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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
REVIEW**

**Issued Monthly
U.S. Naval War College
Newport, R.I.**

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
to the Command and Staff Department
on 1 October 1963

by

Lieutenant Commander David F. Emerson, U.S. Navy

My subject this morning is 'The Principles of War,' and I'd like to begin by categorizing war as a science and as an art. Let us define science as a body of systematized knowledge, and art as skill in the application of knowledge to the accomplishment of a concrete purpose.

Now, we are at the War College to learn about war: to acquire as much as we can of the body of systematized knowledge of war, and to acquire what skills we can in the application of that knowledge. However, I should caution you that any systematized body of knowledge of war must progress some way before it can be characterized as a science. Indeed, it has been said that 'The science of war is so obscure and imperfect that its sole foundations and support are prejudice confirmed by ignorance.'

With that caution aside, how do we go about acquiring this body of knowledge, and skill in its application? It seems to me that there are several methods, but here at the War College we use two, principally. These are the study of history, and the case study method. (The rest of your year will be taken up mainly with various case studies which will increase in complexity as you progress.)

In studying history, we have to be careful of a few things. Obviously, we must be sure that the facts we study are correct—and this is not always so easy. Second, we must be wary of the prejudices of writers (no man ever made himself look bad in his memoirs, for instance). Third, we must be careful in passing judgment: it's one thing to study a battle, or campaign, in the quiet of the War College, free from pressures (particularly the pressure of time), with all, or at least most, of the facts of the situation in our possession, and it's quite another thing to make a decision in combat. Finally, we should all remember that any

man in a position to become a great failure has gotten to that position only through many successes.

The case study method was invented at the Prussian War Academy, and brought to the United States by the Naval War College. Here is a quote from the elder von Moltke which expresses a pretty sound view. It's part of his critique of a battle problem at the War Academy in the 1870's:

If one wishes to answer such questions as are set here, one likes to look for certain rules and axioms. Such can, however, be only offered by science, and that in our case is strategy. But strategy is not of a kind like the abstract sciences. These have their invariable and precise truths upon which we can build, and from which we can draw further conclusions. The square on the hypotenuse is always equal to the sum of the squares described on the sides which contain the right angle; that remains always true be the right-angled triangle large or small, be its vertex turned to the east or west. . . .

Strategy is the application of common sense to the conduct of war. The difficulty lies in its execution, for we are dependent on an infinite number of factors, like wind and weather, fogs, wrong reports, etc. If, therefore, theoretical science alone will never lead us to victory, we must nevertheless not entirely disregard it. As General von Willisen so truly says, 'It is only a step from knowing to doing, but it is a still greater step from not knowing to doing. The best lessons for the future we draw from our own experience, but as that must always be limited we must make use of the experience of others by studying history. Besides which, another means of furthering our education is the working out of such proposed warlike situations as our problems present.'

Lately there is a new vogue in studying war, and that is the application of mathematics to war. It started in World War II with operations analysis. Nowadays we hear a lot about cost effectiveness, for instance, and the application of mathematics has progressed this far:

The general formulation of a battle should embody the following concepts:

1. A battle is represented by a semi-Markov process in continuous time whose states are identified with the non-negative integers with the following possible interpretations:
2. (a) States may represent the number of hits on the enemy;
- (b) States may represent the damage level sustained by the enemy.

I have only a very hazy idea of what a Markov process is, but from the progress of events in Washington I think it is a good idea if all of us learn a little bit about that process, whatever it may be.

Now, down to the principles of war. First of all, what are principles? In the natural sciences, a principle is a statement of cause and effect, or of the relationship between cause and effect, and is true under all conditions. A principle of war, on the other hand, is something different. It is an abstract noun or phrase which epitomizes an idea. I defy you to come up with a statement of cause and effect in the single word 'mass.' Principles of war epitomize ideas but do not give precise statements of cause and effect.

Second, they are catchwords. Here we have to watch ourselves because the human tendency to use catchwords, or rules, may lull us away from thinking, from hard sequential thought, which Norman Cousins says is the most difficult effort a human can undertake. You remember such sayings as 'Red sky at night, sailors' delight.' This means a lot to some of us, but do you think any meteorologist makes his predictions by stepping out the door and looking at the color of the sky? Sometimes it does seem that they do, at least those here in Rhode Island.

A third characteristic of the principles of war is that they are assumptions, and they are rather abstract assumptions at that. They are drawn from a particular historical context, and this particular historical context is the period of modern war which Colonel Langston last week defined for you as beginning with the invention of gunpowder about 1500 A.D. Science can change most of the principles of war, and has, at least since 1945, I'd say.

Fourth, the principles of war are neither sacred nor immutable. Anyone who ever wrote a list of principles of war says that his list is 'it.' His is the final immutable list; and men have said this ever since they began writing lists of principles of war. Just from the fact that the lists have changed so much brings this viewpoint into question, as you will see when I show you some lists of principles of war, and how much they can vary.

Further, there are some dangers of using the principles of war. The first danger is that they rest on the assumption that all wars are alike both as to causes, objects, and methods, and I have only to refer you to the Renaissance, when wars were fought for different causes, had different objects, and certainly used different methods, to illustrate this point. Yet the Renaissance was in the period of modern war.

A second great danger, and this is probably the greatest danger, is that they lead to *a priori* reasoning. *A priori* reasoning deduces consequences from principles assumed as self-evident, and is derived independently of factual observation. Obviously, however, your first principle must be correct. If you start out by saying as a first principle that the earth is flat, and reason from there, you could come to a lot of wrong conclusions, and we all know that human beings have actually done just that.

There is great danger in using *a priori* reasoning in war, and this danger is illustrated by the French after the Franco-Prussian War. As you all know, in that war they were defeated very badly by the Prussians. After the war, French army officers sat down to study and find out why they were defeated. They studied history: they studied Napoleon and they studied the Prussians. They studied Napoleon because just sixty years before he had been the conqueror of all Europe, with the very same French nation, same Frenchmen, etc., and they studied the Prussians for the reason that the Prussians had beaten them. Now the one thing they came up with in common between the Prussians and Napoleon was the spirit of the offensive. Both Napoleon and the Prussians had been on the offensive most of the time; therefore, the French officers deduced that the spirit of the offensive is the key to victory, and from that they built their whole doctrine. They even went so far as to bring into account their French racial characteristics. 'Nothing can stop a Frenchman with a bayonet,' was one of their sayings. 'A Frenchman on the offensive is good, a Frenchman on the defensive is poor, therefore the Frenchman should always be on the offensive,' was another.

There were some dissenters to this doctrine, though. Pétain, who was then a colonel, was one. Pétain said that their doctrine was dangerous, that you couldn't look at just one principle and build a whole doctrine from it. Pétain said, instead, 'Let's study the situation. What are the conditions? What is the terrain? What are the relative strengths? What are the many other considerations?' And he said, 'What about the effects of firepower?' Pétain had been studying the growing technological impact of modern science, and he realized that firepower had been overlooked in the French infantry. He came up with a saying: 'Firepower kills.' Well, the Young Turks on the French General Staff had to come up with a counter to that, and went all the way back to a Russian general in the 17th century who had said, 'Bullets don't think. Only the bayonet has intelligence.' From that they apparently deduced that French spirit made them bulletproof. Anyway, their doctrine was to attack; as soon as you see the enemy, attack. The outcome of this doctrine was the so-called Battle of the Frontiers. In the first two weeks of World War I, the French lost 300,000 men to those unthinking German bullets, and all because they didn't study the situation. They attacked down defiles in the Ardennes Forest. They attacked whenever they saw the Germans, and the Germans shot them. Three hundred thousand casualties, by the way, was a greater loss in a two-week period than was sustained in any other two weeks of the war, just for comparison, and this includes the battles of Verdun and the Somme.

Another danger of using these principles of war is that they tend to lead to oversimplification. This is because they are catchwords. It is easy to oversimplify. It's easy to say, 'I've got mass, I've got security, I shall therefore win,' without seriously considering the situation. Without really knowing what the situation is you may think you have these things, but you haven't thought it out—so beware of oversimplification.

Another danger is that war cannot be fought mechanically by a book of rules. Here is a quote about the enemies of a great general:

Napoleon's opponents moved their men on the chessboard according to the rules which they took for immutable principles, and the game went on so long as their antagonists were also guided by them; but when an adversary appeared who only awaited the development of their methodical movements to play his own secret, profound and decisive game, all equality of chances disappeared and the only variety in the result was the mode of defeat.

