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Winning Without War

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taken an entirely different course had the Japanese succeeded in their assault on Imphal and their drive for Delhi. They almost did.

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Etzioni, Amitai. *Winning Without War*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1964. 271 p.

Professor Etzioni, a sociologist and member of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, points to a new strategy designed 'to advance freedom more and risk survival less' than the policies of containment and bipolar status quo pursued by the United States since 1947. He argues eloquently that the prerequisites of the 'strategy of duopoly' are rapidly disappearing and that both the 'protractionists' (believing in the impossibility of conflict resolution, hence protracted conflict or status quo) and the 'resolutionists' (who would work for resolution in spite of poor chances and high cost) theorize within the same outdated frame of reference. His own alternative, 'competition under rules,' while building upon the emerging novel elements of international reality, is said to offer more than a risky stalemate and to be less difficult to attain than a complete resolution. 'Competition under rules' would confine military deterrence to the two major powers—and that only temporarily, while they continue to work toward a meaningful system of arms reduction. The opportunity offered by the rise of third-force countries would be utilized to reduce the risk of escalation by freeing them from pressure to join one or the other camp and substituting a system of 'remote deterrence' (perhaps on the Austrian model) for the threats of military intervention. But military disengagement is only one side of the picture. Global trade and aid to underdeveloped countries would remain among the outlets for the pent-up energy of the major powers, requiring that the U.S.S.R. be admitted to the international monetary system and included in the negotiations for tariff and quota reductions (and that China be admitted to the United Nations) to assure 'peaceful engagement' of both major camps. Accordingly, a 'redistribution of efforts and resources' among the instruments of foreign policy, already initiated under the Kennedy and Khrushchev administrations, would have to be pursued further. Etzioni suggests a variety of gradual steps, based at first on the mutual interest in nonannihilation, to lead toward community-building activities, eventually under the auspices of strengthened international organizations of both regional and global varieties.

The winning side, if the author's suggestions are followed? 'The victory of peaceful competition,' we are told, 'will not be a triumph of a nation or a bloc, but a stable peace, social justice, and freedom; these can win without war.'

It is a provocative little book, perhaps even more so for its being apparently written with a view to the sophisticated general reader rather than the expert. It is at its best where it exposes, in general but unmistakable terms, the actual decline of bipolarity, thus attempting to demolish the remaining theoretical foundation of the 'duopolistic' balance of power strategy. Its second strength is in its general emphasis on modifying the means, without waiting for the reconciliation of goals or despairing over the lack of mutual trust between the opposing camps. In details, however, it sometimes relies on rather flimsy evidence. It will no doubt provoke sharp disagreement over the specific steps it proposes—the 'internationalization' of various critical areas of the world, the UN 'sovereignty' over the high sea, UN 'flashlight force' in the noncommitted countries, and a policy of promoting indigenous revolutions against corrupt regimes in the rimland 'even at a price of chaos,' to name but a few examples. In sum, if only as a rich source of stimulating propositions still awaiting full support, and as an antidote to the most frequently encountered pat solutions in the interpretation of current world politics, *Winning Without War* should be considered required reading by the serious beginning student.

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Fitzsimons, Matthew A. *Empire by Treaty*. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1964. 235 p.

The author presents an account of British policies in the Middle East from colonial nineteenth century through the post-World War II era. Starting with major British interests in the Middle East that commanded attention of nineteenth-century British statesmen, Mr. Fitzsimons masterfully sets the stage in the first part of his book for the more detailed account of Britain and the Middle East in the current era. Essentially, Britain's interest in the Middle East during the 1800's revolved around her concern with containing Russia's designs of dominion over neighboring Turkey, with the security of India, and with the maintenance of British transit unimpaired through the Middle East. During the twentieth century, Middle Eastern oil and