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## A THEORY ON THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT AND POLYCENTRISM

A Research Paper written by

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Naval Warfare Course, 1963

### INTRODUCTION

The symptomatic approach generally followed by scholars in a study of the currently conspicuous state of tension between China and the Soviet Union almost inevitably leads to the assumption that the conflict is a compound of numerous and complex ideological, economic, political, and social disagreements which have gradually been built up over the past several years. Further, this line of reasoning is almost certain to lead to the conclusion that no one issue in the conflict is so intractable as to preclude a reversal of the process; that is, earnest bargaining applied in mutual good faith to each of the issues might succeed in re-establishing the harmony and solidarity of purpose and effort which both parties to the dispute recognize to be to their mutual advantage in their common and overriding struggle with the West.

In contrast to this generally accepted view of the conflict, a plausible case can be made for an appraisal of the conflict in which the numerous and complex causes generally cited as the compound basis of the tension all become effects of a discernible strategic decision made and adopted in the Soviet Union sometime about 1958. It is the purpose of this paper to propose the outline of such a decision, to develop the strategic concept supporting it, and to suggest some potential implications which the Sino-Soviet conflict appears, from this different approach and viewpoint, to hold for the West. This construction is a hypothesis which is in no way proposed as the most tenable estimate of the actual strategic concept now guiding the actions and intentions of the Soviet Union. Rather, it is proposed as but one of an unknown number of plausible Soviet strategic concepts which should be considered and weighed in the West so as to consider the widest variety of reasonable possibilities concerning the basis, the long-range plans, and the objectives which the ruling circles in the Soviet Union might consider to be best suited for support of long-standing Soviet national interests.

## I. BACKGROUND

*Western Observation and Impressions.* Since the Fall of 1958 the growing evidence of serious discord in what had been referred to as the Moscow-Peking Axis has been drawing increasing interest and attention in the world press. Though discord in varying degrees between the Chinese and Russian Communist Parties dates back almost to the founding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1920, it was not until 1958, when the CCP announced plans for the 'Great Leap Forward,' that the discord began to appear serious enough to warrant widespread Western speculation that these two pillars of communist world power might find their common ideological base vulnerable to their separate and often divergent interests. Through 1957 Sino-Sovietologists in their writings were emphasizing the menace to the Western world which the Moscow-Peking Axis presented. Following 1958 the emphasis in political commentary on Sino-Soviet relations has shifted from the cohesive nature of the Axis to the nature and extent of the growing conflict in their relations.

However, despite an accelerating rate of divergent political action and mutual denunciation voiced through leading elements of the Soviet and Chinese press, in which Albania and Yugoslavia serve as respective 'beating boys,' Western observers in general until very recently have been reluctant to commit themselves regarding the seriousness or even the reality of the split. (31:403) By Fall of 1962, however, following the obvious Soviet consternation and unsympathetic reaction to the Chinese 'adventure' over the Indian border, the great majority of knowledgeable Western observers now agree that the Sino-Soviet conflict is not only a reality, but also a political reality of prime importance to both the free and the communist worlds.

It is interesting to note, however, that whereas most writers on the subject now agree on the fact of a conflict and on the symptomatic evidence which they cite to document the growing discord, few if any prominent Western political analysts or statesmen are as yet willing to go on record with a firm judgment assigning the Sino-Soviet conflict a qualitative mark of *GOOD* or *BAD* for the free world. President Kennedy's wait-and-see attitude expressed during his televised review of the current administration's first two years in office is both a concise summary and a typical expression of the predominant Western attitude regarding the current and future status of Sino-Soviet relations.

*Western Schools of Thought.* Surrounding this predominant Western reaction to the conflict, and so far as the bibliography attached to this paper can be considered a representative sampling of Western study and

viewpoints, the attitudes of informed observers regarding the status and prospects of the conflict fall within one of three schools of thought defined by Donald S. Zagoria, a current and eminent authority on the subject. He describes the first of these schools as one which is inclined to discount the seriousness of reported differences and holds that in any case, friction between China and Russia is of small consequence to the West. Members of the second school, while proceeding from different opinions regarding the fundamental causes of the conflict, conclude in common that an open break between the two giants of the communist world will be the inevitable result of incompatible and increasingly divergent national interests. The third school, to which Mr. Zagoria subscribes, while recognizing the existence of serious strains in the Sino-Soviet alliance, nevertheless concludes that the conflict will be held within manageable limits because of the mutual and overriding commitment of each to the establishment of communism throughout the world. (31:3)

*Western Conjecture on Strategic Implications.* A significant by-product of the conflict is the fact that few students of Sino-Soviet relations have as yet made any serious attempt to formulate any but the most sketchy and tentative theories regarding the probable or possible changes in Soviet or Western strategies which might be devised to offset or accommodate the undeniable impact which an aggravated Sino-Soviet divergence would have on the course of the East-West struggle. The common and central theme of published studies dealing in whole or in part with this subject is generally a painstaking and scholarly documentation and analysis of the meager substantive and voluminous inferential evidence which manages to escape the confines of the iron and bamboo curtains.