The key word here is—and we have all noticed it—‘immutable.’ I don’t believe that a principle of war can be said to be immutable. Immutability leads to inflexibility. Here is a quote from Admiral C. R. Brown: ‘Adherence to one principle frequently demands violation of another. Any leader who adheres inflexibly to one set of commandments is inviting disastrous defeat from a resourceful opponent.’

Now there is yet another danger. This is that the principles of war can lead to a blindness to the real situation. They tend to lead people into preconceived ideas about what the situation is, by blindly following the principles of war, rather than into considering what the situation actually is; and this has happened frequently.

However, there are some values to principles of war. (I don’t want you to think that they are all wrong.) The first value is that they help to get us thinking about war. If we think about the principles of war—not merely repeat them or memorize them—but *think* about them, this is good; we are thinking about war. If we are continually testing them, seeing if they do apply, testing to see whether or not a principle applies in an historical situation, then we are thinking about war - and we are thinking about the situation. Here is what Mahan had to say about the values of the principles of war.

Formulated principles, however excellent, are by themselves too abstract to sustain convinced allegiance; the reasons for them, as manifested in concrete cases, are an imperative part of the process through which they really enter the mind and possess the will.

‘This is the value of them; if we are thinking about them, then we are thinking about war, and this is what we are here at the War College to do. This is the problem of the principles of war: they are not principles of natural science; they are abstract nouns and phrases, and they must be thought about.’

The principles of war have one other value. They may help to keep us on the right track, perhaps. They at least help to keep us from getting off the track. Here is another quote from Mahan: ‘War acknowledges principles, and even rules, but these are not so much fetters, or bars, which compel its movement aright, as guides which warn us when it is going wrong.’

Now let us look at some lists of principles of war. The first one is Sun Tzu's. Sun Tzu wrote a book about war at some time around 500 B.C. All our modern books about Sun Tzu say that he had thirteen principles of war. Well, I searched through his book *The Art of War* and I couldn't find thirteen. I did come to the table of contents eventually, and found that there were thirteen chapters. Now the title of one of these chapters is 'Laying Plans.' Laying plans is not a principle of war. It is a means of planning or a means of applying knowledge to war, but it certainly isn't a principle of war. 'Classification of Terrain,' 'The Army on the March' and 'The Use of Spies' are some of the other chapter titles, and I doubt if any one of those can be called a principle of war. He did, however, formulate five essentials for victory. Here are his five essentials; I think his fifth essential is applicable today.

Sun Tzu's Five Essentials for Victory

1. He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight.
2. He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces.
3. He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all ranks.
4. He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared.
5. He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign.

Next we come to Clausewitz. As Colonel Langston pointed out last week, Clausewitz wrote his book *The Principles of War* in 1810, just before he left the Prussians and went to join the Russians; he wrote this book for the Crown Prince of Prussia. This book, incidentally, was written before Clausewitz became a serious student of military history.

Many writers credit Clausewitz with seven principles, but once again I had to go to the table of contents, and found that he had seven subheadings there. He actually had four or five principles of war. I should say that what Colonel Langston calls a principle is actually a corollary; I'd say that 'Surprise through swiftness' is the corollary to 'Never waste time.' But really it

doesn't make any difference whether it says four or five; the point is that he didn't have seven. You can look through this list and when you see later lists you will see quite a bit of correlation between Clausewitz and others.

Clausewitz's Four Rules

1. Use our entire forces with the utmost energy.
2. Concentrate our power as much as possible against that section where the chief blows are to be delivered and incur disadvantages elsewhere.
3. Never waste time.
 - a. Surprise through swiftness.
4. Follow up our successes with the utmost energy.

Now at this point I would like to digress a little bit. In Colonel Langston's lecture you were told that Clausewitz said that war was an extension of politics by other means. This may well be true, but I would like to point out that Sir Walter Raleigh said that war is the failure of politics. This leads to different conceptions, and what I am talking about right here is the so-called 'soft underbelly of Europe.' I think Colonel Langston told you, but just to refresh you, 'the soft underbelly of Europe,' where Churchill wanted to invade in World War II, was actually Italy and the Balkans. Churchill wanted to get into the Balkans to insure political control after the war. However, it is one thing to call the area 'the soft underbelly of Europe' and it is another thing to look at the map and see what this soft underbelly actually is—to study the situation. This is what Samuel Eliot Morison says about the soft underbelly: 'It was boned with the Apennines, plated with the hard scales of Kesselring's armor, and sheltered by the wings of the Luftwaffe.' This is something to think about. A lot of people found that the soft underbelly of Europe was hard to push into. You know how long it took the Army to go up the boot of Italy. It would have been even more difficult to go into Yugoslavia through the Ljubljana Gap out of Trieste, and here is a footnote, if you are interested about politics: Tito had orders from Stalin that if the Allies invaded Yugoslavia he was to side with the Germans. Now think of the soft underbelly in political terms.

Napoleon had 116 maxims, but the books tell us there were 115. I'll cover the 116th in the question period, if you are interested.

I'll skip over Foch, and come to the British Army principles of war. They were first put down by J.F.C. Fuller in 1912. They were printed in the *Royal United Service Institution Journal* in 1916, and were put into the British Army Field Service Regulations in 1920. They also formed the basis for the U.S. Army's list of principles of war. Here is the list of the British Army's principles of war:

British Army Principles of War

Selection and Maintenance of Aims
Offensive Action
Administration (Note: Logistics, in U.S. usage)
Co-operation
Concentration of Forces
Economy of Effort
Flexibility
Surprise
Security
Maintenance of Morale

Next come the U.S. Army principles. There are nine of them. If you rearrange this list, you can form an acronym for remembering the Army principles of war, and this acronym is MOSSCOMES. If you want to remember principles of war, this is a good way perhaps, but I am not so sure that you should memorize lists of principles.

U.S. Army Principles of War

Objective
Offensive
Mass
Economy of Force
Maneuver
Unity of Command
Security
Surprise
Simplicity

Next we have the U.S. Air Force principles of war. The Air Force takes a little bit different stand. General Muir S. Fairchild, who was first Commanding General of the Air University, refused to allow blind acceptance of any principles of war. He later became Vice Chief of the Air Staff, and in this position still maintained that we can't have principles as official doctrines which would be followed blindly. He desired no blind acceptance; he insisted that each principle has to be restudied constantly in terms of the situation.

U.S. Air Force Principles of War

Objective
Offensive
Co-operation
Concentration
Economy
Surprise
Security
Mobility
Simplicity

The U.S. Navy didn't have a list of principles of war until fairly recently. In fact, as recently as 1953, there was no official doctrine, nor official publication which promulgated a list of U.S. Navy principles of war. In 1953, apparently under the pressure of unification, Admiral R.L. Conolly, who was President of the Naval War College, wrote a list of principles which he published in the Naval Institute *Proceedings*. In his article he said that, under unification, it seemed as if we were going to have to have a list of principles of war, and submitted a suggested list. Now, there are quite a few reasons why Navies have never accepted lists of principles of war. For instance, here is a quote from a British General, written a few months after Gallipoli (in which the British tried to get around the stalemate on the Western Front by applying sea power and going to the flanks): 'Sea power and command of the sea are colossal assets, yet sea power is also a great seducer from the principles of war.'

The Army and Navy approach the principles of war differently. This is what the Army says about the principles of war:

The principles of war are fundamental truths governing the prosecution of war. Their proper application is essential to the exercise of command and to successful conduct of

military operations. These principles are interrelated and, dependent on the circumstances, may tend to re-enforce one another or to be in conflict. Consequently, the degree of application of any specific principle will vary with the situation.

This is what the Navy says:

Principles of war were first formulated in an era when the movements of forces and logistic support were operations much more simple than they are in the 20th century. They were intended originally as a guide to the conduct of land warfare. The principles described briefly in this appendix (to NWP 10) do not agree with any standard lists either in number or titles. Rather, they represent observations relating to principles of war which appear to be applicable in some degree to naval warfare. They are not listed in any particular order, since relative importance will vary in accordance to the nature of a given situation. These principles, which are somewhat interdependent, are suggested as general guides useful for study rather than as immutable doctrine or as infallible laws guaranteed to produce definite results. Since war is not a precise science there is no standard formula for translating any set of principles into action. Interpretation and adaptation must necessarily be made against the background of past successes or failures in war and in the light of the evolutionary nature of technology, naval doctrine, and national policy.

