

Naval War College Review

Volume 17
Number 1 *January*

Article 1

1964

January 1964 Full Issue

The U.S. Naval War College

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Recommended Citation

Naval War College, The U.S. (1964) "January 1964 Full Issue," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 17 : No. 1 , Article 1.
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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

VOL. XVI, NO. 5

JANUARY 1964

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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
REVIEW**

**Issued Monthly
U.S. Naval War College
Newport, R. I.**

THE U.S.S.R. IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 27 September 1963

by

Professor R.F. Staar

The 1917 Bolshevik upheaval, like all totalitarian revolutions, brought about fundamental changes in Russia. The former bourgeois culture of the upper classes was swept into the 'dustbin of history.' The masses, on the other hand, were raised from illiteracy to the level of a pseudoculture. Religion and truth were eliminated by decree. However, there was nothing to replace them, since all world problems had been resolved by the leader, Lenin. It was sufficient now to memorize quotations from his writings and to know answers to all questions by rote. Whereas, prior to 1917, the Russians had been famous for splitting hairs, they were henceforth transformed into a collective, thoughtlessly repeating the dogmas of Marxism-Leninism. The U.S.S.R. thus represents the complete opposite to Tsarist Russia—politically, economically, philosophically, socially, and perhaps most important of all, psychologically. While maintaining the external framework of a traditional empire-state, the internal substance has basically changed in the Soviet Union.

Many writers seek for analogies between U.S.S.R. and Tsarist policy. We have heard various theses, or read them in books, about the urge to the sea. We have also read about Soviet foreign policy as being merely the continuation of Tsarist foreign policy. I believe that these writers are basically wrong because, in the first place, Lenin taught that literally any practical approach may be used to achieve a goal. Also another radical difference is that Soviet foreign policy originated as a conspiracy directed against other states. Thus, it is not the old Russian imperialism which has used international communism as a tool, but vice versa; international communism uses Russian imperialism for its own purposes.

One of the unique phenomena associated with communism has been the removal from language of its significance and the utilization of language as a weapon. At times, the purpose is merely

to render questionable the meaning of words. In other instances, words are given a diametrically opposite meaning. Such degradation of human speech, traditionally the main instrument of world culture, as something of no value, has become more apparent to the observer since the twentieth Communist Party congress in February 1956 and, indeed, the most recent party congress held in October 1961, and this, in an even more shocking manner than during the Lenin-Stalin period. This de-Stalinization proclaims that billions of spoken and printed words have had nothing to do with reality. However, both in the U.S.S.R. and in its so-called people's democratic satellites, by and large, the same actors remain in their official positions, although it was they who spoke and wrote what is today forbidden and expurgated from the record.

An illustration is the new history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Compare this with the old history, allegedly written by Stalin. Another example from Eastern Europe is the new selection of speeches and articles by Gomulka. Today, one no longer can find the two-volume edition which came out in early 1948. It is available abroad, but it is no longer available inside Poland. If you happen to have this old edition and compare it with the new edition, you see that it is different. Or take as an illustration the elderly Voroshilov, seated on the podium of the twenty-second congress of the Soviet Communist Party, being accused of antiparty activities and his absurd self-criticism before 5,000 delegates. What psychological pressure must have been exerted on this old man to get him to stand up and give this self-criticism? By removing from words their original meaning, by calling aggression *liberation*, enslavement *freedom*, persecution *tolerance*, dictation from above *election*, communism aims at forcing, not only upon its own individual subjects, but upon all people throughout the world, the use of language to their own disadvantage.

Now, to discuss Lenin's theory of the deaf-mutes, something which is not found in textbooks. The source for this is *Novyi Zhurnal*, an emigré Russian language publication appearing in New York. An article appeared in this periodical telling about the experiences of a well-known Russian artist, Annenkov, who had been called in to paint a portrait of Lenin back in 1921. Subsequently, after Lenin's death in January 1924, he was invited to Moscow for a visit at the Lenin Institute, which was preparing a series of books on the life of Lenin. Annenkov was invited to consult with regard to illustrations for these books. While there,

he had access to certain manuscripts in Lenin's handwriting and from these he extracted notes. The genuineness of these notes cannot be vouched for. As a matter of fact, there is no corroboration. This also had been the case with Lenin's testament, as published by Trotsky. Many people discounted this by saying that, after all, Trotsky had lost his bid for power; he had been expelled from the Soviet Union; and that this testament was a product of Trotsky's imagination. Well, not too long ago, Khrushchev himself released this same testament. So today, there is corroboration that Lenin actually wrote a testament in which he was most critical of Stalin, recommending the latter's removal from the position of Secretary-General.

These notes made by Lenin read in part as follows: 'Based on observations, my conclusion is that the so-called cultured segments in Western Europe and America are incapable of comprehending the current situation and the true balance of power. These people should be considered deaf and mute. . . . A special tactic must be employed. For the purpose of tranquilizing the deaf-mutes, we will announce a fictitious separation of the government from the Politburo and mainly from the Comintern, presenting the latter as an independent organization only tolerated on U.S.S.R. territory. The deaf-mutes will believe. We shall express the desire to enter into diplomatic relations with capitalist states, based on the principle of non-interference into each other's domestic affairs. The deaf-mutes will believe. To speak the truth is a bourgeois superstition. On the contrary, the goal justifies the lie. Capitalists, in chasing after profits on the Soviet market, will close their eyes to reality and will thus be transformed into deaf-mutes. They will provide us with credits for the financing of communist parties in their own countries; they will supply us with the necessary [strategic] materials to rebuild our war industry which is needed for later victorious attacks directed against our suppliers. In other words, they will be working toward their own suicide.' Thus began the evolution, not of communism, but of the wishful-thinking attitude toward communism.

Next, let us pass on to the 'Trust Affair.' Already in 1922, the Soviet secret police, then operating under the name GPU, in implementing Lenin's precept which was quoted above, began to penetrate and assume control over the anti-Bolshevik organizations among the Russian exiles. The purpose was to convince the West that the Soviet Union was slowly transforming itself into a capitalist state; that any outside intervention would bring

about retrogression to a warlike Bolshevism, whereas peaceful coexistence would contribute to a strengthening of the emphasis in the U.S.S.R. upon traditional Russian national interest.

A tremendous coup was achieved by the Soviet secret police when in 1925 and 1926, over a period of several months, it brought clandestinely into the U.S.S.R. one of the most anti-communist Russian emigrés, a man named Shulgin. He returned to the West not knowing that it had been the GPU which arranged his trip. He thought that the anticommunist underground was so good that he could spend several months in the Soviet Union without the secret police knowing about it. So he began unconsciously to propagandize 'the great rebirth of Russia' and, thus, unwittingly spread misinformation among the Russian exiles in the West. The 'Trust Affair' was not limited to this one aspect; it had many branches, and its success was due in the first place to the next period, the period of the New Economic Policy in the Soviet Union.

Lenin introduced this policy in 1921 and it lasted until 1928, whereby private enterprise was permitted to operate within limits. The success of the 'Trust Affair' was also due to differences and conflict among European states after Versailles. Above all, however, it was due to wishful thinking concerning the evolution of Bolshevism. Now as a result of this evolution, not of Bolshevism, but evolution in the attitude toward Bolshevism, one state after another entered into diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, recognizing the communists as the legal representatives of Russia.