Despite assertions to the contrary, this method of approach inevitably leads to a symptomatic evaluation of the conflict. Cause and effects tend to shift position according to the viewpoint of the particular observer, the time frame of the issue being considered, the volume and vehemence of the intrabloc argument or the existence of other concurrent but vaguely related events on the world scene.\*

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\*A prime example of this blending of cause and effect is the controversy over the establishment of agricultural communes in Red China in 1958. One authority cites the question of the communes in China as 'possibly the most irritating question ever to arise in the Russian-Chinese alliance.' (19:193) By now, however, the commune 'coin' has flipped. While no one denies the role of the commune squabble as a highly effective irritant in Bloc relations, it is now generally conceded that it can be identified primarily as only one of the symptoms erupting from some more basic ideological disagreement. (31:77)

While the general preoccupation among scholars with detecting, recording and evaluating the mass of implied and direct evidence on the conflict is undoubtedly a commendable and necessary step in the strategic evaluation of the conflict, it is nonetheless only one method of approach to, and one step toward, the real Western problem of determining what effect the conflict is most likely to have on the East-West struggle. Most studies on the Sino-Soviet conflict stop short of this problem and consequently make no serious attempt to construct and present possible alternatives in strategy which China, the Soviet Union, or the United States, as the dominant power of the Western world, might consider and adopt to meet the contingency now developing in the Sino-Soviet conflict.

It appears certain that the continued and increasingly aggravated divergence between China and the Soviet Union cannot fail to have a profound effect on the long-range strategic outlook of not only the two principles in the argument but also the United States.

What this effect might be, only the future can discover but it is the task of Western strategic planners, with the aid of the scholars, to develop and examine all plausible possibilities. Hopefully, now that the effort of discerning, documenting, and validating this latest and most potent falling-out within the 'socialist camp' is well in hand, competent and perceptive Western scholars will soon begin to address their efforts to this task. In the meantime, this paper discusses the background and proposes one such plausible possibility for a Soviet strategic concept which is appreciably different in context from those generally assumed by Western scholars to be the guiding motivation of the Soviet Union.

## II. THE SOVIET POSITION IN A COMMUNIST WORLD

*A National Interest.* If there is any written document which spells out the national interests of the USSR as determined and accepted by the small group which controls the policies of the government, this document and its contents are no doubt among the most zealously guarded secrets of a notoriously secretive nation. Nonetheless, certain elements comprising the principal interests of any nation, including those of the USSR, are matters of such a commendable or obvious nature that no attempt is made to conceal them. In fact, extensive effort is often expended in order to insure that such elements of national interest are given the widest possible publicity. One such element of Soviet national interest is the promotion and extension of communism throughout the world to the ultimate exclusion of all other socio-political systems. (6:393) Since the 'Great October Revolution' which established the Soviet state as the vanguard of the 'world-wide proletarian revolution,' no other Soviet aspiration has been more consistently maintained, more proudly and incessantly heralded, and more relentlessly pursued. (2:149) Today, no other is so universally recognized throughout the world and so widely accepted on both sides of the iron curtain as a fundamental aim of the entrenched party (CPSU) and the Soviet Government.

### *World Communism and Leadership.*

*Lenin's Attitude.* Although successive leaders of the USSR have both preached and practiced Soviet support for the international ascendancy of communism, their pronouncements on the eventual political structure of a totally communist world might seem to leave some doubt regarding the role which the Soviet Union will presumably play when this dream is realized. There is no room for doubt about either Lenin's or Stalin's views on the subject. Neither of them felt any inhibitions in asserting the need for a single and incontestable center of power and in contriving to insure that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union would wield this power. As noted by David J. Dallin, Lenin pointed out the practical necessity of both a central authority and a monolithic structure to the successful promotion of international communism.

The image of a single, well-knit, strong international Communist organization—a 'monolith'—was and is still today a factor of emotional and propagandistic force in the world communist movement. It has been inherent in Communism from its early days; it inspired future Communist leaders even before the Comintern was founded. . . . An international organization that has no power over its component parties, Lenin said

contemptuously, is only a 'letter box' not a fighting instrument in an era when civil wars and revolutions are about to transform the world and establish a new social and political order. The urge to create an International that would possess absolute power over its component parts and become a united army in the strict sense of the word was paramount when Lenin proceeded to organize the Comintern in 1918-19. (7:24)

*Stalin's Attitude.* The idea of a communist world without a supreme and central authority was an anathema to Stalin and he left no doubts about the fact that central authority resided in the Soviet Union and that international communism was to have a monolithic structure. (7:24) His ruthless and ill-concealed measures to insure Soviet supremacy of an expanding communist world are the historical facts which aroused concerted Western resistance to Soviet expansion, drove Yugoslavia out of the Bloc, and embarrassed the aims of his successors.

*Post-Stalin Outlook.* Since Stalin's demise, therefore, there has been a tactical retreat on the propaganda front, and the inherent right of the Soviet Union to assume leadership is no longer publicly emphasized. Instead, a line judged to be more palatable for both the satellite countries and neutral nations alike is now being presented. Following the traumatic effect which the Hungarian revolution had on even dedicated communists, the world over, the three most authoritative voices of the Soviet Union—the government, the CPSU, and Premier Khrushchev—joined forces to assure the world that the idea of a communist world did not necessarily require the exercise of a central authority and control from Moscow.\* In so doing, however, they have always been careful not to abandon the idea of Soviet primacy. In a shading of jargon best understood and appreciated by dedicated communists, the Soviet Union as the 'vanguard of the communist movement' or as 'the first among equals' is apparently a different and more palatable concept than was Lenin's or Stalin's straightforward approach to the question of Soviet dominance.