Here is the list of U.S. Navy principles of war:

U.S. Navy Principles of War

Objective
Morale
Simplicity
Control
Offensive
Exploitation
Mobility
Concentration
Economy
Surprise
Security
Readiness

Just for comparison, let us take a look at the Russian principles of war. Here they are:

Russian Principles of War

Advance and Consolidation
Offensive
Combined Arms
Concentration
Economy of Force
Maneuver and Initiative
Surprise and Deception
Adequate Reserves
Morale
Annihilation

Let us now take a look at the U.S. Navy's principles of war individually. The first principle is the 'objective.' The objective is the end toward which action is being directed. It is generally called the first, or most important—and some people say it is the only—principle of war. Obviously we have to make sure our objective is clearly defined; otherwise we may get off into a sideshow. There is a difference between an abstract objective and a physical objective which will be explained later in this study. This is what Admiral Brown says about the objective:

The objective . . . is unquestionably the most important of all the principles of war. It is the connecting link which, alone, can impart coherence to war. . . . Without the objective, all other principles are pointless. It gives the commander the 'what.' The other principles are guides in the 'how.'

The thing we must do is to keep our objective in mind. We don't want to take action without an objective. Marshal Saxe, the great French marshal of the early 18th century, had this to say: 'One must not fight for the sake of fighting. Battles concerning which one cannot say why and to what purpose they have been delivered are commonly the resource of ignorant men.'

Now let's take a look at an historical example of the objective. In June 1944 the Fifth Fleet under Admiral Spruance made an amphibious assault on Saipan. Under Admiral Spruance was Task Force 58 (the fast carriers) and the Joint Expeditionary Task Force, which comprised the Army, Marines and amphibious shipping

which actually assaulted Saipan. On June 16, 1944 Admiral Spruance received word that the Japanese Second Fleet had deployed from Tawitawi. That was the only information of the Japanese that he had. On June 17 he conferred with his subordinates, Admiral Turner and Admiral Mitscher, and told them that it looked like action was imminent, but to remember that the objective was the seizure of Saipan. On the night of June 18th Task Force 58 steamed east toward Saipan, rather than west or southwest toward the enemy, because (1) They didn't know exactly where the enemy was, but (2) their objective was the seizure of Saipan, not the destruction of Japanese carriers. Remember that Admiral Spruance's objective was the seizure of Saipan, not the destruction of Japanese carriers. This has been an item of controversy ever since. I won't go into it any further except to say that in the battle which ensued, Japanese carrier air strength was drastically reduced, despite the fact that Task Force 58 did not seek out the Japanese carriers.

Here is an example of misuse of principles. I refer to that Academy Award winner, Lawrence of Arabia. The railroad which supplied the Turks in Arabia during World War I went down as far as Medina. The British Army under Allenby was fighting along through Palestine toward Jerusalem a very long distance from Medina. Lawrence was wrecking railroads way down in the south toward Medina, where it didn't do a bit of good in helping Allenby's army. In fact, there was only one Turkish battalion in Medina, and Lawrence didn't manage even to interrupt their supply by railroad. The railroad wasn't really cut until 1918, by a man named Dawnay, and he cut it so well that the railroad is not in use today. The point is that the war was going on in Palestine and Lawrence was trying to wreck a railroad supplying one Turkish battalion in Arabia.

Let's take another look at Lawrence trying to accomplish his objective. In the late Fall of 1917 the British Army was approaching Jerusalem. The supplies for the Turks in Jerusalem came down on a railroad to Deraa, thence to the Yarmuk Valley, where the railroad crossed a couple of bridges, and then on to Jerusalem. Allenby told Lawrence to blow the bridges in the Yarmuk Valley between November 5th and November 7th, 1917. Lawrence went up there, but it rained; he sat in his tent, and then eventually went back to Arabia. This is an example of failure to accomplish the objective. Incidentally, it was suggested to me there that perhaps Lawrence invented a new principle of war, the principle of publicity, because Lawrence was given all the credit for this campaign, although he was only one of many.

The next principle we will take up is the principle of 'morale.' We all have our own idea of what morale is. I'll give you the definition out of NWP 10(A) - 'Morale is the general spirit, or state of mind of an individual, or group of individuals, as reflected in behavior under various conditions.' The best example I know of, dealing with morale, is the German High Seas Fleet in the Fall of 1918. It was a fleet which was mechanically and materially superior to the fleet which had fought the British in the Battle of Jutland in 1916. Yet in the Fall of 1918, its morale was so bad that it mutinied. The revolt spread through Northern Germany, and the Germans had to leave the war because of it. Of course, there were many other reasons for their leaving the war, but the immediate cause was this revolt in Northern Germany. The German Army never mutinied, but the German Navy did. That is an example of bad morale.

Another example of morale affecting a situation is the French Army in the Spring of 1917, after the disastrous Nivelle offensive in which there were very high losses—a result of overemphasis on the spirit of the offensive; human grapeshot had failed again. The French Army mutinied. There were only two reliable divisions between the Germans and Paris; 138 divisions were more or less in a state of mutiny. Had the Germans attacked, they could have taken Paris. On the other hand, I am not so sure that Washington's men, after a bad winter in Valley Forge, had really high morale when they crossed the Delaware.

The next principle is 'simplicity.' Simplicity is clarity. We need simplicity in plans, strategy, weapons and command; one man should serve one master. The nature of simplicity is relative, however; what is simple for a well-trained force may be very complex for a poorly trained force. We should avoid oversimplification at the expense of accuracy, completeness and flexibility; there is such a thing as being too simple.

This is what the biographer of Stonewall Jackson had to say:

Stonewall Jackson's orders for battle were in every essential respect a model. They were very short, not to say abrupt; but they were exceedingly clear. They left no doubt whatever as to the intentions of the General and Chief. They entered into no details except where details were absolutely necessary.

Here is the plan which Spruance issued to Mitscher before the Battle of the Philippine Sea of June 19, 1944:

Our air will first knock out enemy carriers, then will attack enemy battleships and cruisers to slow or disable them. Battle line will destroy enemy fleet either by fleet action if the enemy elects to fight, or by sinking slow or crippled ships, if enemy retreats. Action against the enemy must be pushed vigorously by all hands to ensure complete destruction of his fleet. Destroyers running short of fuel may be returned to Saipan if necessary for refueling.

Desire you proceed at your discretion selecting dispositions and movements best calculated to meet the enemy under most advantageous conditions. I shall issue general directives when necessary and leave details to you and Admiral Lee.

Then he cautioned them:

Task Force 58 must cover Saipan.

(He was thinking of his objective—the seizure of Saipan.) This plan was a model of simplicity.

The fourth principle is that of 'control.' In the U.S. Navy, control, which replaces the 'co-operation,' 'co-ordination,' and 'command' found in other lists of principles of war, is composed of four elements: command and organization in which the chain of command responsibility is thoroughly defined; efficient communications to serve command; training and indoctrination; and professionally competent leadership. A good example of violation of this principle is the ABDA Command in Southeast Asia at the start of World War II; it was formed on the 15th of January 1942. ABDA stands for American, British, Dutch, Australian; it was a combined command formed in a hurry. There never was any clear chain of command; there never was a common agreement on strategy. The British wanted to defend Singapore, the Dutch wanted to defend Java, the Australians wanted to defend Australia and the Americans wanted to fall back and gain time to make a comeback. There wasn't any complete agreement on many things. The ABDA naval forces never had a common signal book, nor had they a common language, and their operations were thus hampered tremendously. They never had time for training and indoctrination. Their whole war was over within a month or two.

One can't say that the Allies lost that battle because of errors in applying the principle of control. They probably would have lost this campaign anyway; they were unprepared. But it is an example of the violation of the principle of control.

The next principle is the principle of the 'offensive.' The offensive is the act of seeking to obtain control not previously held. Navy doctrine states that victory can never be won by passive defense. Only sustained offensive action brings success. Examples of the offensive, are, of course, the Pacific campaigns in World War II, the bomber offensive against Germany in World War II, and the landings in Normandy. (Hitler was defeated by an offensive ground battle in Northern Europe.)

Now, there is a question here. Will this principle of the offensive still apply across the board in limited wars? Will any of these principles apply across the board in limited war? Think a little bit about the offensive. How far can you go on the offensive without getting into danger of escalation into general war? An example of this is Korea: after the truce talks started, neither side really went on the offensive.

