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COMMUNIST CHINA'S THRUST FOR POWER

A Research Paper written by
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INTRODUCTION

With the advent of the nuclear stalemate or Soviet-U.S. détente China replaced the U.S.S.R. as the main protagonist in the struggle between the East and the West. The United States decision to commit military forces to the fight for South Vietnam has further focused world attention on the enigma of China.

Various historians of the past gave to China a misleading aura of inscrutability possibly to cover gaps in their own knowledge of this complex empire. Recent scholarship fortunately gives a penetrating insight into the character of the Chinese and their historical aspiration as a nation. Chinese Communist policies of today must be viewed in the light of Chinese historical perspective if a reliable judgment of these policies and their goals is to be attained.

The People's Republic of China still presents a riddle of a sort to the West. It is generally conceded that two concepts of modern China's foreign policy goals exist.¹ The gist of the debate over China's intentions is whether China is a real threat or merely a vituperative propaganda menace with little real power or inclination to use what power she does possess.

To evaluate a nation's objectives it is necessary to view the main policies of the government that impact on the external posture manifested by that country. Within the limited size of this investigation, the Chinese historical outlook on the world, the Chinese Communist strategy in foreign and military affairs and the military and economic base are examined. The aim of the investigation is to resolve the conflicting arguments concerning the aspirations of the Chinese Communist leadership in the world competition of nations and ideologies.

Unfortunately, any evaluation of Communist China is hampered by the strong propaganda flavor of Communist source material. Western writers tend to be something less than objective when dealing with China. This is largely due to a lack of good information, but is also due to a plethora of emotion. The People's Republic of China has been a viable government for sixteen years, and it is hoped that the pattern of their strategy and desires is somewhat clearer today than during the Korean War period.

CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND FOR COMMUNIST CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY

The Ancient Political System. A brief examination of Chinese political history is prerequisite to understanding current policies and aims of the Chinese People's Republic in international affairs.

When China first came to world attention, Western historians recorded only the death throes of an empire. Almost completely overlooked was the operating Chinese international system, the "Confucian Family of Nations."¹ This international political family of nations had been formed several centuries before the Western community of nations and had worked as well as, if not better than, the Western counterpart.²

This family of nations was controlled by a philosophy which for the world organization the Chinese had conceived over two thousand years ago. It was based on the inequality of any nation with China.³ The Chinese belief that they were more "civilized" than those peoples with whom they had contact was undoubtedly true. Thus, China had never recognized any people as culturally superior, even when they militarily dominated China.⁴

This philosophy of a single world government had its origins in ancient China before the end of the Chou dynasty (circa 1122-256 B.C.). It is embraced by today's Chinese leaders.⁵ The philosophy holds that China must be united under one government; that the philosophy must work for the betterment of all mankind; that a disciplined and dedicated elite minority will interpret the philosophy; and that all mankind will be governed by this philosophy fostered by the Chinese.⁶ The role of the disciplined elite, interpreting the philosophy, is precisely the part being played by today's Chinese Communist hierarchy in developing Marxism from the Chinese viewpoint.⁷

"The Middle Kingdom." The name "China" was created by foreigners. The name used by the Chinese most frequently is *Chung Kuo* or "The Middle Kingdom" and represents the Chinese view of their place in the world. The Chinese saw themselves as occupying the inner heartland or middle kingdom surrounded by a

bordering ring of colonies with an outer peripheral group or family of nations.⁸ The Chinese thus held by name and political philosophy that there was one and only one political administration for the world—China.⁹

The concept of a middle kingdom has modern appeal. In a lecture at the U.S. Naval War College, Professor Robert A. Rupen, from the University of North Carolina and an expert on Sino-Soviet affairs, stated the Chinese Communists have revived the "Middle Kingdom" theory.¹⁰ This, of course, is in consonance with the current Chinese assumption that they are the correct interpreters and leaders of the world socialist revolutionary movement. "The Middle Kingdom" represents what every world power or nation with aspirations of world power desires: secure borders surrounding the motherland and a nonhostile world subject to persuasive domination, if not directly controlled.

What did China control with this "Middle Kingdom" empire?

The Extent of the Chinese Empire. The full extent of the control of the empire is debatable, as the Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet border disputes reflect. As the "Middle Kingdom" concept suggests, the Chinese were always interested in their border areas. However, if there was no dispute with China as to her cultural and political superiority, the bordering nations were allowed complete autonomy. The relationship that existed between China and dependent countries was of a *laissez faire* nature. In some instances all that China demanded was tribute, and this occasionally consisted only of obedience to the Chinese emperor. The closest Western idea that expresses the control exercised by the Chinese is that of suzerain.¹¹ With such loose control the Chinese had difficulty in proving their dominion in the face of Western expansion into Asia.

The old empire reached its peak in the middle of the eighteenth century. At that time China controlled, through dependencies or tributaries: Russian Turkestan, a large section north and east of Manchuria called Amursk, the Ryukyus, Outer Mongolia, Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam (north and south), Bhutan, Sikkim, Nepal, Tibet, and the Sulu Archipelago.¹² Most of these countries were held to China by trade. China usually extracted tribute from them and always demanded obedience to the Chinese court. The system was not legalistic as there were no formal treaties. The cohesive force was a common cultural interest.¹³ China was (and is still) a large country surrounded by a sizeable group of vassals who

"flattered her by the most delicate and subtle form of flattery, imitation." ¹⁴ Thus was the Chinese character molded to believe confidently in their cultural superiority.

Foreign Incursions. From a position of preeminence in their world, the Chinese were reduced to the status of a semicolonial state by 1900. The Chinese Empire was unable to cope with the expansion of Western trade-imperialism, and in a fifteen-year period, commencing in 1880, all of the vassal states were lost to control by various imperialistic nations. ¹⁵ The control of traditional Chinese buffer states transferred to Japan in the Liuchui (Ryukyu Islands), France in Indochina, and Great Britain in Burma. Korea and Siam (Thailand) proclaimed independence and drew under other protective wings. Such encroachments, coupled with the unequal trade treaties the Western nations extracted from the militarily weak empire, developed a strong xenophobia in the Chinese.

Xenophobia and Western Legalism. Professor C.P. Fitzgerald, a recognized authority and writer on Chinese affairs, has put the Chinese attitude this way, "In the history of Chinese relations with the West the consequences of weakness and strength, first on one side, then on the other, are conspicuous; the operations of reason and validity of claims to rights and wrongs are not apparent." ¹⁶

An example of the degree of the disregard held for the Chinese Government was the awarding to Japan of the German sphere of influence at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919, despite the fact that China was an ally in World War I. ¹⁷ From the Chinese viewpoint, the Westerner must indeed be a foreign devil.

This history of defeat and exploitation has formed in the Chinese a strong desire to regain the lost grandeur of their empire. The Chinese are determined to redress the old inequities. There is to be no weakness toward the West that could be considered a return to the wrong policies and postures of the dying empire or first Chinese Republic. ¹⁸ The Chinese have a pride in the historic "Middle Kingdom," and consider it their right to restore hegemony over those areas that had once acknowledged Chinese supremacy. ¹⁹

Chinese foreign policies are thus rooted in a history of exploitation by Western nations. The suzerainty of China over the

buffer states was not recognized by the "civilized" Western nations as they did not understand the subtlety of the Chinese domination from a position of cultural superiority. Since the Chinese legal system did not measure up to European standards, the Chinese were wrongly considered backward.²⁰ The Chinese have never appreciated Western legal concepts and cannot countenance that they were stripped of territorial possessions "legally." This historic lack of understanding accounts, in part, for the strong anti-West (United States principally) posture of Chinese Communist foreign policy.

CHAPTER II

FOREIGN POLICY

Foreign Policy at the Outset (1949). In less than one generation and after twelve years of world and civil war the Chinese Communists emerged victorious on the China mainland. On October 1, 1949 the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) was established over a devastated land. Enormous problems faced the new government. Agriculture and industrial production were severely crippled by war, natural disasters, and rampant inflation. Remnants of Nationalist armies fighting along the coast and on Hainan island remained to be subdued. On Taiwan (Formosa) Chiang Kai-shek had established the rival government in exile.¹

At this point the P.R.C. had the option of adopting a semi-neutralist role in international affairs in order to concentrate on domestic problems, or developing a policy calculated to restore China's dominance in Asia and claim to world power, already tacitly recognized by China's status in the United Nations. The Chinese historically, and the Chinese Communist leaders in particular, were not suited for a passive role in world affairs.

