

Naval War College Review

Volume 18
Number 1 *February*

Article 1

1965

February 1965 Full Issue

The U.S. Naval War College

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Recommended Citation

Naval War College, The U.S. (1965) "February 1965 Full Issue," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 18 : No. 1 , Article 1.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol18/iss1/1>

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

VOL. XVII, NO. 6

FEBRUARY 1965

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FOREWORD

The *Naval War College Review* was established in 1948 by the Chief of Naval Personnel in order that officers of the service might receive some of the educational benefits available to the resident students at the Naval War College.


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C. L. Melson
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College



**NAVAL
WAR
COLLEGE
REVIEW**

**ISSUED MONTHLY
U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R. I.**

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY:

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 3 December 1964

by

Dr. Horst Blomeyer-Bartenstein
Counselor, German Embassy, Washington, D.C.

I am glad to have an opportunity to discuss some of my country's problems. I would like to concentrate on some major political items, leaving aside the economic field in which I am no expert. Furthermore, I think I should refrain from commenting on my country's status and role in the world today. It will be up to you to make an assessment of Germany's status in the world; it is my task to furnish you with some facts.

I. The Division of Germany as a National and
International Problem

In starting a description of the German situation one is tempted to begin with an adaptation of Julius Caesar's famous first line in 'De Bello Gallico': Gallia est omnis divisa in partes tres' (Gaul as a whole is divided in three parts.) In political terms there is still one Germany within the borders of the German Reich of December 31, 1937. It is a Germany which awaits a peace treaty, divided and not yet under a central (unified) government. The western part of this Germany has been organized as a temporary entity with a freely elected government, the Federal Republic of Germany, for which I speak here today. The eastern-most parts of our country, namely, East Prussia, Silesia, and Pomerania, are under Soviet and Polish administration. The original German population of these provinces has been expelled to a large extent. The center part, the Soviet Zone of Occupation of Germany, has developed, under direct Soviet influence, into a regime called the 'German Democratic Republic,' which is, as you know, not recognized by the community of nations, with the exception of the states of the Eastern bloc, including Red China.

I am speaking here as a representative of the freely elected government of 55 million Germans. But this government also acts as spokesman for 17 million Germans in the Soviet-occupied zone, who are not at present in a position to join us. They are prevented by the force of Soviet arms from the exercise of their right of self-determination, the exercise of which would bring about an immediate reunification of the German people.

People living in the so-called German Democratic Republic are forcibly prevented from leaving their country in order to travel to the Federal Republic to see and join their relatives and friends. It is easier for them to go to Bulgaria, and even to China, than to make the 20-mile trip from Plauen (Saxony) to Hof (Bavaria). Hundreds of men have been killed or wounded, and thousands have been jailed, simply because they wanted to cross a demarcation line inside Germany. The impact of these facts upon German public opinion, and the necessity as well as the will to change this unbearable situation are, without doubt, the strongest political factors in Germany today. I am talking about the public feeling in both parts of Germany. The situation is so blatantly anomalous that it continuously stirs the conscience of the public. Polls in 1963 have shown that unification was considered, by far, the most important issue, ranking high (31%) above items such as the improvement of the economic situation (21%), maintenance of peace (15%), Berlin (12%), and unification of Europe (12%). Asked about the most ardent political wish, 69% of those interviewed in the Federal Republic in 1962, answered in favor of reunification, compared with 66% in 1957. I may add that the political will toward unification is no monopoly of one of the three parties represented in the Federal Parliament, the Bundestag. There is an absolute consensus in this respect: differences exist only as to the ways and means to reach the common aim. One condition, however, is equally common as well in the public opinion (as the polls show) as among the parties: reunification must not impair the freedom that the German people have obtained in the Federal Republic. This condition obviously creates a serious problem, since the so-called German Democratic Republic is under military occupation exercised by 20 Soviet divisions and is also a part of the communist Warsaw Pact system.

I mention these factors in order to foster an understanding of one of the dilemmas of our foreign policy. Whatever course the Federal Government takes, it is always judged by the public and the political parties according to whether or not it promotes German reunification. On the other hand, the East-West conflict,

the hardening of the border between the free West and the communist East, gave our government little chance to achieve this aim without endangering our freedom.

I have dwelt on this, our basic problem, somewhat longer because I believe that it is indispensable to an understanding of our policy. The quest for reunification pushes us forward and binds our hands at the same time. A concrete consequence is the Hallstein Doctrine, which is devised to discourage other countries from recognizing the Soviet Zone as a state. It has been successful in doing this, but has made us continuously use up much of our political gunpowder. We are obliged to ask our friends to join us in exerting pressure and are forced to use the economic resources which we have, in order to convince new states that it is to their disadvantage to recognize East Germany. But we are doing this in order to keep the separation of Germany from becoming permanent. For the same reason, you will find that we ourselves stubbornly refuse to extend anything to the regime in the Soviet Zone resembling even *de facto* recognition. I regret that we have thereby caused the American government considerable headache and concern, especially during the years of crisis, beginning in 1959, when the Soviet Union tried, by exerting pressure on Berlin, to force the West to recognize the status quo.

The division of Germany and our quest for reunification are major factors in European politics, as well as in East-West relations. It is obvious that the existence of this artificial separation must be the source of constant tension. This is, I believe, recognized even by the Soviet Union. On the other hand, reunification would amount to an important change in the present balance between East and West. A united Germany would have about 73 million inhabitants; it would be by far the most populous country in Europe outside the Soviet Union. To this one must add the fact that the economy of the Federal Republic is already the strongest in Europe (again not counting the Soviet Union), whereas the economy of the Soviet Zone ranks second in the Soviet bloc. Not only would reunification create a tremendously potent economic power in Central Europe, but the Soviet bloc would at the same time suffer a substantial loss. It is not easy, for the moment, to conceive of conditions under which the Soviet Union would accept reunification except, of course, Germany's joining the Eastern bloc, which is as I mentioned before, unacceptable to us. A neutralized Germany has been proposed by some authors and politicians, but it would also mean a loss to the Soviet Union. Not only would the

economic potential of the Soviet Zone be removed from the Soviet orbit, but it would mean that for the first time a communist regime had lost the fight against capitalist reaction. Under these circumstances the status quo—the partition of Germany—is relatively the best situation from the Soviet point of view - at least until new progress towards the West appears possible. Similarly, Germany's neighbors, Poland and Czechoslovakia, for political reasons, prefer a divided Germany - even though Poland at least understands very well, from its own experience, the emotional and historical background of Germany's drive for unity. Poland may also fear that a stronger and united Germany will eventually reclaim her Eastern provinces that are now under Polish administration. It seems also that Czechoslovakia is afraid that this Germany may ask for the Sudetenland, that part of the Republic with an original German population that was ceded to Hitler under the Munich agreement and which was returned to Czechoslovakia after the war.

If we turn to our Western allies, we are told by all of them that they fully understand and back our wish to reunify Germany. This is quite a contrast with the immediate postwar period, when a divided Germany seemed to many the best way to establish a peaceful Europe. I believe it has been understood that the division of Germany creates a constant and dangerous tension in the heart of Europe. The misgivings caused by the image of a strong Germany in the center of the continent seem to have subsided, partially because of the realization of the size of the Soviet threat, and partially because of growing confidence and understanding towards Germany.

However, the sympathy of our friends does not bring us nearer to our goal. What is needed is political, initiative aimed at a change of the present status. And here is one of our gravest problems: asking for reunification of Germany means a drive for a change in the status quo in Europe, even though it involves, from our point of view, only internal German affairs. Other countries, even if they understand the dangers arising from the situation in Central Europe, may feel that a political drive for reunification involves more risks than opportunities and would increase rather than decrease tension. In Germany, on the other hand, there exists a widespread feeling that the policy of *détente* that seems to be favored by both East and West, tends to freeze the status quo and with it the division of our country.

