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The Politics and Economics of European Integration

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and other matters are dealt with in several articles in this publication. Third, while committed to the values of Western civilization and to the alliance with the United States, Canadian analysts are sufficiently detached from the immediate emotions of United States–Soviet conflict to make their observations unusually impartial, enlightening, and (if one disagrees) impossible to reject without reexamining one's own thinking. The essay by Edward McWhinney, 'Soviet and Western International Law and the Cold War in the Era of Bipolarity,' is illustrative. It contains a splendid résumé of Soviet theories of international law, notes the consequences of Russian scholars' often unimaginative doctrinal orthodoxy, and concludes with a discussion of the development of Cold War 'rules of the game' with the Cuban crisis of 1962 as a case study. McWhinney's article is worth reading. Two of the other essays are in French, but should be read by those with a command of the language: Patry writing on international rivers ('Le Regime des Cours d'Eau Internationaux') and Morin on territorial waters ('Les Eaux Territoriales du Canada au regard du Droit International').

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Kitzinger, Uwe W. *The Politics and Economics of European Integration*. New York: Praeger, 1963. 246p.

Mr. Kitzinger's discourse on the political and economic logic of British alignment with Europe and the European Economic Community comes to a doleful conclusion on the basis of de Gaulle's veto of British membership. 'Neither Britain nor the European Community will ever be the same again; President Kennedy's 'Grand Design' lies shattered, and the Western Alliance has never been in such grave disarray.' Having argued cogently and fluently that Britain has no real long-run alternative to close European ties, the author proposes that she not take the rejection lying down; that, in effect, Britain should go over de Gaulle's head by initiating and supporting a far-reaching series of international political consultations and cultural-educational programs designed to show 'her friends on the Continent . . . that her application to Europe is not just commercial bargain-hunting but . . . that she is genuinely concerned with furthering the political unity of Europe.' Although Kitzinger writes from a British vantage point, he is particularly sharp in

his criticism of traditional British aloofness from Continental affairs, and brings out into the open the varieties of British anti-Continentalism ranging from intense xenophobia to the more thoughtful concerns about the differences in Anglo-Saxon and Continental law or the lack of common historical ties and experiences. He seems confident that effective leadership can outwait and outflank de Gaulle. Only history can appraise this judgment.

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Tuleja, Thaddeus V. *Statesmen and Admirals*. New York: Norton, 1963. 256p.

This book is a study of the various forces that worked to form, and at the same time confuse, the naval policy of the United States in the Pacific, primarily during the period between World Wars I and II. It reviews the frustrating years in which isolationists strongly influenced this country's foreign policies. Peace societies were prevalent, numerous conferences were held on naval limitations, and many groups were at work to downgrade sea power. During this time, our foreign policy varied considerably, and the Navy and State Departments frequently did not agree on the role of sea power in the Pacific. The author has made extensive research into various documents and has flavored his work with numerous quotations from official records. Considerable attention is devoted to the period just before World War II. It covers the efforts of President Franklin D. Roosevelt to build up sea power in the Pacific, highlighting the numerous reasons for the slowness in such a build-up despite his obvious favoritism toward the Navy and his pursuance of a foreign policy that made a clash with Japan in the Pacific almost a certainty. The book is easy to read and presents an interesting analysis of our vacillating naval policy in the Pacific prior to Pearl Harbor.

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