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The Crisis: the Inside Story of the Suez Conspiracy

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Fisher of Harvard discusses the three problems of policy and law in intervention: meeting force with force, applying intervention 'rules' to particular facts, and restrictions upon the use of coercion short of force. Although considering the relevance of the time-honored test of reasonableness/unreasonableness, the author argues, with academic merit, that international difficulties should be resolved by putting into operation a principle applicable in domestic law—a settlement based upon the merits of the case. Princeton Professor Richard A. Falk's thesis is based on the legality of United Nations interventions to resolve disputes 'that would be illegal if sought by unilateral or national interventions.' In developing this argument, he opines that while the active role of the UN is considered to be little more than a coalition of power to maintain international peace, it should be given 'a restrictive legislative competence to intervene in domestic affairs' when world peace or human rights are threatened. While the presentation is articulate, this reviewer is not convinced by Falk's theory that the UN Charter contains sufficient 'community responsibility' provisions to overcome the sovereign equality of nations explicitly recognized in Article 2. Professor Michael H. Cardozo of Cornell discusses the imposition of conditions upon the recipient of foreign aid as a form of domestic intervention. While frequently overlooked in favor of the more forceful types, it is, nonetheless, quite effective for the promotion of the national interests and policies of the 'giver.' Professor William T. Burke from Ohio State discusses the regulatory aspects of minor coercive actions in conjunction with the legal framework of the UN. His discussion is not intended to support any particular form of action, but rather to establish some guidelines through which policies and actions may be projected to determine their possible outcome.

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Robertson, Terence. *The Crisis: the Inside Story of the Suez Conspiracy*. New York: Atheneum, 1965. 349 p.

What more can be said about the 1956 Suez incident? A considerable amount, and this author has arranged his material in a manner which gives further sanction to the cliché that truth is indeed stranger than fiction. In addition to citing some rather impressive public and private sources of information, the author enhances the authenticity of his report by having the manuscript corrected by Canada's Department of External Affairs, the former French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau, and Robert Murphy,

former United States Undersecretary of State. Unfortunately, a great amount of the information was given with the understanding that the source would not be attributed—a considerable handicap to the serious researcher. This book gives a clear picture of ineffective action due to the enormous pressures placed upon an indecisive leader, Eden, and the contrasting effectiveness of a clear and unrelenting policy established by a pure nationalist, Ben-Gurion. Of particular fascination is the effectiveness of Israeli intrigue, which managed to enlist the anti-Israel, pro-Arab British along with the anti-Arab, pro-Israel French into a secret alliance to support a preventive war by Israel, and then to have the British and French receive most of the blame for the action. Lester Pearson, then Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations and now Prime Minister, played the most significant role in establishing the UNEF, which enabled all parties to withdraw with some face-saving, yet his efforts have received little recognition in the public domain. Mr. Robertson settles that long overdue account and gives considerable insight into the political maneuverings possible within the United Nations Organization. *The Crisis* is recommended for the student who desires to understand better the reasons that this unfortunate incident developed. The casual reader will find this account on a par with the best of the popular mystery novels.

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Open Space and Peace Symposium. Stanford University, 1963.
Open Space and Peace. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University.
Hoover Institution, 1964. 227 p.

An Open Space and Peace Symposium sponsored by Sylvania and the Hoover Institution was held at Stanford University September 1963. The 19 papers on the subject of satellite observation compiled in this volume were presented at this symposium, which consisted of five sessions covering background, technology, implications, implementation, and feasibility. The opening paper by Stefan T. Possony provides a historical perspective of air reconnaissance, beginning with the first observation balloons used by the French revolutionary army in 1794 and ending with the satellite reconnaissance of the present day. The author indulges in a great deal of hindsight to illustrate how air reconnaissance might have changed the course of World Wars I and II and the Korean War and how it could have foiled the attack on Pearl Harbor. The excellent paper by Robert N. Colwell describes the peaceful uses