At first glance, the dilemma seems unsolvable. But if one takes a closer look at the concept of *détente* and the underlying political calculations, things do not look quite as hopeless. *Détente* does not mean a stabilization of the status quo; it is not necessarily a static concept. On the contrary, the present confrontation in a cold war has made any move impossible. From a *détente* we expect the unfreezing of the situation that will enable the West to conduct a more dynamic policy. A credible defensive strength on the one hand, and the readiness to enter into all kinds of relations with the countries of the Eastern bloc, will possibly create a new and different climate there. We cannot expect the communist regimes in the satellite countries to disappear overnight; but a slow development toward greater independence may sooner or later facilitate a gradual and careful extension of the Western influence towards the East. In such a development we see, as of now, the only possibility for a reunification of Germany in peace is one which would bring Eastern Europe closer to the West. And we are acting accordingly. Notwithstanding the limitations that result from the application of the Hallstein Doctrine, we have established economic missions in Rumania, Poland, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Negotiations with Czechoslovakia are under way. We hope to expand these missions to the cultural field as well, and thus slowly intensify contacts with Germany's Eastern neighbors.

II. Europe and the German-French Relationship

Having pointed to the mortgage on our 'lot,' namely, the absence of a peace treaty with the whole of Germany, I would like to turn to our role in Europe. This role, as well as our position in the Atlantic Alliance, must obviously be qualified by the existence of 'unfinished business.' To what extent can we, in a time of danger and tension such as ours, when an easement is the main political topic, expect our friends to join forces with us if our primary political aim of reunification involves a change of the status quo? Aside from this basic reservation, things look quite encouraging in Europe. It is almost unbelievable - but it is a reality - that after the last formidable outburst in the Second World War and under the threat from the East, distrust and hatred, those patterns of political behavior in Europe through the ages, have practically disappeared. The whole political climate has utterly changed. The realization of how much the peoples of Europe have in common in cultural heritage, in thinking and in history, not to mention the economic and military imperatives, has made possible developments that seemed incredible only one

generation ago. The most striking developments in this regard are, in my opinion, German-French reconciliation and the creation of the European Communities—the Coal and Steel Community, the Common Market, and Euratom. I mentioned the German-French reconciliation first because we feel that this is the cornerstone for the evolution of a new Europe.

Only a close and friendly relationship with France made the first steps toward a European concept possible. Without it, the communities which I just mentioned would not exist and the future of Europe would be dark and uncertain. To cement this basis of a sound European development, the Franco-German treaty of 1963 was concluded. This treaty was *not* meant to give either side a *carte blanche*. On the contrary, it was intended to bring about close cooperation and to create a climate in which possible misunderstandings could be eliminated, and in which it would become impossible for one side to act in a way that would eventually prove to be disadvantageous to the other.

There is no reason for me to hide the fact that a close relationship between France and Germany does not mean - as it may seem - that German and French political thinking are always identical. I must admit to the contrary. One of the most critical differences in opinion concerns the form of future political unity in Europe. You know that six of the European countries have developed a high degree of integration in certain fields of economic life, such as coal and steel, trade, and peaceful use of nuclear power. The three communities will soon merge. There will be a joint parliamentary representation and a common court of justice. The fusion of the six countries in the economic field will become almost inextricable. What is missing is a similar development in the political and the military field. The German Federal Government, and most of the other countries of the community, envisage in these fields as well, a solution of the community type - something that would lead finally toward a genuine integration or a federation of Europe. President de Gaulle, on the other hand, feels that political and military integration is in contradiction to the concept of the state that keeps a nation together.

In President de Gaulle's view, it is inconsistent with the concept of a sovereign state to give up the right to decide by itself, and alone, on matters concerning political survival. This would lead, in fact, to a union and thereby to the end of the original state. The General, I believe, feels that all forms of integration or federation lead to a loss of the personality of the states concerned. This will, he thinks, finally entail a

degeneration of the political will of the nations involved. Not being able to make final decisions on one's own destiny, political interest must decline. It will become harder and harder to mobilize all the active energies in the country that are needed, as for instance, the recovery of France. De Gaulle's idea of a future European unity is based on the acceptance of the national state as the indispensable ground element. The way towards Europe that France is therefore suggesting now is that a process of osmosis should be started among the states of the future union that would eventually lead not only to a high degree of mutual understanding, but also to a closeness in thinking and political planning. This would be brought about by a system of regular consultation on all levels of administration, conducted with a will to work out commonly acceptable views and plans for action on all types of day-to-day and long-term problems. Even though this system might not work - at least at the beginning - in many cases, it is hoped that it will widen slowly, over the years, the field of common interest, understanding and action. This is the way the German-French treaty is supposed to function, and this is, as I see it, also General de Gaulle's idea of a slow but solid growing together of Europe in the political domain.

In the military field, General de Gaulle's starting point is similar: he feels that integration not only takes the fighting spirit—the feeling of mission to serve one's country—out of the Army, but also deprives the nation of its freedom of decision in matters of life and death. The De Gaulle formula for military co-operation in peacetime, therefore, comes much closer to the classical type of alliance than to the present partly integrated NATO concept.

It may look somehow like a deviation from my subject if I have ventured to analyze the attitude of our French friends. But the reason is, of course, that I cannot point out the differences between French and German thinking, if I fail to show how we see the position of our French ally. Now, let me turn to the German views.

For us the idea of a federated, or even a highly integrated, Europe does not cause the same misgivings as it does to President de Gaulle. And we have some good reasons for this, which are essentially, and naturally, quite different from the motives of the French. For us the idea of the individual national state has lost much of its appeal in the last 30 years. We believe that the closer Europe can be molded together, the firmer it will

be. The idea of a Federal State does not sound negative to our ears, since our Federal system has proven that there is enough political power and jurisdiction left under this system for the 'länder' (states) to maintain and develop their own individual personality. Moreover, we have learned in our history, (for instance in the years of the expanding Empire from 1648 to 1803, and during the time of the German Federation from 1815 to 1866) that the hope for an osmosis between relatively independent states has, at least in our case, never worked out. The 'perpetual imperial diet' in Regensburg, as well as the 'Federal Diet' in Frankfurt, simply did not succeed in bringing Germany closer together. On the contrary, in spite of identity in language, culture, history, and in many other respects, the political effect was not positive. The perpetual diet became the scene of political strife inside Germany into which foreign powers interfered indirectly or directly. The history of the German Federation, in particular, shows that the struggle between the two strongest powers in the Federation, Austria and Prussia, resulted in the final collapse of the system.

We have one further reason for our reluctance to follow the line of President de Gaulle. In the military field, we are strong supporters of integration. We believe that the integration of the staff structure of the Alliance is a prerequisite for well-balanced common planning. What is of advantage to the Alliance as a whole, can more easily be worked out by an integrated body, than by a number of individual national general staffs. Such an integrated staff, as we know, for example, from SACEUR, has a tendency to develop a thinking of its own. The close cooperation of staff officers from all the allied countries results, as has been shown, in a meeting of minds that represents the thinking of the Alliance much better than an endeavor to coordinate a number of different national war plans.

Germany has a special interest in integration and for a very obvious reason. The German army contingent under NATO is already the strongest ground force in Europe outside the Soviet Union. It is equipped with the most modern weapons, with the exception, of course, of the American forces. Nineteen years after the end of the last world war this is a most astonishing and, in some respects, a disturbing fact. Demilitarization and total disarmament of Germany belonged to the proclaimed war aims of the Allied Powers during and immediately after the war. The 'reeducation' of the German people after 1945 was particularly strict in its denunciation of everything relating to national

defense. It went so far as to abolish military pensions for the wounded and crippled. Participation in this war—in any war—was looked upon as immoral, if not criminal. Public opinion in Germany, worn out and tired by an endless and hopeless war against almost the entire world, was ready to accept this proposition. A soldier became a kind of symbol and the scapegoat for Germany's political and military catastrophe. No wonder that the sudden change to rearmament in the years after 1951 was highly unpopular. With bravery and farsightedness, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer accepted the Allied wish, and fought it through against the opposition party in the parliament as well as in the constitutional court. Remember that the reestablishment of German sovereignty was directly linked with our acceptance of the European Defense Community, an organization devised for the use and integration of the German military potential in a European organization.