*Flexible Tactics Versus Durable Objectives.* As a consequence of the currently modest Soviet public stand on this question, the advent of 'peaceful coexistence' as a prominent factor in Soviet foreign policy, and the unfolding rapprochement between Russia and Yugoslavia, many Western observers are again hopefully entertaining the assumption that

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\*Announcements by the Soviet Government and the CPSU were made to concede the importance of equality, mutual respect and independence in Bloc relations. (31:51) At the 20th Congress of the CPSU and on numerous occasions since then Premier Khrushchev has added his voice to the chorus affirming the equality among members of the socialist camp. (6:179)

while the expansion of communism is still a Soviet goal, Soviet imperialism and Soviet aspirations to sit at the head and dominate a communist world have been abandoned in the face of reality. This 'reality' is presumably evident in several ways. Red China, over which the USSR never did manage to exert more than a 'guidance' authority, has become increasingly independent and at times almost antagonistic; Yugoslavia, with its formerly intolerable 'Titoism' still intact, is being invited back into the Bloc—a seeming proof that 'national communism,' independent of Soviet dictatorial control is now to be tolerated by the most equal of the equals in the Socialist camp. Even tiny Albania, a mosquito currently attacking the Russian bear, has not been officially read out of the camp, as was Yugoslavia's fate in Stalin's time, despite the vituperative denunciations which Albanian Premier Enver Hoxha directs at the Soviet Premier and the CPSU at every opportunity. (13:809)

This new looseness in the Socialist camp is an undeniable fact which lends a degree of credence and support to a fast-growing Western school of thought, which maintains that the Soviet Union is mellowing to the point where it no longer adheres to its long-standing aim of world domination through control of the international communist movement. This viewpoint chooses to consider the current tendency toward polycentrism and the apparent Soviet acceptance of it as a most fortunate and remarkable modification of basic communist ideology. Accordingly, it is also held that Soviet national interests and long-range goals have been or are being reshaped to conform to the facts of polycentric developments within the Bloc. This approach, of course, ignores the possibility that Soviet acceptance of polycentrism may constitute a mere change in tactics to accommodate a development which the CPSU and Khrushchev view as a temporary obstacle in the path toward long-standing communist ideological goals; goals which they still consider to be in the interests of the Soviet Union.

Neither communism nor the Soviet Union have ever been noted for a readiness to abandon their long-standing and long-range goals, but both are noted for a readiness to change tactics whenever the situation so demands. Their penchant for tactical changes to their program is ingrained in the Soviet interpretation of dialectical materialism and it has frequently enabled them to surmount greater obstacles than polycentrism and emerge with their goals intact.

To carry on a war for the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie . . . [Lenin admonished the Communist International] . . . a war which is a hundred times more difficult, prolonged and complicated than the most stubborn of ordinary wars between states, and to refuse beforehand to manoeuvre,



to utilize the conflict of interests (even though temporary) among one's enemies, to refuse to temporize and compromise with possible (even though transient, unstable, vacillating and conditional) allies —is not this ridiculous in the extreme? Is it not as though, in the difficult ascent of an unexplored and heretofore inaccessible mountain, we were to renounce beforehand the idea that at times we might have to go in zigzags, sometimes retracing our steps, sometimes abandoning the course already selected and trying out various others? (44:166)

The never-say-dic tendency in the West to repeatedly mistake tactical changes in the communist program for abandonment of long-range goals has also been succinctly stated by Bertram D. Wolfe.

It is these 'retracings of steps' and 'zig-zags' that have been the undoing of many of our analysts. At each retreat, we have been told: 'This is for good; now relaxation has set in.' At each zig, there have not been lacking those who saw in it the longed-for permanent change. They extrapolated the zig, prolonged it in a straight line out towards the horizon. Caught in outer space by the zag, they have rushed back to the turning point, only to prolong the zag on a straight line towards the other horizon. Perhaps this explains, as Leonard Schapiro once observed, the noiseless and not unwelcome obsolescence of so much of our Sovietology. (44:166)

*Western Evaluations of Soviet Motives.* Until proven otherwise, and if for no other reason than to avoid again falling victim to this time-worn but still effective trap, the West would be well advised to look closely at the source of the East-West struggle for insight rather than at its current transitory appearances. From appearances it looks as though the East and West have reached a balance of power (or terror) which will be characterized by an era of relative stability. Western analysts are picturing both sides as being resigned to a long-haul conflict, a war confined to economic and ideological weapons. For example, Walter Lippman in an article entitled 'The Great Shakeup,' comments on the nuclear stalemate and concludes that '. . . the true interest of Russia is to make peace with Europe and with the West, and, to speak indiscreetly, to recognize that the containment of China is becoming much more important than any other Soviet interest.' (40:22)

