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Conventional Warfare in the Nuclear Age

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Ginsburgh, Robert N. *U.S. Military Strategy in the Sixties*. New York: Norton, 1965. 160 p.

Here the reader is given a brief and concise, but relatively comprehensive, analysis of the developments in United States strategy, beginning with the Revolutionary War and continuing, broadly, through 1970. The author has done an admirable job in outlining the various domestic influences on national military strategy, such as the interrelationships and interactions between the military and civilian components of the Department of Defense and the executive and legislative branches of the government, and the American concepts of legality and morality. In addition, he makes a meaningful comparison of the fundamental differences and similarities in the national strategies of the United States and the U.S.S.R. The advanced student of strategy and international relations will find little in the book that is particularly revelatory or profound. However, it is an excellent primer and a valuable summary synthesis and is highly recommended as such.

R.F. KENNEY
Commander, U.S. Navy

Heilbrunn, Otto. *Conventional Warfare in the Nuclear Age*. New York: Praeger, 1965. 164 p.

This work is a valuable and most timely contribution to the study of modern warfare. Having written books on guerrilla warfare, partisan warfare, and warfare in the enemy's rear, Dr. Heilbrunn now turns his expertise to the contemplation of a major conflict between nuclear powers. With tight reasoning and clear logic, he analyzes the possible courses of action available to NATO in the event of an attack by the Soviets. He carefully weighs the advantages and disadvantages accruing to the attacker, or the defender, with the introduction of nuclear weapons by either side, and he makes a fair case against those who would base NATO's defense upon the use of tactical nuclear weapons. In fact, the only case in which he considers that either side gains a clear advantage by the introduction of nuclear weapons is in the preemptive mode; and in most other cases the Russians seem to have a slight edge. Thus, he presents the rationale for a NATO defense strategy limited to conventional means—something which, he makes quite clear, NATO is ill-prepared to implement. This is the second major thesis of his book. While the war contemplated may be conventional, the tactics are dictated by the nuclear capabilities of the opponents.

The continuous front line and massive logistic complexes of World War II are too vulnerable and too tempting as nuclear targets for the aggressor. As an alternative, Dr. Heilbrunn turns to his theory of warfare in the enemy's rear, a free-wheeling, circling type of combat which seeks to disorganize and destroy enemy forces, and control territory without actually holding it, much as guerrillas do. And, of course, at no time must either side present an appropriate target for nuclear attack to his opponent; nor may he be too successful, lest the opponent launch nuclear war to avoid total defeat. The command and control problems of this type of warfare are recognized by the author, but apparently are not considered insurmountable. Be that as it may, even if NATO could fight a conflict in the manner that is outlined, the author makes very clear the point that a drastic increase in combat troops will be required because the defense can no longer contain a numerically superior attacker in conventional warfare in the nuclear age. The book is highly recommended to the student of NATO and of military tactics in general. The bibliography and documentation are excellent and comprehensive.

G.H. WINSLOW
Commander, U.S. Navy

Kahn, Herman. *On Escalation*. New York: Praeger, 1965. 308 p.

As the result of a Martin Company contract to the Hudson Institute to study issues that might be of special interest to United States defense planners, Herman Kahn prepared one of the final report documents entitled, *On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios*. This extremely interesting and thought-provoking book is based on that original study by Herman Kahn. Both escalation, which is used to describe an increase in the level of conflict in international crisis situations, and negotiation are addressed in their important role in international relations. Specifically considered are the political, diplomatic, and military issues surrounding a conflict and the level of violence and provocation at which it is fought. This book is written in layman's language utilizing extremely simple metaphors, i.e., the "Chicken" or no face-saving example and the "Labor Strike" where both sides need each other. It focuses attention on the use and misuse of escalation tactics and strategies utilizing the escalation ladder encompassing the entire spectrum from ostensible crisis to all-out nuclear exchange as scenarios. The author acknowledges the fact that he cannot present all possible situations which might arise, but believes a realistic sample is