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School of Naval Warfare: Flexibility—Key to Overseas Support


Warren A. Skon
U.S. Navy

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FLEXIBILITY—KEY TO OVERSEAS SUPPORT

A Research Paper written by Captain Warren A. Skon, U.S. Navy
School of Naval Warfare, 1966

INTRODUCTION

The higher the level of thought, the more strategy and logistics tend to coalesce.¹

The phrase "overseas support" is likely to conjure up in the minds of professional military men immediate visions of mountains of supply crates and fuel drums baking under a hot South Pacific or North African sun—or perhaps visions of endless lines of ships swinging at anchor in a crowded atoll, or of bulky cargo aircraft touching gently down on the hastily constructed runway at a busy overseas airfield.

The term overseas support as used herein will have broader application. In addition to mobile sea and air support, it embraces each type of military shore facility supporting our national interests from the smallest resident office or antenna site to the sprawling, multipurpose naval base.

Nor will the term support be restricted to its logistic connotation. Where problems in support spill over into political, strategic, and economic matters, these relationships will also be considered. A principal objective, in fact, is to determine whether political and military considerations should not be more closely related in the future, while shaping and framing our U.S. overseas military support efforts in a shrinking world. In a world of emerging nations and multiplying regional alliances and base rights agreements, do not the politic and the human values demand increased reckoning in military thinking?

Overseas shore support in the U.S. Navy will in particular be examined. We will review the types of overseas support, take a panoramic look at evolution in their use, discuss support problems which face us today, and finally focus on overseas support in tomorrow's world.

I—TYPES OF SUPPORT

The best operational plan in the world is no better than its logistic support, and in turn logistic support, that is, the entire system of planning for and providing goods and services, is correspondingly dependent on the supply lines.¹

"The No. 1 U.S. problem in Viet Nam at the moment is not the war but the wherewithal to fight the war, not the Communist enemy but the beans and bread, bullets and billets necessary for the daily support of 170,000 American fighting men."² This grim December 1965 appraisal of the logistic picture in Southeast Asia serves well to introduce the subject of overseas support and to portray one of the main problems entailed when an emergency arises in some remote corner of the world. That problem is logistics.

The JCS definition of logistics first published in 1953 is still in use:

LOGISTICS—In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with:

(a) Design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of material.

(b) Movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel.

(c) Acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities, and

(d) Acquisition or furnishing of services.³

This is indeed a comprehensive definition. Equally broad but more succinctly stated, logistics has been described as the "provision of the physical means by which power is exercised by organized forces. In

military terms, it is the creation and sustained support of combat forces and weapons." ⁴

Proceeding from these basic and expert definitions, the terms "logistics" and "support" will be used somewhat interchangeably, with the term "support" given the broader connotation, as already suggested in the introduction.

That the U.S. Navy's functions are fundamentally related to land, sea, and air operations the world over is made clear in the Department of Defense Directive of 1958 which lists as a primary U.S. Navy function: ". . . to establish and maintain local superiority (including air) in an area of naval operations, to seize and defend advanced naval bases, and to conduct such land and air operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign." ⁵

In considering the employment of overseas mobile and shore-based support, the official Navy policy must be made clear at the outset:

It is the policy of the Chief of Naval Operations that logistic support of deployed afloat combat forces will be provided, to the maximum extent feasible, by mobile logistic support forces. Overseas base support of such forces will be provided to the degree necessary to supplement mobile support capabilities . . . Active mobile logistic support forces, supplemented as necessary by existing bases and foreign indigenous resources, will be tailored to sustain, for 90 days without augmentation, operations planned or envisioned under emergency cold war conditions, or in limited war . . . In supporting deployed naval forces indigenous resources available in overseas areas should be utilized whenever practicable. The development of alternate sources of supply outside the continental U.S. will provide strategic reserves to assist in countering interruption of supply lines. ⁶

Mobile Logistic Support. Perhaps Admiral Mahan best defined mobile logistic support, which he called "communications," when he described it as "a general term, designating the lines of movement by which a military body, army or fleet, is kept in living connection with the national power." ⁷

Let us look for a moment at the types of mobile support used in the U.S. Navy today, which are collectively termed the Mobile Logistic Support Group. To be used to the maximum extent feasible, they are:

- (1) The Mobile Support Group of ships and movable base units,
- (2) The Underway Replenishment Group of ships and Carrier On-board Delivery (COD) aircraft.
- (3) The Pipeline Group of ships and aircraft. ⁸

The Mobile Support Group acts as a kind of naval base afloat in an overseas port or anchorage, while the Underway Replenishment Group, commonly called the URG, ranges the seas, making at-sea transfers of fuel, ammunition, general stores and provisions direct to the combat forces. The URG may draw stocks from the Mobile Support Group in port, or it may be resupplied direct from Pipeline ships plying between the continental United States and the operating areas. Pipeline or long-haul ships resupply both the URG and the Mobile Support Group.⁹

One other military group providing seaborne logistic support must be noted here since, though not a part of the numbered fleets, it provides the greater part of the general pipeline flow to overseas forces and support facilities. This is the Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS), "the single agency which provides sea transportation to meet all requirements of the Department of Defense except for that provided by units organic to the operating forces."¹⁰

Overseas Shore Support. For a graphic statement of the need for overseas naval shore support we may turn again to Admiral Mahan:

Having therefore no foreign establishments, either colonial or military, the ships of war of the U.S., in war, will be like land birds, unable to fly from their own shores. To provide resting places for them, where they can coal and repair, would be one of the first duties of a government proposing to itself the development of the power of the nation at sea.¹¹

Another sea power strategist has broadened the concept of naval bases to include "all the points in which sea power meets the land, or vice versa; any locality in which the two exchange their resources or affect each other in any way."¹²

In today's technical world, our Navy's list of overseas shore support activities must be broadened still further. There are over 200 separate Navy and Marine Corps activities located overseas at present in some 38 foreign states or territories. They span the world, from such remote spots as the U.S. Naval Facility at Chichi Jima in the Bonin Islands of the Western Pacific to the U.S. Naval Communication Station in Asmara, Ethiopia. In communications alone the Navy has some 34 stations and units sited around the world.¹³

As another indication of the magnitude of U.S. overseas military basing, it was determined several years ago that slightly over one million Americans, including military dependents and civilians, were involved in our military activities overseas, and that the aggregate expenditures for maintenance of these forces and the installations at which they were located were putting more than two billion dollars into the local economies annually.¹⁴

Wartime basing and stocking overseas can be even more impressive. One of our World War II logistic experts, Vice Admiral Oscar Badger, provides an interesting example of the magnitude of such requirements:

To give you an idea of the problem, we had 6,400,000 big barrels of aviation gasoline underground in England. A tanker carries 2500 barrels. Now that 6,400,000 barrels of aviation gasoline was not an excess allowance. That represented a four months' allowance for the air operation in England. That's all.¹⁵

A quick calculation shows the above storage of aviation fuel in England to have been the equivalent of over 2,500 tankers filled to the capacity indicated by Admiral Badger. As another example of the immense buildup of support required to wage World War II, the Navy had no adequately equipped advance base in 1940 other than Pearl Harbor. In the period 1940-1945 its Bureau of Yards and Docks built or supervised the building of over 400 advanced bases costing \$2,135,427,881. In one month, June 1945, some 25 million barrels of bulk fuel went to the Pacific alone. At Guam, one million gallons of aviation gasoline were used daily.¹⁶

Mobile versus Shore Support. The question of our overseas sea and shore mix will be looked at more closely. Suffice it to say here that the question does concern military planners and our nation's leaders today. One study conducted commercially for the Department of Defense arrived at the following conclusions as to the effectiveness of U.S. overseas bases:

Within the military region, their [U.S. overseas bases] main value seems to be in performance of logistic support and reconnaissance-intelligence functions. Within the political region, their greatest effectiveness is in support of friendly governments, with only slightly less effectiveness in contributing to alliance cohesion, while they compare generally unfavorably to other types [ships, aircraft, missiles] in their sensitivity to political changes. Economically, the bases are most effective in benefiting foreign countries, less effective in their sensitivity to technological changes, and quite ineffective in benefiting the domestic economy.¹⁷

Testifying before the House Armed Services Committee in January 1964, Secretary of Defense McNamara expressed the position of the Defense Department with respect to the more particular problem of whether general purpose forces and their equipment should be kept at overseas bases or be home-based:

The quick reaction capability which these forces help to provide can be achieved in a number of ways: by forward deployment of military forces, by the prepositioning of equipment and supplies on land or in ships, and by the deployment of both men and equipment from a central reserve in the U.S.

