Naval War College Review

Volume 20
Number 9 *November*

Article 20

1967

November 1967 Review

The U.S. Naval War College

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW



- *SOVIET DISARMAMENT*
- *VO-nguyen-GIAP*

November 1967

FOREWORD

The *Naval War College Review* was established in 1948 by the Chief of Naval Personnel in order that officers of the service might receive some of the educational benefits available to the resident students at the Naval War College.

The material contained in the *Review* is for the professional education of its readers. The frank remarks and personal opinions of the lecturers and authors are presented with the understanding that they will not be quoted without permission. The remarks and opinions shall not be published nor quoted publicly, as a whole or in part, without specific clearance in each instance with the lecturer or author.

Lectures are selected on the basis of favorable reception by Naval War College audiences, usefulness to servicewide readership, and timeliness. Research papers are selected on the basis of professional interest to readers.

The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the lecturers and authors, and are not necessarily those of the Navy Department nor of the Naval War College.

CONTENTS

Volume XX, Number 4 November 1967

EDITORIAL BOARD

CHALLENGE

The United States Marine Corps celebrated its 192nd anniversary on 10 November 1967. Because the Marine Corps is one of the naval services, the history of the Marines, I'm proud to say, is naval history. Operating on sea, in the air, and on land the Marines constitute a composite military force which is second to none in each of these elements.

Marines are as old as the sea. Themistocles, when mobilizing Athenian seapower against Persian invaders in 480 B.C. ". . . enlisted marines, 20 to a ship from men between 20 and 30. . . ." Rome had separate legions of *Milites de Classiarii*, one legion to each fleet. Cardinal Richelieu formed a *Campagnie de la Mer*, French sailors trained to fight on shore.

Modern Marines came into being in the 17th century. During the wars between England and Holland the first true corps of Marines were founded. Soldiers bred to the sea were organized into elite maritime fighting forces: the Duke of York and Albany's "maritime regiment of foot," and the Royal Netherlands *Korps Mariniers*.

The first American Marines were established in 1740 when four British colonial battalions, under the command of Alexander Spotswood of Virginia, were raised to fight the Spaniards in the War of Austrian Succession. British Marines served again in North America during the Seven Years' War.

At the dawn of the American Revolution the Continental Marines came into being, thus inaugurating 192 years of

Naval War College Review, Vol. 20 [1967], No. 9, Art. 20

naval history. Following the enactment of a resolution by the Continental Congress on 10 November 1775, Samuel Nicholas was commissioned a captain on 28 November 1775, and he remained the senior officer in the Continental Marines throughout the Revolution.

The exploits of the Continental Marines throughout the Revolution struck the benchmark for exploits to come. During sea fights Marines headed boarding parties and fought from the tops and rigging as sharpshooters. In February 1776, 268 Marines landed on New Providence Island in the Bahamas, a military endeavor which established the maritime landing force as the spearhead and cutting edge of seapower.

Since this limited beginning, United States Marines have been in every major war and all the minor ones. They have fought valiantly in each of these, and during periods of peace they have served their country with no less valiance. Each of us recalls with pride and gratitude the locales which Marines have enshrined with gallant action: Haiti, Nicaragua, Shanghai, Tientsin, Belleau Wood, Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Iwo Jima, Inchon and, now, Con Thien. Every one of these names and what they signify has given Americans the right to walk a little taller.

The Corps today is as strong and as faithful as it has ever been in its glorious history. For, in the words of an eminent military scholar Colonel Robert Heinl, Jr., USMC (Ret.):

> Trained men who will stand and fight are never obsolete. It was not the bowman, but the long bow, not the cavalryman, but the horse, which vanished from the scene. Men — the man, the individual who is the Marine Corps symbol and stock in trade — constitute the one element which never changes. Whether the landing force lands by pulling boat, by motor sailer, by diesel-driven barge, or by helicopter, there must still be fighting men in between. The fearsome, untried weapons of today and tomorrow cannot change the fact that only attack — not defense — wins wars. . . . Far from being obsolete in an era of atomic weapons, the ready expeditionary force, made up of professionals, is the cutting edge of cold-war.
>
> As long as the sea is at our gates, North America will remain the last great island. Her strategy, if she is to win and survive, must be maritime.

The spearhead of this maritime force is the Corps. It is always ready to take the point, to project the force of American seapower, as it has for the past 192 years. With strength undiminished, with glory untarnished, with loyalty unquestioned, Marines have, and will continue to meet every challenge.

John T. Hayward

JOHN T. HAYWARD
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

COLD WAR OPERATIONS:

THE POLITICS OF

COMMUNIST CONFRONTATION



Part I — Marx and His Followers

(A series of eight lectures by Professor Lyman B. Kirkpatrick of the Political Science Department, Brown University, given at the United States Naval War College during the 1966-67 term as a part of the Electives Program. These lectures are selected from those in a course entitled *Cold War Operations* which Professor Kirkpatrick presents at Brown. This is the first lecture, and the others will be published in the next seven issues.)

It is generally acknowledged that the philosophy of Karl Marx is the glue that holds the international Communist movement together. It is also true that nowhere in the world is pure Marxism being followed today. It has been modified and changed in each country and by each leader to fit the circumstances and the time. But like religion, particularly like Christianity, there have to be certain fundamentals which Communists at least tacitly acknowledge, or their movement would collapse. Today, communism is more riven by disagreements and by different methods than ever before in its history. The former monolithic power has now fragmented to a very large degree, accentuated and underlined by the intense conflict between the Soviet Union and China.

It is important that Americans understand Marxism and what it means. It has wide attraction in the world today. This is true even though anybody who studies Marxist philosophy can spot flaws. It has many errors and misconceptions. The error most frequently noted is that Marx predicted that revolutions would take place in the heavily industrialized states: Great Britain, France, the United States, and Germany. The Communist revolution took place in Russia, which was not heavily industrialized. The successful Communist revolution in China was based almost completely on an agrarian movement.

While there are many errors which can be pointed out in Marxist philosophy and theory, this is not the point at issue. The fact is that Marx provided a logical explanation of history for many peoples of the world. We commonly accept the figure that about one-third of the present population on earth is either Marxist or Marxist sympathizers. Marx provides them a logical basis for understanding what generally is their plight or their alienation from society.

It is important that Americans should understand the appeals of Marxism — its strengths and weaknesses. Such an understanding would provide a better basis for coping with communism and preventing its spread. In the past our attitude too frequently has been based on the oversimplified explanation: communism is evil and our way is good. We have handicapped ourselves by taking this attitude and by not recognizing that communism does have appeals, and it will attract people. It will gain strength. It is almost a natural type of religion or bible for underdeveloped nations to follow and adopt. The recent history of many African and South Asian countries, and even Latin American countries, would serve to bear this out.

It is remarkable and encouraging that Notre Dame University has sponsored a Conference on Marxism. At this conference were present not only members of the clergy who are experts on Marxism, but foremost theoreticians from Communist countries. There were critical analyses of Marxism, and perhaps even more significant than the fact that one of our great Catholic universities was sponsoring this meeting was the fact that the Communist Marxists were willing to admit that there were many flaws in the basic philosophy that Marx originally advocated. However, there was general agreement that, beyond question, Marx is one of the most important philosophers whose thought affects modern society.

Marx is both fascinating and repulsive. He was a man so dogmatic that aside from Frederick Engels he had literally no friends in the world. He tolerated no difference from his viewpoints. He was ruthless and scathing, devastating to both critics and to other political philosophers, some of con-

siderable note, with whom he did not agree. His mother said of him after he started writing *Das Kapital*, it was too bad Karl didn't make some, instead of writing about it.

Marx came from a family which was originally of Jewish origin but who had adopted the Lutheran faith. Karl had no faith except in himself. He did not believe in any God and was violent in his denunciation of religion — atheism being one of the fundamental points of Marxism.

Marx originally intended to be a lawyer. He studied at the Universities of Bonn and Berlin, but he decided his interest was philosophy and wrote a doctoral dissertation on Greek materialism at the University of Jena.

His first paying job, of which he held about three in his entire lifetime, each for very short periods, was with a journal of political science called the *Rheinische Zeitung*. He attacked the German Government and system so fiercely in its one year of existence that the publication was banned, and he was asked to leave Germany. He then moved first to Paris, then to Brussels, and was successively asked to leave each of those countries mainly under pressure from the Prussian Government. He gained the reputation as a courageous newspaper man, but he moved into forefront among the political philosophers when with Engels he wrote the *Communist Manifesto* after the first meeting of the International Workingmen's Association (or First International) in Brussels.

In 1849 Marx moved permanently to London. The British were more tolerant of political renegades and less susceptible to Prussian pressure. He held his last paying job in London. Charles Dana, one of the great newspaper men of his time, hired Marx to write articles for *The New York Tribune* at $5 per article.

For the rest of Marx's life, until he died in 1883, he lived on the donations of his collaborator and, in some respects, his ghost writer, Frederick Engels. Marx finished volume one of *Das Kapital* just before he died, and Engels finished and published volumes two and three after Marx's death. Marx launched a philosophy which has probably caused more anguish and perhaps even more human misery than any other. He came from good upper middle class origin. His brother-in-law was Minister of the Interior in the Prussian Government, and he was related through marriage to the Duke of Argyll.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Professor Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr. was educated at Princeton University; he is presently Professor of Political Science at Brown University.

Prior to World War II, Professor Kirkpatrick worked for the U.S. News Publishing Corporation, and during the war he served in the Office of Strategic Services on the staff of Gen. Omar Bradley's 12th Army Group as intelligence briefing officer. At the end of World War II he returned briefly to the U.S. News as editor of *World Report* and then went to the Central Intelligence Agency, where he served in a variety of positions, including Division Chief, Assistant Director, Executive Assistant to the Director, Inspector General, and, from 1962 to 1965, Executive Director. In 1965 he left the Central Intelligence Agency to become Professor of Political Science at Brown University.

For his service in World War II, Professor Kirkpatrick received the Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, European Theater Ribbon with five battle stars, and both the French and Belgian Croix de Guerre. In March 1960, Professor Kirkpatrick was chosen by the National Service League as one of the 10 outstanding career officers in the Federal Government.

Marx read history probably beyond the capacity of most scholars. He studied all of the political philosophers in great detail. We could almost safely say that he probably ended up knowing more about their political philosophies than they did themselves. He wrote devastating commentaries on them. Out of this evolved a Marxist philosophy which has underlined the socialist movement throughout its history. It is interesting to note that because of his aversion to hostile views he broke up the First International rather than lose control of it.

The most important part of Marx's philosophy relates to the inevitability of history: man will not be able to affect his environment or his future to any large degree because there will be an inevitable turn of events which will govern his destiny. To prove this Marx used historical or dialectical materialism. A general reaction and revulsion against working conditions was then starting to create turbulence throughout Europe. Wages were low. The number of hours in the workweek pressed the limit of human endurance. Working conditions were horrible. Child labor was prevalent. The factory owners made fortunes, but the workingman seldom was able to rise above poverty. Marx was convinced that the capitalist system would never correct its ways, and the only solution was for the worker to seize the means of production.

Marx believed man went through specific stages of evolution, starting with primitive man moving into agrarian society, followed by feudalism and then capitalism, and finally the two stages of communism — the socialist and the Communist society.

To Marx religion was a dangerous rival. It gave man a crutch to rest on. The only belief man should hold was socialism. Under socialism the state would acquire all means of production. All men would be equal. Income for everybody would be apportioned according to their production. Classes would disappear. This eventually would result in the withering away of the state, which would no longer be required to suppress class conflict.

The state in the Soviet Union and other Communist countries not only has not withered away, but has prospered and become bigger and healthier and fatter and more inefficient. The Communist Party has become the ruling elite. More and more Communists now recognize the accuracy of Djilas' thesis of a dozen years ago that there has been the development of a new class which has taken over the dictatorship rather than the proletariat. The 23rd Party Congress of the Soviet Union in March 1966 in Moscow brought this out very clearly. The meeting of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Party on 1 July 1966 reemphasized that the Party had become out of control even in Yugoslavia. (Second probably only to the secret police, which apparently had become even more out of control.)

And so we find the Communists moving back. It is interesting to note that at the last three Party Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union it was acknowledged that they do not have communism. They have socialism. They say they are moving towards communism. This is the drum that they must keep beating in order to keep the faithful toeing the ideological line.

Marx's labor theories are important to note in passing. Marx reasoned that all production was based upon the value of the labor put into it, ignoring the other factors that are involved in production. To that he attached his surplus value of labor which was the key to his attack on capitalism. Rather than

to each according to his needs and to his ability, the capitalist got the benefit of the surplus production. This made the capitalist rich and made the workingman poor.

Marx was a philosopher of violence. Violence was endemic to his cult. But Marx was not quite as violent as the man we turn to next: Lenin, the tactician of communism today and probably the most revered of the Communist theoreticians. One cannot help but speculate what would have happened had Lenin lived beyond 1924. Here was a man of as great intellectual brilliance as Karl Marx and one of the great revolutionaries of all time.

Lenin died at the age of 54. It is generally assumed that he died from overwork, in trying to make the Bolshevik Revolution succeed and in being what was, in effect, the absolute dictator of Russia.

Lenin became a revolutionary at the age of 17, in 1887, when his brother was executed for plotting against the Czar. He was a law student but was expelled from the Universities of Kazan and St. Petersburg because of revolutionary activities. He was exiled shortly thereafter and spent most of the years until 1917 in exile. Lenin forced the split in the Russian Social Democratic Party at its meeting in London in 1903 — between those who advocated revolution and those who believed there would be an evolution in society for the better. From that time until his death Lenin was the epitome of the Bolshevik or the majority movement in the revolution. During his long exile in which he got back to Russia only twice, he, like Marx, spent the bulk of his time in studies. The Communist "bible," *The Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism,* is probably 70 percent taken from Lenin's collective works.

Lenin returned to the Soviet Union at the time of the February revolution and then participated in the overthrow of the Kerenski Government in November 1917. He proposed acceptance of the armistice with Germany despite its harsh terms, abolished private ownership of land, nationalized the banks, gave the workers control of factory production, introduced atheism, tried to suppress religion, and organized the Cheka, the first of the Soviet secret police under Dzerzhinsky, which became the instrument for control.

Lenin was the firm believer in world revolution. One of the more important aspects of his work was the creation of the 3rd International in 1919, a body which actually continued to exist until Stalin abolished it as a sop to the Western allies in 1943. The Comintern was a worldwide organization ignored by Stalin to a very large degree after Lenin's death in 1924. During its early years the Comintern ordered the disastrous German revolts which were unsuccessful and premature, sponsored an unsuccessful revolt in Hungary, and was unable to realize its goal of world revolution.

The Comintern developed a formidable organization with an international bureaucracy in Moscow and a network of skilled and trusted operatives all over the world. The non-Russian Communist Parties could belong to the 3rd International only if they accepted as binding the 21 conditions which Lenin prescribed at its 2nd World Congress in 1920. These required that all parties follow the orders of the Comintern and support the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The basic philosophy of the Comintern was Lenin's: that revolutionary conditions could be created only by small, highly disciplined parties.

Stalin did not immediately obtain tight control over the Communist Party of the Soviet Union or over the system, but he moved in with great skill and

adroitness. By the end of the 1920's, Stalin was in control. Following the purges of the 1930's, he was the unquestioned dictator. Stalin did not have either the fascination of Marx or the intellectual qualities of Lenin. He was a cold individual, a clever and calculating revolutionary.

Lenin was the great tactician of Marxism and the great revolutionary. Lenin was willing to compromise; to him theory was a vehicle, and not an iron discipline. He insisted on the discipline within the Party, and he insisted on a small, tight Party of completely disciplined individuals to be the spearhead of the revolution. In his new economic policy Lenin restored the concept of private property in order to obtain cooperation from the farmers. Without the help of the farmers Lenin feared the revolution would fail during the period when the Soviet Union was practically totally isolated from the rest of the world.

Stalin, too, did not concern himself with following all of the philosophy of Marxism. He was a coldblooded, ruthless ruler who would use whatever was needed to maintain controls both over the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the Russian people thereby, and over the Communist Parties of the other countries. But it was Lenin who decided to split the revolutionary movements of the other countries when the Comintern insisted that all of the Communist Parties of the world would have to follow without deviation the dictates and orders of the Soviet Union. This split the Communist Parties of the world.

Stalin was denounced by Khrushchev at the 20th Party Congress in 1956 in a secret 6-hour speech to the Party. The speech was circulated among the Eastern European Communist Parties and in this way reached the non-Communist world.

Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin was, in effect, the start of the fragmentation of communism and the breakdown of the monolithic unity which perhaps was far more dangerous than what we have today. It occurred in the same year as the Hungarian and Polish revolts. It split the Communist Parties of the world as badly as the 21 conditions of the Comintern had in 1920. At various times since 1956 the theoreticians and the leaders of the world Communist movement have tried to close the split; they have attempted to resurrect the image of Stalin and to get the word across that he was not as bad as Khrushchev had painted him; that while he had engaged in excesses, purges occasionally were necessary. This has not succeeded.

The last of the four men most important from the ideological point of view of communism is Mao Tse-tung. Mao is the agrarian Communist. The basis of his movement is the peasant. He ignores to a certain degree the workers in the cities. He based his strength and developed his following primarily in the agricultural areas of China, although the Communist Party prior to Chiang Kai-shek's purge of 1927 was fairly strong in some of the cities. Mao at one point worked with Chiang when the orders from Moscow were to cooperate with the Nationalist movement: to benefit from its strength, to infiltrate it, penetrate it, and then take it over. The Kuomintang itself probably sowed more seeds of its own dissolution than the Communists were able to do. The speed of the success of communism in China in 1949 came to a large degree because of the willingness of the Russians to let Mao and his forces get arms surrendered by the Japanese. This made a tremendous difference in the final battles by the Communists against what were then pretty badly disorganized Kuomintang forces.

Recent publicity out of China is indicative of the tremendous and overwhelming idolation of Mao as the father image to the Chinese Communists. How much he actually controls the decisions of the Central Committee today is unknown. The very faet that he still has sufficient strength to order a purge of the basic elements of the Party and to name his suecessor is indicative of the influence that this man has on China today and the influence he probably will have over all of Asian Communists. Mao has tried to east the Chinese form of communism as a model for the underdeveloped nations of Southeast Asia and Africa to follow. He has attacked with considerable skill and with complete viciousness the Russians and the Russian form of communism. The attacks allege the Russians are racist, that Russia has built a tremendous industrial society but has lost all touch with the reality of the workingman and the peasant, and that it is Communist China that is the true father of revolution today.

The Indonesian revolt was indicative of tactical error on the part of the Chinese. While this was a massive failure, it is not something from which we can take any long-range comfort. The Communists will gradually rebuild their strength in Indonesia over the years. It probably will be more Russian-inclined communism than Chinese-inclined after the debacle of 1965. The fact that some 300,000 people were killed during this revolt does not lessen the potency and the danger of communism in Indonesia. Conditions in that country for the foreseeable future will provide a breeding ground for communism. The influence of China will he great in Indonesia and in all of the South Asian countries even though the Russians will obviously concentrate their major efforts toward gaining influence where China has lost it.

Marxism as practieed today is an important key to cold war operations. The 23rd Party Congress of the Soviet Union held in March 1966 was labeled hy some as a "do-nothing Congress." It was not a "do-nothing Congress." It was an important Congress when it is recognized that a Party Congress is not an action hody hut a ratification body. The Central Committee makes the decisions in advance; the Politburo (or the Presidium) is the main drafting body together with the various Secretariats. When the 23rd Party Congress met in March 1966 we can be quite sure that the organization and the advance work had all been done with meticulous eare. The Communists are good on organization, on planning, and on details. It is only occasionally when they either go by whim, such as Khrushchev putting missiles in Cuba, that they are apt to make a mistake. When they prepare for something as important as the Party Congress, and particularly one where there are going to be some 90 foreign Communist Parties present, nothing is left to chance or to somebody's personal whim. It is all prepared very carefully in advance.

What this Party Congress indicated was, first and foremost, that the Russians at that time did not want to exacerbate the split with Communist China. The Russians did everything they could within the realm of national dignity to persuade the Chinese to attend. They used the North Victnamese as intermediaries. The Russians restrained what must have been a tremendous urge to respond to the criticisms of Peking. The Chinese insulted not only the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, but Russia as a country. The Russians, in return, held out the olive branch.

The 23rd Party Congress also indicated that the Russians were adopting a much more lenient position toward national communism or the individual roads to socialism that had been adopted in many other countries. This was important for Russian relations in Eastern Europe where Yugoslavia acts with independence. The Yugoslavs have twice directly defied the Soviet Union — literally invited military intervention. Tito, a graduate of the Comintern as well as the Spanish Civil War, is idolized in his own country. He clearly indicated to the Russians that their system of communism was not the Yugoslav system of communism. This was brought out even more graphically in the purge in the Yugoslav Party in the summer of 1966. Yugoslav reforms included the return of a greater degree of production control to the factories, decentralization, and the insistence of deemphasizing Party interference with both State and economy. The Yugoslavs are an example of independence, but the Soviets have been careful not to alienate them.

Ceausescu, the leader of the Rumanian Party, has not openly withdrawn from the Warsaw Pact, but he has indicated he no longer considered it a necessity. He has bluntly refused to fully participate in Comecon, the economic community that the Russians have been trying to introduce in Eastern Europe.

The Italian Communist Party is one of the most powerful in the free world, able to poll some 25 percent of the votes in any national election. This is a Party respected not just in Europe but throughout the world. Palmiro Togliatti, the late leader of the Italian Party, was considered one of the great Communists of his time. The Italian Party has sought an understanding with the Church. There has been an exchange of views, an exchange of papers, and the Russians not only have tolerated this, but have passively given it some degree of acceptance. All of these are factors that underline the significance of the 23rd Party Congress.

Marxism in the Soviet Union has changed. The Soviets have recognized that the profit motive is important even in communism. They have decentralized more and more in order to get efficient and economic production. The Soviets have created a private company in the motion picture industry in which there will be a profit sharing among the producers and salaries based upon the income that the company earns. Is this the communism or the socialism that Karl Marx was preaching?

The 23rd Party Congress of the Soviet Union also produced some rather temperate remarks about United States intervention in Vietnam: temperate considering the conditions and the fact that the Soviets could not say publicly that they would like the war ended even if it meant a withdrawal of the North Vietnamese forces and stablization of South Vietnam under an International Control Commission. The fact that within the realm of their commitment to world socialism they have been as moderate is important.

There are all types and brands of so-called Marxism. Some of it is purely political opportunism on the part of the individual or the country, adopted because Marx offered an historically and philosophically cogent explanation of historical development. Marxism is often adopted because it provides an alternative.

To return to our opening premise, Marxism is the glue that holds the world Communist movement together, and without it the world Communist movement would disintegrate even more rapidly and to a greater degree than it appears to be doing at the present time. This is not to say that

the dangers of communism are any less. It still offers a way with which many of the underdeveloped countries will experiment at one time or another, as Guinea did, as Ghana did, and as Indonesia did. Perhaps the best example of the distortion of Marx comes from a Cabinet Minister in an African country who has stated that while he is a Marxist, he does not believe in atheism because religion is very important to his people; he does not believe in state ownership of production because his country needs Western capital; that he does not believe in collectivization because the ownership of land is basic to Africans and that they must have this if they wish to have progress. But he still says he is a Marxist.

This politician is typical of more and more of the type of Marxists that we have in the world today. There are still hard-core Marxists in every country of the world. But the Marxist of today is probably more of an opportunist than a true follower of the original philosopher.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism. 2d rev. ed. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1963. (This is the official ideologieal guide produced by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It is periodically revised and reflects, by its omissions as well as its contents, that theory which is approved and that which has been updated, modified, or dropped.)

Mendel, Arthur, ed. *The Essential Works of Marxism.* New York: Bantam Books, 1961. (This paperback contains most of the essential writings on communism.)

Ulam, Adam B. *The Unfinished Revolution.* New York: Vintage Books, 1964. (A critical analysis of the successes and failures of communism.)

I have just returned from visiting the Marines at the front, and there is not a finer fighting organization in the world.

Douglas MacArthur: In the outskirts of Seoul, 21 September 1950

SET AND DRIFT

New Chief of Staff Assigned to Naval War College

Rear Admiral Joseph C. Wylie, Jr., U.S. Navy, reporting from the post of Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, assumed duties as Chief of Staff, Naval War College in October 1967. Admiral Wylie relieved Rear Admiral Frederick H. Schneider, U.S. Navy, who has been assigned to the Strategic Plans Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

Admiral Wylie has served two previous tours at the Naval War College. In 1948-1949 he was a Commander student in the Senior Class, and in 1950, as a Captain, he spent 1 academic year on the staff in the Department of Strategy and Tactics and 2 academic years in a special course of Advanced Study in Strategy and Seapower.

Born in 1911, Admiral Wylie entered the U.S. Naval Academy and was first commissioned in 1932. Subsequently, he served aboard the cruiser U.S.S. *Augusta*, flagship of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet; the destroyer U.S.S. *Reid*; the destroyer tender U.S.S. *Altair*; and in the Executive Department of the U.S. Naval Academy.

In July 1939 Admiral Wylie reported aboard the destroyer U.S.S. *Bristol*, and he was aboard *Bristol* in the Atlantic when the United States entered World War II. He became Executive Officer of the destroyer U.S.S. *Fletcher* in May 1942, and served in the South Pacific in several actions around Guadalcanal for which he was awarded the Silver Star Medal. As Commanding Officer of the destroyer U.S.S. *Trever*, he also earned the Navy Unit Commendation Ribbon for subsequent action in the Solomon Islands Campaign.

During the remaining years of World War II Admiral Wylie served as Combat Information Center Officer on the Staff of Commander Destroyer Force, Pacific; as Commanding Officer of the destroyer U.S.S. *Ault* in the Pacific; and in the office of Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.

Between previous tours at the Naval War College Admiral Wylie served as Operations Officer on the staff of Commander, Destroyer Flotilla One. Since leaving the College in 1953 he commanded the attack cargo ship U.S.S. *Arneb*; he was Operations Officer and later Chief of Staff and Aide to Commander, Amphibious Group Two; he commanded the heavy cruiser U.S.S. *Macon* which steamed through the newly opened St. Lawrence Seaway into the Great Lakes in 1959; and he served on the staff of Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic.

Attaining flag rank in 1960, he served as Commander, Cruiser Division Three and Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla Nine in the Pacific. He was later assigned as Deputy Chief of Staff, Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet; and, immediately prior to reporting to the Naval War College as Chief of Staff, was assigned as Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe.

Admiral Wylie is the author of a book, *Military Strategy*, which was reviewed in the October 1967 issue of the *Naval War College Review*, and of several articles in the *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*.

Board of Advisers. The 12-member Board of Advisers to the President, Naval War College, conducted the second of three annual meetings at the College on 3-4 November 1967.

At the inaugural meeting held 5-6 May 1967, the seven members of the Board in attendance established rules of procedure and became familiar with the College's educational programs, current operations and future plans. This was accomplished through a series of briefings, informal meetings with members of the student body and staff/faculty, as well as observing student committees and discussions, witnessing a Navy Electronic Warfare Simulator (NEWS) game, and touring the facilities.

At the conclusion of this first meeting, the Board indicated it was most favorably impressed with the War College and anticipated that a greater majority of the Board would attend the fall meeting.

Ψ

The rarest gift that God bestows on man is the capacity for decision.

Dean Acheson: Speech at Freedom House, New York City, 13 April 1965

THE MEANING AND IMPLICATION OF THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT

A lecture delivered to the
Naval War College
on 20 September 1967
by

Professor Frederick H. Hartmann
Alfred Thayer Mahan Chair of Maritime Strategy
Naval War College

This morning we take up the Sino-Soviet split, looking at it partly as a doctrinal disagreement (which it is), and partly as a disagreement about practical politics (which it also is).

I think you are well aware that there are several points of view as to how ideology and foreign policy relate and fit together. There are two extreme points of view and then a moderate or in-between point of view. In American academic circles, until very recently, one of these schools of thought has really predominated. It was frequently

argued (as, for example, by Professor William G. Carleton in 1947 in his "Ideology or Balance of Power?") that nationalism and the balance of power in the traditional sense was being replaced by ideology as the chief element in international relations. He argued that up until World War II national interests, the balance of power — this type of traditional thinking — had dominated the foreign policies of nations. But now we were in a new era. Now we were in an era when what would probably count was really ideology. It would no longer be of the same importance that Chinese were Chinese or Russians were Russians. What would make the difference in the time ahead — the period with which we have now 20 years of further experience — would be the common bond of ideology. And so what he and many others were talking about is the kind of thinking which, in less careful formulation, you have encountered in that familiar but, for many purposes, outmoded dichotomy between "the democratic bloc" (or whatever you want to call it), and "the Communist bloc."

Professor Carleton was saying that what would really count in the post-World War II world, weighing national interests against ideology, would probably be ideology. This was the dominant school in American intellectual thinking. Many writers expressed the same belief in even stronger terms. So, also, this view came to provide the philosophical background which dominated much of the formulation of U.S. foreign policy. We thought they were a bloc and we acted as though we were a bloc.

