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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
REVIEW**

**Issued Monthly
U.S. Naval War College
Newport, R. I.**

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE EXTENSION COURSES

General Order Number 325 of 6 October 1884, established the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island, as a 'college for an advanced course of professional study for naval officers.' It soon became apparent that the resident courses could not educate the numbers of officers which the Service required. In order to overcome this deficiency and extend as much professional education as possible to all officers of the Navy, General Order Number 89, issued 1 April 1914, authorized the conduct of professional courses by correspondence. This was the beginning of the present Extension Education Department of the Naval War College. From the beginning the aim of this Department was to provide as many as possible of the educational benefits of the College to those officers of the naval Service not in residence. To this end the extension courses are continually reviewed and compared with the resident courses. The most recent revisions were made during calendar year 1962. Listed below are the courses currently available.

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION.

Two installments, approximately 60 study hours.

MILITARY PLANNING.

Two installments, 60 hours.

COMMAND LOGISTICS.

Three installments, 60 hours.

NAVAL OPERATIONS.

Two installments, 60 hours.

INTERNATIONAL LAW.

Six installments, 250 hours.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

Six installments, 250 hours.

READING COURSE, INTERNATIONAL LAW.

One installment, 50 hours.

READING COURSE, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

One installment, 50 hours.

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Four installments, 120 hours.

COUNTERINSURGENCY.

Four installments, 150 hours.

Prior to applying for any of these courses, consult BUPERSINST 1500.49 (series) which contains brief course descriptions, previous course equivalents, and present course prerequisites.

Officers on active duty should submit their applications for enrollment to the Extension Education Department, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, via their Commanding Officer.

Officers not on active duty should submit their applications for enrollment to the same address via the District Commandant or other command carrying their records.

Requests for detailed information on any of the courses should be made by informal letter direct to the Extension Education Department, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.

EVOLUTIONARY ASPECTS OF COMMAND

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 31 May 1963

by

Admiral Robert B. Carney, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

It has been eight years since I hauled down my flag for the last time, and I have misgivings about expressing conclusions concerning any military event occurring during those years. Nevertheless, I was afforded frequent and diverse opportunities to practice, and to observe, the workings of Command, and I trust that where these remarks may have current implications, I have correctly interpreted the trends since the day of my retirement. In any event, I feel personal pleasure and satisfaction in once more being invited to stand on this platform where I have confronted patient and courteous audiences on a number of occasions.

In 1961, I spoke to the faculty and students on 'The Gray Areas of Command and Decision.' My appearance, then, was timed to coincide with that part of the curriculum set aside for the specific examination of those two functions. On that occasion I outlined the ever-widening complex of interests which must be taken into consideration in the formulating of decisions at virtually every level, a situation in which there is implicit dilution of authoritative initiative by any one individual. The discussion illustrated the give-and-take inherent in latter-day decision-making, and also pointed out numerous examples illustrating how the actions of commanders, at various levels, were profoundly influenced by considerations originating outside of their own Command structures. It was explained how both, planners and commanders alike, are rarely free from the pressures of outside but legitimate interests of others. Actually, despite the bracketing of those two functions—Command and Decision—my earlier paper was weighted more toward the problems of decision-making. Today, I intend to direct my remarks to the executive function of Command.

As in the previous discussion of the gray areas, the speaker's objective today is to spotlight certain realities, and thereby provide a basis for the discussion, analysis, and introspection which are necessary if one is to understand the real factors of his own era, and his own walk of life. First, I would say that the qualifications for appointment to Command responsibility have a long history of evolution - and I am sure that the end is not yet in sight. This is as true of the exercise of Command, as it was previously shown to be in the field of decision-making.

Captain Bligh relied on seamanship, aloofness, nerve, and the cat-o'-nine-tails. By the yardstick of his times those were deemed to be adequate assets for commanding the *Bounty*. The outcome of his cruise on the *Bounty* might be interpreted as indicating differences between 'Command' and 'Leadership.' Today, as things have evolved in our Services, commanders no longer have unquestioned Olympian life-and-death authority, and Leadership is needed to inspire the sort of confidence and loyalty which can compel intelligent men obediently to follow. The Uniform Code of Military Justice by its restrictions on the authority of the individual, imposes obligations for leading by precept and intelligence not laid down even as recently as World War II.

To make a comparison closer to home than Bligh's times, in the decade, say of the thirties, the spectrum of Navy jobs and Navy life was relatively uncomplicated. Under the influence of Jutland, Navy thinking was predominantly influenced by tactical considerations, with the result that the Naval Establishment rested on the philosophy of a numerically large Fleet and a minimum Shore Establishment. Today, the situation is sharply reversed - so sharply, in fact, that sea billets for senior officers are hard to come by.

In the thirties, the rotation for officers up to the grade of lieutenant commander followed a pattern of three years at sea and two years ashore. Thereafter it was reversed - two years at sea and three years ashore. This we could count on, and we were reasonably certain as to the strictly Navy flavor of the assignments which might come our way. In the thirties, qualifying for selection and preparing one's self for higher responsibilities, were quite simple, viewed in retrospect. We in the Navy concerned ourselves solely with the Navy's business; we learned the mariner's trade; we endeavored to acquire reasonable understanding of the capabilities and limitations of ordnance and engineering; we learned how to estimate the Navy situation and to write intelligible Navy orders; we molded ourselves in the classic pattern of the seagoing leader; and we strove to acquire reputations as shiphandlers and tacticians. In the thirties, the sea officer had disciplinary authority which, while not countenancing the brutalities of other days, did nevertheless permit him to exercise far greater authority over the persons of his subordinates than is the case today. In the thirties, a naval officer's competence was measured by his Navy Fitness Reports and his response to formal professional promotion examinations. Such circumstances, characteristic of that particular period, all influenced the criteria of qualification for Command, and they illustrate the effect of current environment on Command criteria and practices.

World War II brought about some drastic changes in concept with respect to Command qualification and the exercise of Command. The

rapidly expanding Services brought an influx of patriotic citizens rallying to the flag, civilians at heart, unaccustomed to the regimentation of military life. Here, again, the importance of Leadership, as opposed to stark Command, was obvious. The ramifications of World War II forced a closer association of the Services, working together toward common objectives. There was need for planning on a scale that was new. Communications were improved, automatically opening doors for remote control of operations. New weapons and new techniques came into being overnight with attendant burdens of technological understanding. Certainly, as the war progressed, new technical horizons imposed new demands on commanders for widening their professional qualifications; furthermore, no officer had a place in the joint-operations scheme unless he acquired a grasp of many things outside of the Navy's own orbit. The business of Command was changing, changing. The postwar years have, perhaps, produced even more radical changes and developments: unification, alliances, a racing technology, weapons of undreamed of lethality, and an ever-increasing trend toward centralization. It is quite plain that over the years the environment of the times has profoundly affected the requirements, the privileges, the restrictions, and the obligations of Command. It is equally apparent that the attributes of Leadership, as opposed to raw authority, have assumed ever-increasing importance in military life.

And what of the environment of the sixties? I believe that the five phenomena presently having primary impact on Military Command are (1) service and national interdependences, (2) unification, (3) specialization, (4) civilian control and (5) centralization. Each has had, and is having, a profound influence on the practice of Command. As will be pointed out later, the impact is not on the Uniformed Services alone; there are also significant implications in the field of civilian control.

Let us examine these five prime factors. World War II forced recognition of the fact that the Services were mutually dependent upon each other at every step, from planning to combat and logistical support. Joint operations pointed up the vital necessity for professional knowledge and competence extending beyond the horizons of one's own Service. These expanded horizons of military understanding quickly became new and added requirements for Command competence. Those who lacked the perception, analytical objectivity, and the flexibility to see, and to adjust to, the new parameters arising from the developing strategic and tactical situations, soon faded from the comprehensive Leadership picture. Many officers, highly respected in the years between the wars, failed to qualify under the new criteria and unhappily surrendered their major positions of Leadership to others who saw, understood, and acted accordingly.

Wartime realization of the necessity for inter-Service co-ordination inevitably led to postwar analysis of the entire war effort with resulting conclusions to the effect that there had been costly duplications and profligate use of resources. Limited or parochial viewpoint not infrequently led to generalizations and extremist advocacy of complete merger of all fighting and support elements. Out of a welter of differing, and sometimes shrill, viewpoints came legislation which directed the establishment of authoritative co-ordination, but which preserved Service identities. Most people were at a loss precisely to define 'unification,' but the legislation of 1947 was generally, if somewhat loosely, accepted and spoken of as the 'Unification Act.'

Whatever the other effects of unification may have been, it certainly had an impact on Command in that it placed a further premium on an understanding of the viewpoints, the functions, the business, the management, and the aspirations of all the Services. Whether at the council table, in the planning conference, in the logistical and procurement agencies, or in the exercises of the operating forces, broader inter-Service knowledge was a prerequisite for effective participation in matters of joint interest; a Navy-only outlook was, and is, a professional impediment—one might say, a fatal impediment—to such participation.

To the change wrought by unification and the interdependence of the Services in the criteria of professional competence were added still further requirements brought about in connection with the alliances, doctrines, and facts involving our national undertakings and obligations. These made it necessary for the military practitioner to acquire a grasp of new geographical areas, and of other national mentalities, aspirations, organizations, and procedures. New dimensions of historical understanding, geopolitical knowledge, tact and tolerance were added to the qualifications necessary to be eligible for the numerous new assignments in the international field.

Let there be no doubt that the Department of Defense attaches great importance to this broadening of knowledge and participation. Those officers who perform at the DOD level wear the outward and visible sign of their broadened military horizons in the shape of special insignia. Experience in the joint fields of endeavor is a prerequisite for assignment to the top echelons of the Flag and General officer grades. This is a fact of life, and one more example of the impact of environmental change on the criteria for command qualification.

And now we come to one of the knottiest of our personal problems: specialization. There is no escaping the fact that every officer who has Command aspirations must now have a working understanding of the

technical problems affecting material performance and personnel capabilities. In every Command, large or small, technological principles and functions play a vital part in the capability for accomplishing the assigned missions and tasks of the Command; the officer in Command must be able to understand and to utilize the technical tools at hand, and he must be able intelligently to consider, and to decide on, recommendations and alternatives involving his equipment. It is manifestly impossible for every officer to become an expert in every technological field; and yet there will never come a time when some one officer will not be needed to make an intelligent decision involving a complex of systems, each requiring specialized knowledge beyond the grasp of any individual who has not devoted full time to the specialty concerned. In concept, this is not a new problem; it has always existed in some measure. The ship captain of the thirties needed a basic understanding of the capabilities and the limitations of his ship, his guns, his power plant, and his equipment. The same sort of need exists today, but the technologies of our times are more complicated, the rate of scientific advancement is swifter. What, then, is the answer?