Each of these alternatives, and the variations of them, has certain advantages and disadvantages. Our present program is based on using a combination of these various methods, but we still have much to learn about the proper balance among them.¹⁸

To summarize, concepts and facilities to which the U.S. Navy presently looks for overseas support of its missions include the vital Pipeline from the United States, floating bases called Mobile Support Groups, at-sea delivery ships known as Underway Replenishment Groups and including Carrier On-board Delivery by aircraft, and the deployment and forward positioning of personnel and material at a vast complex of advanced bases ashore which provide a myriad of services and vary tremendously in size and scope.

II—OVERSEAS SUPPORT IN ACTION

Inexorable circumstances made America the champion of free men everywhere, and its armed might the principal guardian of the culture and the liberty of the Western World.¹

The Days of Sail. "The days when fleets lay becalmed are gone, it is true; but gone also are the days when, with four or five months of food and water below, they were ready to follow the enemy to the other side of the world without stopping."²

Thus spoke Admiral Mahan, somewhat nostalgically one senses, of a period when the amount of food and drink aboard dictated the time at sea—a dictate which itself could be easily rectified by putting ashore a landing party, if the natives were friendly.

Yet even as early as the War of 1812 Great Britain resorted to overseas naval bases in Canada, Bermuda, and the West Indies. Without them it has been questioned whether she could ever have maintained her effective blockade of young America's East Coast ports.³ And in our own Civil War, U.S. ships were equipped in northern ports but sustained in the struggle for the south by bases at places like Port Royal, Key West, and Pensacola.⁴

The Coaling Interlude. The last half of the 19th century saw steam replace sail and coal become the prime mover of warships. Revolutionary concepts of support and mobility were inevitable. As Bernard Brodie put it: ". . . without fuel, warships cannot move, and without a secure and readily available source of supply they dare not move . . . [They] must submit to the impediments armies have long borne—dependence on a line of communications which must be maintained and defended at all costs."⁵

Great Britain was first to realize the full significance of this revolutionary concept. Admiral Lord Fisher once said of his beloved England that she held the "five keys which lock up the world—Dover, Gibraltar, Alexandria, the Cape of Good Hope, and Singapore."⁶

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Coal as a fuel presented problems of no small stature. Consider the plight of one fleet shortly after the turn of the century:

The voyage of the Russian Fleet under Admiral Rojestvensky from the Baltic to the Sea of Japan (13 October 1904 to 27 May 1905) was a voyage during which logistic factors became the pre-dominating influence on strategical and tactical decisions. A logistical decision became a major factor in the Battle of Tsushima, when extra coal considered necessary to reach destination was stowed on deck and so increased the draft as to put armor belts at or below the waterline.⁷

Just three years later our own Great White Fleet sailed around the world in what has been described as a "logistic travelogue." Nearly three-fourths of its coal needs were supplied by foreign sources.⁸

World War I found the world's navies partially converted to fuel oil. But lack of overseas bases was to restrict what might have been an extended war area to Europe and the North Atlantic. Germany's battle fleet served little purpose, and its submarines suffered sorely for want of extra-continental logistic support. And though we ourselves possessed the Philippine Islands, with no naval bases west of Hawaii, Theodore Roosevelt dubbed these islands the "Achilles' heel" of the United States.⁹ The Great War's end found the United States itself snugly isolated, with no European or Asiatic power having an adequate foothold in the Western Hemisphere essential for significant hostile operations.¹⁰

World War II. For the U.S. Navy, the concepts of mobile support and advanced basing came of age simultaneously in World War II. Admiral Nimitz, then Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, has since credited endurance of the Pacific Fifth Fleet to a combination of advanced bases, progressively established closer to fleet operating areas, and to ever-increasing replenishment of the fleet at sea.¹¹

In Admiral King's final report as wartime Chief of Naval Operations, he summed up the value of Pacific bases thus:

But for the chain of advanced bases the fleet could not have operated in the western reaches of the Pacific without the necessity for many more ships and planes than it actually had. A base to supply or repair a fleet 5000 miles closer to the enemy multiplies the power which can be maintained constantly against him and greatly lessens the problem of supply and repair.¹²

Advanced bases of World War II were not without their serious problems, however. Depositories for what eventually became an uninterrupted torrent of supplies flowing out of mobilized America, bases were frequently left behind in this fast-moving war. Into such backwash bases would continue to pour deliveries well after operations had shifted—due largely to sheer time lag in pacing logistics to strike operations. Vice Admiral Dyer has

described the U.S. Naval Base at Manus Island, north of New Guinea, as one of the examples of such "logistic snowball." It was our third largest advanced base, exceeded only by Guam and Leyte-Samar. It had airfields, a seaplane base, hospital, POL tank farm, supply depot, a 90,000-ton floating drydock, several other drydocks, and a four-million-gallon daily water system. Yet the war had moved far north to the Marianas and the Philippines before the mountains of supplies and the mounting facilities at Manus Base had even slowed their influx.¹³

One authority on World War II naval logistics has estimated that no more than 50 percent of individual supply requisitions sent out from the United States amidst this torrent of forward-flowing material ever got together with their intended users in time to be effective.¹⁴

Thus we see during World War II the first really large-scale use of mobile and shore support mutually supporting each other in a combined sea and land campaign. Unfortunately, analysis of their relative effectiveness and respective proportions is virtually swallowed up in the sheer volume of support which flooded the combat theaters during much of that war. It is significant to note, however, that hundreds of shore facilities were essential to simply contain this flood of material. Whether a similar performance could have been approached by dependence instead on thousands more floating bases, assuming their construction in sufficient time, is problematical.

Post-World War II. "So severe were the financial and personnel cut-backs following World War II that the Navy found itself temporarily forced to abandon mobile logistic support as a practice. By default the overseas base once again found itself responsible for providing logistic support to the fleet."¹⁵ Thus has one author described our predicament as the Korean war approached. Fortunately, concepts had not been lost and mobile support ships were relatively available in mothball fleets. The lesson here was that mobile support in some proportion must be kept in being in the active Navy, but that relative costs will probably govern the proportion of mobile-to-shore support under nonwartime conditions. We shall look further at this problem in the chapters ahead.

Meanwhile, the 1950's introduced yet another facet into the many-sided question of overseas support. Could air power take over the logistic supply duties of ships? Or did air power perhaps even negate the need for overseas support entirely?

Arguments flew thick and fast. One most reliable authority was to point out that "86% of all Allied personnel who went to Korea traveled there by ships. Ships carried . . . 99.68% of all cargo transported there. For every ton delivered by air, ships had to provide four tons of aviation fuel."¹⁶

Alexander de Seversky was to claim in support of air power that "when the Navy claims it can keep the sea lanes open, it is in a

dreamland of the past . . . there would be no point in keeping the sea lanes open." 17 Mr. de Seversky's rebutter had already countered this notion with the plea that "a foothold in Europe must be held, no matter what uncomfortable bedfellows the U.S. must accept into the intimacy of bundling." 18

In point of fact, the United States not only remained in Europe in force, but rimmed all of Eurasia with a net of overseas bases. These bases were to support air, land, and naval forces, while terms such as "balanced force," "flexible response," and "nuclear deterrent" found their way into the Defense vocabulary. As a member of NATO we participated in the "greatest military construction program in the world"—a sprawling complex of naval bases, storage depots, training facilities, warning devices, headquarters areas, and some 220 airfields. 19

Today we are involved in Vietnam. Perhaps the most noteworthy development of the Vietnamese war for the U.S. Navy has been reaffirmation of the need for modern mobile support backed up by shore facilities capable of rapid expansion in an emergency. But modern mobile support, unfortunately, was largely in prototype or design stage. As one naval observer recently put it: "Just as we approached World War II with logistic capabilities predicated upon the type of naval operations experienced in World War I, our logistic concepts and capabilities today reflect very little change from those used to support World War II and Korean operations." 20

The shore facilities were there, to be sure, and have served a vital need. With the Seventh Fleet at sea most of the time and being supplied by mobile service units, bases such as Subic Bay in the Philippines and Yokosuka in Japan have amply demonstrated their vital need. Loss of such shore support complexes would in truth "be considered a serious reversal by the Navy." 21

And once again shore facilities such as Subic Bay and more recently built up facilities in Vietnam—Danang, Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay, and others—are accepting mounting floods of men and material.