The Chinese Communist Party (C.C.P.) was formed in 1921.² The leaders of the party had spent their student years watching the struggles of the first Chinese Republic to regain China's national standing and the removal of the hated status of a semi-colony of Western nations.³ The C.C.P. had been very nearly eliminated on the famous "long march" of 1934-35.⁴ After years of living off the land and slowly rebuilding, there emerged a strong core of highly dedicated military leaders. After 14 years of struggle, the Chinese Communists stood at the head of the largest land army in the world and were convinced their destiny was to lead a "world crusade" on behalf of the oppressed masses.⁵

The foreign policy aims announced in 1949, while not those of zealots, were sufficiently broad to allow wide interpretation as to specific intent. There were five main points:

1. to protect China's independence, freedom and integrity;
2. to work for lasting international peace and friendly co-operation between all countries of the world;

3. to establish relations with governments with friendly attitudes;
4. to establish unity with the U.S.S.R. and Communist Bloc against imperialists and the United States; and
5. to protect the rights of Overseas Chinese.⁶

Sino-Soviet Relations. The U.S.S.R. and P.R.C. indicated preliminary agreement in basic aims when they signed a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance on 14 February 1950.⁷ This was the first foreign alliance for China.⁸ Chinese traditional self-reliance, xenophobia, and isolation were offset by the overwhelming need for economic assistance, military security and a common political ideology. The fact that the United States possessed an ominous weapon in the atomic bomb was perhaps a strong motivating force in the light of subsequent events.

However, Soviet-Chinese accord on all aspects of the struggle for world communism did not persist. Professor C.P. Fitzgerald pointed out as early as 1952 that the differences between the two countries were profound. He considered it doubtful that the Communist ideology was strong enough to overcome Chinese hereditary dreams of empire.⁹

By 1959 the world press took note of the "Sino-Soviet rift." At this time the conflict of interests between the two Communist giants came to the surface. The public debate opened with Chinese criticism of the "peaceful coexistence" theme originated by Khrushchev.¹⁰ The divergence in P.R.C. and U.S.S.R. policies was evident as early as 1955.

Sino-Soviet Divergence of National Interests. In November 1955, Soviet Premier Khrushchev made a state visit to India which resulted in the U.S.S.R.'s support of India's position in the dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir. This conflicted directly with China's preference for Pakistan.¹¹ In the same year, the U.S.S.R. opened diplomatic negotiations with Japan without apparently consulting with China.¹²

International negotiations on Indochina, held in 1954 at Geneva, saw the recognition of the P.R.C. as a power in Asia.¹³ China indicated an independent direction in foreign affairs with considerable success at the Afro-Asian conference held at Bandung in April 1955. New prestige for China was gained by the adroit

statesmanship of Chou En-lai as he worked to regain Chinese hegemony in Asia. 14

The U.S.S.R. and P.R.C. have continued to find themselves on opposite sides. During the Kashmir crises of August and September 1965, China issued a series of ultimatums to India in an effort to relieve pressure on Pakistan. 15 At the same time the U.S.S.R. was pledged to give military support to India in the form of "any number" of jet aircraft. 16 In Vietnam, the Chinese have accused the U.S.S.R. of failure to support the socialist wars of "national liberation" and of collaborating with the United States to end the war, despite opposition of Peking and Hanoi to Soviet proposals. 17

Polemics. In 1961, what had been primarily a "behind closed doors" dispute erupted into the open. The P.R.C. representatives to international Communist organizations began to attack openly U.S.S.R. policies and to turn working conferences into ideologic propaganda forums. 18 On July 14, 1963, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (C.P.S.U.) issued a verbose "open letter" rebuttal to the criticism issued on June 14, 1963, by the Chinese Central Committee. 19 The content of the letter indicates the bitter divisiveness of the rivalry.

The successful negotiation of the partial nuclear test ban treaty was severely denounced by the P.R.C. The Soviet Government was compelled to explain its position in a major statement on August 3, 1963. 20 Despite fundamental differences in policies, Chou En-lai was quoted in Peking on October 13, 1963:

Of course, there are serious disputes between our two parties. . . . Contacts between the two states and the two parties will continue as before. I see no reason for thinking that our two states should be severed from one another. . . . On the contrary, if any act of aggression occurs against any socialist country, this would be an act of aggression against the whole socialist camp. It would be impossible not to give support. . . . 21

It is apparent that, despite the acrimony of the debate, China still felt the need of U.S.S.R. military protection. Mr. R.G. Boyd concluded from research conducted at the Institute of Advanced Studies, Australian National University, that chauvinism was a main element of P.R.C. policy despite the public ideological condemnation of the Soviet Union. He also felt that, as the gulf between the Soviet Union

and China widened, China's handling of foreign affairs would become increasingly arbitrary, self-interested, self-reliant and less well informed.²²

Sino-United States Relations. With the defeat of Japan in World War II, a power vacuum was created in the Western Pacific. The United States filled this vacuum, and from the Chinese perspective, inherited the Japanese Imperialistic role by "occupying" Okinawa (Ryukyu Islands), South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan.²³ The United States is also seen as the main perpetrator of the last vestiges of the hated "extraterritoriality" privileges extracted under the unequal treaties which were not abrogated until 1943. Evidences of this are the U-2 overflights of Chinese territory, the trade boycott, and all other discriminatory actions.²⁴

The Chinese Communists attacked the United States image in China by depicting foreign aid as an element of "cultural imperialism" conducted for economic gain. The C.C.P. effectively expunged any feelings of inferiority or friendliness generated by United States aid during and subsequent to World War II.²⁵ While still engaged in a civil war, the Chinese Communist propaganda was violently anti-American.²⁶

Confrontation. The Chinese People's Liberation Army (P.L.A.) and United States forces came into direct conflict when the P.L.A. intervened in the Korean War in October 1950.²⁷ The United States policy developed since that time has been one of preventing Chinese Communist expansion in Asia. The policy has been dubbed "containment," and has evolved from a series of mutual security treaties signed with friendly Western Pacific nations from 1952 through 1955.²⁸

The Chinese Communists therefore see the United States as the main obstruction to restoring Chinese hegemony in Asia. The P.R.C. defense minister, Lin Piao, in a major policy statement delivered on September 3, 1965, commemorating the 20th anniversary of Japan's defeat summed up the Chinese feeling for the United States.

Since World War II, U.S. imperialism has stepped into the shoes of German, Japanese and Italian fascism and has been trying to build a great American empire by dominating and enslaving the whole world. It is actively fostering Japanese and West German militarism as its chief accomplices in unleashing a world war. Like a

vicious wolf, it is bullying and enslaving various peoples, plundering their wealth, encroaching upon their countries' sovereignty, and interfering in their internal affairs. It is the most rabid aggressor in human history and the most ferocious common enemy of the people of the world. Every people or country in the world that wants revolution, independence, and peace cannot but launch the spearhead of its struggle against U.S. imperialism.²⁹

Friendly Countries. The establishment of relations (other than diplomatic) with countries possessing "friendly attitudes" has come to mean those countries China can dominate, or influence, or who accept the Chinese version of Marxism-Leninism. With the exception of Albania, the P.R.C. has had little success in wooing other members of the Communist Bloc to her side.³⁰

Subversion Exported. Outside of the Communist Bloc, in the uncommitted nations of Africa and Asia, the Chinese Communists have been expending considerable effort to gain support. In recent months these efforts have met with substantial failures.

Chou En-lai made a visit to African and Asian nations during late March and early April 1955, apparently to gain support for Chinese policies in the impending Afro-Asian conference to be held in Algiers.³¹ The purpose was not achieved as the African leaders were more interested in economic progress than a "world crusade" of socialist revolution. Although the conference was cancelled after the Algerian coup, preliminary negotiations indicated that China was determined to exclude the U.S.S.R. from the meetings.³²

The Indonesians, who had already fought a war of liberation against the Dutch and who are presently engaged in a war of sorts with Malaysia, were deemed by the P.R.C. to be ready for a more "Communist" regime. It is too soon to know with certainty, but it appears that the Chinese have lost considerable ground in Indonesia after the abortive "30 September Movement's" attempted coup in October 1965.³³

However, the Chinese Communists are not to be deterred from exporting subversion and exploiting the underdeveloped nations. In a recent report, issued in Peking, it was announced that the Thailand Patriotic Front had merged with the Thailand Independence Movement.³⁴ Thailand is not considered independent by

Chinese Communist standards and therefore requires "liberation" from the forces of imperialism.

Analysis. There are two current interpretations of Chinese Communist intentions or ambitions. One school exemplified by Professor Rupen, feels that the P.R.C. leaders want to be the sole speaker and self-sufficient, have no reliance on others, right all past wrongs, and become the dominant power in Asia.³⁵ On the other hand, the alternative is expressed by Richard Harris, China expert for the *London Times*, who feels China has no expansionist dreams and holds that their policy in Southeast Asia is aimed at gaining neutralist countries as friendly neighbors despite their revolutionary propaganda.³⁶

Conclusion. At this time it appears that a degree of both of the above analyses is correct. Economic necessity may be the controlling factor that gives China a defensive posture. It would be unwise to assume that a government determined to be self-reliant, to the point that the major source of economic aid has been virtually cut off (as will be shown), and has achieved nuclear power status, will not seek to exploit Western weaknesses and spread its doctrine. Communism is at the base an international doctrine. Communist China is vying for the leadership of the international Communist movement albeit with a strong chauvinistic motivation. There is little reason to believe China is unlike any other major power and will thus pursue world power competition.