Without presuming to recommend a fixed policy, or a specific educational program, it seems axiomatic that every officer who today aspires to Command must acquire a basic and fundamental scientific and technical understanding which goes far beyond what can be taught in four collegiate years. In other less complicated times the necessary additional understanding could be gleaned from manuals and publications—and homework. It is very doubtful if that sort of self-made-man program would be adequate for keeping up with the parade today. Some measure of universal and formal postgraduate instruction would appear to be needed as a prelude even to general qualification for Command, such instruction to include scientific basics which would lead to an understanding of the nature of technical problems. Only through the medium of some such technical groundwork can an officer acquire ability to evaluate technical recommendations and factors, and intelligently to make decisions as to the optimum operational use of modern weapons and equipment.

At this point, a question is sure to arise: What are the comparative advantages and penalties of specialization vis-à-vis the more general qualifications for broader co-ordinating or Command responsibilities?

First, it is necessary to face up to the fact that exclusive specialization precludes opportunities to learn by experience many of the other skills that make up the broad picture of over-all military competence. It is also necessary to recognize the needs of the High Command structure to grant increased rank authoritatively and effectively to command

subordinate echelons, and to focus emphasis on the supreme importance of the fighting forces in the military scheme. Implicit in these facts is the conclusion that the restricted specialist must content himself with a somewhat restricted rank ceiling.

On the other side of the coin he who elects, and is selected, to specialize finds satisfactions in devoting himself to his chosen field; he may escape much of the recurring uprootings of the General Line; and he acquires marketable qualifications as a hedge against the hazards of selection and involuntary retirement. But these advantages may not silence discontent with restricted prospects for career prestige, and it is therefore essential that there be worthy and acceptable goals within the specialties to attract and hold top quality men.

As to the various categories of commissioned officers, including the Staff Corps, Specialists, and even the Limited Duty group, each category has its own vital need for leadership, each category has its own technical problems, and each category today must be responsive to superior coordinating authority and to the impinging interests and needs of sister Services and other outside agencies. Therefore it is safe to say that all of the foregoing remarks, and those which follow, are applicable in great measure to all categories of commissioned officers. It is equally safe to say that we cannot do without full-time specialists, and that we must create specialist environments offering adequate rewards and satisfactions.

Reverting, for a moment, to the basic theme of this discussion, it is evident that requirements for specialization are having a powerful collateral impact on the specifications for Command qualifications, and that here again the criteria for the attributes of Command are being subjected to the pressures of evolution and change.

With the termination of hostilities in 1945 a new factor began to make itself felt on the military scene: civilian control. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the concept of civilian control began to change, for policy-level civilian control had always been implicit in the language of the Constitution and in the statutory provisions concerning the authority of the President and the Service Secretaries, and in the legislation having to do with appropriations and their utilization and management.

If this discussion dwells at some length on the subject of civilian control, it does so for two reasons. First, because civilian control coupled with centralization, appears to be overlapping some controls heretofore entrusted to the military. Second, because it is necessary that the fact, and the implications, of such overlapping be widely understood as a basis for intelligent approach to matters touched by this trend.

With the advent of unification in 1947 there began the evolution of the office of the Secretary of Defense. The original concept of a small group of policy co-ordinators soon proved illusory, and eventually subdivisions and large staffs came into being. Many functions previously administered by uniformed officers were taken over by civilian administrators. Understandably, firm convictions of military experience did not always find concurrence in the thinking and philosophies of the appointive civilian officials in whom ultimate control was vested. This phenomenon merits consideration because it does, in fact, have Command implications, and it is germane to the thesis that Command criteria change with changing times.

At the fountainhead of policy—Washington—ultimate policy decision is, of course, vested in civilian authority. This is as it should be; but it is axiomatic that civilian authority will view events and problems in the context of its own personal and individual experiences and past environments. It is equally axiomatic that certain military philosophies, bred and crystallized in the crucible of war against the elements and other adversaries, may not convincingly register on mentalities trained and experienced in totally different circumstances. Civilian questioning of our way of doing business is a recurring phenomenon. And this is quite natural. Each new administration brings in its own civilian executives who have an obligation and a natural desire to examine everything in their respective bailiwicks as a prelude to doing a job. Military thinking in the fields of operation, maintenance, management, personnel criteria, selection, promotion, etc., thus goes under the microscope periodically. There are advantages, and there are dangers, inherent in these cyclical examinations; they serve to prevent the Services from becoming complacent about their ways of doing things; but, on the other hand, there is room for error in civilian conclusions based primarily on civilian experience and on corridor and office observations.

Understandably, the fortunes and affairs of the denizens of the Pentagon are closer and more understandable to the civilian leadership than are the more remote problems and responsibilities of those who man the operating forces. However, where policy decision impinges on the competence, effectiveness, morale, and operational performance of those who man the fighting forces, there is a Command responsibility which devolves on civilian authority, and which calls for attentive and understanding harkening to the considered opinions of those who have spent their lives in preparing, maintaining, and operating our Armed Services to do the safeguarding job for which they were created. It is also a fact that success or failure in battle has traditionally been recorded and remembered as the responsibility of the uniformed leaders; historically that is not a responsibility to be laid at the door of American civilian leadership. Perhaps, under a concept of extreme centralization, history would call upon civilian leadership to assume a

greater measure of responsibility for the outcome of military operations. At one point, a reorganization plan placed the Service Secretaries in the chain of Command. This did not appear to be sound from the standpoint of professional and technical qualification, and it was subsequently rescinded.

One of the recurring aspects of civilian control has to do with the selection of officers for assignments and for promotion. Recently, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, there has been an examination of the criteria for selection to Flag rank. The underlying purpose of such a review is, obviously, an endeavor to determine what sorts of qualifications are required in the Flag grades, how these qualifications should be apportioned qualitatively and quantitatively, and what types are needed to provide the experience and the leadership which will be required from among the Navy's senior officers. Any such study inevitably will have overtones of interest in the entire philosophy of educating and training the officer corps - a factor which must immediately arouse the interest and close attention of officers in every grade because of implications concerning the criteria for advancement and qualifications for Command.

It would seem reasonable to expect that our civilian leadership might place different emphasis on that subject than would the experienced military professional. This is not to say that irreconcilable differences of viewpoint would be inevitable. However, it would be naive not to recognize the possibility of significant differences of viewpoint arising from the differences in the experiences and past environments of the civilian and military leaderships. Good can come of this if differing opinions as to the needs of the Navy, as seen from potentially different but mutually interested viewpoints, are wisely reconciled. Significant disregard of experienced professional opinion could lead to belief that career safety lies in the regard of politically appointed superiors. In any event, formulation of selection and assignment policies does have Command implications, and whenever civilian authority influences the shaping of those policies then civilian authority must assume a measure of Command responsibility.

It is worth repeating that the civilian executives of the Military Establishment have an over-all responsibility which extends to the outermost fringes of the operating areas, and therefore have a profound obligation to accord the views of the military thoughtful and respectful attention. As a corollary, Service leadership has a grave obligation to present its concepts of competence and leadership in documented and convincing manner. So, here again, is evidence that the concepts and practice of military Command are constantly subjected to pressures having implications of change. In this instance, we see factors which may tend toward the injection of appointive civilian viewpoint and authority into the basic policies of education, training, administration, and even the conduct of operations.

The fifth point which was mentioned as a prime factor in the environment of the sixties is centralization. This is a subject which is too complicated for more than the broadest of broad-brush treatment in any such discussion as this. Basically, it divides itself into three philosophical areas: (1) policy control; (2) operational control; and (3) administrative control. Centralization of operational control can be dismissed, here, by simple acknowledgment of the existence of the Unified and Specified Commands, and the capabilities for directing certain operations from Washington through the medium of available communications. From the standpoint of Field Command, such arrangements may stultify decision initiative to a certain extent, but they do not significantly alter the criteria of Command attributes. Evolutionary aspects do, however, enter the picture in that civilian leadership now does have the tools—staffs and communications—by which it can, if it chooses, exercise actual military direction of operations. In other words, even the operational aspects of centralization could have important implications with respect to civilian control. Civilian control and centralization are also closely interrelated in the fields of policy control and administrative control. Here, the possibilities and the actualities are accentuated.

Congressional inquiry and discussions in the various media of public information indicate current strong trends toward the centralization of controls in the person of the Secretary of Defense. Like functions previously handled in the military departments are being pulled into the Department of Defense for control and actual administration. Decisions in the fields of weapons and weapons systems are made at the DOD level, at times in opposition to military evaluation. The Service Chiefs have only very limited Command authority, and it appears that the JCS must be regarded as a primarily advisory agency. For many years there has been lively debate on the pros and cons of the all-powerful single Chief of Staff. Those earlier discussions were concerned with the advisability of placing great power of decision in the hands of one uniformed officer. Today, it would appear that such arguments are somewhat academic in view of the greater authority which has been assumed by the Secretary of Defense.

As disconcerting as these developments may be to the military, it must be recognized that somewhere along the line deciding positions must be taken when unanimity of military opinion does not exist, or when military viewpoint is not consistent with superior national policy. This is implicit in the legal responsibility of the Secretary of Defense for direction authority and control in the Military Establishment. The real issue thus becomes one of judgment by the deciding authority; and any real danger lies in such things as the potential for fallacy in one man's thinking, or the mathematical equating of business efficiency and

combat efficiency. Such factors are not cited with specific instances in mind, but as illustrating what can take place in a climate of civilian assumption of certain Command responsibilities.