Thus far we have defined terms and recounted the past. Are there lessons in the logistics of overseas naval support to be learned from this narration? Have we in truth entered each new conflict prepared only for the last one? What are the problems facing us? What might we change today in anticipation of tomorrow?

III—PROBLEMS GENERATED

The U.S. can never again find a relative security based on its own frontiers; we require mid-ocean sentinels, polar lookouts, overseas bases, a global outpost line—and, soon, spatial scouts. 1

Problems in overseas support will be viewed as they focus toward a single question. What pattern of ship and shore facilities is required to provide optimum overseas support for carrying out the Navy's missions and

tasks? Political, strategic, logistic, and economic problems will be considered here.

Political. The snug isolationism of the United States after World War I has been noted. World War II and the cold war which followed have altered this state drastically. Soon the United States had "made herself the center of elaborate alliance systems which committed the nation to the defense of half the land areas of the world All told, the U.S. by 1960 was committed to the defense of some 45 sovereign nations besides her own territories." ²

Along with these many commitments went overseas bases—hundreds of them of all size and purpose—individually or jointly used by Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. That these bases had and continue to have political implications there can be no doubt. Charles Hitch and Roland McKean have observed in their important work, *The Economics of National Defense*, that "overseas bases affect in many critical ways, political and economic as well as military, the status of an alliance." ³

Not all views of this vast complex of U.S. bases have been favorable. Particularly at the time of the Cuban confrontation, voices were heard questioning our place on soils near Eurasia. Writing in *The Nation*, Fred Neal observed:

The fact is—regardless of how we may see our bases—that to establish bases on the border of another state must inevitably be considered a provocative act. Up until now the U.S. has been kept from appreciating the impact of our bases around the Soviet Union primarily by our tendency to see contemporary international politics primarily in strictly black and white terms—a direct conflict between American good and democracy on the one side and Soviet evil and dictatorship on the other. ⁴

Still other writers complained that we were building up too great a Fortress America with our vast air defense warning system, and not tying ourselves closely enough to our friends and allies overseas. ⁵

Perhaps the surest indication of the value of these overseas bases is to see what the Soviets themselves think of them. The following 1960 statement by Andrei Eremenko in the Moscow *New Times* leaves little doubt:

The Soviet general and complete disarmament plan provides for first stage elimination of means of nuclear delivery with simultaneous liquidation of foreign military bases. Why have these two components of the military potential been singled out? For the simple reason that their elimination is most important, logical and substantiated, both from the political and military standpoint A world without bases would be a world without tensions [Their elimination] would normalize relations between countries operating these bases. ⁶

It is safe to assume that our rimland bases do indeed have high political value, if one is to judge by Soviet interest in their dissolution. But they also pose political problems. Rising nationalistic influences have frequently canceled our previous good will toward U.S. forces at such installations. This is especially true when it is politically expedient. Also, increasing pressure has been placed on the United States to yield jurisdictional control of its personnel to host countries. Then, too, demands are heard more and more frequently for a voice in the operation and maintenance of bases and equipment, an example being Air Force and Navy bases in Morocco.⁷

In discussing economic aid to underdeveloped nations, one noted U.S. economist points out also that the majority of these host governments are not slow to emphasize the dangers of retaliation to which they expose themselves by entering into agreements to provide base rights for the U.S.⁸

Problems of this sort have no easy solutions. Some which have been suggested are to accept increased participation by host nations in the administration and maintenance of U.S. bases, to keep investments low in anticipation of possible losses, and to reduce tensions by channeling funds so as to benefit local economies in host countries.⁹

Unfortunately, the "political temperature" of the world too frequently plays a strong role in the attitudes of host nations and in their treatment of U.S. forces. As an example, much protest was voiced over our work in progress on space and communication tracking stations in Nigeria and Zanzibar in 1960. The reason? Downing of our U-2 reconnaissance aircraft near Sverdlovsk, Russia.¹⁰

Former President Eisenhower, in discussing United States reaction to host country animosities, said recently. "In country after country we see our embassies attacked, our flag insulted, our motives impugned." The reactions at military facilities abroad can also be strong, though usually more controllable. His solution? "No matter how weary we Americans may be after 20 years of trying to do our job, the central fact of the cold war is that we cannot safely 'get out'—or even back away from our responsibilities and commitments."¹¹

The number of U.S. facilities overseas subject to the vagaries of political mood and personnel incidents which can promote unpopularity is staggering. A report prepared for the U.S. Department of Defense in 1963 stated that there were over 2,000 individual U.S. military installations overseas, the majority being radar warning stations, supply depots, communication posts, and other such relatively small installations.¹²

Putting together this weight of numbers and the many political pitfalls which present themselves in each country where the facilities are located, it is no doubt utopian to think that ideal relations can even be approached. One shrewd team of analysts summed it up well when they concluded that, "All in all, it is probably expecting too much to hope that the American forces stationed abroad will actually increase American popularity in these nations."¹³

Strategic. Where political questions leave off and strategic problems begin can itself be debated. One difference may be noted. Nearly all analyses of the strategic value of U.S. overseas support facilities are positive in nature and contain few of the thorny problems we have just considered in the political arena.

Dominant in proposals citing our strategic need for overseas shore bases is the theme that they show the U.S. commitment to its allies, and particularly to host nations, in a firm, tangible way. "They have the effect of openly advertising the direct interest and intentions of the United States in those areas." ¹⁴

The following observation made in 1958 can be equally applied today:

Though [the overseas base] generates friction at many points and creates acute difficulties between the U.S. and the host countries, it remains a major strategic asset. It constitutes the cement in our system of alliances . . . the military presence of the United States has served, and is serving, to strengthen the resolve of many nations to withstand external communist pressures and to deal firmly with internal subversion. ¹⁵

An obvious problem to be considered by a nation possessing such a far-flung network of strategic and logistic bases as the United States is that of vulnerability. Hitch and McKean have cited vulnerability as a definite disadvantage of U.S. bases abroad, noting in particular their higher susceptibility to attack when much closer to the Soviet Union than to the United States. ¹⁶ However, this observation was directed toward a large scale as opposed to limited war, and loses much of its weight when considered in the latter light.

Anthony Sokol has considered at length the matter of how our host allies must view U.S. presence on their soil. In his judgment the increased vulnerability cannot validly be weighed against increased security at any one base or in any one nation. Rather, the entire complex of bases, weapon systems, alliances, and material assets must be viewed in combination, as a mutually supporting total force which in aggregate acts as a "convincing warning to any would-be aggressor to dissuade him from embarking on a perilous adventure." ¹⁷

It should be quickly noted in this regard that we, as well as our foreign hosts, enjoy this mutual security of numbers. It is not a one-way street for their benefit alone.

In discussing strategic support problems one cannot ignore the question of response times. At first consideration it might appear that mobile support, particularly air, is the key to rapid response in emergencies. But Vietnam has proven conclusively that bases such as those in Okinawa, Japan, and the Philippines greatly expedite response time to Southeast Asia. We simply could not have moved all forces, material, and equipment 9,000 miles direct

from the United States and produced the quick response which we did, nor can we reasonably anticipate doing so in the near future.

