

1965

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Recommended Citation

Larson, David L. (1965) "Objectivity, Propaganda and the 'Puritan Ethic'," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 18 : No. 1 , Article 4.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol18/iss1/4>

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OBJECTIVITY, PROPAGANDA AND THE 'PURITAN ETHIC'

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 20 August 1964

by

Professor David L. Larson

There are several ways in which we might discuss or approach the topic of objectivity and propaganda, but since this course and my background are primarily oriented in the direction of international relations, let us try to handle the topic within that context.

As an opening proposition allow me to suggest that no one is objective when observing natural or social phenomena, particularly social phenomena. Everything we observe is distorted by the 'mind's eye'; which is to say that the human mind directs the mind's eye to see, or not to see, what it wants to see. Everything we observe tends to be out of all proportion with reality according to our past experiences, as well as our physical and mental conditions. Therefore, what we observe tends to be an *approximation* of reality in accordance with our own preconceived notions, as well as our physical and mental well-being, and not reality itself. The natural sciences have reduced human error to a small degree through such devices as the camera, the computer, typing machines, and a variety of other mechanical devices, which reduce the interpretative and analytical aspects of observation and communication to a manageable minimum. However, the social sciences are a far different area of concern and confusion.

The social sciences or social studies deal, by definition, with human phenomena and not physical phenomena *per se*. The social studies include such disciplines as history, economics, philosophy, psychology, sociology, and politics; whereas the natural sciences include such disciplines as mathematics, physics, chemistry, botany, and biology. The humanities dealing with language, literature, and fine arts, lie somewhere between social studies and natural sciences.

There have been some recent attempts to reduce the subjective aspects of the social studies and increase their objective aspects

through the use of mass data, data processing and statistics. The people practicing this art are called the behavioralists, and they believe that with large enough samples, good enough questions, and proper tabulation, the behavior of people individually and collectively can be analyzed and predicted. This may be so, but should not be translated into quasi-scientific laws such as may be witnessed in the natural sciences. The difficulty which the behavioralists have comes with the *human factor*, or the subjective elements, in the human equation. It is difficult, if not impossible, to try and predict human behavior with any assurance or finality, particularly if one assumes that man is rational and possesses free will. Therefore, I would earnestly suggest that when dealing with human behavior, we have to be particularly careful to try and be as objective as we possibly can.

Objectivity, then, might be described as the attempt to collect, collate, evaluate, and interpret, all the data relevant to a specific topic in the attempt to be as unbiased and unprejudiced as possible in approximating the truth or reality of the situation. This is an extraordinarily complex process and requires considerable diligence and effort. As was suggested earlier, perfect objectivity and completeness are impossibilities, and all that we can reasonably expect of any person evaluating social phenomena is that he be as critical, as analytical, and as thorough, as he possibly can. As an old professor of mine was fond of saying, 'Accept nothing and test everything.' This is probably a good maxim to live by when seeking objectivity.

However, if after careful investigation there are some gaps in your analysis, it is perfectly acceptable to make some assumptions in the absence of positive information to the contrary. These assumptions may be stated in the forms of premises or hypotheses, but should be used with great discrimination and clearly stated as subjective determinations or value judgments. One of the reasons for the use of assumptions is obviously to round out or complete your case. However, it naturally follows that the more assumptions you make, the further removed you are from reality and objectivity.

The goal of objectivity is not only desirable in terms of scholarship, but also necessary to the average citizen in trying to sort out fact from fiction. In today's world there is a large quantity of fact, but probably an even larger body of fiction. These fictions are particularly prevalent in the area of human

behavior and especially politics. Every nation-state today has its own system of values, interests, and beliefs, which tend to make it unique and distinct from every other nation-state. These value judgments of each nation-state are in a sense assumptions made by that particular society, which provide some cohesive rationale for internal order as well as for external action. This is what we describe as an ideology.

Ideologies also have some other connotations which are worth mentioning, by way of illustration, to give some greater meaning and depth to the concept:

1. An ideology has been described as the cement which helps to hold a constitutional and institutional system together.
2. An ideology is sometimes used as a basis for the national interest in the positive sense, and sometimes used as a rationalization of power or action(s) taken in the negative sense.
3. An ideology has also been described as giving purpose, meaning, and direction to the national interest.