Soon after 1945, it became quite evident to the minds of policy-makers in the United States that the Soviet Union, a wartime ally, quickly supplanted Hitler's Germany as the enemy in Europe. A German contribution to the defense of Europe all of a sudden appeared to be the natural thing; we could not expect to be defended by our American allies without lifting a hand ourselves. The way chosen to avoid the resurgence of the vitally strong German defense force with its own command and general staff - a nightmare for the European countries, and anything but a welcome Christmas present to the Germans themselves - was to give those forces a European mission and to integrate them with other European forces. To our disappointment, the EDC treaty did not come into force. It had to be replaced by some other sort of arrangement:

- (a) Control of the German armament through a refurbished Brussels treaty, the so-called Western European Union, comprising the Six Common Market countries, plus Great Britain;
- (b) Assignment of all German combat forces to NATO; and
- (c) A relatively high degree of integration in NATO on the staff level.

This system made unnecessary the establishment of a German high command with a new German general staff.

In summary, these are the reasons why we so enthusiastically favor the principle of integration in NATO concerning internal German requirements as well as respect for the feelings of our European allies. Needless to say, in addition, the possible difficulties inside and outside the Alliance make us very reluctant to consider a return to a concept along the lines of the classical alliance. This would not only raise the question of a German general staff, but would also change the mission of the German armed forces primarily into a national one.

The next point of divergence between us and France is Britain's role in Europe. It is the declared will of five of the member states of the Common Market that Great Britain should join the organization. The British Government was ready to accede, under specified conditions, which however, France felt unable to accept. The plans for European political unity have always included England, as far as the five were concerned. France's reluctance to accept initial British participation has caused a slowing down of the pace of political unity. Recent events may have changed the situation. The new Labor Government will probably wish to reconsider the European policy of the Tories. It is therefore quite likely that the six will now go on and try to find a limited solution on the basis of the Common Market members, which would be acceptable to France's ideas of sovereignty and would still not exclude further steps toward a closer political organization.

Both the Federal Republic and Italy have since proposed plans for strengthening and developing the political integration of the member states in the European communities. Both plans do not envisage British participation at the outset, and both conceive of a step-by-step concept, recognizing that it is better to take a small step forward towards Europe with French participation, than to wait indefinitely for a more ideal solution. In the first phase of the German plan, the governments will establish and use a system of consultation in order to achieve a conformity of attitude in all matters of common interest in spheres of foreign policy, defense, and cultural affairs, including education. It can easily be seen that our proposal follows the pattern of the Franco-German treaty. But there are two additions: the Governments should be assisted by an advisory committee appointed by them and serving—as an independent entity—solely common interests. This group would be something like a modest but steady motor pulling in the direction of integration. Also, the European Parliamentary Assembly is supposed to function from the outset

as an instrument of political cooperation and integration. What the future of these proposals will be, is hard to say. Lately (in his Strasbourg speech) President de Gaulle has also stressed the necessity of an organization of Europe in the military as well as in the political field. It may well be that the new year will bring new moves toward European integration; moves, that to a certain degree at least are prompted by the developments inside the Atlantic Alliance.

III. The Atlantic Alliance

There has been, and still is, much talk about the desperate state of the Alliance, of its weakness, and its lack of cohesion, and all too many people are inclined to blame France for this deplorable decline. I submit that this is quite a superficial judgment and that there is a basic similarity between the French and the American concepts that should not be overlooked.

There are two main reasons for the weakening of the Atlantic Alliance. One is the diminishing Soviet threat toward Europe that affects the *raison d'être* of the Alliance as such; on this factor we have no influence; we can only try to develop cohesive forces which serve as a substitute for the former, more immediate threat.

The other reason, however, is the inequality of the partners; and in this respect something can be done in order to remove the source of evil. An alliance consisting of one superpower protecting a number of smaller countries can only last for a short period. To be protected corrupts the character of a nation, weakens the will and the ability for self-defense, promotes within public opinion a feeling of not being responsible, and creates at the same time distrust and ingratitude towards the protecting power.

Having realized that this inequality of the parties is the most divisive factor, the U.S. Government has for many years followed a policy of encouraging the unification of Europe in order to have some day an equal partner on the other side of the Atlantic. This idea of the two columns on which the Atlantic Alliance should rest is fully shared by President de Gaulle. He believes in the necessity of having two equal partners in the Alliance, able to conduct a meaningful and productive discussion across the ocean. We do not know exactly what the French ideas are for the structure of the future Alliance based on the two pillars. It may well be that France thinks of a lesser degree of integration than the rest of us may have in mind. But this is a question to be solved when we have a European Union.

The problem now is to agree on what the Atlantic relationship should be, pending an organization of Europe. Here we find that France, although it adheres to the concept of equality of all the members of the Alliance, is opposed to individual transatlantic ties of European countries. The reasons given are that this would endanger future European union and create instead a solar system of unhealthy, vulnerable, bilateral relationships between the United States and other members of the Alliance. In my opinion, the French position neither solves the problem of the cohesion of the Alliance nor that of the inequality of the partners. It merely preserves the status quo which, as everybody including France knows, is unsatisfactory. We do not see any harm in strengthening the links across the Atlantic, and have difficulty in understanding how this could be detrimental to future European developments.

At this point, of course, the nuclear problem comes into the picture and this is where we might find the key to at least part of the story. The French opposition against participation of individual European states in a closer Atlantic organization became, as I see it, evident for the first time, when Great Britain concluded with the United States the Nassau agreement on the creation of a multilateral, nuclear fleet open to the other parties of the Alliance. It is obvious to me that a concept of Atlantic nuclear sharing is incompatible with the French idea of Europe as an equal partner which would also involve a nuclear deterrent independent of, if not as large as, that of the United States.

Logical as the French attitude undoubtedly is, it causes two serious questions. First, there *is* no European nuclear deterrent. The only continental nuclear power is France, and President de Gaulle has made it very clear that in his opinion a sharing of nuclear responsibility would be in contradiction to the notion of national sovereignty. A united Europe, however, one which would have to depend upon French nuclear capability, would simply trade American leadership for French hegemony. Secondly, a nuclear self-sufficient Europe would run the risk of losing American support because of a growing isolationism, or rather a go-it-alone course, unless very close ties in the nuclear field are maintained. These reasons, among others, have caused the German Federal Government, as well as the Italian Government, to attach great value to the MLF proposal. The same reasons make France its adversary.

The first of the two questions which I have just mentioned shows that the more critical problem is what should be the

future structure of Europe; what should its military and, above all, its nuclear organization be? By inserting a European clause in the MLF draft, we hope to keep the way open for a closer European organization within MLF. The multilateral nuclear force would thus become an incentive rather than an obstacle to European unity, and still remain a strong link between Europe and the United States.