All during this period there was also a "backlash" reaction, another school which tended to argue quite the reverse. Crankshaw is a good example of this in terms of the Russians. Cranksbaw always argued that the Russians were Communists, to be sure, but that we were in danger of forgetting that, even more importantly, they were Russians. We would forget the fact that they were Russians at our peril. For whatever the significance of communism or ideology might be in their foreign policy, what was much more fundamental is the fact that they are Russians, they live in Russia, they have to protect Russia, they have to deal with traditional Russian problems. While they would certainly be doing this in a new setting, it was still a setting filled with Russian problems.

Now these were two extreme schools, the dominant one saying, "Ideology is mostly all that counts, and nationalism is dead, or dying, or less significant," and the other argument, in the minority, saying, "Communism may have some importanee in understanding foreign policy, but it is not the prime element. The prime element is the national character, the national setting, the traditional objectives, and the national interests of the country involved."

I have sometimes been thought to have been arguing the second point of view. But I have never really quite associated myself with the second point of view as I have just put it. I would classify myself in a midposition between those two extreme schools of thought. And I would argue that, as one approaches the problem of communism in Russia or China and their relations to each other, one certainly doesn't want to ignore the elements of communism. One wants to ignore even less the element of national interests. But, it is perfectly apparent that the existence of communism has an effect upon how the Communist nations perceive their national interests. Now if one approaches the question in this way, one wants to see what effect being Russian has on the Russians, what effect being Chinese has on the

Chinese. But one also wants to see what effect communism has on the way they conceptualize their national interests and attempts to carry out that conceptualization in actual foreign policy.

If we're going then to look at the Communist aspect along with the national interest aspect, it is useful to see what contribution each makes and whether the balance in contribution has changed now that the Soviets and Chinese no longer see eye to eye.

Many people, who do not profess to any profound knowledge about it, think of communism and its effects and influence on foreign policy in a more elementary way. They think of it as providing a sort of detailed master plan for how to go about carrying on foreign policy. In this simplest of formulations, it is seen as sort of a rule book. You look up page 16 and it tells you, once there is a Middle Eastern war, just exactly whether to send arms aid and more economic aid to the Arab Republic or not. Of course, communism doesn't do this sort of thing at all. It is a set of doctrines; it is above all a system of ideas. Ideology can be defined as an interlocking system of ideas. And as a system of ideas it is above all else a philosophy.

What we must never forget is that every nation has something of a philosophy, although it may be less formal or more formal than communism. We talk about the American way of life, for example — whatever that rather amorphous term means — and there is argument about it. It certainly does have some conceptual centrality to it. We have ideas about how politics ought to be organized in the United States, what is fair play, the kind of goals and objectives that we want to see come of it all, the kind of world we think is the world of the future. These are all bound up in the idea of the American way of life. In fact, if we believed that our ways were quite uncommon, quite unique, quite foreign to the innate nature of man, we would have very definite difficulty in mustering the courage and doing the hard work of pushing forward our foreign policy. If we thought that what we stood for was unique and obsolete, we'd have very great difficulty in facing the future. But, of course, the picture we see is quite the reverse. In our thinking, what we stand for is really very close to the innate nature of man. We believe in the freedom of the individual, and we believe in the freedom of individual nations to find their own destiny, to prosper, and to move forward to a material and also a spiritual abundance — each in its own way. I think this is very central to the concept of the American way of life. So this is a philosophy; it's an outlook and it's based, as all ideologies are, upon assumptions as to what man is like and what the universe is like.

In the same general way, but in a more articulated, more structured fashion, communism provides an idea system, a set of parameters within which to view what is going on. Communism describes to its adherents how things have been, how they are, and how they're going to be. And in doing so it makes assumptions about the nature of man and the nature of the universe, about the nature of the contemporary system of states, about the past, and about what is to come. So, therefore, what communism most importantly provides — in the past and even now that they differ — to both the Russians and the Chinese is two things which they have shared and still share. One of these is their common language of discourse and the other is their common view of the nature of man.

The common language of discourse is a somewhat fancy term which simply

means that they are used to talking communism. Communism has its own language. You must study it if you would know what it is they are communicating to each other, just as we use terminology all the time in the Armed Forces which does not immediately convey the idea to an outsider. We have a specific meaning we attach to terms which sometimes is far from the common usage. When we talk we use this language, and when the Communists talk they use their specific language. When they say "peaceful coexistence of states" or "the inevitability of war," it is not just a set of words by itself to be understood within their ordinary English meaning. You have to understand the whole substructure of concepts that are associated with it, how they glue these concepts together in their thinking and outlook. So communism has its own language; we have to know what the language means when they use these phrases. We have to understand what the implications are to them. And so when they have an argument over doctrine (which is one important aspect of the Sino-Soviet split), one thing they're arguing about as they use this language is what those phrases mean today in today's conditions. What is the requirement if one is to have peaceful coexistence of states, for example? This common language of discourse, this common lingo of communism, persists today despite the Sino-Soviet split, and when they argue their opposed views, they argue in this very language of communism.

The second thing that they share despite the split, as I've already suggested, is the common view of the nature of man and bound up in it a perspective on the evolution of world society from the past and that glimpse of the future which is highly important to them. They share the same theory as to how the world came to be the way it is now. And when they argue, they argue somewhat opposed viewpoints of how they are going to proceed from this point in time to the ultimate Communist world Utopia which, again, they agree, will surely in the fullness of time come into being.

So in order to approach our topic I think we must talk a little of their language, understand a little of their concept. We want to point that discussion specifically toward those doctrines over which they have most vehemently disagreed and which have a fundamental impact on the nature and the progress and the future of the Sino-Soviet split. In doing this we shall gradually weave our way, as this argument becomes acute, to where we are also discussing the practical, nonideological reasons that give them a difference in viewpoint in their argument. To accomplish this, and look at the doctrinal disagreements as a prelude to examining the practical disagreements, I think we can most usefully take the Communist "father philosophers" in sequence and look to see what it was that they contributed to the doctrines over which the later disagreements occur.

If we start with Marx and Engels we quickly find that Marx and Engels contributed very little to what the Soviets and Chinese are currently arguing about. Marx, contrary to most people's assumptions, really said relatively little about the attributes of capitalism as against socialism (or communism) in past times and not very much about future times. He really concentrated much more upon the age in which he himself was living. He was particularly interested in the British industrial system and noted its abuses. He thought that the rich would become richer, the poor become poorer, that antagonism and class conflict would continue, and out of this would come violent revolu-

tion, some form of socialism. But the crux of his concern was on the present system and what was wrong with it. Engels, his close collaborator, was really more responsible for giving this a broader frame of reference, and since the two of them worked very closely together, sometimes it's hard to cut their contributions apart. As a matter of fact, some of the tracts published under Karl Marx's name were really written by Engels. But Engels is the one who really inserted into this concept the historical sweep, talking about the dialectic progression in history which he distinguished as beginning once there were settled groups instead of nomadic, wandering tribes. At this point class conflicts or "contradictions," tensions between the classes could be observed. Master versus slave, for instance, marked the first real classes and then, when this tension came to a head, you got a new synthesis, a new division of the classes. The new feudal system of feudal lords versus serfs was again, in its turn, replaced by a three-cornered struggle between the kings, the bourgeoisie, and the proletariat. Out of this came emerging capitalism to be replaced by socialism, with socialism itself eventually to be replaced by genuine communism.

This phenomenon of recurring class conflict was not conceived in the sense that history goes through a very broad sweep and repeats itself. Nothing could be further from the assumption of the Communists. The interesting thing about the Communist assumption from this point of view is that history is seen as a straight line progression, with each successive conflict marking the spreading of power to a progressively broader mass base. Every one of those stages represents a broader power base, even though the exploiting class still remains until the ultimate end when you get socialism and communism. By this point all power has passed to the largest, most inclusive group of all, the proletariat.

Now you didn't hear a word in all of this about international relations. Marx wrote a little about this, but very little. As I say, Marx and Engels were looking at a particular moment in time. You have to wait until Lenin, really, before you get much international relations aspect to communism. Lenin comes along and he contributes two very important theories to supplement what Marx and Engels had said. For either contribution he probably would have gone down as a theoretician of the first magnitude even if he hadn't achieved power himself. These two contributions represent quite different propositions. One was the theory of how to organize a revolution; the other was the theory of imperialism as the cause of war among nation-states. Let's look at these in turn.

First, as to the theory of organization. Marx and Engels had spoken of "inevitable" revolution, inevitable because of great historical forces whose ultimate consequences could be predicted. This is the philosopher in his study speaking, although Marx also dabbled in the practical politics of the international worker's movement from time to time. Essentially he was speaking philosophically: It would come, it would happen, it was bound to happen. But Lenin had a real problem, because Lenin was a leader in a revolutionary movement that actually hoped to seize power, and Lenin couldn't quite believe that it just would happen of its own volition. It's comforting to know something one wants is going to happen, but always in the end somebody has to make that something happen. Lenin, being of a very practical turn of mind, wrote a book — one with a very American-sounding title — *What Is to Be Done? What Is to Be Done?*

outlined an action program. It tried to answer the question, how do you organize a revolution that is bound to happen, and who specifically is going to have to do what? Lenin was the "organization man" of the Russian revolution. Lenin proposed, and then actually organized, what he called "the vanguard of the workers' class." He saw quite clearly that it was all very well to say, here are all these workers, they are bound to rise up and revolt because the poor are getting poorer and the rich are getting richer; they'll get tired of getting exploited. But Lenin knew that somebody had to take the lead. Who could take that lead? Not certainly the whole workers' class (because they are amorphous, unorganized, and of many minds) but the leaders, the vanguard, the "most mature cadre" of the workers. These are Communist terms, and they recur frequently later. The cadre would be organized into the leadership group who would constitute the Communist Party. They would establish the dictatorship of the proletariat on behalf of the mass proletariat.

Lenin also wrote — and this is extremely interesting — that a vital reason why good organization on a permanent basis of a dedicated group was essential was because it is relatively easy to perpetrate a revolution in the first place. You do it within conditions of turmoil, you do it in conditions of great strain on the social and national fabric, and if you organize and you have a minority group who know what they want, they can be successful. They can achieve a revolution, especially because under conditions of strain the other elements in the society are at odds. But once you have achieved the Communist revolution, you encounter, he said, something else. (I think this next observation of Lenin's took real imagination and that he was quite right.) He said that once the revolution was an accomplished fact, the opposition to the revolution would increase tenfold. All the opposition elements, seeing now very clearly where things were heading, would combine to try to create a counterrevolution, and at this point the cohesion, the unity of the Communist Party becomes extremely vital. Lenin's contribution as "the organization man" is very interesting indeed.

In turning to Lenin's theory of imperialism, we get to a meaningful international relations aspect for really the first time in communism. Lenin wrote another book called *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism.* In it he updated Marx. Marx had been describing the development of capitalism at the mid-19th century point. Marx did not quite observe what the Communists call "the monopoly stage" of capitalism. As a matter of fact, in historical terms it is about after the Franco-Prussian War, about 1873 or so, that what is generally called the great second wave of imperialism occurs. In the first period, the colonial period, the United States, for instance, was colonized. This period we are quite familiar with in our own history. One of the things that came of that, of course, was that it did not work very well. It had a bad ending from the point of view of those who had done the colonizing, because the colonists rose up almost everywhere and established their independence — with us as a prime example. So, by the middle of the first half of the 19th century, it was commonly said that, "Colonies are like ripe fruit, and when the tree matures, they drop off the mother branch." So, in other words, colonialism had little point, one might just as well not colonize, because when colonies are able they break away.

But by 1870 or so all this had been

forgotten and there was a great new wave of enthusiasm for going out and building foreign empires. The statistics involved are impressive. Millions of square miles were taken between that time and the first four or five years of the 20th century. This is when the British achieved the position reflected by the map of Africa they used to have in my boyhood — you don't see it anymore — showing the tremendous area in red, Cape to Cairo. On those maps the French also had a tremendous, usually green, area. So all of Africa was divided among three or four powers, along with Southeast Asia and all the rest of it. This second era of colonial imperialism is the era of monopoly capitalism from the Communist point of view.

What did Lenin say about this? He said that in the nature of capitalism, a capitalist attempts to produce for the maximum profit. To do this he puts his price as high as possible, but he cuts his costs as low as possible. His prime cost is labor, and therefore he exploits labor. The consequence of this is that labor is unable to purchase the fruits of its own activity. But the capitalist has the need to continue maximizing his profits, and therefore he must broaden his market. And therefore to find both sources of cheap raw material and a sufficiently extensive market, he must reach out and grab it. And this, says Lenin writing in the early years of the 20th century, is what has been happening. Now what will come of it? He argues that most of the land of Africa has been taken, most of what is there to be seized has been seized. And when the day comes (and he was writing just about the time it was to come) when there is nothing left to take except to take from each other, there will be war among the capitalist (i.e., imperialist) powers. So the cause of war is ultimately capitalism.

Now the interesting thing about these thoughts is that from that day forward there has never been any real disagreement among Communists that this is indeed the cause of war between states. The cause of *international* war, the single cause of international war to a Communist, is the existence of capitalists who are bound to foment war with other states for the reasons described. This has been a consistent dogma in Communist thought and doctrine. ("National liberal movements" are in another category altogether, in Communist thinking.)

Let's turn to Stalin. Stalin was much less original. He was not an inuovator. But, contrary to what is sometimes said about Stalin, he was a very good Leninist when it came to these basic doctrines. Stalin frequently was able to make a more lucid statement of Leninism than Lenin sometimes did. If you read Lenin's books, the last one I mentioned in particular is atrocious in its style. Stalin, on the other hand, could write quite well. He knew his Leninism well. And so far as these points are concerned, Stalin was an orthodox Leninist. The very last important work Stalin ever wrote was called *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.* Bear in mind, now, that if Communists talked about "economic problems" we would really translate that into "political problems." Because to the Communists, politics *are* economics. So Stalin's book, ostensibly on economics, was really about politics. That is why you shouldn't be surprised that the sixth chapter in this last book of his is entitled "The Question of the Inevitability of Wars Among Capitalist Countries." In there he spoke of "some comrades" who thought that war was no longer inevitable between capitalist states. Why? Because these comrades,

unnamed, unspecified (but we of course now know who they likely were) said that the real contradictions in the contemporary world were between the socialist bloc and the capitalist bloc. Stalin said bluntly: "These comrades are mistaken."

Now if you have listened to this very carefully, you realize that what "some comrades" were arguing was that there was a cold war going on. This is 1952. Some comrades are arguing there's a cold war going on, that there is a Communist bloc and a capitalist bloc, and that any thoughts about the capitalists falling out were romantic. The danger of war, say these comrades, is that these blocs are going to tangle with one another. Stalin says, quite to the contrary, these comrades mistake the fundamental realities for the appearance of things. Obviously it is true that Germany, Japan, England, France all appear to be following American leadership, that they have subordinated their economic conflicts and tensions to that American leadership. But, he said, if you think this is going to last, comrades, you are very mistaken.

The view which Stalin was advancing, while orthodox, also took some imagination. This is the middle of the cold war. Yet here is Stalin saying that one must not assume that there will not again be tensions among capitalist states. Stalin, although he didn't mention De Gaulle or the specific troubles soon to show up in the NATO Alliance, is quite clear that the capitalist states will again fall out with each other. The real danger of war, Stalin argued, still comes from the existence of these capitalist states and the fact that they will foment war with each other, that some may attack the socialist countries, or that their actions will bring the socialist countries into war as a result of their getting into war with each other, just as in World War II.

What Stalin really thought about the maintenance of "socialist camp" unity is not very clear. It is noticeable that Stalin, although he took a lot of territory under his wing, was very careful to draw the line over territory that he could directly control. You know, for instance, that when Mao came to see him and asked for aid in terms of furthering the Chinese revolution, Stalin told him he did not have a chance, Chiang Kai-shek was was bound to win and he would get wiped out. Mao went back and it did not turn out that way. Part of what was almost certainly in Stalin's mind was the conviction that he could not control China. Similarly, he did not make a real effort to control Greece. (This is not to underrate the efficiency of our efforts there.) Stalin tried to control areas he knew he could dominate. If this implied limitations on extending the "communist bloc," Stalin could not well express them too bluntly; but he did make clear his conviction about the "capitalist camp." When Stalin talks about some comrades who took an opposing view, they are unnamed, they are anonymous.

We come now to Khrushchev who very clearly either must have been one of these comrades or soon became a convert.

Here we begin to get into the realm of the innovators and the revisionists. This is also where doctrinally the Sino-Soviet split centers. Khrushchev's great revisionism begins in 1956 when he argued that war was no longer inevitable between capitalist and socialist states because the socialist camp, he said, was "invincible." Note that Khrushchev is virtually using the actual langauge Stalin condemned. Khrushchev thinks there is indeed a socialist camp or bloc and a capitalist bloc, and Khrushchev says that war is no longer

inevitable between these two blocs because the socialist camp is invincible. He went on to say, and this is even more revisionist, that in some capitalist states power might even come into the hands of the workers, into Communist hands, peacefully, without a violent revolution, that it was conceivable here and there. And he also said that in any event what he called "progressive bourgeois elements" and strong workers' groups in various industrial countries still under capitalism were having a restraining effect on the belligerent tendencies of capitalism.

Now these are all very interesting propositions. You must have noticed in my discussion of the evolution of Communist doctrine before Khrushchev that there is a pronounced two-dimensional effect running through the whole set of concepts. There are not any real nuances; it's very cleancut, very simple. For instance, there are capitalist states which must act in a certain manner, because they are run by capitalists who must follow built-in behavior patterns. You know how the play is going to turn out, and the question is merely who is going to organize the pieces of it? But the scenario is all very clear, and it is foreordained; there is no tampering with it; there is no way of changing the course of history.

Now consider: Khrushchev is presiding over a nation, the Soviet Union, which went through much turmoil, terror, trouble — beginning with, of course, the Russian revolution, which was no junket. There is a famous film of newsreel shots of the Russian revolution which particularly stands in my mind as an illustration. In the course of this newsreel there are two film clips taken near the same village during the Russian civil war. They are almost identical shots — you see the soldiers with their rifles slung on their backs and they're smoking cigarettes in the most casual way, a few have guns pointed toward these poor fellows who are digging a trench, and when they've got the trench deep enough the guards take their rifles down and rather boringly shoot them. That is the Reds shooting the Whites. And then about 20 minutes later in this film one sees the same village, the same scene. The only difference between the two scenes is that the roles are reversed. This time it is Whites shooting the Reds. Some villages changed hands three times!

Russia went through this ferocious civil war and period of turmoil with large-scale intervention in its aftermath. This whole period was heavy in human cost. Then the liquidation of the kulaks cost them a lot of population, a lot more were confined in concentration camps. The great Stalinist terror, too, killed off much of the high command and officer corps. Then came World War II itself, the wholesale invasion of Russia by the Germans, and the great physical devastation that went with it. There have been estimates that the Russians lost 20 million lives. There are no firm figures on this at all, but most of the estimates range from 11 to 20 million. If you add all of this up, a tremendous number of Russians lost their lives during the first half century of communism. But, by the time Khrushchev had come into power, a better future is discernible. There is some tentative possibility of tranquility around the corner; they have made some tangible progress. The question is whether all of this is to disappear in the holocaust of an atomic, a nuclear war?

Recall that in Khrushchev's time, in the British Isles (and here a little bit too), some people were talking about total nuclear disarmament, arguing, like Bertrand Russell, "Better Red than dead." Recall, too, that the impact of traditional Leninism on the implica-

tions of what was going to happen to Russia and China and all the rest is that all the world inevitably will become Communist. Such a result, according to Communist thinking, would follow at least one more great war. And in this war the capitalists, being capitalists, inevitably would fight. Being capitalists they would use whatever weapons were at their disposal. They would devastate Russia, and Russia would devastate them. In the end they would all be Red *and* dead. So here you come up against the real rub in Communist theory as it had evolved up to this point. Because, if it is all this inevitable, if it is indeed two-dimensional, and if there is no turning aside from the final cataclysm in which over the radioactive heap of rubble a few people wander around, then that is the way the future will be. Not very appealing as a manner of gaining converts; not very appealing as a doctrine; not very appealing as a philosophy. Therefore, Khrushchev says, these very interesting things: that there are not just nasty old capitalists who come in a single model and all alike; there are also "progressive bourgeois elements." These are the good guys. Or at least better guys. And then there are the workers who haven't yet been "liberated." They, too, are certainly progressive elements even though their reforming or revolutionary effects upon the social structure have not been fully realized yet. So Khrushchev pictures a whole spectrum. He described a pluralist society in capitalism — he didn't use the word, I do, but that is his meaning — pluralism existing within the capitalist world. Described this way, capitalists also have a mind, a brain in their heads, and can objectively evaluate a situation. They are capable of understanding that the socialist camp is invincible (meaning that they cannot really wipe them out without getting wiped out too), they are capable of implementing that understanding. They can make a rational, "flexible response" and they can say, "Well, let's have a détente." Capitalists, says Khrushchev, do not have to behave like capitalists. Capitalists can be human beings too and can sit down and can discuss. There can be peaceful coexistence because it is to the advantage of neither communism nor capitalism for us to wipe each other out. And in 1955 at the meeting at the summit, this is exactly what was said; if you recall, Khrushchev (with Bulganin) came to meet Eisenhower; both agreed that there was no rational point to a nuclear war.

Now there were difficulties with what Khrushchev said. There are advantages, and I have sketched the advantages out, but there were also difficulties. If war is no longer inevitable, as Khrushchev argued, then why should the Communist victory be still inevitable? If the inevitability of capitalists behaving like capitalists ceases, which was the reason why they were going to lose, and the Communists were going to win, how can one be sure that communism will still win? If one inevitability vanishes, why does another remain?

Now we get to Mao. Khrushchev, presiding over a "have" nation, did not want to rock the boat, capsize it; he wanted to stay within definite parameters of risk. The clearest indication of this is when he looks down the mouth of the cannon in 1962, in the Cuban missile crisis. If he really had not cared, if he had wanted to play things to the hilt, he would not have taken the missiles out. By the same token he "proved" he was dealing with "progressive bourgeois elements" for did they not also behave with restraint and give him a way out, promising to refrain from invading Cuba?

Now what about Mao, watching this?

The Chinese had been arguing behind the scenes with the Russians ever since Khrushchev started his revisionism. The first important rupture with Khrushchev really began in 1956, triggered by the quotation I just gave you which comes from his address to the Party Congress in that year: "War is not inevitable because the socialist camp is invincible." The Chinese did not like this. They did not like it doctrinally, and they did not like its implications. The Chinese fear that while they are still far from their own goals, the Russians are going to go into neutral gear and not try nearly so hard any more. Khrushchev's actions in 1962 in the Cuban missile crisis irritated the Chinese no end. In 1963 the Chinese were openly to deride Khrushchev for an initial adventuresome and irresponsible action followed by a cowardly withdrawal. To the Chinese, Khrushchev combined the worst elements of both possible kinds of actions: a reckless move and then a foolish and cowardly withdrawal under pressure. He put the missiles in and he took the missiles out. By this time, 1963, the Sino-Soviet argument over doctrine had become both public and pronounced. It had gone through a phase from 1956 to about 1958 behind the scenes. Then from 1958 to about 1961 there was a second phase in which the argument was quite public but still guarded. (This is the phase in which the Chinese always castigate what "Tito" is doing as revisionism. They don't name the Russians. The Russians, to reciprocate, keep talking about the irritating "Albanians.") But in 1963, in view of these further provocations, the Chinese threw aside all indirection and began to argue with little restraint and less politeness. What seems to have really been the final straw of provocation to the Chinese was the United States-Soviet agreement on the draft Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty in the summer of 1963 in Moscow. It was just a little after this time that the Chinese took the extraordinary action of having Chinese agents scatter leaflets as they transited the Soviet Union on the Trans-Siberian Express! This illegal and clandestine action is soon brought to a halt by the Russians. So then the Chinese start publishing broadsides at the Soviets, who respond in kind. And these contain very interesting arguments.

In them the Chinese maintain that the Russians are really not good revolutionaries any more. The Chinese say that they themselves are the real revolutionaries. Risks must be taken, but they do not want a nuclear war. You delude yourselves, answer the Soviets, because risks raise tensions and must be carefully considered in an age of nuclear war. The Chinese taunt the Russians with thinking too much of the possibility of nuclear war, pointing out that nuclear weapons are a paper tiger since capitalism cannot resort to their use without reciprocal devastation. The Russians argue in rebuttal that the Chinese would be more impressed with such weapons if they were themselves in possession of them, and that a paper tiger with nuclear teeth has to be treated with care.

They argue in this vein back and forth. The Chinese assert that the real significance of Soviet revisionism is not on the nuclear war aspect anyhow. What really counts is that the Soviets are not real revolutionaries precisely because they have acquired a vested material interest by virtue of their own progress, that the Soviets do not want to take risks to further the national liberation movement among the underdeveloped world. Yet there is where one finds the soft underbelly of the capitalist world. This argument is later further articulated in the famous figure of speech of the "countries" versus the "cities." Lin Piao argues that the way victory against the capitalists can be achieved is the way

the Chinese achieved it against the Japanese, a feat repeated by the Chinese Communists later against the Nationalists. Let the enemy hold the cities (i.e., industrialized nations) but cut the train of supply (from the underdeveloped areas). That, argue the Chinese, is strategically what we ought to be doing. There are all sorts of possibilities in the hinterland, in the country, in the underdeveloped world where the national liberation movements exist and can be aided. What were the Russians doing instead? The Chinese argue in effect that they were giving arms aid to Nasser, but Nasser was not a Communist. The Soviets were aiding bourgeois elements in these newly developed states. They were giving arms aid to Sukarno, but Sukarno was not a Communist. They were helping to build the Aswan Dam, but in doing these things the Soviets were bolstering the power of the reactionary — even though not capitalist — elements in these underdeveloped countries. For our part, say the Chinese, we are true revolutionaries, and we are trying to move the national liberation movement forward.

The Soviets return the attack in a very interesting section in this exchange of notes in mid-1963. They correct the text of what they say the Chinese now say they meant about what would happen if there was a war. (The Chinese, out of frustration, had earlier said something, smacking of bravado, to the effect, "All right, suppose there is a war, suppose we lose half the population of China, then so what? We'll still have the other half and if it comes to that a beautiful Communist civilization will arise on the ashes of the bourgeois world.") The Soviets make quite a point of getting the original text of this and giving it prominence in their notes. The Soviets argue that the Chinese are saying in effect, whether they know it or not, let there be war. I don't think this is quite correct. The Chinese are saying that if you get to the point where you are so afraid of nuclear war that you are afraid now to take risks to move this national liberation movement forward, that you are never going to get anywhere. Once you feel fear, you will not dare anymore.

Now Khrushchev is gone, of course, though Mao is still there, but the succeeding Soviet rulers have not changed Khrushchev's revisionism. The argument has remained essentially the same kind of argument. They are arguing over how much risk ought to be taken and how much advantage can be seen for communism, and whether this can be done with or without a nuclear confrontation. In these exchanges the Chinese are all the time arguing for a risk policy, while the Russians consistently argue for a more conservative policy. This controversy becomes so acute, especially by the time of the Vietnam war, that there are some bitter words exchanged. I have here, for instance, a late 1966 publication of the Soviet Embassy reprinting an article from *Pravda* on the events in China. I'll give you a little sample of its flavor by a direct quotation:

> The question arises: with whom then does the Chinese leadership, which is paying lip service to the need of "the broadest united front of struggle against American imperialism" want to unite if it rejects all proposals for joint actions with those forces which are bearing the brunt of the struggle against imperialism? All this actually facilitates the escalation of the United States aggression against the Vietnamese people. The duplicity of the policy of the Chinese leaders is increasingly showing itself in the international arena now. On the one hand they try to impose on the fraternal parties such a course that would lead to a continuous aggravation of the international situation and ultimately to war, allegedly in the name of the world revolution. The Peking leaders themselves

> promote such a line that is intended to leave them aside from the struggle against imperialism. While alleging that all contacts of the Soviet Union with the United States are a "collusion" with imperialism, the Chinese leaders at the same time do not miss a chance to develop relations with capitalist countries, including the United States. . . .

The Russians charge that the Chinese are trying to seize control of this movement, move it in their direction, and they are not above dealing with the enemy, the United States. On this point the Chinese argue exactly the reverse. They say that the Russians are too timid to exploit the opportunity but, in any event, are dealing with the enemy, the United States. All this talk of détente, the Test-Ban Treaty itself — who is it directed against if it is not directed against Communist China? And what about Vietnam? And here the argument waxes hot and heavy.