This is not to decry air power or air support in any sense. In a war 9,000 miles away or in one next door, the balance of air power can be vital. But inevitably the value of overseas support bases asserts itself. One analyst, referring to the value of aircraft in strategic positioning of power in the Pacific, put it this way. "[Our aircraft] have one great need; a place to sit down, refuel, take on weapons. This is why our aircraft carriers and stepping-stone bases—Midway, Wake, Guam, Kwajalein, Taiwan, the Philippines—have become vital as never before. A fortress today is not a Rock of Gibraltar but a runway with supplies." 18

Strategically, then, the case for the overseas base would appear to continue positive and strong. A Department of Defense study in this area made the following summary conclusions:

The setting up and continued presence of U.S. military bases can do much to deter and to defend against external aggression, and somewhat less to reduce the effectiveness of internal insurrection. Against external aggression, the presence of U.S. bases, with their dependents, can give tangible evidence of a U.S. commitment that is not easily ignored without risk of U.S. involvement in a major conflict with a nation invading the host to the bases. The bases can also act as forward logistic terminals for the rapid deployment of general purpose forces, if it becomes necessary to fight a limited war. In addition, they can do much to stimulate the local economy of a developing nation by offering employment and indeed a certain amount of vocational training to local nationals. 19

Logistic. Thus far in this section we have said little of mobile ship support. This was intended, for, in fact, problems concerning ship-based support are few in the political and strategic areas. Rather, mobile ship support excels by all odds in the realms of overseas politics and strategy.

In the logistics area we are not wanting in problems to consider, however, both ship and shore. Pre-World War I and II lack of logistic readiness has already been noted. Vice Admiral Dyer, in retrospect, termed this lack of logistic readiness just prior to World War II as "perhaps our gravest danger of the moment." 20

Even today in a limited war the lack of logistic means has posed serious stresses. Ashore, crash programs have been necessary in places like Subic Bay to ready facilities which will permit rapid high-volume staging through to Vietnam. And in Vietnam itself, long lines of supply ships queue up in the river south of Saigon, awaiting their turn at limited dockside facilities, while hurry-up construction programs at places like Cam Ranh Bay and Danang ready facilities to handle huge flows of men, equipment, and supplies. Yet even these added port capabilities may not suffice.

As recently as November 1965, Vice Admiral Donaho, Commander Military Sea Transport Service, found it necessary to call an emergency meeting of U.S. shipowners to discuss the shortage of ships for supplying war operations in Vietnam. As of October 1965, 150 ships were in use for this purpose, with about 200 needed by January 1966.²¹ And greater material flow demands ever-increasing shore and floating base facilities at the terminal end to accept the flow.

In noting this shortage of shore and floating base facilities, it should also be pointed out that floating bases—ships designed to proceed to a forward area and there dispense their cargoes to other ships or to operating units ashore—have two distinct advantages: (1) by their system of acting as base depots and dispensing material only as needed, they avoid much double cargo handling cost and manpower; and (2) the floating bases may be built in advance, or once built, retained in reserve for the next emergency in which a nation might find itself.

Why does logistic readiness apparently lag behind at each new buildup of hostilities? The reasons can best be discerned in the following statement of the problem and suggested solutions:

Historically, experience has shown that the financial strictures upon logistic forces are relatively more severe than those placed upon combat forces. The limited Fleet Logistic Forces in being must therefore make up in quality what they lack in quantity. They must be capable of adaptation to widely varying tasks at the outset of hostilities; and they must also be capable of absorbing smoothly and without impairment of their other functions, a large increase in numbers of ships, personnel, and facilities. Fleet Logistic Forces must be organized to do these things without a time-consuming and costly reorganization after mobilization.²²

The official Navy position with respect to mobile support has already been stated, namely, the maximum amount. By extension, is minimum shore support here implied? The following plea would lead us to think so:

Since the beginning of World War II, one of the Navy's primary aims has been to free its striking forces from dependency upon fixed bases. In our concentration upon the problem, not enough thought has been given to increasing the independence of our logistic forces from fixed bases, particularly those on foreign soil.²³

But the question is not so easily answered as might first be thought. In his already referred to article, Edward Kolcum pointed out that both our Air Force and Navy view any widespread cutback of our overseas bases as an action which would restrict reaction time and complicate greatly the logistic problem.²⁴

One such logistic complication would surely concern costs. Could we readily afford to be without ship maintenance and repair points such as Yokosuka, Guam, and Subic Bay in the Pacific, for example? A British analyst considers this question in a penetrating manner, best quoted:

Skon: School of Naval Warfare: Flexibility—Key to Overseas Support.
The fleet train can only undertake minor repair jobs; refitting needs a naval dockyard. This means simply that a long-legged navy, operating far from its dockyards with the aid of a fleet train, usually needs twice the number of ships to do the tasks of ships based on a string of overseas bases The U.S. Sixth Fleet rotates to its home bases every six months, which at least doubles the ships needed and perhaps far more than doubles the number of men. Bases, in short, economize in ships and men.²⁵

Unnecessarily doubling the required number of ships, and providing the men to man them, would be a staggering cost indeed. Such claim, however, is not borne out when all factors are considered. First, the U.S. Navy schedules its Sixth Fleet deployments in such manner that return of ships to the East Coast for overhaul and repair coincides with personnel rotation to the United States, for morale, school training, and reassignment purposes. It would consider the leaving of ships in the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean for double or longer length tours as creative of more problems than would be solved. Second, any additional ships which might be needed to do the job in long-legged fashion are birds in hand should war develop and the inevitable increase in needed ships occur. Strategic fleet requirements in the Atlantic are, in fact, tailored to such premise. Third, any addition of fleet overhaul and repair bases in the European area could not result in elimination or even significant reduction of vital East Coast naval bases. Overall costs to support the missions of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet would therefore rise, not lower, by the addition of such bases.

Here, then, is an excellent example of what will be further emphasized: the mix of mobile fleet support, overseas shore support, and U.S.-based support must be tailored to current needs in a given area. Generalizations will not do. Fleet repair bases such as Subic Bay and Yokosuka in the distant Western Pacific may be geographically necessary, while entirely varied needs may obtain in other oceans.

The critical need for swift military response is voiced ever more frequently today. From purely operational considerations such as speed of nuclear pre-emption or deterrence, thinking in this area has broadened to include closer examination of airlift for rapid deployment of forces and material in limited war. The theory, as in fire fighting, is that each increment of response time saved will lessen proportionately the extent of the emergency to be controlled—and the amount of force and material needed to do the job. In a RAND study for the Department of Defense, Allen Ferguson considered the logistic response time for getting material to Europe and concluded that individual requisitions supplied by ship still take a matter of months to arrive, from the time the request is initiated in Europe.²⁶

In contrast, we may recall Operation Big Lift in late 1963, the first mass airlift of an entire division of troops to Europe within a few days.²⁷ An impressive effort indeed, this was a far cry from the grinding effort needed to move a division to Europe by surface means. Yet, one must recognize that from a logistic viewpoint, any concept of airlifting men *and* their material of

war to any point in the world from U.S. home bases is hopelessly optimistic today or soon. In a purely hit-and-run tactic, yes. Or in a special logistic effort such as the Berlin Airlift, by all means. But not in a sustained effort involving combat forces and their equipment as we think of them for most uses. On the House floor, Representative Chamberlain (Mich.) commented on Operation Big Lift on 20 February 1964. After praising the effort, as well it must be, he nevertheless cautioned: "But Operation Big Lift was made possible because we prepositioned heavy equipment weeks and months in advance, and this equipment was carried in the holds of naval vessels. Operation Big Lift was made possible because we had overflight rights . . . because airfields were ready to receive American aircraft." 28

Rear Admiral Dan V. Gallery contrasts the costs of sea versus air transport:

It is not belittling air power to say that it can never replace sea power as the world's basic means of transportation. It is simply stating one of the economic facts of life. It costs \$36 to send a ton of cargo to England by sea. The air costs may run as high as \$1700 per ton. But the cost in dollars means less than the cost to the world's limited fuel reserves. It takes 80 lbs. of black oil to haul a ton of freight across the Atlantic. It takes two tons of high-test gasoline to do it by air. If it were possible to organize a gigantic airlift capable of handling all our imports we would soon devour the world's whole supply of oil. 29

Relative transportation costs by sea, land, and air have been estimated to fall in the ratio of 1:5:50 respectively. 30 This ratio alone would appear to keep airlift in its present valuable role as a means of quick response to move personnel and material only in specialized situations where speed outweighs cost. In the logistic area, Carrier On-board Delivery of high priority cargoes to ships at sea is but one example.

