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The Price of Glory; Verdun 1916

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Cohen, Saul B. *Geography and Politics in a World Divided*. New York: Random House, 1963. 347 p.

In this book, Professor Cohen has set forth the salient politico-geographical characteristics of the major power cores of today's world—the United States, the U.S.S.R. and maritime Europe—and has discussed them in a global strategic framework within which the major power cores must function and interact. This work is written in three parts. Part I reviews the earth's geopolitical foundations and provides a contemporary view of the global geographic scene. The essence of this part of the book is the division of the globe into geostrategic regions and, further, into subareas called geopolitical regions. Part II of the book deals with major power cores, with emphasis on the three strongest mentioned above. The author's framework focuses on location, population distribution, resources and the dynamics of change and movement. Part III treats the 'Shatterbelts' of the Middle East and Southeast Asia and also the African, South American and offshore Asian portions of the maritime world. *Geography and Politics in a World Divided* provides a fundamental and authoritative treatment of today's geopolitical world, and basic reference material for the study of world strategy by military officers.

Horne, Alistair. *The Price of Glory; Verdun 1916*. New York: St. Martin, 1963. 371 p.

With the magic of Alistair Horne's pen, history is made to live in this highly readable account of one of its most momentous battles—World War I's Verdun. In telling this story of the 'worst' battle in history, the author recreates in vivid detail the horror that for ten months was compressed into three and a half square miles of France. Into an inferno which eventually amassed 700,000 casualties, and which soon became a psychological symbol far outweighing any possible military significance the battle might have, both the French and the German nations poured the cream of their manhood. Almost too realistically author Horne catches the battle's nightmarish quality—the incessant shelling, the stench of putrescent flesh, the filth of the trenches and the senselessness with which thousands were sent to their deaths. The author has masterfully interwoven into the tale side trips that catch the grand sweep of the 1914-1918 European stage and the catastrophe that was World War I. In these travels to Paris, Berlin, Vienna or the General Headquarters, the times are recreated, the aspirations of the people are laid out, and the leaders of both sides are brought to life. Understanding becomes possible; excusing the slaughter is not. And it is here that Verdun presents its greatest challenge for today. The casualty lists, so monstrous by World War II or Korean standards, resulted from combining musket-age tactics with man's first weapons of mass

destruction—the machine gun, gas, massed artillery, and the airplane. The challenge for today's military leadership, given the weapons at its disposal, is clear. If this challenge is not met, Verdun's casualty lists will be insignificant alongside those of the next war.

Knorr, Klaus E. and Read, Thornton, eds. *Limited Strategic War*. New York: Praeger, 1962. 258 p.

This book is a collection of essays, written by nine prominent contemporary authors, and edited by Klaus Knorr, Professor of Economics and Director of the Center of International Studies at Princeton University, and by Thornton Read, a research associate at the Center. Each of the contributors treats some facet of what they call 'Limited Strategic War,' or a war in which the belligerents exchange strategic strikes, or threaten such an exchange. Carried out in conjunction with negotiation and bargaining, the deliberate, limited employment of strategic weapons is primarily designed to act on the will of the opponent to make him refrain from employing provocative or aggressive measures. Such a war, in the opinion of the authors, would minimize the destruction of military as well as civilian targets, and aim at bringing about bargaining and negotiation mainly by attrition of resolve rather than of strategic forces. *Limited Strategic War* will occasion considerable discussion among strategic planners everywhere. Many will disagree with the concept of this type of warfare, but all should find it thought-provoking.

Stromberg, Ronald N. *Collective Security and American Foreign Policy*. New York: Praeger, 1963. 301 p.

'This book has as its theme the inception, growth and apparent decline of the idea of collective security in modern—chiefly American—international relations.' So states the author, a professor of History at the University of Maryland. He attempts an analytical coverage of the subject, not a purely historical one. Early world peace movements (1890-1914) and the jolt of World War I are discussed as a background to the establishment of the League of Nations without United States membership. Even before the establishment of the League, it had been foreseen by some that the collective security aspect of the Covenant would be a failure because member states would not gamble on this arrangement as a substitute for power politics. Thus, when the first crucial test came (Japan's invasion of Manchuria), neither the League and its collective security provisions, nor the Kellogg-Briand Pact could withstand the tide. In America, at this time, collective security was considered a respectable idea; but by our neutrality legislation, we indicated to the world that we had no intention of becoming involved in any conflict to implement the idea.