nature of the people that he was organizing and leading and possessed the patience and ability to communicate with them.

To maintain, however, that all of the people were "educated" or converted to the ideas of the revolutionary movement would be erroneous. Many groups, such as those placed in positions of prestige and wealth by the French, those of power and affluence by tradition, and, in general, the Catholics, were not sympathetic to the Viet-Minh cause and did not particularly favor any change. Thus, additional measures were obviously required and were employed. Applying the usual

singleness of purpose and determination to overcome all obstacles, the various elements were dealt with by what was considered to be appropriate means: those which could be united were united; those which could be neutralized were neutralized; those which could be divided were divided; and those which actively opposed were eliminated.

One of the major successes of the Viet-Minh, however, was in uniting the vast majority of the people to their cause. Included in this effort were the minority tribes which provided whole army units under their own generals. Bernard Fall acknowledges this success:

It must be considered one of the Viet-Minh's signal achievements that it succeeded in at least partly winning over the mountain tribes of Vietnam; without the successful wooing of these tribes, Ho and his staff would sooner or later have been betrayed to the French. A Tho tribal chieftain, Chu Van Tan, quickly rose to the rank of major-general in the VPA; and one of the elite divisions, the 316th, was largely recruited from mountain tribesmen which explains its efficiency in highland operations.⁴

As has been demonstrated on numerous occasions, this accomplishment is one that neither the regime of the French nor that of the South Vietnamese has ever solidly realized. The differing attitudes toward the minorities is exemplified by the fact that anyone of Chinese extraction living in South Vietnam was, until early 1966, prohibited from serving in the armed forces of that nation.⁵ Such attitudes are certain to affect the support and strength that any government received from those elements of the population. Obviously, Giap's method is the preferred one.

Since the paramilitary functions which were organized are so closely affiliated with the People's Army, they

will be discussed in the next section of this chapter. At this point Jules Roy's account of the war as seen from the French side is sufficient evidence of the effectiveness of the organization of the people and the coordination of their activities: "The war killed just as blindly on a cafe terrace as on the embankment of a rice field; apparently inoffensive villages concealed citadels; a child leading buffaloes out to pasture was a spy; toothless old women laid mines; laborers assassinated important people."⁶

The Vietnam People's Army.

Giap follows his standard method of repetition of a few basic and simple elements in his accounts and descriptions of the People's Army. These elements, which, in Giap's opinion, have made it an effective force in Vietnam might be summarized as follows: (1) the army is a national army composed of all elements of the people; (2) the army is the people's army, concerned first and always with protection of the interests of the Vietnamese masses from which its strength is drawn, rather than with the interests of a privileged minority; (3) the army is under the leadership of the party; (4) strict discipline within the ranks of the army has always been practiced; and (5) political indoctrination and training have always been among the most important elements of army training.

It is evident that Giap not only believed in the words he had written but that he saw to it that they were practiced in fact. Evidence has been cited to the effect that he succeeded in bringing units of the minority tribes, as well as Vietnamese, into the People's Army and that their leaders as civilians rose in the national army as national military leaders. Similarly, other units were made up largely of recruits from the large cities, and there were units from the various provinces. There is

substantial authority in support of Giap's contention that the Viet-Minh Army, the VPA, was, in fact, a national army which attracted all elements of the Vietnamese people.

Again and again in his writings, Giap has stressed three points: the importance of the masses of the people to the achievement of an independent Vietnam; the importance of continuous concern for the people; and the importance of the people's understanding the "why" of the Viet-Minh movement. The disciplines of the army had, as a central and important feature, provisions for proper relations with the people. Article 9 of the 10-article Oath of Honour, to which every member of the VPA was obligated to swear, requires the fighting man "In contacts with the people, to follow these three recommendations: to respect the people, to help the people, to defend the people . . . in order to win their confidence and affection and achieve a perfect understanding between the people and the army."⁷

This aspect of army discipline was carried even further in the form of a 12-point code of specific regulations which the Viet-Minh soldier was to observe at all times. Included in this code of conduct were such requirements as: to pay for anything received from a citizen; never illegally to deprive a citizen of anything which belonged to him; never to cause damage to rice fields and other crops; never to enter a citizen's house unless invited; and to be always kind, courteous, and considerate to women. Giap points out: "Right from its inception, the question of single-mindedness between the army and the people has been laid down clearly in the ten-point code of honour and 12-point code of discipline in its relations with the people."⁸ Ellen Hammer puts it this way: "More representative of the peasant population than the