I think you will see that there is really nothing much in the doctrines of communism that I have examined as they bear upon this split that really explains the split *per se*. What explains the split (which, of course, *is* argued in these doctrinal terms and in the "Communist language"), is the difference in their situations. The Chinese never worried anybody until recent years. In fact, we in the United States felt very kindly toward the Chinese. If you recall, in 1945, to the consternation or astonishment of the other powers, we said the Chinese ought to have a permanent seat on the Security Council. The reaction of the others amounted to asking why weak China should have a permanent seat? The answer would seem in large part to be American sentimentality toward China. True, China was very weak. China had been a weak nation since George Washington's time and before. We in the United States never knew a strong China, a united China, or essentially united China up to that point. When it actually came into existence — and, unfortunately, under communism — it confronted the United States with a totally new situation. The same was true for the Soviet Union, because the Soviet Union had never had to cope with a united China in modern times. This China, although it came to be unified, was not able to complete its revolution internally, or to complete its territorial consolidation externally. It felt that it still had not "arrived." It was not admitted to the United Nations. It felt that it was still insecure except for the protection nominally afforded by Russian nuclear weapons. It felt that it was still incomplete territorially — Formosa most obviously, but also the other areas which they once dominated in ancient times. The Chinese felt that they had a long way to go to get where they wanted to go. And they considered that they ought to have the help of their fraternal ally, the Soviet Union. But that fraternal ally, the Soviet Union, had already "arrived," and was not going to take any risks. When the chips were down, as over Quemoy-Matsu in 1958, the Russians — looking at it through Chinese eyes - - would assert what wonderful backing they would give as soon as they were positive that they really would not have to pay the penalty.

The fundamental nature of the Sino-Soviet split derives, then, above all else, from the environmental circumstances and the psychological attitude toward these circumstances of these two very different peoples. Their argument is carried on in the "Communist language," but they see doctrine very differently because their environment is so different.

Now what of the future? Is this split a passing phenomenon? No. It has been in the making for a long time. While it is argued in Communist terms, it arises out of more fundamental, geo-

graphical, political, and economic facts. The Soviet Union exists cheek by jowl with an overpopulated, underfed China. They have a long history of border disputes between them. Of all the bones of contention, the historic advantage the Russians took of Chinese weakness in the time of the Tsars is still remembered with greatest bitterness. The Chinese have made no secret of their view that at least 500,000 square miles of the "Soviet Union" is really Chinese.

If one tries to explain the great moderating influence in international politics upon Soviet behavior in the years since Khrushchev first tried his Cuban adventure and also tried to squeeze us out of Berlin, I think one finds the best explanation in the worsening of the Sino-Soviet split. This is another way of saying that Soviet moderation parallels the growing actual or potential ultimate ability of China to cross the land frontiers with land forces. China can cause Russia severe injury, increasingly so as the nuclear arms race continues. This will not go away. There is no way in which I would visualize that the Chinese and the Russians will succeed in overcoming their differences, other than perhaps in a temporary rapprochement if the Western powers, the rest of the powers, play their cards so poorly as to cause it.

One very obvious trap for the United States to fall into in dealing with this Sino-Soviet split is to take sides with the Chinese against the Russians or with the Russians against the Chinese. And so far this is one of the things that we have been very careful not to do. The Sino-Soviet split is one of those situations where by holding aloof, not becoming involved, and leaving nature to take its course without direct pressure by the United States, the advantage will accrue to the United States.

Dr. Frederick H. Hartmann occupies the Alfred Thayer Mahan Chair of Maritime Strategy and is Special Adviser to the President, Naval War College.

The Mahan Chair of Maritime Strategy was established by the President, Naval War College, on 1 July 1966 with the approval of the Secretary of the Navy. The occupant is appointed for an initial term of 3 years. Professor Hartmann is the first occupant.

In recognition that the development of strategic military concepts requires an understanding of political, economic, and sociological, as well as military considerations, the Mahan Chair was established to provide the services of a highly qualified civilian professor on an extended contract. The incumbent actively participates in the conduct of the curricula and, in addition, provides continuous advice to the President, Naval War College, on such matters as curriculum planning, academic methods, the guest lecture program, professorial recruiting, and academic programs. By its title, the Chair appropriately honors Alfred Thayer Mahan, the Navy's most distinguished maritime strategist, whose contributions to advanced education for naval officers and the Naval War College have been inestimable.

Professor Hartmann holds an A.B. from the University of California and an M.A. and Ph.D. from Princeton Uni-

versity. He also studied at the Graduate Institute of Internationl Affairs in Geneva, Switzerland. After instructing at Princeton he became assistant professor of political science and coordinator of undergraduate and graduate work at the University of Florida. Subsequently promoted to associate and full professor, he was appointed director of the institute of international relations at that institution in 1963.

In 1953-1954 he was Fulbright Research Professor at Bonn, Germany, under a Fulbright Grant. He continued research in Germany in 1959 under a Rockefeller Grant. He gave guest seminars in 1959 at Stanford University in Germany and at the Hochschule für Politik in Berlin.

Since 1963 Professor Hartmann has lectured at numerous military and civilian colleges and universities. He has traveled widely in Europe and Asia. He is a member of the American Political Science Association and the American Association of University Professors and other professional organizations. He is a Captain in the U.S. Naval Reserve.

Professor Hartmann's publications include: *Basic Documents of International Relations; The Relations of Nations; The Swiss Press and Foreign Affairs in World War II; World in Crisis; Germany Between East and West* as well as numerous articles in American journals and German, Indian, and other periodicals. He contributed the definition of "internationl relations" to the UNESCO *Social Science Dictionary*.

Ψ

It is by combined use of politics and force that pacification of a country and its future organization will be achieved. Political action is by far the more important.

Joseph Simon Gallieni: Marshal Gallieni's instructions to the French forces occupying Madagascar, 22 May 1898



SOVIET DISARMAMENT POLICY– WHAT LIES AHEAD?

A thesis prepared by
Commander Raymond G. Burkemper, U.S. Navy
School of Naval Warfare
Class of 1967

INTRODUCTION

Disarmament has not been achieved in the world today because each of the major nations involved is influenced by certain differing pressures and goals. In the center of this stalemate stand the United States and the Soviet Union. This paper is a study of the disarmament policy of one of these two main adversaries — the Soviet Union.

The purpose of this study is, first, to determine the goal of Soviet disarmament policy through an examination of this policy and its interrelation with her foreign policy since World War II, and, second, to determine how current considerations will possibly influence future Soviet disarmament policy.

Soviet disarmament negotiations since the mid-1940's are reviewed in the

opening chapter. During the review the interrelation between Soviet disarmament and foreign policies is revealed, and the primary goal of Soviet disarmament policy is derived. That this interrelationship and primary goal have remained unchanged through the years is then documented. Six current considerations which influence Soviet disarmament policy are presented and examined in the next two chapters. The degree of their influence is carefully analyzed. The material developed in the paper leads finally to conclusions concerning future Soviet disarmament policy and they are discussed in the closing chapter.

I — SOVIET DISARMAMENT POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR II

At the end of World War II the Soviet Union and the United States were the world's two major powers. This unique situation of bipolarity later proved to have an adverse effect on world politics. Nevertheless, at this time the Soviet Union and the Western Allies were in agreement that the United Nations organization was needed to help keep the peace. The Kremlin rulers could hardly afford to be cynical or indifferent regarding an international organization that was deemed desirable by the entire world, especially since Soviet propaganda cast them in the role of the most sincere champions of peace and security. (6:96) Also, there is little doubt that the Soviet leaders believed that an international organization, if it were kept ineffective in opposing Soviet interests, might possibly be a useful instrument of Soviet policy. Finally, this organization could serve to prevent or hinder a renewal of the diplomatic and political isolation from which the Soviet Union had suffered throughout most of her history. (6:97)

One of the major issues to be faced by the United Nations was the problem of disarmament. In the aftermath of World War II, world public opinion called for an international attempt to achieve disarmament — not disarmament in the sense that it had been thought of before — but disarmament designed to bring about the abolishment of the atomic bomb as a weapon of war.

The elimination or control of the atomic bomb was not easily approached as the United States and the Soviet Union did not share the same attitude toward atomic energy. On 10 August 1945, just 4 days after the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, the Emperor of Japan offered to surrender. (8:28) This action undoubtedly helped to foster the widespread belief held by U.S. authorities that the atomic bomb had changed previous concepts of war.

On 9 August 1945 President Truman had said, "The atomic bomb is too dangerous to be loose in a lawless world." (86:108) Several writers of the time put similar thoughts into words when they wrote:

> If one side can eliminate the cities of the other, it enjoys an advantage which is practically tantamount to final victory, provided always its own cities are not similarly attacked. (11:47)
>
> All of us must recognize that in another three years the United States of America may not stand alone as a possessor of atomic bombs and that in another five to seven years' time, it is entirely possible that another country will possess a number of atomic bombs sufficient to destroy us. (12:26)
>
> Thanks to the possession of the atomic bomb and an air force of overwhelming strength, we are today far stronger than the Soviet Union and could destroy it. (13:174)

The Soviet attitude toward atomic energy showed a decided contrast to that of the United States. It was at Potsdam on 24 July 1945 that Stalin was informed that the United States had an

atomic bomb and planned to use it against Japan unless she promptly surrendered. Stalin registered no particular interest and merely indicated his satisfaction over the fact that the United States had an atomic weapon and expressed a hope that it would be used. (15:263) This general attitude was reflected in official and unofficial sources.

To complicate further the disarmament picture, the first signs of a cold war struggle appeared in late 1945 while preparations were being made for the initial meeting of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC).

Disagreement had developed over the reconstruction of the Polish Government, the oppressive Soviet rule in Bulgaria and Rumania, the disposition of Trieste, the issue of reparations, and the Allied administration of Germany. (59:204) It should not have come as a surprise to anyone as the shadow of postwar Soviet foreign policy was much in evidence in the political concessions granted by the United States and Great Britain at Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam.

In order that the interrelation between Soviet disarmament and foreign policies can better be understood below, a brief discussion of Soviet foreign policy is appropriate at this time. Soviet foreign policy after World War II can be viewed as a methodical attempt to exploit the wartime achievements of the Soviet Union, to expand the territory of the Soviet Union, to increase the number of her dependent territories, and to raise the power and influence of the Communist Parties throughout the world. (42:59) As a means of accomplishing these goals, the Soviets set about to prevent or delay the construction of united non-Communist military systems. In addition, they worked toward fracturing Allied unity and stripping the United States of her power and influence. The Soviet Union employed a use of force or a threat of force, subversion, and political, economic, and psychological methods. (42:31)

The Soviets capitalized on United States demobilization after the war and on the West's desire for peace when they put their foreign policy into action. By 1947 Russia had control over Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. She was gaining control of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Albania. In addition, she had extracted economic benefits from Italy and Finland and had made a serious effort to conquer Greece and institute civil war in France. (9:123) These Soviet actions seem to verify the fact that Stalin was not intimiated by the United States possession of the atomic bomb.

The Beginning (1946).

On 14 June 1946 the Baruch Plan on atomic control was presented to the UNAEC. Although the plan impressed many Westerners as an offer of unparalleled generosity, it created serious misgivings among Soviet leaders because it would have deprived Russia of her veto over Security Council enforcement of the treaty, breached the Iron Curtain through its provisions for inspection and control, and failed to provide a deadline for the destruction of the U.S. atomic weapons. (8:55, 60, 72) Andrei Gromyko presented the Soviet plan at the very next meeting. He advocated the signing of a convention which would prohibit the production and use of atomic weapons and provide for the destruction of all existing atomic stockpiles within three months. (83:21) He further proposed the establishment of a committee to prepare a draft agreement for the outlawing of the use of atomic and similar forms of weapons of destruction. (83:23)

The Soviet proposals were not much more than mere statements of prin-

ciples. The plan was quite vague on the control problem as it contained no mention of inspection, international ownership, or other techniques, of control. The plan was not vague, however, on what it was designed to accomplish. It was an appeal to the world to bring pressure on the United States to stop production of atomic weapons and destroy her atomic stockpile. The United States had demobilized rapidly after World War II, and her only strength rested in her atomic weapons. (83:182-183) The Soviets, realizing the significance of this, tried to capitalize on it. If the Soviets could cause the United States to destroy her atomic stockpile or accept a ban on its use, the United States would be weakened to a point at which she could offer no effective resistance to Russian aggression. Thus, the Soviets hoped to achieve this further weakening of the United States through a disarmament measure in order to carry out their foreign policy of expansion throughout Eastern Europe.

On 31 December 1946 the UNAEC submitted its first report to the Security Council. (83:50) The report constituted approval of the Baruch Plan and an international control system that was completely unacceptable to the Russians. The Soviet ministers launched a deliberate effort to delay Security Council action on this report. The Soviets fought a delaying action for approximately 17 months before they were finally forced to veto the Security Council resolution to approve the reports of the Atomic Energy Commission. (8:-106)

Gromyko's speech on 5 March 1947 was typical of the delaying tactics employed. He proposed an immediate convention outlawing atomic weapons and condemned the control system of the U.S. plan as constituting interference with international sovereignty. (83:65, 69) However, the main objective of his speech was to prove that the United States did not want to relinquish control over atomic weapons but rather was trying to secure for herself world monopoly in the field of atomic energy. (83:75) The entire speech was an excellent example of the Soviets' use of disarmament discussions to delay action on the Baruch Plan rather than to seek areas of agreement through negotiations.

The Security Council's delay in acting on the UNAEC reports provided time for the Soviets to develop a nuclear capability while the feasibility of international control was dissipating. (30:-22)

Thus, during the time when it had no atomic weapons, the Soviet Union was interested in avoiding foreign interference with its internal affairs, in using disarmament negotiations to embarrass the United States, in inducing the United States to turn over her stockpile to international control or to destroy it, and in dragging out negotiations in the hope of speaking before long from the position of a nuclear power. (16:73)

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Commander Raymond G. Burkemper, U.S. Navy, holds a B.S. from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School and attended St. Louis University.

A naval aviator, Commander Burkemper has served in Fighter Squadron 54, Helicopter Antisubmarine Squadrons 4, 8 and 11, and on the Staff, Commander Carrier Antisubmarine Air Group 60. He was Flag Secretary and Aide to Commander Fleet Air Quonset Point.

Commander Burkemper is a graduate of the U.S. Naval War College School of Naval Warfare, Class of 1967, and is presently assigned as Executive Officer of Helicopter Combat Support Squadron 4.

Appearance of New Issues.

Two other disarmament issues were introduced in late 1946 that furnish some insight into the connection between Soviet disarmament and foreign policies.

The first issue had to do with a troop census requested by the Soviets initially in a letter to the Security Council on 24 August 1946. (58:1) The Soviets requested all members of the United Nations to report to the Security Council the number and location of their armed forces in foreign territories except those in former enemy states. This request served to reinforce the Communist agitation to speed up the process of "bringing the boys home." (8:85) The Soviets possessed superior conventional forces, and any disarmament measure that would hasten the reduction of Western forces in Europe would contribute further to the success of the Soviets' foreign policy of expansionism.

The second issue had to do with the introduction of a discussion on general disarmament. (59:327) The Soviet resolution was nothing more than a vague notion of general disarmament coupled with the "ban the bomb" theme. This type of proposal served the purpose of distracting attention from the Soviets' foreign policy of expansionism and focusing attention on the Soviet Union as being the true proponent of disarmament.

The major goal of Soviet disarmament policy is considered to have been established during 1946-1947. The Soviets sought to obtain a relative disarmament of the West; they were willing to disarm but their disarmament proposals were so designed as to disarm the West to a greater degree by elimination of atomic weapons and drastic reduction of Western conventional forces. If the West could be weakened through disarmament, the Soviets would be virtually unhindered in their spread throughout Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

End of Baruch Plan Era (1948).

The Baruch Plan era closed in 1948 without agreement being reached on any major issue. During the initial negotiations, the Soviet Union developed certain negotiating techniques that have been employed throughout their disarmament talks. One technique consisted of the habit of attempting to gain specific strategic and tactical military advantages through disarmament proposals. An example of this technique in action was contained in the Soviets' proposal for a troop census which was designed to create pressure on the Western powers to withdraw their forces from foreign terrirtories. If this proposal had been accepted, the resultant withdrawal of Western forces would have improved the 1947 Soviet attempts to establish a Communist regime in Greece and to isolate Turkey. (8:85)

The Soviets introduced a second technique that was geared to gain certain concessions from the Western powers before they would agree to discuss related issues. For example, Soviet proposals called for the United States to eliminate her nuclear weapons; then the Soviets would engage in an effort to reach accord on international controls to guarantee observance of commitments. (8:126) These techniques, if successful, would have resulted in a weakening of the West through disarmament measures, thereby reducing Western ability to oppose the execution of Soviet foreign policy.

Vyshinsky Proposal (1948).

On 25 September Andrei Vyshinsky presented a proposal which, in varying

forms, was to set the Soviets' theme for the entire period from 1948 to the close of 1954. He accused the United States and the United Kingdom of preparing for aggressive war against the Soviet Union and introduced a resolution that called for a ban on atomic weapons, reduction of conventional forces by one-third, and international control subject to the veto in the Security Council. (83:176-177) To reduce conventional forces by one-third was the first concrete statistical arms reduction proposal of the postwar era. However, the reduction was not acceptable to the West as it would have created a still greater balance of power in favor of the Soviet Union. (83:185)

The chief characterisic of Vyshinsky's proposal was its ready adaptability to propaganda uses. (8:130) This proposal was introduced before various United Nations committees and assemblies several times and defeated on each occasion. (8:131) Continued reintroduction could not have been prompted by any hope that the proposal would eventually be accepted but rather by the desire to get the Western countries on record time and again as rejecting "concrete" disarmament schemes proposed by the peace-loving Soviet Union. This image was being projected to the world to demonstrate that no one had anything to fear from the Soviets and that Western agreement to disarm was lacking. In so many words, the Soviets were attempting to allay Western fears of Soviet expansionism by presenting themselves as staunch advocates of peace and security through disarmament.

Three Major Events.

Three major events occurred during the period of 1949 to 1950 that had a greater effect on the disarmament picture than did actual negotiations and discussions in the United Nations. These were the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Soviet atomic bomb explosion, and the Korean war.

On 4 April 1949, 12 Western nations formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) designed to provide mutual security in the face of post-World War II pressures. (42:28) This constituted a partial defeat of the Soviet policy to prevent the formation of such collective security organizations. NATO now stood as another obstacle in the way of Moscow's program to weaken Western resistance.

Perhaps the most powerful influence on Soviet disarmament policy during this period resulted from her first successful atomic explosion in September 1949. (83:207) At this time the Soviets abandoned their stand that the possession of nuclear weapons was prima facie evidence of aggressive intentions and began to stress the prevention of the use of atomic weapons rather than their destruction. In addition, the Soviets commenced to advocate the peaceful uses of atomic energy. This shift in emphasis was apparently designed to keep the Soviets in the role of the peace lovers by advocating peaceful over military use of atomic energy.

The third event, the Korean war, began with the Communist attack on South Korea in June 1950. (42:46) The war occurred during the course of the Soviets' "peace campaign" and represents an example of Soviet disarmament propaganda hypocrisy. This Soviet action is partially explained by the fact that in 1949 and 1950 war was bringing good results in China, Burma, Malaya, Indochina, and Korea. (42:64) Therefore, while the Soviets could wage a campaign for peace in Europe, they could wage war in Asia.

This so-called peace campaign had been launched in 1949 at a time when

Communist emphasis began to shift to the Far East following a tapering off of gains in Europe. Its objective was first to check and then to disintegrate the West's gradual awakening to the dangers of Soviet and Communist expansion. (9:135) The 1945-1948 militant Soviet policy of threats, subversions, and military force had genuinely alarmed the Western Powers and precipitated countermeasures on their part. This new Soviet foreign policy was thus aimed at reducing world anxieties toward Russia and delaying non-Communist rearmament programs as well as disrupting the establishment of firmer anti-Communist foreign policies.

Vyshinsky Proposal (1954).

Vyshinsky's speech on 30 September 1954, at the Ninth Session of the General Assembly, provides an excellent example of the interrelation of Soviet disarmament and foreign policies. Vyshinsky introduced a proposal the most significant feature of which was to suggest that the Soviet Union would accept the British-French memorandum of 11 June 1954 as a basis for discussion and negotiation. (30:26) The British-French memorandum had offered a comprehensive set of disarmament steps, beginning with prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons except for defense against aggression and proceeding stage by stage to total elimination of bomb stockpiles and total control. (30:25) Mr. Vyshinsky set forth his proposal in such a manner as to create the impression that the Soviet Union had accepted practically the entire Western position and that little stood in the way of a final agreement. Western spokesmen engaged Vyshinsky in an intense probing operation in order to determine exactly what kind of disarmament system the Soviet Union envisioned. The disappointing discovery was that the differences between the Soviet Union and the West had narrowed in that there was agreement on the basic principles of a step-by-step approach to the nuclear problems and numerical ceilings on manpower instead of a percentage cut, but not to the extent claimed by Vyshinsky. (8:232) The Soviet Union and the West were still far apart on the question of inspection, and the Vyshinsky proposal did not constitute agreement with the Western position. Yet, it seemed that recent Soviet actions and statements in the fall United Nations debates and the manner in which this proposal was presented were meant to indicate that the arms race was soon to be settled. What was the explanation? The answer appears to be that Russia was hoping to achieve a foreign policy goal of defeating the buildup of non-Communist collective security systems by endeavoring to convince the world that she was sincerely negotiating for a disarmament agreement. By making it appear that the East and West were close to an arms agreement, the Soviets hoped to prove to non-Communists that military preparations vis-a-vis Russia were totally unnecessary. The fact that the Soviets had attempted to deceive public opinion in regard to their 30 September disarmament plan and the entire theme of the Russian campaign to defeat the European Defense Community support this. (18:58-59)

Soviet Foreign Policy Change (1955).

Prior to the spring of 1955 the foreign policy of the Kremlin leaders could generally be characterized as hostile to all sections of the non-Communist world. Khrushchev took steps to alter this. The guidelines of post-1955 Soviet foreign policy were revealed at a stormy session of the Central Committee of the

Communist Party held in early July 1955 (18:228) and further delineated at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956. (18:322) In this the Soviets departed from their belief that a Communist revolution in the Western countries was imminent and indicated that a Communist-inspired upheaval would not be successful at this time (18:228) and that war in the nuclear age was no longer inevitable. To effect this new policy, the Soviet Union inaugurated steps to prove her peaceful motives. She relaxed her harsh attitude toward Communist governments which did not slavishly follow Moscow communism; (18:345) she departed from the "two camp" theory, implying that there was room for neutralism, and set about to create a belt of neutral nations; (18:228) and she acknowledged that violent revolutions are not the only road to socialism. (59:282) In this latter regard she attempted to establish good relations with the Socialist Parties of Western Europe and sought accommodation with non-Socialist governments in other European states. Through these various moves, the Kremlin leaders sought to prove that Russia had no aggressive aims and that the strengthening of NATO was not necessary.

This new courting of neutral nations extended to the southern and eastern parts of the world. It was pursued by conferences, Soviet state visits, and the feting of neutralist leaders in Moscow. (18:302)

This brief comment on Soviet foreign policy reveals the degree to which Soviet tactics and strategy had altered in relation to earlier periods. However, the primary goal of 1945-1955 policy, to weaken the ties between the United States and other nations and to strengthen the relationship of these nations with Russia, remained unchanged.

10 May 1955 Soviet Proposal.

These changes in foreign policy tactics and strategy were reflected in the Soviet disarmament policy. The militancy of previous Soviet foreign policy and the general belief that all non-Communists were anti-Communist precluded any possibility of success with earlier Soviet disarmament policy. Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" and "three camps" philosophy changed this. He believed that a new disarmament policy could be devised that would work perfectly with other Soviet moves to convince the world that it had nothing to fear from the Soviet Union.

The Soviets' first disarmament proposal under this new policy was made on 10 May 1955. The first part was closely in line with the program that the Soviet Union had introduced year after year in that it called for an end to propaganda, the settlement of outstanding problems through international negotiation, withdrawal of all troops from German territory, liquidation of foreign military bases, fostering of peaceful uses of the atom, settlement of Far Eastern problems, and removal of barriers to trade. (8:290-291) This first part represented a clear-cut demonstration of the Soviets' presenting foreign policy goals in a disarmament proposal. However, the overall proposal did show that it was in agreement with disarmament measures outlined by the Western powers, except on three important points. First, it called for early elimination of foreign military bases. Second, the Russians insisted that a complete prohibition of the use of atomic weapons would become effective at the time 75 per cent of the total reductions of armed forces and conventional armaments had been accomplished. Third, the Soviets proposed completion of their disarmament proposal in two steps within a 2-year period. (83:461-463) Con-

sideration of these points again clearly shows that the Soviets still were continuing the attempts which they began in 1946 to accelerate the reduction of Western strength through disarmament measures.

With relatively minor variations, Russian chief disarmament proposals from 10 May 1955 to the end of 1957 contained provisions which called for (1) a reduction of occupation forces in Germany, (2) substantial reductions in NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, (3) inspection and limitation of arms in a trial zone in Germany and "adjacent states," (4) complete prohibition of nuclear weapons in the above zones, and (5) a nonaggression pact between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. (83:752)

Change in Emphasis (1958).

In comparison to previous periods, the only noticeable differences have been those of emphasis rather than complete shifts in policy. The Russians continued to interrelate their peace and disarmament themes while emphasizing their military and economic power. Beginning as early as the time of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile launching in 1957, the Russians have endeavored to convince the West that it cannot beat the Russians in the arms race; there is no reason to try because the Soviet Union obviously supports peace and disarmament as witnessed by her many disarmament proposals and her stress on peaceful coexistence. In this regard, a statement of world Communist policy issued in Moscow in December 1960 indicated the belief that the East-West power struggle was being won by the East. (74:191) If this be true, then Moscow certainly did not want substantive disarmament negotiations. What the Soviets would employ in this situation are intimidation (extreme propagandizing of Eastern strength) and persuasion (appealing disarmament proposals).

"Peaceful Coexistence" (1961).

The Soviets entered this period with a policy established by Khrushchev in his declaration that "peace is inevitable" and that "war will not help us reach our goal." That Khrushchev seemed anxious to carry out this policy was evidenced by his reaction to the Cuban Bay of Pigs incident. In a message to President Kennedy in April 1961 he stated that he would not allow the Cuban attack to interfere with United States-Soviet negotiations on easing cold war tensions "and all other questions the solution of which would promote peaceful coexistence." (46: 376) However, the Russians did not religiously adhere to this line.

The Soviets demonstrated great agility in handling the soft and hard sell. One example of their taking advantage of every opportunity to appear in a good light occurred on 20 September 1961 when, following a series of some 10 nuclear tests, Nikita Khrushchev endorsed Pope John XXIII's appeal for East-West negotiations to end world tension. (47:318)

Once their tests were satisfactorily completed, the Soviets began to advocate a ban on nuclear testing with at least a moratorium on underground testing. This immediate reversal of attitude was directed at undermining U.S. preparations to resume testing. To keep the pressure on the United States, Mme. Nikita S. Khrushchev issued a call for peace and a general disarmament program in a February 1962 shortwave radio broadcast to the women of America. (48:253) And Nikita kept things stirred up with a series of statements intended to coerce some and calm others. He declared on 16 March that

the Soviet Union had an invulnerable "global" rocket not detectable by the U.S. early warning system. In addition, he stated that Russia would work for a disarmament agreement at Geneva and warned the West that a settlement must be reached in the Berlin situation. (49:317-318) The balance of the year was devoted to similar utterances.

The year 1963 opened with the Soviet Union calling for the liquidation of foreign bases. It closed with the signing of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (LNTBT) on 5 August 1963. In a message to Red Chinese leaders on August 21 Khrushchev referred to the LNTBT as "our victory." He stated that the treaty will "perpetuate not the American nuclear monopoly, but the fact of its liquidation." (2:25)

Modified "Peaceful Coexistence" (1964-Present).

On 11 February 1964 the Soviet Union proposed early elimination of submarine-based missiles, a move that would have placed the nuclear balance of power in her favor. (43:245) Throughout the year the Russians continued to insist that nuclear delivery systems must be eliminated at the outset of an arms pact (44:181) and that an early German peace settlement must be negotiated to improve East-West relations. (50:250) The year closed with a pledge from Brezhnev and Kosygin to continue the policy of peaceful coexistence established by the deposed Khrushchev. (51:374)

The Russians have continued to work to get the United States out of Europe and weaken the ties between the United States and her Western Allies. This was the point of Soviet delegate Tsarapkin at the 18-nation Geneva disarmament talks in August 1965, when he informed the conferees that the Geneva negotiations could make no progress until the United States withdrew her overseas troops and dismantled her bases in foreign territories. (45:247)

The Chinese Communists have challenged the Soviets for leadership in the Communist world and with a newly developed nuclear capability pose a real physical threat to the Soviet Union. The Soviets are caught in the middle. They need to back North Vietnam if they hope to be acknowledged as leaders of the Communist camp. (76:41) But they cannot back Hanoi to the degree that escalation will bring about a clash between the United States and Red China. This would present Russia with a difficult choice: whether to remain neutral and jeopardize Soviet influence in the Communist world, or to come to the aid of Red China in accordance with the Sino-Soviet Agreement of 1950 and risk a nuclear confrontation with the United States. (20:39-41)

Developments in 1966 indicated that the Soviet Union is not maneuvering to obtain a major détente with the United States but appears more interested in indirect maneuvers for exploiting the disagreements within the Western Alliance. The Soviets have been concentrating on probing the weak spots of the Western position, both in Europe and among the new nations. They had apparently decided that a breathing spell could be obtained in the arms race without maneuvering for an overall détente, and that they could continue undermining Western positions in various parts of the world. (40:30) A deviation from this approach appeared in late 1966 when it was revealed that the Soviets were deploying an antiballistic missile defense. (72:1) However, even this move does not seem irreversible as discussions were being held in early 1967 between the United States and Russia concerning possible agreement on the abandonment of development and deployment of such systems. (62:

10) Further evidence to indicate that the Soviets may be seeking a breathing spell in the arms race is possibly contained in the United States-Soviet Union treaty to ban nuclear weapons from outer space signed on 27 January 1967. (82:3)

II — INTERNAL CONSIDERATIONS

Various internal considerations exercise an effect on the Soviet Union's disarmament policy. Among the most influential of these are the economic situation in the Soviet Union, the Soviet deep-seated objections to inspection and control in conjunction with disarmament proposals, and the possibility of the Soviets gaining a military advantage over the Western World. The first of these influences could cause the Russians to seek relief from the arms race, while the last two might militate against agreement in disarmament negotiations. These three considerations will now be discussed.