CHAPTER III

RED CHINA'S ECONOMY

The Economic Problems. It was pointed out in Chapter II that the Chinese Communist Party faced formidable problems on assuming control of China. The C.C.P. leaders were not inexperienced in directing the basic economic structure and resources of their country, for the long struggle to gain national control had given them valuable training. In areas of China under Communist control, various experiments in land redistribution and the building of economic infrastructure had been going on since early in the 1930's.¹

The Chinese economy in 1949 was severely crippled by the effects of prolonged armed conflicts. Compared with the best yearly outputs between 1941-43, steel and iron production were reduced by over 80 percent, coal by 50 percent, petroleum by 60 percent, and heavy machine tools by 70 percent.² Communist experience had shown that, after initial land redistribution, agricultural output would temporarily decrease.³ The industrial centers in Manchuria under Soviet control were being systematically stripped, and the equipment was being shipped to the Soviet Union.⁴ The currency of the nation was in total collapse.⁵ China's national population of 541 million⁶ was the largest in the world and increasing. Yet less than 12 percent of the nation's land was under cultivation, and the amount had been static for nearly twenty years.⁷

China was four years behind the rest of the world in rebuilding after World War II because of the civil war. The development of the People's Republic of China into an industrial nation was a task unprecedented in the modern world. Edgar Snow, one of the two United States writers to visit Communist China in recent years, concludes that China, with a per capita income one-thirtieth that of the United States in 1949, could not modernize by accumulating capital in the Western manner of private enterprise and ownership.⁸ It would have to come from the sweat of the people.

Progress. By 1952 the Communist regime in China had achieved firm political control and had demonstrated to the world a surprising military capability in Korea. Soviet aid was beginning

to be felt by the economy, and the chaos of military conquest at an end. A period of intensive, forced economic growth commenced with the First Five-Year Plan, 1952-1957.⁹

Initial progress was slow with industrial output increasing 60 percent by 1955 compared to 1952 levels. In 1956, a concerted drive to reach desired goals was effected which resulted in an overall increase of over 200 percent in the value of industrial output between 1952 and 1957 and an annual economic growth estimated as high as 8 percent.¹⁰ During this same period approximately 22.3 percent of the national budget was earmarked for defense expenditures.¹¹ Franz Michael, a recognized China scholar, predicted in 1958 that, if the current rate of growth continued, China would equal Japan by 1970 in heavy industrial production.¹² The Chinese leadership, in a hurry to catch up with the West and confident in its success, inaugurated the "Great Leap Forward" in 1958-1959 during the Second Five-Year Plan.¹³

Backslide. The "Great Leap Forward" proved to be a failure. Official shortcomings and overstatement by party cadres led to the gross miscalculation that the Second Five-Year Plan industrial production goals "had already been fulfilled in 1958 and 1959,"¹⁴ two years ahead of schedule. It appears that Communist economic planners lacked an appreciation of modern methods of governmental planning and control. This led to blunders, such as the precipitous introduction of communes, which destroyed the ancient agricultural base and removed family rationing controls on food consumption.¹⁵ Another error was vast labor wastage in the well-publicized and highly unsuccessful "backyard steel" production program. In actual fact, the Chinese economy, rather than booming, was heading for serious trouble in 1959.

Despite official reports, grain production fell in 1959, continued to decrease through 1960, and the total gross national product fell in 1961 to approximately the 1953 level.¹⁶ In 1961 China began importing wheat and grain from Western countries such as Australia and Canada.¹⁷ At the same time trade was significantly reduced with the U.S.S.R. and Bloc countries.¹⁸

Self-Reliance at Any Price. At the 40th anniversary of the founding of the C.C.P., Liu Shao-ch'i, chairman of the People's Republic of China, said in his address, "Today our country is still economically backward. Imperialism continues to bully us. The people of our country urgently demand an end to this backwardness."¹⁹ The people were to wait longer. In December

1963, the C.C.P. announced: "Serious natural calamities during three consecutive years and the perfidious action of those [i.e., Soviet] who unilaterally tore up [some 600] agreements and withdrew [some 1,400] experts have resulted in successfully building socialism by relying on our own efforts."²⁰ This is not the Soviet version of the events in 1960, but regardless of on whose initiative the Soviet aid was cut back, the U.S.S.R. did not help China to weather the economic crisis. With the economy in such a poor state, China still repaid the loan owed the Soviets—at considerable sacrifice to industrial development. This debt was repaid by decreasing badly needed capital investment in industry 75 percent in 1962 below that made in 1959.²¹ The industrial goods China needs are readily available from Japan. However, to trade with a U.S.-oriented Japan would require modifications in China's foreign policy and ideological doctrines the Communist leaders appear unwilling to make.²²

On October 16, 1964, Communist China detonated a nuclear device.²³ It is generally believed that this cost China a great deal in terms of fundamental technological progress in other areas of scientific development. The decision to develop nuclear weapons underscores the C.C.P. determination and willingness to sacrifice long-range goals for immediate psychological impact and prestige.²⁴

Self-reliance has become increasingly engrained in the ideology. Though China can still profitably use Soviet technical and economic aid, the struggle for power and the strong anti-Western stance prevent the C.C.P. from accepting assistance from condemned "revisionists."

Prospects. In 1963, after the failure of the "Great Leap Forward" and several bad crop years, the *People's Daily* set the mood of the Chinese Communists planners: "Brimming over with happiness, the Chinese people have entered a new year, the year of 1963, after striding through 1962, a year woven of struggles and victories."²⁵ United States economic analysts felt that in 1962 the economic crisis had "bottomed out."²⁶ In 1964 the Chinese GNP had returned to the levels immediately preceding the "Great Leap," and industrial production increased, but the latter was likely caused by a return to production of plants idled by the agricultural crisis.²⁷ The per capita income fell with the economic backslide aided by an estimated two percent annual population increase.²⁸

Population is considered an asset by the Chinese and does represent a most impressive feature. The population could prove to be a liability if the economy does not expand. It is currently estimated that the labor force is approximately 250 million. It has been carefully deduced by Western researchers that China currently has a 2.2 percent population growth and a GNP increase of about 4 percent annually.²⁹ This will allow for modest growth and a small margin for error. The Third Five-Year Plan has been delayed until 1966 instead of 1963 as originally planned.³⁰ In effect the "Great Leap" has cost the P.R.C. nearly a decade of progress.

Any economic predictions on Communist China must be based on analysis of incomplete information. The official statistics were discontinued after they were severely and officially discredited at a national conference held at Lushan in August 1959.³¹ For an economically backward country to accumulate the capital necessary for economic progress, agricultural consumption must be held below production. China is still importing wheat and grain. This may be economically feasible as China shows a favorable balance of foreign trade.³² China possesses vast resources for steel production, large resources of coal, water power, and oil. These indicate a capability of huge industrial development.³³ However, in 1962 China's GNP was but 11 percent of the United States and only 16 percent of the U.S.S.R.'s.³⁴

Conclusions. The "Great Leap Forward" debacle is indicative of the Chinese leadership's obsessive haste to greatness and the lack of sophisticated "know-how." Whether the Chinese can solve the formidable problems posed by the huge, largely untrained, population and concomitantly, pursue a bellicose and lonely course remains to be seen. The real key to China's future lies in the ability of the leadership to achieve the economic progress needed to build a modern nation.

CHAPTER IV

COMMUNIST CHINA'S NATIONAL STRATEGY

The 1949-1958 Period. Since World War II, atomic and nuclear weapons have dominated the strategic thinking of the major world powers. Communist China, emerging into this era with strong desires for world power, found herself restricted without modern nuclear weaponry. This disadvantage was initially offset by U.S.S.R. protection, assured under the terms of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance and Friendship signed in 1950.

As a nuclear "have not" nation, China maintained a loud public, policy of contempt toward the destructive potential of nuclear weapons. The Chinese policy, in general, sought to disparage the effectiveness of new weapons, sought pledges of "no first use," and indicated a strong skepticism that the weapons would ever be used. Experience in the Korean War probably accounts for this skeptical outlook and to Mao Tse-tung's now famous contemptuous "paper tiger" remark concerning atomic bombs.

China's policy during this period, despite involvement in military operations and the Korean War, was to pose as a backward country—desperate for peace in order to solve pressing internal problems. Edgar Faure, former Prime Minister of France, was convinced from conversations with Chou En-lai, during a 1956 visit to China, that Communist China was passionately devoted to peace, required peace to grow, and that armament expenditures were being decreased yearly.¹

Military Adventures in Korea. The P.R.C. actions in the initial phases of the Korean War indicate that there was no prior plan to help North Korea.² The massive intervention of P.L.A. forces in October came as a surprise to United Nations commanders. In support of this, Allen Whiting, of the Rand Corporation, in his study, *China Crosses the Yalu*, concluded that China was interested in the U.S.S.R.-sponsored North Korean attack, but lacked responsibility for its direction or success.³ Mr. Whiting's analysis of the events in 1950 indicated that China's belated intervention came when U.N. forces appeared to be endangering China's borders. He also conjectured that the United States military presence in the Far East was exerting

pressure in areas of traditional Chinese interest, and China felt it must prevent other nations from settling issues without China being heard.⁴ The war in Korea ended in a stalemate, with victory claimed by both sides. Communism did not extend its area of influence onto the Korean peninsula, but U.N. forces did not throw back the Chinese-backed North Koreans. The last major offensive of the Korean War was a Communist victory.

