

1967

Book Review


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Recommended Citation

War College, The U.S. Naval (1967) "Book Review," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 20 : No. 9 , Article 7.
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PROFESSIONAL READING

The evaluations of recent books listed in this section have been prepared for the use of resident students. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these books of interest in their professional reading.

The inclusion of a book in this section does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein.

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San Diego, Calif. 92136

Bosworth, Allen R. *America's Concentration Camps*. New York: Norton, 1967. 283 p.

Captain Bosworth, a former San Francisco journalist, served with Naval Intelligence at the time of the Japanese evacuation from the west coast. In a clear, factual style, he describes the events that led up to the racial hysteria which resulted in the internment of Japanese Americans in the early days of World War II. He reviews the actions of special interest groups, hate groups, and so-called "military necessities" that led up to the evacuation of some 100,000 Japanese from their homes and businesses and their tragic internment in desert barracks. The sadness and stupidity of this abuse of Government power are made more vivid by the personal accounts contained in this documentation.

In contrast, the author cites the combat achievements of those same Japanese Americans of the 100th Infantry Battalion and the 442nd Regimental Combat Team. The 442nd Regimental Combat Team became the most highly decorated unit of the U.S. Army in all its history. The hardships and misery of life in the internment camps are delineated in the accounts by those who endured the conditions facing the internees. The personal and pecuniary losses of these citizens caused by the War Relocation Act are stunning to the reader. The political and financial exploitation by others, at the expense of American citizens, is likened to the white man's exploitation of the Indian — a national shame.

The ironical view of most Japanese Americans that "the evacuation" was a good thing in that it was "a helpful catastrophe" evolves as the final consensus of those good citizens who bore the brunt of internment in physical discomfort, humiliation, and great personal loss. The book is well written

and appropriate reading in this time of racial tension.

J. E. SULLIVAN

Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Buchan, Alastair. *War in Modern Society*. London: Watts, 1966. 207 p.

Although this is not a history, according to the author's own words, *War in Modern Society* is based on the history of ideas about war and its control, of technological developments, and of the growth of international association to prevent war. In the preface of this thought-provoking book, Mr. Buchan expresses its objective by stating: "I hope that it may make some of today's controversies, both among the experts and between nations, more comprehensible: it will have served its purpose if it convinces those who read it that war is a phenomenon worthy of extended study before one can form any valid judgments about the conditions of peace."

In "Perspectives on Modern War," the first chapter of the book, Mr. Buchan presents a scholarly historical review of, and an excellent discussion on, the causes and control of war. He then devotes the next two chapters to the transitions in the nature of war and forms of strategy that have taken place in the last 20 years. In effect, he develops an understandable picture for the reader of war and its control in the contemporary world — at the start of the last third of the 20th century. He emphasizes three areas that are rapidly changing that picture: the concept of deterrence and its expansion beyond the original threat of nuclear retaliation; collective security and the growing problems within existing alliances, created in part by resurgent nationalism, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the Sino-Soviet schism; and the continuing spread of violence throughout the world, sparked by the nationalism and aspirations of the un-

derdeveloped nations. The last half of the book looks beyond the present day to the "remaining years of the 20th century, with the dangers and opportunities which the heritage of the past century have presented to us." Starting with a review of the major armed camps and potential conflict areas of the world, Mr. Buchan examines the forces that lead to war in light of the pressures and restraints of modern society. In particular, he discusses the part played by the United Nations, by United States/U.S.S.R. desires to avoid direct confrontation, and by the concept of apparent "convergence" in which Communist and capitalist countries are becoming more alike in their ambitions and responses. Discouraging on the dangers of war, both real and apparent, he dwells at length on three threats of growing concern: third power instigation, technological innovations such as the ABM with its possibilities of a renewed arms race, and nuclear proliferation. Finally, he treats the possibilities of controlling war, either through the control of armaments or through the control of national aggressive tendencies that lead to war.

Mr. Buchan has done an excellent job of analyzing the events of the past and the realities of the present, together with their implications. He succeeds not only in affording an understanding of the war in modern society, but he also pinpoints the problems and trends which presage the changes that might be expected before the end of the century.

A. V. RINEARSON, III

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army

Davis, Vincent. *The Politics of Innovation: Patterns and Navy Cases*. Denver: University of Denver, 1967. 69 p.