From these elaborations we can also see that there is an apparently close relationship between an ideology and the national interest. This is a favorite argument of political scientists, and is somewhat endless like the argument of which came first; the chicken or the egg. We do not have time for an exhaustive analysis of the relationship of an ideology to the national interest, but I would suggest that it would probably be worthwhile to consider the relationship at your own leisure.

An ideology is a highly subjective collection of values, interests, and beliefs which is individually suited to the tastes and needs of a particular nation-state. If the ideology is firmly implanted and generally supported by the people, there are usually few difficulties in maintaining this prevailing value system at home. However, as soon as an ideology is projected outside of the nation-state, and thereby into another nation-state, it becomes propaganda. Propaganda in this sense is the attempt to spread a particular national ideology from one nation-state to another, and in most instances around the world. The conviction that a particular nation-state has the ultimate truth embedded in its values, interests, and beliefs, has led to phenomena known as 'nationalistic

universalism' described by Professor Hans Morgenthau. This, rather simply, is the projection of the national ideology around the world, and we can see this today in the forms of universal communism espoused by the Soviet Union, and universal constitutional democracy espoused by the United States. These are not the only national ideologies aiming at universal acceptance, for virtually every ideology has universal aspirations in order to justify and rationalize its acceptance back home in the nation-state.

It would be virtually impossible to catalog or describe all the national ideologies of the world, but suffice it to say that the ideology as defined both internally and externally is usually the prerogative of the responsible authority. That is to say that Maoism is what Mao says it is, Titoism is what Tito says it is, Khrushchevism is what Khrushchev says it is, and so forth. Thus, where we find a totalitarian regime or a nation-state with a strong national consensus, it is relatively easy to define the national ideology. However, when you move from the monolithic unity of the extreme right and left, to the pluralism of the center, it is far more difficult to try and determine, much less define, the national ideology. This is acutely the case with a pluralistic society such as the United States, and is part of the great quadrennial debate with which we are now seized.

However, one of the duties of the responsible citizen is to try to understand his own national ideology before evaluating others, not only in the interests of objectivity, but also of good citizenship. This is a most difficult task because to try to analyze your own national character and ideology is somewhat like trying to psychoanalyze yourself. At best, autoanalysis is a highly subjective and a rather risky business, but one in which we should all engage at one time or another. Probably the clearest and most objective analyses of American national character, ideologies, and institutions are by outsiders such as:

Alexis de Tocqueville (French - 1834)
James Bryce (British - 1891)
Denis Brogan (British - 1944)

American national character and ideology are like all other national characters and ideologies in that they are largely products of historical traditions and contemporary experiences. The historical tradition in the case of the United States is a rather long one going back through London, Paris, Geneva, Rome, Athens, and

Jerusalem. The contemporary experience is a short one by the standards of history, and is usually traced to the primitive Calvinist movement which ultimately settled at Plymouth on Massachusetts Bay.

These primitive Calvinists, or fundamentalist Puritans, brought with them a somewhat unique system of government or 'civil body politick.' The Mayflower Compact was not quite the same thing as Locke's 'original compact' or Rousseau's 'social contract' which were developed much later, but certainly contained some of the principles of egalitarianism and popular sovereignty developed during the following century. However, the most prevailing characteristic of the Puritan was his primitive fundamentalism: The will of God was to be found in the literal interpretation and application of the Bible and no clergy or ecclesiastical hierarchy was necessary to reveal the ultimate truth. It was the duty and the responsibility of the Pilgrims to purify Christian practices and return to the 'word of God' for the salvation of mankind, no matter how sinful he might be.

This puritanism has helped to establish a rather strong tradition of fundamentalism in American national character, and this fundamentalism is certainly still prevalent in the United States. This fundamentalism is in rather distinct contrast to the pragmatism of the British, the eclecticism of the Indian, the messianism of the Russian, and the absolutism of the German. The original fundamentalism has long since been modified and enlarged, but it is still rather extraordinary to recall that in 1925 William Jennings Bryan and Clarence Seward Darrow would debate biblical fundamentalism with Darwinian evolution.