There is one more facet of military business which, while not new, has been increasing in importance as a function of Command: management. Speaking now of the Navy, business and industrial management have been old hat to the Staff Corps for longer than my Service recollections cover, but there was a time when the typical Line officer did not concern himself with these matters. With the postwar formal establishment of Op-04 (Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Logistics) in the Navy Department, the problems of industrial, business and financial management became a charge on Line concern. In the late forties Comptroller-ship at the Department level was accorded recognition as an essential tool for managing the resources made available for the creation, support, and operation of the Forces. More and more, the Line has come to realize that the Comptroller, if left to his own devices without Command supervision and direction, would in effect take over many functions of Decision and Command. Parenthetically, it might be noted that the Air Force was the first of the Uniformed Services to recognize the Command implications of the Comptroller function. Succeeding DOD administrations have laid increasing emphasis on business administration procedures and techniques. This emphasis is currently so sharp that no program, of whatever nature, escapes cost-effectiveness scrutiny, and no officer-Line, Staff, Specialist, or LDO can dodge the necessity for presenting his proposals in terms acceptable to management scrutiny. All of these things are part and parcel of the evolutionary processes affecting Command in the United States Military Establishment. They are realities with which the military of today must live. They are realities which must be pondered, seriously and objectively, by those who aspire to, and are preparing themselves for, Command.

Thus far, this discussion has been primarily a recitation of events and developments which have led to changes in the qualifications for Command and in the mechanics of Command. Contributing factors have been pointed out without attempt to justify or criticize. And yet in any such discussion there must be implicit recognition of the fact that people, and the reactions of people, are involved and are inevitable. No black box has been devised successfully to control human emotions and responses. Consequently, a consideration of the developments just recounted is certain to give rise to human questions, human doubts, human plans and objectives, human apprehensions, and human hopes.

What can be distilled, by way of guidance, from an examination of the evolution of this business of Command? First, I fear that much of

the existing literature on the subject will be of but limited help to the laborer in the military vineyards of the sixties. No one has yet improved on the character and personality specifications which John Paul Jones laid down for the guidance of naval officers. He was far ahead of his times in his dream of the truly professional naval officer, and, today, any officer would benefit by an endeavor to live up to the standards which John Paul Jones enunciated. Nevertheless, he who aspires to Command today, must develop within himself skills and understandings not dreamed of by that great fighter of the days of sail.

The same might be said of many other treatises on the subject of Command penned in earlier days. Much that was accepted as gospel in years gone by, no longer can be considered as covering the subject to include all of the additional obligations and responsibilities which have been imposed on military officers by the developments of recent years. Nor, as far as I know, is there available much in the way of codified guidance on these matters. However, there are some signposts along the military road. For every man who wears an officer's uniform, be he Line, Staff Corps, Specialist, or what have you, there are certain attributes of attainment and character that are essential to qualify for leadership. To name some: understanding of superior policy; understanding of the missions and structures of related organizations; professional competence; willingness to assume responsibility; understandings of the techniques of guidance, delegation, and supervision; capacity for articulate presentation; loyalty up and loyalty down. With these in one's personal inventory, any officer—Line, Staff Corps, or Specialist—can reasonably hope for command assignment within his sphere, and can contemplate the responsibilities of command with self-assurance. Deficiencies in one or more of those attributes condemn to mediocrity.

Despite controls which may at times inhibit initiative, there is still a whale of a Command job to be done, and there are innumerable opportunities for displaying leadership. Each has it in his power to guide his subordinates to responsive competence and confident disciplined behavior. Each has endless opportunities to lead and to guide and to inspire; by his inspections he can set standards; through knowledge and fairness he can set goals and inspire both confidence and self-respect in his subordinates. These opportunities are open to junior officers as well as to the Flag grades with their wider horizons.

The Staff Corps man with a desk job may, by the quality of his performance, make his efforts felt in the farthest reaches of the Fleet and the Shore Establishment. He may have an important impact on industry's participation in the national defense effort. If his job is one of importance in the Shore Establishment, he assumes obligations of precept, direction,

supervision, management, the wise handling of military and civilian personnel, and heavy custodial responsibilities. All of these things are functions of Command and are essential to the smooth performance of the military machine.

The opportunities and the responsibilities in the field of the Specialist fall into the same pattern. He must, of course, excel in the techniques of his specialty, but there is more to it than that. Whether he is engaged in research, technical development, administrative activities, instruction, or the management of some project or installation, the attributes of Command and leadership come into play; the greater his ability to make use of those attributes the greater will be his value in the defense effort, and the better his prospects for advancement.

Entirely outside each Service's framework there are scores and scores of billets being manned by military officers of every category. For the most part such billets are concerned with various aspects of staff work, but the need for leadership capability is no less in that environment than it is elsewhere. What I am saying is this: Regardless of the field of endeavor, the measure of success will largely be determined by the measure of leadership demonstrated. At every level leadership is required, and leadership will only be achieved by mastering those fundamentals which make for loyal obedience to superior authority, intelligent co-operation with related activities, and the successful channeling and co-ordinating of the efforts of subordinates.

Here at the Naval War College Command and Decision are considered in conjunction. It might be easy to fall into the habit of thinking of 'commandanddecision' as one word - something like 'damnyankee.' However, the two functions should be mentally sorted out, for there are factors in each of the processes which will call for attributes not necessarily of equal importance in both. For example, in the business of formulating decisions, there are undoubted opportunities for council and conference leadership where the emphasis will be on a comprehensive grasp of the 'gray areas' involved in the problem at hand and on powers of persuasion. On the other hand, the Commanding Officer of a ship or an operating unit may not have much to say about superior Decision, but he is confronted with the obligations and responsibilities of Command 24 hours a day - on the bridge, instructing his officers, inspecting, maintaining morale and discipline, and functioning intelligently in the field of public relations.

By its very title this discussion is identified as an exercise to point up origins of innovations in Command concepts which have been born of changing circumstances. We have seen some examples of creeping

infringement of military Command initiative. However, it is safe to predict that there will never come a time when the military Services will be able to turn their business and their operations over to computers and to put the Command types out to pasture. If our country is to place justified reliance in its Armed Services, the proven standards of military character can never be relaxed. If Service-wide emphasis on leadership and Command is diluted, our Services will find it difficult, if not impossible, to live up to the proud record of the past. So I would say to every uniformed officer that as important as the latter-day professional criteria may be, they alone do not constitute a substitute for military character, leadership attributes, and the ability to 'take charge' with wisdom and firmness, and in a manner to inspire the confidence and respect of seniors and subordinates. On the other side of the coin, those who exercise civilian control of the military under our American system should realize that even the greatest mastery of the skills of civilian life does not carry with it an automatic competence to pass judgment on what it takes to make a dependable and properly armed fighting man and fighting force.

One last thought: As each generation approaches the end of its allotted span, it views with concern the modern new-fangled developments. 'The Navy isn't what it used to be' - and, I suspect, it never was. My generation lived through what, to us, seemed to be startling changes, and we accommodated to them, survived them, and usually harnessed them. Later generations undoubtedly will work out a *modus vivendi* for recent changes and those which are sure to come. It can all work out in the end with the help of intelligence and objectivity, the wit to see and to analyze impending change, the mentality to arrive at sound and reasoned conclusions, and the integrity and moral fibre to stand by those conclusions.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Admiral Robert B. Carney, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

Admiral Carney was appointed to the U.S. Naval Academy in 1912, and graduated with a B.S. degree and a commission as Ensign, on 3 June 1916.

His first assignment was to the battleship *New Hampshire*. In October of that year he was transferred to the *USS Dixie*, a tender to the Atlantic Torpedo Flotilla. In 1917 he was ordered to the destroyer *Fanning* and in July of 1918 was ordered to the Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation in Squantum, Massachusetts, in connection with fitting out the *USS Laub*. He remained with that ship when it was commissioned, and later was given command. From 1920 to 1928 he served aboard the *USS Reno*, *USS Rathburne*, *USS Delphy*, *USS Mississippi*, and *USS New Mexico*.

From August 1928 to April 1930 Admiral Carney served in the Division of Fleet Training, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. He was then ordered to sea duty in the *USS Cincinnati*. Between June 1933 and June 1935 he was Commanding Officer of the Receiving Station of the Washington Navy Yard and War Plans Officer of the Naval Gun Factory and Washington Navy Yard and District. From 1936 to 1937 he commanded the *USS Buchanan* and the *USS Reid*, both destroyers.

His next duty was in the Shore Establishment Division of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy from August 1938 to June 1940. When Crown Prince Olaf of Norway visited Washington during his American tour in the summer of 1939, Admiral Carney served as his naval aide.

In June 1940 the Admiral joined the *USS California*, and served as Executive Officer until February of the following year. He next had staff duty with the Support Force of the Atlantic Fleet from March 1941 until September 1942.

In 1942, Admiral Carney assisted in fitting out the light cruiser *USS Denver*, which he commanded in the Southwest Pacific from October 1942 until July 1943. He was Chief of Staff and Aide to Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., Commander of the South Pacific Force, from July 1943 to June 1945, after which he was assigned to the staff of the Commander of the Third Fleet in the same capacity. In August 1945, Admiral Carney formally accepted the surrender of Yokosuka, Japan's second largest secret naval base, at the entrance to Tokyo Bay.

Ordered to duty in February 1946 as Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics) at the Navy Department, the Admiral later assumed the duties of Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics and continued in that capacity until 1950.

On 1 April 1950, Admiral Carney took over formal command of the Second Task Fleet in the Atlantic. Five months later he was assigned as Commander in Chief of the United States Naval Forces in the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean. On 18 June 1951 he became Commander in Chief of Allied Forces in Southern Europe and the Allied Naval Forces in Southern Europe. He assumed the position of Chief of Naval Operations on 17 August 1953.

In August 1955, Admiral Carney retired and since then has been serving as Chairman of the Board of Bath Iron Works, and as Director of Fairchild Engineer Aircraft Corporation and Nation-Wide Securities Company, Inc.

EGYPT'S RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION: AN APPRAISAL

A Research Paper written by

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INTRODUCTION

The cold war struggle between the free world and the communist bloc continues with increasing intensity, shifting rapidly from one part of the globe to another. While focusing attention on one area, the communists prepare to launch a new drive in yet another area. Communist tactics have recently shifted the Western powers' attention from the Far East to Europe and then to South America. Meanwhile, communist activities have been relatively quiet in another vital and potentially explosive area—the Middle East.

Egypt is considered the most important Arab state. (28:50) Because of her size, population, military strength, and nationalistic appeal, she is able to exert much influence on other Middle East states. The country is of strategic importance also, for whoever controls Egypt can control the flow of oil to Europe, cut a major communication artery, and gain a bridgehead to Africa.