How does nuclear power relate to the problem of overseas logistics? Admiral Hyman Rickover, father of nuclear propulsion in the Navy, has positive views on the matter. Before a House committee in March 1964, he pointed out that frequent arguments that we don't need the advantages of nuclear propulsion in the Navy "are based on the assumption that logistic support will be as readily available in wartime as it is in peacetime. I believe that this is a fallacious assumption. The logistic support forces are more vulnerable to attack than our striking forces." 31

In this connection it is appropriate to introduce what will be a recurring theme throughout the remainder of this work. It is the simple fact that in flexibility lies the key to sound planning for overseas support of our forces. At the moment the question concerns nuclear propulsion. If it will broaden our logistic base and lessen reliance on underway replenishment or visits to ports in any appreciable degree, and we can afford it, should we not have it?

Skop: School of Naval Warfare: Flexibility—Key to Overseas Support
Logically pursuing the Admiral's view above is the following plea for mobile logistics to supplement the advantages of nuclear propulsion—one might even say, to preclude nullification of these advantages:

Nuclear propulsion affords the opportunity to throw off the shackles of fuel. But there are other shackles that nuclear power will not touch. We have always had them, but compared to fuel they were of secondary importance. Now they come into their own. They can be eliminated by a logistic support system as modern as nuclear power itself. This system must be built at the same time as we build nuclear-powered striking forces. We must not permit the nuclear striking force to overshadow its replenishment force in our thinking . . . These ties—the under-way replenishment ships—are the neglected children of the Navy. They have no appeal and therefore tend to be ignored.³²

Economic. So far we have examined overseas support problems from political, strategic, and logistic points of view. But cost considerations, in essence an extension of the logistic question, have increasingly plagued the Department of Defense and the Navy in seeking to carry out overseas commitments.

Consider the increased complexity of equipment. As just one example, our submarine tenders, when first reassigned to support nuclear-type submarines, had to have their supply load lists doubled in line items to accomplish this complex task.³³ Required fuels for naval operations, once largely comprised of black oil, now run the gamut of jet fuels, gasolines of varied octane, liquid oxygen, and an array of exotic missile propellants.

And what of overseas base facilities? Not only are they costly in sum total, but a 1963 Department of Defense study concluded that the entire base structure of all Services added something like two billion dollars annually to local foreign economies, causing serious drain on our U.S. gold reserves.³⁴

The flow of gold problem became so serious in recent years that drastic measures were required in all branches of the government. Secretary McNamara devoted much attention to it in his presentation of the 1964 Defense budget to Congress. On 30 January 1963 he told the House Armed Services Committee:

National security expenditures overseas represent a significant percentage of recent deficits in our balance of payments. In recent years, net U.S. defense expenditures entering the balance of payments have averaged \$2.6 billion per year. Through economies in our own expenditures, and by arranging with our allies for their purchase of additional American equipment and services, we reduced that figure to about \$2.0 billion for 1962, and it is our objective to bring it below the billion dollar mark by 1966.³⁵

The program to accomplish such drastic reduction by 1966 must not be thought of as a mass shutdown of bases. Specific means to accomplish the goal were recounted by the Secretary as: (1) voluntary reduction of individual expenditures by military and civilian personnel and their dependents; (2) maximum procurement of supplies and services from the United States, where this would not exceed the cost of foreign equivalents by more than 50 percent; (3) reduction of Military Assistance Program funds to very selective projects; and (4) comprehensive review of the need for each foreign military base and installation.³⁶

It should be noted that the second means delineated by the Secretary reduced the flow of gold but increased overall costs. Bases, it must be repeated, are normally cost effective in comparison to accomplishing identical tasks supported solely from a home base. They will, to quote one sea power analyst, "more than pay for themselves in savings in the wear and tear of ships, in storage, speed and ease of cargo handling, and the many other economies they will permit."³⁷ Meanwhile, the flow of gold problem at present nullifies a portion of this advantage. And unquestionably, the total balance of payments picture will henceforth continue to take into account the effect of overseas bases.

Having dwelt at some length on problems in overseas support, let us look now at what might be done and is being done to meet these problems.

IV—FOCUS OF TOMORROW

The unresting progress of mankind causes continual change in the weapons; and with that must come a continual change in the manner of fighting—in the handling and the disposition of troops or ships on the battlefield.¹

Developments in Mobile Support. Logistic lag has been suggested. So also has the accusation been made that only fiscal leftovers dribble into logistic modernization.

Where then do we stand in our capability to sustain modern strike forces at sea? The picture is by no means gloomy. Striking new developments are just now reaching fruition—so much so that one Naval Supply Corps specialist has suggested changing the name of the Underway Replenishment Group to the Combat Logistic Support Force, and the Mobile Support Group to the Mobile Sea Base Force. The most fundamental change in operational concept will be the capability of such Combat Logistic Support Force to travel with the Strike Force or join it in the combat area, in contrast to the usual withdrawal of the Strike Force to safe refueling and replenishment range.²

Key ship types to permit this step are the new Combat Support Ship known as the AOE, and the new Combat Stores Ship, the AFS. The USS *Sacramento* (AOE-1) represents the first real breakthrough in underway replenishment since World War II. A combined fleet oiler and ammunition resupply ship, she has a design speed of 26 knots and displaces 50,000 tons, making her the largest

and most powerful auxiliary ever built by the Navy.³ Carrying 177,000 barrels of fuel oil, 1,500 tons of ammunition, and 500 tons of stores and provisions,⁴ she will do at once the tasks of an older AO and AE combined, at combat force speed and at replenishment separation distances up to 200 feet. She carries such innovations as aircraft type refueling probes and improved constant tension transfer rigs.⁵

The prototype Combat Stores Ship USS *Mars* (AFS-1) is just as striking. Also capable of high speeds and with improved transfer equipment, she can simultaneously provide the entire loads of an AKS and an AVS, along with one-half the provisions of an AF.⁶

Carrier On-board Delivery. At sea delivery by air is also coming up with two prototypes which are more nearly breakthroughs than simple stages of development. A comparison with the aircraft and helicopters which they will replace is the best evidence of this claim:⁷

MODEL	PAY LOAD	FEATURES
OLD C-1A AIRCRAFT	3,500 LBS.	700 MI. FULL LOAD DELIVERY
NEW C-2A AIRCRAFT	10,000 LBS.	1,300 MI. FULL LOAD DELIVERY LARGE DOOR ACCESS
OLD H-34 HELICOPTER	4,000 LBS.	LIMITED SIZE CARGOES
NEW UH-46 HELICOPTER	8,000 LBS.	GREATLY INCREASED SIZE CARGOES

Supermarkets. Supply ships serving our Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and Seventh Fleet in the Far East today have acquired the descriptive name "supermarkets" because of the range of items they stock. They may carry as many as 25,000 types of items and replenish a twenty-ship task group in one daylight period.⁸ Prototypes such as the AOE already described will do still better.

Also proposed by some as replenishment ships are the Essex class aircraft carriers presently held in combat reserve. While the cost of converting and outfitting these ships would be high, their potential as replenishment ships would more than offset the cost. A single Essex class carrier in this new role could simultaneously provide large quantities of fuel, ammunition, general provisions, aircraft, and aviation spares. It could provide carrier on-board delivery of replacement aircraft and helicopters, as well as COD cargo service. And it could provide ASW and AAW defense for the Combat Logistic Support Force, of which the converted aircraft carrier would itself also be the key logistic provider.⁹

Limited War. The Defense Department is contracting now for two more developments in the area of mobile combat logistics which offer dramatic possibilities for quick response in limited war. One will be seaborne, the other an aircraft.