One of the first steps was taken by Germany. Only two years after the unsuccessful march of the Red armies across what they hoped would be the cadaver of Poland to Berlin, Germany signed the Treaty of Rapallo on 17 April 1922. This provided for political, military, and economic collaboration between the two countries. For example, Germany exported machinery for Soviet heavy industry, meaning the armaments industry. Politically, the alliance was directed against Poland. This latter country in 1920 had constituted the barrier which stopped the Red tide. The Red armies had reached Warsaw, but the 'Miracle on the Vistula River' halted them. As an illustration of the thinking in Germany at this time, it would be useful to cite the view of Count Brockdorff-Rantzau who thought that contact with the Soviets would make them more peaceful. Of course this is a legend, a legend which even today is alive, that the Soviets can be bribed by courtesy.

Only four years later, in 1926, the Berlin Agreement, signed by Stresemann and Chicherin, reconfirmed the Rapallo Treaty. Here again the German Army intensified its aid in developing the armed forces of the Soviet Union, the military arm of international communism. After the death of Stresemann came the peak of German help to the Soviet military in the years 1929 and 1930. This assistance was mutual. German officers from the Reich, for example, were permitted to command large units of the Red Army during maneuvers, something they were forbidden to do under the Versailles Treaty inside of Germany proper. General Von Seeckt said the following: 'Russia and Germany within their respective borders of 1914—this should represent a basis for an understanding.'

Had the politicians and generals in Germany forgotten Lenin's speech, concerning Poland as the barrier between Russia and Germany, which appeared in *Pravda* on 30 April 1920? Had they forgotten Lenin's many references to Berlin as the key to Europe? Had they forgotten the many resolutions passed by the Central Committee of the Bolshevik party? Had they forgotten Tukhachevsky's orders of the day to the Red armies marching toward Germany in 1920? Of course not. However, objective knowledge had become obscured by political wishful thinking.

Now let us skip through the 1930's, the Hitler-Stalin honeymoon, and discuss Stalin's national communism during the Second World War. Lenin had introduced the New Economic Policy and the related concept of national communism back in the early 1920's, in order to save Bolshevism. Stalin followed this example domestically when the U.S.S.R. was on the verge of collapse due to German military victories in the Second World War and the passive, apathetic attitude of the Russian population. Ukrainian and Russian peasants greeted the German troops as liberators; they held out the traditional bread and salt of friendship at the crossroads entering into villages, offering this to German soldiers.

Now, internationally, Stalin also followed in Lenin's footsteps by dissolving the Comintern in May 1943. This precipitated a new wave of optimism in the West. Again, the theme was heard of an internal evolution in the U.S.S.R. Hailed and sustained by Western allied wartime propaganda, it described the Soviet Union as patriotic and nationalistic. It was sustained by anti-Soviet nationalities in Eastern Europe, like the Ukrainians and the Poles, as support for their Russian imperialism thesis. It was

supported by the anticommunist Russian emigrés in the West, who wanted to emphasize in this manner the thin veneer of the communist form under which 'beat the heart of the Russian nation,' capable of heroic action when its emotions had been awakened. And, finally, it was sustained perhaps by the most important element, the *Wunschtraum* of all those who desired to see in the Soviet Union a return to the old traditional Russia.

Let us now move on to the cold war in perspective. It includes not only the military and political fronts, but also the exploitation by the Kremlin conflict managers of class, race, art, science, education, research; in brief, the entire area of human and governmental endeavor. This conflict is unlimited in time. There are no periods of peace. It continues permanently. Since 1944, we have been in a de facto state of war. It is also unlimited in terms of space, encompassing today the entire world. The cold war was an invention of the Soviets, originating within the aggressive dynamic of communist doctrine. The first phase, the decade between 1944 and 1954, was characterized by a military emphasis on the U.S.S.R.'s periphery and lasted until shortly after the death of Stalin. It bears his imprint. In Europe, it took on the form of the Greek civil war; on the Central Asian periphery, the abortive coup in Azerbaijan; back in Central Europe, the take-over of Czechoslovakia, very quickly followed by the Berlin blockade.

Now the West was relatively active in these areas. The United States had promulgated the Truman Doctrine. The only real communist success was the coup d'état in Czechoslovakia. The Berlin blockade was countered by the airlift. As far as Azerbaijan was concerned, the whole record is still not clear. However, something that former President Truman said should be mentioned here. He has disclosed that he issued an ultimatum to the Soviets to evacuate Azerbaijan or else.

The communists were more successful in the Asiatic theatre. With the attempt to expand their area of occupation between 1949 and 1954, through the victory in China, the war by proxy in Korea which ended in a stalemate, and the partition of former Indochina, the net result at the end of this first decade was the establishment of a power bloc, stretching from Central Europe to the Pacific Ocean.

The second phase, between 1955 and 1962, was characterized by a shift to action on a global scale. The arms deal between Czechoslovakia and Egypt took place in September 1955, with

the U.S.S.R. in the background. Actually, it was the Soviet Union selling these arms. The procedure followed was typical. The U.S.S.R. did not know what the reaction of the West would be, so it pretended that Czechoslovakia was selling these arms, including tanks, aircraft, and artillery. Soviet Bloc technicians and instructors brought about the elimination of British military personnel and Western influence in general. Now the result of this arms deal was the establishment of a bridge between the U.S.S.R. and Egypt. In other words, the Soviets could use this advantage to leapfrog across the Western ring of bases surrounding the U.S.S.R. heartland. Another gain was the potential transformation of Egypt into a springboard, from which the Soviets could penetrate the African continent. The following year, in July 1956, came the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the total ejection of the West from this strategic area.

Next, attention was focused on Berlin, as part of the German problem. The Soviet ultimatum of 1958, with its six months' duration and the threat of a separate peace treaty between the U.S.S.R. and East Germany, was meant as blackmail (control over access routes to West Berlin). U.S. troops were alerted. The time came, the critical day passed, and nothing happened. Somebody later asked Khrushchev: 'Why didn't you do something? Why did you issue an ultimatum? Why did you put a time limit of six months?' He replied that if it takes a woman nine months to have a baby, it certainly should have been possible to settle this Berlin problem within a period of six months.

The last ultimatum regarding Berlin was in 1960, telling the West to leave by the end of the year. Again, nothing happened. Finally, of course, came construction of the Wall, as a sop to Ulbricht. In this connection, it should be mentioned that Western Europe still remains, qualitatively speaking, the most important part of the Free World. In this area, the Federal German Republic geographically occupies the key position. Here are the words of Khrushchev, speaking in East Berlin on Ulbricht's seventieth birthday, as transcribed in *Pravda* (1 July 1963): 'We indicate our firm conviction that a single German state will be created, united on a socialist basis, under the Red banner. In our time there will be no other united Germany.'

It should also be noted in this context that the barrier (Poland), existing back in 1920 between the U.S.S.R. and Germany or Western Europe, was breached at the end of World War II. Today, the barrier is West Germany. There is an obvious concentration

by the Soviets on this barrier. It can be seen in the attempts by the U.S.S.R. from time to time to sign a new Rapallo-type agreement with the Bonn government. The West Germans, above all, should harbor no illusions regarding communism after their experience (1) with East Berlin, (2) with the Wall, and (3) with the so-called German Democratic Republic which is justly referred to by West Germans as *Die Sowjetische Besatzungszone* or the Soviet zone of occupation. However, instead, the world is witnessing today something unique in that those Germans in Bonn who argue for closer contacts with Moscow, or with its stooges in Pankow, Warsaw, Prague—those individuals are labeled paradoxically as exponents of the *Realpolitik*. The confusion in terminology is complete, and certainly one of the characteristics of contemporary world politics is the chasm between *Realpolitik* and reality.