The Puritan heritage, nonetheless, gave rise to a rather peculiar ideological phenomenon known as the 'Puritan Ethic.' This is a rather complex concept as it has evolved down to the present, but in its simplest statement the essence seems to be that 'somehow, someway, right will prevail over might,' particularly if you place unbounding faith in the wisdom and will of God as revealed through the Scriptures.

The foremost characteristic of the Puritan Ethic is a distrust of power—whatever the source and locus. Americans have traditionally been suspicious of the exercise of power whether it be personnel, national, or international. This dislike of power may be traced to what they felt was the abuse of power and the conception of responsibility by both the ecclesiastical and secular authorities

in England and on the Continent. It is also not without some significance that the Plymouth Company was chartered and settled in the midst of the Reformation and Thirty Years' War. The Mayflower Compact illustrates the dichotomy of the struggle between ecclesiastical and secular authority and the attempt to develop some third alternative where the Puritans 'by these presents, solemnly and mutually, in the presence of God and of one another, covenant and combine ourselves together into a civil body politick, for our better ordering and preservation and furtherance of the ends aforesaid . . .'

This distrust of uncontrolled power has led to several interesting manifestations. On the personal level it developed into a rather strong egalitarianism and rugged individualism. On the national level we see it woven into the Constitution of 1789 and its elaborate system of checks and balances, whereby none of the three major branches of government could be described as fully sovereign or absolute. Indeed, the essence of constitutional democracy seems to be the restraint and regulation of power. The more traditional concept of the head of state as the locus and source of sovereignty, based largely upon the divine right of kings and being unrestricted, absolute and equal, is certainly not true of the President of the United States. Congress has the Constitutional power to lay and collect taxes, provide for the common defense, regulate commerce, support and maintain the Army and Navy, as well as to make all laws. The Senate, in particular, expresses its advice and consent on treaties and appointments. Even with the rapid rise of Executive initiative in foreign policy through the use of such devices as the Executive Agreement to bypass the Senate, the President is still relatively restrained or restricted in his foreign policy, although he does exercise great powers. In point of fact, the broader statement might be made that American domestic policy, and domestic politics, exert a decisive influence on the direction and content of U.S. foreign policy and the mix of international politics.

On the international level the characteristic American distrust and suspicion of power and international politics assume even larger proportions. The basic dislike or misunderstanding of power and international politics by the American people has filled U.S. foreign policy, as Walter Lippmann says, with 'stereotyped prejudices . . . sacred cows, and wishful conceptions' and that the basic failure of U.S. conceptual thinking on foreign policy is 'to admit, to take as the premise of our thinking, the fact that rivalry, strife, and conflict among states, communities, and factions are the normal condition of mankind.'

The Puritan Ethic and American national character take the view that the struggle for power, prestige, and prosperity are not the natural state of things and that war is somehow immoral, unjust, and illegal. Shortly after the emergence of the United States of America as a constitutional democracy of sorts, in 1789, we can see the acceptance and espousal of international law as a means of resolving international conflicts through arbitration, adjudication and mediation. In fact, this reliance on international law became one of the predominant characteristics of U.S. foreign policy down to World War I when dealing with weaker powers. The astute American philosopher, William James, described this reliance on international law as 'the moral equivalent for war.' Or again, 'somehow, somehow, right will prevail over might.'

The outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789 evoked a response of considerable sympathy in the United States on ideological grounds as vindication of the American Revolution and of verification of the rightness of the Puritan Ethic. However, when Great Britain began to take restrictive counter-measures against the French, the United States was placed in an awkward dilemma between the idealism of the ideology and the realism of the national interest. After considerable internal stress and some strain, which resulted in Thomas Jefferson leaving as Secretary of State, the United States developed a new synthesis out of the conflict between the thesis of idealism and the antithesis of realism. This new policy was officially described as one of 'neutrality' or 'noninvolvement.' This approach had its roots in the Treaty Plan of 1784 and was also manifested in such declarations as 'freedom of the seas,' 'neutral ships make neutral goods except for contraband of war,' and so on. This was really more of an accommodation by an essentially weak commercial nation-state with the realities of international politics and an attempt to avoid being caught in the struggles of the Great Powers. On April 22, 1793, President Washington signed the Proclamation of Neutrality, which was both an internal measure to restrain Francophile sympathies and an external measure to reassure the British. This was indeed a difficult time for the United States, but as Professor Bemis points out, the secret of Washington's diplomacy was in the phrase, 'Europe's distress was America's advantage.' This became one of the bedrocks of U.S. foreign policy, with a few minor exceptions, down to World War I.