My talk may have created the impression that Germany and France hold differing views in all the critical issues. This, of course, was not my intention. I wanted to stress the necessity of a close Franco-German relationship in order to overcome the existing differences of opinion concerning the future construction of Europe and the Atlantic Alliance. I am sure this will not be an easy task, but feel convinced that we are moving in a forward direction. Germany and France are talking about ways to unite Europe and after hundreds of years of antagonism both have a common aim. This is basically what matters. The problems that we have to face are quite different from those of the old days of Europe. The nuclear issue has added a new dimension to our way of thinking. I believe that under the present circumstances a nuclear sharing by the European nations is not only the way to unite the continent on a basis of equality, but also the way to create a sound balance inside the Atlantic Alliance. The key to this solution lies in the hands of the United States, and the Administration is well aware of this responsibility. As far as we are concerned, we are willing and ready to continue on our way forward in building a strong Europe as an inseparable partner of the Atlantic Alliance.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Dr. Horst Blomeyer-Bartenstein

- 1936-1945 - Military service, finally Captain, artillery
- 1945-1948 - Study of law and political science,
University of Munich
- 1948-1951 - Preparatory training at the courts of law
in Munich
- 1950-1952 - Assistant at the Institute for International
Law of the University of Munich; Doctor
degree in law
- 1951-1952 - Lecturer at the Academy for Political
Sciences in Munich
- June 2, 1952 - Foreign Service, Bonn, as specialist for
international law
- November 17, 1956 - Appointment Legationsrat I. Klasse
(First Secretary)
- April 1958 - Consul with the German Consulate General
in San Francisco, California
- November 25, 1960 - First Secretary, German Embassy,
Washington, D.C.
- June 1963- - Counselor with emphasis on political -
military affairs

NEW DIMENSIONS IN EXTENSION

Did you know that . . . Commander Frederick F. Williams, USNR, the Editorial Director of the newspaper, *The Austin Statesman*, Austin, Texas, recently commented as follows upon completion of the Naval War College's Extension Course in Counterinsurgency:

This installment, and the three earlier ones on Counterinsurgency, should be a must requirement (before active duty, before promotion) of any World War II, or earlier, officer. For this type of warfare, this program of cold war assistance, embodies a new perspective which has blossomed since the last world war. Since it has become the pattern of communist aggression, it must be studied at length by not only every officer on active duty, but every officer (such as the Navy's Ready Reserve) who may be called back to such active duty.

Did you know that . . . several Reserve Officers who occupy responsible positions in civilian industry have indicated that they use the 'Staff Study' approach in determining feasibility of initiating revolutionary procedures in their respective enterprises? Staff Studies are an integral part of staff planning. Procedures used in Staff Studies provide a systematic approach to develop information on a subject or to solve a problem.

The 'Staff Study' is currently included in the Extension Courses in Military Planning and in Command Logistics.

Did you know that . . . upon completion of the Reading Course, Selected Reading in International Law, a student wrote to the President, Naval War College, as follows:

I wish to thank you and the staff of the Naval War College for the privilege you have given me to take this course. I have enjoyed it and have been stimulated to continue reading in the subject. The three basic references I found excellent. The entire course is well calculated to convince a naval officer that he needs much more than a smattering of international law if he is to discharge command responsibilities.

OBJECTIVITY, PROPAGANDA AND THE 'PURITAN ETHIC'

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 20 August 1964

by

Professor David L. Larson

There are several ways in which we might discuss or approach the topic of objectivity and propaganda, but since this course and my background are primarily oriented in the direction of international relations, let us try to handle the topic within that context.

As an opening proposition allow me to suggest that no one is objective when observing natural or social phenomena, particularly social phenomena. Everything we observe is distorted by the 'mind's eye'; which is to say that the human mind directs the mind's eye to see, or not to see, what it wants to see. Everything we observe tends to be out of all proportion with reality according to our past experiences, as well as our physical and mental conditions. Therefore, what we observe tends to be an *approximation* of reality in accordance with our own preconceived notions, as well as our physical and mental well-being, and not reality itself. The natural sciences have reduced human error to a small degree through such devices as the camera, the computer, typing machines, and a variety of other mechanical devices, which reduce the interpretative and analytical aspects of observation and communication to a manageable minimum. However, the social sciences are a far different area of concern and confusion.

The social sciences or social studies deal, by definition, with human phenomena and not physical phenomena *per se*. The social studies include such disciplines as history, economics, philosophy, psychology, sociology, and politics; whereas the natural sciences include such disciplines as mathematics, physics, chemistry, botany, and biology. The humanities dealing with language, literature, and fine arts, lie somewhere between social studies and natural sciences.

There have been some recent attempts to reduce the subjective aspects of the social studies and increase their objective aspects

through the use of mass data, data processing and statistics. The people practicing this art are called the behavioralists, and they believe that with large enough samples, good enough questions, and proper tabulation, the behavior of people individually and collectively can be analyzed and predicted. This may be so, but should not be translated into quasi-scientific laws such as may be witnessed in the natural sciences. The difficulty which the behavioralists have comes with the *human factor*, or the subjective elements, in the human equation. It is difficult, if not impossible, to try and predict human behavior with any assurance or finality, particularly if one assumes that man is rational and possesses free will. Therefore, I would earnestly suggest that when dealing with human behavior, we have to be particularly careful to try and be as objective as we possibly can.

Objectivity, then, might be described as the attempt to collect, collate, evaluate, and interpret, all the data relevant to a specific topic in the attempt to be as unbiased and unprejudiced as possible in approximating the truth or reality of the situation. This is an extraordinarily complex process and requires considerable diligence and effort. As was suggested earlier, perfect objectivity and completeness are impossibilities, and all that we can reasonably expect of any person evaluating social phenomena is that he be as critical, as analytical, and as thorough, as he possibly can. As an old professor of mine was fond of saying, 'Accept nothing and test everything.' This is probably a good maxim to live by when seeking objectivity.

However, if after careful investigation there are some gaps in your analysis, it is perfectly acceptable to make some assumptions in the absence of positive information to the contrary. These assumptions may be stated in the forms of premises or hypotheses, but should be used with great discrimination and clearly stated as subjective determinations or value judgments. One of the reasons for the use of assumptions is obviously to round out or complete your case. However, it naturally follows that the more assumptions you make, the further removed you are from reality and objectivity.

The goal of objectivity is not only desirable in terms of scholarship, but also necessary to the average citizen in trying to sort out fact from fiction. In today's world there is a large quantity of fact, but probably an even larger body of fiction. These fictions are particularly prevalent in the area of human

behavior and especially politics. Every nation-state today has its own system of values, interests, and beliefs, which tend to make it unique and distinct from every other nation-state. These value judgments of each nation-state are in a sense assumptions made by that particular society, which provide some cohesive rationale for internal order as well as for external action. This is what we describe as an ideology.

Ideologies also have some other connotations which are worth mentioning, by way of illustration, to give some greater meaning and depth to the concept:

1. An ideology has been described as the cement which helps to hold a constitutional and institutional system together.
2. An ideology is sometimes used as a basis for the national interest in the positive sense, and sometimes used as a rationalization of power or action(s) taken in the negative sense.
3. An ideology has also been described as giving purpose, meaning, and direction to the national interest.

From these elaborations we can also see that there is an apparently close relationship between an ideology and the national interest. This is a favorite argument of political scientists, and is somewhat endless like the argument of which came first; the chicken or the egg. We do not have time for an exhaustive analysis of the relationship of an ideology to the national interest, but I would suggest that it would probably be worthwhile to consider the relationship at your own leisure.

An ideology is a highly subjective collection of values, interests, and beliefs which is individually suited to the tastes and needs of a particular nation-state. If the ideology is firmly implanted and generally supported by the people, there are usually few difficulties in maintaining this prevailing value system at home. However, as soon as an ideology is projected outside of the nation-state, and thereby into another nation-state, it becomes propaganda. Propaganda in this sense is the attempt to spread a particular national ideology from one nation-state to another, and in most instances around the world. The conviction that a particular nation-state has the ultimate truth embedded in its values, interests, and beliefs, has led to phenomena known as 'nationalistic

universalism' described by Professor Hans Morgenthau. This, rather simply, is the projection of the national ideology around the world, and we can see this today in the forms of universal communism espoused by the Soviet Union, and universal constitutional democracy espoused by the United States. These are not the only national ideologies aiming at universal acceptance, for virtually every ideology has universal aspirations in order to justify and rationalize its acceptance back home in the nation-state.

It would be virtually impossible to catalog or describe all the national ideologies of the world, but suffice it to say that the ideology as defined both internally and externally is usually the prerogative of the responsible authority. That is to say that Maoism is what Mao says it is, Titoism is what Tito says it is, Khrushchevism is what Khrushchev says it is, and so forth. Thus, where we find a totalitarian regime or a nation-state with a strong national consensus, it is relatively easy to define the national ideology. However, when you move from the monolithic unity of the extreme right and left, to the pluralism of the center, it is far more difficult to try and determine, much less define, the national ideology. This is acutely the case with a pluralistic society such as the United States, and is part of the great quadrennial debate with which we are now seized.