The Soviet Union has recognized the importance of Egypt. In 1955 the Soviet Union initiated the communist Middle East offensive by increasing political, military, economic, social, and cultural relations with Egypt. Other communist bloc countries soon followed suit, with the result that Egypt has been subject to significant communist influence.

Some seven years have passed since the communist bloc and Egypt began to develop firmer relations. In view of tense cold war issues elsewhere in the world, it is considered prudent to pause and make an assessment of Egypt's relationship with the communist bloc. What brought about their firmer relations? What have been the nature and effects of the relationship? What is the future outlook? These are questions which must be answered if we are to accurately gauge the influence of the communist bloc on Egypt and similarly the communist threat to the Middle East.

A complete assessment of the over-all relationship must encompass Egypt's political, military, economic, social, and cultural associations

with the entire communist bloc, as well as interrelationships and total effects. The influence exerted by Egyptian communists should also be considered. Such a broad assessment is beyond the scope of this writing. This paper will be limited to a consideration of Egypt's political, military, and economic relations with the Soviet Union from 1955-1962. Egypt's relations with other individual communist bloc countries will be discussed only as necessary to show the impact of Soviet economic activities. Although limited in scope, the appraisal should provide meaningful insights to the Egypt-Soviet relationship.

The purpose of this paper is, therefore, an appraisal of Egypt's political, military, and economic relations with the Soviet Union, in order to determine the cause of the relationship, the nature and effects of the relationship, and the future prospects for the relationship.

To accomplish the purpose, this paper will be developed in the following manner. First, necessary background information will be considered in order to gain an understanding of the circumstances and factors which led to the relationship. The political aspects will then be examined, followed by a discussion of the military and economic aspects of the relationship. Finally, factors expected to influence future relations will be explored and conclusions drawn.

I. BACKGROUND AND UNDERSTANDING

Egypt's move toward closer relations with the Soviet Union, as signaled by the Soviet-Egyptian arms agreement in 1955, was viewed with alarm and distrust by the Western powers. (27:211) In view of the Western reaction, an appraisal of the relationship that ensued should commence with an examination of the circumstances which precipitated the relationship.

The Setting. Shortly before 1955, Egypt experienced a change in leadership and was subsequently to steer a new course in national and international affairs. The country gained its independence from Great Britain in 1922; however, in the years that followed, successive national governments had not developed a viable economic and political structure. As the result, governmental corruption prevailed, living conditions were substandard, class distinctions were great, the economy was weak, and the population was increasing faster than food could be produced. (61:277-278) On July 23, 1952, a military junta overthrew the existing Egyptian government. (50:6) This group was faced with a monumental task and lacked experience for such an undertaking. Authoritarian leadership prevailed, and in 1954 Gamal Abdel Nasser, a principal leader in the coup, was recognized as the strong man of Egypt. Nasser declared his dedication to the improvement and development of Egypt; but he also had other goals, which to him required immediate attention.

Foremost among Nasser's aspirations was the complete elimination of 'imperialism.' In his eyes this included Israel, which had been brought about by 'imperialistic' powers. (33:98) Nasser remembered Egypt's humiliation and defeat during the Palestine War of 1948. Confronted by growing Israeli strength, he sought to increase Egypt's military preparedness.

Concomitant with the elimination of 'imperialism,' Nasser included three other goals. He sought to unify the Arab world, to provide leadership for Africans, and to ultimately unify Moslems throughout the world. (33:98-114) The dormant nationalistic desire of the Arab people to regain their world stature was strongly reflected in Nasser, who saw Egypt as the nation to lead the way. Nasser obviously needed military, financial, and economic support. He made known his needs to both East and West.

Although relatively poor and underdeveloped, Egypt has always been of strategic importance to world powers, by virtue of her geographical location. In the context of the cold war, Egypt began to assume even greater importance to the Western powers in their efforts to contain

communist expansion. With the gradual withdrawal of British and French influence from the Middle East, the United States began to take a more active interest in bolstering the area against possible communist encroachment. Previous Western efforts to bring Egypt into a Middle East defense alliance against communist aggression met without success in 1951. (50:5) The appearance of a new regime in Egypt presented the West another opportunity to enlist Egypt's co-operation.

Hopeful of closer relations with Egypt, the United States assisted in negotiations for the removal of British forces from the Suez Canal Zone and promised firm commitments for military aid to Egypt. (6:68-69) (50:8) The Suez agreement was concluded on July 27, 1954, and the United States agreed to assist with Egypt's economic development program—to include the Aswan Dam, which was Nasser's key development project. (50:8) The situation appeared to be developing well for both the United States and Egypt; but the honeymoon was short-lived, as the two parties could not agree on the terms for military equipment.

After failing to obtain arms from the United States on his conditions, Nasser negotiated with the communist bloc nations. Accordingly, in September 1955, Egypt concluded an agreement to obtain arms from Czechoslovakia. (53:731) The agreement triggered strained relations between the United States and Egypt, withdrawal of the United States offer of assistance for the Aswan Dam, and closer relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union. What brought Egypt's turn to the East? John C. Campbell has indicated that the precipitating events were the following: Israel's attack on Gaza in February 1955, which highlighted Egypt's failure in not obtaining arms from the United States; and the Baghdad Pact, a defense alliance including Turkey and Iraq, which infuriated Nasser. (6:69) These events undoubtedly contributed; but they were also indicative of the more fundamental causes—attitudes and interests, coupled with communist opportunism.

Attitudes and Interests. Nasser's attitude toward 'imperialism' reflects the deep resentment of the Arab toward the West. (27:214) For centuries the country had been ruled by, or under the dominating influence of, foreign powers and most recently Western powers. The social unrest and the poor state of development in Egypt was associated with previous external influence. As a result, the people had developed a burning desire to break away from outside influence. Any overture which could be misconstrued as further efforts to dominate would be looked upon with suspicion and distrust. The United States, being of Western culture and tradition, was associated with 'imperialism.' Unfortunately, actions and inactions of the United States were misinterpreted by Egyptians as efforts to increase Western hegemony, if not to replace British influence.

The United States problem in dealing with Egypt was one of conflicting interests. The Baghdad Pact was a step forward in Middle East security against communist aggression. Conversely, Nasser was angered over the Pact and the United States support of it, as the Pact was counter to his plans for Arab unity under Egyptian leadership. Nasser wanted arms, without conditions stipulated by the United States. United States arms aid, however, was predicated on mutual security arrangements. (53:783) Nasser wanted arms to meet the growing Israeli 'threat,' but the United States was supporting Israel's development. To arm Egypt with offensive weapons would have caused an imbalance in the then existing situation between Israel and Egypt. Thus interests of the United States were not compatible with those of Nasser and were viewed by the latter as efforts to intervene and to influence.

Although anti-Western by nature, Egyptians had not considered themselves involved in the cold war struggle. (22:221) The need for a great deal of external assistance to accomplish his economic, military, and political goals soon changed Nasser's attitude toward a more active foreign policy. (27:215) A policy of nonalignment would provide the means of getting assistance from both West and East and might bolster Nasser's standing in the Arab world. Such a policy would also turn the attention of Egyptians from continuing internal difficulties. Nasser's contacts with Nehru and Tito, coupled with his success at the Bandung Conference, undoubtedly pointed out the advantages of playing West against East. Perhaps more important, acceptance of support from the communist bloc presented the only way of openly pressuring the West. Nor was communism a threat, as Egyptians had not been exposed to the dangers of communism. As Walter Z. Laqueur wrote, communism was '... some mythical invention, or perhaps a clever stratagem of American and European 'imperialists' . . .' (23:261) The communist economic system also appeared to offer a great deal for Egypt's development.

Egypt clearly needed a change, for its economic system and rate of development would not support Nasser's goals. In contrast to the United States, the Soviet Union represented a planned economy and one that had demonstrated rapid economic development. It served as an example for a backward state striving for fast development. Capitalism connoted 'imperialism' in Egypt and its opposite—socialism—was selected as the system of economic development. (28:78) Furthermore, to the Egyptians, the Soviet economic system was equated with change. Joel Carmichael observed that regardless of their personal opinion of communist ideology, the Egyptian leaders '... could not help but view the Soviet system . . . as remarkably fitted to their own situation.' (7:36) The attractiveness of the Soviet economic system, the desire to bring about rapid change, and the absence of communism as a threat oriented Egypt toward its socialistic involvement.

Communist Opportunism. While the West had been trying to organize the Middle East in a defense alliance, communist bloc activities had been confined to relatively unsuccessful local party activities. (2:13) The Soviets showed little overt interest in the Middle East following World War II, except for futile attempts to retain their hold on Iran and to gain an inroad to Turkey. Stalin viewed the stirrings of nationalist movements in the Middle East with disdain. (27:189) He adhered to the doctrine that only the proletariat, led by local communist parties, could bring about a true revolution. Nationalist leaders such as Nasser were unpredictable and could be likened to Kemal Ataturk who chose an independent course after receiving Soviet support. Consequently, there was no future in supporting such movements, as a country was either communist or non-communist.

Following Stalin's death in 1953, the new Soviet leaders took a different view toward nations emerging from 'imperialist' control. More could be gained from supporting, rather than ignoring or antagonizing such a nationalist movement. It was considered that communism would ultimately prevail because of the incompetence of nationalistic governments. (27:160) Meanwhile, advantages would accrue if the movement could be made to become militarily and economically dependent upon the Soviet Union.

Western efforts to organize a defense alliance in the Middle East, especially the Baghdad Pact, were viewed with alarm in Moscow as well as in Cairo. Action was indicated for the Soviet Union and the objectives were clear: block Western efforts to organize the area in a defense alliance; decrease the Arab countries' economic dependence on the West; cause the Arab countries to become dependent upon the communist bloc; and finally, bring about the collapse of nationalist governments and supplant them with communist regimes. (43:260) The results would be disastrous for the West. The Soviet Union would threaten the NATO flank, cut a major communication artery, control the movement of oil, and possess a bridgehead to Africa.

Egypt appeared to be the most promising point to begin the Soviet Middle East offensive. Nasser was becoming a symbol of Arab nationalism; he was impressed with neutralism, and he was becoming disenchanted with the West. (6:212) Egypt needed political support and military and economic assistance. The strategy was thus clear: support Arab nationalism; side with Egypt on all issues not in direct conflict with Soviet interests; lend emphasis to Nasser's anti-Western campaign; provide economic support to Egypt and tie her economy to the communist bloc. (16:679) The Soviet Union bode its time and waited for an opportunity to capitalize on Western mistakes. The waiting was not long. Arms, without 'strings,' proved the catalyst for closer relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union.