In this brief monograph Mr. Davis

reviews the methods which certain Navy officers have used to encourage the adoption of new weapons systems within the Navy. His case studies are excellent although, as he states, by no means complete.

The author examines the Navy's initial struggles to achieve a nuclear strike capability from aircraft carriers, the development of a nuclear propulsion system, and the fight for the fleet ballistic missile. In each example Mr. Davis implies that any successful venture requires vertical (top echelon) support as well as horizontal encouragement within the service. In this regard the reader is instructed to analyze the climate for innovation carefully before dashing forward with uncontained enthusiasm. The advice is plain, but caution cannot really be the hallmark of progress; in each of these cases, even prudence was abandoned on occasion.

Although never stated specifically, Mr. Davis also cautions against the loss of military effectiveness which can result from parochial thinking at the highest levels. It seems that the desire to maintain one-service control over the development of weapons systems might result in a time lag simply because such absolute control encourages a degree of restraint which is absent in a competitive environment.

This monograph covers cases which were really decided a decade or more ago. A sequel to this fine study, which would analyze specific programs since 1960, might be a most valuable research topic for enterprising Naval War College students. Mr. Davis has provided a well-organized format for future investigators in the field of military behavioral science — and it would be enlightening (and encouraging) to find that his premises were still valid.

WALTER "R" THOMAS
Commander, U.S. Navy

Fehrenbach, Theodore R. *F.D.R.'s Undeclared War 1939 to 1941*. New York: McKay, 1967. 344 p.

F.D.R.'s Undeclared War 1939 to 1941 is a clearly written examination of the inner workings of the pre-World War II U.S. Government under the leadership of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Although not primarily adopting a pro-Roosevelt stand, the author has gone to considerable length to justify each of the President's significant domestic and international political decisions. This book describes in considerable detail President Roosevelt's concerns over the rising threats of Hitler's Nazi Germany and expansionist-minded Japan. It discusses his successful moves to gain the backing and confidence of an isolationist-inclined Congress and a "no more foreign wars" American public in order to prepare the United States against the inevitable threat of war. Of special interest are the explanations of his methods — many times unknown to the Congress and the public — of committing and extending United States/European involvement, primarily through military aid to Great Britain and Russia. In addition, the book presents an excellent analysis of Hitler's attitude toward the United States and Japan's reasons for the eventual Pearl Harbor attack. The author has produced an interesting and informative contribution to an already greatly discussed period of American history.

G. H. KAFFER

Commander, U.S. Navy

Halperin, Morton H., ed. *Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control*. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1967. 342 p.

The Sino-Soviet cleavage and the nuclear arms control problem have long provided scholars with discussion materials. This book was generated from a conference held in 1965 and attended

by 36 subject-matter experts. The editor is to be commended for the balance he has achieved in assembling the 10 papers that comprise the volume. The authors make liberal and constructive use of primary sources as they attempt to explain the fine points in the triad of relationships among the United States, the Soviet Union, and Communist China. For the beginning student of international relations, *Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control* is a fine survey and screening device to determine if the subject areas are worth his further study. This book is not for the general reader but does illuminate several aspects of the nuclear proliferation problem for the foreign affairs specialist.

I. E. M. DONOVAN

Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Hilsman, Roger. *To Move a Nation*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967. 602 p.

Roger Hilsman has written a rare and unusual kind of a book. It is rare in its sustained merit (for it is quite a long book) and unusual in its format (for it is partly a theoretical essay on the foreign policy process, partly action report, and partly a memoir). Chapters 1, 35, and 36 are deliberate efforts at a theoretical formulation of the lessons distilled from Mr. Hilsman's experiences in Government, most importantly as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. The bulk of the book is a blend of analysis, chronological background treatment, and case studies in crisis during President John F. Kennedy's administration. It is far and away the best statement so far of the foreign policy process during Kennedy's term.

The titles of the main parts of the book accurately indicate its scope and content. They are, in order: the politics of policymaking; the organiza-

tional struggle (to produce an effective "team"); President Kennedy and the CIA (with a look at the Bay of Pigs fiasco); Laos; the Cuban missile crisis; the Congo crisis; the United States and Communist China; Indonesia, Malaysia, and confrontation; Vietnam; and, finally, the making and managing of foreign policy. The last few pages, an epilogue, are an assessment of John F. Kennedy's statecraft.