The significant signs on which this picture is generally based are the current Soviet accommodation to emerging polycentrism in the international communist movement, the soothing sound of 'peaceful coexistence,' the apparent retreat from aggressiveness in Cuba, and the 'generous' Soviet

relaxation of tension in Berlin. All these add up to a mellowing Soviet Union rapidly becoming a status quo nation with status quo interests. (35:553) In this Western picture, Khrushchev and the Soviet Union are seen as being stalled on top dead center of a program which is coming apart at the seams. The political and social systems of the West are growing stronger and more united rather than the contrary; there is a consistent reluctance among the numerous new nations escaping the yoke of Western imperialism to opt for communism; the monolithic structure of communism is disintegrating; the economies of almost all countries in the Socialist camp are stagnating; and worst of all, the solidarity of the Bloc, supposedly inseparably joined by a common ideology and antagonism to the West, is proving to be no more cohesive than the amount of Soviet force that can be applied to each of its components.

Add to these troubles facing Khrushchev and the Soviet Union the specter of an increasingly intransigent but potentially powerful Red China in the role of an aggressive competitor within the communist world and it does not seem unreasonable to conclude that the policy makers of Russia have no alternative but to reconsider and scale down their long-standing goal of world domination. From these symptoms apparent to the West, Khrushchev is seemingly confronted by multiplying dilemmas and among these he sits most uncomfortably astride the horns of the Chinese dilemma. As Mr. Zagoria concludes:

In the final analysis, the Sino-Soviet dilemma is whether or not it is possible to divide ideological authority in a revolutionary movement that has historically required a single leader to interpret the ideology and to dictate the strategy and tactics in a shifting and complex world. A closely related dilemma is whether it is possible to carve up the world into spheres of influence. The history of Communism thus far suggests that it is not compatible with shared authority. (31:392)

But does Khrushchev see it that way? Probably not any more than he expects 'shrimps will learn to whistle.'

### III. THE SOVIET APPROACH TO A STRATEGIC APPRAISAL

*Historical Background.* The view from the Kremlin undoubtedly looks different. The outlook there discloses no problems of greater magnitude than some that have already been overcome in days of far less promise than the future holds today. The impossible odds facing the Party when Lenin and his numerically insignificant group of followers first gained control of the government, or the dismal outlook when Hitler's armies were within sight of Moscow were two such periods in history, and from the records of neither case is there the slightest indication that abandonment of the Party's long-range goals was even considered. How much more unlikely then it is that those responsible for guiding the Party today should entertain any doubts about the inevitability of their eventual success. Where once they were fortified with only ideological support for the 'correctness' of their purpose and the effectiveness of their doctrine, they now have an undeniable empirical basis as 'proof' of the theory to encourage their pursuit of ultimate victory.

In the past 45 years has history not encouraged them to believe that they are the future and we the decaying past? At the outset—unless it should be saved by the World Revolution—Lenin barely ventured to hope that his rule would 'last longer than the Paris Commune.' It is rounding out four-and-a-half decades secure in its might, the second power on earth straining to be the first, the stronghold of a 'socialist camp.'

What reason does a man looking with Khrushchev's eyes have for abandoning the view that 'capitalist-imperialism' is decadent when it is losing all its colonies, did not show the resolution to protect Hungary's freedom or complete the unification of Korea, failed to make the military moves to prepare its sort of peace during World War II, thereby letting maimed and bleeding Russia pick up all of Eastern Europe, half of Germany, win powerful allies and partners in Asia, expand the 'camp of communism' from one-sixth of the earth to one-fourth, with one-third of the earth's population?

We may offer our explanations of all this. None of them would seem to him to refute his simple explanation of 'decadence' and 'progress.' (44:167)

With this outlook it is quite probable that when the Khrushchev regime finally managed to settle the dust of the satellite rebellions and consolidate its control of the Soviet Union it addressed itself to a long-overdue

appraisal of the world situation. Prominent on the world scene at that time (1958) were the budding shoots of the developments which loom so large on the scene today. Under the 'objective conditions' of the time it was conspicuously apparent to the Kremlin planners that the decadent West was reviving; they needed no Gallup poll in India and other newly emerging nations to realize that communism, true to past history, would win no elections; polycentrism was already a vigorous young fact of international communism bred by Tito when he exercised the count-me-out option afforded by the lack of real Soviet power in Yugoslavia; and Red China, though a true model of Marxism-Leninism and a staunch ally, was effectively resisting the infiltrations of Soviet political influence while making startling progress under Russia's economic and technical tutelage.

Clearly the program in pursuit of a united and harmonious world of communism in the Soviet image was bogging down. Since Soviet communist interests and objectives were fixed and inviolable, the fault obviously lay in policies which could not be thoroughly overhauled until the fight for succession in the Kremlin was settled.