The prime manifestations of the United States' desire to remain disengaged from European power struggles, as well as

to increase internal power and hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, are Washington's Farewell Address and the Monroe Doctrine. A few excerpts, in this connection, are illustrative:

1. Washington's Farewell Address

Observe good faith and justice toward all nations. Cultivate peace and harmony with all. Religion and morality enjoin this conduct The great rule of conduct in regard to foreign nations is: in extending our commercial relations have as little political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop.

Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise for us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics as the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.

Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course.

2. Monroe Doctrine

a. . . . That the American continents by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers

b. In the wars of the European powers, in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so.

c. With existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere.

d. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness.

In this connection, it is difficult to escape the analogy between the 'neutrality' and 'noninvolvement' of the United States in its first century and a quarter of diplomacy, and the contemporary 'neutralism' and 'nonalignment' of many Afro-Asian nations today. Europe's distress and the *Pax Britannica* of the 19th century were certainly to America's advantage, and the bipolar power struggle of today with its 'balance of terror' seems to have been to the advantage of the neutralists. The interesting paradox in this analogy is that the United States, with its Puritan Ethic and moralistic condemnation of war, criticizes the latter-day 'neutralists' and 'nonaligners' as immoral.

This leads us into another major characteristic of the Puritan Ethic and American national character which is moralism. As Cecil Crabb says, 'Moralism is not the same as morality Morality has to do with the substance of behavior. It is conduct in accordance with a predetermined code of behavior, and throughout Christendom this refers to behavior sanctioned by the Christendom faith. Moralism [in the political sense] is concerned with [the] appearances, with the concepts and language employed in foreign relations, with the symbols used, and with the way that ends and means are visualized and expressed publicly.' From this definition we can occasionally see the attempts of the United States to extend its value system, based largely upon the Puritan Ethic, to other civilizations and cultures with different and differing value systems. While moralistic behavior in the foreign policy of the United States may seem high-minded at home, it often seems high-handed abroad.

This moralistic attitude on the part of the United States has been expressed in several forms and slogans such as 'Manifest Destiny,' 'No compromise with principle,' 'Make the world safe for democracy,' 'Self-determination,' 'Atheistic communism,' 'Unconditional surrender,' 'Total victory,' and 'We will never commit aggression.'

Manifest Destiny is a rationalization on the part of the United States for expanding across the continent and eventually across the Pacific Ocean. Americans made a clear distinction between what they called 'expansionism' and crass, immoral European 'imperialism.' It is rather interesting that the strongest

condemnation of Manifest Destiny was expressed by a Congressman from Massachusetts, the home as it were, of the Puritan Ethic in the late 1840's. In his words Manifest Destiny was opening 'a new chapter in the law of nations or rather in the special laws of our own country, for I suppose the right of a manifest destiny to spread will not be admitted to exist in any other nation except the universal Yankee nation.'

The height of Manifest Destiny was reached in 1900 in the debate over whether or not to annex the Philippines. Senator Albert Beveridge from the good fundamentalist state of Indiana was the leading spokesman for annexation. His speech on Manifest Destiny is interesting from several standpoints: (a) the rationalization of imperialism, (b) the invocation of the Puritan Ethic and (c) the messianic mission of the United States to save the world:

Mr. President, the times call for candor. The Philippines are ours forever, 'territory belonging to the United States' as the Constitution calls them. And just beyond the Philippines are China's illimitable markets. We will not retreat from either. We will not repudiate our duty in the archipelago. We will not abandon our opportunity in the Orient. We will not renounce our part in the mission of our race, trustee under God, of the civilization of the world. And we will move forward to our work, not howling our regrets like slaves whipped to their burdens, but with gratitude for a task worthy of our strength, and thanksgiving to Almighty God that He has marked us as his chosen people, henceforth to lead in the regeneration of the world.