The sixth principle is 'exploitation.' Exploitation is following up success. It is closely allied to the principle of the offensive and to the principle of surprise, and it is closely associated with momentum, also. Plans and operations must be flexible enough to take advantage of local successes or situations, or to follow up. An example of the failure to follow this principle was the failure of Union General Meade after Gettysburg. He defeated Lee at Gettysburg, but he didn't follow up. Some modern historians say that he never had a chance to follow up, but the point is that he never seriously tried; he left Gettysburg much too late to chase Lee. A good example of the successful use of exploitation occurred in September 1944: Admiral Halsey's recommendation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to move into the Philippines in advance of schedule. In his carrier strikes against the Philippines, he had found that the Japanese air was very weak there. He immediately recommended moving forward the timetable, to take Leyte two months ahead of schedule, and bypassing Yap. The Joint Chiefs concurred, and Leyte was assaulted two months ahead of schedule. The result was that we made greater gains than had we marched step by step, island by island—a Japanese weakness was exploited.

'Mobility' is the next principle. Mobility implies rapidity plus flexibility plus endurance. Don't confuse mobility with speed,

because mobility has also the element of endurance. Endurance is achieved through logistic support. For the Navy, mobility replaces 'maneuver,' which is essentially a tactical term, and 'movement,' which is essentially a strategic term, and includes endurance.

An example of mobility is Halsey's Task Force 38 operations from the 1st of July to the 15th of August 1945. He struck targets from the Inland Sea to Hokkaido several times, and moved about constantly, operating for 45 days. He could have stayed for 90 days, or even longer, because he had endurance. Indeed, our whole offensive across the Pacific during the war was a demonstration of mobility.

The eighth principle is 'concentration.' Concentration implies superior force at the decisive point at the proper time. (Incidentally, you'll notice the word 'implies'; we can't say 'equals,' because these aren't principles of natural science, and we can't say that there is any mathematical proportion to be found in these principles.) Concentration is used in the Navy, instead of 'mass' or 'superiority,' because of its connotation of decisiveness in time and space. Here is an example of concentration: In January and February of 1944 the Pacific Fleet went into the Marshall Islands. The decisive point in the Marshall Islands was Kwajalein. It was decisive because (1) it had the strongest defensive force; (2) it was the logistics distribution point for all of the Japanese forces on the outlying islands; (3) it is geographically right in the heart of all of the Marshalls and (4) it was decisive in time because the Japanese were just about to complete a 6,000-foot bomber strip there. Admiral Nimitz realized that if he were going to take the Marshalls he had to take Kwajalein. He believed that the fast carriers, in conjunction with land-based bombers from Tarawa, could hold down the Japanese air enough so that he could get in and seize the atoll. Admiral Spruance, Admiral Turner and General H.M. Smith thought that his plan was much too bold. They wanted to go into Majuro, and then work into Kwajalein. Nimitz, however, was convinced that he could achieve concentration with the carrier task force and land-based bombers, and that this concentration applied at the decisive point (Kwajalein) would enable him to seize the Marshalls. And that is what happened; the Japanese air was beaten down and Kwajalein was seized. The result was that the Japanese outer defensive line was smashed and the Japanese were put back onto their inner defensive line, which ran from Samoa to New Guinea and thence to the Marianas. From then on, the Japanese were on the downgrade, and were pushed steadily back for the rest of the war.

'Economy' is the next principle. Economy implies an economical use of forces and a judicious expenditure of resources in order to achieve maximum efforts. What that means is that we can't be strong everywhere. We must be strong in some places, but we can't be strong in all places. An example of the use of economy is the withdrawal of units of our combat fleet from the South Pacific in the Spring of 1944. There wasn't any real combat going on down there, and the Japanese did not have enough forces to accomplish any worthwhile objectives, so combat forces were withdrawn from the South Pacific and sent to the Central Pacific. Because of this accretion to the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Nimitz was able to form the Third and the Fifth Fleets. An example of violation of the principle of economy, however, was maintaining the bases for these combat forces in the South Pacific once they had been withdrawn. Maintaining bases is an expensive proposition.

The tenth principle is 'surprise.' Surprise is confrontation of the enemy with force he is not prepared to meet. Clausewitz was enamored of surprise, and, of course, many battles have been won through its use. But surprise can be intoxicating; one may get so wrapped up in the contemplation of what his surprise will do to the enemy that he will be surprised in the meantime. We must always keep thinking, for 'ignorance and stupidity are the dam and sire of surprise.'

Surprise can be achieved through originality, audacity, speed, secrecy, concealment, or deception—and don't forget that the principle of exploitation is closely allied to the principle of surprise—be prepared to follow up. The British Army in the Autumn of 1917 achieved surprise, in the mass use of tanks for the first time at Cambrai, but they weren't prepared to follow up. The tanks made a tremendous penetration into the German lines, but because the British weren't prepared for success, they didn't follow up with enough infantry, and the result was that they lost their tanks and what little infantry they had, and got pushed back two miles in the bargain. Another illustration of surprise is Midway, where the *Yorktown* and *Enterprise* appeared suddenly when the Japanese believed them to be far to the south of Pearl Harbor. And still another example is the Battle of the Falkland Islands in December of 1914, when two British battle cruisers—which had arrived only twelve hours previously—surprised von Spee's squadron. Von Spee was attempting to seize the Falklands, but lost his cruiser squadron because he was surprised.

Now for an illustration of the danger of following any one principle too closely: in this case the principle is surprise, and the occasion is the Salerno Bay landing. The Army wanted surprise, and a predawn assault landing was planned, with no naval gunfire preparation. Unfortunately, a German division was there with a battalion on the beach, and tremendous infantry losses were incurred in that landing; the German battalion could have been destroyed by naval gunfire preparation, which had been omitted through a desire for surprise.

The next principle is 'security.' Security implies anticipating and minimizing unproductive loss resulting from enemy action. Security gives us freedom of action, but we can't be secure everywhere. We have to use forces economically, and it is well to remember that sometimes security can be achieved better by offensive measures than by defensive measures.

Napoleon had this to say about security:

A great captain ought to say to himself several times a day, 'If the enemy appears in front, on my right, or on my left, how shall I act?' If he finds himself in want of answers he is ill-prepared.

General Sheridan remarked on the distinction between Grant and the previous commanders of the Army of the Potomac:

The difference between previous commanders of the Army of the Potomac and Grant was that *they* were always worrying about what the enemy could do to them, whereas Grant wondered what he could do to the enemy.

An example of the principle of security, from World War II, was the dilemma of the Commander, North Pacific Force in the Summer of 1942. The Japanese had established themselves on Attu and Kiska, but this admiral was convinced that the Japanese were going to seize Dutch Harbor, regardless of the fact that they didn't have the forces to do it, and regardless of the fact that Midway had pretty well defeated the Japanese for the time being. As a result of this conviction, he tied himself to Dutch Harbor, and didn't do what Admiral King several times told him to do. The final result was that this admiral spent the rest of the war in Boston.

The last principle is 'readiness.' There are five types of readiness—command readiness, intelligence readiness, personnel readiness, plans readiness and logistics readiness. Command readiness requires an adequate organization and trained staff and leaders. Intelligence readiness implies an intelligence structure in being, organized and functioning before hostilities commence and maintained afterward. Personnel readiness comprises, in part, training programs and personnel replacement plans. Plans readiness implies the availability of plans for anticipated operations. Finally, logistics readiness means that we have logistics support ready, we know how we are going to employ it, and we have tested our plans for logistics feasibility.

Now, what have I told you in this lecture? I hope I got these points across: first, that the principles of war are not a substitute for logical analysis, common sense, broad professional judgment, and good leadership; second, that you can't fight wars by a book of rules, and that reliance on the principles, or on just one of them, can get you into trouble. Both Napoleon and Hitler observed every one of the principles of war in their invasions of Russia. A British general said, referring to the principles of war:

By themselves they will not help a soldier to solve a problem of war any more than a knowledge of the principles of painting will, without steady practice and natural aptitude, enable an artist to paint a picture.

Every critic knows the principles of painting, but very few of them can paint. There is no substitute for facing each situation and dealing with it as it actually is, rather than as you would like to see it in terms of the principles of war. Finally, if there is a real principle of war, it is the principle of the objective. The objective means more than all the rest.

I thought that you might be interested in some further reading on the principles of war:

Suggested Further Reading.

Sound Military Decision.

Brown, Charles R. 'The Principles of War.' *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, June 1949, p. 621-633.

Conolly, Richard L. 'The Principles of War.' *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, January 1953, p. 1-9.

Gaulle, Charles de. *The Edge of the Sword*. New York: Criterion, 1960.

Keegan, John D. 'On the Principles of War.' *Military Review*, December 1961, p. 61-72.

U.S. Department of the Air Force. *U.S. Air Force Basic Doctrine*. AFM 1-2. Washington: 1 December 1959.