However, one of the duties of the responsible citizen is to try to understand his own national ideology before evaluating others, not only in the interests of objectivity, but also of good citizenship. This is a most difficult task because to try to analyze your own national character and ideology is somewhat like trying to psychoanalyze yourself. At best, autoanalysis is a highly subjective and a rather risky business, but one in which we should all engage at one time or another. Probably the clearest and most objective analyses of American national character, ideologies, and institutions are by outsiders such as:

Alexis de Tocqueville (French - 1834)
James Bryce (British - 1891)
Denis Brogan (British - 1944)

American national character and ideology are like all other national characters and ideologies in that they are largely products of historical traditions and contemporary experiences. The historical tradition in the case of the United States is a rather long one going back through London, Paris, Geneva, Rome, Athens, and

Jerusalem. The contemporary experience is a short one by the standards of history, and is usually traced to the primitive Calvinist movement which ultimately settled at Plymouth on Massachusetts Bay.

These primitive Calvinists, or fundamentalist Puritans, brought with them a somewhat unique system of government or 'civil body politick.' The Mayflower Compact was not quite the same thing as Locke's 'original compact' or Rousseau's 'social contract' which were developed much later, but certainly contained some of the principles of egalitarianism and popular sovereignty developed during the following century. However, the most prevailing characteristic of the Puritan was his primitive fundamentalism: The will of God was to be found in the literal interpretation and application of the Bible and no clergy or ecclesiastical hierarchy was necessary to reveal the ultimate truth. It was the duty and the responsibility of the Pilgrims to purify Christian practices and return to the 'word of God' for the salvation of mankind, no matter how sinful he might be.

This puritanism has helped to establish a rather strong tradition of fundamentalism in American national character, and this fundamentalism is certainly still prevalent in the United States. This fundamentalism is in rather distinct contrast to the pragmatism of the British, the eclecticism of the Indian, the messianism of the Russian, and the absolutism of the German. The original fundamentalism has long since been modified and enlarged, but it is still rather extraordinary to recall that in 1925 William Jennings Bryan and Clarence Seward Darrow would debate biblical fundamentalism with Darwinian evolution.

The Puritan heritage, nonetheless, gave rise to a rather peculiar ideological phenomenon known as the 'Puritan Ethic.' This is a rather complex concept as it has evolved down to the present, but in its simplest statement the essence seems to be that 'somehow, someway, right will prevail over might,' particularly if you place unbounding faith in the wisdom and will of God as revealed through the Scriptures.

The foremost characteristic of the Puritan Ethic is a distrust of power—whatever the source and locus. Americans have traditionally been suspicious of the exercise of power whether it be personnel, national, or international. This dislike of power may be traced to what they felt was the abuse of power and the conception of responsibility by both the ecclesiastical and secular authorities

in England and on the Continent. It is also not without some significance that the Plymouth Company was chartered and settled in the midst of the Reformation and Thirty Years' War. The Mayflower Compact illustrates the dichotomy of the struggle between ecclesiastical and secular authority and the attempt to develop some third alternative where the Puritans 'by these presents, solemnly and mutually, in the presence of God and of one another, covenant and combine ourselves together into a civil body politick, for our better ordering and preservation and furtherance of the ends aforesaid . . .'

This distrust of uncontrolled power has led to several interesting manifestations. On the personal level it developed into a rather strong egalitarianism and rugged individualism. On the national level we see it woven into the Constitution of 1789 and its elaborate system of checks and balances, whereby none of the three major branches of government could be described as fully sovereign or absolute. Indeed, the essence of constitutional democracy seems to be the restraint and regulation of power. The more traditional concept of the head of state as the locus and source of sovereignty, based largely upon the divine right of kings and being unrestricted, absolute and equal, is certainly not true of the President of the United States. Congress has the Constitutional power to lay and collect taxes, provide for the common defense, regulate commerce, support and maintain the Army and Navy, as well as to make all laws. The Senate, in particular, expresses its advice and consent on treaties and appointments. Even with the rapid rise of Executive initiative in foreign policy through the use of such devices as the Executive Agreement to bypass the Senate, the President is still relatively restrained or restricted in his foreign policy, although he does exercise great powers. In point of fact, the broader statement might be made that American domestic policy, and domestic politics, exert a decisive influence on the direction and content of U.S. foreign policy and the mix of international politics.

On the international level the characteristic American distrust and suspicion of power and international politics assume even larger proportions. The basic dislike or misunderstanding of power and international politics by the American people has filled U.S. foreign policy, as Walter Lippmann says, with 'stereotyped prejudices . . . sacred cows, and wishful conceptions' and that the basic failure of U.S. conceptual thinking on foreign policy is 'to admit, to take as the premise of our thinking, the fact that rivalry, strife, and conflict among states, communities, and factions are the normal condition of mankind.'

The Puritan Ethic and American national character take the view that the struggle for power, prestige, and prosperity are not the natural state of things and that war is somehow immoral, unjust, and illegal. Shortly after the emergence of the United States of America as a constitutional democracy of sorts, in 1789, we can see the acceptance and espousal of international law as a means of resolving international conflicts through arbitration, adjudication and mediation. In fact, this reliance on international law became one of the predominant characteristics of U.S. foreign policy down to World War I when dealing with weaker powers. The astute American philosopher, William James, described this reliance on international law as 'the moral equivalent for war.' Or again, 'somehow, somehow, right will prevail over might.'

The outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789 evoked a response of considerable sympathy in the United States on ideological grounds as vindication of the American Revolution and of verification of the rightness of the Puritan Ethic. However, when Great Britain began to take restrictive counter-measures against the French, the United States was placed in an awkward dilemma between the idealism of the ideology and the realism of the national interest. After considerable internal stress and some strain, which resulted in Thomas Jefferson leaving as Secretary of State, the United States developed a new synthesis out of the conflict between the thesis of idealism and the antithesis of realism. This new policy was officially described as one of 'neutrality' or 'noninvolvement.' This approach had its roots in the Treaty Plan of 1784 and was also manifested in such declarations as 'freedom of the seas,' 'neutral ships make neutral goods except for contraband of war,' and so on. This was really more of an accommodation by an essentially weak commercial nation-state with the realities of international politics and an attempt to avoid being caught in the struggles of the Great Powers. On April 22, 1793, President Washington signed the Proclamation of Neutrality, which was both an internal measure to restrain Francophile sympathies and an external measure to reassure the British. This was indeed a difficult time for the United States, but as Professor Bemis points out, the secret of Washington's diplomacy was in the phrase, 'Europe's distress was America's advantage.' This became one of the bedrocks of U.S. foreign policy, with a few minor exceptions, down to World War I.

The prime manifestations of the United States' desire to remain disengaged from European power struggles, as well as

to increase internal power and hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, are Washington's Farewell Address and the Monroe Doctrine. A few excerpts, in this connection, are illustrative:

1. Washington's Farewell Address

Observe good faith and justice toward all nations. Cultivate peace and harmony with all. Religion and morality enjoin this conduct The great rule of conduct in regard to foreign nations is: in extending our commercial relations have as little political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop.

Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise for us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics as the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.

Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course.

2. Monroe Doctrine

a. . . . That the American continents by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers

b. In the wars of the European powers, in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so.

c. With existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere.

d. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness.

In this connection, it is difficult to escape the analogy between the 'neutrality' and 'noninvolvement' of the United States in its first century and a quarter of diplomacy, and the contemporary 'neutrality' and 'nonalignment' of many Afro-Asian nations today. Europe's distress and the *Pax Britannica* of the 19th century were certainly to America's advantage, and the bipolar power struggle of today with its 'balance of terror' seems to have been to the advantage of the neutralists. The interesting paradox in this analogy is that the United States, with its Puritan Ethic and moralistic condemnation of war, criticizes the latter-day 'neutralists' and 'nonaligners' as immoral.