In the Formosa Straits. The return of Taiwan has been a precondition for China's participation in virtually every international negotiation from disarmament to membership in the United Nations. It is extremely irksome to China to have a defeated enemy (Chiang Kai-shek) speaking on behalf of Chinese in the main international forum, the United Nations. During the 1950's the Chinese clamor for liberation of Taiwan was augmented by several military operations in the Formosa Straits.

The Tachens, an island group 230 miles northwest of Taiwan, were attacked by Communist forces in January 1955. The Nationalist forces on the islands were subsequently evacuated by the U.S. Seventh Fleet on 12 February.⁵ Commencing on August 23, 1958, P.R.C. artillery subjected Quemoy, Little Quemoy Island, and sea approaches to heavy bombardments.⁶ Negotiations toward a cease-fire were proposed by the Chinese Foreign Minister in September to be held between P.R.C. and U.S. Ambassadors in Warsaw.⁷ Negotiations were commenced in mid-September, and shellings have since been reduced to sporadic nuisance firings.⁸

In India. Large-scale fighting on the Sino-Indian frontier broke out on October 20, 1962.⁹ On November 21, 1962, the Chinese announced a unilateral cease-fire.¹⁰ Opposing forces are still adhering to the cease-fire lines despite occasional minor skirmishes. Former Indian Prime Minister Shastri expressed concern that China still has territorial ambitions at India's expense, and reported that significant Chinese military construction was in progress along their common frontier.¹¹

Significance of the Military Adventures. The Chinese maneuvers in the Formosan Straits area in 1955 and 1958 were probably designed to test U.S. resolve with respect to the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China.¹² Another outgrowth of these preliminary adventures has been the tempering of the Sino-Soviet military alliance. It has become apparent that the mantle of Soviet protection does not extend to military operations initiated by China. The U.S.S.R.

has also been unwilling to give China sufficient military support or direct assistance to achieve purely Chinese national objectives.

The Sino-Indian border dispute has shown the different national objectives that exist between the two major Communist powers (see Chapter II). The Soviet Union is not likely to support the Chinese in revanchist objectives since the U.S.S.R. still has territorial benefits that accrued from czarist Russia and which are a source of dispute between China and the Soviets.¹³

With the exception of Korea, the P.R.C. has acted militarily with restraint. This reflects an appreciation of their limited military capabilities. The continued harassment of Quemoy and border incursions against India and the U.S.S.R. indicate that the Chinese will take advantage of weaknesses to reassert ancient territorial claims and strengthen their position in Asia.

Without Soviet military assistance to rely upon and the withdrawal of advisors and other support in 1960, China invoked the "self-reliance" theme regarding national military strategy. In September of 1959, the Minister of National Defense and the Chief of the General Staff were replaced amid considerable criticism for being excessively military in viewpoint and sacrificing personal experience to dependence on foreign countries and foreign experiences.¹⁴

"Go-It-Alone." Alice Langley Hsieh, in research sponsored by the U.S. Air Force, analyzed P.L.A. military publications recently made available to U.S. scholars. Mrs. Hsieh concluded that the Chinese by 1961 were firmly committed to a policy of reliance on their own strategy, doctrine, and capabilities. The military writings of Mao Tse-tung were given renewed emphasis as early as July 1958.¹⁵ The writings of Mao constantly emphasize that revolutionary victory can be obtained only by relying on one's own efforts. This undoubtedly results from the Chinese Communists bitter experiences of having twice had U.S.S.R. support denied and in the abortive United Fronts formed with the Kuomintang.

Dr. Harold Hinton, a recognized authority on China, feels that the military and political strategy laid down in the 1920's and 1930's by Mao is very relevant today in Chinese doctrinal thinking.¹⁶ The strategy developed during the early years of

the Chinese Communist Party has been embellished into a master plan for a Socialist world victory utilizing "people's wars." Mao's tactics of securing rural base areas and isolating the cities have become the basic tactics of wars of national liberation.

"Cities of the World." An insight into current Chinese strategic thinking was provided by a major policy article written by the Chinese Minister of National Defense, Lin Piao, which was accorded three and one half pages in Peking newspapers on September 2, 1965.¹⁷ In a subsection entitled, "The International Significance of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's Theory of People's War."¹⁸ Mao's rural base area versus cities thesis was seen as the world situation of today. The industrial nations in North America and Western Europe were described as representative of cities which were surrounded by the "rural" underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and South America. Mao was eulogized as a "military scientist, proficient at directing war . . ." and the formulator of a new and complete theory for revolution.¹⁹

China gives vociferous support to wars of national liberation. The final defeat of the hated forces of "capitalist-imperialism" is seen to come from a worldwide proliferation of "people's wars" that will encircle and annihilate the "cities of the world." Reliance on a strategy based on people is not strange for a country with the world's largest population. The strong propaganda support given such wars is also an indication of Chinese recognition of their military weaknesses. Lin's article is notable for the advice given the revolutionaries not to count on outside assistance, but to adhere to strict self-reliance.

The revolutionary forces of the world were told by Lin not to fear nuclear retaliation, that sustained close fighting by ground forces will determine the outcome, and that the "spiritual atomic bomb" they possessed was far more valuable than atomic weapons.²⁰

Belligose but Pragmatic. As yet China does not possess atomic weapons. They have, therefore, indicated a preference for protracted struggles on a guerrilla basis which exploit their experience in warfare and the main Chinese asset—manpower. The belligerent doctrinal and propaganda statements of China can lead to a conclusion that China is poised to strike out in aggressive war. Judging from the actual military ventures of China in recent years, it is concluded by most authorities that China is very cautious tactically and not eager to confront the United States.²¹

The following remarks made by Mao Tse-tung contrast with more bellicose statements and belie interpretation of Chinese policy as reckless.

War is a well-known phenomenon; when it is waged, people die. During these twenty-five years of war, the Chinese people lost several tens of millions of dead and wounded. As regards war on paper, there are no dead in such a war. We have been waging such a war for several years now, and not a single person has died. We are prepared to wage this war for another twenty-five years.²²

Alice Hsieh found the military thinking of China to be very pragmatic and Chinese military doctrine based on realistic assessment of: (1) China's military capabilities; (2) U.S. military might; (3) the extent to which U.S.S.R. support could be relied upon, and; (4) the areas where China's limited military power can be advantageously employed.²³ The Chinese are apparently cognizant that opportunities will exist to use military power (e.g., the Indian border) where it would be difficult to bring direct U.S. military counterforce to bear. China can be expected to continue to threaten neighboring countries in order to influence their policies of Chinese superiority in Southeast Asia.

Close analysis of less dramatic Chinese writings reveals that the military leadership is well aware of the significance of nuclear warfare and China's particular vulnerability. It appears that they have assessed the chance of escalation to nuclear war at a lower level of probability than the Soviets and are thus willing to accept greater risks. Though the Sino-Soviet military alliance has been strained, it is not broken, and China probably still counts on U.S.S.R. backing if the United States is pressed too far by a miscalculation. Dr. Hinton concluded that the Soviets would likely aid China with military force if air attacks on China came too close to U.S.S.R. territory or U.S. military forces were landed in Northern China.²⁴

Toward Nuclear Power. The incessant propaganda barrage from Peking has had the effect in world opinion of branding China as reckless and fearless of nuclear war. Contrary to this propaganda posture is the realistic assessment of various contingencies, in particular China's vulnerability to surprise air attack.²⁵

In 1963, during the continuing polemics, the Chinese denounced the U.S.S.R. for agreeing with the United States and the United Kingdom to restrict nuclear information to those countries then possessing nuclear power. The Chinese also revealed that the Soviets had refused in 1959 to provide technical data on atomic bomb construction as agreed in 1957.²⁶ The divergent national policies of the U.S.S.R. and China by 1959 have already been shown, and the statement was probably calculated to reinforce later claims of developing a nuclear capability by Chinese effort alone. The unwillingness of the Soviets to provide complete atomic weapon information reinforced P.R.C. determination to "go-it-alone."

On May 14, 1964, a second nuclear test was announced. Western analysis believed this to be of an advanced device. Thus far, the P.R.C. has been content to announce the achievements merely as evidence of: technological advance, validity of the "self-reliance" theme, and as a victory for revolutionary peoples of the world.²⁷

Only towards Japan has China issued statements that, in effect, are nuclear blackmail. Propaganda aimed at Japan has stressed the awesome effects of nuclear war and the dangerous consequences of permitting U.S. nuclear power to be stationed on Japanese soil.²⁸

By 1961 Chinese military strategists had considered tactical employment of nuclear weapons.²⁹ The scanty evidence available indicates that the Chinese, while believing that manpower is the keystone to victory in war, were aware of the destructive potential of modern weapons systems.³⁰

China's joining of the ranks of nuclear powers will increase the creditability of progressive policies and lend weight to their claim of leadership of revolutionary struggles.

Conclusion. The P.R.C. leaders are cognizant of their military and technological inferiority to their principal foe, the United States. However, for historic and doctrinal reasons, a bellicose strategy of aggressive war and cautious military adventures, where U.S. force will not be encountered, has been adopted. The ultimate goal is to reassert Chinese supremacy in Southeast Asia and to remove the restraint imposed by U.S. power, seen by the Chinese as hostile, warlike and encircling.