The third phase appears to have begun at the end of last year. A question still remains whether the Cuban crisis represents this turning point. No details about Cuba will be given, because these events are too well known to all of us and too recent. What were some of Khrushchev's motivations for placing intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba? In the first place, it is obvious that he underestimated the toughness of President Kennedy. His assessment apparently was that the United States would not fight, that it was too soft, and this he repeated time after time. There were reports that he even told this to President Kennedy when they met in Vienna. He dropped this in a comment to the late Robert Frost, when the great poet was in Moscow. Secondly, Khrushchev thought that a decision would be made in the United States only after time-consuming consultation with the Organization of American States and/or the United Nations.

Another consideration was most probably the attempt to overcome the real missile gap; in other words, the inferiority of the Soviet Union. Possibly also Khrushchev was willing to trade withdrawal of these missiles for a withdrawal of Western troops from Berlin. It all comes down to blackmail. And finally, a fifth motivation might have been the attempt to gain prestige in the conflict with Red China. It could have been any one of these, but probably was a combination; perhaps all of these, and maybe other reasons.

The Soviet failure was certainly due to the decisive and swift action by the United States. This certainly improved America's credibility. The buildup in Florida, for example, was so well publicized that it was probably done on purpose in order to let

the Soviet Union know what the U.S. was doing. The courage of President Kennedy in choosing the possibility of nuclear war rather than submitting to blackmail, and the realization by Khrushchev of the high risk and dangers involved, played their part. The interview given by Guevara, who runs the Cuban economy, in December 1962 is worth recalling. He said that if the United States had attacked Cuba, missiles with nuclear warheads would have been launched against major United States cities including New York. This was an extremely dangerous situation, illustrated by the cartoon that appeared after Mikoyan's trip to Havana. He stayed there for weeks. The cartoon showed Mikoyan sitting back in Moscow, talking to Khrushchev. The inscription read: 'Well, first of all, the guy's obviously crazy!'

Perhaps most significant of all in this connection was the importance of the Red Chinese attack on India. This attack probably was not undertaken by chance. It started at the height of the crisis, on 20 October 1962. Now obviously, the Chinese were showing no consideration for Soviet plans with regard to the so-called underdeveloped countries, or Soviet goals for winning these uncommitted nations. India, with its 450 million people is the largest and most important in this group. The brutal Chinese attack also influenced other countries adversely in the Afro-Asian bloc. What was Red China doing? It was giving notice of a desire to be dealt in, that it wanted a voice as a third party in any Soviet-American decision on a global scale. In the back of Khrushchev's mind must have been a fear that the Moscow-Peiping differences might explode violently, with the Soviet Union then in the middle between two blocs.

It is amazing to note how quickly Khrushchev reacted. In his speech on 12 December 1962 before the Supreme Soviet, the equivalent of a parliament, Khrushchev stated the following: 'We have only one alternative—peaceful coexistence or a war of annihilation.' Apparently, in view of Red China's attitude, the U.S.S.R. now is compelled to play for time; to make an arrangement with the West, in order to concentrate on the East. The co-existence theme is merely what the Russians call a *peredyshka*, a breather, and does not signify any fundamental change in long-range Soviet strategy. The undeviating goal remains, as always, the spread of communism throughout this planet under Soviet leadership. In the long letter sent by the Soviet Communist Party to the Chinese on 14 July 1963 Khrushchev stated: 'We not only believe in the inevitable destruction of capitalism, but are doing everything for this to be accomplished as soon as possible.'

Currently the balance of power calls for a relaxation of the cold war over a certain period of time. Once the U.S.S.R. has secured its rear, it will again resume its strategy and tactics directed toward world domination. In this connection, one of the long-range gambits of Soviet political strategy has been, and remains, disarmament propaganda. Back in 1931, at the Lenin School of Political Warfare in Moscow, a veteran Comintern agent named Dmitry Manuilsky in a lecture stated: 'Our time will come in 20 to 30 years. We shall begin by launching the most spectacular peace movement on record. The capitalist countries, stupid and decadent, will rejoice in their own destruction. As soon as their guard is down, we will smash them with our clenched fist.'

What about postwar Soviet proposals in this area of disarmament? Andrei Vishinsky in 1948 suggested a one-third reduction across the board in the armed forces throughout the world, without any verification, of course; the Bulganin Plan, ten years later, wanted first to destroy all nuclear weapons and then negotiate inspection. The joint moratorium on testing in March 1958 was followed by the unilateral Soviet violation in August 1961. Khrushchev, at the United Nations, again proposed total disarmament and control by each state on its own territory. And only last week, Gromyko in the United Nations, again repeated some of these same plans. The United States was not impressed. In this connection, let us look at the Test Ban Treaty which was approved three days ago by the U.S. Senate, and the day before yesterday by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. What were the possible reasons for entering into this Test Ban Treaty by the Kremlin? Could this be perhaps a first step in the achievement of Soviet objectives in Western Europe, meaning first recognition of the status quo in Eastern Europe? Secondly, neutralization of West Germany? And finally, dissolution of NATO?

Another consideration, which the Soviets certainly must have given thought to, is the economic consequences of the arms race. This is an expensive proposition and one impossible to win by the U.S.S.R. The recent grain purchases in Canada perhaps indicate that Moscow realizes it must allocate more investments into agriculture, which means, of course, less into the armaments industry. Then, there is the real fear of nuclear proliferation. An article by a man named Yuri Zhukov in *Pravda* for 29 July 1963 stated that there are 36 states with enough plutonium to construct about a dozen bombs by the end of this year. By 1967, hundreds of bombs could be available to these countries, other than the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and Britain. This article

indicates that of the 36 states, only four (the U.S.S.R., East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia) in the Soviet bloc have the technological ability to build nuclear weapons. This means that eight times as many of these minor countries with such a capability exist outside of the bloc.

Of course, there is also the fear of Red China. An article appeared in *Krasnaya Zvezda*, official organ of the Soviet armed forces in Moscow just the other day (24 September 1963) by a Colonel I. Zheltikov, who holds the equivalent of a Ph.D. in military science. The interesting title reads: 'It Is Forbidden to Joke with Atomic Weapons.' The author says that nuclear weapons would allow China to increase its influence in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and also to resolve differences with other countries 'from a position of strength.' He concludes that it is enough for the Soviet Union to have a monopoly of these weapons in the bloc, because the U.S.S.R. is defending all of the socialist countries.

Finally, there are the psycho-political motivations for signing this treaty. Already, one can observe a ground swell of popular optimism in the West that the cold war is ending. In assessing the so-called Spirit of Moscow, it is important to recall that the 1955 euphoria over the 'Geneva Spirit' was followed by the breakthrough into the Middle East, by the brutal suppression of the Hungarians, the Berlin ultimatum, and last, but not least, by the IRBM's in Cuba. President Kennedy certainly made a very profound and wise statement in his speech to the United Nations exactly one week ago, when he said the following: 'In short, we believe that people must be free to choose their own future, without discrimination or dictation, without coercion or subversion. These are basic differences between the Soviet Union and the United States. And they cannot be concealed. As long as they exist they set limits to agreements, and they forbid the relaxation of our vigilance. Our defenses around the world will be maintained for the protection of freedom, and our determination to safeguard that freedom will measure up to any threat or challenge.'