The seaborne innovation will be known as the FDL, or "fast deployment logistic" ship. With a roll-on, roll-off capability, it will carry thousands of tons of airport and pier construction equipment as well as heavy military hardware. Such items as bulldozers, cranes, lumber, pipe, and cement will be carried for the rapid construction of airfields and bases on short notice—a capability in which we proved weak in Vietnam. Included will be tanks and amphibious vehicles, ammunition and small arms supplies. Teams of engineers, technicians, and a support combat force could move in aboard such a ship, off-load, and construct facilities, all as a self-contained unit.¹⁰

More dramatic will be the C5A, a mammoth jet-powered aircraft designed to carry up to 600 troops, or tanks and other heavy military equipment, more than six thousand miles at about 550 m.p.h. This aircraft will have a payload up to 250,000 pounds, compared to Russia's Antonov transport, estimated to carry 100,000 pounds. The C5A will not, however, be ready before 1969.¹¹

Shore Support Requirements. Mobile developments just cited are impressive. Do they negate the need for standing overseas bases? The consensus of opinion is no.

The following excerpts from a 1960 editorial in *Time* magazine highlight the conflicting roles of logistics and strategy in determining a course to follow. The opinion has been amply confirmed by events of the past five years:

The Air Force moved up to the long-legged B-52 jet . . . The Navy equipped its Sixth and Seventh Fleets with enough tankers and supply ships to operate, if necessary, from home bases . . . the Polaris submarine can range around the world, and the Air Force ICBM's can be fired 7500 miles from the U.S. to any target in the Soviet Empire . . . While hardware changed, the case for the base system changed, too. For its own defense the U.S. could, if necessary, now leave its forward outposts and retreat to Fortress America. But for defense of the free world alliance—which in a larger sense is the United States' own best defense—the base system is still an essential and will be for the foreseeable future.¹²

This argument for bases overseas hinges then on alliances for defense. But could we not forego such forward positioning and depend instead on rapid deployment to trouble spots? A Department of Defense study says no, that logistic support of U.S. limited war activities in the underdeveloped areas, where trouble is the most likely to develop, poses extremely serious problems and may be the limiting item.¹³ Vietnam support has underscored this conclusion. Okinawa and the Philippines, in particular, have provided irreplaceable logistic strength.

Read Hanson Baldwin's personal observation following a trip to Okinawa, as of November 1965:

Okinawa, which many American military men consider the 'keystone of the Pacific,' has become a keystone of the U.S. war effort in Vietnam. This small island, scene of the final and perhaps bloodiest battle of World War II, is bulging with the stuff of war. Kadena AFB has become in the last two months the busiest overseas air base in the world. The port of Naha is jammed with shipping. Vessels lie outside in the open stead, sometimes for several days, awaiting their turn to unload. Ammunition ships unload day and night at White Beach Pier in Buckner Bay while others wait. The warehouses are full of trucks and amphibious tractors. Wire and fuel drums stand in the open.¹⁴

The Korean conflict, too, might well have had a less acceptable ending without the logistic support bases on nearby Japan. Only in short or very limited control actions such as in Lebanon or in the Dominican Republic does support by mobile units alone appear practical.

Sheer distance of travel to potential trouble spots of the world must really be experienced to appreciate fully the difference between support from home base and the provision of area support through prepositioning or use of local resources. An example may help. Consider a Navy cruiser with a 12,000 mile fuel range at economical cruise speed. To proceed to and from an area of operation as little as 2,000 miles away will require one-third of its fuel. Allowing also for fuel reserve and some high speed operations in the combat area, the cruiser can plan at best on one-half of its fuel duration as useable for time on station upon arrival.¹⁵

Now consider the Vietnam area some 9,000 miles from the United States. Here the same cruiser will use three-fourths of its fuel just to get there, and require refueling before it can even commence useful operation. To then refuel it solely on a sea-based tether from the United States becomes an expensive, elaborate business. How much more efficient and less costly to have local support bases into which the warship can slip for refueling from prepositioned stores or from locally provided commercial sources. In the Philippines today, commercial fuel is powering our Navy ships and planes of the Far East in large and increasing quantities. Commercial overseas shore support for both fuel and general supplies is both feasible and practical in limited war.

A time-defying analysis of this question of distance and position, written during World War II but reminiscent of Mahan, is worth repeating here:

Advantage of location is something to be sought for itself in planning systems of bases Every claim that a new magic weapon, a new long-distance bomber, a super-submarine of extended cruising range, has made unnecessary the acquisition of political and strategic bases overseas should be summarily rejected. All duels of weapons and counter-weapons

tend to reach a point of deadlock. When the deadlock is reached, maintenance of *position* usually is decisive.¹⁶

But the 1944 dateline of this statement predated the atomic bomb, the ICBM, and the Polaris submarine. Do they negate the argument? This writer thinks not. Rather, it appears that the deadlock has been reached and the maintenance of position does apply.

In focusing on tomorrow's shore support requirements, it is again appropriate to hear the official Department of Defense views in the matter of supplying materials of war for potential actions around the globe. Secretary McNamara has been explicit on this subject also, particularly on the question of moving materials direct from the United States, versus overseas prepositioning. On 29 January 1964 he told the House Armed Services Committee:

One of the major determinants of airlift/sealift requirements is the amount of equipment and supplies which can be feasibly maintained overseas, either in land-based or sea-based depots A number of studies have been made of the lift that would be required to move and support various size forces under a variety of assumptions. Based on the results of these studies, we now believe that we will require some increase in deployment capability, depending on the amount of prepositioning which proves to be economically and militarily feasible. Prepositioning (particularly of non-air-transportable items) will have to be greatly expanded in any event, but it cannot completely substitute for airlift.¹⁷

To cite just one complication in analyzing the feasibility and the practicality of airlift/sealift versus overseas prepositioning: cost comparisons must not only consider the overall cost of prepositioning and eventual employment of the material from that point, as against airlift or sealift costs direct from the United States to point of employment, but they must also take into account recoverability and disposal or transfer costs for equipment and consumables which are prepositioned but never employed from that location. The assumptions and comparisons multiply rapidly in such analyses. No complete study of this complex question has as yet been completed.

The tenor of Secretary McNamara's testimony, in any case, appears to be to increase overseas prepositioning to a maximum except for that support which clearly can be sustained through other means. He also makes reference in the January 1964 statement to problems with host countries, and it is to this area of interest which we will now turn.

Blending of Political and Military Interests. "What is a political base? It is a fortified independent military establishment created abroad for purposes of political influence—not necessarily for defense—at points that are vital either to potentially friendly or potentially hostile powers."¹⁸

With this interesting definition we suggest a paradox which shall be examined at some length; one which is growing yearly in importance. Simply

stated it is this: while modern weaponry on the one hand will permit home-based warfare, modern technology on the other hand shrinks our world ever smaller, drawing all nations more closely together. Politically, we are in each other's backyards. Can we ignore this paradox? Not so long as politics is the fuze which sets off a conflagration.

Today, political considerations are increasingly determining the choice of new military installations and the loss of old ones. One need only survey a world map briefly, moreover, to see the countless possibilities to acquire base rights from allies in the thousands of islands dotting the Pacific, Atlantic, and Indian Oceans, and neighboring seas. Superimpose on this the continental opportunities for agreements with our dozens of allies the world over, and it becomes clear that the question is not whether we can obtain base rights, but rather where we should select sites and how many.

We are not in a seller's market here. Our approach must be one of hard bargaining. We are committed to serve or especially please no one. The cooperation of prospective hosts in arriving at equitable arrangements and in sharing costs and effort should be commensurate with the security and economic advantages they acquire by playing host to the military forces of a powerful ally such as the United States. If they desire more than we feel should be provided, we should bargain or look elsewhere. We will be the more respected and more frequently obtain a stable agreement.

U.S. military strategy in the past has normally been to establish "beachheads" in foreign lands from which to function in isolation and insulation from the affairs of the host nation. The war in Vietnam is dramatically refuting that principle today. One sees news photos of strapping U.S. Marines carrying children from bombed villages and of U.S. platoons securing fields as peasants get out the rice crop. One analyst has flatly stated:

Our hope for maintaining conditions favorable to our presence in Asia depends on our entering into activities and commitments from which we have heretofore held aloof. We must be prepared to share the operation of the bases with the host government, to participate in joint military planning, to designate particular forces for particular defense missions, to encourage local armed forces to assume responsibility for military tasks which fall within their technical and financial capabilities, and to relate these tasks to a coherent plan of local or regional defense.¹⁹

Just as significantly, the author predicts that, "Even with superlative diplomacy and the utmost good will, we will not succeed everywhere, but will encounter situations that call for fundamental adjustments to political facts."²⁰

Political/Military Cooperation. What then are some specific means available to our military forces abroad by which to obtain closer and more fruitful relations with current or prospective host nations?