Lao Dong party, which constitutes an official class, is the People's Army. As is characteristic of Asian communism, this army has been trained to identify its interests with those of the peasant masses."⁹

The army is, and was, unquestionably under the leadership and control of the Party and responsive to directions issuing from the Central Committee. General Giap is, after all, not only Commander in Chief of the People's Army, but also a dedicated Communist, a member of that Central Committee from which policy and direction issue, and a deputy premier of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Decisions of military strategy, as well as major tactical decisions, are always formed in the Central Committee. For example, when the French paratroops descended upon Dienbienphu in late 1953 and occupied that now-famous administrative center, located at that time in the heart of Viet-Minh "liberated" areas, Giap and his military aides made the determination to attack the French forces there and destroy them. However, this decision was of such major proportions in terms of commitment of Viet-Minh strength and resources that once the plan for preparation and attack was drawn up, it was presented in minute detail to the Central Committee for final approval. Ho Chi Minh himself was present for these proceedings.¹⁰

Every account of discipline in the VPA attests to its strictness. One sees in this discipline a reflection of the personal discipline which Giap has apparently applied to his personal conduct — that of total concentration on the task decided upon and removal of any element which would tend to detract or divert attention from the accomplishment of the objective. Giap writes:

As an armed collective unit whose task is fighting and to insure single-

mindedness and united action for its own preservation and destruction of the enemy, our army cannot abstain from having centralization to a high degree and strict discipline. Therefore, right from its inception, absolute obedience to orders and strict observance of discipline were written down clearly in the ten pledges of honour.¹¹

The ninth point in these 10 pledges has previously been mentioned. In the other nine the Viet-Minh soldier swore to sacrifice everything for the good of the cause, to obey his officers completely, to fight resolutely and without complaint, to train diligently, never to reveal secrets, to bear torture if captured, never to reveal information to the enemy, to take good care of his equipment, and to maintain high morale.¹²

Clearly, the simple administration of an oath such as this would not guarantee an army of high discipline, but here again Giap's methods are highlighted. While violators of the code were often very harshly punished, his preference for methods of education, training, and indoctrination are evident.¹³ In *People's War, People's Army* he comments that in the early days of building the army, many officers were tainted with the militaristic manner and habits of previous armies and placed excessive reliance on blind obedience and punishment as the tools of managing an army. While readily supporting obedience and punishment as essential elements in the task of such an undertaking, he indicates that greater effort had to be directed toward education and persuasion.¹⁴

This education and persuasion had, of necessity for Giap, a very political tone. In the classic Communist mode, he comments: "The internal democracy and iron discipline of our party are the basis for democratic centralism and for the strict discipline of the army."¹⁵ While Giap was clearly aware of the

importance of purely military training, fully half of the Viet-Minh soldier's training time was devoted to a program of continuous and rigorous political indoctrination. Not content simply to enlist men and women to fight, the party in this daily political training went to great lengths to explain why the French were the hated enemy, why those who collaborated with the French were traitors to their people, why the Popular Front objectives of independence and democracy were in the personal interests of all faithful citizens of Vietnam, and how the contribution of each man and woman should relate to these objectives. All of these things won people to the Viet-Minh cause because, for the first time, the peasant saw himself as a part of something more than a life of inescapable poverty and servitude. He was made to understand "why" and was told that he was important. In the process, he was made aware of the need for absolute devotion to the cause and of the need for a conscious self-discipline.

Thus taken in hand by intelligent masters, the armed peasant became a fanatic, an apostle of a new religion. To insure that the faith was kept, the organized units were staffed with political commissars whose job it was to insure the continued political enlightenment. Presidential Decree No. 32/SL of 4 March 1950, which instituted "Front Command Committees With Political Preponderance," declared in effect that the Front Command Committee of the Vietnam People's Army was composed of a political commissar, a military commander, and a deputy military commander; and, in case of divergent views among the Committee, the political commissar shall have the power of final decision.¹⁶ Such are the circumstances indicating the importance placed by the Commander in

Chief on political aspects of military life.

It was a concept indispensable to the effort against the French. In order for there to be unity of purpose, it was necessary to establish a common denominator for the people and the army. In order for the people and the army to work toward one goal, it was essential that the goal be identical and mutually understood. The army could not have purely military objectives while the people concentrated upon political objectives. It was necessary to consolidate the mass of available energy in harmonious relationship. It was necessary that the army understand the political objectives — that military action serve always to further the political objectives. Similarly, the people could not leave all military action to the army but must understand that the army's interests were the people's interests — that the army's objectives were the political objectives which were the *raison d'être* for the insurgency. Thus, through the political common denominator, unity of purpose was achieved.