In view of the past two days spent in the seminars on 'Fundamentals of Warfare,' it seems appropriate to end this lecture with one of the extraordinary stories by Ambrose Bierce. He wrote of a regimental line of battle, awaiting the order to advance. The long line was described as quiet, perfect in its precision, each soldier and officer knowing his position, role, and national purpose, each superbly disciplined and ready. Then, like a roving camera, the author pen-sketched in the background behind

the lines where there was great tumult among the supply trains, orders and counterorders, medical corpsmen and others running in all directions. In short, a kind of organized pandemonium. And he concluded his story with this sentence: 'The men who do not fight are never ready.'

Too many in the West today are in this state of unreadiness, not necessarily and hopefully not for a surprise attack, which is always for some curious reason a surprise. But they are not ready with a deep cognizance of the adversary, with moral discipline, and with the essential knowledge of world affairs in 1963 which could make them an alert and wise citizenry. Too many are taking the contest too lightly, and too many others are taking the Trojan warhorse tactics of Soviet coexistence too seriously. We should never forget that Eastern Europe once coexisted with the Soviet Union, Tibet with Red China, and that we, in the United States, were coexisting, even negotiating, with Japan just ten seconds before Pearl Harbor.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor Richard F. Staar

EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND:

Dickinson College, 1948, B.A.
Yale University, 1949, M.A.
University of Michigan, 1954, Ph.D.

MILITARY AFFILIATION:

United States Marine Corps Reserve, Intelligence Officer,
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PROFESSIONAL ASSIGNMENTS:

Naval War College	Chester W. Nimitz Chair of Social and Political Philosophy	1963-1964
Georgia	Associate Professor, Professor of Political Science (Emory University); currently on leave of absence	1959-date
Germany	Lecturer in Government for overseas program (University of Maryland)	1958-1959
Arkansas	Associate Professor, Professor of Political Science (Harding College); Chairman, Department of Social Science (Arkansas State College)	1954-1958
Washington, D.C.	Research analyst, intelligence research specialist on U.S.S.R. and East Europe (CIA and Department of State)	1949-1954

MAJOR PUBLICATIONS:

Contributor to John H. Hallowell (ed.), *Satellite Nations: the New Imperialism* (Gainesville, Florida: 1958);

Author of *Communist Party Leadership: a Study in Elite Change* (Washington, D.C.: 1960);

Political Dynamics of a Soviet Satellite (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: 1961); and

Poland, 1944-1962: the Sovietization of a Captive People (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: 1962);

Contributor to Andrew Gyorgy (ed.), *Problems in World Communism* (Boston, Massachusetts: 1964), forthcoming;

Coauthor of *Eastern Europe* (New York, N.Y.: 1965), forthcoming.

MAHAN'S CONCEPTS OF SEA POWER

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 23 September 1963

by

Captain H. Kaminer Manship, USN

Admiral Austin, Admiral Hogle, gentlemen:

Just about a year ago, I sat out there as a student to absorb my appointed instruction in what has been derisively termed by a former Secretary of War as 'The Gospel According to St. Mahan.' I would not have you believe, however, that I am here to preach a Navy gospel—though one or two of last year's class criticized the speaker for not doing so. I will not attempt to set forth a 'Navy line' on strategy. I would submit to you that Admiral Mahan himself was only secondarily a propagandist for his views and primarily an analytical historian who derived from his studies and writings demonstrable cause and effect relationships between sea power and national greatness. From his evaluation of these relationships, he then developed and propounded his theories of sea power as an instrument—perhaps an indispensable one—for projecting and expanding United States power and influence throughout the world. Inasmuch as the time during which he formulated his ideas was a time of hiatus in the Navy—and indeed in the whole military and diplomatic posture of the United States—Mahan cast himself as an expositor of increased strength and readiness. But I come here today not to praise Mahan and his ideas, but hopefully to explain them. It is entirely true that much of Mahan's writing bears the imprint of that particular time in which he lived and must be considered in historical context. But the main purpose of my discussion with you is to summarize and highlight those basic precepts of Mahan which retain a fundamental validity and currency.

In order to do this, it may be useful that I cover briefly a few of the high points of Admiral Mahan's life and career, and that I describe the extent and scope of his writings, to the end that you may have some meaningful guidance should you desire to research his writings or seek additional light professional reading to fill the many gaps among your committee sessions, lectures, seminars, classes, and research paper sessions!

Alfred Thayer Mahan was born in 1840 at West Point. His father, Dennis Mahan, was for 41 years an instructor in engineering and military science at the Military Academy; and you gentlemen of the Army will doubtless recognize the tribute to one of West Point's founding fathers embodied in Alfred Mahan's middle name. The atmosphere attendant to the son's childhood environment doubtless molded his aptitude for matters both military and intellectual; but it is known that the elder Mahan counseled him against a service career, believing young Alfred to have better aptitude for a civil occupation. Professor Mahan acquiesced, however, when, after a year at Columbia, his son sought and obtained entry into the Naval Academy, whence he graduated just prior to the Civil War.

As a line officer, Mahan pursued for about twenty-five years a rather routine career in standard billets. It was perhaps inevitable that, in the wake of the Civil War, the country's energies and attention were directed to the settlement and development of its vast continental domain; and the Navy at this time found itself in a rather moribund state with neither motivation nor money adequately to span the transition from sail to steam and on to the other technological advances accruing to the industrial revolution. At this point in his career, Mahan described himself as 'drifting on the lines of simple respectability as aimlessly as one very well could.' In his aimless drifting, however, Mahan had managed to impress his intellectual capacity upon Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, who in the early 1880's no longer accepted with equanimity the idea of a Navy aimlessly adrift. In fact, in the words of Professor Russell of the Naval Academy, Luce was engaged in a crusade to enable the Navy to adapt doctrine and personnel to the machine age. One of Admiral Luce's accomplishments in his crusade was the establishment of the Naval War College. His summons to Mahan to lecture at this institution on the art of war and naval history signaled Mahan's emergence from obscurity to a position in the forefront of the expositors of strategic thought. It is perhaps indicative of the pace and tenor of the times that Mahan was able to devote two years of study to preparation for his War College assignment. At this point, his life-long avocation to scholarship was transformed into his professional reason for being.