The Soviet Economic Situation.

In the field of economics the greatest problems appear to lie in agriculture and industry, in improving the standard of living, and in defense and space spending.

Agriculture and Industry. In January 1959 Premier Khrushchev's keynote speech to the 21st Soviet Communist Party Congress contained a timetable for a Soviet economic victory over capitalism. By 1970, Khrushchev claimed, Soviet agriculture and industry both would be out-producing the United States on a per capita basis and in total output. (61:122) Khrushchev's boast has turned out to be a gross miscalculation. Based on current trends, per capita Soviet production in 1970 may be no more than 30 percent of the United States output. (37:2)

The critical predicament of Soviet agriculture is confirmed by the fact that the Soviets have been forced to import grain in 1963, 1964, and 1965. Reliable reports show that they bought a total of 1,100,000 tons of grain from Canada, Belgium, and France between October 1964 and February 1965. In addition, the Soviet Union made huge purchases of soybeans in the United States, of wool in Australia, and of cattle in various European countries. (22:223) In June 1966 they signed an agreement with Canada to obtain 800 million tons of grain and another agreement with France to obtain 200 million tons of grain. The grain is to be received over the next 3 years. (29:1)

Moreover, one must consider the fact that an adverse change in nature may combine with inherent Communist inefficiency to prolong the agricultural difficulties. During the past 15 years, cooler and wetter summers have been unfavorable to wheat and rye in the northern part of Russia, while other areas have been plagued by droughts. Studies have indicated that these conditions could prevail for the next 200 years. (37:2)

However, agriculture still suffers most from the resentment of peasants on collective farms. In recent years small, peasant-owned private plots, which make up only 3 to 4 percent of the arable land, accounted for 30 to 40 percent of total Soviet agricultural production. (91:1018) Additional agricultural difficulties can be traced to a failure to emphasize production of fertilizer and pesticides, the overcropping of new lands which exhausted their moisture, and an attempt to grow certain crops on land not suited for them. (91:1021)

In industry, plants built in the 1930's are still being operated. Money is badly

needed for retooling and capital investment, but it is in short supply. (65:1) Industrial output has been hampered by bad management, wastefulness, and an ineffective use of the country's labor force. For example, every year millions of industrial workers move from one plant to another on their own initiative, and about one-third of these transferees change their profession. In 1963 these movements were estimated to cost the economy two billion rubles in lost man-days. (67: 623)

The Soviets are making every effort to overcome their economic difficulties in the area of agriculture and industry. In the new Five Year Plan, 205 billion rubles ($227.5 billion) are being invested in agriculture, industry, transportation, and communications. Two-fifths of this amount have been allocated to industry. (67:623) This and other efforts will be necessary to achieve a vitalization of Soviet agriculture and industry and may cause the Soviets to become more genuinely interested in disarmament negotiations to slow down or eliminate the arms race.

Improved Standard of Living. The Soviet leaders have been faced for some years with the perennial choice of investing in heavy or light industry. For some time the decision has been in favor of producer goods and raw materials at the expense of consumer goods. However, after Stalin's death in 1953 Georgi Malenkov tried to bring about substantial increases in consumer durables. Although the attempt was not successful, the idea was retained by Khrushchev, Bulganin, and others. The Soviet's Seven Year Plan for 1959-1965 promised increased quantities of milk, butter, meat, sugar, vegetables, and fruit. Further, good and attractive clothing and shoes were to be available, and the people's housing situation was to be improved. (61:122) Khrushchev made extravagant promises of dramatic improvements in living standards in the late 1950's and sparked a revolution of rising expectations among the populace that has not been fulfilled. In addition, 1959 saw Khrushchev promise higher real wages, increased minimum wages, a shorter workweek, and abolition of the Soviet income tax. These promises either have not been met or have only been partially realized. (61:176)

Following the removal of Khrushchev, the new Soviet leaders, Brezhnev and Kosygin, continued efforts to raise the standard of living of the Soviet people. At the 23rd Party Congress Premier Kosygin declared that consumer goods industries will grow by 43-46 percent during the years 1966-1970 as compared to a 36 percent growth for 1961-1965. (90:225) Significantly, these industries are to grow almost as rapidly as heavy industry. Kosygin's statement also contained a promise of higher quality consumer goods and a greater variety.

Some European experts argue that the Soviet Union has gone beyond the point of no return in her efforts to improve the standard of living. These experts believe that a consumer-dominated economy is inevitable. (14:174) The Soviet leaders are now faced with the problem of providing this higher standard of living, and it probably will be achieved only at the expense of other Soviet endeavors, possibly the arms race.

Defense and Space Spending. The pace of future Soviet economic expansion is a great unknown. One of the key variables in determining that pace is the burden of defense and space expenditures that the Soviet Union will have to bear in the coming years. Expenditures on defense and space ex-

ploration may be considered together since both have military implications and require similar kinds of inputs. (90:225) Defense and space production place a serious demand on research and managerial personnel and material resources. Russia invests a high proportion of such talent on nuclear and rocket research and on weapons development. (91:1021) A reduction in these expenditures could enable the government to shift large quantities of resources to help meet the needs of the civilian economy. (61:239)

In the area of monetary expenditures, Premier Kosygin announced a 500 million ruble ($550 million) reduction in the Soviet Armed Forces budget in December 1964. (91:1023) However, one year later, in December 1965, Kosygin announced that his country was forced to increase the military budget for 1966 by 600 million rubles because the United States is "whipping up military psychosis." (55:1) Still one year later, in December 1966, the Soviet Government announced an increase in its defense spending for 1967. The increase will create a 1967 defense budget that will be 8 percent greater than it was in 1966. (70:1) These annual increases seem to bear out J. M. Mackintosh when he wrote: "As seen in 1960, the priorities of Soviet economic policy appear to be: first, defence and science; and second, the standard of living required to give the Soviet Union 'model' status. . . ." (42:329) No one seems to know where it will end. Evidence can be presented to show that such defense spending does not severely strain the Soviet economy. However, in a very real sense any amount of defense spending places a "burden" on a nation's economy. (90:225) In support of this, one may note that Kremlin economic planners have protested against the installation of an antimissile-missile system in the Soviet Union on the basis of the cost involved. (69:59)

As noted above, defense and space programs place a large demand on scientists, technicians, and specialized production facilities. These resources are needed to achieve success in increasing industrial productivity and efficiency, boosting agricultural output, and expanding consumer goods output. (90:241) It is fairly well accepted that the more that is spent on defense now, the lower will be the growth rate. The Soviet Union seems to be faced with a difficult choice between trying to win the economic growth race with the United States and retaining her position as champion of world communism. (90:241)

Objections to Inspection and Control.

Of all the major issues involved in disarmament negotiations, the Soviet bent on secrecy in inspection and control has been one of the most stubborn and most persistent issues frustrating disarmament agreement. (17:142) The Soviets registered their first objection in this regard when they opposed the comprehensive international inspection and control measures of the Baruch Plan. (30:21) We will now examine three prime determinants of the Soviet stress on secrecy with regard to inspection and control.

Political Factors. In the time of the Tsars, secrecy was used as a screen between the Russian autocratic system and the industrial revolution. The Russian rulers deliberately preserved the backwardness of their country in order to safeguard their power. As Russia's industrializing Western neighbors gradually pulled ahead of her, the need for secrecy increased. The Russian masses could not be allowed to compare their

miserable condition with that of their more fortunate neighbors. (26:726)

Stalin used secrecy as a device to maintain the regime's grip on the social order. Secrecy was achieved by segregating all social groups through the erection of communication barriers between Russian rank and file and the elite, and between different elites. (17:145) In this regard, the maintenance of internal barriers to the flow of information helped secure the status of the top leaders and reduced the possible influence of the rank and file on policy formulation. (17:146)

Soviet leadership has been equally intent on protecting its political control structure from outside influences as well. An object of Soviet concern is the very existence of alternative loyalties, appeals, and ideologies. (17:146) An illustration of how strong this feeling is can be found in Stalin's refusal to allow Allied planes or troops to be stationed in the Soviet Union in 1942-44, even though such forces could have rendered valuable assistance.

In addition, the Soviets have employed secrecy as a weapon in both domestic and international political warfare. The occurrence of accidents, disasters, or disorders within the Soviet Union are rarely reported in Soviet news media. This may stem from a policy to minimize adverse information and not to disturb confidence in the Communist system of government. (17:147) Essential to internal and external Soviet politics is the image of progress -- the image of communism as the "wave of the future." A careful manipulation of information supports this image through the accentuation of positive accomplishment and the dissimulation of failure. (26:733)

Economic Factors. The Soviet Union has been reluctant to open the country to outsiders for fear of exposing economic weaknesses. Many production facilities, laboratories, and some of the armaments in stockpiles are admitted to be below Western standards. The Soviets do not wish to exhibit such items, especially to Westerners. (39:53) It is possible, however, that improvements in material conditions might reduce their reluctance to accept reasonable inspection proposals out of fear of exposing "shameful" spots to foreign observers. (64:419-420) One Soviet official is credited with saying that the attitudes of the United States and the Soviet Union toward secrecy will change in the future. This will occur when socialism is on the top and capitalism on the bottom. At that time the Soviet Union will allow inspection "of everything" and the United States will be the party to refuse entry to foreigners. (39:53)

Military Factors. In a military sense it is quite probable that the Soviet Union regards secrecy as an important asset. In fact, it is not too hard to conclude that secrecy may be an integral part of Soviet doctrine:

> If the 1961 American estimates of the relatively modest scale of Russian strategic capacity are correct, we have a ready explanation of the Russians' unwillingness to allow their territory to be inspected to this degree (required by the West). For it is undeniably likely that teams of inspectors visiting several times a year any part of Russia in which a shock wave has been recorded, might locate one or more of the Russian ICBM sites. And if there are indeed less than fifty of these missiles in existence — grouped probably in sites containing several missiles — the discovery of even a few of these sites would begin to destroy the invulnerability of the main Russian strategic deterrent. Such are the awkward consequences of the Russians' having adopted a policy of the "minimum deterrent" dependent for its invulnerability upon secrecy. (79:171)

Secrecy serves both to cover weaknesses and to keep a potential enemy guessing about elements of strength. Further, secrecy obscures the direction and rate of military research and development. For example, Soviet secrecy was responsible for the myth of the missile gap in the 1960's. (17:147) Secrecy also prevents an accurate estimate of Soviet capabilities. Many times in the past the United States has credited the Soviet Armed Forces with greater strength or combat readiness than was warranted. (17:148)

Finally, it is quite possible that Western determination that inspection systems must be established before disarmament takes place only serves to revive Communist fears that capitalist disarmament proposals are designed for espionage.

> One of the difficulties in any inspection scheme is that it is bound to yield information beyond its intended purpose. This is partly because the personnel and techniques of surveillance will simply "see" a lot of things other than the particular objects and activities that they are intended to monitor. It is partly because some of the very knowledge required in order to verify compliance, or in order to safeguard against dangerous military preparations outside the agreement, will itself be "sensitive" information. That is, it will be information that can be misused by the inspecting country, or that is conducive to military instability. The obvious example, and one that is alleged to underlie the Soviet depreciation of inspection and control, is the acquisition of targeting information for a strategic attack as a by-product of an inspection system intended to reduce vulnerability. (28:103)

The Soviet Union undoubtedly recognizes that because of the Iron Curtain any international inspection or control system operating within her boundaries would benefit the West more than an equivalent system operating in the West. There is a strong possibility that the Soviet Union already has most of the information the system would develop. (10:274) Unless Moscow is given compelling reasons, she is not likely to surrender this strategic advantage.

Potential Soviet Military Advantage.

The third major influence on the Soviet attitude toward disarmament is based on the premise that the Soviet Union is gaining offensive and defensive advantages over the West, and that in the event of all-out war capitalism would be destroyed whereas socialism would survive.

Offensive Advantage. In a report to the Supreme Soviets on 14 January 1960 Premier Khrushchev asserted, "The balance of forces in the international arena is in favor of the peace-loving states." (24:923) Khrushchev assured the assembly that Russia had sufficient nuclear weapons and weapons carriers literally to wipe any aggressor off the face of the earth. He further stated that the Soviet Union has the advantage of an enormous area and of a population which is less concentrated in large industrial centers than are the inhabitants of many other countries. Marshal R. Malinovsky, the Soviet Minister of Defense, echoed the same basic sentiments in 1962. In an interview with *Pravda*, he proclaimed with all of the authority of his office "that we are now the stronger, and of course we are not standing still." (24:924) He stated that the Soviets would rout anyone who attacked them or their allies. A month later he warned the "imperialists" not to touch or threaten the Soviet Union, lest they be consumed without trace in nuclear hell. (24:924) He boasted of Soviet conventional forces, rocket forces, and missile-equipped land forces and proclaimed that Polaris sub-

marines would not be spared from destruction.

Whether or not these boasts were accurate in the early 1960's or are accurate today is not known. What is known is that the Soviet Union is engaged in a massive military research and new weapon development program geared to acquire the equipments necessary to back up their claims.

The Soviets have developed a whole new family of solid-fueled missiles, ranging from relatively short-range battlefield weapons to ICBMs and long-range submarine-based missiles. In the ICBM field the Soviets apparently are concentrating on two types of multi-stage, solid-fueled missiles — one used in silo-launched hardened sites and the other used on a mobile, caterpillar-tracked launcher. Additionally, top Soviet military officials made frequent reference in 1965 to their development of maneuverable warheads for ICBMs designed as a penetration aid. The Soviets are also pursuing significant liquid-fueled rocket developments with indications that these can be used as specialized weapons to boost warheads as powerful as 100 megatons. Further, the Soviets have moved to a Polaris-type submarine and underwater-launched missile with much longer range. Both the submarine and the missile are in large-scale production. (73:90)

In December 1966, Vice Admiral Charles B. Martell, U.S. Navy, announced that the Russians have embarked on an aggressive submarine building program and now have more than 40 nuclear submarines. (87:23) Admiral Martell placed the total Russian submarine force at 400 in all, able to carry 120 missiles.

In contrast to Soviet efforts, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that budgetary cuts to compensate for the war in Vietnam have continually postponed many major U.S. advanced weapons systems. (34:11) The Joint Chiefs are concerned that the Soviets are accomplishing more in advanced weaponry than Secretary of Defense McNamara is giving them credit for. (89:16) As an example, in the same year that Secretary McNamara told Congress that the Soviets had no solid-fueled missile capability, the Soviets unveiled a whole family of these missiles, indicating second generation development in their solid-fueled ICBM program. (34:11)

Defensive Advantage. The Soviets have been concentrating their antisubmarine warfare program on new detection devices, development of nuclear depth bombs, and hunter-killer type submarines. They apparently feel that detection, tracking, and destruction are feasible tactics against a planned total U.S. force of only 41 Polaris-type submarines. (73:90)

The Soviets are making their major move in the development and deployment of an elaborate system of anti-missile defense. Their nuclear weapon production, which they claim has surpassed that of the United States, is believed primarily devoted now to relatively small nuclear warheads for antimissile weapons. The Soviet anti-missile defense system apparently includes both an extremely high-altitude interception and destruct capability and a medium-altitude capability coupled with a new radar system capable of discriminating between authentic warhead reentry vehicles and decoys. (73:90)

Little is known about the efficacy of this system, but most experts believe it must have at least a fractional effectiveness or it would not have been deployed. (4:E3) However, the new missile sites are believed to be in place or going into place not only around Moscow and Leningrad but also around other major cities. (69:59)

The Soviets' decision to start produc-

tion, after several false starts, was apparently made in 1964 after they had time to analyze the results of their A-bomb tests of 1961-62. Those 1961-62 tests, the most extensive ever conducted, were designed in part to gauge the "kill power" of antimissiles at various altitudes. The tests provided vital information and, it is reported, convinced Soviet leaders that an anti-missile-missile was worth building. (81:31)

What was the vital information that these tests provided? It is quite possible that it was the discovery of the effects of a nuclear explosion byprodknown as electromagnetic pulses (EMP). In their column on 27 January 1963 columnists Robert Allen and Paul Scott wrote:

> Several weeks ago this column disclosed that these new Soviet tests have been most extraordinary. They include a number of ballistic missile firings, ranging from ICBMs to anti-missile missiles. In one of these tests, three IRBMs were destroyed by a single nuclear blast from the warhead of what U.S. experts believe is the latest Soviet anti-missile missile.
>
> The U.S. has had no comparable tests. (1:6)

The Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services of the United States Senate reported the following in 1963:

> The Soviets have overtaken and surpassed us in design of high-yield nuclear weapons. They may possess knowledge of weapons effects and anti-ballistic missile programs superior to ours. . . . It is prudent to assume that the Soviet Union has acquired a unique and potentially valuable body of data on high-yield blast shock, and electromagnetic pulse phenomena which is not available to the United States. (71:15)

EMP is a phenomenon of physics that can devastate power facilities and communications. When electronics equipment is hit by a burst of EMP, the effect is like a lightning bolt. The blast can melt wires, burn out transistorized circuits, and break insulation. (54:77) The fear is that the Soviets' antimissile-missile system may be capable of deactivating United States missiles in their silos by EMP from exploding high-yield nuclear weapons. The missiles in the silo would be rendered inert, incapable of being fired or easily repaired. (71:14-15)

The U.S. Defense Department has given a high priority to EMP research at the Atomic Energy Commission's laboratory at Los Alamos. Combined efforts of the AEC and the U.S. Air Force have produced elementary methods for shielding missile launching facilities from EMP effects. (54:77) Other work is being done to develop electronic equipment less sensitive to radiation, but its effectiveness against high-yield explosives will be questionable. (71:14-15)

As this paper is being written the question of the extent and effectiveness of the Soviets' antimissile system continues to be raised in various quarters. An article in the 6 February 1967 issue of *U.S. News & World Report* stated that a Russian breakthrough in missile defense is causing open and serious concern among United States scientists and military men. (35:36) This particular report was discounted by Pentagon officials. (53:7) On 5 February 1967 an examination of the Russian developments and their possible consequences to the United States was clearly presented in a *New York Times* article by Hanson Baldwin. (5:1) Mr. Baldwin cited the U.S. knowledge gap, that the destruction or neutralization of missile warheads might be accomplished by one of several effects, and predicted sweeping strategic, political, and economic consequences for the United States.

III — EXTERNAL CONSIDERATIONS

Just as there are certain internal considerations which must be examined in an effort to understand the basis for current Soviet disarmament policy, there are external considerations as well. Three such considerations appear to be most influential and will now be examined. They are the Soviets' concern over nuclear proliferation, NATO nuclear sharing, and Communist China. The first and third of these influences might be considered as conducive to Soviet agreement to certain disarmament measures, whereas the second appears to be an obstacle in the path of agreement.

Nuclear Proliferation.

The problem of nuclear proliferation has been with us since the early 1940's. Despite strict U.S. security policies and many vigorous protests, the world's "nuclear club" now has five members. (33:1) Russia gained membership in 1949 which spurred the British to produce their bomb in 1952. France, which became the fourth nuclear power in 1960, was followed by Red China in 1964. Just how critical is the problem of proliferation, and how is it viewed by the Soviets? We will now deal with the issues involved in the answers to this question.

An Influence for Evil?

Nuclear proliferation has long been viewed as being politically, militarily, and morally bad, as it could conceivably contribute to political instabilities and increase the chances of nuclear war. (21:10) This gives rise to fear of accidental war, catalytic war, escalation of small or limited wars into general war, and unstable relations among nuclear nations.

Secretary McNamara registered concern over accidental war resulting from an accidental explosion in his testimony before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in March 1966. (63:18) He ventured that nuclear weapons in the hands of small powers threaten "the almost certain result of an accidental detonation at some time," with difficulties in diagnosing the cause of detonation giving rise to the risk of nuclear war. However, an opposite view holds that it simply is not plausible that an accidental nuclear explosion could stampede a major nuclear power into a general war. (77:4)

The scenario for a catalytic war calls for a minor nuclear power to launch a nuclear attack on one major power and make it appear that the attack came from another major power. (77:5) A variation would be an attack on both while the small power simulates each of the two major powers. United States officials do not give this theory much credibility. They claim that modern radar and other present-day devices would instantly tell where any bomb or missile came from, and cite the Washington-Moscow "hot line" as being available for instant consultation. (57:34) Catalytic war is believed to be a remote possibility only if the retaliatory forces of the major powers are highly vulnerable and if relations between the major powers are already in a high state of tension.

The danger of escalation appears to exist with or without nuclear weapon dissemination. However, the Nth country problem does increase the risk of nuclear wars occurring between small powers. (77:5) There are few who hold that escalation of small or limited wars will result from nuclear dissemination.

That nuclear dissemination will increase the risks of wars between smaller nations seems to have the broadest base

of belief. (77:5) The spread of weapons may generate fear, and when governments become fearful, they are likely to adopt unfriendly and divisive policies. (60:36) Thus, proliferation can increase the number of uncertainties affecting international tensions and add to the problems of managing the world.

Finally, an inherent danger in nuclear proliferation is that as each new country joins the nuclear club, other countries are provided more incentive to join. Secretary McNamara pointed this out when he stated that as each new nation acquires a nuclear capability a larger number of nations are prompted to "go nuclear," and the problem grows. (63:18) This idea is contained in the nuclear "domino theory." The theory operates in this manner: Red China's atomic power will compel India to develop a similar capability to offset the inequality in armed strength. When this occurs, Pakistan will feel obliged to take steps to guard against India's nuclear might. Similar reasoning can infect Israel and the United Arab Republic. The argument continues, and one by one the majority of the medium powers find sufficient reason to acquire a nuclear force. (32:1) However, this somewhat bizarre and slightly fantastic theory is used mostly as a scare technique for promoting disarmament measures.

Where Is The Danger? Would an increase in the membership of the nuclear club be all that bad? There are officials in the United States who would give at least a qualified "no" answer. These people believe that the dangers of proliferation have been overstated and the consequences presented too darkly. (57:34)

There are others who propose that world stability might be enhanced through increased membership. Representatives from India, Australia, and Japan gave voice to this view at the International Assembly on Nuclear Weapons in Scarborough, Ont., in 1966. (21:10) They stated that nuclear proliferation among certain Asian and South Pacific states might be desirable in providing an Asian counterbalance to Red China. However, these same people recognized the prohibitive costs involved in nuclear development; this cost factor serves as a brake on them and others who entertain the idea of going nuclear.

An estimated cost for a nation to develop a nuclear force capable of challenging the two major powers has been placed at $3 to $5 billion annually for a decade or more. (60:37) Another source has stated that a nation which launches a nuclear power program signs a blank check on her future financial and industrial resources. (7:4) When such costs are considered, it can be argued that the danger of proliferation is not too great. Which of the nations (India, Egypt, or Israel) considered to be leading candidates to join the nuclear club (38:15) is financially prepared to make such a move? For these and other countries, sheer cost alone is a deterrent even if a scientific, industrial, and technological capability is present. (57:34)

The Soviets' View. The Soviet leaders are believed to want a nonproliferation treaty to isolate further Red China and reinforce their own supremacy as the leading Communist power. (57:34) The Soviets have shown a definite reluctance to allow the membership in the nuclear club to grow, as witnessed by their refusal to provide a nuclear force to Eastern Europe and their curtailment of aid to the Red Chinese in 1959. (41:133-134)

Russia is particularly sensitive to the thought of West Germany sharing any

control over nuclear weapons through participation in a Multilateral Force (MLF) or an Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF). The United States has been unsuccessful in her attempts to convince the Soviet Union that such forces are compatible with a nonproliferation treaty. (38:141) The United States and the Soviet Union each presented draft treaties on nonproliferation at Geneva in the summer of 1966. The fundamental and apparently unchangeable objection of the Russians to the United States proposal is the manifest desire of the United States to include an option whereby nuclear sharing with West Germany would be permitted through the NATO alliance. (85:4)

On 9 December 1966 the United States and the Soviet Union agreed on a treaty prohibiting weapons in space. (23:1) The treaty bars the installation of nuclear weapons on celestial bodies and placement of such weapons in orbit around the earth or otherwise stationing them in space. Further, all military bases, installations, fortifications, nuclear weapon testing, and military maneuvers are banned on celestial bodies. (75:18) This agreement is viewed as a step along the way to a pact to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. Thus, Soviet agreement fosters encouragement for the eventual signing of a nonproliferation treaty. If the Soviets are actually this close, what obstacle yet remains? One possible answer is contained in the following:

> The major impediment to agreement here is the Soviet position on the NATO Multilateral Force (MLF). Whatever the balance of considerations for and against it in the West, there is no reason to question the fact that Soviet statements on the MLF reflect actual concern about its anticipated effects and prospects — including the eventual acquisition of independent nuclear capability by West Germany. (17:129)

NATO Nuclear Sharing.

In August 1957 the Soviets announced that they had launched intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of carrying thermonuclear warheads. This event had staggering military, strategic, political, and psychological consequences. For the first time the United States homeland was open to devastating attacks by invulnerable weapons launched from Europe. There were misgivings among the NATO nations about the value of the United States gaurantee to employ her nuclear sword in the defense of Europe. (31:1030) This marked the beginning of the NATO nuclear sharing problem. Over the years this problem has come to be portrayed as a "German problem." (3:693) The following discussion centers about the three principal nations involved — West Germany, the United States, and Russia.

West Germany. West Germany has made impressive advances in nuclear technology since 1958. These advances have helped initiate the feeling that the Germans are about to launch on a weapons building program. (3:697) West Germany's future in the nuclear field is one of increasing strength and diversity. However, her remarkable advances in this field do not mean that she will endeavor to develop or obtain a military nuclear capability. (3:697)

On the incentive side of the ledger, however, Germany has a more immediate reason for wanting to control nuclear weapons than Britain or France. (56:206) In the event of Soviet aggression, the latter's need for nuclear forces is somewhat remote, whereas Germany could easily be faced with the brunt of the fighting if the Allies displayed any reluctance to use nuclear weapons for fear of expanding the war.

On the other hand, there are various considerations that seem to militate against West Germany's desire for nuclear weapons. West Germany's size is not favorable for a nuclear weapons program. Adequate underground testing sites would be difficult to find, and the requirements for dispersal of a fixed missile system could not be met. (3:697) Further, if West Germany did decide to build a nuclear force designed to threaten the Soviet Union, she would run a high risk of drawing a Soviet preemptive attack in the development stage. (3:698) Another negative consideration is the fact that West Germany renounced the production of nuclear weapons in the Paris Agreements of 1954. (88:656) A revision or violation of the Western European Union Protocol of 1955 is the only path open to West Germany. (7:110) A violation would certainly create strong opposition and uneasiness throughout Western Europe. In fact, the NATO alliance might not survive such a crisis. (56:208)

A peculiar situation is posed by West Germany's desire to obtain nuclear weapons in order to pressure for reunification. In 1964 Amatai Etzioni reported that about one-third of the 25 German generals he interviewed were in favor of West Germany gaining control of nuclear weapons. (25:8-9) These generals viewed such possession as a means of putting pressure on the U.S.S.R. to bring about German reunification. West German Foreign Minister Schroeder stated in July 1965 that his country was not ready to renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons until the reunification of Germany was agreed to by the Soviet Union. (3:698) The remakable thing about these views is the practical certainty that the usefulness of the nuclear weapons issue in gaining reunification would be shattered once Germany actually acquired weapons.

In summary, West Germany's acquisition of a nuclear force would probably be politically regarded as a calamitous threat to the peace. (56:207) For this reason and the realization that possession would most likely defeat any possibility of reunification in the foreseeable future, the West Germans do not seem to want their own nuclear weapons. What they apparently want is the bargaining power that the threat of acquiring weapons may bring to them. (3:699)

The United States. The United States has emphasized the establishment of collectively owned and managed nuclear forces for two reasons. The United States desires, first, to discourage national nuclear efforts, and, second, to help create a framework of Atlantic partnership which could be of a major importance to the future of European unity. (3:694)

The United States took her first steps toward the establishment of such nuclear forces when President Eisenhower participated in the NATO Council decision of 1957. The Council decided that "intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM's) will have to be put at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe." (52:29) The Council decision called for a bilateral force composed of two elements: the United States would furnish the nuclear warheads and another NATO nation would maintain the firing unit. Thus, there would be two independent fingers on the trigger. In order to fire a nuclear weapon, authority must come from the President of the United States, and his action must be concurred in by the other partner in the bilateral force. (31:1038)

Although the creation of such forces has been successful from a military

viewpoint, objections have developed on political and strategic grounds. These objections are based upon European national interests, a gnawing fear of overdependence on the United States for nuclear protection, and doubt regarding the credibility of the United States deterrent unless her forces in southern Germany became directly involved in the event of Soviet aggression. (31:1039) Because only IRBM's were involved, concern also arose over a NATO medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) nuclear "gap."