This leads us into another major characteristic of the Puritan Ethic and American national character which is moralism. As Cecil Crabb says, 'Moralism is not the same as morality Morality has to do with the substance of behavior. It is conduct in accordance with a predetermined code of behavior, and throughout Christendom this refers to behavior sanctioned by the Christendom faith. Moralism [in the political sense] is concerned with [the] appearances, with the concepts and language employed in foreign relations, with the symbols used, and with the way that ends and means are visualized and expressed publicly.' From this definition we can occasionally see the attempts of the United States to extend its value system, based largely upon the Puritan Ethic, to other civilizations and cultures with different and differing value systems. While moralistic behavior in the foreign policy of the United States may seem high-minded at home, it often seems high-handed abroad.

This moralistic attitude on the part of the United States has been expressed in several forms and slogans such as 'Manifest Destiny,' 'No compromise with principle,' 'Make the world safe for democracy,' 'Self-determination,' 'Atheistic communism,' 'Unconditional surrender,' 'Total victory,' and 'We will never commit aggression.'

Manifest Destiny is a rationalization on the part of the United States for expanding across the continent and eventually across the Pacific Ocean. Americans made a clear distinction between what they called 'expansionism' and crass, immoral European 'imperialism.' It is rather interesting that the strongest

condemnation of Manifest Destiny was expressed by a Congressman from Massachusetts, the home as it were, of the Puritan Ethic in the late 1840's. In his words Manifest Destiny was opening 'a new chapter in the law of nations or rather in the special laws of our own country, for I suppose the right of a manifest destiny to spread will not be admitted to exist in any other nation except the universal Yankee nation.'

The height of Manifest Destiny was reached in 1900 in the debate over whether or not to annex the Philippines. Senator Albert Beveridge from the good fundamentalist state of Indiana was the leading spokesman for annexation. His speech on Manifest Destiny is interesting from several standpoints: (a) the rationalization of imperialism, (b) the invocation of the Puritan Ethic and (c) the messianic mission of the United States to save the world:

Mr. President, the times call for candor. The Philippines are ours forever, 'territory belonging to the United States' as the Constitution calls them. And just beyond the Philippines are China's illimitable markets. We will not retreat from either. We will not repudiate our duty in the archipelago. We will not abandon our opportunity in the Orient. We will not renounce our part in the mission of our race, trustee under God, of the civilization of the world. And we will move forward to our work, not howling our regrets like slaves whipped to their burdens, but with gratitude for a task worthy of our strength, and thanksgiving to Almighty God that He has marked us as his chosen people, henceforth to lead in the regeneration of the world.

Another aspect of moralism is the rather negative-sounding phrase of 'No compromise with principle.' This is partially an outgrowth of Puritan fundamentalism with such corollaries as 'Right is right and wrong is wrong.' This aspect of moralism and its relatively inflexible dicta has certain overtones of the Continental concept of compromise as capitulation, and not the Anglo-Saxon concept of compromise as a mutual bargain. Compromise has also acquired the connotation of 'Appeasement' in the fundamentalist lexicon of Puritanism. Appeasement in turn has acquired an intrinsically immoral connotation and we can see some historical antecedents going back to the XYZ affair with France and the treaties with the Barbary Pirates.

The cry then was 'Millions for defense, not a penny for tribute.' The depth of appeasement was reached in 1938 at Munich. Although the United States was seized by another fit of neo-isolationism, it roundly condemned the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia as 'immoral' and a 'sell-out.' The subsequent events leading to World War II seemed to confirm this conviction and became an important element in American national character.

Appeasement is really a rather good word in and of itself, and literally means to bring to a state of peace, to pacify, to calm, to win an enemy or opponent over by displaying a willingness to be just and fair. Appeasement, then, in the literal sense implies more of an attitude toward negotiation rather than the giving away of something. However, appeasement retains the connotations of capitulation and duplicity. These concepts have clearly become identified in the public mind with diplomacy as somehow immoral and associated with 'secret deals' and 'sellouts.' This puritanical suspicion of diplomacy has traditionally been supported by the relative isolation of the United States and the lack of necessity to negotiate and compromise. These suspicions of diplomacy and diplomats were further heightened by the 19th century practices of the bribe and secret agreements. The leading example of this was the Secret Treaty of London in 1915 which essentially bought Italy off to come in on the side of the Allied and Associated Powers and caused a feeling of revulsion and guilt by association in the United States. The result, of course, was the first of President Wilson's Fourteen Points: 'Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.' It is rather interesting to see the puritanical word 'covenant' used here and again in the Covenant of the League of Nations. It was almost as though the United States were launched on a Great Crusade not only to 'Make the World Safe for Democracy' but also to spread the Puritan Ethic.

A fundamental tenet of the Puritan Ethic is the dignity and equality of all men. This is a derivative of the concept that man is somewhat divine, and that all men were equal before God. This rather naturally led to popular sovereignty, mass nationalism, and then to self-determination. Almost half of Wilson's Fourteen Points were directly or indirectly associated with the concept of self-determination. Autodetermination may be somewhat of a fiction in practice, but to say that 'when in the course of human events it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another,'

has had no effect or impact on international relations, would probably be the understatement of the last two centuries.

The moralism of the United States has led to the fundamentalist espousal of principles, but has also led to the assumption of some rather unrealistic postures such as: unconditional surrender, total victory, no appeasement, and universal democracy. These postures have been encouraged by the self-delusions of omnipotence and omniscience. These delusions of power and truth are clearly rooted in the fundamentalist absolutism of the Puritan Ethic. Unfortunately these delusions have given rise to the general belief in 'instantaneous foreign policy' or 'no sooner said than done.' As Denis Brogan, the astute British observer, remarked: 'The illusion of American omnipotence has given rise to the belief that any situation which distresses or endangers the United States can only exist because some Americans have been fools or knaves.' Brogan goes on to say that Americans have yet to learn that the world cannot be altered overnight by a speech or a platform.

Another aspect of the Puritan Ethic and American national character is the peculiar phenomenon of isolationism. This isolationism, of course, was partially a conscious desire to be rid of Europe's religious, political, and economic troubles; but it was also partially derived from geographic separation and absorption in creating and expanding a new civilization. However, traditional American isolationism was not a retreat into itself, like Japan from 1604 to 1854, but was a cautious participation in the economic and political aspects of international politics *as its power permitted*. And therein lies the key.

Again, except for the 1930's American isolationism was almost a direct function of its economic and political power: As power increased, 'isolationism' decreased. However, at no time was the United States isolated from the rest of the world economically, politically, or ideologically: The United States had the second largest commercial fleet in the world until 1862; it purchased Louisiana, enunciated the Monroe Doctrine, annexed Texas, fought Mexico, expanded across a continent and acquired an empire; this could hardly be described as a political. Ideologically, the United States helped to finance and support virtually every nationalistic revolution, from Argentina to Cuba, and from Greece to Norway. This was not exactly isolationism! The cry of isolation seems to be more of an anguished rationalization for the lack of adequate or

commensurate power, which was alien to the Puritan Ethic, rather than nonparticipation. On the contrary, a substantial case can be made out for an activist, positive diplomacy on the part of the United States in the 19th century.

However, the myth of isolationism tended to give rise to the predominance of domestic policy over foreign policy. This was also fostered by the need for internal development and the creation of a new society. In 1839, John Louis O'Sullivan, wrote an article entitled 'The Great Nation of Futurity.' A short excerpt from this selection is illustrative:

Our national birth was the beginning of a new history, the formation and progress of an untried political system, which separates us from the past and connects us with the future only; so far as regards the entire development of the rights of man, in moral, political, and national life, we may confidently assume that our country is destined to be the great nation of futurity.

This passage also helps to further illustrate the messianic vision of the Puritan Ethic and the need to develop and secure the 'New Society' at home before engaging in an active foreign policy. This sounds strangely reminiscent of the Stalin-Trotsky argument of 1921-22 and the statements of the contemporary neutralists.