Closer logistic interface is one means. "The closer the member nations of an international organization are united in a common purpose and the closer their combatant forces are committed to act together in time of hostility, the closer must be the coordination of military logistic support."²¹ This principle, generally recognized by the military during wartime and during the feverish stages just preceding a war, is too frequently neglected in peacetime. Great alliances such as NATO of necessity employ the principle, but at the host and tenant level it may be incidental. Why?

Part of the answer appears to be the reluctance of large powers such as the United States to become too dependent on other nations and other supply sources. Militarily, we retain the beachhead theory. Paradoxically, we accept the commitment of foreign basing but reject the opportunity to exploit the advantages of mutually supporting logistic cooperation. This is especially puzzling when one considers that the decision to live together in peacetime implies the commitment to fight together if hostilities occur.

Logistic cooperation can be furthered in many ways. Standardized equipment is perhaps the most apparent. Other means are common storage sites for joint use, training and standardization programs in-country, joint harbor and shore facility development, increased local purchasing and local hiring (within balance of payments limitations), and programs to provide host nations obsolescent military equipment excess to U.S. needs and to train with them in its use. The possibilities are endless.

Mutual host-tenant satisfaction is fundamental to political/military cooperation. It has been suggested that "the maximum program of [political and strategic] bases, which looks to political guidance and the prevention of war, the assurance of stability and protection of friendly powers, and the winning of unfriendly powers, should be put into effect only with the harmonious consent of the power concerned."²² Applied to base rights agreements, this may be translated: don't go into an agreement if it is likely that doing so will lead to discord and squabbling—and get out if it does.

A corollary to this principle of selectivity to ensure harmony must surely be to avoid the position of vitally requiring any single foreign-based installation. Not only does such dependence make the United States unacceptably vulnerable, but it destroys our bargaining position and the option to depart gracefully from a politically untenable situation.

The decision to leave an overseas military facility, whether under friendly or strained political relations, usually involves the turning over of all fixed installations, an action of no small cost to the U.S. Government. While mobility and portability in shore installations is inherently limited, there are some opportunities to be flexible even here. One example presently under observation is the new U.S. Naval Communication Station

in Greece. For the first time a facility of this type was completely packaged in mobile vans and trailers, and then sited so as to permit U.S. military personnel who would operate it to base on the local economy. Here is a package which, if it proved expedient, could apparently be relocated at a fraction of the cost for usual installations.

Across the world is another example of a shore-based installation with potential portability. At Chu Lai in Vietnam, U.S. Marines and Navy Seabees laid a useable jet runway in 23 days, out of interlocking two-by-twelve foot panels of extruded aluminum.²³ Each panel, several inches thick and weighing 144 pounds, forms a rugged box girder which is reuseable in fact as well as theory, unlike the familiar perforated steel matting of World War II.

Other semiportable installations are common, such as the familiar quonset hut and butler building. But much could be done, if attention were given the problem, to effect true portability of entire installations overseas. And portability lends flexibility. Such portability would prove particularly effective when accomplished in conjunction with action to streamline the total overseas infrastructure to minimum essential needs, while simplifying and standardizing construction techniques and equipment used.

It has already been noted that there are over 2,000 U.S. military installations abroad—defining an installation in this case as each separate piece of property performing a particular function. The possibilities here for originality to strengthen political relations are rich. We have all seen or read where military installations in the United States, no longer needed for their original purpose, were used by local public or private organizations for schools, hospitals, youth camps, colleges, churches, public agencies, and so on. Military acquisition, construction, and disposal at the many U.S. facilities abroad could well be deliberately tailored to the eventual needs of the foreign community. We seldom stay forever.

Similarly, joint host-tenant use of facilities where security is not a problem can in many cases be encouraged from the start. Rather than view such action with hesitation or as a last resort, we should make "political hay" of the opportunity. We should welcome working hand in hand with a firm ally. Bases are usually lost not by oversharing but by undersharing and aloofness which makes cooperation and good will impossible. Once such a state arrives, the most powerful and far-flung base is at the mercy of host politicians. We are unlikely to retain it for long.

And finally, the benefits of overseas military purchasing in the fostering of political cooperation and good will should not be overlooked. During peacetime and in limited war, the shot-in-the-arm effect of U.S. military spending on local economies is too often forgotten. By today, economies like Japan and West Germany have little need for the military purchase or the serviceman's dollar. But such purchases were significant in the post-World War II era. And in the turmoil and tragedy of war in the Republic of Vietnam today, the economic modernization of the state is little noted.

But progress is everywhere. The moral here is not that progress and prosperity follow the U.S. military, but rather that where U.S. military forces must be based, local economies may be both used to advantage of the U.S. forces and bolstered simultaneously.

To be sure, politico-military cooperation is by no means totally lacking in U.S. management and planning of overseas installations. The country-team concept, wherein the U.S. ambassador coordinates the activities of representatives of the various U.S. agencies abroad, includes close working relationships with military officials. And at the top level of government, the Secretaries of State and Defense meet regularly in Cabinet and Security Council meetings and in discussions with the President involving U.S. political and military affairs abroad. However, between these in-country and top level echelons there appears to be a large area where politico-military planning and execution of U.S. overseas basing could be strengthened. This seems particularly true in the area of predicting potential troubles and in planning new means and methods to achieve closer working relations with governments hosting U.S. military activities.

Conservation of Resources. The Navy must be prepared to do its share in evolving multiuse bases overseas, by combining operations and basing within the U.S. military as well as with other branches of the U.S. Government which have activities abroad. The Department of Defense is encouraging attempts to promote this end, and a great deal more should be heard on the subject. Efficiency and conservation abroad must be constantly improved in an era when cost effectiveness, including balance of payment precautions, has become an important cold war tool.

In a similar vein, conservation must be sought by regular review and updating of defense contingency plans for foreign basing rights. Where appropriate, such plans should permit immediate activation of base rights at the installations of allies in event of emergency. In some instances firm planning of this nature may well negate the need for actual occupation of facilities during peacetime.

Emerging Nations. Nearly all U.S. military bases are today located in the Northern Hemisphere. But to the south, independent states are springing up by the score and political action is on the rise. The Indian Ocean is rung by disturbances. Is it likely that emergencies can be limited indefinitely to local skirmishes in these lands down under? The question should interest all of us.

In this thought provoking book, *Politics in Africa*, Herbert Spiro makes the following observation regarding U.S. interests on that continent:

If the U.S. does not move in where its allies of NATO moved out, the Soviet Union inevitably will. 'Moving in' or 'taking over' is thought of in military, economic, and political-constitutional terms. In other words, the argument is, first, that we need to take over the military bases of the departing colonial powers. The West needs these

bases, and if the U.S. fails to replace France or Great Britain, the Soviet Union will do so instead.²⁴

These are strong words indeed. Mr. Spiro is quick to add, "We should welcome the waning of the military argument in view of the lack of military traditions in these new political systems."²⁵ Nevertheless, his original point is all too clear. Power vacuums have a way of filling.

U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean may well be close at hand. In October 1965 it was publicly stated that the U.S. Navy was "currently studying the possibility of erecting a joint base in the Seychelles Islands." For the British this would be one of a series of small island bases in the Indian Ocean which might eventually substitute for such major bases as Aden and Singapore.²⁶ In November 1965 the Seychelles site, Diego Garcia, was described as a British backup for their larger base at Aden, and as a "transistorized islet" for combined Anglo-American communications, staging, and refueling missions.²⁷

One other development could push maritime interests southward. International agreement on standardizing the width of territorial seas at six miles may not be far off. Such action missed being widely adopted as a convention of the sea in 1960 by the narrow margin of a single vote. Widening of the territorial seas, along with unilateral tendencies by some nations to claim large chunks of ocean as inland waters, would greatly increase interest in alternate shipping routes to the south. With such shifts must inevitably come increased interest in southern ports and southern base rights.

