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The Cold War...and After

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of its kind up to the moment, and because of its obvious implications within the framework of national defense, *The New Priesthood* is particularly pertinent reading for military and naval officers as well as for all thinking individuals concerned with industry, government, or public affairs. It should, however, be viewed correctly as only one approach to a subject on which many facets remain unexplored. *The New Priesthood* is not a long book and is easy reading, but it should be perused critically and searchingly as well as open-mindedly.

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Lerche, Charles O., Jr. *The Cold War . . . and After*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965. 150 p.

In *The Cold War . . . and After*, Professor Lerche of American University has attempted a searching and dispassionate analysis of Soviet-American cold war relations since 1945. He concludes that the cold war as a historical era is drawing to a close and that relations between the two world giants, although destined to remain fiercely competitive for the foreseeable future, is gradually reverting to the classical concept of great power relationships of the type associated with the Congress of Vienna. The main thrust of the author's thesis supports the popular belief that while the international climate is still basically glacial, the antagonists are at last learning to adapt meaningfully to the vicissitudes of their environment and the pressures of each other's ambitions. The chapters dealing with the Soviet Union's grand strategy of "initiative" versus that of "response" or "reaction" by the United States are of particular value to the serious student of international affairs. In them Professor Lerche boldly addresses one of the most chronically galling questions concerning the conduct of American foreign policy: how could a nation which justifiably prides itself in the collective enterprise, flexibility, and initiative of its people become rigidly shackled to a defensive cold war posture? His theory suggests that the dead hands of the isolationist tradition coupled with a utopian view of the international scene imperceptibly molded our position in the early years of the conflict. The book, as befitting its serious subject matter, is not designed for casual reading. The occasional pedantic and redundant lapses are easily counterbalanced by the lucid exposition of ideas and convincing, well-supported discussions. In all, *The Cold War . . . and After* should prove to be a useful research source for the professional military officer.

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