*Stalin's Approach and Limitations.* Under Stalin's reign, the strategic approach to Soviet objectives involved two basic criteria. First, expansion was to be steadily pushed from the center outward. For Stalin, communist control of governments in areas noncontiguous with the Soviet areas of influence held little appeal. Second, his maxim of empire-building included a firm belief that complete subordination of the people's democracies to Moscow was a prerequisite of real progress in the spread of communism. (7:12) Being an extremely strong believer in the part which power plays in world politics, he had little confidence in the establishment of communist regimes in areas remote from the homeland where the ideology could not be sustained by Soviet military influence nor firmly subjected to his dictates. This conviction was bred in the fiasco of the Spanish revolution, confirmed by his experience with Tito, and notably practiced in his lame support of the Chinese Communists. (13:811)

As a consequence he consistently opposed any substantial independence for individual communist parties not only because it contradicted basic communist tenets but also because he thoroughly realized the impracticality and utter impossibility of achieving a homogeneous and harmonious communist world if multiple centers of ideological and political authority were allowed to develop. A basic principle in his campaign for the expansion of communism was that it was to be Soviet communism unquestionably responsive to Soviet control; no second 'socialist Federation' could be tolerated; polycentrism in Stalin's communist world was unthinkable. (7:23) Stalin was a realist in a Soviet world of raw power as well as a communist. No one realized better than

he that, while the ideology of communism might be the substance, force—or at least the obvious ability to use it—was the real cement required to build and hold both national and international communism together.

The potentialities inherent in the independence of the Chinese Party (CCP) were a development which plagued Stalin to his dying day. Although anxious to see communism spread into the political vacuum of China, he was even more anxious to insure that Soviet control of China through a responsive communist party would be guaranteed. His inability to 'have his cake and eat it, too' accounted for the Soviet on-again-off-again support of Mao Tse-tung and the CCP right up until they took over the government of China. (24:98)

In essence, in Stalin's basic concept of communist expansion, Soviet dictatorial control was a fundamental prerequisite. His answer to the question of polycentrism was to forbid it. Any communist government not constituted so as to recognize this fact was summarily labeled a traitor to the true cause, a lackey of the West, and was banished from the Socialist camp at the first sign of determined resistance to Soviet policies. Red China never precipitated decisive action under this concept even though no direct reins of control tied it to the Soviet Union, because the leaders of the CCP never chose to defy or deny the leading positions of both Stalin and the Soviet Union. (6:128-137)

*Soviet Strategic Inertia, 1953-1958.* Stalin's strategic concepts and the policies resulting from it could not be dislodged despite their obvious obsolescence and inapplicability to the new situations developing in the world until the power struggle in the Kremlin to determine his successor could be terminated. It is almost axiomatic that national policies set and long practiced under one government or dictator will persist through political inertia until unequivocal control is gained by a successor. Although Khrushchev began to emerge as this successor following Malenkov's short and unsteady tenure, it was not until the conclusion of the satellite unpleasantness, the ousting of Molotov and the dissolution of the 'B and K show' that Khrushchev and his supporters were able to assume the unequivocal primacy required to reorient the Soviet strategic concept. (7:453) When this unequivocal position was finally achieved in early 1958, there can be no doubt that a matter of first priority in Soviet business was the need for a new strategic appraisal and the formulation of a new concept from which up-to-date, workable and effective policies could be established.

Presumably a new set of national interests and objectives could then also have been devised; but there is a total lack of either evidence or reason to indicate that they were. Khrushchev is as dedicated a communist

as was Stalin, if not more so, and in his denunciations of 'the cult of the individual' there is no hint of disagreement on the basic goals ingrained in their mutual ideology. Further, the abandonment of such long-held, attractive, and still promising goals would not even be entertained unless, following the strategic appraisal, no strategic concept consistent with the national interests and objectives could be conceived. Only wishful thinking could conclude that such a condition confronted the Khrushchev regime when it found itself heir to the task and the responsibility of guiding the destiny of the Soviet Union.

*Khrushchev's Approach.* The dilemmas which in the Western view sporadically arise to confront the Soviet program are most often mirages visible only from the Western viewpoint. From the Kremlin, these mirages are merely 'objective conditions,' problems to be recognized and either surmounted or harnessed to the program. Where a dilemma implies an impossibility of resolution, a problem in 'objective conditions' only requires determination, ingenuity, and the application of 'scientific historical determinism' to be overcome.

With this approach, the 'Sino-Soviet dilemma' could well have been one of the decisive factors in a Soviet post-Stalin era strategic appraisal from which a new strategic concept was derived. Although such an appraisal would necessarily cover the full spectrum of political, social, military, and economic aspects of the world scene, only those elements essential to the hypothetical strategic concept outlined later in this paper need be highlighted here. These elements were:

1. A new Soviet acquaintance with and understanding of the elements of nuclear warfare.
2. Polycentrism versus international democratic centralism:
  - a. A new look at and evaluation of the short-term versus the long-term status of satellite nations with respect to their subservience to the Soviet Union.
  - b. A practical look at the elementary requisites of the communist world in which Marx and Lenin promised that war would be banished, national boundaries would become meaningless and peace would be an intrinsic product of the communist socio-political structure under which all mankind would live.
3. A clear understanding of the implications emerging with a unified and politically well-organized China.