Not having a sophisticated strategic weapon system, the Chinese Communist leaders have chosen an old form of military conflict and have given it strategic value and significance. The degree of success that is achieved by the mobile, guerrilla-type war taking place in Vietnam could well be a major factor in determining the scope of future Chinese maneuvers in Southeast Asia.

CHAPTER V

MILITARY CAPABILITIES

Transportation Problems. China is the second largest country in the world. The area of China is approximately 250,000 square miles greater than the United States including Alaska, Hawaii, and the territorial islands.¹ The eastern border of China is an immense stretch of seacoast which exceeds the contour length of the U.S. Gulf and Atlantic seabords combined. The east-west breadth is the equivalent of the distance from San Diego, California, to Cape Cod, Massachusetts. A north-south straight line distance along China's eastern edge would stretch from Cuba to Hudson Bay, Canada. The size of the land demands modern transportation systems to support industrial development and provide strategic movement of military forces. As yet, China does not possess such systems.

It is often said that nearly anything can be proved with statistics. To appreciate China's internal transport and logistic problems, a few statistics are valuable. In 1959 the total rail mileage in China was 24,000 miles or one tenth the U.S. total. In the same year, China had only 270,000 miles of roadways which is meager compared to the U.S. total of 3,510,000.² Since 1960, China has been "placing agriculture first,"³ while the United States has engaged in major federal and state road-building programs which should make the above comparison even more startling.

A further contrast can be made by comparing the rail freight tonnages for 1960, the last year's statistics available from China. In 1960 U.S. railroads carried a total of 228,000 million tons while Communist China's railways handled 6,360 million tons.⁴ This comparison takes on added significance in a national emergency. During World War II, U.S. railroads carried over 90 percent of all commercial and military freight with an approximate doubling of the normal peacetime peak employment.⁵

China has three rail accesses from outside the country. Through Hanoi and North Vietnam, the Chinese provinces of Yunnan and Kwangsi are linked. Links to the Soviet Trans-Siberian railway are made through Ulan Bator, Mongolia, and Harbin, Manchuria.

China has spent considerable effort on inland waterways to exploit and extend a historical method of transport. It is reported that public work projects have doubled the navigable mileage of inland waterways.⁶ However, vast areas of China cannot be reached by inland waterways, and convenient waterways do not reach between the industrial centers of Manchuria and other sections of the country. The accounts of recent visitors to China are notably lacking in reports of motor transport. China is still a land where human power bears the major share of the transportation burden and likely will be for sometime to come.

Manpower. The Chinese possess a "deeply rooted, almost mystical, belief in the power and potentiality of mobilized masses."⁷ The obvious asset China possesses, not held by the remaining countries of the world, is an immense population. China has a staggering 250 million persons in its work-force pool (working age 15-60 for men, 55 for women).⁸ The effective use and control of this vast resource has not been fully mastered by the C.C.P.

The inefficient farming methods employed by the peasants and the lack of full-time employment involved in farming were viewed as a tremendous untapped labor source by Chinese planners. In this they were correct. A fundamental cause of the "great-leap" failure was the poor use of this labor. During this period of forced economic growth, literally every able-bodied person was employed.⁹ The government assumed nearly complete control over, and responsibility for, the huge peasant population with the establishment of the communes. The communes did not work with complete success, as building a "new China" was not sufficient incentive for back-breaking labor to an uneducated peasant. In 1959, the Central Committee of the C.C.P. recognized the errors and decentralized the communes, permitting a return to private ownership of certain items of personal property and "private plot" farming.¹⁰ Mass labor is still utilized, but total communization of the peasant population has been postponed. The C.C.P. has viewed the failure of the communes partially, to the inadequate political indoctrination of the cadres and the people.

The People's Liberation Army is the element of power wielded by the C.C.P. It is also the model they hold before a population that is constantly exhorted to "learn from the P.L.A."¹¹ The goal of the P.R.C. Government is to instill in the people, labor battalions, agricultural brigades, and militia the same degree of political organization and indoctrination maintained in the P.L.A.

Mao Tse-tung has publicly expressed concern that the succeeding generations did not possess the revolutionary zeal that would produce dedicated leaders to carry on when the present leaders were gone.¹² The "revisionism" in the U.S.S.R. proclaimed loudly by Chinese propaganda is apparently seen as a potential danger to effective control of the Chinese people. The failure to organize effective communes and the spectre of an infectious "revisionism," that would weaken the revolutionary spirit, has caused the C.C.P. to stress politics over other doctrines. A new slogan by Mao was given prominent display in the Chinese press and apparently sets the theme for 1966: "Politics is the supreme commander, the very soul of our work."¹³ Political indoctrination is emphasized in all governmental work and is considered essential by the C.C.P. in achieving and maintaining full control of the Chinese masses.

The Chinese leadership recognizes the importance of the large numbers of Chinese people. Mao and other leaders have consistently asserted that the country's "greatest asset" is its vast population.¹⁴ No overpopulation problem has ever been officially declared.

The ability of the P.R.C. Government to mobilize the people in the event of a national emergency must not be overlooked. The militia is reported to be 200 million strong. Some doubt as to the effectiveness of the militia as a military force has been deduced from P.L.A. publications, and it is concluded the militia is primarily a conscript labor force.¹⁵ The significance of the militia is that a paramilitary force of tremendous size exists and can be mobilized to support military operations.

China, Southeast Asia, and the Indian subcontinent are areas relatively devoid of modern transportation networks. Modern armies trained in tactics stressing mechanized mobility and requiring mountains of supplies will be at a disadvantage in this theater. China, with easily provisioned and readily available mass labor possesses a distinct advantage. The Chinese military planners appreciate this, and strategic thinking is based on falling back on the immense terrain and manpower in the event of atomic attack. The destructive capabilities of atomic weapons is admitted, but to conquer China the Chinese leaders believe that invasion is required, and here they believe in their historical invulnerability to complete subjugation and ability to ultimately triumph.¹⁶

The advantage of the Chinese in a conventional war over an unconfined front and friendly terrain cannot be overemphasized. The prodigious feats performed by coolie labor in World War II, Korea, and now in Vietnam are noteworthy and reflect a military capability. Human labor does not represent a modern supply system, but it is adequate for the military theater, terrain, and type of warfare envisioned by the Chinese.

People's Liberation Army—the Army. The Chinese Communists in 1949 ended a long armed struggle for control of the Chinese people. Their People's Army was then the largest in the world; the number has been estimated to be approximately five million. This was not an army in the generally accepted sense, but rather a collection of guerrilla bands, a hard core of Communist troops and large groups of Nationalist soldiers. In 1949 nearly mass surrender of Nationalist armies had forced the P.L.A. to absorb whole units directly into their forces.¹⁷ The equipment of this force was a polyglot of Chinese, Russian, and large quantities of American and Japanese arms.¹⁸

In 1950 the modernization of the army was commenced under the newly signed treaty with the Soviet Union. The size of the army was reduced to about two and one half million and has remained at that level.¹⁹ On entering the Korean conflict in October 1950, the P.L.A. was confronted with severe logistics problems. Equipment failed to function, ammunition was in short supply and defective; the lack of transportation and escort personnel made supply of front-line forces difficult and occasionally impossible.²⁰ These deficiencies undoubtedly led the Chinese to pressure the U.S.S.R. for accelerated military aid to modernize the P.L.A. The army is now equipped primarily with Soviet arms of World War II vintage. Since 1960, provision of military supplies to China by the U.S.S.R. has virtually ceased.²¹

There is evidence that the long use of the army for construction work and the aging of the civil and Korean war veterans has created morale and combat effectiveness problems.²² Since Korea, the army had been losing combat veterans and gaining conscripts without operational experience. The 1965-1970 period would see noncombat-trying officers reaching regimental command level.²³ That the army can still be an effective force was demonstrated by the Indian border campaign. It would be dangerous to underestimate a force accustomed to the hardships of the land and heavily politically indoctrinated. The morale of the P.L.A. is still secondary to the political purity and complete

ideological commitment demanded by C.C.P. leaders. In a move designed to ensure the party control over the army and prevent the emergence of a military hierarchy, all insignia of rank were abolished in the summer of 1965.²⁴ The political inculcation of the army meets with some resistance. Recent criticism of army officers for failure to fully appreciate the requirement for political study was printed in Peking newspapers.²⁵ The P.L.A. as a whole is still an elite force within China.

The modernization of the army has restricted the mobility that was so impressive during the Chinese civil war. The army still possesses tactical mobility, but lacks a strategic mobility because of inadequate logistics and transport.²⁶ The army is at its best in rugged terrain where the endurance of the Chinese infantry can be exploited.