Summary. In 1955 Nasser sought military and economic assistance for Egypt, in furtherance of his aims to eliminate imperialism, to increase Arab nationalism, and to achieve Arab unity. He turned initially to the West, but was unable to obtain arms on his conditions. Fearing further Western influence and deeming nonalignment an advantageous policy, Nasser turned to the communist bloc, which to him posed no threat and appeared to have much to offer for Egypt's development. The Soviet Union saw an opportunity to initiate its Middle East offensive by supporting Egypt. The Soviet leaders hoped to reduce Western influence in Egypt, cause Egypt to become dependent on the communist bloc and eventually to bring her under Soviet domination.

II. POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP

The Soviet offensive in Egypt represented at the time a new communist strategy for domination—control through external rather than internal means. What, therefore, have been the nature and effects of the Soviet Union's political relations with Egypt? In 1957 the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, indicated that, to determine whether or not a country is controlled by international communism, one must consider the ' . . . actions or lack of actions which the government takes in its international and in its domestic affairs . . . ' (52:29) With this in mind, let us consider some of the major events in Egypt's political association with the Soviet Union.

Action and Reaction. Following the arms agreement in 1955, Nasser's prestige and that of the Soviet Union soared. Laqueur wrote that, in the eyes of Arabs, ' . . . Nasser had suddenly become the great liberator who had broken the Western yoke, and the Soviet Union became the only true and selfless friend of the Arab peoples.' (27:224) Almost overnight the Soviet Union became a power in the Middle East which would have to be considered by the West.

Egypt's declared policy became one of nonalignment which, although correct on the surface, caused much consternation in the West. The West distrusted Nasser's motives and feared that Egypt would become dependent upon the Soviet Union and align herself with the communists. Egypt reacted with propaganda attacks against the West, thus relations between that country and the United States became more strained. (27:212,229) Conversely, Egypt's relations with the Soviet Union became increasingly firmer.

Russia was quick to capitalize on growing Egyptian enmity toward the West. The Soviet Union increased diplomatic, cultural, social, and economic relations with Egypt, and with other Arab states, which became more receptive to Soviet overtures following Egypt's example. Efforts by the United States to caution Nasser against further involvement with the Soviet Union were misinterpreted as an attempt to employ economic pressure, and as further incursions against Egypt's right to independence of action. (29:132-134) Events which followed further exacerbated the situation. On May 16, 1956, Egypt announced her recognition of Communist China. On July 19, 1956, the United States withdrew its offer to assist in financing the Aswan Dam. Nasser's reply was nationalization of the Suez Canal. (50:14-15) Unintentionally, the United States caused Egypt to draw closer to the Soviet Union.

The ensuing Suez Canal crisis afforded the Soviet Union a principal opportunity to support Egypt's position and to earn her friendship. Soviet propaganda assailed Western 'imperialism' and espoused the Arab cause. Soviet 'volunteers' were offered to fight for Egypt and a massive Soviet world-wide propaganda effort demanded the withdrawal of Western and Israeli forces. The United States and the United Nations played major roles in effecting the evacuation of Western forces, but the Soviet Union was credited by Egypt as being her benefactor. Egypt's standing in the Arab world increased after the Suez Canal crisis and contributed to Nasser's plan for Arab unity.

On February 1, 1958, Syria merged with Egypt to form the United Arab Republic, a union that was to end in 1961. The Soviet Union would have preferred to deal with Syria separately, but it was not outwardly critical of the merger for fear that Soviet prestige might diminish. (27:259-261) Nasser considered the union a stride forward in Arab nationalism and Arab unity. The Soviets continued to support the new republic politically, militarily, and economically.

In 1958 Egypt's affiliation with the Soviet Union became increasingly better, while Egypt's relations with the United States grew generally worse. In the Spring of 1958, Nasser visited Russia where he was treated with great respect and many manifestations of Soviet-Egyptian solidarity were evidenced. The crises in Lebanon and Iraq again found Egypt and the Soviet Union closely aligned in support of Arab nationalism. An effort by the United States to curtail the United Arab Republic's apparent subversion of other Arab governments was assailed by Nasser and the Egyptian press. (44:286-297) The West's fears concerning Egypt's cold war position were supplemented by new fears regarding Nasser's nationalistic drive in the Middle East.

Soviet Influence. The important point is the degree to which Egypt's international actions toward the West and her domestic actions have been influenced by the Soviet Union. United States officials have been concerned over the Egyptian propaganda attacks against the United States. (53:245) As indicated by Laqueur, '. . . the weapons of the cold war are propaganda, and it would be difficult to argue that anti-Western propaganda emanating from the United Arab Republic is much milder than that coming from the Soviet Union.' (27:318-319) In all fairness, it must be pointed out that, in many cases, Nasser's anti-Western actions may have been due to his own xenophobia, his drive to eliminate 'imperialism' and his need for a 'scapegoat' rather than Soviet inducement.

Egypt rejected the Eisenhower Doctrine, an effort by the United States to show its willingness to support the sovereignty of Arab states. This

rejection of the Doctrine was attributed largely to Soviet propaganda influence. (27:244) Although well intended, the Eisenhower Doctrine placed emphasis on support against communist aggression which, to the Arabs, posed no threat. Another indicator of Egypt's political position is her stand at the United Nations.

The United Nations is a world forum where states publicly exhibit their political positions on many international issues. A review of United Nations yearbooks from 1956-1960 indicates that on several political questions, such as the representation of Mainland China, the Cuban issue, and certain disarmament issues, Egypt sided with the Soviet Union. More often, Egypt has *abstained* from voting on political issues between West and East. In one instance, the Hungarian issue, Egypt's abstention served the Soviet cause equally well because an abstention signified a failure to condemn Russian actions in Hungary. It is significant to note that, in most cold war issues, Egypt has taken a neutral position with other traditionally nonaligned states.¹

Nasser has continually opposed communism in Egypt. (4:766) The Communist Party in Egypt has no legal status and in January 1962, was reported to consist of no more than 1,000 members. (57:67) Apparently, Nasser has felt adequately secure in his relations with the Soviet Union to suppress communism in Egypt. The Soviet leaders have undoubtedly been willing to overlook Nasser's opposition to Egyptian communism in hopes of greater long-range benefits. But as Dr. Charles H. Malik was quoted in *Newsweek*: 'It isn't that the membership of the . . . party has increased so much as it is that people are more prepared to co-operate with the communists and to expect great things from them.' (9:50)

It is evident that the development of a favorable image of the Soviet Union in Egypt can be attributed to the Soviet's ability to exploit Western mistakes and to side with Egypt without encountering conflicting interests. However, as Soviet interests began to spread to other parts of the Middle East, its cloak of respectability and its credo of nonintervention began to fade. The first step came as the result of Soviet ventures in Iraq.

Conflicting Interests. Nasser viewed the Iraqi revolution as an opportunity to expand the United Arab Republic, but his hopes were dashed by the rising influence of Iraqi communists who were opposed to the union. Russia considered Iraq, with its strong Communist Party, a prize even greater than Egypt. A communist-dominated Iraq would drive a wedge

¹See Bibliography items 62-66.

between the Baghdad Pact states of Iran and Turkey, so the Soviet leaders chose to support Iraq as they were supporting Egypt. The conflict between Egypt and Iraq widened. Nasser denounced Iraqi communists and blamed the Soviet Union for supporting Iraq and Iraqi communists. Nikita Khrushchev retaliated with propaganda attacks against Nasser. The quarrel between Nasser and Khrushchev soon subsided though, possibly because both parties realized the mutual advantages of their affiliation. (6:153) Nevertheless, the Soviet Union found itself in a dilemma of conflicting interests similar to that of the United States when the Baghdad Pact was formed.

In light of the increasing communist threat to his plans for Arab nationalism, the United Arab Republic, and Egypt's development, Nasser began a reappraisal of his relations with the Soviet Union. (16:680) Nasser had previously considered that he could deal with Russia as a state and not with communism. (27:244) But Nasser was quoted by George E. Kirk, in *Contemporary Arab Politics*, as saying in 1959 that:

The Arab Communists . . . are tools in the hands of Russia . . . Until quite recently Khrushchev supported us. For every move on his part in favor of Arabs, we have been grateful ten times over. But for every blow that he levels against us we will give him ten in return . . . For all our lives we have struggled against imperialism . . . Now this new danger threatens us . . . The Communists and the imperialists must understand that we are masters in our own country . . . (21:158-159)

Nasser's awareness of the Soviet Union's ultimate goal in the Middle East has not turned him entirely from the Soviet Union, nor has it led him to an alliance with the West. Significantly, however, relations between Egypt and the United States began a decided trend for the better in 1959, and had improved considerably by the Spring of 1960. (12:59,61) There have been indications that Egypt and the United States are quietly and discreetly probing for a better understanding of each other. Egyptian propaganda attacks against the United States had subsided somewhat by 1962, and the United States seemed willing to deal with Egypt, regardless of her relations with the Soviet Union. (19:13) (8:7) Egypt's associations with the Soviet Union in 1961, were considered by Alvin Z. Rubinstein to be ' . . . correct but cordial . . . ' (40:221) Nasser appeared to be seeking a more stable position between West and East.

There is also evidence that Nasser has been striving to reduce Soviet influence in Egypt. Egyptian leaders have indicated their concern as to the degree of communist orientation being given Egyptian students

in Russia. As the result, some 330 Egyptians, attending or scheduled to attend Russian schools, were recently transferred to Western schools. (12:15-16) Of equal importance is the fact that a booklet entitled, *What Happens When Communism Enters a Country* was printed in Egypt in 1959 and was given wide circulation in Egyptian schools. The significant point is that the booklet is a reprint of a United States publication entitled *The Struggle of Hungary for Freedom*, which was suppressed in Egypt in 1956. (12:12,14) Though not so close, political relations continue between Egypt and the Soviet Union, with mutual interests overshadowing ideological differences.