U.S. Department of the Army. *Field Service Regulations, Operations*. FM 100-5. Washington: February 1962.

U.S. Department of the Navy. Office of Naval Operations. *Naval Warfare*. NWP 10(A). Washington: 1 November 1961.

If there is anything I can leave with you, it is this: 'Rules can aid the wise, but they are snares to the fool.'

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NavWarCol	Staff	6/62-
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<i>USS Barry</i> (DD-933)	XO	9/59-7/61
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<i>USS Redpoll</i> (MSC(O)-57)	CO	7/55-8/57
<i>USS Keppler</i> (DDE-765)	Ops	7/53-7/55
VS Sq	Air Frames	6/52-6/53
Flight Training	Student	10/50-5/52
USNA	Midshipman	8/46-6/50
<i>LST-658</i>	QM 3/c	9/45-6/46
Various training stations	Enlisted	9/44-9/45

GREAT BRITAIN: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 15 November 1963

by

Sir David Ormsby Gore

I understand that you are coming to the end of a series of studies of the internal and external situations of individual nations of various alignments and their role in what is described in your syllabus as the power struggle now being waged by the United States and the USSR. From Britain's point of view this is essentially a struggle between, on the one hand, certain alliances in which Britain and the United States are both partners and, on the other hand, the Communist Bloc. After I have discussed Britain's internal political and economic situations, I will discuss Britain's contribution to the world struggle in the context of these alliances. This may be something of an oversimplification of the kind of world in which we really live, but if I try to cover every aspect of Britain's policy in the present day in my opening lecture, it would be extremely long and I think it is really very much better if I try and work within this context and then perhaps some of the other points which will immediately occur to many people in the audience can be taken up during the question and answer period.

The North Atlantic Alliance is, of course, the most significant and powerful of these alliances to which I have referred, and I will therefore say something toward the end of my lecture on the prospects for greater European, and also greater Atlantic, unity in the future.

Internal Political Situation. But first of all, let me say a word about our internal political developments and trends. We have, as you know, a new Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, and he formed a new administration just one month ago, largely along the lines of his predecessor, Mr. Harold MacMillan. Next year, this government will have to face a general election for a new Parliament. For both the United States and Britain, therefore, 1964 will be an election year. Secretary Rusk was pointing out to me the other day that, during the course of the next eighteen months or

so, forty nations in the Free World are going to have elections. This is a problem which we have to face in our democratic societies, which is rather different from the problems facing the Communist Bloc. Of course, an election year in your case will take place because of the fixed four-year cycle written into your Constitution; in our case, because a general election, for all 630 seats in our House of Commons, must take place by law at least every five years, and this period will expire on October 9th of next year. Our Prime Ministers, of course, have the right of choosing any date for such a general election within this period; that is to say, they can have an election one year after taking office if they so wish. The first election I fought was in 1950 and we fought another election in the Autumn of 1951, because the Labour government at that time had such a small majority (I think it was five and the House 625) that it became very difficult, indeed, to govern.

The most general but by no means absolutely guaranteed prediction of our political pundits is that the election will take place next May or June. The theory is that the summer holiday months are unsuitable for an election and that thereafter no government would wish to be forced into an election at the last possible moment before the end of the five-year term in October when conditions may become unexpectedly unfavorable to their reelection. Obviously, you have more flexibility, more maneuverability, if you choose your date sometime before the final expiring of the constitutional period. I do not know how strong an argument this is because it seems to me the United States gets on pretty well, although it has a fixed date for an election. With this prospect in view it is natural that overseas observers should go to some trouble to find out what the main opposition party is thinking, and what they are likely to do if they come to power at the next general election.

Fortunately, I think, for our allies there is no fundamental division between any of the parties who could conceivably come to power, about the basic premise of our foreign and defense policies. The Conservative, Labour, and Liberal Parties are all agreed on seeking to bring about peaceful settlement of international differences, particularly East-West differences, and also search for some sort of secure and just world order which will enable nations with differing social systems to live, deal, and compete with each other without the continual threat and risk of war. But all these three parties also recognize that so long as the communist powers obstruct attempts to achieve these ends in

the United Nations and elsewhere, and pursue their present harassing, and in some respects aggressive, policies, it will be necessary for the free nations to combine in various security arrangements. The most important of these, the North Atlantic Alliance, was first launched in partnership with the United States by a British Labour government. They were in power at the time that the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, and this alliance has been steadily developed by three successive Conservative governments since that day. It will be supported by any government which could conceivably succeed them.

Perhaps I should just say a word about the present lineup of the parties in the House of Commons. At this moment the Conservative Party have a majority of about 100 seats; let us say they have roughly 360 seats, the Labour Party have 260 seats, and the Liberal Party have 5 or 6 seats. The Liberal Party, from the point of view of the votes in the country, is rather underrepresented. They normally poll about 9% or 10% of the electorate but under our system of voting and dividing up the areas it can be that a small party of that kind will find itself with fewer seats in the House of Commons than their total voting strength would allow. If you look at the existing Gallup polls, (I don't know how much faith any of you have in them. I think we all have to have some, but perhaps not blind, faith in them) the Labour Party are leading at the present time with perhaps an 8% to 10% lead over the Conservative Party in the country. Again the Liberal Party seems to be likely to poll about 10% of the votes.

I have been talking about these three parties. Of course, there are other small splinter parties including a perfectly legal Communist Party which has its own newspaper, and puts up candidates for local elections and the general election. At the last general election, the Communist Party polled 30,000 votes out of a total electorate of about 23 million, and they continue to be seemingly active, but have not had a Member of Parliament in the House of Commons since the period of 1945-1950. During that period they had two Members of Parliament; but they have never succeeded in electing a Member since that day.

All the leading parties are agreed on the fundamental concepts of our defense policy in support of this alliance, including the use of existing nuclear weapons possessed by Britain and the United States to deter, preferably, or resist aggression. They are agreed upon making available Britain and British territories overseas for this deterrence, and on the closest possible collaboration between

Britain and the United States in the formulation and execution of joint military plans. I hardly need to remind this audience that Britain provides the only European base for United States Polaris submarines, as well as air bases and other facilities for your Strategic Air Command. The Labour Party have expressed doubts whether Britain can afford the immense costs of maintaining and developing its own nuclear weapons after the present weapons become obsolete. But they do not oppose the maintenance of the British nuclear potential which is now in existence, which was also initiated by a Labour government; nor the use of Britain as a base for American nuclear weapons. The Labour Party have, after considerable debate, rejected unilateral disarmaments. They have supported, as have the other parties, the nuclear test ban treaty. The Conservative Party's support for the British nuclear deterrent, and incidentally the Labour government's reasons for first creating it, are that it makes Britain a less attractive target for the aggressor, and therefore enables us to resist nuclear blackmail; that it increases the weight of British counsels in the discussion of nuclear and other questions such as disarmament; and that it is a continuation of the close co-operation and mutual assistance between Britain and the United States, which was built up in wartime and which originally led to the joint development of the first atomic bomb. Indeed, the decision during the war to concentrate all the development work on an atomic weapon in the United States was, as you know, taken jointly by the British government and the United States government at that time for the very good and simple reason that Britain during those days was under direct bombardment, and it seemed wise therefore that the project should go forward on the much more secure territory of the United States. But it was a joint venture in wartime, and that kind of co-operation sometimes is less satisfactory than others, but on the whole there is a theme running through our atomic co-operation right from the wartime days up to the present.

In general, then, there is a consensus amongst all who are likely to occupy the seat of power in any future British government on those questions of foreign and defense policies which are of prime importance to our allies. And this, indeed, is not surprising, as the choice of policy open to any British government, of whatever party, is fairly strictly limited. This limitation is imposed by certain almost constant factors. These include the geographical position of the country, its natural resources in human and material terms, our need for a very high level of trade to support our standard of living, the pattern of such trade, and, of course, the tradition and history of our people.

Internal Economic Situation. Next I would like to turn to our internal economic situation. I'm glad to be able to report that your ally is showing many signs of robust economic health and growth this year. Both industrial production and exports are now at record levels in our history and look like continuing to move steadily upwards for some time in the future. Since 1950, investment in industry has doubled and our industrial production has risen by some 40%. As a result, unemployment has been kept down to an average of some 1½% of the working population over these years and the present level is about 2%.