In support of the mobile regular army units, various paramilitary forces were organized. At the basic village level these forces were organized by the village political committees and consisted of two groups: the *Dan Cong*, which included nearly everyone, and the *Du Kich*, a small, part-time combat group of men between the ages of 18 and 45. The *Dan Cong* were essentially a labor force with some small degree of informal military training. Though they occasionally performed sabotage, their principal responsibility was to collect intelligence, serve as guards, make road repairs, build bases, fortify the villages and — very important — serve the regular forces as porters. The *Du Kich* had more extensive military training and were supplied with arms. They undertook

guerrilla actions on a small scale and were the basic source of replacement and augmenting manpower for regional units and the regular army.

At the district or provincial level were still larger and better armed units known as regional troops. For the most part, the largest unit was of battalion size, the chief function of these forces being the protection of an area and its population. These troops met the French clearing operations, launched small attacks, and generally harassed the enemy.

At the top of this military organizational pyramid was the People's Army. Each stratum in the pyramid, as noted, had specific responsibilities in Giap's total combat plan, but because the People's Army units were the mobile forces, they were dependent for total support on the *Dan Cong*, *Du Kich*, and the regional troops. Without the proper coordination, full support, and common sentiment of all of these components, it would have been difficult to have envisioned an effective VPA. That these forces were, and are, an effective combatant structure is established in thousands of accounts of the Viet-Minh campaign against the French, and it is being attested to today by American opponents of VPA units now fighting in South Vietnam. General Vo Nguyen Giap was equal to the organizational, administrative, and training requirements which faced him as he developed the Vietnamese revolutionary military organ.

Strategies and Tactics. The strategies and tactics of General Giap during the Indochinese War were not substantially different in concept from those expounded by Mao Tse-tung in such of his works as *On Protracted Conflict*, *Strategic Problems in the Anti-Japanese War*, and *Our Mission in View of Present Circumstances*. They

have in common the elements which seem logically essential for an inferior armed force attempting to defeat a ruling organization with greatly superior military resources.

First, of course, the strategy had to be one of protracted conflict, where the objective was simply to destroy enemy personnel rather than to attempt to occupy territory. As the enemy forces were being thus reduced, the revolutionary forces were engaging in political activity to win the support of the populace, enlarging the forces of insurgency, and equipping them with captured or donated equipment. The importance of a sanctuary was appreciated and utilized to great advantage during the building-of-forces phase.

In the classic mode, the war was to be fought in three stages: a stage of contention (strategic defensive for Viet-Minh forces); a stage of equilibrium, where relative strengths were nearly equal; and a stage of the general counteroffensive (strategic offensive for Viet-Minh forces).¹⁷

During the stage of contention, combat was to be exclusively small unit, fast strike, fast retreat, striking only where success was certain, i.e., destroying more enemy personnel than would be lost to insurgent forces. Political activity was emphasized during this phase and, as Viet-Minh units grew in strength, training, and experience, guerrilla-type strikes would be supplemented by larger unit operations. General Giap writes:

. . . this guerrilla war developed progressively into a form of mobile war that daily increased in scale. While retaining certain characteristics of guerrilla war, it involved regular campaigns with greater attacks on fortified positions. Starting from small operations with the strength of a platoon or a company to annihilate a few men or a group of enemy soldiers, our army went over, later, to more important combats with a battalion or regi-

ment to cut one or several enemy companies to pieces, finally coming to greater campaigns bringing into play many regiments, then many divisions. . . .¹⁸

The tactics are clearly indicated. First, attack only when revolutionary forces have clearly established tactical superiority, the sole military objective being to destroy enemy manpower and not to hold or occupy land. Giap makes the point very clear:

Concentration of troops to realize an overwhelming superiority over the enemy where he is sufficiently exposed in order to destroy his manpower; initiative, suppleness, rapidity, surprise, suddenness in attack and retreat. As long as the strategic balance of forces remains disadvantageous, resolutely to muster troops to obtain absolute superiority in combat in a given place, and at a given time. To exhaust little by little by small victories the enemy forces and at the same time to maintain and increase ours. In these concrete conditions it proves absolutely necessary not to lose sight of the main objective of the fighting that is the destruction of the enemy manpower.¹⁹

More than this, four important prerequisites were stressed for embarking on any attack: the proper choice of time, a careful plan, adequate preparation including intelligence collection and analysis, and a high combative spirit among the participants.