The Air Force. The Communist Chinese Air Force is composed entirely of Russian aircraft. The number of aircraft is declining (3,000 in 1961 to 2,300 in 1964)²⁷ owing to attrition, obsolescence, and withdrawal of U.S.S.R. support. The bulk of the force is composed of MIG-15's and 17's of the early 1950's vintage. Small numbers of MIG-19 aircraft are available along with IL-28 medium bombers, roughly equivalent to the U.S.A.F. B-57. The training and proficiency of the air force is weak by Western standards. This is a result of a general lack of petroleum products and spare parts.²⁸

The major threat envisioned by the Chinese strategists is surprise air attack. Accordingly, the Communist Chinese Air Force (C.C.A.F.) has been assigned the primary role in defending the country against attack. Recent Chinese military doctrine has stressed mobility for the C.C.A.F. and a staggered defense in depth at points of maximum effectiveness.²⁹

With the bulk of the C.C.A.F. aircraft rapidly becoming obsolete and the U.S.S.R. pipeline drying up, the P.R.C. needs a source of airframes, aircraft engines, and spare parts. Recent reports indicate the Chinese may have the capability to produce MIG-17 aircraft at a plant located at Shenyang.³⁰ The C.C.A.F. and the army have not worked as a tactical team nor has airpower been employed by the Chinese Communists in other than a defensive role.

The C.C.A.F. is likely to continue in a defensive role while possessing a limited capability for offensive employment. Prior to the 1960 polemics, the Soviets supplied the P.R.C. with

"rockets," and there is evidence to suggest that China is developing a nuclear missile delivery system in preference to an aircraft deliverable bomb.³¹

The Navy. China, despite an immense coastline, has only briefly exploited seapower for national expansion. The Chinese were not disposed to seafaring as the land was large and plentiful. Historically, China faced north and west and not south and east. The southern coastal states were not integrated into the Chinese cultural sphere until the 8th or 9th century B.C.³² Chinese history chronicles one period of large maritime exploration and expansion. Under Emperor Yung-lo several expeditions in the years 1405-1433 were undertaken by large fleets in the South China Sea and Indian Oceans, penetrating to the East African coast.³³ These feats preceded the famed Portuguese exploits in the latter part of the 15th century. The potentialities of seapower were never grasped by the Chinese Government, and after the last voyage in 1433, interest in seafaring lapsed, and the experience gained was not exploited.³⁴

The Chinese Communists, having won their power through land warfare, have continued to relegate seapower a secondary position. The navy is a small force compared to the army. It is little more than a coastal defense force and woefully small for the task. Motor torpedo boats comprise the largest number of a single type in the naval force (approximately 150). The navy has been supplied with 28 Soviet submarines.³⁵ With the acquisition of submarines, the P.R.C. gained a weapon capable of extending the national will to a considerable distance from home waters.

Since the commencement of the Sino-Soviet dispute, China's trade has increased with Western nations. This has intensified China's dependence on sea commerce. China's registered merchant shipping in 1964 was 535 thousand gross tons.³⁶ The Chinese Republic (Taiwan) registered 588 thousand gross tons, and the United States 22,430 thousand gross tons in the same year.³⁷ If the current trend toward more trade with the "Western Bloc" continues, China will become more and more vulnerable to economic pressures that can be enforced by embargoes on shipping facilities, credit, exports, etc. Further, China's geographical location and limited rail access makes the country dependent on imports delivered by sea for modern industrial development. Finally, due to her small navy, China is very susceptible to the external pressure that can be applied by conventional seapower.

Technology and Industrial Advance. The P.L.A. is not equipped with or versed in modern weaponry. The estimates of the Chinese Communist Military Affairs Council (M.A.C.) has led them to conclude that it is "Men over War Machines."³⁸ The Chinese espouse this theme to cover up their lack in sophisticated weapons and inability to supply national liberation movements with other than basic weapons, while fully recognizing the implication of modern weapons in both tactical and strategic roles. There is some evidence that the U.S.S.R. supplied China with short-range missiles and rockets as early as 1959.³⁹ If such were the case, China may be able to develop a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) system capable of delivering nuclear warheads by 1970.⁴⁰

On the basis of exhaustive technical analysis, a research team concluded in 1963 that China would not invest in large numbers of even crude nuclear weapons.⁴¹ The main benefit to a country without the means to deliver a nuclear warhead over strategic distances was held to be propaganda value. This view is arrived at mainly from economic considerations. The willingness of the Chinese to sacrifice economic considerations to political policies has already been discussed. The possession of even crude weapons would certainly give China tremendous leverage in dealing with Southeast Asian neighbors. Dr. Hinton's analysis of China's nuclear capability is that the Chinese will build MRBM's, with intercontinental missiles a possibility after five to ten years of research and development.⁴²

The necessary sinews of modern military power are petroleum, oil and lubricants (P.O.L.). Chinese military training has suffered from a lack of P.O.L. Peking recently reported that they had achieved self-sufficiency in petroleum with the development of the Tatsing oil field into a modern facility.⁴³ Western observers in Hong Kong, reviewing China's economic progress up to mid-1964, found that substantial imports of refined petroleum products were still required and that the Tatsing (Ta Ching) oil field capability was overemphasized.⁴⁴ China does have adequate crude petroleum reserves to support industrial expansion. Possession of modern refineries and transport to exploit the Tatsing field would be of great benefit to the Chinese militarily.

There have been reports that the P.R.C. now has the capability of producing radar sets and computers.⁴⁵ However, with the effective sealing off of economic reports from China in 1960, the growth of China's industrial potential has become very difficult to estimate. The only conclusion possible from the available

Western analysis and Chinese statements is that progress is being made. How fast and in what militarily significant directions the progress is being made cannot be answered with certainty. The official C.C.P. organ *Jenmin Jih Pao*, in a 1966 New Year editorial, stated that the P.R.C. plan is to catch up with advanced countries "within 20 to 30 years." 46

Capabilities Today and Tomorrow. China, with the largest army in Asia and manpower resources that are nearly limitless, poses a serious threat to neighboring countries, in particular, to Southeast Asia. The only constraint against direct aggression by China in this area is U.S. military power.

Military power along the Sino-Indian border is used by China to influence Indian policies, and China's military might has convinced Cambodia that alignment with the P.R.C. is advantageous. This has been accomplished with only a semimodern army but one that dwarfs any other in the Asian sphere. China can continue to exert this influence indefinitely. The current lack in modern transport, defense industry and modern weaponry is not a serious deficiency in the area China seeks to influence most—peripheral countries. The P.L.A. is a significant force, adequate for the current Chinese strategy of limited conflict that avoids confrontation with the United States.

China has demonstrated nuclear power, and indications are that nuclear weapons will be supplied to the P.L.A. With nuclear armaments, China will attain the ability to exert even more pressure on surrounding nations. Nuclear weaponry will allow military adventures of increased scope as China will be able to counterthreat the United States to a still higher level of conflict and exploit the U.S. demonstrated reluctance to use atomic weapons. Chinese possession of an 800 to 1,000-mile missile would make the Philippines, Japan, Southeast Asia (excluding the lower Malay Peninsula), and the main population areas of India hostage to Chinese atomic threats. The P.R.C. will place Western interests in Southeast Asia in increasing jeopardy should it gain the nuclear capability that is obviously being sought.

Major weaknesses in China's defense are the vulnerability to seapower and an obsolescent air force. The exploitation of these weaknesses by the United States and Western allies in a war with China would depend, however, on an estimate of the military support the U.S.S.R. would give to China.

In summary the Chinese have a significant capability to menace Western interests in Asia and will have an even greater capability with the acquirement of nuclear weapons.

CHAPTER VI

WHITHER CHINA?

Restoration of the "Middle Kingdom." Southeast Asia, as seen by the P.R.C. leaders in Peking, may appear today "as Latin America would look to Washington if the Monroe Doctrine had been shattered for a hundred years,"¹ and it was considered possible to restore U.S. hegemony in Latin America. Chinese policies and national strategy are calculated to build a modern version of the Chinese "Middle Kingdom" and establish China as the cultural and political leader of the world.

The Chinese firmly believe in their cultural superiority which is intensified by exaggeration of past injustices suffered at the hands of foreign "barbarians." Communist doctrine is compatible with ancient tenets of Confucianism as well as the ideals of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The goals of China under the C.C.P. are identical to those any government of strongly chauvinistic China would pursue. Professor Fitzgerald wrote in 1952 that regardless of the politics of the Chinese Government in power, they would strive for and demand nothing less than the complete withdrawal of foreign military power in the Far East so that no vestige of Western colonialism would remain.²

Sino-Soviet Divergence. There is no evidence that the giants of the communist world will return to the palmy days of the early 1950's. The amazingly bitter Sino-Soviet dispute is a prime example of historical Chinese distrust of foreigners. The disruption in friendly relations has cost China needed economic aid and assistance as well as requiring a reevaluation of military strategic planning. As in the days of the civil war, the C.C.P. propaganda again asserts that dependence on outside assistance is foolhardy and that self-reliance is the only means to achieve and consolidate the fruits of victory.

P.R.C. official statements and editorials continue to assail the Soviets for betrayal of people's wars of liberation and to proclaim that violent revolution is the only method to attain political power. Some Western authorities conclude that the Sino-Soviet split indicates the end of "world communism as a united force."³ Strong national self-interests and differing stages of economic development are usually considered main causes of the

rift. Professor Rupen, professing a somewhat different view, feels that China deliberately initiated the dispute in order to disrupt the U.S.-Soviet détente.⁴ The lessening in tension between the United States and U.S.S.R. would allow increased U.S. attention to Southeast Asia, which is detrimental to Chinese objectives in the area.