The proposal of an MLF was a United States attempt to provide MRBM coverage without putting strategic missiles in Europe. The MLF was to serve the additional purpose of placating President de Gaulle's insistence on an independent nuclear role for France. (63:15) This force was to be composed of 25 surface vessels. Each ship was to carry eight Polaris missiles equipped with nuclear warheads and crews drawn from all the NATO allies. (19:208)

In her efforts the United States has appeared primarily concerned with assisting West Germany in obtaining "an appropriate share in the nuclear defense" of Western Europe. (36:5) Because of this seeming preoccupation, the general discussion of nuclear sharing within NATO has left the impression that the central problem is how best to satisfy the German desire for further control of nuclear weapons. (3:693)

To many Europeans the United States' real purpose in proposing nuclear sharing within NATO seems simply to provide a convenient way of giving the Germans nuclear weapons. Consequently, the issue of Germany and nuclear weapons tends to dominate talk of nuclear sharing and creates varying degrees of concern. (3:695) The resulting strong opposition has dampened U.S. insistence on the establishment of an MLF but has not caused her to scrap the plans entirely.

Even in the face of the establishment of a permanent nuclear planning group within NATO, the United States still has not abandoned her idea of a nuclear force for NATO. (80:8) According to the British view, the establishment of this planning group permanently shelved all plans for a multination nuclear force in which West Germany would have access to nuclear weapons. U.S. officials took an opposite view in their statement that the formation of such a force had not been preempted. Thus today, despite the fact that MLF is considered a dead beast, it has not been buried. (63:16)

The U.S.S.R. James Richardson makes the point that the danger of a violent Russian reaction to German nuclear weapons has been exaggerated. (56:207) He points out that the Russians agreed to West German rearmament, and in 1957–58 Khrushchev responded to the decision of the NATO Council to equip the German Army with tactical nuclear-delivery vehicles with nothing more than menacing language. (56:207) This reaction probably stemmed from two Russian understandings. First, the Soviets are aware that they enjoy an overwhelming military strength against West Germany. (56:207) Second, the weapons in the NATO stockpile are all of relatively short range, unable to reach targets within the Soviet Union. For example, the maximum range of the Pershing missile is 400 nautical miles. (31:1039)

In contrast, the Russians have objected to the formation of an MLF from the very beginning. In 1964 the Soviet representative in Geneva stated that the Russians were ready to agree to a nonproliferation treaty if the MLF hurdle was removed. (63:17) The MLF was proposed as a seaborne nuclear force

equipped with nuclear weapons capable of striking the Soviet mainland; this provides one obvious reason for Soviet objection.

The Soviets objected additionally because they did not want such weapons in the hands of West Germany. The United States explained that the nuclear warheads would remain in the U.S. custody, and U.S.-operated electronic locks would control their release. (31:1041) The United States argued that the MLF was the best way of preventing Germany from ever obtaining national control over a nuclear force. (38:141) The Russians are unconvinced. In fact, as recently as November 1966, the chief Soviet disarmament negotiator, A. A. Roschin, voiced concern in the United Nations that the United States still had not developed concrete measures for keeping nuclear weapons out of West German hands. (68:48) At the same time the Russians have not balked at the establishment of a NATO nuclear planning group which includes West Germany as one of four permanent members. (80:1) This group is to meet periodically to consider nuclear tactics and strategy.

In summary, it appears that any further militarization of West Germany by the establishment of an MLF in which West Germany shares control would preclude Russia's cooperation in the reunification of Germany. (36:5) It would also provide an insurmountable obstacle to agreement on a nonproliferation treaty.

Communist China.

In considering Communist China, the main purpose is to discuss areas which will illuminate the way in which Red China may have influenced Soviet disarmament policy in recent years. This influence should not be exaggerated. As we have seen, there are other important influences, so one must not become fascinated by the drama of the Sino-Soviet dispute and accept Red China as the complete or even major explanation of Soviet disarmament policy. The impact of Red China is examined in terms of Soviet conference tactics, Soviet disarmament proposals, and serious Soviet interest in negotiating disarmament agreements.

Soviet Conference Tactics. The first example of possible Chinese influence on Soviet maneuvers in conference tactics can be cited as occurring in August 1957 when the Soviets proposed an end to the London disarmament talks. (41:75) The Chinese were excluded from these talks where issues clearly affecting them, e.g., conventional force levels, had been discussed. From this, one might contend that the Soviets decided to scuttle the conference in order to enhance the likelihood of success at pending negotiations with the Chinese in Moscow. Without denying this possibility, there seem to be other plausible explanations for the Soviets' action. The Kremlin had long objected to this five-power United Nations disarmament subcommittee in which four NATO Allies were aligned against her. The success of her first ICBM and the impending launch of Sputnik I conceivably caused the Soviets to select this time to insist on parity in disarmament forums. (66:124) Soviet withdrawal may have resulted from a judgment that the subcommittee had failed and had run its course.

The Soviet walkout from the 10 Nation Committee on 27 June 1960 provides a second example. (27:41) This maneuver seems explained easily by relating it to the Soviets' threat, following the U-2 incident, to halt further contacts with the U.S. Administration until after the 1960 presidential elections.

Also, the committee was making no progress, and there was a possibility that the West was on the verge of making a proposal which might detract from the significance of Moscow's "general and complete disarmament" (GCD) plan. (66:126) However, there is evidence to indicate that the Soviets did not wish to have disarmament negotiations with the West going on at the same time the 3rd Congress of the Rumanian Workers Party was meeting in Bucharest. (27:41) The likelihood is that Khrushchev, in anticipating increased difficulties with the Chinese and intense introbloc maneuvering, wanted to prepare for the Bucharest meeting undistracted by Geneva and innocent of any Chinese allegations that he was consorting with the West. (66:126)

Another Soviet tactical maneuver occurred with the signing of the Limited Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty in 1963. (84:60) The possibility exists that Khrushchev convened test-ban talks with the United States and the United Kingdom deliberately timed to coincide with Soviet-Chinese negotiations which broke down in disagreement. (27:40) Khrushchev stood ready to sign the test-ban treaty and to use the treaty as a major issue in the Sino-Soviet rift. Clearly, Sino-Soviet relations had a major impact on the Kremlin's attitude toward the test-ban.

Relations with China probably had a good deal to do with Soviet maneuvering to postpone the meetings of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) in the spring of 1965. The Soviets tended to speak very softly on those points of their disarmament position known to be offensive to the Chinese and to make some show of support for Chinese disarmament positions. In this regard, the ENDC may have appeared to be one irritant that could be dispensed with in the Russian-Chinese relationship. (66:127) Another consideration was the Soviets' desire to avoid any Chinese accusation that the former were willing to engage in disarmament negotiations while the Vietnam war was going on. (27:41)

From this brief discussion of conference tactics, one might judge that the Russians are prone to back away from disarmament talks when they are trying to improve relations with the Chinese, as in 1957, 1960, and 1965. On the other hand, the Russians have shown some preference for disarmament talks when they have abandoned efforts to improve Sino-Soviet relations, as occurred in 1963 and 1966. (27:42)

Soviet Disarmament Proposals. The Soviet GCD proposal of September 1959 is probably the most interesting Soviet action to examine in considering the effect of the Chinese on Soviet disarmament proposals. The Chinese would have been satisfied if the Russians had used the proposal to embarrass and expose the capitalists. However, the Russians chose also to embellish the proposal with certain doctrinal assertions concerning the nature of imperialism and the preventability of war. (66:128) When the Chinese took exception to the notion of a "world without arms, a world without war," Khrushchev seemed readily inclined to dispute them. He apparently looked upon the GCD proposal and its doctrinal trimmings as a profitable issue to pursue with the Red Chinese. He must have been guided by the belief that his stand on this issue would have appeal among the Soviet population, the international Communist movement, and the third world. (66:129) For his purposes, Khrushchev could use the Chinese opposition to GCD as "proof" that the Chinese really wanted nuclear war. (27:38)

In later Khrushchev years, certain Soviet disarmament proposals seemed

clearly designed to demonstrate Moscow's readiness to take positions irrespective of Chinese concurrence or opposition. In fact, the year 1962 appeared to mark a point after which the Russians actually increased their interest in making proposals likely to arouse Chinese opposition. (66:129)

The "nuclear umbrella" plan of September 1962 is a good example of a proposal on which the Soviets expected and were willing to accept strong Chinese criticism. (27:42) This plan called for the retention of a limited quantity of nuclear delivery vehicles by Russia and the United States during the complete disarmament process. (78: 160) The Soviet proposal apparently impressed the Chinese as a demonstration of Soviet readiness to establish an atomic monopoly with the United States. (66:129)

Following Khrushchev's fall, Soviet disarmament proposals seemed to show greater concern for the feelings of Communist China. The Soviets' program was more in consonance with Chinese ideas and contained signs of soft-pedaling earlier Soviet advocacy of proposals considered objectionable by the Chinese. However, this pattern changed in the summer of 1965. Quite possibly at this time further deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations caused the Russians to abandon their concern for the feelings of Red China. In any event, the foregoing examination does seem to lead to the conclusion that "disarmament proposals have at various times played a role in Moscow's tactical conduct of the dispute with the Chinese, sometimes as a stick, sometimes as a carrot." (66:130)

Soviet Disarmament Agreements. A favorite and major example of Chinese influence on the willingness of the Soviets to engage in serious negotiations leading to agreement is the 1963 Test-Ban Treaty. (27:43) Soviet signing of the treaty is presented as evidence of Soviet disregard for Chinese disapproval and as providing a weapon to undercut the Chinese position. A second example in this category is the possibility that the Chinese factor may influence future Soviet actions to seek agreements as a means of showing that peaceful coexistence and cooperation with the United States are not only possible, but effective. (27:44)

Another author holds that the Chinese influence in Soviet disarmament policy has been overdrawn. (66: 132) Simply stated, an examination of the evidence merely points to the fact that the Soviets concluded certain agreements deemed to be in their best national interest at times when they knew that such agreements would be rejected and the Soviets condemned by the Chinese. In fact, "while it is possible to conclude that the dispute with the Chinese has made the U.S.S.R. more willing to consider arms control agreements in disregard of Chinese objections, it must also be noted that one can trace to the Chinese factor certain inhibitions of Soviet flexibility in disarmament negotiations with the West." (66:135)

IV — WHAT LIES AHEAD?

An examination of Soviet disarmament and foreign policies since World War II has revealed their definite interrelationship. The record shows that Soviet disarmament policy for the most part has been tailored to be mutually supporting of and complementary to Soviet foreign policy. This interrelation has not always produced the desired results, notably during the period 1945-1953. This post-World War II period provided little chance for success because of the militancy of Stalin's international actions. In the face of

Russian expansion the world was not convinced that the Soviet Union was the peace-loving nation she claimed to be. Nevertheless, on two significant occasions Soviet disarmament policy made overt attempts to assist foreign policy goals. One was the 1946-1947 campaign to accelerate Western demobilization. The second instance was the 1949-1950 "peace campaign" which had been launched in an effort to calm the fears of the Western Powers at a time when these nations finally had become alarmed over Soviet 1945-1948 moves on the international scene and were now seeking collective security arrangements.

Khrushchev changed the Soviet foreign policy approach in 1955. He championed the policy of "peaceful coexistence" and modified disarmament policy to support this new approach. The launchings of her first ICBM and Sputnik I in 1957 heralded the beginning of a hardened Russian foreign policy; a corresponding change took place in Soviet disarmament proposals.

The Soviets continued in the 1960's to pursue foreign policy goals through disarmament negotiations by calling for the liquidation of U.S. foreign bases. For example, in August 1965 the Soviet delegate in Geneva announced that the United States would have to withdraw her overseas forces and dismantle her bases in foreign territories before any progress could be made in disarmament negotiations. That this interrelation of disarmament and foreign policies will continue in the future seems to be a most likely prospect.

The goal of Soviet disarmament policy has been the relative disarmament of the West. That is, the Soviets have sought to achieve the elimination or neutralization of Western military strength, political solidarity, and will to resist. This goal is almost implicit in the close interrelationship that has existed between Soviet disarmament and foreign policies. The Soviets have used their disarmament proposals to create images — the Soviet Union as the advocate of peace and disarmament and the West as the obstructionist. The image of the Soviet Union was contrived to allay the fears of non-Communists and permit Russia to improve her military posture. One must judge that the Soviets have been successful as their military strength has been advanced and their holdings have been consolidated without unduly alarming the Western states.

The Soviets are not going to abandon their disarmament negotiations formula while it serves their purpose so well. They may zig and zag at appropriate times, but they will continue to interrelate their disarmament and foreign policies as a means of achieving the relative disarmament of the West. Even the influence of Soviet internal and external considerations is not considered likely to cause any major alteration in her approach to disarmament talks and agreements.

Unless Soviet policymakers find themselves confronted with a choice between intolerable military inferiority and large new outlays well above current spending levels, economic restraints alone will not force them into arms control or disarmament agreements unless desired for other reasons.

Soviet obsession for secrecy in opposition to inspection and control is too deeply ingrained to be abandoned or appreciably modified. This attitude can be expected to remain. The Soviets will continue to hold out in an attempt to wear down the West in the belief that they will eventually achieve agreement without any meaningful inspection and control requirements.

In her attempt to achieve and maintain a military parity with the United States, the Soviet Union will continue

to engage in the arms race and in disarmament negotiations. She has seldom demonstrated any sincerity in her disarmament negotiations and will continue to propose only that which will advance her military position vis-a-vis the West. For example, in 1958 she proposed a ban on testing that was timed to preempt scheduled testing by the United States and the United Kingdom. In 1961 she violated the voluntary test-ban moratorium when it was advantageous to do so. After she had time to study the results of her 1961 tests, the Soviet Union then earnestly negotiated for a test-ban treaty in 1963. In 1966 the Soviet Union began deploying an antiballistic missile defense. In this case the pattern has been altered somewhat as the United States is proposing curtailment of further development and deployment of such systems. Nevertheless, one can wager that the Soviets will readily agree if they determine the move to be solidly in their best interests based possibly on the fact that they at least have a system installed whereas the United States has none.

There are divergent views on the cause and severity of the Sino-Soviet dispute. The basic cause of the rift has been reasonably established as the determination of the Chinese leaders that China should become a superpower and the equal determination of the Soviet leadership to prevent it. The severity has been expressed as being so great that any permanent reconciliation seems unlikely. However, regardless of the cause or the severity, the Soviets have been unsuccessful in their efforts to prevent Red China from acquiring a nuclear capability. Future attempts at containment will probably be no more profitable. Therefore, the Soviets are faced with the prospect of the possible emergence of Red China as a superpower. In the meantime, the Chinese factor is not likely to influence appreciably Soviet disarmament negotiations.

Russia's greatest area of maneuver appears to lie in negotiating the issue of nonproliferation. By engaging in nonproliferation treaty negotiations, even if agreement is not reached, the Russians are provided the opportunity to separate West Germany from NATO. They have made it clear that agreement on a nonproliferation treaty would probably be achieved if the United States would drop her insistence on seeking a share in the nuclear defense of Western Europe for West Germany. On other occasions, the Soviets have called for all plans for NATO nuclear sharing to be dropped before they would consider any nonproliferation proposals. In any case, the Soviets are keenly aware of how badly the United States wants to reach agreement on the nonproliferation issue, and they may believe that if they hold out long enough the United States will agree to their terms.

In the future the likelihood of the United States and the Soviet Union arriving at any far-reaching disarmament agreement is extremely remote. What one may expect to witness is a continuation of the Soviets' simmering pursuit of and eventual agreement to a nonproliferation treaty as a measure to separate West Germany from NATO. The Soviets conceivably believe that this separation will lead to the abandonment of all plans for a NATO nuclear force, the withdrawal of the United States power from Western Europe, and the eventual collapse of the Atlantic alliance. These goals are desired by the Soviets as steps along the way to their aim of world domination which has never been refuted or modified.

The Soviets' disarmament and foreign policies since World War II are a matter of history. There is no sub-

stantial evidence to indicate that the Soviet philosophy involved from 1945 to the present will not continue for the foreseeable future. The evidence is before the United States and cannot be forgotten. It must not be forgotten, for as George Santayana has said, "Those who do not remember the past are condemned to relive it."

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Allen, Robert and Scott, Paul. "Unannounced Test Halt Called by Kennedy." *The Shreveport Times*, 27 January 1963, p. 6:7.
2. "Back of Russia's Sudden 'Soft' Line." *U.S. News & World Report*, 2 September 1963, p. 25-28.
3. Bader, William B. "Nuclear Weapons Sharing and 'The German Problem.'" *Foreign Affairs*, July 1966, p. 693-700.
4. Baldwin, Hanson W. "A New Round Begins in the Battle of Sword vs. Shield." *The New York Times*, 27 November 1966, p. E3:2.
5. ————. "Soviet Antimissile System Spurs New U.S. Weapons." *The New York Times*, 5 February 1967, p. 1:2, 76:1.
6. Barghoorn, Frederick C. *The Soviet Image of the United States*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950.
7. Beaton, Leonard and Maddox, John. *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons*. New York: Praeger, 1963.
8. Beehhoefer, Bernhard G. *Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control*. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1961.
9. Bouscaren, Anthony T. *Soviet Foreign Policy: a Pattern of Persistence*. New York: Fordham University Press, 1962.
10. Brennan, Donald G., ed. *Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security*. New York: Braziller, 1961.
11. Brodie, Bernard, ed. *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946.
12. Brown, Harrison S. *Must Destruction Be Our Destiny?* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946.
13. Bullitt, William C. *The Great Globe Itself*. New York: Scribner, 1946.
14. Burck, Gilbert. "The Auspicious Rise of the Russian Consumer." *Fortune*, August 1966, p. 130-133, 168-174.
15. Byrnes, James F. *Speaking Frankly*. New York: Harper, 1947.
16. Dallin, Alexander. *The Soviet Union at the United Nations*. New York: Praeger, 1962.
17. Dallin, Alexander, et al. *The Soviet Union, Arms Control, and Disarmament*. New York: Praeger, 1964.
18. Dallin, David J. *Soviet Foreign Policy after Stalin*. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1961.
19. Etzioni, Amitai. "The Multilateral Force: Germany's Finger on the Atom." *The Nation*, 12 October 1964, p. 208-211.
20. "Europe's New Mood — Its Meaning for U.S." *U.S. News & World Report*, 20 June 1966, p. 39-41.
21. Finney, John. "Experimental Moratorium on Underground Tests?" *The New Republic*, 16 July 1966, p. 10-11.
22. Florinsky, Michael T. "Economic Policies after Khrushchev." *Current History*, October 1965, p. 223-226.
23. Frankel, Max. "Treaty to Bar Space War by Exclusion of Weapons Agreed Upon at the U.N." *The New York Times*, 9 December 1966, p. 1:6, 19:1.
24. Gareau, Frederick H. "Nuclear Deterrence: the Soviet Position." *Orbis*, Winter 1965, p. 922-936.

25. "German Generals and Nuclear Weapons." *War/Peace Report*, August 1964, p. 8-9.
26. Hahn, Walter F. "The Mainsprings of Soviet Secrecy." *Orbis*, Winter 1964, p. 719-747.
27. Halperin, Morton H. *Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control*. Cambridge: Harvard University. Center for International Affairs. East Asian Research Center, 1966, v. 1.
28. Halperin, Morton H. and Schelling, Thomas C. *Strategy and Arms Control*. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961.
29. Harrigan, Anthony. "Canada and the Soviets: the Future of North America." *Washington Report*, 12 September 1966, p. 1-4.
30. Henkin, Louis. *Arms Control: Issues for the Public*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1961.
31. Heymont, Irving. "The NATO Nuclear Bilateral Forces." *Orbis*, Winter 1966, p. 1025-1041.
32. Hosmer, Craig. "Nuclear 'Domino Theory' Spurs Disarmers." *Washington Report*, 12 July 1965, p. 1-4.
33. ————. "Problems of Proliferation." *Washington Report*, 4 January 1965, p. 1-4.
34. Hotz, Robert B. "A Vital Probe." *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 28 February 1966, p. 11.
35. "Is Russia Winning the Arms Race?" *U.S. News & World Report*, 6 February 1967, p. 34-37.
36. "The Johnson-Erhard Communique." *The Christian Century*, 5 January 1966, p. 5.
37. Johnson, Frank J. "Economics and World Revolution." *Washington Report*, 15 November 1965, p. 1-4.
38. Kintner, William R. "A Reappraisal of the Proposed Nonproliferation Treaty." *Orbis*, Spring 1966, p. 138-151.
39. Lall, B. G. "Perspectives on Inspection for Arms Control." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March 1965, p. 51-53.
40. Lowenthal, Richard. "The Soviets Change Their Foreign Policy." *The New York Times Magazine*, 4 April 1965, p. 30, 138.
41. Luard, Evan, ed. *First Steps to Disarmament*. New York: Basic Books, 1965.
42. Mackintosh, John M. *Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963.
43. "The Month in Review; Disarmament." *Current History*, April 1964, p. 245.
44. "The Month in Review; Disarmament." *Current History*, September 1964, p. 181.
45. "The Month in Review; Disarmament." *Current History*, October 1965, p. 247.
46. "The Month in Review; the U.S.S.R." *Current History*, June 1961, p. 376.
47. "The Month in Review; the U.S.S.R." *Current History*, November 1961, p. 318.
48. "The Month in Review; the U.S.S.R." *Current History*, April 1962, p. 253.
49. "The Month in Review; the U.S.S.R." *Current History*, May 1962, p. 317-318.
50. "The Month in Review; the U.S.S.R." *Current History*, October 1964, p. 250.
51. "The Month in Review; the U.S.S.R." *Current History*, December 1964, p. 374.
52. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. *North Atlantic Treaty Organization; the NATO Handbook*. Paris: 1960.
53. "Pentagon Discounts Reds' X-Ray Defense." *The Evening Bulletin* (Providence, R.I.), 30 January 1967, p. 7:5.
54. "Probing the Effects of a Nuclear Blast." *Business Week*, 14 May 1966, p. 77.
55. Reston, James. "Kosygin Says U.S. Policy Foments War and Forces Soviet Arms Budget Rise." *The New York Times*, 8 December 1965, p. 1:8, 20:1.
56. Richardson, James L. *Germany and the Atlantic Alliance*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966.
57. Roberts, Chalmers M. "Confining the Nuclear Genie." *The Evening Bulletin* (Providence R.I.), 5 December 1966, p. 34:3.
58. Rosenthal, A. M. "Soviet Demands U.N. Tally on Troops Occupying Allies." *The New York Times*, 30 August 1946, p. 1:6, 3:5.
59. Rubinstein, Alvin A., ed. *The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union*. New York: Random House, 1960.

60. Schlesinger, James R. "The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation." *The Reporter*, 20 October 1966, p. 36-38.
61. Schwartz, Harry. *The Soviet Economy since Stalin*. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1965.
62. "Senators Back LBJ on Missiles Bid." *The Evening Bulletin* (Providence, R.I.), 16 January 1967, p. 10:3.
63. Silard, John. "Nuclear Weapons: a Liability." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, September 1966, p. 15-20.
64. Singer, J. David, ed. *Weapons Management in World Politics*. Ann Arbor.: University of Michigan Press, 1963.
65. Smith, Frederick N. "The Soviet Dollar Shortage as a Factor in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy." *Washington Report*, 30 May 1966, p. 1-4.
66. Sonnenfeldt, Helmut. "The Chinese Factor in Soviet Disarmament Policy." *The China Quarterly*, April-June, 1966, p. 123-135.
67. Sosnovy, Timothy. "The New Soviet Plan: Guns Still before Butter." *Foreign Affairs*, July 1966, p. 620-632.
68. "Soviet Asks U.S. Clarify A-Pact Stand." *The Evening Bulletin* (Providence, R.I.), 9 November 1966, p. 48:1.
69. "Soviet Builds Rocket Defense." *The Evening Bulletin* (Providence, R.I.), 24 November 1966, p. 59:2.
70. "Soviets Hike Arms Budget; Blame U.S." *The Evening Bulletin* (Providence, R.I.), 16 December 1966, p. 1:4.
71. "Soviets May Have Ultimate ABM; Possibility of De-activating U.S. Missiles in Silos." *Missiles & Rockets*, 16 September 1963, p. 14-15.
72. "Soviet Missile Defense Seen." *The Evening Bulletin* (Providence, R.I.), 11 November 1966, p. 1:6.
73. "Soviet Missile Efforts Emphasize Concealment, Mobility, Anti-ICBM." *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 7 March 1966, p. 90.
74. "Soviet Union Foreign Relations." *Deadline Data on World Affairs*, 9 December 1960, p. 191.
75. "Space Pact — May Spark Halt in Nuclear Arms Spread." *The Evening Bulletin* (Providence, R.I.), 9 December 1966, p. 18:1.
76. Stevens, Francis B. "Russia's Game — U.S. Size-Up." *U.S. News & World Report*, 31 January 1966, p. 41.
77. Stewart, Charles T., Jr. "The Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons." *Military Review*. October 1964, p. 3-8.
78. Stone, Jeremy J. *Containing the Arms Race; Some Specific Proposals*. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966.
79. Strachey, John. *On the Prevention of War*. New York: St. Martin's, 1963.
80. Tanner, Henry. "NATO Will Set Up Atom-Plans Unit." *The New York Times*, 15 December 1966, p. 1:7, 8:4.
81. "$30 Billion vs. 70 Million U.S. Lives." *U.S. News & World Report*, 28 November 1966, p. 30-33.
82. "U.S. and Soviet Sign Pact for Peace in Space." *The Evening Bulletin* (Providence, R.I.), 27 January 1967, p. 3:1.
83. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1960.
84. ———. *Review of International Negotiations on the Cessation of Nuclear Weapon Tests, September 1962-September 1965*. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966.
85. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. *Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference*. Report of Senator Joseph S. Clark, May 1966. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966.
86. U.S. Dept. of State. *The International Control of Atomic Energy: Growth of a Policy*. Publication 2702. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1946.

87. "U.S. Says Soviet Has 40 Nuclear Subs." *The Evening Bulletin* (Providence, R.I.), 21 December 1966, p. 23:4.
88. "U.S. Welcomes 'Forward-Looking' German Note of March 25." *The Department of State Bulletin*, 25 April 1966, p. 656.
89. Wilson, George C. "Joint Chiefs Fear Soviet Technical Coup." *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 28 February 1966, p. 16.
90. Wright, Arthur W. "The Soviet Economy." *Current History*, October 1966, p. 218-225, 240-241.
91. Yoder, Amos. "Obstacles to Soviet Economic Growth." *Orbis*, Winter 1966, p. 1018-1024.

Ψ

When the animals had gathered, the lion looked at the eagle and said gravely, "We must abolish talons." The tiger looked at the elephant and said, "We must abolish tusks." The elephant looked back at the tiger and said, "We must abolish claws and jaws." Thus each animal in turn proposed the abolition of the weapons he did not have, until at last the bear rose up and said in tones of sweet reasonableness: "Comrades, let us abolish everything — everything but the great universal embrace."

Attributed to Winston Churchill, 1874-1965

Adm. E. P. Holmes, U.S. Navy, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, commends Comdr. Edward R. Ettner, U.S. Navy, assigned to SACLANT staff, for his graduation from the Naval War College Correspondence Course of Naval Warfare.

CORRESPONDENCE COURSES IN PERSPECTIVE

Naval War College Diplomas Awarded

In separate ceremonies Lt. Comdr. Paul W. Garber, U.S. Naval Reserve, and Comdr. Edward R. Ettner, U.S. Navy, received Naval War College Diplomas in August 1967. Lieutenant Commander Garber is a graduate of the Correspondence Course of Naval Command and Staff and Commander Ettner completed the Correspondence Course of Naval Warfare. Vice Adm. John T. Hayward, President, Naval War College, made the award to Lieutenant Commander Garber, and Vice Adm. Ephraim P. Holmes, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, presented the diploma to Commander Ettner.

Commander Ettner becomes the third officer to complete the Correspondence Course of Naval Warfare and only the second regular officer. Preceding him were Comdr. Michael Travalio, U.S. Naval Reserve, and Comdr. Keith H. Robertson, U.S. Navy. His diploma represents some 1,700 hours of individual study over a period of 17 years during which he completed eight correspondence courses, all requiring lengthy, essay-type solutions. His accomplishment closely parallels the courses of study offered to resident students in both the School of Naval Command and Staff and School of Naval Warfare.