**A new evaluation of and attitude toward these factors could well have been the principal ingredients in a new strategic appraisal initiated by the Khrushchev regime after 1958.**

## IV. A SOVIET STRATEGIC APPRAISAL

*Terms of Reference.* There is both a subjective and an objective composition to any strategic appraisal. The subjective component is the attitude, interests and intentions of the individual or group making the appraisal, whereas the objective component is the summation of the numerous relevant conditions existing in the world. Thus, though prominent world conditions at any given time are the same for all to see, these conditions will be assessed from different viewpoints; different factors will be emphasized and relative values will be differently assigned by any two groups conducting the appraisal. What may be significant features of the panorama to one group may be incidental to another; and the potentialities and meaning of events and conditions will be measured differently by groups holding different intentions and standards of values. It is essential, therefore, in postulating a Soviet appraisal to first consider the frame of reference from which the appraisal is made.

The mentality of the life-long communists in control of Russia is radically different from that of a Western democratic governing body and it is characterized by a dogmatic fixation on communist goals and a sense of morality based on the principle that 'the criterion of right action is the degree to which it assists the cause of revolution.' (18:84) The 'cause of revolution' is world communism; and, in pursuit of it, conventional standards of ethics, which at least inhibit the concept, plans, and actions of democratic governments, play no such limiting role in the Kremlin. On the contrary, a standard of ethics which commends the use of force, violence and terror as necessary to achieve established aims has been conditioned into the mentality of communists since before the days of Lenin. (18:Ch.VII) Thus a given set of conditions, significant and inspirational to one mentality, may be no more than repugnant, depressive or 'unthinkable' to another. Conditions which one may see as 'peace in our time' may be seen by another as the unfolding opportunity to unleash a cataclysmic and ruthless program, justified in its ideology and ordained by its doctrines.\* In short, the subjective components of a Soviet strategic

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\*To overlook the possibility that extreme courses of action are beyond consideration and are precluded by the sheer immensity of horror involved is to forget history. As with the projection of distance into space, the human mind cannot discriminate between degrees of horror beyond certain magnitudes. These magnitudes of self-inflicted horror have been repeatedly reached in the records of humanity. The deliberate, senseless, and brutal extermination of millions of helpless Jews and Poles by the government of a highly advanced and civilized Western European nation approaches this limit. The Katyn massacre, the Stalin purges, and the treatment of the Hungarian uprising are not far short of it.



appraisal and concept cannot avoid identification and resemblance to the ideological matrix from which it springs.

*An Outlook on Nuclear War Power.* When Khrushchev and company found themselves in a position to revise Stalin's concept of world revolution (or the Soviet concept for national strategy—should the semantics be a point of debate) after concluding the Kremlin power struggle and quelling the satellite disorders, they looked out on a world scene notable for several prominent conditions which had not been clearly visible nor understood during the last days of Stalin. Outstanding among these were three which from a communist viewpoint could be interrelated in a way not readily apparent to the noncommunist mind. These were the impact of nuclear weapons on national power, the industrial potential underway in China, and the growth of polycentrism in the communist world.

By 1957-1958, extensive nuclear tests by the Soviet Union made the potentialities of nuclear military power crystal-clear to the Kremlin. Since these tests only began in the latter part of 1952, the stark facts and the implications of nuclear weapons were far more conclusive in 1958 than they were at the time of Stalin's death. From these facts it had now become conclusively apparent, as it was not in Stalin's day, that real and absolute national military power was no longer a function of the quantity and quality of armies, navies, and air forces, but almost solely a function of the possession or nonpossession of nuclear weapons and a delivery capability. On the scale of all-out war, national power no longer could be represented as a gradually descending order of magnitude with relatively moderate separations between the states. In effect, a mutation in military power had occurred which required a new method of classification. With reference to all-out war, nations were now either nuclear powers or, for all practical purposes, unarmed.

This simple fact has long been recognized in the West; but to the West it was appreciated first in terms of security from communist military aggression and later in terms of deterrent effect, nuclear stalemate, and the overriding requirement for international conduct and accommodation which would preclude the possibility of ever precipitating the catastrophe to humanity which would result from a nuclear war. To the Western world this implies the pressing need for a community of world nations all under, and accountable to, a mutually protective rule of law for the prevention of world war.

It is at best naive to think that nuclear power implies a similar concept to a mentality welded to an unchanging goal and framed in an ideology that justifies and commends any and all measures in attaining its ends. To this kind of mentality, an outstanding feature of nuclear arms could well

be the practical link such power provides between the vague and illusory theories of Marx regarding the inevitability of communist domination of the world and the heretofore inescapable impracticability of such an idea. Where the potentialities of nuclear weapons lead Western nations to embrace the concept of a world community under the rule of law, they are more likely to impress a communist mentality as the long-sought answer to the question of how to achieve and maintain a homogeneous communist world under a rule of force.

*Problems of World Control and Management.* Within national boundaries, or in areas subject to Soviet military influence, the communist device for insuring a rule of force behind a facade of legality is the doctrine of democratic centralism. Where this doctrine can be supported and applied with the power to back it up there can be no problem of polycentrism or divergence such as now being demonstrated by China. The current Soviet inability to apply this doctrine uniformly to all countries embracing communism highlights the problem of effective world government.