Hilsman's book is as honest and frank about his own role in these affairs as it would seem possible for any participant to be. He does not gloss over or rewrite the record — or if he does, he does so without detection by this reviewer. Another of the book's best features is its high standards of accuracy. In short, it is a highly dependable book from the standpoint of scholarship.

Nor does the author confine his frankness to his own actions. He characterizes Secretary McNamara, for example, in this fashion (p. 43): "McNamara was an extraordinarily able man, a brilliantly efficient man. But he was not a wise man." Speaking later on the same point (p. 579) with reference to what he considers a basic mistake in U.S. strategy in Vietnam, he says: "If the Secretary of Defense . . . had been less self-confident and dominating, the political side might have received more emphasis. But no cabinet member can be faulted for presenting his own and his department's case with all the eloquence and vigor at his command . . . and the real blame rests with the Secretary of State and his department."

These excerpts suggest the flavor of what is quite a forthright (and equally a controversial) book. The value of what Hilsman has done does not rest on whether the reader agrees with his arguments and judgments. It rests on the honesty and vigor with which one

person in a policymaking position during critical and important developments states his case, and the insights he gives as to how particular options were chosen and why. This is a book which sheds real light on how Government really operates. It deserves a wide audience.

FREDERICK H. HARTMANN
Alfred Thayer Mahan Chair of
Maritime Strategy

Karol, K. S. *China: The Other Communism*. New York: Hill and Wang, 1967. 474 p.

This lengthy volume, translated from the French, was authored in 1965-1966 by a Polish refugee (as a teenager from Hitler's armies) of Communist leanings. First "enraptured" by his new Soviet fatherland, he became a Soviet citizen for 7 years, played around the edges of the Russian-sponsored Communist Government of Poland, and returned briefly to Poland in 1946. Finally, becoming less fascinated with Stalin's brand of communism, he settled in France in the late 1940's (when the French Communist Party was getting stronger daily) and began writing for leftist publications.

The book centers on author Karol's 4-month trip (his first) of approximately 16,000 miles (by air and train) in Communist China during February-June of 1965, during which his time was so thoroughly scheduled that even "the majority" of his evenings were taken up. His prior knowledge of China (other than of its communism) was meager and, based on his own comments, stemmed primarily from a single volume of pre-World War I vintage for foreign travelers. Professing to be a "socialist," but a "socialist" within the confines of the Communist definition, the author states that he was "admittedly . . . prejudiced in [China's] favor." That the ChiComs

approved his visa request in relative record time tends to confirm that they shared his belief in this "prejudice." Nevertheless, Karol goes through the motions of stressing his objectivity, although his "objectiveness," at best, is measured within a Marx-Lenin-Stalin-Mao (primarily Mao) frame of reference as he compares Soviet Russia with the other communism — Communist China. Soviet Russia comes in a poor second to Chinese egalitarianism and its rejection of the Soviet economic system, while the non-Communist world, particularly the United States, serves as a target for a perceptible amount of his biases, as well as his tirades, in his "objectiveness." The book's philosophy could well have caused it to be renamed *The Communist Gospel according to Mao*.

The author appears to demonstrate his greatest competence in setting forth China's history as "they see it" today, in describing the communes he visited, and in the developing of "correct" political thought for towns. But his aplomb is badly mauled when he discusses the "elusive proletarian culture," and dismay creeps into his chapter as he tries to make logical assessments of the role of writers (the area in which he has the most experience) and their treatment by the ChiCom government and the Red Guards. But shaking off these doubts, Karol ends on a crescendo in acclaiming China and its role in the world as though he were reading the pronouncements of Mao in undiluted fashion. Only infrequently, but periodically nevertheless, throughout the volume the author appears to forget his advocacy and omits the sometimes deft twists he gives events; for example, he notes that the isolationist tendencies of China which "daily becomes more marked," or observes that the ChiComs "feed the hostility the Chinese feel toward the United States," or concludes

that "the China of today . . . leads to a . . . view of . . . extremism." Portions of the volume are illuminating and informative when one looks behind the facade erected by Karol, particularly if the reader has traveled some in continental China and has kept his reading on China current. To glean those portions, however, is a task not worth the effort unless the reader has these qualifications or has time on his hands to spare.

B. F. KEITH

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Marshall, Samuel L. A. *Battles in the Monsoon*. New York: Morrow, 1967. 408 p.

