

1965

On Dealing with the Communist World

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Recommended Citation

Garlinghouse, B. B. and Kennan, George F. (1965) "On Dealing with the Communist World," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 18 : No. 1 , Article 12.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol18/iss1/12>

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against the effects of a burgeoning military/industrial complex, Mr. Raymond traces, in dispassionate and straightforward terms, the growth of the American military establishment from a small cadre of obscure, dedicated professionals before World War II, to the vast, heavily funded, complex establishment of today. Mr. Raymond discusses the various aspects of the ascendancy of security matters in national affairs in a comprehensive and wide-ranging manner. In addition to recounting the history of military growth during World War II, he highlights, *inter alia*, such subjects as military education; the impact of science and technology upon our military posture; the relationships between Congress and the military establishment; conflicts of interest involving senior civilian and military defense officials; the development of national strategic concepts in the post-World War II period; the economic significance of defense spending; the 'McNamara monarchy'; and the necessity for an international United States military presence. It is particularly refreshing and reassuring to read a book whose overall tone is one of approbation for the competence, dedication, and motivation of the professional military man. The author rejects the thesis that the military establishment is ambitious for its own sake and correctly defines our military posture as an effect of world conditions. While depicting the operations and accomplishments of the military establishment as generally praiseworthy, Mr. Raymond issues a clear call for increased public awareness and scrutiny of the establishment: '. . . we must challenge the judgment of the specialists in civilian clothing as well as the professionals in uniform . . . Thus all the traditional arguments against military dominance must be broadened to make them arguments against bureaucratic dominance.' Mr. Raymond's book is clear, complete, and just. It is highly recommended both for background knowledge of national security affairs during the past twenty-five years and for personal morale-building for those who have become sickened by such distorted offerings as *Seven Days in May*, *Fail-Safe*, and *Dr. Strangelove*.

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Kennan, George F. *On Dealing with the Communist World*. New York: Harper & Row, 1964. 57p.

George Kennan's thirty years' experience in Soviet-American diplomacy and history are distilled into this wafer-thin summary of his views on hastening the dissipation of tensions between

the two major power blocs. Based on his noted Elihu Root lectures, Mr. Kennan in this book examines three topics—the rationale of coexistence, East-West trade, and polycentrism in the Communist camp. He asks what the so-called total victory over communism can in fact mean when those living under it may not relish their present government, but dislike foreigners even more. The author's proposals seem somewhat shocking, coming from one of the main architects of the West's containment policy. Has he gone soft on communism? He states:

I should have deepest misgivings about any concept of policy which envisaged, as a sort of an end-product, the overthrow of Soviet power either by the direct use of our forces or by incitement of subject peoples to revolts which we would be vaguely expected to back up if they got into trouble.

Concerning the Russian wheat deal, he says it would seem, on the face of it that

the United States, by selling its wheat, would make it possible for the Russians to go on giving their farmers inadequate incentive for the production of grain; they, by purchasing it, would make it possible for the United States to go on giving its own farmers too much.

Polycentrism—the emergence of different Communist centers of decision and policy—is a fact, we are admonished in the last chapter.

If there is really strength in unity, Communist leaders can only be grateful for a Western policy which slights the values of polycentrism and declines to encourage them; for a rigidly unreceptive Western attitude may eventually enforce upon the bloc a measure of unity which, by their own unaided effort, they could never have achieved.

Those who believe the East-West conflict irreconcilable will not agree with Mr. Kennan's conclusions, but anyone would do well to read this remarkable little book and become exposed to his thoughts.

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