The mechanics of governing the homogeneous and 'inherently tranquil' communist world following total victory have never been enunciated by Marx, Lenin, or anyone else. There has therefore always been, and still is, an embarrassing gap in both the ideology and doctrine as to just how the promised eternal peace and tranquility in this dream world is to be established and preserved. (18:81) Such a world status could, of course, be attained to a certain extent if a central authority capable of enforcing its judgments and decisions in any part of the world could be created complete with the overwhelming superiority of power required or with a monopoly of political and military power. For the CPSU or the Soviet Union to openly admit aspirations to such a power position, however, would be grossly impolitic. Unfortunately no one has ever devised an alternate method. The vague illusions in communist literature to the 'intrinsic unanimity of purpose and action' among all segments of society under the world-wide mystical 'dictatorship of the proletariat' which is supposed to negate all the social frictions at the root of strife and war, delude no one, not even communists. The basic facts of human nature and society have not been revoked. Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev, as practical politicians, have been more cognizant than most human beings of the fact that at the present state of the art in political development (and for the foreseeable future as well) power to enforce is the irreplaceable keystone of government. It is the keystone of government from the intranational to the national level. Thus far, few have had the ambition, and none the capability, to wield this kind of power on the international level across the entire world.

There can be little question that in pursuit of world domination the communist directorate recognizes that to achieve and maintain this goal they must first achieve and maintain either overwhelming superiority of power or a monopoly of it. The communist system for achieving and preserving a monopoly of power on the national scale was developed by Lenin in his doctrine of democratic centralism. It has proved to be a remarkably efficient and durable blueprint for the dictatorship of the Party in the Soviet Union and elsewhere. No national government once under the control of communism, entrenched to the degree where the regime could openly proclaim its true colors, has ever managed to throw off the system. The administrative processes of the government, the military, and the internal police are all 'democratically centralized' to the point where organized resistance is highly improbable, if not impossible.

Effective as it has proven to be, democratic centralism is based on force, or the capability to exert force, when and where needed. Where superior force, and the willingness to use it as ruthlessly as the occasion demands, are not present, democratic centralism is a hollow doctrine. The roots and limitations of this key communist doctrine and its relation to Soviet expansion merit a brief review.

*A Gap in Doctrine Between Theory and Practice.* Though both Marx and Lenin emphatically preached the inevitability of a totally communist world, Marx, being a pure theorist, was never confronted with the practical necessity of implementing his theories. Lenin, on the other hand, was a genius of political finesse and organization who came face to face with political reality when he was confronted with the task of administering and governing the affairs of the Soviet Union.

. . . there is one aspect of the Communist ideology which distinguishes Leninism from all other varieties of Marxism and it is central to our problem; namely, Lenin's absorption not with the dream of socialism but with the mechanics and dynamics of organization and power. In a world where most intellectuals were in love with ideas and accustomed to the gap between dream and deed. Lenin's idea was organization. He was an organization man, the organization man of whatever movement he participated in. An enemy alike to the dawn-to-dusk discussions of the intelligentsia and the 'unreliable,' 'spontaneous' flareups and subsidings of the masses, he was all his life at work on a machine to control untidily, unreckonably, detestably 'spontaneity.'

Organization, control, and centralism were the sacred tripod of power. 'Now we have become an organized party,' he early wrote, 'and that means the creation of power, the

transformation of the authority of ideas into the authority of power, the subordination of the lower party organs to the higher ones.' (44:169)

To accommodate and preserve the attractive illusions of democracy in 'the dictatorship of the proletariat' he devised the concept of Democratic Centralism. Although this dialectic term is defined by various versions of communist jargon according to the needs of the moment, it is recognized by friend and foe alike as a political device incorporated into the administrative structure of the Party and the government as a guarantee to insure that the central 'dictatorship' will always be free and uninhibited to decide, define, and interpret just what shall be the democratic aspirations and mandates 'of the proletariat.'

In the Soviet political organization, Lenin's democratic centralism has been long implemented and firmly rooted. On the national scale, within the Soviet Union and the true satellites, forty-five years of Soviet administrative experience have developed this system of self-perpetuating dictatorship to the point where it is highly sensitive, quickly responsive, and automatically destructive of all potential opposition to its rule. Perhaps fortunately for the West, however, Lenin did not live long enough to be confronted with the practical problem of administering an international empire. As a consequence there was no pressing occasion during his lifetime to require the application of his talent to the construction of a blueprint for democratic centralism on the international scale.

Where Marx was the ideological architect who vaguely outlined the form and sketched in the goals of communism, Lenin was the political engineer and superintendent of 'communist construction' who could translate the theories into manageable political doctrines and a system of government. On the other hand, Stalin, like a heavy-handed plumber, could make no durable connections beyond the point where he could exert brute force. Thus he could expand his 'true communism' only to those states subject to Soviet military power. In the aftermath of World War II he found a fertile and untended Eastern European field on which to apply his limited talents and appreciable strength, but when he reached a line of firm Western resistance his program of communist 'growth' became bankrupt.