In a letter to Admiral Holmes, Admiral Hayward stated:

> I can hardly overemphasize the significance of Commander Ettner's achievement. . . . As you are aware, there is an increasingly critical requirement of the naval service to improve and expand the graduate-level education of the officer corps. The ideal solution to this requirement would be to enroll every promising naval officer in a resident course at one of the senior service schools; however, it is also obvious that because of the great operational commitments of the Navy, this ideal simply cannot be realized at this time. But correspondent study with the Naval War College is a most effective alternative to resident enrollment. The several courses closely parallel the studies offered in residence, and I am convinced that they are a most valuable substitute for resident study.

Lieutenant Commander Garber is the 45th officer and the 11th Naval Reserve officer to complete the Correspondence Course of Naval Command and Staff. His diploma reflects the completion of lengthy, postgraduate courses in National and International Security Organization, Military Planning, Naval Operations, and Command Logistics. These courses closely parallel the 10-month resident course in Naval Command and Staff, and their completion indicates the attainment of an advanced professional education, which includes a significant amount of disciplined reading, research, and writing.

In a letter to Lieutenant Commander Garber, Admiral Hayward said, "Your initiative and diligence in completing these courses are highly commendatory and worthy of special recognition. . . . The added knowledge and experience which these correspondence courses have offered you will greatly assist you in meeting the increasing challenges and responsibilities we face today."

Commander Ettner attended the University of Wisconsin, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, and the Armed Forces Staff College. He does not have an undergraduate degree. Presently he is assigned as Submarine Nuclear Plans Officer on the staff of Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic.

Lieutenant Commander Garber holds an A.B. and LL.B. from Harvard. He is a partner in the law firm of Garber and Garber in Boston, Mass., and is Administrative Assistant to Commanding Officer, Naval Reserve Naval Control of Shipping Organization, Division 1-1.

Vice Adm. John T. Hayward, U.S. Navy, President, Naval War College, congratulates Lt. Comdr. Paul W. Garber, U.S. Naval Reserve, for his completion of the Naval War College Correspondence Course of Naval Command and Staff.

GENERAL VO-nguyen-GIAP

Insurgent Theorist or Leader of a People?

A thesis prepared by
Commander Arthur D. Jackson, Supply Corps, U.S. Navy
School of Naval Command and Staff
Class of 1967

INTRODUCTION

In his well-known essay "On Contradiction," Mao Tse-tung uses the words of another famous Chinese leader to stress a point which he considers to be vitally important in waging successful military campaigns. Quoting from Sun Tzu, Mao says: "Know your enemy and know yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster."[1] Successful military men down through the ages have similarly stressed the importance of intelligence of the enemy as essential to success in warfare.

Conversely, one could deduce, denial of intelligence concerning one's own forces, personnel, and intentions would deprive one's enemy of an important asset and, thus, would enhance the probabilities of one's own forces succeeding in combat.

Anyone who has objectively considered the successes of the Viet-Minh in their campaign against the French from 1946 to 1954 and who has followed the current insurgency in South Vietnam becomes immediately cognizant of the degree to which both the Viet-Minh and the Viet Cong have employed the weapons of secrecy and stealth in the conduct of warfare. While the employment of these tactics is not in itself startling, the successes realized are indicative of a discipline and organization that are seldom matched in the world's history and that constitute a factor that forces of the free world must honestly admit and prepare to combat on a knowledgeable basis if such combat is to be successful.

In attempting a determination of the causes of this organization and discipline, one is immediately at error in seeking to credit total responsibility to a single concept or individual. Such phenomena seldom occur in such sanitized fashion in the "real world." Nevertheless, total assessments are logically made by analyzing and evaluating the separate elements of a total environment before venturing an overall determination. This paper will endeavor to assess and evaluate one person closely associated with the Vietnamese insurgent movements.

One of the key factors in the successes of the Viet-Minh and, undoubtedly, one of the important guiding forces in the current conflict in Vietnam is General Vo Nguyen Giap. General Giap was not the only factor which made the Viet-Minh resistance to the French effective and successful. He is not the most important man in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam today, any more than he is the total guiding force for the Viet Cong. His contributions to all of these organizations are immediately suspected of being very significant, however, when one considers that it was Giap who assembled, led, and trained the first organized Viet-Minh armed force; who is acknowledged as the founder of the Vietnamese People's Army; whose victory over the French at Dienbienphu climaxed the first defeat of white armed forces by nonwhite armies in a war; and who is currently Commander in Chief of the Vietnamese People's Army, Minister of National Defense and Deputy Premier of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and a member of the Central Committee of the *Dang Lao Dong* (Vietnam Workers' Party).

One is immediately impressed with the mystery surrounding General Giap. Little of a factual nature is known about him in the Western World. Even statistical data concerning General Giap are in conflict among "authoritative" sources. It would seem that his personal life is a model for the secrecy and security which have been so successfully employed by the movement with which he is associated.

The purpose of this paper, then, is to consider General Vo Nguyen Giap as a man, a leader, a military strategist and tactician, and a politician and to draw conclusions regarding his contributions to the art of guerrilla warfare and, particularly, regarding his role in the past two decades of Vietnamese history. From these conclusions, a prognistication of the future role of this man in the world scene will be made.

I — GIAP, THE MAN

Biographical Sketch. Vo Nguyen Giap was born in 1912 in the village of An Xa, Quang Binh Province, in the part of Indochina called Annam by the French. This general area, consisting of the central part of the Vietnamese land, (North and South), also lays claim to being the birthplace of Ho Chi Minh. Giap has been described as born of peasant stock[1] and as being the son of a scholar who was himself a revolutionary.[2]

In any event, it seems certain that Giap attended high school at the Lycee Quoc-Hoc in Hue and that while there he became active in the *Tan Viet Menh Dang* (Revolutionary Party for a Great Vietnam) at about the age of 14. Professor Bernard B. Fall's description of the Lycee Quoc-Hoc is very graphic and enlightening:

> That school had been created at the initiative of Ngo Dinh Kha, a high official of the Hue imperial court and father of South Vietnam's Ngo Dinh Diem, for the express purpose of perpetuating in Vietnam a type of education that, providing the young Vietnamese elite with Western knowledge, would be untainted by French views. . . . a list of the students who graduated from it or were dismissed from it over the past forty years reads like a "Who's Who in Vietnamese Revolution" on both sides of the 17th parallel; to name a few: Ho Chi Minh, Vo Nguyen Giap, Pham Van Dong and Ngo Dinh Diem.[3]

Thus, it seems apparent that Giap was exposed to strong nationalistic concepts early in life. He first attracted the attention of the French colonial *surete* in 1930 when he lead anti-French student demonstrations in Hue to protest French brutality in suppressing a starving peasants' march on the French administrative center of Nghe-An. For this escapade Giap was sentenced to 3 years in jail but was released on good behavior after serving only a few months.

Whatever the reason or incentive, Giap seems to have embarked at this point on a concentrated effort of self-improvement and education. He is described as "finishing school at Hue with high marks in the *baccalaureat*"[4] and as "a brilliant and precocious student who fought his way through school with energy and brilliance, topping every class."[5]

Following high school and a year of precollege studies at Hanoi's Lycee Albert Sarraut, Giap attended the University of Hanoi. About the only thing that is certain of his accomplishments at this institute of higher learning is that he was awarded his *licence en droit* (license to practice law) in 1937. He took a position that year as a teacher of history at Thang Long High School in Hanoi. Among other scholastic credits attributed to him by various sources are a Doctorate in Political Economy[6], a Doctorate in Law[7], and a Doctorate of Philosophy in History.[8] Hoang Van Chi, states flatly that Giap did not achieve a Doctorate of Law.[9]

Giap probably became a member of the Communist Party early in 1937 at the time when the French Communist Party sent a special representative to help organize the Indochinese Communist Party. After he married the daughter of Professor Dang Thai Mai, with whom he had lived while an undergraduate student in Hanoi, she too

soon embraced the Communist ideology and became an ardent and active member of the party.[10]

When the Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939 was signed and the Nazis attacked Poland, the French Government was motivated to outlaw the Communit Party in France and in her colonies. She followed this action with scores of arrests of known members of the party. Giap, along with many other Vietnamese Communists, fled the major cities for refuge in the country or in China. Giap's wife, however, was arrested, along with her sister, and was sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor for life. She died in a French prison in 1943.[11]

From this point, even less information of a specific nature is known regarding Giap's whereabouts and activities than was known during the first 27 years of his life. His first meeting with Ho Chi Minh probably took place at a May 1941 gathering of the Indochinese Communist Party at Ching-hsi in Kwangsi Province.[12] It was at this meeting of the Indochinese Communist Party that the *Vietnam Doc Lap Dong Minh* (Viet-Minh), the *League for Independence for Vietnam*, was formed[13] and here that Giap was probably assigned responsibility for organizing a Communist military force inside Vietnam.[14]

Between May 1941 and December 1944 Giap concentrated on learning the art and methods of warfare and in organizing the first unit of the Viet-Minh armed forces. Where he undertook his studies is the subject of diverse speculation. It has been said that he gained his knowledge from studying historical accounts of the battles and techniques of the world's greatest military leaders.[15] Others claim that he owed a great deal of the credit for his successes to his study of the works of Mao Tse-tung.[16] It is also maintained that Ho Chi Minh had arranged for selected individuals to go to Yenan to work with Mao's Communists prior to the May 1941 meeting and that Giap, having been designated along with Truong Chinh, went there for his training immediately after the meeting closed.[17] Hoang Van Chi claims that Giap never went to Yenan but received his only formal military training from American Army officers at a military training course conducted in Tsin-tsi.[18]

In any event, by the middle of December 1944 Giap had recruited, organized, and trained the first regular unit of the Viet-Minh forces — a 31-man platoon. The date when this unit started on its first action against a French outpost — 22 December 1944 — is still celebrated in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as the official birthday of the Vietnam People's Army. By August 1945, when the Japanese capitulated, this force had grown to an army of some 10,000 men, which marched into Hanoi early in September to proclaim the independence of Vietnam.[19] That same army, now matured in size and professionalism by more than two decades of combat experience, has been continuously, and still is, led by Vo Nguyen Giap.

Character. Giap has been acknowledged to be an extremely intelligent individual, on the basis of his performance in all the schools he attended. Although his principal formal scholastic accomplishment seems to have been the acquisition of a license to practice law in colonial French Indochina, it is firmly established that he had a great interest in the world's history and that he surely pursued this interest, in addition to his studies in law, while at the University of Hanoi.[20] Considering his exposure to Vietnamese traditionalism at the Lycee Quoc-Hoc, his studies of the centuries of Vietnamese struggle

and sacrifice for freedom and independence, and his firsthand observance of French domination, it is not surprising that this energetic young man developed strong nationalistic sentiments early in his life.

His studies of Vietnamese history most certainly brought to Giap's attention the traditional foe of the Vietnamese people — the Chinese. Giap has not permitted this fact to escape his memory; although his armed forces have welcomed training and material support from the Chinese People's Republic, Giap is known to be a leader in the faction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam hierarchy which favors closer alignment with Soviet Russia in the world Communist movement and an arm's-length relationship with China.[21]

It is unclear as to why Giap chose to become a member of the Communist Party in preference to any of the many other nationalistic organizations that abounded in Vietnam during most of the period of French domination. Certainly he was a nationalistic before he became a Communist. It is not unrealistic to surmise, however, that his powers of analysis and deduction saw in the Communist order the organization, strength, and promise of outside assistance that would be necessary to rid his country of the French presence as rulers. None of the other struggle groups in Vietnam had much hope of outside assistance. Most of the non-Communist world either was friendly to France, and thus unwilling to offend Paris by rendering aid to an insurgent movement in one of its colonies, or was likely to seize any appropriate opportunity to displace France as the ruler of Vietnam.

One of Giap's greatest attributes as a man and leader seems to be his willingness to learn from any source or from any event. One might deduce that he learned a great deal from his arrest by the French. He was arrested only once, so naturally his activities did not cease. They went in a different direction. Much as he may have studied the art of warfare, grave and costly errors were committed under his orders in the early years of fighting against the French. He admits to such errors and goes on to say that in each case lessons were learned which served the future.[22] History has recorded the accuracy of this contention.

In addition to being a man of great intelligence, Giap has been described in varying terms as "a sentimental and passionate man,"[23] and "a man filled with hate . . . [with] . . . a native impulsiveness . . . ."[24] Jules Roy, who has met and talked with Giap, describes him in this manner: "That broad face consumed by intelligence, that high, powerful brow framed in a stiff, black mane, were stamped with determination. Irony, kindness, cunning and indomitable strength were revealed in it one after the other."[25] Giap is quoted by many sources as having said: "Every minute, hundreds of thousands of men die all over the world. The life or death of a hundred, a thousand, tens of thousands of men, even if they are fellow countrymen, really amounts to very little." Mr. Roy reports that he asked General Giap if he had made such a statement and goes on to say: "He denied it indignantly when I asked him. Yet that cruel remark is not out of place in his mouth."[26]

Thus, one draws a general picture of Giap as an intense, sensitive, and passionate man of great intelligence and deep, strong loyalties. His passion and hate have at times caused undesirable consequences, while at other times his mental acuity, objectivity, and tact have been admired by critical observers.[27]

Whatever his weaknesses and faults, Giap's energies and full devotion have

consistently been directed along a single path — that of a Vietnam free of foreign domination. His methods have often been costly but to date have been very successful in the face of almost overwhelming odds. In the light of proven ability and unfailing devotion to the country and people he serves, it is small wonder that General Giap is practically a national hero in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

II — GIAP, THE MILITARY LEADER

General. The techniques and methodology that enabled the forces led by General Vo Nguyen Giap to defeat the modern, well-equipped army of a richer and more powerful nation have been studied and restudied. Respected analysts have termed Giap one of the world's outstanding theoreticians of revolutionary warfare. Others claim that he simply followed the guidelines set down by Mao Tse-tung and one of his compatriots, Truong Chinh.

It may well be, however, that these efforts at affixing labels simply serve to confuse and confound, or restrict the objectivity of otherwise noble attempts at understanding the enigma posed by Giap and other successful revolutionary leaders of his ilk. Quite truthfully, anyone who succeeds for the first time in a new and specific venture might be classified as an innovator. But equally probable is the fact that the same techniques tried at a different time, under conditions of a different environment, and with different personalities involved might not be successful.

Giap comments frequently upon a fact which becomes very obvious as one examines the general conduct of the Viet-Minh activities: the people are involved in all aspects of the movement — the army, the paramilitary, the logistics, the politics. This was not a campaign in which a military force simply conducted military operations and defeated the enemy on the field of battle. In examining the army, one is immediately involved in considerations of active civilian support and assistance. In examining the activities and attitudes of the populace, one becomes equally involved in complex considerations of the relationships between the army and the people. In Giap's words:

> How could the Vietnamese nation have defeated an imperial power such as France which was backed by the U.S.? They try to explain this extraordinary fact by the correctness of strategy and tactics, by the forms of combat and the heroism of the Vietnam People's Army. Of course all these factors contributed to the happy outcome of the resistance. But if the question is put: "Why were the Vietnamese people able to win?" the most precise and complete answer must be: "The Vietnamese people won because their war of liberation was a people's war."[1]

The basic truth in these words has, after many years, been finally realized by the United States in the long course of its efforts to conduct successful counterinsurgency operations in South Vietnam. Efforts to build a powerful army, factories, bridges, and roads for the Government of South Vietnam and its privileged few were on the brink of total failure in mid-1965. The essential aspect that Giap grasped was that strategy and tactics and an efficient army of themselves could not win a war such as had to be fought in Vietnam. The essential element is that the great majority of the people must support, or be in sympathy with, such a movement.

With the People. It appears that three basic truths were recognized by Giap as he embarked upon the task of organizing the Vietnamese people to combat the French. The first and most

important, of course, has already been cited: if the resistance was to succeed, it would have to have the support of the mass of the people. Further, he realized that the mass of the Vietnamese people were peasants — mostly uneducated and certainly unsophisticated. Thus, it was necessary to put forth the aims of the revolutionary movement and the ways in which the masses would benefit from its success in plain, unsophisticated terminology that would be clearly understood.

Giap's experience as a high school history teacher must have been of great benefit to the effort. His explanations of the factors and conditions which led to the wars fought by his people are simple and straightforward. His statements concerning the elements required for success and the ways by which these conditions were achieved are models of plain-words statements in which the essential points are repeated over and over. Anyone familiar, in even limited degree, with the Vietnamese people and language, quickly perceives solid evidence as to why Giap succeeded in becoming an effective leader of these people. In *People's War, People's Army*, he says: "It was . . . not enough to have objectives entirely in conformity with the fundamental aspirations of the people. It was also necessary to bring everything into play to enlighten the masses of the people, educate and encourage them in fighting for national salvation."[2] He also explains:

> We waged a people's war, and that in the framework of a long since colonized country. Therefore the national factor was of first importance. We had to rally all the forces likely to overthrow the imperialists and their lackeys. On the other hand, this war proceeded in a backward agricultural country where the peasants, making up the great majority of the population, constituted the essential force of the revolution and of the Resistance War. Consequently the relation between the national question and the peasant question had to be closely defined. . . .[3]

Appendix I, "A Message from General Vo Nguyen Giap to the Troops at Dienbienphu," provides concrete evidence that the man understood the nature of the people that he was organizing and leading and possessed the patience and ability to communicate with them.

To maintain, however, that all of the people were "educated" or converted to the ideas of the revolutionary movement would be erroneous. Many groups, such as those placed in positions of prestige and wealth by the French, those of power and affluence by tradition, and, in general, the Catholics, were not sympathetic to the Viet-Minh cause and did not particularly favor any change. Thus, additional measures were obviously required and were employed. Applying the usual

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Commander Arthur D. Jackson, Supply Corps, U.S. Navy, was graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy with a B.S. in Naval Science and holds an M.S. in Industrial Management from Purdue University.

Commander Jackson has served aboard U.S.S. *Talladega* (APA 208) and U.S.S. *C.T. O'Brien* (DE 421); he has been assigned to the Navy Finance Center at Cleveland; to the Naval Supply Depot and the Ship Repair Facility at Yokosuka; he was Director of the Data Processing Department at Naval Supply Center, Oakland; and he served as Senior Naval Supply Advisor to the Naval Advisory Group, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

A graduate of the U.S. Naval War College School of Naval Command and Staff, Class of 1967, Commander Jackson is presently assigned to Naval Supply Systems Command Headquarters, Navy Department, Washington.

singleness of purpose and determination to overcome all obstacles, the various elements were dealt with by what was considered to be appropriate means: those which could be united were united; those which could be neutralized were neutralized; those which could be divided were divided; and those which actively opposed were eliminated.

One of the major successes of the Viet-Minh, however, was in uniting the vast majority of the people to their cause. Included in this effort were the minority tribes which provided whole army units under their own generals. Bernard Fall acknowledges this success:

> It must be considered one of the Viet-Minh's signal achievements that it succeeded in at least partly winning over the mountain tribes of Vietnam; without the successful wooing of these tribes, Ho and his staff would sooner or later have been betrayed to the French. A Tho tribal chieftain, Chu Van Tan, quickly rose to the rank of major-general in the VPA; and one of the elite divisions, the 316th, was largely recruited from mountain tribesmen which explains its efficiency in highland operations.[4]

As has been demonstrated on numerous occasions, this accomplishment is one that neither the regime of the French nor that of the South Vietnamese has ever solidly realized. The differing attitudes toward the minorities is exemplified by the fact that anyone of Chinese extraction living in South Vietnam was, until early 1966, prohibited from serving in the armed forces of that nation.[5] Such attitudes are certain to affect the support and strength that any government received from those elements of the population. Obviously, Giap's method is the preferred one.

Since the paramilitary functions which were organized are so closely affiliated with the People's Army, they will be discussed in the next section of this chapter. At this point Jules Roy's account of the war as seen from the French side is sufficient evidence of the effectiveness of the organization of the people and the coordination of their activities: "The war killed just as blindly on a cafe terrace as on the embankment of a rice field; apparently inoffensive villages concealed citadels; a child leading buffaloes out to pasture was a spy; toothless old women laid mines; laborers assassinated important people."[6]

The Vietnam People's Army. Giap follows his standard method of repetition of a few basic and simple elements in his accounts and descriptions of the People's Army. These elements, which, in Giap's opinion, have made it an effective force in Vietnam might be summarized as follows: (1) the army is a national army composed of all elements of the people; (2) the army is the people's army, concerned first and always with protection of the interests of the Vietnamese masses from which its strength is drawn, rather than with the interests of a privileged minority; (3) the army is under the leadership of the party; (4) strict discipline within the ranks of the army has always been practiced; and (5) political indoctrination and training have always been among the most important elements of army training.

It is evident that Giap not only believed in the words he had written but that he saw to it that they were practiced in fact. Evidence has been cited to the effect that he succeeded in bringing units of the minority tribes, as well as Vietnamese, into the People's Army and that their leaders as civilians rose in the national army as national military leaders. Similarly, other units were made up largely of recruits from the large cities, and there were units from the various provinces. There is

substantial authority in support of Giap's contention that the Viet-Minh Army, the VPA, was, in fact, a national army which attracted all elements of the Vietnamese people.

Again and again in his writings, Giap has stressed three points: the importanee of the masses of the people to the achievement of an independent Vietnam; the importance of continuous coneern for the people; and the importance of the people's understanding the "why" of the Viet-Minh movement. The disciplines of the army had, as a central and important feature, provisions for proper relations with the people. Article 9 of the 10-article Oath of Honour, to which every member of the VPA was obligated to swear, requires the fighting man "In contacts with the people, to follow these three recommendations: to respect the people, to help the people, to defend the people . . . in order to win their confidence and affection and achieve a perfect understanding between the people and the army."[7]

This aspect of army discipline was carried even further in the form of a 12-point code of specific regulations which the Viet-Minh soldier was to observe at all times. Included in this code of conduct were such requirements as: to pay for anything received from a citizen; never illegally to deprive a citizen of anything which belonged to him; never to cause damage to rice fields and other crops; never to enter a citizen's house unless invited; and to he always kind, courteous, and considerate to women. Giap points out: "Right from its inception, the question of single-mindedness between the army and the people has been laid down clearly in the ten-point code of honour and 12-point code of discipline in its relations with the people."[8] Ellen Hammer puts it this way: "More representative of the peasant populatiou than the Lao Dong party, which constitutes an official class, is the People's Army. As is characteristic of Asian communism, this army has been trained to identify its interests with those of the peasant masses."[9]

The army is, and was, unquestionably under the leadership and control of the Party and responsive to directions issuing from the Central Committee. General Giap is, after all, not only Commander in Chief of the People's Army, but also a dedicated Communist, a member of that Central Committee from which policy and direction issue, and a deputy premier of the Demoeratie Republie of Vietnam. Decisions of military strategy, as well as major tactical decisions, are always formed in the Central Committee. For example, when the French paratroops descended upon Dienbienphu in late 1953 and occupied that now-famous administrative center, located at that time in the heart of Viet-Minh "liberated" areas, Giap and his military aides made the determination to attack the French forces there and destroy them. However, this decision was of such major proportions in terms of commitment of Viet-Minh strength and resources that once the plan for preparation and attack was drawn up, it was presented in minute detail to the Central Committee for final approval. Ho Chi Minh himself was present for these proceedings.[10]

Every account of discipline in the VPA attests to its strictness. One sees in this discipline a reflection of the personal discipline which Giap has apparently applied to his personal conduct — that of total concentration on the task decided upon and removal of any element which would tend to detract or divert attention from the accomplishment of the objective. Giap writes:

> As an armed collective unit whose task is fighting and to insure single-

> mindedness and united action for its own preservation and destruction of the enemy, our army cannot abstain from having centralization to a high degree and strict discipline. Therefore, right from its inception, absolute obedience to orders and strict observance of discipline were written down clearly in the ten pledges of honour.[11]

The ninth point in these 10 pledges has previously been mentioned. In the other nine the Viet-Minh soldier swore to sacrifice everything for the good of the cause, to obey his officers completely, to fight resolutely and without complaint, to train diligently, never to reveal secrets, to bear torture if captured, never to reveal information to the enemy, to take good care of his equipment, and to maintain high morale.[12]

Clearly, the simple administration of an oath such as this would not guarantee an army of high discipline, but here again Giap's methods are highlighted. While violators of the code were often very harshly punished, his preference for methods of education, training, and indoctrination are evident.[13] In *People's War, People's Army* he comments that in the early days of building the army, many officers were tainted with the militaristic manner and habits of previous armies and placed excessive reliance on blind obedience and punishment as the tools of managing an army. While readily supporting obedience and punishment as essential elements in the task of such an undertaking, he indicates that greater effort had to be directed toward education and persuasion.[14]

This education and persuasion had, of necessity for Giap, a very political tone. In the classic Communist mode, he comments: "The internal democracy and iron discipline of our party are the basis for democratic centralism and for the strict discipline of the army."[15] While Giap was clearly aware of the importance of purely military training, fully half of the Viet-Minh soldier's training time was devoted to a program of continuous and rigorous political indoctrination. Not content simply to enlist men and women to fight, the party in this daily political training went to great lengths to explain why the French were the hated enemy, why those who collaborated with the French were traitors to their people, why the Popular Front objectives of independence and democracy were in the personal interests of all faithful citizens of Vietnam, and how the contribution of each man and woman should relate to these objectives. All of these things won people to the Viet-Minh cause because, for the first time, the peasant saw himself as a part of something more than a life of inescapable poverty and servitude. He was made to understand "why" and was told that he was important. In the process, he was made aware of the need for absolute devotion to the cause and of the need for a conscious self-discipline.

Thus taken in hand by intelligent masters, the armed peasant became a fanatic, an apostle of a new religion. To insure that the faith was kept, the organized units were staffed with political commissars whose job it was to insure the continued political enlightenment. Presidential Decree No. 32/SL of 4 March 1950, which instituted "Front Command Committees With Political Preponderance," declared in effect that the Front Command Committee of the Victnam People's Army was composed of a political commissar, a military commander, and a deputy military commander; and, in case of divergent views among the Committee, the political commissar shall have the power of final decision.[16] Such are the circumstances indicating the importance placed by the Commander in

Chief on political aspects of military life.

It was a concept indispensable to the effort against the French. In order for there to be unity of purpose, it was necessary to establish a common denominator for the people and the army. In order for the people and the army to work toward one goal, it was essential that the goal be identical and mutually understood. The army could not have purely military objectives while the people concentrated upon political objectives. It was necessary to consolidate the mass of available energy in harmonious relationship. It was necessary that the army understand the political objectives — that military action serve always to further the political objectives. Similarly, the people could not leave all military action to the army but must understand that the army's interests were the people's interests — that the army's objectives were the political objectives which were the *raison d'etre* for the insurgency. Thus, through the political common denominator, unity of purpose was achieved.

In support of the mobile regular army units, various paramilitary forces were organized. At the basic village level these forces were organized by the village political committees and consisted of two groups: the *Dan Cong*, which included nearly everyone, and the *Du Kich*, a small, part-time combat group of men between the ages of 18 and 45. The *Dan Cong* were essentially a labor force with some small degree of informal military training. Though they occasionally performed sabotage, their principal responsibility was to collect intelligence, serve as guards, make road repairs, build bases, fortify the villages and — very important — serve the regular forces as porters. The *Du Kich* had more extensive military training and were supplied with arms. They undertook guerrilla actions on a small scale and were the basic source of replacement and augmenting manpower for regional units and the regular army.

At the district or provincial level were still larger and better armed units known as regional troops. For the most part, the largest unit was of battalion size, the chief function of these forces being the protection of an area and its population. These troops met the French clearing operations, launched small attacks, and generally harassed the enemy.

At the top of this military organizational pyramid was the People's Army. Each stratum in the pyramid, as noted, had specific responsibilities in Giap's total combat plan, but because the People's Army units were the mobile forces, they were dependent for total support on the *Dan Cong*, *Du Kich*, and the regional troops. Without the proper coordination, full support, and common sentiment of all of these components, it would have been difficult to have envisioned an effective VPA. That these forces were, and are, an effective combatant structure is established in thousands of accounts of the Viet-Minh campaign against the French, and it is being attested to today by American opponents of VPA units now fighting in South Vietnam. General Vo Nguyen Giap was equal to the organizational, administrative, and training requirements which faced him as he developed the Vietnamese revolutionary military organ.

Strategies and Tactics. The strategies and tactics of General Giap during the Indochinese War were not substantially different in concept from those expounded by Mao Tse-tung in such of his works as *On Protracted Conflict*, *Strategic Problems in the Anti-Japanese War*, and *Our Mission in View of Present Circumstances*. They

have in common the elements which seem logically essential for an inferior armed force attempting to defeat a ruling organization with greatly superior military resources.

First, of course, the strategy had to be one of protracted conflict, where the objective was simply to destroy enemy personnel rather than to attempt to occupy territory. As the enemy forces were being thus reduced, the revolutionary forces were engaging in political activity to win the support of the populace, enlarging the forces of insurgency, and equipping them with captured or donated equipment. The importance of a sanctuary was appreciated and utilized to great advantage during the building-of-forces phase.