It is a matter of record that, prior to his call from Admiral Luce, Mahan held views that in latter-day parlance would be termed isolationist: that the United States should avoid expansion into overseas territories; that the United States should eschew heavy naval expenditure, not only to save money but also to minimize undue military influence in the governmental processes; and

that the Navy's wartime functions properly should be limited to commerce raiding and coastal defense. However, in the course of his studies, he discovered that 'control of the sea was an historic factor which had never been systematically appreciated and expounded.' Concurrently, his own analysis of the factors pertaining to sea power as an instrument of national power resulted in the transformation of his own thinking. He therefore proposed in a letter to Admiral Luce that his lectures would 'begin with a general consideration of the sea, its uses to mankind and to nations, the effect which the control of it or the reverse has upon their peaceful development and their military strength. This will naturally lead to and probably embrace in the same lecture a consideration of the sources of sea power, whether commercial or military; depending upon the position of the particular country, the character of its coasts, its harbors, the character and pursuits of its people, its possession of military ports in various parts of the world, its colonies, etc., its resources in the length and breadth of the world.' These words of Mahan constitute as good a summary as I can derive of the scope and purpose of his War College lecture teachings, which evolved in 1890 into his first monumental work, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783*. This great work initiated an eventual output of 21 books and more than a hundred essays; more than two thirds of the essays were republished in book form. Such republication inevitably resulted in duplication and renders somewhat difficult the separation of individual thoughts and ideas into a clear, concise pattern. However, it is in the works sometimes referred to as the 'influence' series that Mahan developed his main themes concerning sea power. In addition to *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*, this series includes *The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812*, which was a two-volume work published in 1892 and which Mahan himself rated his best; and *Sea Power in Relation to the War of 1812*, also a two-volume set appearing in 1905. In addition to these, much of his definitive thought is contained in a collection of his lectures published in book form in 1911 and entitled *Naval Strategy, Compared and Contrasted with the Principles of Military Operations on Land*—a title usually shortened to the simple form, *Naval Strategy*. There is general agreement that the collection of essays in the book entitled *The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future* contains interesting and worthwhile reading. It should be emphasized, however, that most of his later works serve to amplify, fortify, and update the basic rationale and conclusions of the introduction and first chapter of *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*, which passage is included in your recommended reading for this study.

And now, having very briefly acquainted you with Mahan, his career, and his works, I must press on to a brief examination of what Mahan said—and I do so with a bit of the feeling expressed by the incurable optimist who jumped from the Empire State Building, and as he passed the second floor descending said, ‘So far, so good!’

The first and most obvious light in which the sea presents itself from the political and social point of view is that of a great highway; or better, perhaps, of a wide common, over which men may pass in all directions but on which some well-worn paths show that controlling reasons have led them to choose certain lines of travel rather than others. These lines of travel are called trade routes; and the reasons which have determined them are to be sought in the *history of the world*.

Notwithstanding all the familiar and unfamiliar dangers of the sea, both travel and traffic by water have always been easier and cheaper than by land.

*The Influence of Sea Power
Upon History, 1660-1783*

From the point of departure stated by the words before you, Mahan reached back into the history of mankind's struggles to develop his thesis concerning sea power. In Mahan's day, Britain was at the zenith of her ascendancy as the seat of a world empire; and Mahan's historical analysis extracted from the story of Britain's rise the factors which had enabled her to achieve wealth and dominion in the face of opposition from various foes in many ways superior to her except in the medium of the sea. But before he began his detailed historical narrative, he provided us with a nutshell preview of his thesis in the form of an analysis of Rome's ascendancy in the Mediterranean from the days of the Punic Wars. He explains the Roman capability to use the waters of the Mediterranean—albeit in a primitive way—as a medium through which she increased the strategic mobility of her forces. Rome controlled the Mediterranean and, despite Hannibal's monumental attempts to outflank her overland, Rome eventually succeeded in destroying Carthage, for Carthage had no effective reciprocal means to strike at Rome's heart. Much later, and on a much broader stage, Britain, too, exploited the mobility afforded her by her command of the sea in order to project and concentrate her strength and influence at key points around the globe which both fed the

economic coffers of the Empire and assured retention of the factors which perpetuated British control.

In analyzing the historical factors that formed the basis of British power, Mahan detected and propounded parallels to the strategic position of the United States as this nation reached the limits of its continental expansion. As stated previously, Mahan had moved in the 1880's from an isolationist viewpoint to one in 1890 whereby, with the unmatched zeal of any convert, he could see no future for the United States except that she should expand her influence and power outward beyond her sea frontiers in order to achieve political greatness and economic wealth. In essence, Mahan's doctrine stated that:

- (1) The United States should be a world power;
- (2) Control of the seas is necessary for world power status;
- (3) The way to maintain such control is by a powerful Navy.

But let us here be very careful not to exclude the nonnaval elements of sea power which are so vital a part of Mahan's overall concept. In speaking of United States outward expansion, he stated:

. . . home trade is but a part of the business of a country bordering on the sea. Foreign necessities or luxuries must be brought to its ports, either in its own or foreign ships . . . (and parenthetically return with products of the country).

The ships . . . must have secure ports to which to return, and must be followed by the protection of their country throughout the voyage.

This protection in time of war must be extended by armed shipping.

In another passage Mahan gives this succinct definition of sea power:

. . . sea power in the broad sense . . . includes not only the military strength afloat that rules the sea or any part of it by force of arms, but also the peaceful commerce and shipping from which alone a military fleet naturally and healthfully springs, and on which it securely rests.

It is most important to note in the foregoing passages the interplay he envisages between the naval and nonnaval portions of a nation's overall maritime posture: the merchant shipping requires the protection of naval forces; on the other hand, the fundamental requirements of a Navy are realized in the existence of an adequate merchant marine base. It must be acknowledged that certain knowledgeable later writers fault Mahan for his attempt to present an oversimplified equation of maritime and naval dominance. It is true that certain countries such as Norway and Greece have developed sizeable merchant fleets without proportionate naval protection; likewise, Mahan himself recognized that certain political circumstances might lead a nation to the development of naval strength in the absence of proportionate mercantile interests. The question posed here is: Does Mahan's thesis concerning the mutual dependence between merchant and naval fleets no longer apply because of the exceptions mentioned—or does the existence of a general atmosphere of law and order at sea, underwritten by British power in the immediate past and by the United States and allied navies today, permit small nations to develop maritime strength without naval protection? These are interesting speculations, but I attempt here to be an impartial interpreter. Therefore, I leave you with this capsule summation of Mahan's thesis which was provided for him several hundred years earlier by Sir Walter Raleigh:

He who rules the sea controls the commerce of the world
and thus the riches of the world and finally the world
itself.

Having stated the strategic necessity for outward United States expansion, Mahan then set forth to define the principal conditions affecting a nation's ability and will to project its influence across the sea; these conditions are enumerated here:

THE PRINCIPAL CONDITIONS AFFECTING THE SEA POWER OF NATIONS

Geographical Position
Physical Conformation
Extent of Territory
Number of Population
Character of the People
Character of the Government

*The Influence of Sea Power
Upon History, 1660-1783*

As to the first of these, Mahan perceived that Britain's ascendancy on the seas had in part stemmed from her relative immunity from attack by rival land powers. Moreover, her position athwart the most important Atlantic trade routes enabled her to dominate the commercial flow between Europe and the resource areas in America, Africa, and Asia; and in time of war, to sever her enemies' access to vital materials. As to the United States, Mahan saw even greater potential for maritime dominance in this country's freedom from the burden of land defense against strong neighbors and in the dominant position of this country relative to the new vital trade routes soon to be established through the Panama Canal.

Proceeding on down the list, Mahan evaluated the many deep, defensible harbors along the United States seaboard as an indispensable element in the establishment of both commercial and naval maritime strength. Moreover, the fortuitous linking of many of our harbors with the continental interior, by the natural means of an unsurpassed navigable river system as well as by the rapidly developing man-made links of railroads and canals, provided access for raw export materials and manufactured goods to their points of export.