Battles in the Monsoon is a penetrating and graphic account of the role played by the individual soldier in the small-unit actions that are the backbone of the strategy currently employed in the Vietnamese War. Never before in the history of ground warfare has the ultimate outcome of the conflict depended so much on the professional skill and courage of the lieutenant, the sergeant, and the private. Much to the dismay and frustration of the hundreds of war correspondents, news editors, and historians, Vietnam is not, and probably will never be, a war characterized by decisive battles being fought between division-size forces expertly led by battle-seasoned and well-known generals. In Vietnam the big conflict is a composite of hundreds of squad-, platoon-, and company-size engagements. Rather than by battle-seasoned generals, these small units are maneuvered and led in combat by men recently departed from the teeming cities and rural communities of the United States. The author, S. L. A. Marshall, has provided a detailed analysis of these young warriors and many of the skirmishes and actions in which they fought. Only a writer like Marshall

could reconstruct these small-unit clashes in such an intimate and skillful manner. Having spent a lifetime as a highly successful military historian, author, and officer, he is well qualified to conduct an extremely interesting and objective account of irregular warfare as it is being fought in Vietnam today. The author spent 3 months in Vietnam during the summer of 1966 with the soldiers and units covered in *Battles in the Monsoon*. During this period he shared their fears and concerns, as well as their victories and defeats. Aside from being an interesting hook, it gives the reader a deeper understanding concerning the true nature of irregular warfare. It is highly recommended reading for all military officers.

J. C. MIZE

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Army

Pell, Claiborne and Goodwin, Harold
L. *Challenge of the Seven Seas*. New York: Morrow, 1966. 306 p.

If the earth were a smooth sphere it would be covered by a mile and a half of water. About four-fifths of the earth's animal life is found in the sea. Earth's highest peak is Mount Everest, slightly more than 29,000 feet above sea level. Dump this giant among mountains into the Marianas Trench and its top would be more than a mile below the surface. What other facts do you know about the sea? Our authors feel a growing sense of urgency and conviction that we must begin a full program of ocean education and exploitation without delay. The public and the executive and legislative branches of the Federal and State Governments must be made keenly aware of the potential which the seas have to offer for national as well as international gain. In attempting to advance this awareness, the authors cover and discuss, although somewhat superficially, the full spectrum of events, problems, and de-

velopments relating to this vast and challenging subject. The following are a few of the major topics covered: a prediction of oceanographic prospects 30 years hence; the need for turning to the sea for food, minerals, and water; the merchant marine and its continued economic potential; international law; legitimate exploitation of the sea; and the 32 governmental agencies, departments, and offices that are involved in oceanographic activities, leading to the opinion that "the creation of a statutory base of ocean developments does not answer all questions or solve all problems."

The authors demonstrate an unusual intellectual honesty in not maintaining that they have all the answers. However, they do provide a penetrating look at both the problems and possibilities that ocean exploitation holds for not only the United States, but all the world.

R. N. PETERSON

Commander, U.S. Navy

Salisbury, Harrison E. *Behind the Lines — Hanoi*. New York: Harper & Row, 1967. 243 p.

This is a rather strongly opinionated report by a "trained" observer who, it would appear, also considers himself to be a military strategist and a diplomatic tactician. To the author, apparently everything Americans have done in the conduct of the war in Vietnam has been faulty. They have erred in the targets they have designated to be important military objectives; they have underestimated the endurance and patriotism of the Vietnamese — North and South; they have failed to seek a negotiated settlement with the enemy. *Behind the Lines — Hanoi* is readable and provocative, if one can tolerate the harsh criticism of American bombing and the remarks inferring possibly questionable motives on the part of U.S. leaders. The book covers the observations and

impressions that the writer, a *New York Times* correspondent, experienced during 2 brief weeks in the Hanoi area between 23 December 1966 and 7 January 1967. While in North Vietnam the author spoke to only one major leader, Premier Pham Van Dong, who stated, "it is a sacred war for Independence, Freedom, Life." He declared that America's air war had met with both military and propaganda defeats. He impressed the interviewer with the indomitable spirit of the North Vietnamese. Most of them bear arms; the teenagers are fiercely patriotic; all are persuaded that there will be another great victory as at Dien Bien Phu over the French. Maintaining that the United States is unable to achieve a military victory despite continued escalation, Dong said that "the key to peace lies with Washington where the first move must be to cease bombing North Vietnam." Mr. Salisbury points out that bombing North Vietnam has only stiffened Hanoi's resistance. He considers Americans remiss not to realize the divergencies between "Socialism in the North and Democracy in the South," and feels they do not understand the political programs and problems of reunification in Vietnam. He believes Hanoi is now ready to talk terms in private and with no third party involved. The author bases this view on the chaos in China and the feeling that Hanoi has no wish to come under that country's domination. If Peking felt that Hanoi was pro-Soviet or that China should intervene in the war against the United States, it would send its "volunteers" into the fray. Salisbury ventures to declare that the U.S. military might actually be seeking such involvement in order to crush China. He feels that China is prepared, even in the event of a nuclear attack, and that it should be a challenge to American diplomats to deal with China and to avoid

