

1965

Design for Survival

J. E. Ford
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Thomas S. Power

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Recommended Citation

Ford, J. E. and Power, Thomas S. (1965) "Design for Survival," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 18 : No. 6 , Article 10.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol18/iss6/10>

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through interviews the opinions of the proponents of the many and varied policies. His approach is to categorize the people and organizations into forward strategists, analysts, realists, government idealists, experimentalists, peace researchers, survivalists, and radicals in descending order of militancy. Each category is examined objectively, and the author provides enough supplemental information—in addition to the accounts of the interviews—for the reader to understand the objectives and rationales of the groups. A synthesis is made by Mr. Herzog after all of the cases have been presented, drawing what he considers the best points of each argument. The extremes are rejected, such as deterrence through fear advocated by the forward strategists, along with unilateral disarmament voiced by the radicals. The author calls for experimentalism whereby the United States, under the umbrella of a minimum deterrent, aggressively searches for peace in an imaginative, open, and optimistic manner, which hopefully will result in genuine universal nuclear disarmament. To substantiate this conclusion, the author emphasizes that others as well as Americans suffer from nucleomitophobia, the fear of atomic attack. Although everyone may not agree with the author's conclusions, Mr. Herzog deserves credit for sorting out the many voices which try to say what the United States policy should be. This book provides good background information for one interested in national security.

R.H. WILSON
Commander, U.S. Navy

Power, Thomas S. *Design for Survival*. New York: Coward-McCann, 1965. 255 p.

General Power's book has waited for five years to be published. He writes, "This is the second edition of *Design for Survival*. The first edition was never published; it was 'banned,' as the press put it." The then Secretary of Defense Niel McElroy denied clearance in August 1959 because "he considered it inappropriate for an officer in [General Power's] position to publish a book pertaining to his area of responsibility while on active duty." General Power presents a solid case for his deterrent system in winning the cold war or any hot war. His deterrent system requires SAC's manned bombers and ICBM's in balanced mixture plus Polaris submarines, aircraft carriers (he makes a strong argument for more nuclear carriers), a good air defense and civil defense, and what he calls the Ultimate Weapon—man himself. As former Commander in Chief of SAC and one who contributed much to its growth, he

quite naturally makes his strongest pitch for the continuation of the manned bomber in the total deterrent system. His arguments are not new to the military, nor are any of his concepts. He simply produces a well-thought-out case for providing a large spectrum of weapons systems aligned to provide maximum deterrence within the ability of the taxpayer to support, and of sufficient strength to leave no doubt in the mind of any aggressor that attack on the United States will bring not only immediate retaliation but the defeat of the aggressor. The guaranteed defeat of the aggressor is the key to his thesis. He fears the production of a system that will not convince the Soviets or the Chi-Coms that defeat is inevitable. He points out that anything less will not be a deterrent but, rather, an invitation to war. The book is written in the language of the layman and is for civilian consumption. While there is little new to the military man, it does make interesting reading.

J.E. FORD
Commander, U.S. Navy

Warner, Oliver. *The Sea and the Sword*. New York: Morrow, 1965.
305 p.

Rather than having attempted an all-embracing history of the various countries bordering the Baltic Sea, the author has placed emphasis on what appears to be an English view of approximately five hundred years of Baltic conflict by land and sea and upon its results, temporary or more permanent. This book is therefore essentially a military history of the Baltic. Upon this matrix, international relations and certain economic and strategic factors are covered in order to insure a certain reason for the bloodletting that seems to be characteristic of the Baltic peoples during this period. Interesting detail concerning power struggles involving such notables as Gustavus Adolphus, Peter the Great, Charles XII of Sweden, Napoleon, and Hitler are covered. Superimposed upon the narratives concerning these well-known leaders are details of the rise and fall in military and political dominance of various countries bordering the Baltic. Also, the struggle involving the political integrity of Poland and creation of Germany as a world power is outlined. The influence of such fringe countries as Spain, France, and England is also analyzed in order to assist in placing the military aspects of the Baltic during this period in clear perspective. Finally, a significant part of the book is devoted to the twentieth-century history of the Baltic and the influence played upon it by the United States and the United Kingdom.

R.S. HOSIER
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