The next two elements must, to some extent, be considered together, in that Mahan implied that, whereas national capacity and strength depended upon the nature and extent of its territory, too much territory in proportion to population was a source of weakness as far as sea power is concerned. He felt that a nation's expansion beyond her sea frontiers was dependent upon an overflow of people, so to speak, who might man the ocean-going fleets and execute national commercial and political pursuits overseas. Crowded Britain, of course, is an extreme example of such a balance; Mahan pointed to the Confederate States, on the other hand, as an illustration of the other end of the scale, because the Confederacy was sparsely populated and had too much coastline to defend. Also, he points to The Netherlands as an example of an inadequate home base which eventually undercut the success of the Dutch in exploiting the other basic elements of sea power.

Mahan goes on to point out that the national character and aptitudes of the people condition the development of sea power. As a point of fact, he accords this element primacy with the statement:

The tendency to trade, involving of necessity the production of something to trade with, is the national

characteristic most important to the development of sea power.

Elsewhere, he amplifies this thought with the words :

. . . production, with the necessity of exchanging products, shipping whereby the exchange is carried on, and colonies, facilitate and enlarge the operations of shipping and tend to protect it by multiplying points of safety. . . .

In passing, it is interesting to note the effect of substituting the words 'allies and foreign investments' wherever Mahan used the word 'colonies,' particularly if your interest is in achieving a valid updating of Mahan's basic thesis.

And last on this list, but certainly not least, Mahan perceived that governmental attitudes and processes inevitably conditioned a nation's outlook on overseas commerce and concomitant naval strength. He reasoned that if the advocates of maritime commercial expansion and those of naval preparedness held a preponderant voice in the councils of government, a nation would inevitably support and expand its maritime posture. He perceived the handicaps faced by a popular government in maintaining a consistently favorable attitude towards maritime and naval pursuits; and it was largely his purpose to attempt to condition our people, but more particularly our government, to an appreciation of the opportunities and the challenges offered by the favorable stance of the United States in the essentials of sea power.

It is interesting to note that Mahan himself acknowledged the inexactness of the very term 'sea power' as a label and a catch-word for his cause—and it may be that this imprecision itself has led to some of the misunderstanding and misapplication of Mahan's thesis that has characterized some persons and nations who have superficially called up Mahan in support of a purely naval argument. Tirpitz in Germany, for example, was dazzled by Mahan's case for sea power as an instrument of national power; but Tirpitz didn't read Mahan carefully—or he ignored what he read—for he made the mistake of equating sea power with naval strength in ships of the line, and he failed to appreciate Germany's deficiencies in several of Mahan's elements such as position, conformation, and so on. It should be recognized that the incisive thesis that we've thus far discussed was truly a concept of national strategy, as conceived in today's acceptance of that term. With his

Army origins, Mahan would have been shortsighted indeed had he not recognized the interrelationships of the ground and sea forces of his day. In this regard Mahan developed a brilliant hypothetical analysis which involved the trans-Pacific projection of an army to engage a mythical East Asian enemy. In this hypothesis, Mahan exhibited clear prophecy of amphibious and logistic concepts that received definition and development much later in World War II. And in last year's Cuban confrontation and quarantine, it is possible to see a classic example of Mahan's conception of applied control of the sea, which is, in a pragmatic context, a matter of ships and not of abstract dominance of routes drawn on a chart. Here also was an extension—beyond Mahan's imagination—of the exercise of sea power not only by naval elements, but also through concurrent action of our sister services, particularly in the search and reconnaissance phases. The naval power of this nation in the Cuban affair was applied and projected with great restraint and finesse—but surely Mr. Khrushchev, in his contemplation of the portent of that situation, must have realized, whether or not he has read Mahan, the lasting truth of these words:

It is not the taking of individual ships or convoys, be they few or many, that strikes down the money power of a nation; it is the possession of that overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemy's flag from it, or allows it to appear only as the fugitive; and by controlling the great common, closes the highways by which commerce moves to and from the enemy's shores. This overbearing power can only be exercised by great navies. . . .

*The Influence of Sea Power
Upon History, 1660-1783*

Now though, as we have seen, Mahan's primary object and transcendental theme was the political and strategic importance of sea power, he evaluated historical naval events with a secondary object of determining, in his words, 'leading principles—always a few—around which considerations of detail group themselves, [tending] to reduce confusion of impression to simplicity and directness of thought. . . .' To this end he devoted many thousands of words of discussion and analysis. Taken in total, his words boil down to a four-pillared foundation of naval strategy, with these elements as the pillars:

- | | |
|------------------|-------------------|
| 1. Concentration | 3. Offense |
| 2. Objective | 4. Communications |

In his book, *Naval Strategy*, Mahan stated:

The fundamental object in all military combinations is to gain local superiority by concentration.

Over and over, in other passages, he repeats this basic idea; for example:

Never attempt to straddle, to do things at the same time, unless your force is evidently so supreme that you have clearly more than enough for each.

or this :

Not by rambling operations, or naval duels, are wars decided, but by force massed, and handled in skillful combinations.

Mahan detected in his historical studies a direct relationship between British successes in utilizing their naval mobility to achieve concentration of force at a critical point, as opposed to the French tendency to disperse their efforts to nuisance raiding and harassment of commerce. This led him to the rejection of *guerre de course*, or commerce destruction, as the primary role of a Navy and led him to this broad conclusion:

. . . concentration of effort will as a rule be a sounder policy than dissemination.

*The Influence of Sea Power
Upon the French Revolution and
Empire, 1793-1812*

In this age of widespread mutual security arrangements, it is interesting to note some of the pitfalls prophesied by Mahan when he said:

The proverbial weaknesses of alliances are due to inferior power of concentration. Granting the same aggregate of force, it is never as great in two hands as in one, because it is not perfectly concentrated. Each party to an alliance has its particular aim, which divides action.

In brief summary of this point, Mahan envisioned the essence of naval strategy to embody the exploitation of the mobility of ships to achieve concentration of power at a decisive point, while at the same time holding firm at other potential points of action. From this concept stemmed his capsule definition of strategy as the decision 'where to act.'

Proceeding from this first great principle, Mahan stressed the determination of a proper objective as an essential element of where to act. Broadly and comprehensively stated, these words contain the germ of this idea:

. . . the proper objective is . . . the organized military force of the enemy.

Naval Strategy

In a narrower vein, he also stated that 'in war, the proper objective of the Navy is the enemy's navy'; but I submit to you that one must ever interpret Mahan in broad context in order to derive maximum guidance from the wisdom of his thoughts. Surely, if Admiral Spruance harked to Mahan when the Japanese Fleet approached the first battle of the Philippine Sea, he applied a broad appreciation of Mahan's concepts of mission and objective to reach the eminently sound decision not to advance the Fifth Fleet out of covering range of the beachhead at Saipan until he was assured that the Japanese could not outflank him and fall upon the Marines and soldiers then so desperately engaged. In a more negative sense, Admiral Halsey has been criticized for misapplication of the principle of concentration in the incident of 'Bull's Run' because he misdefined his objective. Perhaps my most valuable contribution in this regard would be the admonition that, to understand Mahan, you must read him in full context; and that in the application of Mahan's, or any other, maxims, only a judicious interpretation of the extant conditions and circumstances can make a principle a true aid to proper action instead of an inhibition or misdirection.

