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Battles in the Monsoon

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approved his visa request in relative record time tends to confirm that they shared his belief in this "prejudice." Nevertheless, Karol goes through the motions of stressing his objectivity, although his "objectiveness," at best, is measured within a Marx-Lenin-Stalin-Mao (primarily Mao) frame of reference as he compares Soviet Russia with the other communism — Communist China. Soviet Russia comes in a poor second to Chinese egalitarianism and its rejection of the Soviet economic system, while the non-Communist world, particularly the United States, serves as a target for a perceptible amount of his biases, as well as his tirades, in his "objectiveness." The book's philosophy could well have caused it to be renamed *The Communist Gospel according to Mao*.

The author appears to demonstrate his greatest competence in setting forth China's history as "they see it" today, in describing the communes he visited, and in the developing of "correct" political thought for towns. But his aplomb is badly mauled when he discusses the "elusive proletarian culture," and dismay creeps into his chapter as he tries to make logical assessments of the role of writers (the area in which he has the most experience) and their treatment by the ChiCom government and the Red Guards. But shaking off these doubts, Karol ends on a crescendo in acclaiming China and its role in the world as though he were reading the pronouncements of Mao in undiluted fashion. Only infrequently, but periodically nevertheless, throughout the volume the author appears to forget his advocacy and omits the sometimes deft twists he gives events; for example, he notes that the isolationist tendencies of China which "daily becomes more marked," or observes that the ChiComs "feed the hostility the Chinese feel toward the United States," or concludes

that "the China of today . . . leads to a . . . view of . . . extremism." Portions of the volume are illuminating and informative when one looks behind the facade erected by Karol, particularly if the reader has traveled some in continental China and has kept his reading on China current. To glean those portions, however, is a task not worth the effort unless the reader has these qualifications or has time on his hands to spare.

B. F. KEITH

Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Marshall, Samuel L. A. *Battles in the Monsoon*. New York: Morrow, 1967. 408 p.

Battles in the Monsoon is a penetrating and graphic account of the role played by the individual soldier in the small-unit actions that are the backbone of the strategy currently employed in the Vietnamese War. Never before in the history of ground warfare has the ultimate outcome of the conflict depended so much on the professional skill and courage of the lieutenant, the sergeant, and the private. Much to the dismay and frustration of the hundreds of war correspondents, news editors, and historians, Vietnam is not, and probably will never be, a war characterized by decisive battles being fought between division-size forces expertly led by battle-seasoned and well-known generals. In Vietnam the big conflict is a composite of hundreds of squad-, platoon-, and company-size engagements. Rather than by battle-seasoned generals, these small units are maneuvered and led in combat by men recently departed from the teeming cities and rural communities of the United States. The author, S. L. A. Marshall, has provided a detailed analysis of these young warriors and many of the skirmishes and actions in which they fought. Only a writer like Marshall

could reconstruct these small-unit clashes in such an intimate and skillful manner. Having spent a lifetime as a highly successful military historian, author, and officer, he is well qualified to conduct an extremely interesting and objective account of irregular warfare as it is being fought in Vietnam today. The author spent 3 months in Vietnam during the summer of 1966 with the soldiers and units covered in *Battles in the Monsoon*. During this period he shared their fears and concerns, as well as their victories and defeats. Aside from being an interesting hook, it gives the reader a deeper understanding concerning the true nature of irregular warfare. It is highly recommended reading for all military officers.

J. C. MIZE

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Army

Pell, Claiborne and Goodwin, Harold
L. Challenge of the Seven Seas. New York: Morrow, 1966. 306 p.

If the earth were a smooth sphere it would be covered by a mile and a half of water. About four-fifths of the earth's animal life is found in the sea. Earth's highest peak is Mount Everest, slightly more than 29,000 feet above sea level. Dump this giant among mountains into the Marianas Trench and its top would be more than a mile below the surface. What other facts do you know about the sea? Our authors feel a growing sense of urgency and conviction that we must begin a full program of ocean education and exploitation without delay. The public and the executive and legislative branches of the Federal and State Governments must be made keenly aware of the potential which the seas have to offer for national as well as international gain. In attempting to advance this awareness, the authors cover and discuss, although somewhat superficially, the full spectrum of events, problems, and de-

velopments relating to this vast and challenging subject. The following are a few of the major topics covered: a prediction of oceanographic prospects 30 years hence; the need for turning to the sea for food, minerals, and water; the merchant marine and its continued economic potential; international law; legitimate exploitation of the sea; and the 32 governmental agencies, departments, and offices that are involved in oceanographic activities, leading to the opinion that "the creation of a statutory base of ocean developments does not answer all questions or solve all problems."

The authors demonstrate an unusual intellectual honesty in not maintaining that they have all the answers. However, they do provide a penetrating look at both the problems and possibilities that ocean exploitation holds for not only the United States, but all the world.

R. N. PETERSON

Commander, U.S. Navy

Salisbury, Harrison E. *Behind the Lines — Hanoi*. New York: Harper & Row, 1967. 243 p.

This is a rather strongly opinionated report by a "trained" observer who, it would appear, also considers himself to be a military strategist and a diplomatic tactician. To the author, apparently everything Americans have done in the conduct of the war in Vietnam has been faulty. They have erred in the targets they have designated to be important military objectives; they have underestimated the endurance and patriotism of the Vietnamese — North and South; they have failed to seek a negotiated settlement with the enemy. *Behind the Lines — Hanoi* is readable and provocative, if one can tolerate the harsh criticism of American bombing and the remarks inferring possibly questionable motives on the part of U.S. leaders. The book covers the observations and