The polemics between Peking and Moscow have clearly demonstrated the strong will of the current leadership and their determination to accept a lonely and difficult course in pursuit of world power and the leadership of world "Socialist revolution."

World Revolution Chinese Style. That Socialist revolution must be accomplished through violent means, is a dogma consistently preached by Peking. Moscow and Peking differ on this point; the Soviets allowing for peaceful or evolutionary change. Western Sinophiles do not believe that Chinese statements can be taken literally on this point, claiming China's economically backward condition and lack of strategic weapons do not permit China to provide other than propaganda support for wars of national liberation. It is also pointed out that China's armed forces are mainly defensive in character and not deployed outside of China. This is an interesting point of view, but it overlooks the long-range advantages that accrue to China by generating "people's wars" through subversion while not actively engaged militarily herself. That this is China's strategy is amply demonstrated in the world today.

China has a substantial interest in maintaining a sympathetic government in Hanoi and in supporting reunification of Vietnam under North Vietnamese leadership. Peking gives strong propaganda backing to Hanoi and issues violent verbal attacks against the United States. This activity has cost China little in goods and nothing in manpower. Prolonging the Vietnam War increases the likelihood of creating tension between the United States and the U.S.S.R. It also creates an enormous economic drain on the United States.

The P.R.C. is abetting a subversive front organization dedicated to the overthrow of the Government of Thailand. Peking has also announced the formation of the "National Liberation League and the National Liberation Army of Malaya."⁵ These front organizations are modeled after the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front and calculated to create instability in Southeast Asia and to further Chinese expansionistic ambitions.

Chinese attempts to foster new wars of national liberation have met with recent reversals. In Indonesia the army has commenced operations designed to eliminate the local Communist Party. The Indonesian Communist Party is held responsible for the abortive coup last year and the murder of several generals. In Africa, the Central African Republic, Upper Volta, and Dahomey suffered military coups in the first week of 1966. In each case the Communist Chinese embassy and technical missions personnel were requested to leave immediately.⁶ No reason was announced for the ouster of the P.R.C. representatives, but it is considered significant that the new governments were headed by army officers. As in Indonesia the army is usually the first arm of governmental power to feel the probings of a subversive force. The C.C.P. leaders apparently are convinced by their own propaganda that the world is ripe for "people's wars;" and simultaneous conflicts throughout the globe will defeat Western imperialism (the United States).

Defensive Posture. A main criticism of U.S. policy vis-à-vis China, voiced by those who feel China's posture is completely defensive, is the containment of China by U.S. military force.

Initially this criticism made a persuasive argument; however, recent developments in P.R.C. policy contradict such an assessment of Communist China's outlook.

Had the C.C.P. leader's objectives been world peace and stability within which to consolidate their political control and promote economic progress and industrial development, why antagonize the U.S.S.R. and jeopardize the military alliance? Why channel badly needed capital and scientific talent into nuclear weapons development when economic progress was severely strained? The answer is that P.R.C. aspirations are not compatible with a weak military posture. Marshal Chen Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister has stated, "The Chinese people will build atomic weapons, even if they have to go without trousers."⁷ As yet China does not pose a direct threat to the United States. This does not mean that China is not a threat or that China harbors no dream of expansion. In a letter published after his death, Adlai E. Stevenson argued that Chinese expansion existed and must be checked as indicated by the following:

I do not think that the idea of Chinese expansionism is so fanciful that the effort to check it is irrational.

And if one argues that it should not be checked, I believe you set us off on the old, old route whereby expansive powers push at more doors and more doors, believing they will open until, at the ultimate door resistance is unavoidable and major war breaks out.⁸

China still possesses the largest land army in the world. While the air force is not equipped with aircraft comparable to the latest models in either the United States or U.S.S.R., it has far greater numbers than any other far eastern nation. The navy, until the acquisition of submarines, was the only arm of the P.L.A. that possessed no real offensive capability. China projects an image of immense strength to neighboring countries and has the potential for creating instability in any power balance set up in Asia which excluded Chinese participation.

Economic Problems Persist. Predictions or assessments of China's capabilities all draw attention to the lack of statistical information available from Communist China. Evaluations must be based on partial information gleaned from outside sources and announcements made by the P.R.C. for propaganda reasons. Recently Cuba and Red China have had an exchange of charges concerning an \$80 million cutback in Chinese aid to Cuba.⁹ Chinese insistence that they must balance trade and cannot grant loans to Cuba will cause the Cubans to cut their rice ration in half.¹⁰ This may indicate disfavor with Castro for political support of the U.S.S.R., or that aid to Vietnam or internal problems are creating a pinch in the Chinese economy.

The third and fourth nuclear tests that were announced as coming soon by Mao last summer have yet to be detected.¹¹ Delays in nuclear tests in the past have been thought by Western observers to indicate economic problems as well as technical difficulties.

Conclusions. China does not now have the capability to directly threaten the United States with conventional or nuclear war. The potential of China lies in a significant capability to threaten or attack countries the United States is pledged to help. The emergence of the insidious "liberation front" or "people's war" makes the threat of China all the more dangerous. The lack of a clear-cut enemy and the facade of popular revolution have shown weaknesses in the Western World's determination to stop aggressions and prevent the spread of communism. The Sino-Soviet rift clearly demonstrates that Communist-inspired revolution is a

mask for national aspirations and not a new world revolution dedicated to the salvation of oppressed masses.

The C.C.P. has not completely solved the tremendous problems that faced them in 1949. The evidence is scanty and fragmented but two main vulnerabilities appear. First, trade patterns are shifting toward Western countries or their allies at the expense of the Soviet Bloc.¹² China may be forced to modify its belligerence as Western economic ties grow. Finally, the Chinese have eschewed seapower in their plans thus far. Increased economic dependence on countries other than the U.S.S.R. will see China become more susceptible to external pressures that can be applied by naval power.

The C.C.P. must still feed the world's largest population from a dangerously small portion of the country's land and at the same time accumulate capital for foreign purchases and investment in industrial growth. The solution of these problems and attainment of nuclear weapons will see China become one of the three dominant world powers.

Hatred of the United States and other "running dogs of imperialism" is the psychological glue that holds China united and thrusting toward world power. A whole generation is growing up on propaganda which will make understanding and accommodation to the real world difficult for the Chinese, and increases the danger of a miscalculation that could cause disaster. China's objective is clearly to become once again dominant in Asia and remove all foreign power regardless of origin or politics. Only grave internal problems or an economic catastrophe will force Red China to abandon a bellicose stance and allow rapprochement with the West.

FOOTNOTES

Introduction

1. James Reston, "Washington: the Two Concepts of China." *The New York Times*, 19 January 1966, p. 36:5, feels that the two fundamentally different arguments are one, that China plans to destroy or weaken the Western society; or two, that may be what China says and means but lacks the influence or power to carry out.

Chapter I

1. Paul M.A. Linebarger, et al., *Far Eastern Governments and Politics* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1954), p. 88.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 88.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 77.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 78.

5. Kenneth D. Latourette, *The Chinese, Their History and Culture* (New York: MacMillan, 1964), p. 66.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 66.

7. *Ibid.*

8. Linebarger, p. 78.

9. Latourette, p. 1.

10. Robert A. Rupen, "The Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China," Unpublished Lecture, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island; 30 September 1965.

11. Linebarger, p. 75.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 81.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 93.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 93; G.H. Blakeslee, *China and the Far East* (New York: 1910), p. 32.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 94.

16. Charles P. Fitzgerald, *Revolution in China* (New York: Praeger, 1952), p. 197. Mr. Fitzgerald is Professor of Far Eastern history in the Australian National University.

17. Peggy Durdin, *Mao's China* (New York: Headline Series, Foreign Policy Association, No. 136, July-August 1959), p. 3.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 3; Fitzgerald, p. 219.

19. Latourette, p. 399. See also Dennis J. Doolin, *Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict* (Stanford, Calif.: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1965) for maps showing the claims of Chinese historical territory put forth by the Chinese Republic and the People's Republic of China, p. 16-18.

20. Fitzgerald, p. 195-197.

Chapter II

1. Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, November 1960), p. 15-17.

2. Mao Tse-tung, *On New Democracy* (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1960), p. 63.

3. Sun Yat-sen, "Nationalism," *Residential Seminars on World Affairs, Outlook for Our China Policy* (Philadelphia: 1955), p. 26-29. See also Mao, p. 5. The aims of Chinese leaders are remarkably alike particularly where Dr. Sun states, "we must . . . , unify the world upon the foundation of our ancient morality and love of peace, and bring about a universal rule of equality and fraternity," p. 28.

4. Edgar Snow, *The Other Side of the River* (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 136-143.

5. A.G. Megerik, ed., *China Representation in the UN* (New York: International Review Service, 1962), p. 199.

6. R.G. Boyd, *Communist China's Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 20.

7. *The New York Times*, 18 February 1950, p. 5:5.

