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To Move a Nation

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Fehrenbach, Theodore R. *F.D.R.'s Undeclared War 1939 to 1941*. New York: McKay, 1967. 344 p.

F.D.R.'s Undeclared War 1939 to 1941 is a clearly written examination of the inner workings of the pre-World War II U.S. Government under the leadership of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Although not primarily adopting a pro-Roosevelt stand, the author has gone to considerable length to justify each of the President's significant domestic and international political decisions. This book describes in considerable detail President Roosevelt's concerns over the rising threats of Hitler's Nazi Germany and expansionist-minded Japan. It discusses his successful moves to gain the backing and confidence of an isolationist-inclined Congress and a "no more foreign wars" American public in order to prepare the United States against the inevitable threat of war. Of special interest are the explanations of his methods — many times unknown to the Congress and the public — of committing and extending United States/European involvement, primarily through military aid to Great Britain and Russia. In addition, the book presents an excellent analysis of Hitler's attitude toward the United States and Japan's reasons for the eventual Pearl Harbor attack. The author has produced an interesting and informative contribution to an already greatly discussed period of American history.

G. H. KAFFER

Commander, U.S. Navy

Halperin, Morton H., ed. *Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control*. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1967. 342 p.

The Sino-Soviet cleavage and the nuclear arms control problem have long provided scholars with discussion materials. This book was generated from a conference held in 1965 and attended

by 36 subject-matter experts. The editor is to be commended for the balance he has achieved in assembling the 10 papers that comprise the volume. The authors make liberal and constructive use of primary sources as they attempt to explain the fine points in the triad of relationships among the United States, the Soviet Union, and Communist China. For the beginning student of international relations, *Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control* is a fine survey and screening device to determine if the subject areas are worth his further study. This book is not for the general reader but does illuminate several aspects of the nuclear proliferation problem for the foreign affairs specialist.

I. E. M. DONOVAN

Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Hilsman, Roger. *To Move a Nation*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967. 602 p.

Roger Hilsman has written a rare and unusual kind of a book. It is rare in its sustained merit (for it is quite a long book) and unusual in its format (for it is partly a theoretical essay on the foreign policy process, partly action report, and partly a memoir). Chapters 1, 35, and 36 are deliberate efforts at a theoretical formulation of the lessons distilled from Mr. Hilsman's experiences in Government, most importantly as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. The bulk of the book is a blend of analysis, chronological background treatment, and case studies in crisis during President John F. Kennedy's administration. It is far and away the best statement so far of the foreign policy process during Kennedy's term.

The titles of the main parts of the book accurately indicate its scope and content. They are, in order: the politics of policymaking; the organiza-

tional struggle (to produce an effective "team"); President Kennedy and the CIA (with a look at the Bay of Pigs fiasco); Laos; the Cuban missile crisis; the Congo crisis; the United States and Communist China; Indonesia, Malaysia, and confrontation; Vietnam; and, finally, the making and managing of foreign policy. The last few pages, an epilogue, are an assessment of John F. Kennedy's statecraft.

Hilsman's book is as honest and frank about his own role in these affairs as it would seem possible for any participant to be. He does not gloss over or rewrite the record — or if he does, he does so without detection by this reviewer. Another of the book's best features is its high standards of accuracy. In short, it is a highly dependable book from the standpoint of scholarship.

Nor does the author confine his frankness to his own actions. He characterizes Secretary McNamara, for example, in this fashion (p. 43): "McNamara was an extraordinarily able man, a brilliantly efficient man. But he was not a wise man." Speaking later on the same point (p. 579) with reference to what he considers a basic mistake in U.S. strategy in Vietnam, he says: "If the Secretary of Defense . . . had been less self-confident and dominating, the political side might have received more emphasis. But no cabinet member can be faulted for presenting his own and his department's case with all the eloquence and vigor at his command . . . and the real blame rests with the Secretary of State and his department."

These excerpts suggest the flavor of what is quite a forthright (and equally a controversial) book. The value of what Hilsman has done does not rest on whether the reader agrees with his arguments and judgments. It rests on the honesty and vigor with which one

person in a policymaking position during critical and important developments states his case, and the insights he gives as to how particular options were chosen and why. This is a book which sheds real light on how Government really operates. It deserves a wide audience.

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Alfred Thayer Mahan Chair of
Maritime Strategy

Karol, K. S. *China: The Other Communism*. New York: Hill and Wang, 1967. 474 p.

This lengthy volume, translated from the French, was authored in 1965-1966 by a Polish refugee (as a teenager from Hitler's armies) of Communist leanings. First "enraptured" by his new Soviet fatherland, he became a Soviet citizen for 7 years, played around the edges of the Russian-sponsored Communist Government of Poland, and returned briefly to Poland in 1946. Finally, becoming less fascinated with Stalin's brand of communism, he settled in France in the late 1940's (when the French Communist Party was getting stronger daily) and began writing for leftist publications.

The book centers on author Karol's 4-month trip (his first) of approximately 16,000 miles (by air and train) in Communist China during February-June of 1965, during which his time was so thoroughly scheduled that even "the majority" of his evenings were taken up. His prior knowledge of China (other than of its communism) was meager and, based on his own comments, stemmed primarily from a single volume of pre-World War I vintage for foreign travelers. Professed to be a "socialist," but a "socialist" within the confines of the Communist definition, the author states that he was "admittedly . . . prejudiced in [China's] favor." That the ChiComs