Exports, which as you know are absolutely vital to us, far more so than they are to you, are also continuing to rise. Since 1950 they have gone up by more than 70% and this year they are 8% higher than they were a year ago. There has been some recent increase in our exports to North America; they were not doing too well in the first half of the year, but they have been picking up since then. But the most interesting and promising development is the success of our exports in surmounting the tariff barriers to the Common Market in Europe. Despite our exclusion from membership, and therefore our exclusion from the trading privileges that membership involves, over the last five years our exports to the Common Market countries have doubled and are still continuing to rise. I think it is a fair indication of the competitiveness of British industry at the present time. That is because, of course, in the Common Market they have to compete against German, French, and Italian industry, over a tariff barrier which is more formidable for us than it is for the countries that are actually in the Common Market.

European Unity. I will not attempt in these opening remarks to go into detail of the past history of our decision to apply for membership in the Common Market, or the decision of President de Gaulle to use his right of veto to exclude us. I would, however, like to emphasize that the British government's decision to try and enter the European Common Market was a great historic landmark and our exclusion was a blow to Western unity, regretted not only by my own government, but by the other five European members of the community, and I think by the United States. The resilience of Britain's economy and diplomacy in the face of this blow has surprised many. There seems, however, no immediate prospects of any withdrawal of the veto by President de Gaulle and therefore no early prospect of a resumption of the negotiations. In a sense, we can regard the negotiations as suspended rather than terminated, but they cannot be resumed until it is

absolutely clear that there is a will among all the members of the Common Market, including France, to make them succeed. We cannot have another long negotiation and then failure again. We have had two long negotiations now. We first of all tried to promote an industrial free trade area which would have excluded agricultural goods from its operation. The negotiations of that particular project went on for over a year and at the end of that time the French decided that they did not wish to continue with the negotiations. Two years later the British government decided to try to seek reentry into the Common Market itself. We had another eighteen months of very intensive negotiations and at the end of that period, as you know, we were excluded chiefly because of the wishes of President de Gaulle. I don't think you can put British industry in this kind of uncertainty again, unless you have a very reasonable prospect of being able to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion.

In the meantime, we are doing our best to avoid permanent economic damage, either to ourselves or to the Common Market countries, by trying to insure that our own economic policy develops in such a way as to make our future entry comparatively painless. Above all, we are anxious to prevent these economic divisions and differences from having an adverse political effect on the unity and strength of Western Europe, and therefore on the unity and strength of the North Atlantic Alliance as a whole. It is, I think, self-evident that if countries pursue opposed economic policies, this almost inevitably leads to differences on the political plane, and at the end of the road even to differences on defense and other matters of general interest to the two blocs of countries. So we are seeking to keep our economic policies in line with those of the Common Market to prevent these two from gradually drifting further apart, so that in the beginning of any further negotiations in the future we would not find the problems even more difficult than they were last time.

Britain's ties with Europe correspond, of course, to the facts of geographic propinquity; strategic necessity; and economic, political, social, and cultural involvement, over many centuries. From a long-term point of view, it is difficult to see how any sincerely pursued movement for European unification can ignore these realities without defeating its own ends and ultimately becoming a movement for European divisions. We therefore must prepare for the day when we shall in some way become associated closely with the European political and economic community.

Atlantic Unity. At the same time the inescapable facts of interdependence are impelling us toward still wider Transatlantic unity between the nations of Europe, including Britain, and those of North America, including, of course, Canada. What are these inescapable facts? First, that these nations can neither deter aggression nor defend these two continents except by collective action. Second, that they are dedicated to the social systems and types of government to which the communist powers are committed by their doctrine to overthrow and undermine. Third, that they include the leading industrial powers (very roughly, these contain between 80% or 90% of the manufacturing capacity of the Free World) and that they have similar capabilities and responsibilities for providing much needed aid and capital to the underdeveloped world outside. Finally, there is the fact that science and technology have created a greater interdependence than has ever existed before between all the nations of the Free World, and especially between the industrial nations to which I have referred.

No Conflict Between Atlantic and European Unity. In our view, there is no reason for any conflict between the two trends toward Atlantic and European unity; providing, first, that all the members are prepared to accept the obligations to consult and co-operate, and, if necessary, sacrifice, which any collective effort involves; and providing, secondly, that no member attempts to use the working of the collective process to dominate and frustrate the policies of its allies. In fact, Britain and the United States regard the two unifying movements as complementary, not contradictory. One very important reason for this is that the emergence of a united Europe will give greater balance to the Atlantic partnership by making it a partnership between units of more comparable political, economic and military power. I expect you all know the figures. But if the United Kingdom and certain other Western European countries did enter the Common Market and we built up the political institutions which would be required in a unified Europe, you would have the creation of a unit which would have a population larger than that of the United States, a population larger than that of the Soviet Union, a gross national product which would probably be over two-thirds that of the United States, and a gross national product which would exceed that of the Soviet Union. This is Western Europe, including Britain, by itself.

Far from wishing to dominate Europe or the alliance, Britain and the United States want a united Europe because this will enable Europe to play a more influential and effective role in the policy-making, the management, and the planning of the alliance and particularly in the wielding of nuclear power.

The Alliance's Worldwide Implications. Now, let us take a look at the worldwide implications of the Atlantic Alliance and see how this affects the relationship of Britain and other members to it. This is an aspect of special concern to Britain with its worldwide interest and responsibilities, the scopes of which are comparable with the United States and the United States alone. Our responsibilities do still extend to every ocean and to every continent in the world.

The nature of the communist challenge to the alliance is such that it is not enough for members of NATO to confine their concern to the area of the treaty itself. There are a number of reasons for this, but the most compelling is that our opponents will not themselves permit any such limitation. The directions from which the Soviet Union brings its pressure to bear are worldwide and cooperation between members of the alliance must be correspondingly worldwide. The danger that the communists might risk a major attack against us on the central front in Europe is to my mind limited because of the unquestioning determination of the nations to defend that particular, very sensitive, very vital area. The communists, therefore, have been continually endeavoring from the beginning of the alliance to penetrate, undermine, and dominate economically and politically, all military areas of key importance to members of the alliance, either on the flank or elsewhere in the world. To this end, they endeavor to exploit anti-Westernism, anti-Colonialism, anti-Americanism, and residual isolationism around the world. These forces have, of course, an independent strength of their own, whether the East-West struggle existed or not. But the communists' hope is to use them as a means not only of dividing the Atlantic countries from the non-aligned nations, but of creating dissensions between the Atlantic powers themselves.

Through a policy of decolonization, which as you know has brought self-rule and independence to over 600 million people since the last war, Great Britain finds herself intimately involved in these particular problems in Asia, Africa, and even in South America. I have in mind the West Indies and British Guiana.

That is why we, like other members of the North Atlantic Alliance, continually have to keep trying to harmonize policies, not only for the Atlantic area but in every ocean and on every continent. This is necessary not only where a communist threat is immediately involved, but where there is a possibility of divisions arising between the allies on other issues which could at the end of a chain reaction substantially advance communist

purposes. I am not suggesting that France, for example, must always dance to an American or a British tune, or vice versa, but I do mean that there are occasions when we must all dance to a North Atlantic tune. Except in the barest legalistic sense, the members of NATO cannot be allies and partners in Europe, and neutrals or opponents in other parts of the world, and there has been some evidence of this kind of development in recent months.

This was the lesson we all learned (and it was a painful experience) at the time of Suez. I am not now discussing the merits of the case, but what was perfectly apparent was that a divided Western world, on an issue of this kind, did nobody any good. That lesson is not entirely irrelevant today when there is so much talk about disagreement within the alliance on a wide range of issues. It is worth recording in today's context the words of the committee of 'Three Wise Men' who reported to the NATO council in 1957. The three wise men, if I remember rightly, were Mr. Lester Pearson, now Prime Minister of Canada; Dr. H.M. Lange, the very distinguished Foreign Minister of Norway; and Dr. Gaetano Martino of Italy, who, I think, is at the moment President of the Council of Europe.

This is what they said: 'An alliance in which the members ignore each other's interest, or engage in political or economic conflict, or harbor suspicions of each other, cannot be effective either for deterrence or for defense.' They went on to point out that the security was far more than a military matter. NATO shouldn't solely concern itself with military affairs, and they said this: 'The strengthening of political consultation and economic co-operation, the development of resources, progress in education and understanding—all these can be as important, or even more important, for the protection of the security of a nation, or an alliance, as the building of a battleship or the equipping of an army.'