It would be an overestimation of General Giap's abilities to believe that mistakes were not made, that every attack launched by Viet-Minh forces succeeded in achieving the objectives put forth. Mistakes were made — mistakes in which Giap personally directed the proceedings. Such an affair was Vinh Yen where, in January 1951, Giap, apparently believing that the time for the general counteroffensive had come and believing his forces to be ready for large-scale combat with French forces, attacked in multidivision

force on the open plains of the Red River Delta.

In this attack, which was to begin the march to Hanoi and the end of the war, initial Viet-Minh thrusts proceeded according to expectations; but, as the battle proceeded, with French defenders losing position after position, Marshal de Lattre de Tassigny assumed personal command and, mustering all aircraft capable of dumping bomb canisters, covered the Viet-Minh positions with napalm in two attacks. The battle cost the Viet-Minh some 6,000 dead and 500 men lost as prisoners.²⁰ In spite of this experience, General Giap was to try two more times to breach the French defense lines protecting the heart of the Delta, once at Mao Khe, in March 1951, and again in a combined assault on the Day River barrier at Phu Ly and Ninh Binh in June of the same year. It was estimated that Viet-Minh forces suffered losses of 10 killed for every defender lost.²¹

It was apparent that the objectives of the revolutionary movement had not been served and that unacceptable losses of manpower had been suffered. These errors were admitted by General Giap, but at the same time he learned lessons in the art of open-field and river-marsh warfare that were not forgotten for the rest of the war and which were immediately incorporated into required study for other Viet-Minh officers.

Thus it was that Giap developed his own methods of revolutionary warfare in Vietnam. It was not that the basic concepts he applied were any different from those that had been used and recorded by practitioners of warfare for centuries before; principles such as causing the enemy to disperse his forces in order to attack the divided strength were long ago practiced by Napoleon as well as other victorious generals.

Giap's philosophy, "Is the enemy strong? One avoids him. Is he weak? One attacks."²² can be considered a paraphrase of Mao's "Fight when you can win, run away when you cannot."²³ This tactic, in turn, may be said to have been applied at least as long ago as the 19th century when the American Indians were destroying settler outposts and wagon trains on the frontiers of the United States.

What Giap did was to successfully adapt the general principles which he absorbed from his studies of the world's masters of the art of warfare to the environment of Vietnam, developing techniques which provided optimum advantage to the Viet-Minh forces from existing terrain, political conditions, enemy weaknesses, and Vietnamese strengths.

In the urban areas, terrorist activities to undermine faith in the ability of the colonial government were applied. In Vietnam, these operations were particularly effective because the latent sympathies of a large part of the population had been motivated toward the cause of the terrorists, and these Viet-Minh operatives were provided with shelter and intelligence.

In the marshy and waterlogged rice flatlands a form of warfare was developed which may be considered the specialty of the Viet-Minh although the centuries-old practice of ambush was its essential element. The flat tops of the rice-paddy dikes, essentially the only means of vehicular traffic across these areas, generally limit such traffic to one-way transit. Noting the route of advance chosen by a motorized column and determining the dikes which would most probably be crossed, the Viet-Minh surreptitiously mined, booby-trapped, and placed bamboo spikes alongside the chosen routes. Then, concealing snipers who could place effective fire on the dikes, they would

ambush the column as it traveled the route. The usual immediate reaction of the well-trained French soldiers, upon receiving fire while mounted in vehicles, was to dismount from the vehicles, return the fire, and seek to maneuver. Upon dismounting, they immediately found themselves in a mined and boobytrapped area or impaled upon the sharpened bamboo stakes. The Viet-Minh snipers would continue to inflict casualties upon the column until the French were able to maneuver to advantageous position at which point the snipers refused further combat and melted into the countryside. This type of combat inflicted serious casualties on the Government forces while the Viet-Minh suffered relatively minor losses.