Mahan's third great principle of strategy involved his concept of the offensive, a principle that overlies almost all statements of the maxims of warfare. Mahan stated it thus:

. . . the assumption of a simple defense in war is ruin. War, once declared, must be waged offensively aggressively. The enemy must not be fended off, but smitten down. You may then spare him every exaction, relinquish every

gain; but till down, he must be struck incessantly and remorselessly.

The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future

This is not to say that Mahan did not recognize the necessity for defense under certain circumstances; but he cautions that 'even though the leading object of the war be defense, defense is best made by offensive action.' Mahan credits the 'go-get-'em' attitude of British commanders such as Rodney and Nelson as a determining factor in overcoming often superior material odds accruing to French commanders who too often adopted defensive, no-risk courses of action. Mahan also warns that successful offensive actions require at least local superiority of force; but he points to holding actions, hit and run raids, and suicide attacks as strategically useful employments of temporarily inferior forces. It is interesting to view in retrospect the long-term strategic value of such actions in the early days of World War II in the Pacific by our temporarily inferior forces.

Such a view in retrospect leads us to the examination, finally, of the fourth of Mahan's points of strategic principle.

. . . communications, in the full meaning of the term, dominate war. As an element of strategy they devour all other elements.

Naval Strategy

In his book *Naval Strategy*, Mahan discusses at some length the concept of positions and lines. He particularly emphasized the importance of central position and interior lines, and considered a nation with firm control of the sea to possess strong interior lines on a global basis. He points out an army's great dependence on its supplies and the relative ease with which a navy can support itself and an expeditionary army far from home. He explains that, on land, an army lacks the self-sufficiency that a naval force has at sea. An army must have its supplies frequently renewed and delivery of these supplies can only be briefly interrupted without consequences.

So long as the fleet is able to face the enemy at sea communications mean, essentially, not geographical lines . . . but . . . supplies of which the ships cannot carry in their own hulls beyond a limited amount.

He goes on,

Nevertheless, all military organizations, land or sea, are ultimately dependent upon open communications with the basis of the national power.

In the book, *The Problem of Asia*, Mahan again says,

Communications dominate war . . . ;

and he goes on,

Broadly considered, they are the most important single element in strategy, political or military. In its control over them has lain the pre-eminence of sea power - as an influence upon the history of the past; and in this it will continue . . .

The power, therefore, to insure these communications to one's self, and to interrupt them for an adversary, affects the very root of a nation's vigor . . .

This is the prerogative of the sea powers; and this chiefly . . . they have to set off against the disadvantage of position and of numbers in which, with reference to land power, they labor. . . .

In these passages on the importance of communications are to be found two different meanings to the word 'communications.' The idea is sometimes advanced that the word 'logistics' may be substituted for the word 'communications' whenever Mahan uses the latter, but this substitution cannot be made without regard to context. Mahan often clearly means 'logistics' when he says 'communications.' At other times, he is using the word in another sense. For instance, the word 'logistics' is out of place in his sentence, '. . . all military organizations, land or sea, are ultimately dependent upon open communications with the basis of national power. . . .'

However, it may also be partly Mahan's fault that, upon occasion, strategists have become overly concerned with protecting something so abstract as a 'line of communication.'

Professor E.B. Potter of the Naval Academy identified this error and made the point quite clearly when he wrote,

Unfortunately, Mahan, having to invent a terminology to carry his meaning, had borrowed from land warfare such phrases as 'lines of communications,' 'communication routes,' and 'sea lanes.' These expressions quickly became catch phrases to naval strategists. Since it is easier to quote Mahan than it is to read him, his disciples employed his terminology without noting the careful qualifications he had employed. As long as great circle lines connecting ports could be drawn on a chart, they became 'sea lines of communication' and by 1914 navies conceived it their duty to protect these 'lines.' Actually their business was, and is, to protect ships. Sea lines of communications carry nothing; ships carry the trade of the world.

In brief summary, Mahan believed that adequate control of the sea both depended upon and assured the necessary communications in the broad sense, that enabled a nation to project its power and influence into the uttermost parts of the earth, into the very teeth of those forces which might challenge that nation's security or prosperity. We remember the Marshall Plan as the catalyst for a remarkable political, economic, and psychological reconstruction of free Europe; but I would suggest to you that its effects—both material and moral—were made possible by European realization that continued United States military presence was assured by the United States and Allied dominance of the maritime regions and logistic support routes of the North Atlantic. It is the application of sea power, in its most comprehensive sense, that has enabled this nation and its allies in the free world to knit together and maintain a concert of strength around the periphery of the continental communist powers. By this chain, the projection of communist power and influence has been contained, with certain exceptions of political sufferance, within a tightly defined continental ring. One author has described this process as an updating of Mahan's ideas, to which he applies the term 'peripheral strategy.'

But in this line of discussion, I can see that I am spilling over into the scope of later lectures by Captain Hayes on the subject 'Sea Power and National Greatness' and by Captain Hurst on the subject 'The Influence of Sea Power on the Current World Crisis.' Therefore, in closing, I would like to believe that my necessarily cursory coverage of the vast scope of Mahan's concepts will serve chiefly to pique your curiosity and lead you to the study and evaluation of his works, to the end that his basic

factors and principles may aid you in your consideration and formulation of current strategic concepts. In this context I would submit to your consideration the avowal of Bernard Brodie when he said, in effect, that until a ton of goods can move as cheaply by air as by sea, we must continue to control the sea.

In this era of ultimate force, when the very feasibility of war is often brought into question, I think it appropriate that I leave you with a Mahan quotation stemming from his consideration of the moral aspects of war:

Power, force, is a faculty of national life; one of the talents committed to nations by God. Like every other endowment of a complex organization, it must be held under control of the enlightened intellect and of the upright heart; but no more than any other can it be carelessly or lightly abjured, without incurring the responsibility of one who buries in the earth that which was entrusted to him for use . . . Until it is demonstrable that no evil exists, or threatens the world, which cannot be obviated without recourse to force, the obligation to readiness must remain; and where evil is mighty and defiant, the obligation to use force - that is, war - arises . . .

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

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 Aircraft Commander, Senior Combat Crew, SAC (B-47)
 Atomic Warfare Operational Planning, Strategic and NATO

EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND:

The Citadel
 USNA, Class 1944, B.S.
 Naval War College, Command and Staff Course, 1955
 Naval War College, Naval Warfare Course, 1963
 George Washington University, graduate study in International Affairs, 1962-1963

DUTY ASSIGNMENTS:

NavWarCol	Staff	1963-
NavWarCol	Student	1962-1963
Hv Attack Squadron ELEVEN	CO	1961-1962
Hv Attack Squadron ELEVEN	XO	1960-1961
2nd and 308th Bombardment Wings, SAC, USAF	Senior Combat Crew Commander; Squadron Commander	1957-1960
Staff, COMSTRIKFOR-SOUTH	Atomic Weapons Off	1955-1957
NavWarCol	Student, C&S	1954-1955
Nav Air Spec Wpns Facility	Hv Attack Proj Off	1952-1954
Composite Squadron SIX	PIane Commander, AJ-1 and P2V-3C; Navigation Off; Comm Off	1950-1952
Sandia Base, Albuquerque, N.M.	Instructor, Technical Training	1948-1949
Fighting Sq 81/13A/131	Ops Off; Material Off	1946-1948
Flight Training, various stations	Student aviator	1944-1946
USS Wichita (CA-45)	Jr Fire Con Div Off	1943-1944

RECOMMENDED READING

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find them of interest.