Another aspect of moralism is the rather negative-sounding phrase of 'No compromise with principle.' This is partially an outgrowth of Puritan fundamentalism with such corollaries as 'Right is right and wrong is wrong.' This aspect of moralism and its relatively inflexible dicta has certain overtones of the Continental concept of compromise as capitulation, and not the Anglo-Saxon concept of compromise as a mutual bargain. Compromise has also acquired the connotation of 'Appeasement' in the fundamentalist lexicon of Puritanism. Appeasement in turn has acquired an intrinsically immoral connotation and we can see some historical antecedents going back to the XYZ affair with France and the treaties with the Barbary Pirates.

The cry then was 'Millions for defense, not a penny for tribute.' The depth of appeasement was reached in 1938 at Munich. Although the United States was seized by another fit of neo-isolationism, it roundly condemned the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia as 'immoral' and a 'sell-out.' The subsequent events leading to World War II seemed to confirm this conviction and became an important element in American national character.

Appeasement is really a rather good word in and of itself, and literally means to bring to a state of peace, to pacify, to calm, to win an enemy or opponent over by displaying a willingness to be just and fair. Appeasement, then, in the literal sense implies more of an attitude toward negotiation rather than the giving away of something. However, appeasement retains the connotations of capitulation and duplicity. These concepts have clearly become identified in the public mind with diplomacy as somehow immoral and associated with 'secret deals' and 'sellouts.' This puritanical suspicion of diplomacy has traditionally been supported by the relative isolation of the United States and the lack of necessity to negotiate and compromise. These suspicions of diplomacy and diplomats were further heightened by the 19th century practices of the bribe and secret agreements. The leading example of this was the Secret Treaty of London in 1915 which essentially bought Italy off to come in on the side of the Allied and Associated Powers and caused a feeling of revulsion and guilt by association in the United States. The result, of course, was the first of President Wilson's Fourteen Points: 'Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.' It is rather interesting to see the puritanical word 'covenant' used here and again in the Covenant of the League of Nations. It was almost as though the United States were launched on a Great Crusade not only to 'Make the World Safe for Democracy' but also to spread the Puritan Ethic.

A fundamental tenet of the Puritan Ethic is the dignity and equality of all men. This is a derivative of the concept that man is somewhat divine, and that all men were equal before God. This rather naturally led to popular sovereignty, mass nationalism, and then to self-determination. Almost half of Wilson's Fourteen Points were directly or indirectly associated with the concept of self-determination. Autodetermination may be somewhat of a fiction in practice, but to say that 'when in the course of human events it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another,'

has had no effect or impact on international relations, would probably be the understatement of the last two centuries.

The moralism of the United States has led to the fundamentalist espousal of principles, but has also led to the assumption of some rather unrealistic postures such as: unconditional surrender, total victory, no appeasement, and universal democracy. These postures have been encouraged by the self-delusions of omnipotence and omniscience. These delusions of power and truth are clearly rooted in the fundamentalist absolutism of the Puritan Ethic. Unfortunately these delusions have given rise to the general belief in 'instantaneous foreign policy' or 'no sooner said than done.' As Denis Brogan, the astute British observer, remarked: 'The illusion of American omnipotence has given rise to the belief that any situation which distresses or endangers the United States can only exist because some Americans have been fools or knaves.' Brogan goes on to say that Americans have yet to learn that the world cannot be altered overnight by a speech or a platform.

Another aspect of the Puritan Ethic and American national character is the peculiar phenomenon of isolationism. This isolationism, of course, was partially a conscious desire to be rid of Europe's religious, political, and economic troubles; but it was also partially derived from geographic separation and absorption in creating and expanding a new civilization. However, traditional American isolationism was not a retreat into itself, like Japan from 1604 to 1854, but was a cautious participation in the economic and political aspects of international politics *as its power permitted*. And therein lies the key.