The Viet-Minh carried their war of attrition tactics into the hills and jungles of Vietnam where the movements of French units were restricted to trails through tall elephant grass or dense tropical vegetation. In these areas, where air reconnaissance is virtually ineffective, the Viet-Minh laid their ambushes well forward of advancing columns, taking optimum advantage of the cover and concealment provided by the virtually impassable terrain. Having chosen the ambush site, the Viet-Minh troops would then mine both sides of the trail. After allowing the French units to proceed well into the killing zone, maximum effective enfilade and flanking fire was brought upon the advancing column forcing them to take cover along the sides of the trail and exposing them to the mined areas. As in the rice paddies, the Viet-Minh would continue to exact losses on their enemy until he reacted properly to counter the ambush at which time contact would be broken.²⁴

One tactic which was practiced by Giap as well as by Mao and on which neither contributes any written intelli-

gence concerning concept of application is the human wave attack. Judging from the accounts of various battles, including Dienbienphu, where this tactic was used, and considering the losses incurred by the Viet Minh in some of these battles in comparison to the manpower losses of their opponents, it would appear that the acceptable expenditure of lives is a variable element. Evidently acceptability varies with the predetermined value of the objective, once the decision that assured "victory" is possible has been made. It has been estimated that Giap's forces suffered casualties of 15,000 to 20,000 men from a total force of 50,000 committed to the capture of Dienbienphu.²⁵ Although these casualty figures are extremely high, perhaps three times those of the French defenders, it is not unrealistic to assume that higher losses would not have deterred the Viet-Minh leadership from completing this particular undertaking, which was recognized as so important to the Vietnamese cause.

In summary, then, Giap most assuredly drew from the writings of Mao Tse-tung whatever lessons he felt served the purpose of the Viet-Minh cause, as he drew from Napoleon, Clausewitz, the Russian and French Revolutions and, probably, many other sources. The critics of Giap who make much of his failure to specifically acknowledge a debt to Mao's theories ignore the character of Giap and disregard Mao's own warnings that, in considering the principles he discusses, every historical stage and geographic site must be considered separately.²⁶ Giap, in his writings, deals exclusively with the conduct of the Vietnamese conflict and, while acknowledging the valuable contributions of lessons learned from the Russian and Chinese Revolutions, notes that significant differences existed, differences which had to be

taken into careful account in order to make the Vietnamese insurgency successful.

III — GIAP IN THE POLITICAL ARENA

Although General Giap has performed statesmanlike or political duties, there is little evidence to suggest that his role as a politician has, or will, extend much beyond those instances where his great popularity among the people will seem to make him the "man for the job." He has worked closely with the people of Vietnam in achieving the independence of the North and, like his army, he seems to be very close to the populace. His one "political" assignment of an international nature was to lead the Vietnamese contingent at the first Dalat Conference with the French in the Spring of 1946. He was there described as: ". . . a political man in every sense of the word."¹ The conferences were, however, nonproductive.

When Ho Chi Minh went to Fontainebleau in May 1946 to confer further with the French on the subject of Vietnamese independence, he left the Minister of the Interior, Huynh Thuc Khang, at the head of the Government. In an indication of relative strengths, however, it was Vo Nguyen Giap who exercised the power of leadership during Ho's absence from May to October. Perhaps as a result of his Dalat experiences and foreseeing the unlikelihood of French agreement to Vietnamese demands, he proceeded to dispense with many opponents of the Ho Chi Minh government and consolidated the control of the Viet-Minh over Vietnam.

More typical, in recent years, of Giap's political role has been his performance as a pacifier. When a peasant revolt broke out in Nghe An province in November 1956 which took

the large part of a VPA division to quell, General Giap was called on at the 10th Congress of the *Dang Lao Dong* to criticize the overzealous land reform carried out under Truong Chinh as the legitimate basis of the people's grievances.² In an article of 21 February 1963, issued by the Vietnam News Agency, General Giap sought to assure all readers of *Dang Lao Dong* solidarity and to leave no doubt that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam considered China and the Soviet Union as absolute equals in the world Communist movement.³ Coming at a time when serious disagreement was becoming evident between China and Russia and from a man well known for his sympathies with the Soviet Union, this was a neat demonstration of the fact that General Giap considers party solidarity of greater importance than personal inclinations.

To say that Giap does not appear to be strong in the political arena should not, however, be interpreted as disassociating him from the politics of North Vietnam. As a Communist, he is a political man first and a military leader only as a consequence. His political duties as Commander in Chief of the VPA and Defense Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam will always occupy a major part of his time. Yet his reputation as an ultranationalist with very strong dislikes for so many things foreign makes it unlikely that he will advance to a more "political" position in the government.