a war with her. The writer does not think that the United States has anything to gain even if she defeats North Vietnam and that hence she should try to reach an honorable and reasonable settlement with Hanoi before it is too late.

B. M. TRUITT
Commander, U.S. Navy

Simpson, Smith. *Anatomy of the State Department*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967. 285 p.

This is another analysis of the ills of the State Department. It has the virtue of having been written by a recently retired officer of the diplomatic service, and thus the examples used by the author to support his views are generally accurate. Furthermore, the author has added a considerable amount of research to his extensive firsthand knowledge and experience, but — unfortunately — he becomes a victim of the very "mystifying phenomenon" he warns about: the tendency of each officer to characterize the diplomatic establishment in a different way.

Quoting Plato, the author begins his criticism with "why." Why is there so much doubt about the State Department? The reader is led through a searching, but often slanted, analysis of the inner workings of the Department of State and the Foreign Service of the United States. The State Department is compared with other Federal agencies to show its strengths and weaknesses. State's relations with the Congress and the White House are found wanting. Congress is praised for prodding that brought about reforms in State, but is chastised for not providing the support that the author considers State should have. Military officers will probably be favorably impressed by the author's high regard for the manner in which the military establishment operates, particularly with

regard to long-range planning and the training programs for its officers. In these areas the State Department is woefully inadequate, according to the author who probably would find that most of his colleagues agree.

Acknowledging a "current spurt" of improvement in State, the author nevertheless has some harsh things to say about all but a few of the top level authorities of the Department and concludes that it "is in dire need of a general manager . . . who has time to oversee the establishment in its entirety." This manager should be experienced in the Department and the Foreign Service, and Presidents and Secretaries of State should give him the support he needs "through succeeding Administrations." Without explaining just how the time span involved in his solution is to be covered by one human being, the author finally concludes that no President nor Secretary would entrust such a powerful and influential position to a career officer of the diplomatic service until the Department has won respect for professionalization and sound operating procedures. It is regrettable that this otherwise skillful, if somewhat biased, analysis of the diplomatic service should end on such a contradictory and rather unrealistic note. One suspects that the author longs for a McNamara instead of a Rusk in State. The book is recommended for supplementary reading by officers who wish to delve more deeply into some of the problems of the State Department, particularly as they affect relations with the Department of Defense.

T. S. ESTES
State Department Adviser

Wilson, Dick. *A Quarter of Mankind*.
London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
1966. 308 p.

Dick Wilson, former editor of the
Far Eastern Economic Review of Hong

Kong, has written a three-part analysis of Communist China under the regime established in 1949. It begins by considering the main elements and tensions within new Chinese cultural, social, and political life; the second part of the book discusses the national economy; and the third concludes with a prophetic review of Red China's international relations. After the first few pages the reader is already impressed by the meticulous manner in which Mr. Wilson documents his statements drawn from both Communist and anti-Communist sources. Upon completing the 300 pages of close-set type, one cannot help but also admire the author's sympathetic and friendly approach to the Chinese people and their revolution. His lack of hostility makes the book not only commendably objective but more easily understandable. *A Quarter of Mankind* was written before the current Chinese uprisings; however, the author did have the insight to forecast that the resurgence of traditional individualism among the people might eventually jeopardize collective disciplines and the materialistic rule of international communism. On the other hand, he feels that the universalistic aspect of communism could eventually break down China's cultural distaste for Western modern living. Recent events have apparently confirmed at least the first of these forecasts. This interesting book is "must" reading for all students of international affairs who wish to obtain an accurate comprehension of the forces behind the contemporary Chinese revolution.

K. C. HOLM
Captain, U.S. Navy