Summary. Initially, the Soviet Union attained great prestige and influence in Egypt, simply by supporting Egypt's political position and Arab nationalism. Soviet political backing facilitated Egypt's policy of non-alignment, caused a withdrawal of Western influence, and led to strained relations between Egypt and the United States. Egypt's declared political preference of nonalignment seemed at times to be pro-Soviet; yet Egypt's antagonistic attitude toward the West could have been influenced by Nasser's own anti-Western, 'anti-imperialistic' attitudes. It is important to note that Egypt did not support the Soviet cause completely, or succumb to Soviet domination. Nasser also continued to oppose communism in Egypt. Soviet intervention in Egypt's plans to join Iraq in the United Arab Republic thwarted Nasser's efforts for Arab unity. Accordingly, Nasser became aware of the Soviet threat in the Middle East and concerned over Egypt's close relations with the communist bloc. There followed closer relations between Egypt and the United States. In effect, Nasser has recently appeared to be seeking a more favorable power balance in which to play West against East and East against West—to Egypt's advantage.

III. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

The Soviet Union's announced purpose in providing military and economic assistance to Egypt was to help Egypt reduce her dependence on Western countries. (23:360) The Soviet Union's real purpose, however, was to use military and economic assistance in support of its over-all strategy to subordinate and replace Western influence. (59:3) Soviet assistance to Egypt would insure at least a neutral Egypt, while facilitating increased Soviet prestige, good will, and influence. If Egypt became militarily and economically dependent upon the Soviet Union, a form of leverage would be available to influence Egypt's actions. While it is neither possible nor necessary, in the context of this paper, to catalog all the details of the military and economic transactions, it is possible and necessary to consider the landmarks, the trends, and the significant aspects.

The Economic Influence. The arms agreement between Czechoslovakia and Egypt was arranged by the Soviet Union and was characteristic of those to follow. Egypt was provided credits which could be used to purchase military items, with repayment being made primarily in cotton over a period of at least five years. It has been reported that some \$250 million of the credits were expended for all types of military items. Much of the equipment was lost during the Suez Canal crisis, but was subsequently replaced from the same source. (56:44-47) There is little doubt that the arrangement was appealing to Egypt. It appeared to be a purely commercial transaction, without 'strings.' It provided a needed outlet for Egyptian cotton and did not necessitate the expenditure of hard currency. Other such agreements soon followed to finance specific Egyptian development projects, trade, and technical assistance.

After the United States withdrew its offer to assist in financing the Aswan Dam, the Soviet Union contracted to finance the Dam. Credits amounting to an estimated \$100 million were provided in 1958 to finance the first stage. (46:12) During the same year, the Soviet Union provided Egypt with \$178 million for industrial development, including such projects as factories, plants, shipyards, and mills. Although the Soviet Union was the principal participant, much of the equipment was provided by other communist bloc countries. Repayment of these credits was to be made over a 12-year period at two and one-half per cent interest. (56:45-46) By 1960 communist bloc economic assistance to Egypt totaled \$919 million, making Egypt the third largest recipient of communist bloc economic assistance, exceeded only by India and Indonesia. (60:8)

Prior to 1955, less than 15 per cent of Egypt's total trade was with countries now included in the communist bloc. By 1957, however, nearly 50 per cent of Egypt's total exports—primarily cotton—were going to the communist bloc. (56:48) Figures available show that, as of 1960, the communist bloc still accounted for the largest share of Egypt's total trade.¹

When the arms agreement was effected, Nasser indicated that Soviet technicians would not be sent to Egypt. Notwithstanding, 4,000 Soviet military and nonmilitary technicians were estimated to have been in Egypt by 1956. (37:92) As late as 1960, there were still approximately 525 communist bloc technicians in Egypt at any given time. (60:11) Many Egyptians have, therefore, come into contact with exponents of the communist system, while Western personnel have had less contact with Egyptians.

Along with increased trade came trade delegations and trade fairs. The Soviet Union, East Germany, and Communist China staged trade and industrial fairs in Egypt. Egyptians have attended similar fairs in communist bloc countries. (56:49) As the result, many Egyptians have been exposed to products of the communist system under the most favorable circumstances.

From the foregoing it is evident that, in many respects, Egypt is dependent upon continued military and economic relations with the Soviet Union and other communist countries. Egyptian cotton is mortgaged for years ahead to repay Soviet credits. Future developments, such as the Aswan Dam, are geared to continued Soviet assistance. Even more important, Egypt must look to the Soviet Union for replacement items and spare parts for her armed forces.

It is difficult to determine the degree to which Soviet economic leverage has been applied to influence Egypt's political actions; one can only surmise. As indicated in *The Intelligence Digest*, the Soviet Ambassador informed Nasser, in 1959, that continued Soviet support would be conditional upon the cessation of Egyptian interference in Iraqi affairs. (10:16) It is also significant that the Soviet offer to finance the second stage of the Aswan Dam came in January 1960, following the Khrushchev-Nasser quarrel and firmer relations between Egypt and the United States. (47:27) Could this have been a peace offering? At any rate, as Senator Hubert H. Humphrey wrote: 'Nations unable to supply their own military and industrial needs of necessity become dependent upon their major source of supply . . .' (59:VIII) In view of Egypt's dependence upon the

¹See Appendices A and B.

communist bloc for military and economic assistance, her *independence* of political action is questionable. It is doubtful that the Soviet Union would jeopardize its position with Egypt by applying any *obvious* economic pressure unless a great deal could be gained. Nevertheless, the leverage is available.

The psychological impact of the Soviet military and economic assistance program cannot be overlooked. (1:72) Indeed, the Soviet program appears to have been designed to create a favorable impression of the Soviet economic capability and to lend credence to its claim of 'altruistic' motives. Credits, rather than grants-in-aid, as frequently practiced by the United States, give the impression of a purely commercial transaction without 'strings.' The Arab would view a gift with suspicion, whereas low interest rates and long-term repayment periods cause Egyptians to feel the Soviet Union is not trying to take advantage of them. At the same time, long-term repayment arrangements permit more to be purchased and used over a shorter time frame. The Soviets have been willing to finance specific pet local projects or projects of a significant nature, such as the Aswan Dam and the Nuclear Physics Laboratory in Cairo, rather than hinging their assistance on an over-all development plan. The effect of such projects in raising the prestige of Egypt in the eyes of Egyptians is substantial and could cause them to overlook many inherent disadvantages.

The Disadvantages. Increased economic relations with the communist bloc have not been entirely advantageous to Egypt. As a result of increased trade with the East, Egypt soon lost many of her normal Western markets. As pointed out in a report by the Middle East Institute in 1959:

. . . Communist countries bid prices beyond that which Western countries would pay. Then the Communist countries have re-exported the Egyptian imports to the same Western markets which Egypt had lost, at prices below those which Egypt had been paid. When the Western markets became permanently alienated and imports from Communist countries did not measure up to those which Egypt could have obtained from the West, it became apparent to Egypt that its trading position had deteriorated. (41:82)

Insofar as Soviet credits are concerned, Egypt has been limited to communist bloc countries for her purchases. (60:12) Further, as Egypt's exports to the communist bloc increased, she soon developed a trade surplus with the bloc which, by 1959, amounted to \$60 million. Generally, such a trade surplus can only be spent in bloc countries. Communist bloc goods did not in all cases fill her requirements, but Egypt was limited in

her ability to shop elsewhere. (55:26) There is also evidence that Egypt has been dissatisfied with the quality of bloc goods and late deliveries. (1:23)

Nasser is not unaware of Egypt's increased dependence upon the Soviet Union for continued military and economic assistance. He was quite concerned over the continued flow of weapons spare parts during his disagreement with Khrushchev over Iraq. (44:303) Nasser had reason for concern, because he has considered a strong military force requisite to Egyptian independence. He is certainly cognizant of the fact that without resupply of ammunition and spare parts, weapons soon become useless.

A Reappraisal. In 1959 Nasser began an earnest effort to lessen Egypt's bonds with Russia. (51:23) Action was taken to adjust price systems and export premiums to facilitate increased trade with the West. (51:23) Credits were obtained from Japan and West Germany and economic transactions were increased with the United States. Negotiations were also instigated with the United States for the resumption of aid and technical assistance programs which had been stopped during the Suez crisis. (16:682)

Economic assistance from the United States had never been acceptable to Syria prior to her union with Egypt, although Soviet assistance was acceptable. (59:12) Under Nasser's leadership in 1959, both countries of the United Arab Republic began to accept increasingly large quantities of economic assistance from the United States. From 1959-1961, the United States obligated approximately \$256.7 million for economic assistance to the United Arab Republic; whereas, during the period 1956-1958, the United States economic assistance obligations to Egypt and the United Arab Republic had totaled about \$35.4 million.¹ Reports indicate that Egypt expects even larger amounts of economic aid from the United States in the future. (19:13) In 1959 and 1960, United States trade with Egypt nearly doubled that of previous years and almost matched that of the Soviet Union.² Egypt is now receiving a large amount of economic assistance from both the United States and the Soviet Union, as Russian assistance is still continuing. (20:18737,18889)

¹See Appendix C.

²See Appendices A and B.

Nasser's desire to decrease Egypt's economic dependency on the communist bloc may have been born of economic necessity, increasing awareness of the Soviet motives, or fear of becoming too dependent on a single foreign influence. It is most probable that all these factors influenced Nasser to seek a more favorable balance of economic dependency for Egypt. It is significant to note that Egypt's increased economic dealings with the West followed the Iraqi revolution and the Soviet Union's involvement in inter-Arab affairs.

Summary. As the result of its military and economic assistance to Egypt, the Soviet Union rapidly succeeded in reorienting Egypt's military and economic dependency toward the communist bloc. Egypt is indebted to the Soviet Union for the repayment of expended credits. She depends upon the communist bloc for her cotton exports, for the completion of development projects, and for the resupply of military items and spare parts. Egypt is consequently subject to military and economic pressure from the Soviet Union. Economic activities have also served the Soviet cause by promoting good will and by impressing Egyptians with Soviet economic capabilities. Due to an increasingly unfavorable balance of trade and the fear of Soviet influence, Nasser launched a program to loosen Egypt's ties with the Soviet Union through increased economic relations with the West. To a degree he has succeeded, but Egypt is still at the mercy of Soviet military and economic influence.

IV. FUTURE INFLUENCING FACTORS

From the foregoing discussion it is apparent that Egypt has recently sought to decrease her dependency on the Soviet Union and to gain a more favorable power position between West and East. Egypt's future associations with the Soviet Union, as in the past, will depend largely upon Egyptian needs and actions of the protagonists—the United States and the Soviet Union.