V—CONCLUSIONS

Across the earth from Asia to the heart of Africa forces are loosened whose direction is uncertain and whose portent is full with challenge.¹

What, then, can be said specifically and with confidence about the future of overseas Navy support planning?

Availability of Bases. It is safe to assume that shore support through such mediums as regional and bilateral alliances and base rights agreements will continue to be available in generally sufficient quantity. As to our continuing role as a maritime power needing basing rights overseas, the distinguished strategic analyst, George Fielding Eliot, has made this flat prediction:

In summation, it is assumed with confidence, even with assurance, that the political and strategic environment of the year 1973 will be dominated by a maritime coalition of industrial democracies under the leadership of the United States, in association with an integrated Western Europe, and that the global dominance of the alliance will be based on control of the oceans of the world.²

Shore Basing Concept. Shore basing remains a sound concept as one means of overseas support, whether considered from political, strategic, logistic, or purely economic considerations. A preponderance of both military and nonmilitary views stand behind this opinion. A number have already been cited in the foregoing chapters, including official Department of Defense expressions. Studying U.S. military views alone, one civilian analyst concluded that "Air Force, Navy, and Army all maintain that any mass closing of foreign bases would cripple the existing capability to contain local war and permit Communist forces to fill the resulting military vacuum."³ Expanding on the theme of local wars along the Eurasian rimland, he concludes:

Debate on the validity of foreign bases has forced the Services to review alternatives. Defense planners have concluded that collective security alliances, with base rights, remain the best defense against Communist bloc expansion. They also feel that the present forward base strategy is strategically sound as long as there is a threat of local war involving allied nations along the Communist bloc periphery which are not strong enough to meet the threat alone.⁴

Expressed in political terms, another analyst has noted that we must retain advantageous forward positions overseas if we are to hold a favorable balance of power in particular regions.⁵ He also refers in this instance to the Eurasian rimland.

Anthony Sokol has taken one of the most sweeping views of the concept of overseas shore support. Embracing at once political, strategic, and logistic considerations, he arrives at these conclusions:

But it is obvious that this system of bases [around Eurasia], at least as far as seapower is concerned, does not necessarily consist of a chain of fortified islands—the image of advanced naval bases that comes to the minds of most people—but that every port and harbor along the Eurasian continent represents a potential base and a springboard, to which we project the power originating on the American mainland, and from which we send it out again toward the intended target areas. This system of bases includes not only Iceland or Okinawa, but also London, Cherbourg, North Africa, or Seoul, and many others, plus whatever additional locations become necessary in case of war. If viewed in this comprehensive manner, bases are obviously as necessary today as they ever were; neither the development of mobile fleet support nor the greatly increased vulnerability of fixed positions can change or abrogate that need.⁶

Primacy of Mobile Support. From the Navy standpoint, overseas shore support must always be viewed as an adjunct to, not a replacement for, mobile support. In dealing principally with the pros and cons of shore

support, this point has perhaps been insufficiently underscored. In no way can naval forces derive so much flexibility of support as through fast, multi-purpose, logistic vessels, supplemented by air delivery of priority cargoes. As a corollary to this prime conclusion, it must be repeated that insufficient attention has been given in the past to modernizing logistic resupply ships and mobile resupply techniques. On both counts, the more dramatic strike forces and their equipage too often overshadow logistic modernization, resulting in logistic lag. Grim warning is sounded: "Until we bring our logistic concepts into focus with the realities of the potential conflict situations of today and attempt to project them into future situations, our combat forces will continue to operate on a logistic tether which is likely to remain unseen until it pulls taut in some future conflict."⁷

Political Significance. Military planners, Navy included, must increasingly recognize the close political/military relationships in overseas basing. And just so must the politicians see this meeting of interests:

Clearly the greatly increased role of the military can be explained in good part by the crucial importance of the military equation in international politics. It is also clear that this dependence of American foreign policy on military strength has major consequences for the military as well as for the makers of foreign policy. As far as national security is concerned, military and non-military factors are so closely interrelated that they may be thought of as inseparable aspects of particular problems and situations.⁸

Ways in which overseas military bases can be used to concurrently strengthen political ties are several. Joint ventures between host and tenant should be encouraged where security will permit. Bases should be planned with current and future needs of the host country clearly in mind, so that friendships may grow. Even more emphasis should be placed on military personnel training and adaptation for foreign shore duty and visits abroad. The country-team concept should increasingly blend U.S. political and military planning and execution at the in-country level. Local overseas purchasing of goods and services must be recognized as a form of assistance, and correlated with political interests.

Foreign basing must be sufficiently flexible and diffused so that installations can be given up rapidly and in a spirit of good will when in the best interests of the United States. Sufficient overseas support capability, mobile and fixed, must be kept available so that all dealings with foreign governments can be made from a position of strength and mutual respect rather than under pressure.

In sum, each foreign basing venture must be looked upon as a joining of forces against a common threat. "We're in this together" should be the byword. Attitudes must be recognized as being fully as decisive to continued success as force or wealth. For those who worry about the dependency engendered by falling in too closely with overseas hosts, it must be realized once and for all that in today's shrinking world, we *are*

dependent. The term "interdependent," however, more closely describes our mutual needs with friendly nations.

Flexibility the Key. Flexibility must be recognized as the key to balanced overseas support. No formula can be set by which the proper blend of ship and shore support can automatically be metered. But flexibility will permit trial while lessening the seriousness of error. How then can flexibility of support be attained?

By alternate options. It has been said that "the hallmark of current policy is flexibility in dealing with local imitations over bases—thanks to extra margin of safety in the long reach of home-based weapons."⁹ But options must also be possible within the overseas base structure itself, through proper siting and employment.

By rapidity of deployment. Use of overseas support bases need not be thought of solely in terms of permanent, preestablished sites. Rather, fast deployment techniques, and the ability to conduct operations from quickly erected skeleton facilities concurrent with their further development, will permit correspondingly fewer standing installations. As part of such techniques, planning must see to the training of personnel able to quickly erect, operate, and support these new-style advanced base facilities. And organizational and operational plans must embrace the entire concept.

By sufficient mobility. Rear Admiral Eccles once observed that "flexibility and mobility are closely related and that each is essential to the development of the other."¹⁰ A strong and versatile mobile support force will add tremendously to the potential for flexibility in support ashore.

By cost analysis. There will be times when cost effectiveness dictates the degree of emphasis to be placed on mobile support or on shore-based support. As an example, extension of significant U.S. naval operations throughout the Indian Ocean area might not be cost effectively supported by mobile forces alone. Bases such as that being planned for the Seychelles might prove highly cost effective at such extended ranges of operation. In other circumstances (for example, where the political climate portends problems ashore) mobile support alone might prove less costly in the long run.

By proper mixing. General Wheeler testified before the House Armed Services Committee in 1964 that "militarily no one can deny that you must have a proper mix of mobility and forward deployment. The hard thing to do is to sort out what the proper mix is, particularly in view of political commitment, psychological factors, and so on."¹¹ Clearly implied here is the need for continuing review of our overseas support needs by the responsible military and civilian planners.

By the good judgment of men. It is on this note that we will close. In the final analysis, one man must each time make a final judgment, right or wrong. Knowledge of the facts, experience, and dedication to right are his resources with which to make that judgment. Flexibility both eases the task and strengthens the decision.

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BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Captain Warren A. Skon, U.S. Navy, is a naval aviator. He was educated at the University of Minnesota, General Line School, and the University of Maryland. He holds a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Social Science from the George Washington University.

Captain Skon has served as a pilot on various attack carriers; he was CIC Officer on the USS Norton Sound (AVM-1), Executive Officer at NAAS Kingsville, Commanding Officer at NAS Moffett Field, and he served in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Captain Skon graduated from the School of Naval Warfare at the Naval War College in 1966 and is presently serving at the Defense Communications Agency, Navy Service Center, in Washington, D.C.