In the classic mode, the war was to be fought in three stages: a stage of contention (strategic defensive for Viet-Minh forces); a stage of equilibrium, where relative strengths were nearly equal; and a stage of the general counteroffensive (strategic offensive for Viet-Minh forces).[17]

During the stage of contention, combat was to be exclusively small unit, fast strike, fast retreat, striking only where success was certain, i.e., destroying more enemy personnel than would be lost to insurgent forces. Political activity was emphasized during this phase and, as Viet-Minh units grew in strength, training, and experience, guerrilla-type strikes would be supplemented by larger unit operations. General Giap writes:

> . . . this guerrilla war developed progressively into a form of mobile war that daily increased in scale. While retaining certain characteristics of guerrilla war, it involved regular campaigns with greater attacks on fortified positions. Starting from small operations with the strength of a platoon or a company to annihilate a few men or a group of enemy soldiers, our army went over, later, to more important combats with a battalion or regiment to cut one or several enemy companies to pieces, finally coming to greater campaigns bringing into play many regiments, then many divisions. . . .[18]

The tactics are clearly indicated. First, attack only when revolutionary forces have clearly established tactical superiority, the sole military objective being to destroy enemy manpower and not to hold or occupy land. Giap makes the point very clear:

> Concentration of troops to realize an overwhelming superiority over the enemy where he is sufficiently exposed in order to destroy his manpower; initiative, suppleness, rapidity, surprise, suddenness in attack and retreat. As long as the strategic balance of forces remains disadvantageous, resolutely to muster troops to obtain absolute superiority in combat in a given place, and at a given time. To exhaust little by little by small victories the enemy forces and at the same time to maintain and increase ours. In these concrete conditions it proves absolutely necessary not to lose sight of the main objective of the fighting that is the destruction of the enemy manpower.[19]

More than this, four important prerequisites were stressed for embarking on any attack: the proper choice of time, a careful plan, adequate preparation including intelligence collection and analysis, and a high combative spirit among the participants.

It would be an overestimation of General Giap's abilities to believe that mistakes were not made, that every attack launched by Viet-Minh forces succeeded in achieving the objectives put forth. Mistakes were made — mistakes in which Giap personally directed the proceedings. Such an affair was Vinh Yen where, in January 1951, Giap, apparently believing that the time for the general counteroffensive had come and believing his forces to be ready for large-scale combat with French forces, attacked in multidivision

force on the open plains of the Red River Delta.

In this attack, which was to begin the march to Hanoi and the end of the war, initial Viet-Minh thrusts proceeded according to expectations; but, as the battle proceeded, with French defenders losing position after position, Marshal de Lattre de Tassigny assumed personal command and, mustering all aircraft capable of dumping bomb canisters, covered the Viet-Minh positions with napalm in two attacks. The battle cost the Viet-Minh some 6,000 dead and 500 men lost as prisoners.[20] In spite of this experience, General Giap was to try two more times to breach the French defense lines protecting the heart of the Delta, once at Mao Khe, in March 1951, and again in a combined assault on the Day River barrier at Phu Ly and Ninh Binh in June of the same year. It was estimated that Viet-Minh forces suffered losses of 10 killed for every defender lost.[21]

It was apparent that the objectives of the revolutionary movement had not been served and that unacceptable losses of manpower had been suffered. These errors were admitted by General Giap, but at the same time he learned lessons in the art of open-field and river-marsh warfare that were not forgotten for the rest of the war and which were immediately incorporated into required study for other Viet-Minh officers.

Thus it was that Giap developed his own methods of revolutionary warfare in Vietnam. It was not that the basic concepts he applied were any different from those that had been used and recorded by practitioners of warfare for centuries before; principles such as causing the enemy to disperse his forces in order to attack the divided strength were long ago practiced by Napoleon as well as other victorious generals. Giap's philosophy, "Is the enemy strong? One avoids him. Is he weak? One attacks." [22] can be considered a paraphrase of Mao's "Fight when you can win, run away when you cannot." [23] This tactic, in turn, may be said to have been applied at least as long ago as the 19th century when the American Indians were destroying settler outposts and wagon trains on the frontiers of the United States.

What Giap did was to successfully adapt the general principles which he absorbed from his studies of the world's masters of the art of warfare to the environment of Vietnam, developing techniques which provided optimum advantage to the Viet-Minh forces from existing terrain, political conditions, enemy weaknesses, and Vietnamese strengths.

In the urban areas, terrorist activities to undermine faith in the ability of the colonial government were applied. In Vietnam, these operations were particularly effective because the latent sympathies of a large part of the population had been motivated toward the cause of the terrorists, and these Viet-Minh operatives were provided with shelter and intelligence.

In the marshy and waterlogged rice flatlands a form of warfare was developed which may be considered the specialty of the Viet-Minh although the centuries-old practice of ambush was its essential element. The flat tops of the rice-paddy dikes, essentially the only means of vehicular traffic across these areas, generally limit such traffic to one-way transit. Noting the route of advance chosen by a motorized column and determining the dikes which would most probably be crossed, the Viet-Minh surreptitiously mined, booby-trapped, and placed bamboo spikes alongside the chosen routes. Then, concealing snipers who could place effective fire on the dikes, they would

ambush the column as it traveled the route. The usual immediate reaction of the well-trained French soldiers, upon receiving fire while mounted in vehicles, was to dismount from the vehicles, return the fire, and seek to maneuver. Upon dismounting, they immediately found themselves in a mined and boobytrapped area or impaled upon the sharpened bamboo stakes. The Viet-Minh snipers would continue to inflict casualties upon the column until the French were able to maneuver to advantageous position at which point the snipers refused further combat and melted into the countryside. This type of combat inflicted serious casualties on the Government forces while the Viet-Minh suffered relatively minor losses.

The Viet-Minh carried their war of attrition tactics into the hills and jungles of Vietnam where the movements of French units were restricted to trails through tall elephant grass or dense tropical vegetation. In these areas, where air reconnaissance is virtually ineffective, the Viet-Minh laid their ambushes well forward of advancing columns, taking optimum advantage of the cover and concealment provided by the virtually impassable terrain. Having chosen the ambush site, the Viet-Minh troops would then mine both sides of the trail. After allowing the French units to proceed well into the killing zone, maximum effective enfilade and flanking fire was brought upon the advancing column forcing them to take cover along the sides of the trail and exposing them to the mined areas. As in the rice paddies, the Viet-Minh would continue to exact losses on their enemy until he reacted properly to counter the ambush at which time contact would be broken.[24]

One tactic which was practiced by Giap as well as by Mao and on which neither contributes any written intelligence concerning concept of application is the human wave attack. Judging from the accounts of various battles, including Dienbienphu, where this tactic was used, and considering the losses incurred by the Viet Minh in some of these battles in comparison to the manpower losses of their opponents, it would appear that the acceptable expenditure of lives is a variable element. Evidently acceptability varies with the predetermined value of the objective, once the decision that assured "victory" is possible has been made. It has been estimated that Giap's forces suffered casualties of 15,000 to 20,000 men from a total force of 50,000 committed to the capture of Dienbienphu.[25] Although these casualty figures are extremely high, perhaps three times those of the French defenders, it is not unrealistic to assume that higher losses would not have deterred the Viet-Minh leadership from completing this particular undertaking, which was recognized as so important to the Vietnamese cause.

In summary, then, Giap most assuredly drew from the writings of Mao Tse-tung whatever lessons he felt served the purpose of the Viet-Minh cause, as he drew from Napoleon, Clausewitz, the Russian and French Revolutions and, probably, many other sources. The critics of Giap who make much of his failure to specifically acknowledge a debt to Mao's theories ignore the character of Giap and disregard Mao's own warnings that, in considering the principles he discusses, every historical stage and geographic site must be considered separately.[26] Giap, in his writings, deals exclusively with the conduct of the Vietnamese conflict and, while acknowledging the valuable contributions of lessons learned from the Russian and Chinese Revolutions, notes that significant differences existed, differences which had to be

taken into careful account in order to make the Vietnamese insurgency successful.

III — GIAP IN THE POLITICAL ARENA

Although General Giap has performed statesmanlike or political duties, there is little evidence to suggest that his role as a politician has, or will, extend much beyond those instances where his great popularity among the people will seem to make him the "man for the job." He has worked closely with the people of Vietnam in achieving the independence of the North and, like his army, he seems to be very close to the populace. His one "political" assignment of an international nature was to lead the Vietnamese contingent at the first Dalat Conference with the French in the Spring of 1946. He was there described as: ". . . a political man in every sense of the word."[1] The conferences were, however, nonproductive.

When Ho Chi Minh went to Fontainebleau in May 1946 to confer further with the French on the subject of Vietnamese independence, he left the Minister of the Interior, Huynh Thuc Khang, at the head of the Government. In an indication of relative strengths, however, it was Vo Nguyen Giap who exercised the power of leadership during Ho's absence from May to October. Perhaps as a result of his Dalat experiences and foreseeing the unlikelihood of French agreement to Vietnamese demands, he proceeded to dispense with many opponents of the Ho Chi Minh government and consolidated the control of the Viet-Minh over Vietnam.

More typical, in recent years, of Giap's political role has been his performance as a pacifier. When a peasant revolt broke out in Nghe An province in November 1956 which took the large part of a VPA division to quell, General Giap was called on at the 10th Congress of the *Dang Lao Dong* to criticize the overzealous land reform carried out under Truong Chinh as the legitimate basis of the people's grievances.[2] In an article of 21 February 1963, issued by the Vietnam News Agency, General Giap sought to assure all readers of *Dang Lao Dong* solidarity and to leave no doubt that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam considered China and the Soviet Union as absolute equals in the world Communist movement.[3] Coming at a time when serious disagreement was becoming evident between China and Russia and from a man well known for his sympathies with the Soviet Union, this was a neat demonstration of the fact that General Giap considers party solidarity of greater importance than personal inclinations.

To say that Giap does not appear to be strong in the political arena should not, however, be interpreted as disassociating him from the politics of North Vietnam. As a Communist, he is a political man first and a military leader only as a consequence. His political duties as Commander in Chief of the VPA and Defense Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam will always occupy a major part of his time. Yet his reputation as an ultranationalist with very strong dislikes for so many things foreign makes it unlikely that he will advance to a more "political" position in the government.

IV — CONCLUSIONS

General Vo Nguyen Giap has become a successful military leader of the Vietnamese people because of numerous factors. He is first of all a proud and intensely loyal Vietnamese who loves his country and understands its people. More than this, he is an extremely intelligent and resourceful man

who, having been exposed to Western thought, has been able to adapt his methods effectively to the unique characteristics of the enemy as well as to those of his own people; and he has always been faced with a foreign enemy.

General Giap, assuredly, has drawn valuable lessons from the words of other successful practitioners of warfare. What successful military leader has not, since accounts of battles and wars were first recorded? Giap's place in history is secured not by his contributions to the general theory of guerrilla or revolutionary warfare — Mao Tse-tung did an excellent job of pulling together, organizing, and recording the concepts and techniques of centuries of experience before Giap started practicing — but, rather, by his successful adaption of all the concepts and techniques that he studied and learned to the environment of Vietnam at the time when the Viet-Minh undertook to achieve the independence of their country. If he did make a contribution to the general art of revolutionary warfare or wars of insurgency, it was probably his estimate of the political-psychological deficiencies of democratic forms of government when faced with an inconclusive military operation. In a presentation to the political commissars of the 316th Division of the VPA, Giap stated:

> The enemy will pass slowly from the offensive to the defensive. The blitzkrieg will transform itself into a war of long duration. Thus, the enemy will be caught in a dilemma: he has to drag out the war in order to win it and does not possess, on the other hand, the psychological and political means to fight a long-drawn-out war. . . .[1]

General Giap was a key element in all aspects of the Viet-Minh success. He grasped, correctly, that the people were the first objective of revolutionary warfare. With cold objectivity he studied the enemy as much as he studied his own forces. The Vietnam People's Army which he fathered and leads today is regarded by some authorities as one of the strongest native military forces in Southeast Asia.[2] It remains completely loyal to him, as he is loyal to the army, his country, and its independence. He has succeeded in establishing close and warm relationships between the army and the people and, while insuring the politicial orientation of the army in the best Communist fashion, has kept it free of the ideological turmoil seen in China.

The loyalty of the army, its strength and solidarity, and his personal popularity with the people place General Giap in a position of strength in the North Vietnamese hierarchy. Furthermore, he is, undoubtedly, one of Ho Chi Minh's most trusted compatriots. All of these factors serve to insure that the position of General Giap will not be adversely changed. There is no indication, however, that General Giap will rise in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam government, for he has been provided little opportunity to gain experience in the practice of diplomacy and/or politics on the international level. It seems more likely that in his intense patriotism, and with the VPA behind him, he will serve to influence changes in top-level leadership which will become necessary with the passing of Ho Chi Minh.

General Vo Nguyen Giap is one of those leaders who come to the world with a distinct lack of frequency. Combining the techniques of an educator, a brilliant mind, selflessness, and objectivity with an intense patriotism and total devotion to the political mechanism which, in his mind, has made his country's independence possible, he is a rare complexity of man that most nations will fail to produce.

APPENDIX I

A Message from General Vo-nguyen-Giap to the Troops at Dienbienphu[1]

Officers and men, fighters on the Dienbienphu front!

In the first fighting phase of this historic campaign we have gained great victories and the enemy has suffered great losses. All of you have known this.

The Party Central Committee has sent a letter to congratulate you, emphasizing that this is a historic campaign, and reminded that you shall fight persistently and perseveringly and shall not be subjective and shall not underestimate the enemy.

The Army Party Committee has also praised you.

At first the enemy tried to hush up the public opinion on the reality, but now he can do it no longer. He has said, "If the flag of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam fly over the Dienbienphu fortifications, the situation of Indochina will undergo great changes influencing the whole of South-East Asia."

He fears that if France loses the battle, she will be in a disadvantageous position at the Geneva Conference.

The day before last, the reactionary ruling circles in France observed five minutes' silence to encourage their troops at Dienbienphu. What wretchedness!

All the big French papers have frontpaged the news of the Dienbienphu battle. *L'Humanite*, organ of the French Communist Party, has warmly acclaimed the victory of our army.

I have told you these news so that you may better value the honour of participating in this historic campaign, not be subjective and not underestimate the enemy, and have greater confidence and make greater efforts, and be imbued with the *principle of striking surely, advancing cautiously and fighting unremittingly.*

Today, I want to talk with you about some problems of ideology and tactical principles. I will speak in simple terms; try to listen to me and you will understand what I say. I will say nothing difficult.

At present we have won great victories, the enemy has suffered heavy defeats, but he is still powerful. Our superiority in effectives and fire-power has increased, but it is not yet an absolute superiority. Therefore, we have to strike surely and advance cautiously.

In what respects is the enemy still strong?

He is still strong because *his effectives are still nearly ten thousand strong.* Though his morale has flagged, and the difficulties he has met with are incalculable, we must not underestimate him. If we underestimate the enemy we shall be defeated.

The enemy is still strong on the three following points:

First, he can still *parachute supplies.* We have controlled his airfields but have not yet completely cut his supply line.

Second, he can still *parachute reinforcements.* We have controlled his airfields but cannot yet completely cut his reinforcement line.

Third, *his artillery has been still very active, his air force will be even more active.* Our artillery and anti-aircraft guns can curb the activities of the enemy artillery and air force only to some extent.

In this situation, are you willing to overcome those three strong points of the enemy? I am reported that you are burning with the hatred for the enemy artillery and aircrafts, and are very angry when seeing that he could still parachute supplies and troops. Thus all of you want to deprive the enemy of his three aforesaid assets.

What shall we do to attain that important goal?

After completing the positions of attack and encirclement and realizing the greater part of the aim of gradually depriving the enemy of the three aforesaid assets, what shall we do?

Now you shall pool your efforts to complete the building of positions. Next time, I shall tell you what you must do afterwards.

I am reported that you have spent many days on end building positions between combats and some of you are wearied.

But if we are wearied, we must remember that the enemy within the Dienbienphu fortified entrenched camp is in greater tension and more wearied than we are, his wounded have no shelters and no medicine, his fortifications have fallen in or shaken, his supplies are running short, and his casualties are increasing under our shelling.

Thus, shall we take rests so that the enemy may take rests too and reorganize his ranks, call for reinforcements, receive the supplies dropped by his air force, and bring into full play his artillery and air force, or shall we, being members of a People's Army and of the Vietnam Workers' Party, highlight difficulties, getting ourselves a bit more wearied in order to make the enemy ten times more wearied and cause him ten times more difficulties? Which shall we choose between these two roads? I am sure that you unanimously answer that we shall develop our army's tradition of enduring hardships, overcoming difficulties, and fighting heroically in order continuously to build positions, and unremittingly to fight the enemy.

To say so does not mean that we do not attach importance to the health conditions of our fighters. On the contrary, officers shall attach the greatest importance to the health conditions of their men, and soldiers shall take care of their own health and to that of their comrades-in-arms. Especially the cooks shall make efforts. Shelters on the front shall be good, they shall not be untidy. Rice and tea shall be served hot. The health service shall intensify the prophylactic measures. Officers at all levels shall control this work because it is the material basis for continuous fighting. This is a very important work.

I remind the officers and political commissars and instructors one more thing: to work out a very *detailed plan* for the building of positions and distribution of forces in order to spare time and efforts of their men. Especially they shall get themselves close to the fighters to encourage them, and supervise the building of positions. Recently, due to your superficial supervision, in many places they were built carelessly and as a result our casualties have increased.

I emphasize once more that the *officers at all levels shall in person supervise the building of positions.* This is a duty. Officers at any level who do not fulfill it shall be subject to disciplinary sanctions.

In short, *the immediate central task at the present time is to build positions of attack and encirclement at a rapid rate and according to norms; at the same time we shall fight the enemy to wear him out and fulfill our task of building positions.*

To build positions is firmly to grasp the principle of "striking surely and advancing cautiously." We shall not fight, or we shall fight victoriously. To say "striking surely and advancing cautiously" does not mean that we shall not work against time. We must actively *work against time*, because if we complete our positions one day sooner, we will increase difficulties for the enemy one day sooner, and create more conditions for our certain victory one day sooner. *To dig one more cubic metre of earth at this hour means actively to work for the victory of the campaign.*

As our present central task is to build positions, the General Political Department decided that the first criterion to win Uncle's "Determined to Fight and to Win" banner is the building of positions.

The building of positions is a combat task no less glorious than the attack upon the enemy to destroy him.

Have you understood clearly what I have said? I am certain that you have.

If there are some who do not yet understand clearly, the officers shall give them further explanations and their comrades shall help them.

Only by clearly understanding our tasks can we develop all our forces, and once we can develop our forces, we shall certainly fulfill our tasks.

Our troops are strong enough to haul our artillery over tens of kilometres along hilly roads, hack the jungle to build tens of kilometres of road, establish over one hundred kilometres of

positions and destroy the enemy's most fortified strongholds. It is certain that our forces shall *fulfill the task of building the offensive positions and encircling the enemy*, thus creating conditions to win complete victory for the campaign.

Yon all have yonr share of responsibility in this important task.

I shake hands with you and wish that yon shall make further efforts.

With affection and determination to win.

March 20, 1954

THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
OF THE VIETNAM PEOPLE'S ARMY

GENERAL VO-nguyen-GIAP

FOOTNOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. Mao Tse-tuug, *Selected Works* (New York: International, 1954), v. II, p. 27.

I

1. Ameriean University, Speeial Operations Researeh Offiee, *Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Vietnam, 1941-1954* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1963), p. 72.
2. Bernard B. Fall, "Vo-nguyen-Giap — Man & Myth," *Marine Corps Gazette*, August 1963, p. 34.
3. Bernard B. Fall, *The Two Vietnams* (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 85.
4. Fall, "Vo-nguyen-Giap — Man & Myth," p. 34.
5. Denis A. Warner, *The Last Confucian* (New York: Macmillan, 1963), p. 45.
6. Phillippe Devillers, *Histoire du Vietnam de 1940 a 1952* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1952), p. 70.
7. Fall, "Vo-nguyen-Giap — Man & Myth," p. 35.
8. Bernard B. Fall, *Vietnam Witness* (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 35.
9. Hoang Van Chi, *From Colonialism to Communism* (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 54.
10. Fall, *Vietnam Witness*, p. 248.
11. *Ibid.*
12. Fall, "Vo-nguyen-Giap — Man & Myth," p. 35.
13. Warner, p. 46.
14. Fall, "Vo-nguyen-Giap — Man & Myth," p. 35.
15. *Ibid.*
16. Tai Sung An, "The Sino-Soviet Dispute and Vietnam," *Orbis*, Summer 1965, p. 429n.
17. Warner, p. 46.
18. Hoang Van Chi, p. 55.
19. Ellen J. Hammer, *The Struggle for Indochina* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1954), p. 97.
20. Patrick J. Honey, *Communism in North Vietnam* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1963), p. 28.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
22. Vo-nguyen-Giap, *People's War, People's Army* (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1964), p. 47.
23. Fall, "Vo-nguyen-Giap — Man & Myth," p. 36.
24. Malcolm W. Browne, "Our Toughest Foe since Rommel." *True*, June 1966, p. 96.
25. Jules Roy, *The Battle of Dienbienphu* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 53.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

27. Hammer, p. 159-160. Ellen Hammer reports that a French journalist for *Le Monde* described Giap as the outstanding man present at the first Dalat conference which convened on 18 April 1946. He was called: "a political man in every sense of the word."

II

1. Giap, p. 43.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 48.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
4. Fall, *The Two Vietnams*, p. 112
5. Interview with Thieu-ta Tran Van Du, Commanding Officer of the Vietnamese Naval Supply Center, Saigon: 3 May 1966.
6. Roy, p. 4.
7. Giap, p. 56.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 124.
9. Ellen J. Hammer, *Vietnam -- Yesterday and Today* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), p. 241.
10. Roy, p. 68.
11. Giap, p. 129.
12. George K. Tanham, *Communist Revolutionary Warfare -- the Viet-Minh in Indochina* (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 60.
13. Hoang Van Chi indicates that the penalty for rape, for example, was usually death, p. 146.
14. Giap, p. 130.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 131.
16. Bernard B. Fall, *The Viet-Minh Regime* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1954), p. 74.
17. Giap, p. 46.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 49.
19. Giap, p. 48.
20. Bernard B. Fall, *Street without Joy* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 1963), p. 34.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 38.
22. Giap, p. 48.
23. Warner, p. 61.
24. Bernard B. Fall, "Indochina — the Last Year of the War," *Military Review*, October 1956, p. 6.
25. Robert Guillain, "What Is at Stake in Indochina," *The Listener*, 10 June 1954, p. 992.
26. Walter D. Jacobs, "Mao Tse-tung as a Guerrilla: a Second Look," *Military Review*, February 1958, p. 30.

III

1. Hammer, *The Struggle for Indochina*, p. 159.
2. Bernard B. Fall, "The Other Side of the 17th Parallel," *The New York Times Magaizne*, 10 July 1966, p. 52.
3. Honey, p. 179.

IV

1. Fall, *The Two Vietnams*, p. 113.
2. Fall, "Vo-nguyen-Giap — Man & Myth," p. 37.

APPENDIX I

1. Vo-nguyeu-Giap, *Dienbienphu* (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1964), p. 214-220.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

American University. Special Operations Research Office. *Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Vietnam, 1941-1954.* Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1963.

Browne, Malcolm W. "Our Toughest Foe since Rommel." *True,* June 1966, p. 37, 96-98.

Burchett, Wilfred G. *The Furtive War.* New York: International Publishers, 1965.

Buttinger, Joseph. *The Smaller Dragon.* New York: Praeger, 1958.

Cameron, James. *Here Is Your Enemy.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965.

Clutterbuck, Richard L. *The Long War.* New York: Praeger, 1966.

Cole, Allen B. *Conflict in Indochina and International Repercussions.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1956.

Devillers, Phillippe. *Histoire du Vietnam de 1940 a 1952.* Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1952.

Fall, Bernard B. "If Ho Chi Minh's Army Moves South in Force - - -." *The New York Times Magazine,* 5 September 1965, p. 7, 51-52, 54-55.

———. "Indochina — the Last Year of the War." *Military Review,* October 1956, p. 3-11.

———. "North Vietnam: a Profile." *Problems of Communism,* July-August 1965, p. 23-24.

———. "The Other Side of the 17th Parallel." *The New York Times Magazine,* 10 July 1966, p. 4-5, 52, 54-56, 58.

———. *Street without Joy.* Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 1963.

———. "The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counter-insurgency." Lecture, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I.: 10 December 1964.

———. *The Two Vietnams.* New York: Praeger, 1963.

———. *Le Viet-Minh, la Republique Democratique due Vietnam.* Paris: Paul Mus, 1960.

———. *The Viet-Minh Regime.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1954.

———. *Vietnam Witness.* New York: Praeger, 1966.

———. "Vo Nguyen Giap — Man & Myth." *Marine Corps Gazette,* August 1963, p. 34-37.

Faure, Edgar. *The Serpent and the Tortoise.* New York: St. Martin's, 1958.

Fontaine, Andre. "The Fall of Dienbienphu." *The Listener,* 13 May 1954, p. 807-808.

Gettleman, Marvin E., ed. *Vietnam — History, Documents and Opinions on a Major World Crisis.* New York: Fawcett, 1965.

Guillain, Robert. "What Is at Stake in Indochina." *The Listener,* 10 June 1954, p. 991-992.

Hammer, Ellen J. *The Struggle for Indochina.* Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1954.

———. *The Struggle for Indochina, 1940-1955.* Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1966.

———. *Vietnam — Yesterday and Today.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966.

Hillsman, Roger. "What Giap Did Not Say." *Marine Corps Gazette,* August 1963, p. 38-40.

Hoang Van Chi. *From Colonialism to Communism.* New York: Praeger, 1963.

Honey, Patrick J. *Communism in North Vietnam.* Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1963.

Honey, Patrick J., ed. *North Vietnam Today.* New York: Praeger, 1962.

Jacobs, Walter D. "Mao Tse-tung as a Guerrilla: a Second Look." *Military Review,* February 1958, p. 26-30.

Johnson, John D. "The Elephant and the Tiger: Mao Tse-tung's Classical Guerrilla Warfare Theory and the War in Indochina." Thesis. Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: 1965.

Joiner, Charles A. "Administration and Political Warfare in the Highlands." *Vietnam Perspectives,* November 1965, p. 14-18.

Kahin, George McT. *Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1964.

Katzenbach, Edward L., Jr., and Hanrahan, Gene Z. "The Revolutionary Strategy of Mao Tse-tung." *Political Science Quarterly,* September 1955, p. 321-340.

Lacouture, Jean. *Vietnam: between Two Truces.* New York: Random House, 1966.

McManus, Jason. "The Red Napoleon." *Time,* 17 June 1966, p. 32-36.

Mao Tse-tung. *Selected Works.* New York: International Publishers, 1954-1956. 5v.

Murti, Bhaskarla S. N. *Vietnam Divided.* New York: Asia Publishing House, 1964.

Newman, Bernard. *Background to Vietnam.* New York: Roy, 1965.
Paine, Lauran. *Vietnam.* London: Robert Hale, 1965.
Raskin, Marcus G., and Fall, Bernard B., eds. *The Vietnam Reader.* New York: Random House, 1965.
Roy, Jules. *The Battle of Dienbienphu.* New York: Harper & Row, 1965.
Shaplen, Robert. *The Lost Revolution.* New York: Harper & Row, 1965.
Sivaram, M. *The Vietnam War: Why?* Tokyo: Tuttle, 1966.
Starobin, Joseph R. *Eyewitness in Indochina.* New York: Cameron & Kahn, 1954.
Tai Sung Au. "*The Sino-Soviet Dispute and Vietnam.*" *Orbis,* Summer 1965, p. 426-436.
Tanham, George K. *Communist Revolutionary Warfare — the Viet-Minh in Indochina.* New York: Praeger, 1961.
Truong Chinh. *Primer for Revolt: the Communist Takeover in Vietnam.* New York: Praeger, 1963.
————. *The Resistance Will Win.* New York: Praeger, 1963.
Vo-nguyen-Giap. *Dienbienphu.* Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1964.
————. *People's War, People's Army.* Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1964.
Warner, Denis A. *The Last Confucian.* New York: Macmillan, 1963.

Ψ

That two Battalions of Marines be raised consisting of one Colonel, two lieutenant Colonels, two Majors & Officers as usual in other regiments, that they consist of an equal number of privates with other battalions; that particular care be taken that no person be appointed to officer or enlisted into said Battalions, but such as are good seamen, or so acquainted with maritime affairs as to be able to serve to advantage by sea . . .

Resolution of the Continental Congress creating the U.S. Marine Corps, 10 November 1775



PROFESSIONAL READING

The evaluations of recent books listed in this section have been prepared for the use of resident students. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these books of interest in their professional reading.

The inclusion of a book in this section does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Certain of the books on the list which are not available from these sources may be available from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books are obtainable on loan. Requests from individual officers to borrow books from an Auxiliary Library Service Collection should be addressed to the nearest of the following special loan collections.

Chief of Naval Personnel (G14)
Department of the Navy
Washington, D. C. 20370

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station (Guam)
Library (ALSC), Box 174
San Francisco, Calif. 96630

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station (Pearl Harbor)
Library (ALSC), Box 20
San Francisco, Calif. 96610

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station
Library (ALSC), Bldg. C-9
Norfolk, Virginia 23511

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station
Library (ALSC)
San Diego, Calif. 92136

Bosworth, Allen R. *America's Concentration Camps*. New York: Norton, 1967. 283 p.

