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Limited Strategic War

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destruction—the machine gun, gas, massed artillery, and the airplane. The challenge for today's military leadership, given the weapons at its disposal, is clear. If this challenge is not met, Verdun's casualty lists will be insignificant alongside those of the next war.

Knorr, Klaus E. and Read, Thornton, eds. *Limited Strategic War*. New York: Praeger, 1962. 258 p.

This book is a collection of essays, written by nine prominent contemporary authors, and edited by Klaus Knorr, Professor of Economics and Director of the Center of International Studies at Princeton University, and by Thornton Read, a research associate at the Center. Each of the contributors treats some facet of what they call 'Limited Strategic War,' or a war in which the belligerents exchange strategic strikes, or threaten such an exchange. Carried out in conjunction with negotiation and bargaining, the deliberate, limited employment of strategic weapons is primarily designed to act on the will of the opponent to make him refrain from employing provocative or aggressive measures. Such a war, in the opinion of the authors, would minimize the destruction of military as well as civilian targets, and aim at bringing about bargaining and negotiation mainly by attrition of resolve rather than of strategic forces. *Limited Strategic War* will occasion considerable discussion among strategic planners everywhere. Many will disagree with the concept of this type of warfare, but all should find it thought-provoking.

Stromberg, Ronald N. *Collective Security and American Foreign Policy*. New York: Praeger, 1963. 301 p.

'This book has as its theme the inception, growth and apparent decline of the idea of collective security in modern—chiefly American—international relations.' So states the author, a professor of History at the University of Maryland. He attempts an analytical coverage of the subject, not a purely historical one. Early world peace movements (1890-1914) and the jolt of World War I are discussed as a background to the establishment of the League of Nations without United States membership. Even before the establishment of the League, it had been foreseen by some that the collective security aspect of the Covenant would be a failure because member states would not gamble on this arrangement as a substitute for power politics. Thus, when the first crucial test came (Japan's invasion of Manchuria), neither the League and its collective security provisions, nor the Kellogg-Briand Pact could withstand the tide. In America, at this time, collective security was considered a respectable idea; but by our neutrality legislation, we indicated to the world that we had no intention of becoming involved in any conflict to implement the idea.