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Collective Security and American Foreign Policy

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destruction—the machine gun, gas, massed artillery, and the airplane. The challenge for today's military leadership, given the weapons at its disposal, is clear. If this challenge is not met, Verdun's casualty lists will be insignificant alongside those of the next war.

Knorr, Klaus E. and Read, Thornton, eds. *Limited Strategic War*. New York: Praeger, 1962. 258 p.

This book is a collection of essays, written by nine prominent contemporary authors, and edited by Klaus Knorr, Professor of Economics and Director of the Center of International Studies at Princeton University, and by Thornton Read, a research associate at the Center. Each of the contributors treats some facet of what they call 'Limited Strategic War,' or a war in which the belligerents exchange strategic strikes, or threaten such an exchange. Carried out in conjunction with negotiation and bargaining, the deliberate, limited employment of strategic weapons is primarily designed to act on the will of the opponent to make him refrain from employing provocative or aggressive measures. Such a war, in the opinion of the authors, would minimize the destruction of military as well as civilian targets, and aim at bringing about bargaining and negotiation mainly by attrition of resolve rather than of strategic forces. *Limited Strategic War* will occasion considerable discussion among strategic planners everywhere. Many will disagree with the concept of this type of warfare, but all should find it thought-provoking.

Stromberg, Ronald N. *Collective Security and American Foreign Policy*. New York: Praeger, 1963. 301 p.

'This book has as its theme the inception, growth and apparent decline of the idea of collective security in modern—chiefly American—international relations.' So states the author, a professor of History at the University of Maryland. He attempts an analytical coverage of the subject, not a purely historical one. Early world peace movements (1890-1914) and the jolt of World War I are discussed as a background to the establishment of the League of Nations without United States membership. Even before the establishment of the League, it had been foreseen by some that the collective security aspect of the Covenant would be a failure because member states would not gamble on this arrangement as a substitute for power politics. Thus, when the first crucial test came (Japan's invasion of Manchuria), neither the League and its collective security provisions, nor the Kellogg-Briand Pact could withstand the tide. In America, at this time, collective security was considered a respectable idea; but by our neutrality legislation, we indicated to the world that we had no intention of becoming involved in any conflict to implement the idea.

There was, then, no collective security organization to meet and turn back the challenge of Japan, Italy, and Germany, and the world marched on to Munich and world war. America entered the war only after realizing that there was a direct threat to her own security; the theory of collective security was not the issue. As the war drew to a close, the idea of another try at collective security (with the United States taking its proper place in a world organization) took hold and became a guide for American foreign policy. Soon after the organization of the United Nations, the United States discovered a new aggressor—the U.S.S.R. The result was the creation of NATO, a new collective security organization for the protection of our national interests. Then came Korea. The result of Korea was a return to unilateral action and big-power meetings. The author sees as a major flaw of collective security the unwillingness of major states to make binding commitments for future action, as the theory demands. The United Nations today, he says, is not a collective security arrangement, but a court of world opinion. To the author, collective security is a myth; and a myth, to survive, must be applicable to reality.

Okumu, Washington. *Lumumba's Congo: Roots of Conflict*. New York: Obolensky, 1963. 250 p.

The author of this book, a native of Kenya, Africa, is 26 years old and is described by Professor Rupert Emerson of Harvard as 'an angry young African.' If the reader keeps the identity of the author in mind, as he reads the book, an important insight can be gained into the 'way in which Africans look back upon the colonial experience from which they are now emerging.' This easy-to-read volume gives a brief, but adequate, background of the earliest colonization of the Congo, dating from 1885. However, the writer does more than give a chronological account of events. He attempts to analyze the train of events in the Congo as he understands those events. His analysis is based on personal study and experience in the Congo. The chapter entitled 'The Sudden Revolt Against Paternalism' would be most helpful to anyone attempting to gain an understanding of the background of events that transpired in the hectic days following the granting of Congo independence on 30 June 1960. The full value of this book will be realized by researchers if it is used in connection with United Nations' reports, newspaper reports of events in the Congo (30 June 1960, and forward) and other books written on the same subject.