IV — CONCLUSIONS

General Vo Nguyen Giap has become a successful military leader of the Vietnamese people because of numerous factors. He is first of all a proud and intensely loyal Vietnamese who loves his country and understands its people. More than this, he is an extremely intelligent and resourceful man

who, having been exposed to Western thought, has been able to adapt his methods effectively to the unique characteristics of the enemy as well as to those of his own people; and he has always been faced with a foreign enemy.

General Giap, assuredly, has drawn valuable lessons from the words of other successful practitioners of warfare. What successful military leader has not, since accounts of battles and wars were first recorded? Giap's place in history is secured not by his contributions to the general theory of guerrilla or revolutionary warfare — Mao Tse-tung did an excellent job of pulling together, organizing, and recording the concepts and techniques of centuries of experience before Giap started practicing — but, rather, by his successful adaption of all the concepts and techniques that he studied and learned to the environment of Vietnam at the time when the Viet-Minh undertook to achieve the independence of their country. If he did make a contribution to the general art of revolutionary warfare or wars of insurgency, it was probably his estimate of the political-psychological deficiencies of democratic forms of government when faced with an inconclusive military operation. In a presentation to the political commissars of the 316th Division of the VPA, Giap stated:

The enemy will pass slowly from the offensive to the defensive. The blitzkrieg will transform itself into a war of long duration. Thus, the enemy will be caught in a dilemma: he has to drag out the war in order to win it and does not possess, on the other hand, the psychological and political means to fight a long-drawn-out war. . . .¹

General Giap was a key element in all aspects of the Viet-Minh success. He grasped, correctly, that the people were the first objective of revolutionary war-

fare. With cold objectivity he studied the enemy as much as he studied his own forces. The Vietnam People's Army which he fathered and leads today is regarded by some authorities as one of the strongest native military forces in Southeast Asia.² It remains completely loyal to him, as he is loyal to the army, his country, and its independence. He has succeeded in establishing close and warm relationships between the army and the people and, while insuring the political orientation of the army in the best Communist fashion, has kept it free of the ideological turmoil seen in China.

The loyalty of the army, its strength and solidarity, and his personal popularity with the people place General Giap in a position of strength in the North Vietnamese hierarchy. Furthermore, he is, undoubtedly, one of Ho Chi Minh's most trusted compatriots. All of these factors serve to insure that the position of General Giap will not be adversely changed. There is no indication, however, that General Giap will rise in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam government, for he has been provided little opportunity to gain experience in the practice of diplomacy and/or politics on the international level. It seems more likely that in his intense patriotism, and with the VPA behind him, he will serve to influence changes in top-level leadership which will become necessary with the passing of Ho Chi Minh.

General Vo Nguyen Giap is one of those leaders who come to the world with a distinct lack of frequency. Combining the techniques of an educator, a brilliant mind, selflessness, and objectivity with an intense patriotism and total devotion to the political mechanism which, in his mind, has made his country's independence possible, he is a rare complexity of man that most nations will fail to produce.

APPENDIX I

A Message from General Vo-nguyen-Giap to the Troops at Dienbienphu¹

Officers and men, fighters on the Dienbienphu front!

In the first fighting phase of this historic campaign we have gained great victories and the enemy has suffered great losses. All of you have known this.

The Party Central Committee has sent a letter to congratulate you, emphasizing that this is a historic campaign, and reminded that you shall fight persistently and perseveringly and shall not be subjective and shall not underestimate the enemy.

The Army Party Committee has also praised you.

At first the enemy tried to hush up the public opinion on the reality, but now he can do it no longer. He has said, "If the flag of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam fly over the Dienbienphu fortifications, the situation of Indochina will undergo great changes influencing the whole of South-East Asia."

He fears that if France loses the battle, she will be in a disadvantageous position at the Geneva Conference.

The day before last, the reactionary ruling circles in France observed five minutes' silence to encourage their troops at Dienbienphu. What wretchedness!

All the big French papers have frontpaged the news of the Dienbienphu battle. *L'Humanite*, organ of the French Communist Party, has warmly acclaimed the victory of our army.

I have told you these news so that you may better value the honour of participating in this historic campaign, not be subjective and not underestimate the enemy, and have greater confidence and make greater efforts, and be imbued with the *principle of striking surely, advancing cautiously and fighting unremittingly*.

Today, I want to talk with you about some problems of ideology and tactical principles. I will speak in simple terms; try to listen to me and you will understand what I say. I will say nothing difficult.

At present we have won great victories, the enemy has suffered heavy defeats, but he is still powerful. Our superiority in effectives and fire-power has increased, but it is not yet an absolute superiority. Therefore, we have to strike surely and advance cautiously.