The last large ingredients of the Puritan Ethic are optimism and confidence—optimism bred out of the concept that 'somehow, someday right will prevail over might,' and confidence in the innate and ultimate superiority of the American system and the American way of life. This optimism and this confidence have never really been seriously challenged from without, although it was attacked from within during the Civil War. With the possible exception of the War of 1812, the United States has neither fought an international war on its own territory nor has it been defeated. This unparalleled success may be partially attributed to prudence, but it has also tended to increase the national confidence and create an aura of invincibility, as well as to strengthen the feeling of omnipotence and the attitude of omniscience.

This optimism and confidence are also strengthened by the overwhelming success of the American economy, but has seemingly become somewhat distorted into a sense of

superiority. However, this sense of superiority is somewhat modified by the traditional humanitarianism and philanthropic attitude of the American people which is also part of the Puritan Ethic. Nonetheless, the residue remains.

The Puritan Ethic, then, is indeed a complex phenomenon with a 'strange' admixture of a number of idealistic ingredients. Cecil Crabb probably has one of the most succinct statements on the Puritan Ethic in foreign policy as seen from abroad:

To foreigners, Americans must resemble nothing so much as the sombre Puritan: motivated by high ideals, austere, [and] unshakable in his conviction that goodness will triumph in the end, but at the same time impatient with wrongdoing, sanctimonious, and at times insufferably self-righteous.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor David L. Larson

Professor Larson teaches international relations, international law and organization, and U.S. foreign policy at Tufts University, and is a consultant on international operations to the Systems Analysis Research Corporation of Boston and Washington. He also has some current interests in Latin America, the Balkans, and the theory of international relations.

Professor Larson attended Dartmouth College as an undergraduate, where he majored in history. He graduated with honors (in history) and enlisted in the Air Force. Following his basic training, he entered OCS and subsequently received intelligence training as an air-photo-radar intelligence officer. For the next two years he was stationed in Wiesbaden, Germany, as an intelligence specialist attached to Headquarters, USAFE.

In the Fall of 1956, Professor Larson began his graduate work at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. While in residence at the Fletcher School, Professor Larson was successively a Fletcher Fellow, a Clayton Fellow, and a Research Fellow, as he earned the A.M., M.A.L.D., and Ph.D. degrees. American diplomatic history was one of his interests as a graduate student, and he wrote his Master's thesis on 'U.S. Foreign Policy toward Spain: 1945-1953' and his Doctor's thesis on 'The Foreign Policy of the United States toward Yugoslavia: 1943-1960.'

Professor Larson has published a book on *The 'Cuban Crisis' of 1962: Selected Documents and Chronology* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963) and is presently working on a textbook for Houghton Mifflin tentatively entitled *The Relativity of International Relations: a Macro-Political Theory*. He is a member of the American Political Science Association, the American Society of International Law, the American Academy of Political and Social Science, the American Historical Association, and the American Economic Association.

PROFESSIONAL READING

The evaluations of recent books listed in this section have been prepared for the use of resident students. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these books of interest in their professional reading.

The inclusion of a book in this section does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Certain of the books on the list which are not available from these sources may be available from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books are obtainable on loan. Requests from individual officers to borrow books from an Auxiliary Library Service Collection should be addressed to the nearest of the following special loan collections.

Chief of Naval Personnel (G14)
Department of the Navy
Washington, D.C. 20370

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station
Library (ALSC), Bldg. C-9
Norfolk, Virginia 23511

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station
Library (ALSC)
San Diego, California 92136

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station (Pearl Harbor)
Library (ALSC) Box 20
San Francisco, California 96610

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station (Guam)
Library (ALSC) Box 174
San Francisco, California 96630

BOOKS

Larrabee, Harold A. *Decision at the Chesapeake*. New York: Potter, 1964. 317p.

For the student of sea power this is interesting reading, indeed. It has been written: 'The Battle of Chesapeake Bay was one of the decisive battles of the world. Before it, the creation of the United States of America was possible; after it, it was certain.' The author sets out to explore this thesis, and brings together from many sources—some of them obscure—most of what is known about this battle of the American Revolution. War, certainly, can and must be viewed from many perspectives, and the author is not unmindful of this. Accordingly, he goes to some length to set the stage properly, and succeeds in giving the reader sufficient background to enable him to draw his own conclusions. The first third of the book is devoted to sketching the actors, both on the stage and behind the stage. Then follows a discussion of why and how Cornwallis got to Yorktown in the first place. Next, attention is directed to de Grasse in the West Indies and his decision to come north. Then the author describes the sea battle off the Virginia Capes, and finally, the land battle at Yorktown, where we find Washington stating to de Grasse: 'You will have observed that, whatever efforts are made by the land armies, the Navy must have the casting vote in the present contest.'

F.A. BALDWIN
Captain, U.S. Navy

Blond, Georges. *Verdun*. New York: Macmillan, 1964. 250p.

For the person who likes to read about the gory details of trench warfare, and unbelievable mistakes in tactics of field commanders when such tactics are compared to modern concepts, this book will be a treat. This narrative is considered an excellent effort to follow the development of the Battle of Verdun—the attempt of the Germans to break through the center of the strong defensive position of the French during World War I. Altogether, it appears to make a special effort to avoid presenting a case against any of the responsible and highly recognized commanders. Coverage begins with the troop build-up on the German side and then depicts additional preparation and the conduct of the Battle of Verdun, primarily during the

period February-July 1916. The author in great detail and clarity describes this battle. One with little military experience is prone to conclude quickly that no lessons were learned from earlier major conflicts—such as General Pickett's charge at Gettysburg. The offensive was on the side of the Germans—artillery preparation followed by infantry frontal attacks against well-prepared French positions. The French countered with a strong defense in place: 'Die rather than yield a single inch of ground' was an order and belief, and a high percentage of the fighters did just that. Throughout, the frontal attacks were contained by last-ditch resistance and desperate local counterattacks. As reported, the latter were generally badly executed by the French and resulted in extreme loss of life. Provided in this document is an excellent account of the horrors of the battle under the tactics mentioned before—poisonous gas, mass artillery preparation, hand-to-hand combat, wounded left on battlefield for days without treatment, dead neither identified nor buried, and a continuous lack of water and food for the front line troops. The book comes to a close with the Germans realizing that in early July 1916, they had lost the battle for Verdun and their decision was to adopt the defensive. Thereafter, there is a brief description of preparation for the counteroffensive by the French, as well as some observations obtained by visits to the battle area. One extreme difficulty to the reader of this book is the lack of a clear sketch map which would be of considerable assistance in following this important struggle which must be considered as a major turning point in favor of the French and their allies in the First World War.

E. C. DAMERON
Colonel, U.S. Army

Kaufmann, William W. *The McNamara Strategy*. New York: Harper & Row, 1964. 339p.

The author is an ardent supporter of the 'McNamara strategy.' At least this is the impression one gets from reading the book. This work is designed primarily to inform the public of the McNamara and Kennedy-Johnson Administration views on defense in the nuclear age. As such, the book draws largely on the words of the Secretary of Defense (Congressional testimony, press conferences, and speeches) and those of his civilian associates in the Department of Defense. Mr. Kaufmann covers in detail Secretary McNamara's strategy of flexible response from nuclear war to counterinsurgency; his dialogue with NATO over his new policy; the B-70, Skybolt, and the four-ocean navy

controversies; and arms control and Mr. McNamara's role in the formation of the test ban treaty. The author includes a detailed exposition of the procedural reforms introduced by the Secretary of Defense within the Pentagon itself; and he explains the cost-effectiveness approach to weapon systems procurement, budgeting, and programming. Mr. Kaufmann has presented a clear and concise picture of the 'McNamara strategy' and the reasons behind it. He has, however, failed to produce the opposing views in the same manner, and one wonders whether he ever intended to. Nevertheless, for the military reader this volume provides thought-provoking material, and for the layman, a comprehensive treatment of the current defense policies of the United States.

C.D. PETERSON

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force

Rosecrance, Richard N., ed. *The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964. 317p.