Again, except for the 1930's American isolationism was almost a direct function of its economic and political power: As power increased, 'isolationism' decreased. However, at no time was the United States isolated from the rest of the world economically, politically, or ideologically: The United States had the second largest commercial fleet in the world until 1862; it purchased Louisiana, enunciated the Monroe Doctrine, annexed Texas, fought Mexico, expanded across a continent and acquired an empire; this could hardly be described as a political. Ideologically, the United States helped to finance and support virtually every nationalistic revolution, from Argentina to Cuba, and from Greece to Norway. This was not exactly isolationism! The cry of isolation seems to be more of an anguished rationalization for the lack of adequate or

commensurate power, which was alien to the Puritan Ethic, rather than nonparticipation. On the contrary, a substantial case can be made out for an activist, positive diplomacy on the part of the United States in the 19th century.

However, the myth of isolationism tended to give rise to the predominance of domestic policy over foreign policy. This was also fostered by the need for internal development and the creation of a new society. In 1839, John Louis O'Sullivan, wrote an article entitled 'The Great Nation of Futurity.' A short excerpt from this selection is illustrative:

Our national birth was the beginning of a new history, the formation and progress of an untried political system, which separates us from the past and connects us with the future only; so far as regards the entire development of the rights of man, in moral, political, and national life, we may confidently assume that our country is destined to be the great nation of futurity.

This passage also helps to further illustrate the messianic vision of the Puritan Ethic and the need to develop and secure the 'New Society' at home before engaging in an active foreign policy. This sounds strangely reminiscent of the Stalin-Trotsky argument of 1921-22 and the statements of the contemporary neutralists.

The last large ingredients of the Puritan Ethic are optimism and confidence—optimism bred out of the concept that 'somehow, someday right will prevail over might,' and confidence in the innate and ultimate superiority of the American system and the American way of life. This optimism and this confidence have never really been seriously challenged from without, although it was attacked from within during the Civil War. With the possible exception of the War of 1812, the United States has neither fought an international war on its own territory nor has it been defeated. This unparalleled success may be partially attributed to prudence, but it has also tended to increase the national confidence and create an aura of invincibility, as well as to strengthen the feeling of omnipotence and the attitude of omniscience.

This optimism and confidence are also strengthened by the overwhelming success of the American economy, but has seemingly become somewhat distorted into a sense of

superiority. However, this sense of superiority is somewhat modified by the traditional humanitarianism and philanthropic attitude of the American people which is also part of the Puritan Ethic. Nonetheless, the residue remains.

The Puritan Ethic, then, is indeed a complex phenomenon with a 'strange' admixture of a number of idealistic ingredients. Cecil Crabb probably has one of the most succinct statements on the Puritan Ethic in foreign policy as seen from abroad:

To foreigners, Americans must resemble nothing so much as the sombre Puritan: motivated by high ideals, austere, [and] unshakable in his conviction that goodness will triumph in the end, but at the same time impatient with wrongdoing, sanctimonious, and at times insufferably self-righteous.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor David L. Larson

Professor Larson teaches international relations, international law and organization, and U.S. foreign policy at Tufts University, and is a consultant on international operations to the Systems Analysis Research Corporation of Boston and Washington. He also has some current interests in Latin America, the Balkans, and the theory of international relations.

Professor Larson attended Dartmouth College as an undergraduate, where he majored in history. He graduated with honors (in history) and enlisted in the Air Force. Following his basic training, he entered OCS and subsequently received intelligence training as an air-photo-radar intelligence officer. For the next two years he was stationed in Wiesbaden, Germany, as an intelligence specialist attached to Headquarters, USAF.

In the Fall of 1956, Professor Larson began his graduate work at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. While in residence at the Fletcher School, Professor Larson was successively a Fletcher Fellow, a Clayton Fellow, and a Research Fellow, as he earned the A.M., M.A.L.D., and Ph.D. degrees. American diplomatic history was one of his interests as a graduate student, and he wrote his Master's thesis on 'U.S. Foreign Policy toward Spain: 1945-1953' and his Doctor's thesis on 'The Foreign Policy of the United States toward Yugoslavia: 1943-1960.'

Professor Larson has published a book on *The 'Cuban Crisis' of 1962: Selected Documents and Chronology* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963) and is presently working on a textbook for Houghton Mifflin tentatively entitled *The Relativity of International Relations: a Macro-Political Theory*. He is a member of the American Political Science Association, the American Society of International Law, the American Academy of Political and Social Science, the American Historical Association, and the American Economic Association.