8. Charles P. Fitzgerald, *The Chinese View of Their Place in the World* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 57.

9. Charles P. Fitzgerald, *Revolution in China* (New York: Praeger, 1952), p. 224.

10. Boyd, p. 29-31.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 69. See also Edward Crankshaw, *The New Cold War Moscow v. Peking* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1963), for an interesting account of the origins of the Chinese-Russian polemics, Chap. 3.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 70.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

14. Coral Bell, "Southeast Asia and the Powers," *The World Today*, April 1965, p. 138.

15. "India Foreign Relations," *Deadline Data on World Affairs*, 16 September 1965, p. 219.

16. *Deadline Data*, p. 81, 212.

17. M.S. Handler, "Red China Details Anti-Soviet Stand," *The New York Times*, 18 November 1965, p. 3:1.

18. "Open Letter of CPSU Central Committee to All Party Organizations and All Communists of the Soviet Union, July 14, 1963," *Two Major Soviet Statements on China* (New York: Crosscurrents Press, 1963), p. 11-12. (Crosscurrents Press is a registered agent of the Soviet Novosti Press Agency.)

19. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 51.

21. Reuters, reported in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Far East*, No. 201, 15 October 1963, p. BBR11.

22. Boyd, p. 47-52.

23. Fitzgerald, *Revolution in China*, p. 208.

24. Mezerik, p. 30.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 200.
26. General George C. Marshall, "General Marshall's Statement on China, January 7, 1947," reprinted in *Outlook for Our China Policy*, *op. cit.*, p. 146.
27. Whiting, p. 116.
28. John F. Dulles, "Text of Statement made by Secretary of State Dulles to Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Formosa Treaty, Feb. 7, 1955," *Outlook for Our China Policy*, *op. cit.*, p. 169.
29. Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of the People's War," *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Far East, No. 171 (4S)*, September 1965, p. 24.
30. *Two Major Soviet Statements on China*, p. 41-43.
31. "Communist China Foreign Policy," *Deadline Data*, p. 207, 208.
32. "Algerian Foreign Policy," *Deadline Data*, June 26, 1965, p. 107.
33. *Facts on File*, 30 Sept., 1965, p. 360-362, 377-378.
34. New China News Agency (Hsinhau), reported in *The New York Times*, 16 December 1965, p. 5:3.
35. *Rupen*, *op. cit.*
36. Richard Harris, quoted in Felix Greene, *A Curtain of Ignorance* (New York: Doubleday, 1964), p. 194.

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1. Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works, Vol. I* (New York: International Publishers Co., 1954), p. 141-146.
2. Whiting, p. 16.
3. Mao, p. 142.

4. Edgar O'Ballance, *The Red Army of China* (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 155.
5. Snow, p. 166.
6. Yuan-li Wu, et al., *The Economic Potential of Communist China, v. I* (Menlo Park, Calif.: Stanford Research Institute, June 1963), p. 40.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 64.
8. Snow, p. 177.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 178.
10. Yuan-li Wu, p. 150-151, 160.
11. Mezerik, p. 49.
12. Franz Michael, *The Role of Communist China in International Affairs 1965-1970* (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Technical Military Planning Operation, General Electric Co., 1958), p. 19.
13. Snow, p. 178.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 181.
15. Yuan-li, p. 5.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 5, 7-8.
17. Greene, p. 284-285.
18. *Two Major Soviet Statements on China*, p. 10-11, 42.
19. Liu Shao-ch'i, official English text reprinted in E. Stuart Kirhy, ed., *Contemporary China* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University, 1963), p. 111.
20. E.H. Steinberg, ed., *The Statesman's Yearbook 1964-65* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1965), p. 879-880.
21. Chin Szu-K'ai and Vincent King, "Sino-Soviet Trade and Payment Balance, 1960-61," *Contemporary China*, p. 63-64.

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24. *Ibid.*, p. 159.

25. *People's Daily*, 1 January 1963, quoted in John Wilson Lewis, *Major Doctrines of Communist China* (New York: Norton, 1964), p. 281.

26. Yuan-li Wu, p. 5 and Chapter 11.

27. Krammer, p. 161.

28. U.S. Information Service, "China's Economy at Mid-year," *Current Scene*, 15 August 1964, (Hong Kong: Green Pagoda Press), p. 5.

29. Yuan-li Wu, p. 60, Chapter 1.

30. Krammer, p. 161.

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32. United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook, 1964* (New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations, 1965), p. 472, 478.

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34. Yuan-li Wu, p. 354.

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1. Edgar Faure, *The Serpent and the Tortoise* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1958), p. 16-17.

2. James R. Michael, "The Sino-Soviet Military Alliance," *Naval War College Review*, October 1964, p. 5.

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8. Nationalist China, *Deadline Data*, 8 February 1965, p. 62.
9. Reuters, reported in *The New York Times*, 21 October 1962, p. 1:6.
10. Reuters, reported in *The New York Times*, 21 November 1962, p. 1:1; text of the Chinese cease-fire proposal, p. 2:3.
11. James Reston, "Chinese Build-up Worries Shastri," *The New York Times*, p. 1:1, 5:3.
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13. Dennis J. Doolin, *Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1965). This excellent research work points out the border problems that exist on China's northern frontiers.
14. Alice Langley Hsieh, "Communist China's Military Doctrine and Strategy," (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1963), Memorandum RM-3833-PR Abridged, p. 18-19.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
16. Harold Hinton, "The Military Strategy of the People's Republic of China," Lecture, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island: 1 October 1965.
17. *The New York Times*, 3 September 1965, p. 1:7.
18. Lin Piao, p. 19.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 22-23.
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21. Harold Hinton, *op. cit.* R.G. Boyd concluded in 1961 that "Chinese advocacy of intense belligerence towards the West became particularly forthright during 1960, and as has been seen, this was a subject of dispute with the U.S.S.R. Nevertheless, the Chinese did not take any course of action which would have meant acceptance of increased risks of conflict with the West." *op. cit.*, p. 34.

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23. Hsieh, p. 35.

24. Hinton, *op. cit.*, Hsieh, p. 20.

25. Hsieh, p. 7.

26. *Pravda and Izvestia*, reported in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 18 September 1963, p. 3.

27. "Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China," *Peking Review*, "Special Supplement," 16 October 1964, p. iii.

28. Morton H. Halperin, "Chinese Nuclear Strategy: the Early Post Detonation Period," *Asian Survey*, June 1965, p. 277-278.

29. Hsieh, p. 34, 38.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 22-23.

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2. Snow, p. 45, 185.

3. *Jenmin Jih Pao*, reported in *The New York Times*, 2 January 1966, p. 22:4, 5.

4. United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook, 1964*, p. 372.
5. Roy Wirtzfeld, "Railroads," *American People's Encyclopedia*, v. 16, p. 16-486.
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8. Yuan-li Wu, p. 58-59.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
10. Snow, p. 436-437.
11. *Current Scene*, 15 September 1964, p. 4.
12. Mao Tse-tung, quoted in *Current Scene*, 1 February 1965.
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15. Ralph L. Powell, "Politico-Military Relationships in Communist China," U.S. Department of State, *Policy Research Study* (Washington: 1963), p. 13, and S.H. Steinberg, ed., *The Statesman's Year Book 1964-65* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1965), p. 879.
16. Powell, p. 19-20.
17. Robert B. Rigg, *Red China's Fighting Hordes* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Co., 1951), p. 272-273.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 276-277.

19. Harold Hinton, *op. cit.*, and *The Military Balance 1964-65* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1964), p. 9, show the strength as of October 1964 to be 2,250,000.

20. Whiting, p. 161, from excerpts of captured documents of the 26th Army, Chinese People's Volunteers.

21. Hsieh, p. 17-18.

22. Powell, p. 11.

23. *Ibid.*

24. Charles Taylor, "Image and Reality: China from Within," *The Nation*, 4 October 1965, p. 182.

25. "Chinese Officers Balk on Training," *The New York Times*, 21 November 1965, p. 30:3.

26. *The Military Balance 1964-65*, p. 9.

27. *The Military Balance 1961-62*, p. 7; *The Military Balance 1964-65*, p. 10.

28. *The Military Balance 1964-65*, p. 10.

29. Hsieh, p. 25-26.

30. *The Statesman's Year Book 1964-65*, p. 879.

31. Hsieh, p. 27.

32. Latourette, p. 23.

33. Linebarger, et al., p. 20. See also Edwin O. Reischauer and John K. Fairbank, *East Asia; the Great Tradition*, v. I., (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), p. 321.

34. Reischauer, p. 323.

35. *The Statesman's Year Book 1964-65*, p. 879; *The Military Balance 1964-65*, p. 10.

36. *Statistical Yearbook 1964*, United Nations, p. 380.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 381.
38. Anthony Harrigan, "Men over War Machines," *Nato's Fifteen Nations*, English ed., August-September 1965.
39. Hsieh, p. 27.
40. Ralph L. Powell, "Communist China as a Military Power," *Current History*, September 1965.
41. Yuan-li Wu, p. 384.
42. Hinton, *op. cit.*
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45. *The New York Times World Economic Review 1964*, p. 160.
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BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

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