The inclusion of a book or article in this list does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein. They are indicated only on the basis of interesting, timely, and possibly useful reading matter.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Certain of the books on the list which are not available from these sources may be available from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books are obtainable on loan. Requests from individual officers to borrow books from an Auxiliary Library Service Collection should be addressed to the nearest of the following special loan collections:

Chief of Naval Personnel (G14)
Department of the Navy
Washington 25, D.C.

Pearl Harbor Naval Base Library
Navy No. 128
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California 96614

Library
U.S. Naval Station
San Diego, California 92136

Library, ALSC
U.S. Naval Station
Box 169, Navy 926
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California 96910

Library
U.S. Naval Station
Norfolk, Va. 23511

BOOKS

Goodfriend, Arthur. *The Twisted Image*. New York: St Martin, 1963. 264p.

The reader interested in the propaganda field, the inner workings of the USIS, or the culture and mores of the Indian people will find this book quite rewarding. The author writes of his several years of experience as an information official in India in a simple, interesting, and appealing fashion. However, one has the feeling that the theme of *The Ugly American* is repeated in the book. Frequently 'good' and 'bad' American information officials and deeds are discussed. The prevailing theme throughout the book is the need to express United States ideas and policies by words and terms that can be related to the thoughts and aspirations of the native people—rather than by an emphasis on the abundance of material wealth of American society. Another opinion permeating the book is the need to communicate to a larger audience. Other levels of Indian society than just the intelligentsia should be our communication goal. The author at times belabors arguments with his superiors concerning methods, and the reader has the feeling that he is part to a family quarrel. The student interested in an inside viewpoint of the USIS information efforts, using India as a case study, will find Mr. Goodfriend's work thought-provoking.

Crankshaw, Edward. *The New Cold War: Moscow v. Peking*. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1963, 167p.

Edward Crankshaw, an English scholar noted for his erudite writings on Russia and the Soviets, began this book with the purpose of presenting evidence concerning the rift between the Soviet Union and China. Most of the writing occurred prior to the time, coincident with the Cuban episode and China's invasion of India, when open polemics between the two communist nations made the affair public property. In completing his writing, Crankshaw provides an excellent narrative, establishing the genesis of the dispute between Moscow and Peking. He also constructs, through a lucid analysis of well-documented maneuverings of all the involved Communist parties, a logical understanding of the depth of the breach, as well as an appreciation of its potential influence on the power balance of the world. Crankshaw very adequately supports his conclusion that this conflict, rather than being one of pure ideology, is a struggle between neighboring powers for self-assertion—if not for domination—using ideology as a weapon.

Levine, Robert A. *The Arms Debate*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963. 347p.

This is an important book, but its misleading title may deny it the attention it deserves from military readers. Levine, a Rand economist on leave at Harvard, attempts to analyze various approaches to weapons policy and therefore to strategies, by isolating the 'values' (basic assumptions) underlying each approach and establishing the areas of necessary disagreement and of possible cooperation. 'Debates over Strategic Alternatives' would have been a more accurate and more appealing title. He rules out the dogmatists on the extremes—the 'better Red than dead' school vs. the 'do-it-now' anticommunist school, while conceding the impact of their simple arguments on public opinion. Between the extremes is a broad middle ground which, he argues, is generally in agreement on values but is unaware of it, since the values of this group are not explicit and are often unconscious. The basic questions are analytical, not fundamental. Can deterrence work and will it be fairly stable? If it does not, is escalation inevitable? Levine leaves those questions unanswered. But his presentation of the answers that can reasonably be given on both sides pulls one's thinking out of ruts, for it shows the weaknesses not only in one's antagonists' positions but in one's own. All in all, *The Arms Debate* is a valuable corrective to strategic myopia.

International Law in a Changing World. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, 1963. 125p.

The theme common to this collection of 13 essays by lawyers, international civil servants, and scholars of world reputation is that the techniques of law offer invaluable assistance in developing an orderly and harmonious relationship among men. Because technology has contributed new opportunities for conflict and an increasing capacity to inflict injuries, there is unusual unanimity, even among Soviet jurists, in concluding that international law has a role in world affairs. The differences reflected by these essays are substantial, however. Professor Tunkin of the Soviet Union, in a brief contribution, reflects the profound conservatism that characterizes the Russian view of international law in its emphasis upon the need for precise agreement and its distrust of any sort of compulsory international jurisdiction. In contrast is the essay by Dag Hammarskjöld, which discloses a far less rigid and pessimistic outlook, and which suggests some of the practical contributions of customary international law generally,

and of the International Court of Justice in particular. Unfortunately, the standards which Hammarskjold and a few others establish in their writings are not maintained by the bulk of contributors, who devote more time to a rendition of abstract principles than to concrete uses of international law. The book was intended for the general reader who is not to be overwhelmed with footnotes or facts. If the reader assumes the value of international law, the book may be useful, but if he is a skeptic at the beginning he is likely to remain one.

Wilson, Hugh R. *Disarmament and the Cold War in the Thirties*. New York: Vantage, 1963. 87p.

In this book, the author portrays the diplomatic maneuvers and events of a period in international affairs bearing remarkable similarities to the present. By quoting extensively from letters he received during these years and from his personal diary, he instills in the reader a feeling of being there as history unfolds. The author presents a firsthand account, since he was officially and intimately involved in many of these significant events. The first part of the book deals with the frustrations in the attempts at disarmament during the period between the wars. The problems associated with disarmament today seem much the same as those of three decades ago. Germany, like Russia today, was interested in disarmament only to the extent that she might gain in relative power. French stubbornness hindered coordination in much the same manner then as now. The latter part of the book deals with the uneasy peace which finally was submerged by World War II. Of particular note is the analysis of the United States' preoccupation in the Far East, as the storm clouds gathered over Europe. The author suggests that this running verbal battle with Japan helped convince Hitler that the United States would not intervene in his plans for Europe. As a concluding admonition, the author cautions against the United States tendency to scold, although unwilling to back such scolding with force. Scolding for the sake of relieving one's feelings, he points out, has no place in international relations.

Keats, John. *They Fought Alone*. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1963. 425p.

John Keats has done an excellent job in presenting the extremely interesting, fast-moving World War II story of Colonel Wendell Fertig, USAR. Wendell Fertig was a mining engineer who chose to take his chances in the jungles of the Philippines

rather than surrender with the American forces in May of 1942. *They Fought Alone* is a story of the Filipino guerrilla operations, which, under Fertig's guidance, continued to oppose the occupational forces for almost three years. It is the story of a handful of Americans who, from May of 1942 until the end of the war, refused to surrender. Though written in the form of a novel and not documented, the book appears to be a very realistic accounting of events which occurred in the Philippines and of the accomplishments of the guerrilla forces during the Japanese occupation. The story is important, as it can be applied to the study and formulation of guerrilla tactics and guerrilla warfare. The reader is presented with a vivid picture of conditions which existed in the Philippines under Japanese occupation and is shown what can be accomplished where there is the will and the courage to resist surrender; the author contends that it was Wendell Fertig more than any other man 'who gave the Filipinos on Mindanao increasing reason to believe in themselves.' This, rather than a military victory, was Fertig's triumph.

— NOTES —