'There are those who believe that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by many countries may well constitute one of the most dangerous problems in future international relations.' Mr. Rosecrance's book emphasizes, along with the historical background of nuclear weaponry, the many strategic and political problems that have developed from nuclear inception in the late 1930's to the current times. The book, a series of articles, depicts a thorough analysis of nuclear weaponry development. In the United States during World War II, the early collaboration of British scientists, military, and political leaders in development of fissionable materials and atomic bomb projects, was accompanied by considerable apprehension and political bickering. The initial concept, explosion, and reconstruction brought about many economical, political, and military decisions (well discussed here) that were consequent upon the involvement of the United States, Great Britain, and France in nuclear capabilities. This involvement extended to nuclear weapon systems and other military strengths and weaknesses, and the effects on the countries' budgetary problems. The overall impact of the United States' control of nuclear weapons then brought about continued and ever-mounting problems associated with military alliances, nuclear technology, and concurrently, the peaceful expansion of atomic reactors in leading countries throughout the world. United States and Russian control has developed a limited country race for nuclear arms power, which will continue to impose political and diplomatic reassessment of international

problems and relations in order to insure balances in this strategic game to guarantee Western alliance superiority. The book is a complete and concise analysis of the major historical evolution of nuclear power in international relations. It considers also some of the future ramifications of the problems relative to nuclear stability and diffusion in the emerging nuclear nations. This work is an excellent summary of present and prospective issues connected with this powerful weapon. The selected bibliography in the book gives a short but clear insight into many authors' views on this subject matter.

L.A. TOMKINS
Commander, U.S. Navy

Lyon, Peter. *Neutrality*. Leicester, Eng.: Leicester University Press, 1963. 215p.

British political scientist Peter Lyon's *Neutrality* is a wide-ranging, masterful analysis of this philosophy and its influence today, and should prove profitable to anyone interested in international affairs. Unfortunately, Mr. Lyon's effort reads like a doctoral dissertation. Consequently, one is beset by the feeling that had the author been less concerned with impressing his professorial colleagues, this cruise through the tepid waters of neutrality could have been completed in half the time consumed by his leisurely passage. In his analysis of neutrality and its development, the author detects 'five main threads in the tangled skein of neutralist argument.' These are that cold war conditions can be tempered and perhaps eliminated altogether; that neutrality is morally defensible; that neutralists should pursue an independent foreign policy; that colonialism in all its forms must be erased; and that foreign aid must be bestowed unconditionally. Mr. Lyon then discusses these doctrinal ingredients as variously practiced by prominent neutralists, notably India, Yugoslavia, and the United Arab Republic. By themselves refusing to join rival camps in the cold war, neutralists claim, according to the writer, to reduce the world's bipolar complexion, hence easing world tensions. The substitution of a multilateral for a bilateral balance of power is advertised by neutralists as promoting peace, although this 'third' role in world affairs the author believes has so far proved an illusory one. Another variant of the neutralist theme is that of 'bridgemanhip.' Again, Mr. Lyon sees little evidence that neutralists really represent a middle position over which the superpowers can communicate and hopefully bridge the yawning chasm of conflict. A third variant of the

argument that neutralists can help prevent war is that, by adopting a nonaligned posture and placing public faith in Communist intentions, they put a premium on Communist good behavior. Mr. Lyon cites China's callous humiliation of India in 1962 as dealing this contention a body blow.

F. F. PARRY
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

Baxter, Richard R. *The Law of International Waterways*.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964. 371p.

The student of international law will be delighted with this scholarly, thoroughly documented text on the very complex problem of international waterways. The author is well known and highly respected by the students and staff of the Naval War College by virtue of an exceptionally long and close association. He has lectured and been a consultant in the field of international law for many years. *The Law of International Waterways* is a study of the principal forms of international waterways: rivers, straits, and canals. The author concentrates primarily on the main inter-oceanic canals—Suez, Panama, and Kiel, with special emphasis on the Suez Canal. Professor Baxter examines the experience gained in connection with the shared problems of international waterways. He then turns his attention to the manner of operating these waterways and to the freedom of passage in time of peace and in time of war. Thereafter, the author discusses the matter of charges for use of international waterways, including the provisions covered by law. He turns his attention to the international administration of these waterways and to many proposals on such regulation. In an appendix, Professor Baxter presents a codified form to the law in the Articles on the Navigation of International Canals. The reader will find this volume complete and well worth careful study.

C. R. LARGESS
Captain, U.S. Navy

Raymond, Jack. *Power at the Pentagon*. New York: Harper & Row, 1964. 334p.

In assessing *Power at the Pentagon*, it is significant to note at the outset that the author is neither historian nor analyst, but an experienced reporter on *The New York Times* Washington staff. Taking as his point of departure President Eisenhower's admonition

against the effects of a burgeoning military/industrial complex, Mr. Raymond traces, in dispassionate and straightforward terms, the growth of the American military establishment from a small cadre of obscure, dedicated professionals before World War II, to the vast, heavily funded, complex establishment of today. Mr. Raymond discusses the various aspects of the ascendancy of security matters in national affairs in a comprehensive and wide-ranging manner. In addition to recounting the history of military growth during World War II, he highlights, *inter alia*, such subjects as military education; the impact of science and technology upon our military posture; the relationships between Congress and the military establishment; conflicts of interest involving senior civilian and military defense officials; the development of national strategic concepts in the post-World War II period; the economic significance of defense spending; the 'McNamara monarchy'; and the necessity for an international United States military presence. It is particularly refreshing and reassuring to read a book whose overall tone is one of approbation for the competence, dedication, and motivation of the professional military man. The author rejects the thesis that the military establishment is ambitious for its own sake and correctly defines our military posture as an effect of world conditions. While depicting the operations and accomplishments of the military establishment as generally praiseworthy, Mr. Raymond issues a clear call for increased public awareness and scrutiny of the establishment: '. . . we must challenge the judgment of the specialists in civilian clothing as well as the professionals in uniform . . . Thus all the traditional arguments against military dominance must be broadened to make them arguments against bureaucratic dominance.' Mr. Raymond's book is clear, complete, and just. It is highly recommended both for background knowledge of national security affairs during the past twenty-five years and for personal morale-building for those who have become sickened by such distorted offerings as *Seven Days in May*, *Fail-Safe*, and *Dr. Strangelove*.

H.K. MANSHIP
Captain, U.S. Navy

Kennan, George F. *On Dealing with the Communist World*. New York: Harper & Row, 1964. 57p.

George Kennan's thirty years' experience in Soviet-American diplomacy and history are distilled into this wafer-thin summary of his views on hastening the dissipation of tensions between

the two major power blocs. Based on his noted Elihu Root lectures, Mr. Kennan in this book examines three topics—the rationale of coexistence, East-West trade, and polycentrism in the Communist camp. He asks what the so-called total victory over communism can in fact mean when those living under it may not relish their present government, but dislike foreigners even more. The author's proposals seem somewhat shocking, coming from one of the main architects of the West's containment policy. Has he gone soft on communism? He states:

I should have deepest misgivings about any concept of policy which envisaged, as a sort of an end-product, the overthrow of Soviet power either by the direct use of our forces or by incitement of subject peoples to revolts which we would be vaguely expected to back up if they got into trouble.

Concerning the Russian wheat deal, he says it would seem, on the face of it that

the United States, by selling its wheat, would make it possible for the Russians to go on giving their farmers inadequate incentive for the production of grain; they, by purchasing it, would make it possible for the United States to go on giving its own farmers too much.

Polycentrism—the emergence of different Communist centers of decision and policy—is a fact, we are admonished in the last chapter.

If there is really strength in unity, Communist leaders can only be grateful for a Western policy which slights the values of polycentrism and declines to encourage them; for a rigidly unreceptive Western attitude may eventually enforce upon the bloc a measure of unity which, by their own unaided effort, they could never have achieved.

Those who believe the East-West conflict irreconcilable will not agree with Mr. Kennan's conclusions, but anyone would do well to read this remarkable little book and become exposed to his thoughts.

B.B. GARLINGHOUSE
Commander, U.S. Navy