In what respects is the enemy still strong?

He is still strong because *his effectives are still nearly ten thousand strong*. Though his morale has flagged, and the difficulties he has met with are incalculable, we must not underestimate him. If we underestimate the enemy we shall be defeated.

The enemy is still strong on the three following points:

First, he can still *parachute supplies*. We have controlled his airfields but have not yet completely cut his supply line.

Second, he can still *parachute reinforcements*. We have controlled his airfields but cannot yet completely cut his reinforcement line.

Third, *his artillery has been still very active, his air force will be even more active*. Our artillery and anti-aircraft guns can curb the activities of the enemy artillery and air force only to some extent.

In this situation, are you willing to overcome those three strong points of the enemy? I am reported that you are burning with the hatred for the enemy artillery and aircrafts, and are very angry when seeing that he could still parachute supplies and troops. Thus all of you want to deprive the enemy of his three aforesaid assets.

What shall we do to attain that important goal?

After completing the positions of attack and encirclement and realizing the greater part of the aim of gradually depriving the enemy of the three aforesaid assets, what shall we do?

Now you shall pool your efforts to complete the building of positions. Next time, I shall tell you what you must do afterwards.

I am reported that you have spent many days on building positions between combats and some of you are wearied.

But if we are wearied, we must remember that the enemy within the Dienbienphu fortified entrenched camp is in greater tension and more wearied than we are, his wounded have no shelters and no medicine, his fortifications have fallen in or shaken, his supplies are running short, and his casualties are increasing under our shelling.

Thus, shall we take rests so that the enemy may take rests too and reorganize his ranks, call for reinforcements, receive the supplies dropped by his air force, and bring into full play his artillery and air force, or shall we, being members of a People's Army and of the Vietnam Workers' Party, highlight difficulties, getting ourselves a bit more wearied in order to make the enemy ten times more wearied and cause him ten times more difficulties? Which shall we choose between these two roads? I am sure that you unanimously answer that we shall develop our army's tradition of enduring hardships, overcoming difficulties, and fighting heroically in order continuously to build positions, and unremittingly to fight the enemy.

To say so does not mean that we do not attach importance to the health conditions of our fighters. On the contrary, officers shall attach the greatest importance to the health conditions of their men, and soldiers shall take care of their own health and to that of their comrades-in-arms. Especially the cooks shall make efforts. Shelters on the front shall be good, they shall not be untidy. Rice and tea shall be served hot. The health service shall intensify the prophylactic measures. Officers at all levels shall control this work because it is the material basis for continuous fighting. This is a very important work.

I remind the officers and political commissars and instructors one more thing: to work out a very *detailed plan* for the building of positions and distribution of forces in order to spare time and efforts of their men. Especially they shall get themselves close to the fighters to encourage them, and supervise the building of positions. Recently, due to your superficial supervision, in many places they were built carelessly and as a result our casualties have increased.

I emphasize once more that the *officers at all levels shall in person supervise the building of positions*. This is a duty. Officers at any level who do not fulfill it shall be subject to disciplinary sanctions.

In short, *the immediate central task at the present time is to build positions of attack and encirclement at a rapid rate and according to norms; at the same time we shall fight the enemy to wear him out and fulfill our task of building positions*.

To build positions is firmly to grasp the principle of "striking surely and advancing cautiously." We shall not fight, or we shall fight victoriously. To say "striking surely and advancing cautiously" does not mean that we shall not work against time. We must actively *work against time*, because if we complete our positions one day sooner, we will increase difficulties for the enemy one day sooner, and create more conditions for our certain victory one day sooner. *To dig one more cubic metre of earth at this hour means actively to work for the victory of the campaign*.

As our present central task is to build positions, the General Political Department decided that the first criterion to win Uncle's "Determined to Fight and to Win" banner is the building of positions.

The building of positions is a combat task no less glorious than the attack upon the enemy to destroy him.

Have you understood clearly what I have said? I am certain that you have.

If there are some who do not yet understand clearly, the officers shall give them further explanations and their comrades shall help them.

Only by clearly understanding our tasks can we develop all our forces, and once we can develop our forces, we shall certainly fulfill our tasks.

Our troops are strong enough to haul our artillery over tens of kilometres along hilly roads, hack the jungle to build tens of kilometres of road, establish over one hundred kilometres of

positions and destroy the enemy's most fortified strongholds. It is certain that our forces shall fulfill the task of building the offensive positions and encircling the enemy, thus creating conditions to win complete victory for the campaign.