Captain Bosworth, a former San Francisco journalist, served with Naval Intelligence at the time of the Japanese evacuation from the west coast. In a clear, factual style, he describes the events that led up to the racial hysteria which resulted in the internment of Japanese Americans in the early days of World War II. He reviews the actions of special interest groups, hate groups, and so-called "military necessities" that led up to the evacuation of some 100,000 Japanese from their homes and businesses and their tragic internment in desert barracks. The sadness and stupidity of this abuse of Government power are made more vivid by the personal accounts contained in this documentation.

In contrast, the author cites the combat achievements of those same Japanese Americans of the 100th Infantry Battalion and the 442nd Regimental Combat Team. The 442nd Regimental Combat Team became the most highly decorated unit of the U.S. Army in all its history. The hardships and misery of life in the internment camps are delineated in the accounts by those who endured the conditions facing the internees. The personal and pecuniary losses of these citizens caused by the War Relocation Act are stunning to the reader. The political and financial exploitation by others, at the expense of American citizens, is likened to the white man's exploitation of the Indian — a national shame.

The ironical view of most Japanese Americans that "the evacuation" was a good thing in that it was "a helpful catastrophe" evolves as the final consensus of those good citizens who bore the brunt of internment in physical discomfort, humiliation, and great personal loss. The book is well written and appropriate reading in this time of racial tension.

J. E. SULLIVAN
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Buchan, Alastair. *War in Modern Society*. London: Watts, 1966. 207 p.

Although this is not a history, according to the author's own words, *War in Modern Society* is based on the history of ideas about war and its control, of technological developments, and of the growth of international association to prevent war. In the preface of this thought-provoking book, Mr. Buchan expresses its objective by stating: "I hope that it may make some of today's controversies, both among the experts and between nations, more comprehensible: it will have served its purpose if it convinces those who read it that war is a phenomenon worthy of extended study before one can form any valid judgements about the conditions of peace."

In "Perspectives on Modern War," the first chapter of the book, Mr. Buchan presents a scholarly historical review of, and an excellent discussion on, the causes and control of war. He then devotes the next two chapters to the transitions in the nature of war and forms of strategy that have taken place in the last 20 years. In effect, he develops an understandable picture for the reader of war and its control in the contemporary world — at the start of the last third of the 20th century. He emphasizes three areas that are rapidly changing that picture: the concept of deterrence and its expansion beyond the original threat of nuclear retaliation; collective security and the growing problems within existing alliances, created in part by resurgent nationalism, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the Sino-Soviet schism; and the continuing spread of violence throughout the world, sparked by the nationalism and aspirations of the un-

derdeveloped nations. The last half of the book looks beyond the present day to the "remaining years of the 20th century, with the dangers and opportunities which the heritage of the past century have presented to us." Starting with a review of the major armed camps and potential conflict areas of the world, Mr. Buchan examines the forces that lead to war in light of the pressures and restraints of modern society. In particular, he discusses the part played by the United Nations, by United States/U.S.S.R. desires to avoid direct confrontation, and by the concept of apparent "convergence" in which Communist and capitalist countries are becoming more alike in their ambitions and responses. Discoursing on the dangers of war, both real and apparent, he dwells at length on three threats of growing concern: third power instigation, technological innovations such as the ABM with its possibilities of a renewed arms race, and nuclear proliferation. Finally, he treats the possibilities of controlling war, either through the control of armaments or through the control of national aggressive tendencies that lead to war.

Mr. Buchan has done an excellent job of analyzing the events of the past and the realities of the present, together with their implications. He succeeds not only in affording an understanding of the war in modern society, but he also pinpoints the problems and trends which presage the changes that might be expected before the end of the century.

A. V. RINEARSON, III
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army

Davis, Vincent. *The Politics of Innovation: Patterns and Navy Cases.* Denver: University of Denver, 1967. 69 p.

In this brief monograph Mr. Davis reviews the methods which certain Navy officers have used to encourage the adoption of new weapons systems within the Navy. His case studies are excellent although, as he states, by no means complete.

The author examines the Navy's initial struggles to achieve a nuclear strike capability from aircraft carriers, the development of a nuclear propulsion system, and the fight for the fleet ballistic missile. In each example Mr. Davis implies that any successful venture requires vertical (top echelon) support as well as horizontal encouragement within the service. In this regard the reader is instructed to analyze the climate for innovation carefully before dashing forward with uncontained enthusiasm. The advice is plain, but caution cannot really be the hallmark of progress; in each of these cases, even prudence was abandoned on occasion.

Although never stated specifically, Mr. Davis also cautions against the loss of military effectiveness which can result from parochial thinking at the highest levels. It seems that the desire to maintain one-service control over the development of weapons systems might result in a time lag simply because such absolute control encourages a degree of restraint which is absent in a competitive environment.

This monograph covers cases which were really decided a decade or more ago. A sequel to this fine study, which would analyze specific programs since 1960, might be a most valuable research topic for enterprising Naval War College students. Mr. Davis has provided a well-organized format for future investigators in the field of military behavioral science — and it would be enlightening (and encouraging) to find that his premises were still valid.

WALTER "R" THOMAS
Commander, U.S. Navy

Fehrenbach, Theodore R. *F.D.R.'s Undeclared War 1939 to 1941.* New York: McKay, 1967. 344 p.

F.D.R.'s Undeclared War 1939 to 1941 is a clearly written examination of the inner workings of the pre-World War II U.S. Government under the leadership of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Although not primarily adopting a pro-Roosevelt stand, the author has gone to considerable length to justify each of the President's significant domestic and international political decisions. This book describes in considerable detail President Roosevelt's concerns over the rising threats of Hitler's Nazi Germany and expansionist-minded Japan. It discusses his successful moves to gain the backing and confidence of an isolationist-inclined Congress and a "no more foreign wars" American public in order to prepare the United States against the inevitable threat of war. Of special interest are the explanations of his methods — many times unknown to the Congress and the public — of committing and extending United States/European involvement, primarily through military aid to Great Britain and Russia. In addition, the book presents an excellent analysis of Hitler's attitude toward the United States and Japan's reasons for the eventual Pearl Harbor attack. The author has produced an interesting and informative contribution to an already greatly discussed period of American history.

G. H. KAFFER
Commander, U.S. Navy

Halperin, Morton H., ed. *Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control.* Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1967. 342 p.

The Sino-Soviet cleavage and the nuclear arms control problem have long provided scholars with discussion materials. This book was generated from a conference held in 1965 and attended by 36 subject-matter experts. The editor is to be commended for the balance he has achieved in assembling the 10 papers that comprise the volume. The authors make liberal and constructive use of primary sources as they attempt to explain the fine points in the triad of relationships among the United States, the Soviet Union, and Communist China. For the beginning student of international relations, *Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control* is a fine survey and screening device to determine if the subject areas are worth his further study. This book is not for the general reader but does illuminate several aspects of the nuclear proliferation problem for the foreign affairs specialist.

I. E. M. DONOVAN
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Hilsman, Roger. *To Move a Nation.* Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967. 602 p.

Roger Hilsman has written a rare and unusual kind of a book. It is rare in its sustained merit (for it is quite a long book) and unusual in its format (for it is partly a theoretical essay on the foreign policy process, partly action report, and partly a memoir). Chapters 1, 35, and 36 are deliberate efforts at a theoretical formulation of the lessons distilled from Mr. Hilsman's experiences in Government, most importantly as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. The bulk of the book is a blend of analysis, chronological background treatment, and case studies in crisis during President John F. Kennedy's administration. It is far and away the best statement so far of the foreign policy process during Kennedy's term.

The titles of the main parts of the book accurately indicate its scope and content. They are, in order: the politics of policymaking; the organiza-

tional struggle (to produce an effective "team"); President Kennedy and the CIA (with a look at the Bay of Pigs fiasco); Laos; the Cuban missile crisis; the Congo crisis; the United States and Communist China; Indonesia, Malaysia, and confrontation; Vietnam; and, finally, the making and managing of foreign policy. The last few pages, an epilogue, are an assessment of John F. Kennedy's statecraft.

Hilsman's book is as honest and frank about his own role in these affairs as it would seem possible for any participant to be. He does not gloss over or rewrite the record — or if he does, he does so without detection by this reviewer. Another of the book's best features is its high standards of accuracy. In short, it is a highly dependable book from the standpoint of scholarship.

Nor does the author confine his frankness to his own actions. He characterizes Secretary McNamara, for example, in this fashion (p. 43): "McNamara was an extraordinarily able man, a brilliantly efficient man. But he was not a wise man." Speaking later on the same point (p. 579) with reference to what he considers a basic mistake in U.S. strategy in Vietnam, he says: "If the Secretary of Defense . . . had been less self-confident and dominating, the political side might have received more emphasis. But no cabinet member can be faulted for presenting his own and his department's case with all the eloquence and vigor at his command . . . and the real blame rests with the Secretary of State and his department."

These excerpts suggest the flavor of what is quite a forthright (and equally a controversial) book. The value of what Hilsman has done does not rest on whether the reader agrees with his arguments and judgments. It rests on the honesty and vigor with which one person in a policymaking position during critical and important developments states his case, and the insights he gives as to how particular options were chosen and why. This is a book which sheds real light on how Government really operates. It deserves a wide audience.

FREDERICK H. HARTMANN
Alfred Thayer Mahan Chair of Maritime Strategy

Karol, K. S. *China: The Other Communism.* New York: Hill and Wang, 1967. 474 p.

This lengthy volume, translated from the French, was authored in 1965-1966 by a Polish refugee (as a teenager from Hitler's armies) of Communist leanings. First "enraptured" by his new Soviet fatherland, he became a Soviet cititzen for 7 years, played around the edges of the Russian-sponsored Communist Government of Poland, and returned briefly to Poland in 1946. Finally, becoming less fascinated with Stalin's brand of communism, he settled in France in the late 1940's (when the French Communist Party was getting stronger daily) and began writing for leftist publications.

The book centers on author Karol's 4-month trip (his first) of approximately 16,000 miles (by air and train) in Communist China during February-June of 1965, during which his time was so thoroughly scheduled that even "the majority" of his evenings were taken up. His prior knowledge of China (other than of its communism) was meager and, based on his own comments, stemmed primarily from a single volume of pre-World War I vintage for foreign travelers. Professing to be a "socialist," but a "socialist" within the confines of the Communist definition, the author states that he was "admittedly . . . prejudiced in [China's] favor." That the ChiComs

approved his visa request in relative record time tends to confirm that they shared his belief in this "prejudice." Nevertheless, Karol goes through the motions of stressing his objectivity, although his "objectiveness," at best, is measured within a Marx-Lenin-Stalin-Mao (primarily Mao) frame of reference as he compares Soviet Russia with the other communism — Communist China. Soviet Russia comes in a poor second to Chinese egalitarianism and its rejection of the Soviet economic system, while the non-Communist world, particularly the United States, serves as a target for a perceptible amount of his biases, as well as his tirades, in his "objectiveness." The book's philosophy could well have caused it to be renamed *The Communist Gospel according to Mao.*

The author appears to demonstrate his greatest competence in setting forth China's history as "they see it" today, in describing the communes he visited, and in the developing of "correct" political thought for towns. But his aplomb is badly mauled when he discusses the "elusive proletarian culture," and dismay creeps into his chapter as he tries to make logical assessments of the role of writers (the area in which he has the most experience) and their treatment by the ChiCom government and the Red Guards. But shaking off these doubts, Karol ends on a crescendo in acclaiming China and its role in the world as though he were reading the pronouncements of Mao in undiluted fashion. Only infrequently, but periodically nevertheless, throughout the volume the author appears to forget his advocacy and omits the sometimes deft twists he gives events; for example, he notes that the isolationist tendencies of China which "daily becomes more marked," or observes that the ChiComs "feed the hostility the Chinese feel toward the United States," or concludes that "the China of today . . . leads to a . . . view of . . . extremism." Portions of the volume are illuminating and informative when one looks behind the facade erected by Karol, particularly if the reader has traveled some in continental China and has kept his reading on China current. To glean those portions, however, is a task not worth the effort unless the reader has these qualifications or has time on his hands to spare.

B. F. KEITH
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Marshall, Samuel L. A. *Battles in the Monsoon.* New York: Morrow, 1967. 408 p.

Battles in the Monsoon is a penetrating and graphic account of the role played by the individual soldier in the small-unit actions that are the backbone of the strategy currently employed in the Vietnamese War. Never before in the history of ground warfare has the ultimate outcome of the conflict depended so much on the professional skill and courage of the lieutenant, the sergeant, and the private. Much to the dismay and frustration of the hundreds of war correspondents, news editors, and historians, Vietnam is not, and probably will never be, a war characterized by decisive battles being fought between division-size forces expertly led by battle-seasoned and well-known generals. In Vietnam the big conflict is a composite of hundreds of squad-, platoon-, and company-size engagements. Rather than by battle-seasoned generals, these small units are maneuvered and led in combat by men recently departed from the teeming cities and rural communities of the United States. The author, S. L. A. Marshall, has provided a detailed analysis of these young warriors and many of the skirmishes and actions in which they fought. Only a writer like Marshall

could reconstruct these small-unit clashes in such an intimate and skillful manner. Having spent a lifetime as a highly successful military historian, author, and officer, he is well qualified to conduct an extremely interesting and objective account of irregular warfare as it is being fought in Vietnam today. The author spent 3 months in Vietnam during the summer of 1966 with the soldiers and units covered in *Battles in the Monsoon*. During this period he shared their fears and concerns, as well as their victories and defeats. Aside from being an interesting book, it gives the reader a deeper understanding concerning the true nature of irregular warfare. It is highly recommended reading for all military officers.

J. C. MIZE
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Army

Pell, Claiborne and Goodwin, Harold L. *Challenge of the Seven Seas.* New York: Morrow, 1966. 306 p.

If the earth were a smooth sphere it would be covered by a mile and a half of water. About four-fifths of the earth's animal life is found in the sea. Earth's highest peak is Mount Everest, slightly more than 29,000 feet above sea level. Dump this giant among mountains into the Marianas Trench and its top would be more than a mile below the surface. What other facts do you know about the sea? Our authors feel a growing sense of urgency and conviction that we must begin a full program of ocean education and exploitation without delay. The public and the executive and legislative branches of the Federal and State Governments must be made keenly aware of the potential which the seas have to offer for national as well as international gain. In attempting to advance this awareness, the authors cover and discuss, although somewhat superficially, the full spectrum of events, problems, and developments relating to this vast and challenging subject. The following are a few of the major topics covered: a prediction of oceanographic prospects 30 years hence; the need for turning to the sea for food, minerals, and water; the merchant marine and its continued economic potential; international law; legitimate exploitation of the sea; and the 32 governmental agencies, departments, and offices that are involved in oceanographic activities, leading to the opinion that "the creation of a statutory base of ocean developments does not answer all questions or solve all problems."

The authors demonstrate an unusual intellectual honesty in not maintaining that they have all the answers. However, they do provide a penetrating look at both the problems and possibilities that ocean exploitation holds for not only the United States, but all the world.

R. N. PETERSON
Commander, U.S. Navy

Salisbury, Harrison E. *Behind the Lines — Hanoi.* New York: Harper & Row, 1967. 243 p.

This is a rather strongly opinionated report by a "trained" observer who, it would appear, also considers himself to be a military strategist and a diplomatic tactician. To the author, apparently everything Americans have done in the conduct of the war in Vietnam has been faulty. They have erred in the targets they have designated to be important military objectives; they have underestimated the endurance and patriotism of the Vietnamese — North and South; they have failed to seek a negotiated settlement with the enemy. *Behind the Lines — Hanoi* is readable and provocative, if one can tolerate the harsh criticism of American bombing and the remarks inferring possibly questionable motives on the part of U.S. leaders. The book covers the observations and

impressions that the writer, a *New York Times* correspondent, experienced during 2 brief weeks in the Hanoi area between 23 December 1966 and 7 January 1967. While in North Vietnam the author spoke to only one major leader, Premier Pham Van Dong, who stated, "it is a saered war for Independence, Freedom, Life." He declared that America's air war had met with both military and propaganda defeats. He impressed the interviewer with the indomitable spirit of the North Vietnamese. Most of them bear arms; the teenagers are fiercely patriotie; all are persuaded that there will be another great victory as at Dien Bien Phu over the French. Maintaining that the United States is unable to achieve a military victory despite continued escalation, Dong said that "the key to peace lies with Washington where the first move must be to cease bombing North Vietnam." Mr. Salisbury points out that bombing North Vietnam has only stiffened Hanoi's resistance. He considers Americans remiss not to realize the divergencies between "Socialism in the North and Democracy in the South," and feels they do not understand the political programs and problems of reunification in Vietnam. He believes Hanoi is now ready to talk terms in private and with no third party involved. The author bases this view on the chaos in China and the feeling that Hanoi has no wish to come under that country's domination. If Peking felt that Hanoi was pro-Soviet or that China should intervene in the war against the United States, it would send its "volunteers" into the fray. Salisbury ventures to declare that the U.S. military might actually be seeking such involvement in order to crush China. He feels that China is prepared, even in the event of a nuclear attack, and that it should be a challenge to American diplomats to deal with China and to avoid a war with her. The writer does not think that the United States has anything to gain even if she defeats North Vietnam and that hence she should try to reach an honorable and reasonable settlement with Hanoi before it is too late.

B. M. TRUITT
Commander, U.S. Navy

Simpson, Smith. *Anatomy of the State Department.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967. 285 p.

This is another analysis of the ills of the State Department. It has the virtue of having been written by a recently retired officer of the diplomatic service, and thus the examples used by the author to support his views are generally accurate. Furthermore, the author has added a eonsiderable amount of research to his extensive firsthand knowledge and experience, but — unfortunately — he becomes a victim of the very "mystifying phenomenon" he warns about: the tendency of each officer to characterize the diplomatic establishment in a different way.

Quoting Plato, the author begins his criticism with "why." Why is there so much douht about the State Department? The reader is led through a searching, but often slanted, analysis of the inner workings of the Department of State and the Foreign Service of the United States. The State Department is compared with other Federal agencies to show its strengths and weaknesses. State's relations with the Congress and the White House are found wanting. Congress is praised for prodding that brought about reforms in State, but is chastised for not providing the support that the author considers State should have. Military officers will probably be favorably impressed by the author's high regard for the manner in which the military establishment operates, particularly with

regard to long-range planning and the training programs for its officers. In these areas the State Department is woefully inadequate, according to the author who probably would find that most of his colleagues agree.

Acknowledging a "current spurt" of improvement in State, the author nevertheless has some harsh things to say about all but a few of the top level authorities of the Department and concludes that it "is in dire need of a general manager . . . who has time to oversee the establishment in its entirety." This manager should be experienced in the Department and the Foreign Service, and Presidents and Secretaries of State should give him the support he needs "through succeeding Administrations." Without explaining just how the time span involved in his solution is to be covered by one human being, the author finally concludes that no President nor Secretary would entrust such a powerful and influential position to a career officer of the diplomatic service until the Department has won respect for professionalization and sound operating procedures. It is regrettable that this otherwise skillful, if somewhat biased, analysis of the diplomatic service should end on such a contradictory and rather unrealistic note. One suspects that the author longs for a McNamara instead of a Rusk in State. The book is recommended for supplementary reading by officers who wish to delve more deeply into some of the problems of the State Department, particularly as they affect relations with the Department of Defense.

T. S. ESTES
State Department Adviser

Wilson, Dick. *A Quarter of Mankind.* London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966. 308 p.

Dick Wilson, former editor of the *Far Eastern Economic Review* of Hong Kong, has written a three-part analysis of Communist China under the regime established in 1949. It begins by considering the main elements and tensions within new Chinese cultural, social, and political life; the second part of the book discusses the national economy; and the third concludes with a prophetic review of Red China's international relations. After the first few pages the reader is already impressed by the meticulous manner in which Mr. Wilson documents his statements drawn from both Communist and anti-Communist sources. Upon completing the 300 pages of close-set type, one cannot help but also admire the author's sympathetic and friendly approach to the Chinese people and their revolution. His lack of hostility makes the book not only commendably objective but more easily understandable. *A Quarter of Mankind* was written before the current Chinese uprisings; however, the author did have the insight to forecast that the resurgence of traditional individualism among the people might eventually jeopardize collective disciplines and the materialistic rule of international communism. On the other hand, he feels that the universalistic aspect of communism could eventually break down China's cultural distaste for Western modern living. Recent events have apparently confirmed at least the first of these forecasts. This interesting book is "must" reading for all students of international affairs who wish to obtain an accurate comprehension of the forces behind the contemporary Chinese revolution.

K. C. HOLM
Captain, U.S. Navy

THE BAROMETER

READERS' COMMENTS

This section has been established to provide a forum for the useful exchange of ideas between *Naval War College Review* readers and the Naval War College.

Unofficial comments by the readers on articles which appear in the *Review* are encouraged and will be considered for publication in subsequent issues.

Comments should be addressed to:

The Editor
Naval War College Review
Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island 02840

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
STAFF AND FACULTY

President	*Vice Adm. J. T. Hayward, USN*
Chief of Staff	*Rear Adm. J. C. Wylie, Jr., USN*
Aide to the President	*Capt. B. F. Ginn, USN*
Public Affairs/Protocol Officer	*Capt. W. E. Aymond, USN*
Advisers to the President	
State Department Adviser	*Ambassador T. S. Estes*
U.S. Army Adviser	*Col. W. F. Long, USA*
U.S. Air Force Adviser	*Col. W. J. Davitt, USAF*
Academic Plans Department	
Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Director	*Capt. E. B. Henry, Jr., USN*
Assistant Director	*Capt. E. M. Porter, Jr., USN*
Plans Officer	*Capt. D. D. Grantham, USN*
Director of Research	*Capt. T. H. Stetson, USN*
Lecture Program Officer	*Comdr. W. "R" Thomas, USN*
Civilian Chairs and Consultants	
Alfred Thayer Mahan Chair of Maritime Strategy	*Prof. F. H. Hartmann*
Ernest J. King Chair of Maritime History	*Prof. R. G. O'Connor*
Chester W. Nimitz Chair of Social and Political Philosophy	*Prof. R. H. Cox*
Charles H. Stockton Chair of International Law	*Prof. J. H. Spencer*
Chair of Physical Sciences	*Prof. C. M. Cook*
Stephen B. Luce Chair of Naval Science	*Prof. E. L. Beach*
Chair of Economics	*Prof. F. R. Root*
James V. Forrestal Chair of Military Management	*Prof. Z. S. Zannetos*
Milton E. Miles Chair of International Relations	*Prof. A. C. Miller, Jr.*
George Washington University, Naval War College Center	
Director	*Prof. C. B. Sargent* *Prof. W. C. Hopkins* *Prof. G. Stambuk*
Administration Department	
Director/Secretary Naval War College	*Capt. R. F. Jackson, USN*
Asst. Director/Asst. Secretary	*Comdr. D. Council, USN*
Personnel Officer	*Lt. B. Bole, USN*
Security Officer	*Lt. Comdr. C. F. McAdams, USN*
Registered Publications Officer	*Lt. (jg.) B. F. Berg, USN*

School of Naval Warfare	
Director	*Capt. J. D. Chase, USN*
Asst. Director/Hd., Plans Division	*Col. D. S. Hartley, Jr., USMC*
Plans Officer	*Capt. C. E. Neely, SC, USN*
Air Force Adviser/Asst. Plans Officer/Elective Program Officer	*Col. W. D. Clark, USAF*
Army Adviser	*Col. A. V. Rinearson, III, USA*
Intelligence Officer	*Comdr./Lt.Comdr. F. H. Johnston, USN*
GSD Administrative Officer/ Reserve Training Officer	*Comdr. B. M. Truitt, USN*
Escort Officer	*Ens. W. A. Peterson, USNR*
Head, Sea Power and National Strategy Study	*Capt. J. E. Godfrey, USN*
Assistants	*Capt. R. W. Niesz, USCG*
	Lt. Col. W. K. Callam, USAF
	Col. A. V. Rinearson, III, USA
	Capt./Comdr. F. W. Ulbricht, USN
	Comdr. D. G. Worden, USN
Head, Naval Warfare Study	*Capt. J. G. Fifield, USN*
Assistants	*Capt. B. V. Ajemian, USN*
	Comdr. G. H. Winslow, USN
	Comdr. J. G. Tillson, USN
	Capt. W. H. Lowans, USN
Head, Strategic Planning Study	*Col. B. E. Keith, USMC*
Assistants	*Capt. J. G. Boniface, USN*
	Comdr. G. H. Kaffer, Jr., USN
	Comdr. R. N. Peterson, USN
	Lt. Col. J. D. Stevens, USAF
	Comdr. R. L. O'Neil, SC, USN
School of Naval Command and Staff	
Director	*Capt. R. N. Miller, USN*
Assistant Director	*Capt. R. S. Lewellen, USN*
Plans Officer	*Comdr. R. H. Wilson, USN*
Assistant Plans and Escort Officer	*Ens. D. V. Vroom, USNR*
Head, Team One	*Comdr. H. E. Lang, USN*
Assistants	*Comdr. R. A. Beaulieu, USN*
	Comdr. D. A. Morton, CEC, USN
	Comdr. A. J. Ashurst, USN
Head, Team Two	*Capt./Comdr. D. J. Morgiewicz, USN*
Assistants	*Lt. Comdr. S. L. Ritchie, USN*
	Lt. Comdr. W. W. Bigler, USN
	Comdr. H. R. Jones, USN
	Lt. Col. J. V. Cox, USMC
	Comdr. R. C. Watt, SC, USN
	Comdr. J. E. Sullivan, Jr., USN

School of Naval Command and Staff (cont'd)

Head, Team Three	*Lt. Col. G. R. Hershey, USMC*
Assistants	*Comdr. J. A. Bacon, USN*
	Comdr. D. J. Kershaw, USN
	Lt. Comdr. R. P. Hanson, USN
	Comdr. R. M. Harp, USN
Army Adviser	*Lt. Col. J. C. Mize, USA*
Air Force Adviser	*Lt. Col. J. W. Cotton, Jr., USAF*
Research Program Officer	*Lt. Comdr. I.E.M. Donovan, USN*

Naval Command Course

Director	*Capt. W. F. Chaires, USN*
Assistant Director and Plans Officer	*Capt. K. C. Holm, USN*
Head, Team ALFA	*Capt. H. T. Rodgers, USN*
Assistants	*Comdr. F. C. Gilmore, USN*
	Comdr. R. L. Dodd, USN
	Lt. Comdr. H. Venezia, USN
Head, Team BRAVO	*Capt. A. J. Pickert, Jr., USN*
Assistants	*Lt. Col. E. H. Arkland, USMC*
	Comdr. J. E. Arnold, USN
Operations Officer	*Comdr. T. E. Lukas, USN*
Administrative Officer	*Lt. L. R. Jacobs, USN*
Escort Officer	*Ens. M. D. Shalter, USNR*

War Gaming Department

Director	*Capt. E. A. Hemley, USN*
Assistant Director and Planning Officer	*Capt. C. H. Price, USN*
Head, Operations, Evaluation and Research Division	*Comdr. D. W. DeCook, USN*
Head, Evaluation and Research Branch	*Lt. Comdr. J. M. Johnston, USN*
Head, Gaming Development Branch	
Assistants	*Comdr. G. E. Yeager, USN*
	Comdr. R. D. Coogan, USN
	Comdr./Lt. Comdr. M. D. Kuttler, USN
	Lt. Comdr. D. W. Somers, USN
Head, Operations and Programming Branch	*Comdr. O. I. Meadows, USN*
Assistants	*Lt. Comdr. H. J. Grace, USN*
	Comdr. W. E. Wilder, USN
	Lt. Comdr. E. J. Sottak, USN
	Comdr./Lt. Comdr. C. D. Bush, USN
Head, Engineering and Maintenance Division	*Comdr. E. G. Pezzei, USN*
Head, Maintenance Branch	*Lt. E. L. Dammann, USN*

Correspondence School

Director	*Col. T. C. Dutton, USMC*
Head, International Affairs Division	*Comdr. R. M. Laske, USN*
Assistants	*Lt. Comdr. F. J. Flynn, USN*
	Comdr./Lt. Comdr. D. E. Oleson, USN
	Comdr. W. J. Quirk, USN
	Comdr. R. L. Gennette, USN
Head, Strategy and Tactics Division	
Assistants	*Comdr. W. F. Goodman, USN*
	Comdr. J. E. Woolway, USN
	Lt. Comdr. W. A. Bacchus, USN
	Lt. Comdr. H. L. Lane, SC, USN
Head, International Law Division	*Comdr. H. S. Palau, USN*
Assistant	*Comdr. R. J. Rogers, USN*

Ψ

It was an example of inflexibility in the pursuit of previously conceived ideas that is, unfortunately, too frequent in modern warfare. Final decisions are made not at the front by those who are there, but many miles away by those who can but guess at the possibilities and potentialities.

Douglas MacArthur: Reminiscences, 1964