Special Relationships Outside the Alliance. This involves respect and consideration for the special relationships which members of the alliance may have in areas outside the alliance. France, for example, has such a relationship with, and special responsibilities to, former colonies in Africa, in terms of trade, investment, historical associations. These are comparable to our own special relationship to members of the Commonwealth. Both these relationships legitimately deserve the consideration of all members of the alliance, because we believe they contribute to stability and to harmony in what is, let's face it, a pretty

restless world. The German Federal Republic does not have comparable overseas responsibilities, but it does have a special relationship with the Soviet occupied part of Germany, which is, of course, of vital concern to the whole alliance. Britain, in addition to its Commonwealth ties, also has special responsibilities arising from its membership of other alliances covering threatened areas in the Middle East and in the Far East. There is the CENTO alliance, of which we are full members (the U.S. is a member of the military committee, but it is not a full member of that alliance); and, of course, both of us are full members of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.

No one is in a better position to appreciate the kind of burden that this involves for us than the United States because, in its effort to contain the aggressive expansionism of the Soviet Union and Communist China and their satellites, the United States has assumed security commitments with some forty other nations. In the fulfillment of these commitments it finds itself more closely associated with Britain than with other powers. This is not because of ties of common heritage or historical association, important as these may be in other respects, but because of the indisputable fact that our material interests do meet and overlap all over the world in the field of politics, in the field of defense, in the field of commerce and finance.

The Scope of Britain's Contribution. Because of the worldwide nature of our involvement it would be unfair to attempt to assess the value of the contributions being made by either Britain or the United States merely by adding up what is done on our own territories or within the Atlantic area.

I was strongly reminded of this the other day when I was reading an article in a recent issue of *The Saturday Evening Post*, which was charging that Britain was not bearing its fair share in the sense of Europe. I will not attempt this morning to correct some of the detailed inaccuracies in an article which, for example, described the British Army of the Rhine, one of the best-trained and best-equipped armies we have ever placed on the continent of Europe, as consisting of the equivalent of two rather feeble divisions. That is not the case, as I will explain later. The basic fallacy of the article, however, is that it completely ignores the large forces which we maintain outside continental Europe, either on our own soil ready to go to any point on the surface of the globe, or spread around the world in fulfillment of other treaty commitments, supporting the eastern flank of NATO in the Middle

East, or deployed still further east in defending the security of the members of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, or protecting supply routes of strategic importance from bases in Malta, Cyprus, Aden, Gibraltar, Singapore, and elsewhere. The article went on to compare the incomparable and came out with the triumphant statistic that the Germans, who, of course, have their forces stationed on their own soil, and do not have such overseas commitments, are contributing to the alliance three times as many divisions as the British and French combined. Our contribution is, in fact, three divisions in Europe and a tactical Air Force, all of them in Germany. This compares with six divisions contributed by the United States, and I hardly need remind this audience that your population in this country is roughly four times that of Britain, and your gross national product is seven times ours.

The alleged deficiencies of the British are said to be due to the unwillingness of the British to impose conscription in peacetime, or to endanger the balance in their international payments. I would like to deal with both these points. First, the decision not to continue with conscription was made a number of years ago. In 1957 we adopted a five-year defense plan involving what was described at the time as the biggest change in military policy ever made in normal peacetime. Our thinking then was, and still is, that we must be ready for two types of war: world war (however remote and much to be deplored) and local war. It was clear that in a global war fought with nuclear weapons we would not have time to mobilize a vast citizen Army of conscripts. It was also thought that in our case the needs for local or brushfire war could not be met by the existing type of semiconsript Army. This was partly because dealing with the sort of numbers we had, a very large proportion of our professional army was tied down in training conscripts, who remained for only a comparatively short period in the armed forces and were required to serve very often in very distant places such as Singapore or Aden. Therefore, the effective work that was done by these conscripts, as compared to the amount of resources that had to be put into training them, was thought by us to be excessive. Our need on both counts (global war and local war) was for a well-trained and purely professional Army, and, in addition to this, an ever-ready strategic reserve which could be quickly deployed by air and sea to trouble spots around the world. These professional forces are backed by reserve forces which have recently been put on a basis enabling them to be called up at very short notice. In particular, specialists or technical personnel are very quickly available; this is where we

usually find that there are some gaps in our established forces. We now have legislation which enables specialists and technical personnel to be recalled very rapidly to the colors and sent to fill gaps in our professional forces which have developed by uneven recruiting and other reasons.

The Balance of Payments Problem. Turning now to the balance of payments problem; the immensely complex question of how allied nations can maintain a balance in their international payments and finance military expenditure overseas is raised and disposed of in a sentence or two in the article to which I referred. This problem, it is argued, cannot provide an excuse for Britain's alleged reluctance to keep troops in Europe because the United States has its balance of payments problems, too. I think that this particular problem does require rather more detailed and deep study.

It is, of course, always difficult for both Britain and the United States to maintain a balance between expenditures overseas and their receipts from overseas. The reason is the same for both countries. Both of us export more than we import and could accumulate a comfortable surplus if we kept our troops within our own frontiers, reduced aid to underdeveloped areas, restricted overseas investment, and did not have the responsibility of providing the two international currencies in which practically all the Free World's trade is conducted. The cost of these items to both of us is similar in terms of our respective gross national product. Thus, we devote about 1.2% of our gross national product to overseas aid and investment, while the United States devotes about .9% of its gross national product for these purposes. In the case of overseas military expenditure, we find that the burden is very similar, expressed again in terms of a percentage of our gross national product. But in certain respects this whole problem is even more significant in Britain's case because of certain essential differences between the nature of our two economies. We are first and foremost a trading nation, dependent on earning foreign exchange through exports in a way that the United States, with its own vast internal resources of food and raw materials, is not. We have almost no natural resources and must import one third to one half of the food we eat. Our people exist by a process of importing raw materials, exercising our skill upon them, and exporting the resulting manufactured goods in order to obtain the foreign exchange to buy our food plus more raw materials to keep our economy going. Our exports of goods account for some 16% of our gross national product—yours for

some 4% of your gross national product. If you add to exports of goods, income earned from abroad, for example, from such services as shipping, the disparity is even greater; the final total would amount to some 27% of our GNP and to only 5.2% of the United States GNP. We are obliged, therefore, to keep a careful watch on the actual direct cost in foreign exchange in our overseas military expenditure, and also upon the loss in foreign exchange resulting from the diversion of man power, of steel, and of raw materials from our export industries to our armaments industries.

Despite this position, our expenditure for defense has been running at a rate of more than 7% a year for the last decade and compares favorably with that of the other North Atlantic nations, with the exception of the much richer United States which devotes about 10% or just under of its GNP to defense. For us this involves a burden of taxation as great as, if not greater, per capita than that of any other country in the world. Unfortunately, we cannot completely ignore the facts of financial life and the basic characteristics of our British economy. It is not going to help our allies if Britain goes broke or is continually beset by balance of payments crises as it has been for many years since the war, and since a war which increased our indebtedness to the rest of the world by no less than three billion dollars.

Summing up before we proceed to what I hope will be a frank session of cross-examination, let me attempt an inventory of the contribution of Britain to the alliance, including those items which I have mentioned, with one or two additions.

First, a stable political society, in which all the parties who are likely to assume power are committed to support the foreign and defense policies of the North Atlantic Alliance. These policies incidentally include steadily increasing allocations to foreign aid which we have doubled in the last five years.

Second, a sound and expanding economy backed by one of the most highly skilled and best-equipped labor forces in the world, working under conditions of stable prices and full employment. These are assisted, moreover, by a corps of technicians and scientists who appear to be so highly regarded internationally that we have great difficulty keeping them at home. I think, also, that we seem to be getting our fair share of the Nobel prizes.

Third, a central position in international trade through which Britain acts as a banker, manufacturer, and trader for a large part of the Free World, and provides for its use a currency in which some one half of all its international trade is conducted.

Fourth, some valuable military bases, not only in Britain itself, but at strategically situated points throughout the world, some of them vital for the effective deployment of the United States forces and the protection of their lines of communication.

Fifth, all-professional armed forces which are the most numerous we have ever maintained during peacetime in our history. These are, as I expect you know, being reorganized under the expanded Ministry of Defence along lines very similar to those adopted here in the United States.

Gentlemen, you will note that I have succeeded in delivering a rather lengthy lecture without making any reference to our common heritage except to dismiss it, or to Anglo-American relations as such. Let me add, therefore, in one sentence or two, that when two peoples have to work together in the various enterprises I have mentioned, it does make a difference and it does help every working arrangement if, in fact, we do speak something like the same language, and have the same scale of human values to which Admiral Austin referred. That has been the experience of all branches of our armed services and of our foreign service, and I do not think it is necessary to elaborate on it here except to say that I am sure that not only we, but the world, would be poorer if these close personal ties were ever allowed to deteriorate.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

THE RIGHT HONORABLE SIR DAVID ORMSBY GORE, K.C.M.G.