You all have your share of responsibility in this important task.

I shake hands with you and wish that you shall make further efforts.

With affection and determination to win.

March 20, 1954

THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
OF THE VIETNAM PEOPLE'S ARMY
GENERAL VO-nguyen-GIAP

FOOTNOTES

INTRODUCTION

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I

1. American University, Special Operations Research Office, *Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Vietnam, 1941-1954* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1963), p. 72.
2. Bernard B. Fall, "Vo-nguyen-Giap — Man & Myth," *Marine Corps Gazette*, August 1963, p. 34.
3. Bernard B. Fall, *The Two Vietnams* (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 85.
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5. Denis A. Warner, *The Last Confucian* (New York: Macmillan, 1963), p. 45.
6. Phillippe Devillers, *Histoire du Vietnam de 1940 a 1952* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1952), p. 70.
7. Fall, "Vo-nguyen-Giap — Man & Myth," p. 35.
8. Bernard B. Fall, *Vietnam Witness* (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 35.
9. Hoang Van Chi, *From Colonialism to Communism* (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 54.
10. Fall, *Vietnam Witness*, p. 248.
11. *Ibid.*
12. Fall, "Vo-nguyen-Giap — Man & Myth," p. 35.
13. Warner, p. 46.
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15. *Ibid.*
16. Tai Sung An, "The Sino-Soviet Dispute and Vietnam," *Orbis*, Summer 1965, p. 429n.
17. Warner, p. 46.
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19. Ellen J. Hammer, *The Struggle for Indochina* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1954), p. 97.
20. Patrick J. Honey, *Communism in North Vietnam* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1963), p. 28.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
22. Vo-nguyen-Giap, *People's War, People's Army* (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1964), p. 47.
23. Fall, "Vo-nguyen-Giap — Man & Myth," p. 36.
24. Malcolm W. Browne, "Our Toughest Foe since Rommel." *True*, June 1966, p. 96.
25. Jules Roy, *The Battle of Dienbienphu* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 53.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

27. Hammer, p. 159-160. Ellen Hammer reports that a French journalist for *Le Monde* described Giap as the outstanding man present at the first Dalat conference which convened on 18 April 1946. He was called: "a political man in every sense of the word."

II

1. Giap, p. 43.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 48.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
4. Fall, *The Two Vietnams*, p. 112
5. Interview with Thieu-ta Tran Van Du, Commanding Officer of the Vietnamese Naval Supply Center, Saigon: 3 May 1966.
6. Roy, p. 4.
7. Giap, p. 56.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 124.
9. Ellen J. Hammer, *Vietnam -- Yesterday and Today* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), p. 241.
10. Roy, p. 68.
11. Giap, p. 129.
12. George K. Tanham, *Communist Revolutionary Warfare -- the Viet-Minh in Indochina* (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 60.
13. Hoang Van Chi indicates that the penalty for rape, for example, was usually death, p. 146.
14. Giap, p. 130.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 131.
16. Bernard B. Fall, *The Viet-Minh Regime* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1954), p. 74.
17. Giap, p. 46.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 49.
19. Giap, p. 48.
20. Bernard B. Fall, *Street without Joy* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 1963), p. 34.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 38.
22. Giap, p. 48.
23. Warner, p. 61.
24. Bernard B. Fall, "Indochina — the Last Year of the War," *Military Review*, October 1956, p. 6.
25. Robert Guillain, "What Is at Stake in Indochina," *The Listener*, 10 June 1954, p. 992.
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III

1. Hammer, *The Struggle for Indochina*, p. 159.
2. Bernard B. Fall, "The Other Side of the 17th Parallel," *The New York Times Magazine*, 10 July 1966, p. 52.
3. Honey, p. 179.

IV

1. Fall, *The Two Vietnams*, p. 113.
2. Fall, "Vo-nguyen-Giap — Man & Myth," p. 37.

APPENDIX I

1. Vo-nguyeu-Giap, *Dienbienphu* (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1964), p. 214-220.

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That two Battalions of Marines be raised consisting of one Colonel, two lieutenant Colonels, two Majors & Officers as usual in other regiments, that they consist of an equal number of privates with other battalions; that particular care be taken that no person be appointed to officer or enlisted into said Battalions, but such as are good seamen, or so acquainted with maritime affairs as to be able to serve to advantage by sea . . .

Resolution of the Continental Congress creating the U.S. Marine Corps, 10 November 1775