Egypt's Needs. By Egyptian standards, considerable progress has been made toward internal improvement. Numerous social and educational programs are underway. Roads, plants, and factories have been constructed, and the cherished Aswan Dam is being built. However, Egypt has not reached an adequate level of economic development. (61:283-284) Nasser has recently tried to increase Western economic assistance to Egypt. It has been seen, however, that much of Egypt's economic development is geared to continued Soviet assistance and trade. Egypt is, therefore, indebted to the Soviet Union for previous assistance and looks to the Soviet Union to assist with future developments. Of more importance is Egypt's dependence upon the Soviet Union for continued military assistance. According to Kenneth de Courcy: 'Nasser—even if he wanted to—could not now reorientate himself into a Western context without depriving himself of the military supply on which his forces depend, and rebuilding those forces within an entirely different context.' (11:5) Egypt's requirement for continued relations with the Soviet Union goes beyond military and economic considerations, for political policy is also involved.

Although tenuous at times, Egypt's avowed policy, like that of India, has been one of nonalignment in the cold war. It is evident that, so long as such a policy prevails, Egypt will continue to deal with both West and East. Nasser's position in the Arab world is, in large measure, due to his stand against Western influence. Nasser has not attained his goal of Arab unity, and it is unlikely that he will jeopardize his position by risking the appearance of being influenced by the West. On the other hand, experience has shown Nasser that the Soviet Union is a menace to his ambitions. (42:17) With this knowledge, Nasser has reason to exercise caution in his dealings with the Soviet Union. Russia failed to go to India's aid when she was threatened by China. Similarly, Egypt has reason to doubt that the Soviet Union would support her if communist interests were at stake. The West, however, was quick to go to India's aid, notwithstanding her dubious neutrality. Because of this, Nasser may feel secure in risking further involvement with Russia, depending on the West to go to his rescue if the Soviet embrace becomes unbearable.

Approach by East and West. Soviet political, economic, and military support for Egypt has continued, despite Nasser's attacks against Middle East communists, his complaints against Soviet intervention in Arab affairs, and his acceptance of increased assistance from the United States. The Soviets are persistent. Having made some progress with Egypt they are not likely to cease their efforts, especially when their ultimate objectives have not been attained. The Soviet Union is deeply committed to Egypt's economic development. If it fails to continue supporting Egypt militarily and economically, Soviet prestige and influence will decrease immeasurably. Furthermore, the Soviet Union is keenly aware of the benefits to be obtained from its military and economic hold on Egypt. It is thus considered likely that Soviet support for Egypt will continue, unless Soviet Middle East objectives change materially.

United States officials are of the opinion that the Soviet Union does not now control Egypt. (4:766) Friendly relations between the United States and Egypt are considered essential, in view of Egypt's standing in the Arab world. As indicated by Howard R. Cottam, a State Department official, the United States is willing to provide Egypt with economic assistance so that she can avoid the ' . . . alternative of total reliance on Soviet aid.' (49:714) Benefiting from previous mistakes in dealing with Egypt, the United States is exercising caution and patience, while applying assistance without appearing to influence.

The road to closer relations with Egypt will not be an easy one for the United States. Nasser's drive for Arab nationalism and Arab unity may clash with American interests. For example, Egypt may lend support to a revolution in Saudi Arabia, as she did in Yemen. Should King Saud ask for American support, the United States would be faced with the choice of supporting or not supporting a long-time friend. In addition, American aid to Egypt is already causing consternation among other Arab states that feel they are being slighted. (31:19) Conversely, there are advantages to supporting Egypt. Nasser's opposition to communism may prove a formidable barrier to communist expansion in the Middle East. Even more important is the fact that Nasser will not always rule Egypt; however, American support will be remembered and still needed by the Egyptian government. The colonial tide in the Middle East is ebbing, but the communist threat is growing. When Nasser is no longer the dominant figure in Egypt, American economic assistance and political interests may assume a greater role in Egyptian affairs.

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Increased relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union resulted from the desire of both parties, but for entirely different reasons. Egypt needed external assistance to facilitate internal development. Nasser also wanted to improve Egypt's military and economic posture in support of his drive against imperialism and his goal for Arab unity under Egyptian leadership. Nasser failed to obtain assistance from the West on his terms. The continued need for assistance, the desire for independence of action, and the apparent advantages of an active foreign policy caused Egypt to seek Soviet assistance and to pursue a policy of nonalignment with West or East. The Soviet Union was anxious to provide Egypt with political, military, and economic support, in hopes of causing her to become dependent upon Soviet assistance and thus susceptible to Soviet influence and ultimate Soviet control.

The Soviet Union has penetrated Egypt politically, militarily, and economically. By backing Egypt politically, by siding with Arab nationalism, and by providing massive military and economic assistance to Egypt, the Soviet Union has had the following successes:

1. The Soviet Union became a power in the Middle East and gained greater access to other Arab countries.
2. Soviet prestige and influence increased, while Western influence decreased.
3. Middle East tensions increased, because a strengthened Egypt enabled Nasser to pursue his campaign to eliminate 'imperialism' and to achieve Arab unity.
4. Egypt became militarily and economically dependent upon continued Soviet support and subject to Soviet influence.

The Soviet Union has not, however, gained control of Egypt, nor has it dominated her actions to any obvious extent. Although questionable at times, Egypt has adhered to her policy of nonalignment. Internal communism has been suppressed and Nasser has rebelled at Soviet intervention in inter-Arab affairs. A growing awareness of the Soviet threat to Arab unity and Egypt's susceptibility to Soviet military and economic leverage, coupled with an unfavorable trading situation, has caused Nasser to seek a more favorable power position between East and West. To a degree he has succeeded, but his country remains indebted to the Soviet Union for previous assistance and dependent upon the Soviet Union for continued military and economic assistance.

It is difficult to forecast the extent of Egypt's future relations with the Soviet Union, but indications are that they will continue. Egypt still needs a great deal of external assistance, and Nasser has not attained his goals. The Soviet Union has a large investment in Egypt and will probably continue to support her unless the situation changes considerably. The United States appears willing to provide economic assistance to Egypt so that the state does not fall under significant Soviet domination. Egypt is now in a better position than ever before to play West against East and vice versa, to her advantage.

In view of previous experiences, Egypt's future relations with the Soviet Union will probably be more cautious and less extensive than before. Because of continued anti-Western feelings, Nasser will most likely exercise restraint in dealing with the United States. In the long run, as the communist threat increases and colonialism subsides, Nasser will likely choose to deal less with the communist bloc and more with the West. The immediate interest to the United States is that Egypt be kept from going further into the Soviet sphere of influence.

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APPENDIX A

THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC
EXPORTS BY PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES

COUNTRY	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
Bulgaria	.073	.073	1.06	.77	.77	.89	1.00
Mainland China	2.90	6.24	5.98	8.61	7.49	7.69	8.14
Czechoslovakia	4.41	6.42	14.75	8.60	9.21	10.59	6.79
East Germany	.53	1.03	2.37	4.07	4.82	6.84	5.27
Hungary	1.34	3.03	1.19	.61	2.17	1.63	1.12
Poland	1.76	2.10	2.76	3.92	2.96	3.76	4.05
Romania	1.95	2.94	2.32	1.96	2.28	1.89	1.41
U.S.S.R.	1.37	5.85	3.94	18.37	17.58	18.51	16.20
TOTAL	14.99	28.34	34.37	46.91	47.28	51.80	43.98
United States	4.63	6.60	3.31	4.51	1.97	1.33	5.22

Notes:

1. Figures are percentages of total trade.
2. Syrian trade is excluded.
3. Military goods are excluded.

Source:

United Nations, Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Off.
Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1960, (New York: 1962),
p. 557-562.

APPENDIX B

THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC IMPORTS BY PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES

COUNTRY	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
Bulgaria	.056	.093	.30	.51	.65	.59	.61
Mainland China	.17	.18	2.08	3.92	3.67	3.85	3.02
Czechoslovakia	1.69	2.04	2.05	3.45	4.25	3.76	3.57
East Germany	.30	.45	1.58	3.57	3.82	4.14	3.91
Hungary	.82	.39	.85	1.28	1.99	1.58	1.07
Poland	.29	.27	.56	1.51	1.81	1.25	1.27
Romania	1.07	2.11	2.69	1.08	2.60	2.09	1.28
U.S.S.R.	1.44	1.26	4.24	10.18	13.29	12.51	10.17
TOTAL	6.34	7.63	14.35	25.50	32.08	29.77	24.90
United States	11.05	11.95	13.43	8.98	7.41	13.97	17.77

Notes:

1. Figures are percentages of total trade.
2. Syrian trade is excluded.
3. Military goods are excluded.

Source:

United Nations, Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Off.
Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1960, (New York: 1962),
p. 557-562.

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
OBLIGATIONS TO THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

(Millions of Dollars)

	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	Totals
Technical Co-operation and Other Special Assistance	2.6	0.7	*	2.0	5.7	2.5	13.5
Development Loan Fund	-	-	-	1.0	22.7	(-) .25	23.45
Public Law 480	30.8	0.5	0.8	45.4	69.9	76.2	223.6
Export-Import Bank Loans	-	-	-	3.5	9.1	18.0	30.6
TOTALS	33.4	1.2	0.8	51.9	107.4	96.45	291.15

*Less than \$50,000.