William David Ormsby Gore, the son and heir of Lord Harlech, was born May 20, 1918. His father, the 4th Baron, was for 28 years a Member of Parliament and at one time Secretary of State for the Colonies; on his mother's side he is a grandson of the 4th Marquess of Salisbury and is descended from the Cecil family.

He was educated at Eton and New College, Oxford, where he studied history. On leaving Oxford in the Summer of 1939, he joined the Territorial Army, and during the Second World War he served with the Berkshire Yeomanry as an Air Observation Pilot, later as Adjutant, and, from 1944-1946, on the General Staff at the War Office, with the rank of Major.

After the war his father announced that he had made over to his heir the ownership of his lands. Sir David became managing director of the Brogyntyu Estate Company, and he himself farms 400 acres in Shropshire. He has retained his interest in agriculture and is a governor of the Royal Agricultural Society of England.

Sir David was brought up in an intensely political atmosphere, and has been a keen student of politics since he was at Oxford, where he was a member of the Canning and Stratford Clubs. In October 1948, he was adopted as prospective Conservative candidate for Oswestry, a largely agricultural constituency; he was elected in the General Election of 1950 and reelected in 1951, 1955 and 1959.

In 1955, on a Smith-Mundt Grant, he visited the United States and lectured to International Affairs groups in many cities and at various universities, including Harvard, New Mexico, Pomona and Southern Methodist. He has appeared on television and on radio both in the United Kingdom and in the United States.

Sir David has been a member of the Executive Committee of the National Trust and of the British Council.

He was invested K.C.M.G. (Knight Commander of the Order of St. Michael and St. George) by H.M. The Queen immediately prior to sailing for his post in Washington.

Sir David took up his post as British Ambassador to the United States in October 1961, after nearly five years as a member of the Government. He had served as Joint Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from November 1956 until January 1957, when he was promoted Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and created a Privy Councillor. From 1950 until 1961 Sir David was Conservative Member of Parliament for Oswestry. In November 1951, he was appointed Parliamentary Private Secretary to the then Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, a position he held until 1954. He was an alternate British delegate at the United Nations General Assembly in Paris in 1951-52, and in New York in 1954.

As Minister of State, Sir David led the British delegation to the United Nations whenever the Foreign Secretary was absent, and attended the meetings of the Economic and Social Council. He also led the British delegation during the protracted negotiations at Geneva on disarmament and on the cessation of nuclear tests. He took special responsibility for European affairs, and almost his first task was to be British spokesman at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, where he delivered the 'Grand Design' speech, advocating the bringing together of all European organizations.

RECOMMENDED READING

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find them of interest.

The inclusion of a book or article in this list does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein. They are indicated only on the basis of interesting, timely, and possibly useful reading matter.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Certain of the books on the list which are not available from these sources may be available from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books are obtainable on loan. Requests from individual officers to borrow books from an Auxiliary Library Service Collection should be addressed to the nearest of the following special loan collections:

Chief of Naval Personnel (G14)
Department of the Navy
Washington 25, D.C.

Pearl Harbor Naval Base Library
Navy No. 128
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California 96614

Library
U.S. Naval Station
San Diego, California 92136

Library, ALSC
U.S. Naval Station
Box 169, Navy 926
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California 96910

Library
U.S. Naval Station
Norfolk, Va. 23511

BOOKS

Thayer, Charles W. *Guerrilla*. New York: Harper & Row, 1963. 195p.

Unconventional warfare did not originate with the communists. Historically, it was recorded some 2,000 years before Marx by the Chinese. Its first modern theorist, T.E. Lawrence, outlined basic principles in his *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*. The author of the book under review was graduated from West Point, resigned his commission to enter the Foreign Service, and headed the OSS mission to Tito's Partisans during World War II; he thus seems eminently qualified to write on the subject of guerrilla warfare. He begins with a critique of United States operations in South Vietnam 'as prescribed by regulations' and in the Bay of Pigs. These fiascos are contrasted with Magsaysay's success versus the Huks, the Tito victory over Mikhailovich, and the Giap campaign in Indochina. Later chapters deal with the Greek civil war, Malaya (where although the ratio was 25 to 1, the struggle lasted ten years, with a final total of 6,000 dead Reds and 3,000 captured), terror in Cyprus, the Soviet partisans in World War II, the 35-day Warsaw uprising, and Latin America. It is obvious that the U.S.S.R. will continue to support this type of irregular 'warfare by proxy.' To combat this threat more effectively, Mr. Thayer suggests in his conclusions the establishment of an Irregular Warfare Command.

Fischer-Galati, Stephen. *Eastern Europe in the Sixties*. New York: Praeger, 1963. 239p.

This book is a compilation of eight articles, each by a different author, which were written to cover specific topics as suggested by the editor. The attempt to present and interpret the principal developments in Eastern Europe appears, in this reviewer's opinion, to have been successful. Each article approaches the problem from a different viewpoint, yet there is cohesiveness in the discussion of the problems of the overall area involved. The book is divided into the three parts: I - The New Social Order, II - The Planned Economy, and III - The Politics of Peaceful Coexistence. Grouped under these headings are observations on the following subjects: the society, education, agriculture, industry and labor, trade patterns, and political order; and a discussion of both East Europe and world communism, and East Europe and the noncommunist world. The volume is an excellent work for an overview of the problems facing East Europe; and the short Note section appended lists a limited number of works useful for further research.

Caidin, Martin. *Overture to Space*. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1963. 300p.

Mr. Caidin clearly covers in detail the evolution of the United States space program from the earliest days up to 1963. His book is written for the layman in nontechnical terms. The author is very critical of our national space policies and the civilian administration in Washington, especially the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and cites numerous specific examples to illustrate what he considers to be unfortunate organization and policy decisions. He points out the general lack of consistent planning and development programs as well as the lack of proper emphasis from top echelon authorities. He is an avid crusader for a strong space program and is very complimentary to the military services in his coverage of their efforts to further the development of a space program that would be second to none. His expressed opinions are factually documented and supported by quotes from official records and recognized authorities in the scientific, military, and political fields. *Overture to Space* is a brief yet comprehensive history of United States failures and successes in her space race with the Russians and of her plans for the future. The short epilogue subtly issues a somber visionary warning, which alarmingly emphasizes some of the implications of losing the race to the moon.

Gripp, Richard C. *Patterns of Soviet Politics*. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1963. 366p.

With the elementary clearness of a grade-school primer, an outline of Russian government and politics is set forth by author Gripp. His purpose: to dispel the myth that comprehension of communism and Soviet politics is impossible. Without the usual comparisons between East and West in agriculture, education, or science, the reader is restricted to a simple study of the subject—the structure and functioning of the present-day Soviet political and governmental systems—with a background of Czarist Russian and Soviet history. Additional features of Professor Gripp's 'patterns' include an elaborate treatment of regional and local government; two full chapters and an appendix on the Communist Party organization, rules, and functions; a number of clear charts and diagrams to illustrate organizational structure; an interesting appendix on the Constitution of the U.S.S.R.; and a glossary of Russian words and abbreviations. In addition to the chapters on the formal government and party structure, attention is given to economics, law, and foreign policy. There is a discussion of

communist theory, tracing its evolution through Marxism, Leninism, Stalinism, and post-Stalin developments. The material is up-to-date through 1962, and is presented in a readable, interesting style. This work is basic, but by this approach the author attains his objective.

Fulbright, J. William. *Prospects for the West*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963. 132p.

This volume of essays by the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations makes an excellent evening's reading for almost any thoughtful student of contemporary Western civilization. Delivered as the William L. Clayton Lectures on International Economic Affairs and Foreign Policy in the Spring of 1963 at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, these essays suggest certain directions of Western policy which seem appropriate to Senator Fulbright for the world conditions of our time. The book argues that the West should make it clear to the Soviets that it is not communism which is at issue between the Soviet Union and the West but communist *imperialism*; and that the Soviet Union, insofar as it renounces expansionist and subversive ambitions, can enjoy a safe and honorable national life without threat or danger from the West. The Senator supports the indivisibility of Western defense, the elevation of the NATO Council to the stature of a genuine organ of policy co-ordination, and many other interesting policy prescriptions too numerous to mention in a short review. The control of the nuclear deterrent, foreign aid, and the space race are among the subjects discussed. In his final chapter, 'The American Agenda,' concern is expressed lest an insufficient emphasis be given, in the selection of national priorities, to public education.

— NOTES —