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The McNamara Strategy

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period February-July 1916. The author in great detail and clarity describes this battle. One with little military experience is prone to conclude quickly that no lessons were learned from earlier major conflicts—such as General Pickett's charge at Gettysburg. The offensive was on the side of the Germans—artillery preparation followed by infantry frontal attacks against well-prepared French positions. The French countered with a strong defense in place: 'Die rather than yield a single inch of ground' was an order and belief, and a high percentage of the fighters did just that. Throughout, the frontal attacks were contained by last-ditch resistance and desperate local counterattacks. As reported, the latter were generally badly executed by the French and resulted in extreme loss of life. Provided in this document is an excellent account of the horrors of the battle under the tactics mentioned before—poisonous gas, mass artillery preparation, hand-to-hand combat, wounded left on battlefield for days without treatment, dead neither identified nor buried, and a continuous lack of water and food for the front line troops. The book comes to a close with the Germans realizing that in early July 1916, they had lost the battle for Verdun and their decision was to adopt the defensive. Thereafter, there is a brief description of preparation for the counteroffensive by the French, as well as some observations obtained by visits to the battle area. One extreme difficulty to the reader of this book is the lack of a clear sketch map which would be of considerable assistance in following this important struggle which must be considered as a major turning point in favor of the French and their allies in the First World War.

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Kaufmann, William W. *The McNamara Strategy*. New York: Harper & Row, 1964. 339p.

The author is an ardent supporter of the 'McNamara strategy.' At least this is the impression one gets from reading the book. This work is designed primarily to inform the public of the McNamara and Kennedy-Johnson Administration views on defense in the nuclear age. As such, the book draws largely on the words of the Secretary of Defense (Congressional testimony, press conferences, and speeches) and those of his civilian associates in the Department of Defense. Mr. Kaufmann covers in detail Secretary McNamara's strategy of flexible response from nuclear war to counterinsurgency; his dialogue with NATO over his new policy; the B-70, Skybolt, and the four-ocean navy

controversies; and arms control and Mr. McNamara's role in the formation of the test ban treaty. The author includes a detailed exposition of the procedural reforms introduced by the Secretary of Defense within the Pentagon itself; and he explains the cost-effectiveness approach to weapon systems procurement, budgeting, and programming. Mr. Kaufmann has presented a clear and concise picture of the 'McNamara strategy' and the reasons behind it. He has, however, failed to produce the opposing views in the same manner, and one wonders whether he ever intended to. Nevertheless, for the military reader this volume provides thought-provoking material, and for the layman, a comprehensive treatment of the current defense policies of the United States.

C.D. PETERSON

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Rosecrance, Richard N., ed. *The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964. 317p.

'There are those who believe that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by many countries may well constitute one of the most dangerous problems in future international relations.' Mr. Rosecrance's book emphasizes, along with the historical background of nuclear weaponry, the many strategic and political problems that have developed from nuclear inception in the late 1930's to the current times. The book, a series of articles, depicts a thorough analysis of nuclear weaponry development. In the United States during World War II, the early collaboration of British scientists, military, and political leaders in development of fissionable materials and atomic bomb projects, was accompanied by considerable apprehension and political bickering. The initial concept, explosion, and reconstruction brought about many economical, political, and military decisions (well discussed here) that were consequent upon the involvement of the United States, Great Britain, and France in nuclear capabilities. This involvement extended to nuclear weapon systems and other military strengths and weaknesses, and the effects on the countries' budgetary problems. The overall impact of the United States' control of nuclear weapons then brought about continued and ever-mounting problems associated with military alliances, nuclear technology, and concurrently, the peaceful expansion of atomic reactors in leading countries throughout the world. United States and Russian control has developed a limited country race for nuclear arms power, which will continue to impose political and diplomatic reassessment of international