Sources:

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EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND: University of Georgia, 1950, BBA

DUTY ASSIGNMENTS:

82nd Abn Div, Ft. Bragg, N.C.	Asst G-1	4/61-7/62
1st Abn Battle Gp, 503d Inf,	Adjutant	1/61-4/61
82d Abn Div, Ft. Bragg, N.C.		
Co E, 1st Abn Battle Gp,	CO	2/60-1/61
503d Inf, 82d Abn Div,		
Ft. Bragg, N.C.		
Royal Gd Advisory Sec, USA	Bn Advisor	1/59-2/60
Element USA TM, Saudi Arabia		
Arlington Towers, Va.	Mil Asst Orientation Crse	11/58-1/59
Ofc of Dir of Instr, USA Inf Sch,	Plans Sect	4/58-11/58
Ft. Benning, Ga.		
Instr Trng Crse, USA Inf Sch,	Instructor	10/57-4/58
Ft. Benning, Ga.		
USA Inf Sch, Ft. Benning, Ga.	Basic Abn Crse	8/57-10/57
USA Inf Sch, Ft. Benning, Ga.	Inf Off Adv Crse No. 2	1/57-8/57
30th Inf Combat Com (Prov),	Asst S-3	8/56-1/57
3d Inf Div, Ft. Benning, Ga.		
30th Inf Combat Com (Prov),	S-3	7/56-8/56
3d Inf Div, Ft. Benning, Ga.		
30th Inf Combat Com (Prov),	Asst S-3	1/56-7/56
3d Inf Div, Ft. Benning, Ga.		
Co D, 6th Inf Bn (Prov), 3d Inf	CO	7/55-1/56
Div, Ft. Benning, Ga.		
Co B, 6th Inf Bn (Prov), 3d Inf	XO	5/55-7/55
Div, Ft. Benning, Ga.		
USA Inf Sch, Ft. Benning, Ga.	Assoc Inf Co Off Crse	1/54-10/54
	No. 5	
Hq 22d Inf Regt, 4th Inf Div,	Liaison Off	4/53-3/54
USAREUR, Germany		
Co A, 22d Inf, 4th Inf Div,	Plat Ldr	10/50-4/53
USAREUR, Germany		

RECOMMENDED READING

The evaluations of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find them of interest.

The inclusion of a book or article in this list does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein. They are indicated only on the basis of interesting, timely, and possibly useful reading matter.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Certain of the books on the list which are not available from these sources may be available from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books are obtainable on loan. Requests from individual officers to borrow books from an Auxiliary Library Service Collection should be addressed to the nearest of the following special loan collections:

Chief of Naval Personnel (G14)
Department of the Navy
Washington 25, D.C.

Pearl Harbor Naval Base Library
Navy No. 128
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station
(Attn: Station Library)
San Diego 36, California

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station
Attn: (Library ALSC) Box 169
Navy No. 926, Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

U.S. Naval Station Library
Attn: Auxiliary Service Collection
Building C-9
U.S. Naval Base
Norfolk 11, Virginia

BOOKS

McDougal, Myres S. and Burke, William T. *The Public Order of the Oceans*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962. 1226 p.

Professor McDougal has published an impressive addition to his earlier analyses of the world community and international law. *The Public Order of the Oceans* deals with uses of, and activities on, internal waters, the territorial sea, and ocean areas adjacent to the territorial sea and the high seas. One significant chapter is entitled 'The Maintenance of the Public Order of the Oceans and the Nationality of Ships.' The skillful analysis of sea problems is constructed upon a methodology through which the author has called attention to the role of national claims in the international decisional process. Such claims may be for inclusive or exclusive uses, and for permissible or nonpermissible conduct. The author has again brought to bear the great wealth of his learning to the task of relating legal processes to preferred policy goals and values. The appendices set out the four recent international conventions on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zones, High Seas, Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, and the Continental Shelf. This is an extraordinarily constructive and imaginative book on the international law of the sea.

Fehrenbach, T.R. *This Kind of War*. New York: Macmillan, 1963. 688 p.

T.R. Fehrenbach presents a factual, hard-hitting and authoritative history of the Korean War. He points out quite vividly the general lack of understanding and preparedness on the part of the United States Government and the American people at the beginning of the Korean conflict. Due to a psychological, as well as military, lack of preparedness, the American people were initially unable to cope with the communist threat to world peace. Psychologically, the American people were immersed in a 'peace mentality.' Traditionally, Americans have shown an unwillingness to prepare for combat, but given a 'cause'—a Pearl Harbor for example—they are quick to develop the mental attitudes necessary to go to war. Korea was slow to bring forth this warlike attitude. It was not a popular war, for it lacked exalted motivations. It was a war of policy, not a crusade. The main point the author makes is that the United States must be prepared to fight 'this kind of war' for a long time to come. To be ready to fight these 'policy wars' anywhere and everywhere throughout the world means we must have at all times a highly professional Army. Even in a peaceful society there must be maintained a body of men trained in requirements opposite to peace—trained to go to war, to fight and to kill. Without this professional military element, the peaceful society itself will be overwhelmed by the forces of communism and cease to exist.

Cohen, Saul B. *Geography and Politics in a World Divided*. New York: Random House, 1963. 347 p.

In this book, Professor Cohen has set forth the salient politico-geographical characteristics of the major power cores of today's world—the United States, the U.S.S.R. and maritime Europe—and has discussed them in a global strategic framework within which the major power cores must function and interact. This work is written in three parts. Part I reviews the earth's geopolitical foundations and provides a contemporary view of the global geographic scene. The essence of this part of the book is the division of the globe into geostrategic regions and, further, into subareas called geopolitical regions. Part II of the book deals with major power cores, with emphasis on the three strongest mentioned above. The author's framework focuses on location, population distribution, resources and the dynamics of change and movement. Part III treats the 'Shatterbelts' of the Middle East and Southeast Asia and also the African, South American and offshore Asian portions of the maritime world. *Geography and Politics in a World Divided* provides a fundamental and authoritative treatment of today's geopolitical world, and basic reference material for the study of world strategy by military officers.

Horne, Alistair. *The Price of Glory; Verdun 1916*. New York: St. Martin, 1963. 371 p.

With the magic of Alistair Horne's pen, history is made to live in this highly readable account of one of its most momentous battles—World War I's Verdun. In telling this story of the 'worst' battle in history, the author recreates in vivid detail the horror that for ten months was compressed into three and a half square miles of France. Into an inferno which eventually amassed 700,000 casualties, and which soon became a psychological symbol far outweighing any possible military significance the battle might have, both the French and the German nations poured the cream of their manhood. Almost too realistically author Horne catches the battle's nightmarish quality—the incessant shelling, the stench of putrescent flesh, the filth of the trenches and the senselessness with which thousands were sent to their deaths. The author has masterfully interwoven into the tale side trips that catch the grand sweep of the 1914-1918 European stage and the catastrophe that was World War I. In these travels to Paris, Berlin, Vienna or the General Headquarters, the times are recreated, the aspirations of the people are laid out, and the leaders of both sides are brought to life. Understanding becomes possible; excusing the slaughter is not. And it is here that Verdun presents its greatest challenge for today. The casualty lists, so monstrous by World War II or Korean standards, resulted from combining musket-age tactics with man's first weapons of mass

destruction—the machine gun, gas, massed artillery, and the airplane. The challenge for today's military leadership, given the weapons at its disposal, is clear. If this challenge is not met, Verdun's casualty lists will be insignificant alongside those of the next war.

Knorr, Klaus E. and Read, Thornton, eds. *Limited Strategic War*. New York: Praeger, 1962. 258 p.

This book is a collection of essays, written by nine prominent contemporary authors, and edited by Klaus Knorr, Professor of Economics and Director of the Center of International Studies at Princeton University, and by Thornton Read, a research associate at the Center. Each of the contributors treats some facet of what they call 'Limited Strategic War,' or a war in which the belligerents exchange strategic strikes, or threaten such an exchange. Carried out in conjunction with negotiation and bargaining, the deliberate, limited employment of strategic weapons is primarily designed to act on the will of the opponent to make him refrain from employing provocative or aggressive measures. Such a war, in the opinion of the authors, would minimize the destruction of military as well as civilian targets, and aim at bringing about bargaining and negotiation mainly by attrition of resolve rather than of strategic forces. *Limited Strategic War* will occasion considerable discussion among strategic planners everywhere. Many will disagree with the concept of this type of warfare, but all should find it thought-provoking.

Stromberg, Ronald N. *Collective Security and American Foreign Policy*. New York: Praeger, 1963. 301 p.

'This book has as its theme the inception, growth and apparent decline of the idea of collective security in modern—chiefly American—international relations.' So states the author, a professor of History at the University of Maryland. He attempts an analytical coverage of the subject, not a purely historical one. Early world peace movements (1890-1914) and the jolt of World War I are discussed as a background to the establishment of the League of Nations without United States membership. Even before the establishment of the League, it had been foreseen by some that the collective security aspect of the Covenant would be a failure because member states would not gamble on this arrangement as a substitute for power politics. Thus, when the first crucial test came (Japan's invasion of Manchuria), neither the League and its collective security provisions, nor the Kellogg-Briand Pact could withstand the tide. In America, at this time, collective security was considered a respectable idea; but by our neutrality legislation, we indicated to the world that we had no intention of becoming involved in any conflict to implement the idea.

There was, then, no collective security organization to meet and turn back the challenge of Japan, Italy, and Germany, and the world marched on to Munich and world war. America entered the war only after realizing that there was a direct threat to her own security; the theory of collective security was not the issue. As the war drew to a close, the idea of another try at collective security (with the United States taking its proper place in a world organization) took hold and became a guide for American foreign policy. Soon after the organization of the United Nations, the United States discovered a new aggressor—the U.S.S.R. The result was the creation of NATO, a new collective security organization for the protection of our national interests. Then came Korea. The result of Korea was a return to unilateral action and big-power meetings. The author sees as a major flaw of collective security the unwillingness of major states to make binding commitments for future action, as the theory demands. The United Nations today, he says, is not a collective security arrangement, but a court of world opinion. To the author, collective security is a myth; and a myth, to survive, must be applicable to reality.

Okumu, Washington. *Lumumba's Congo: Roots of Conflict*. New York: Obolensky, 1963. 250 p.

The author of this book, a native of Kenya, Africa, is 26 years old and is described by Professor Rupert Emerson of Harvard as 'an angry young African.' If the reader keeps the identity of the author in mind, as he reads the book, an important insight can be gained into the 'way in which Africans look back upon the colonial experience from which they are now emerging.' This easy-to-read volume gives a brief, but adequate, background of the earliest colonization of the Congo, dating from 1885. However, the writer does more than give a chronological account of events. He attempts to analyze the train of events in the Congo as he understands those events. His analysis is based on personal study and experience in the Congo. The chapter entitled 'The Sudden Revolt Against Paternalism' would be most helpful to anyone attempting to gain an understanding of the background of events that transpired in the hectic days following the granting of Congo independence on 30 June 1960. The full value of this book will be realized by researchers if it is used in connection with United Nations' reports, newspaper reports of events in the Congo (30 June 1960, and forward) and other books written on the same subject.