The bankruptcy of Soviet strategy which preceded the Khrushchev regime was more than just a temporary impasse—a communist 'pause' in preparation for renewed onslaughts against the still strong but decadent West. More importantly from the Party standpoint, Stalin's strategic concept was exposed as a sterile and unimaginative reliance on and use of a military force which though effective in the immediate postwar period had long since proved inadequate to keep the program moving forward. (6:149) Though

the process took years to accomplish, the Stalinist faction, hoping to inherit power from Stalin, was doomed by a bankruptcy of both strategy and doctrine. On arriving at the point in history where a concept and a practical doctrine for international democratic centralism had become a matter of practical Soviet necessity, they were unable to conceive a new approach or develop a credible blueprint for action and progress. They could neither conceive of a new solution for the problem of polycentrism nor could they apply the old solution effectively. Their China policy, divorced from Stalin's personal attendance which kept Russian aid to China carefully balanced between just enough to insure the survival of communism in China without permitting enough to allow China to get over the threshold of an industrial take-off stage, became frozen on Stalin's last zag. (7:77) Soviet aid to China, which began in 1950 after the Moscow Conference and steadily increased through 1957, was affording China a chance for rapidly achieving major power status concurrently with a steadily decreasing political subservience to the Soviet Union. (7:435) The bankruptcy in Stalin's concept reflected a basic gap in communist doctrine between theory and practice. Under his concept, 'true communism' could not expand faster or beyond the Soviet capability to apply the doctrine of democratic centralism across international boundaries. In short, communism's visionary world system, which respects power above all other human influences, requires the capability to apply some doctrine akin to democratic centralism across the entire communist world. The unavoidable malady which results from the absence of this doctrine and the capability to apply it is polycentrism—a political condition inimical both to Soviet national interests and to the ideology which supposedly defines the form of world communism and guides its course. An as yet unrealized capability to always apply the doctrine of democratic centralism on the international scale is the only solution to the problem of polycentrism.

If nothing else, Khrushchev has proved that, unlike Molotov and other Stalinists, his imagination and initiative escaped petrification in the Stalin mold. His recognition of neutrals as something different from 'lackeys of imperialism,' his vigorous trumpeting of 'peaceful coexistence,' his announced contention that war between the Socialist camp and the Capitalist world was *not* inevitable, and his promulgation of the theory of 'equality among members of the Socialist camp' are all evidence of the initiative of a new regime finally freed from the straight-jacket of Stalin's viewpoints. None of these innovations in policy could have stemmed from Stalin's rigid conceit for 'true Communist growth.'

*A Soviet 'New Look' at Polycentrism.* Ostensibly, Khrushchev has either worked out a solution to these problems, or he has explained them away to the satisfaction of the CPSU in order to justify his leadership in the face of the Stalinist opposition between 1953-58. On the surface at

least, the polycentrism problem has been solved by the new Soviet policy which recognizes the right of national parties to interpret the laws of socio-economic communist development according to the special conditions prevailing in their respective countries. In preparing the way for a reversal of Stalin's old stand on the treatment of polycentrism, Khrushchev has apparently abandoned the heretofore unbudgeable Soviet position on the need for a single, central, and final authority in the structure of the communist movement. In order to admit Yugoslavia, complete with Tito and his formerly heretical revisionisms, back into the Socialist camp he has publically assented to the correctness of 'a multiplicity of forms of socialist development' and agreed not to impose Soviet opinion on another member of the Bloc. (31:50)

For the time being at least, this is a doubly expedient solution to both polycentrism and the special Chinese variety of it—the Sino-Soviet conflict which, it turns out, is a figment of Western imagination and desperation; the kind of 'squabble that can be expected in even the best of marriages.'

If it could be established that the Soviet Premier always says what he means and means what he says, the West could then conclude, as many Free World observers have, that there has been a fundamental change in the Soviet outlook toward the need for a centrally controlled monolithic structure to the world-wide communist program. Henceforth, then, the movement will be directed and pursued not as an outgrowth of Soviet foreign policy—a reflection of the Soviet strategic concept—but rather as a joint venture of international communism with the interests and decisions of all members guiding its form and substance. This is the picture Khrushchev is selling and this is the concept he proposes both friend and foe accept at face value—a new, more mellow, and fraternal attitude toward all communist countries, including the satellites-in-fact and including China, Yugoslavia, Albania and Cuba.

A more incredible and erroneous conclusion would be difficult to imagine. To accept Khrushchev's new policy of 'equality among equals' in the communist movement as a sincere abandonment of the 'rightful' position of the Soviet Union at the head of the world-wide program would mean that this policy is credible evidence of a basic change in national interests. If this could be true then 'shrimps have [finally] learned to whistle.'

It is far more likely that this radically changed policy toward polycentrism is a typical communist zag in the flexible tactics for which communism is famous; a new policy stemming from the 1958 revised strategic concept devised to better support unchanged and firmly established national interests.

An analysis of polycentrism reveals several fundamental facts. First, the Soviet government prior to Khrushchev's regime considered polycentrism a cancerous growth in the body of international communism which had to be destroyed or rejected before the movement was safe for further expansion. It was the antithesis of democratic centralism which was probably the most fundamental, time-tested, thoroughly proven, and trusted doctrine in Stalin's 'bible' of communism. It therefore could not be allowed to get beyond conception in communist territory. If it did manage to gain a territorial foothold beyond the limit of uncontested Russian power, as in Yugoslavia, the country involved was quickly ejected from the body of 'true communist states.' Until Khrushchev's ascendancy to control, there could be no worse kind of heresy in the communist world. Second, polycentrism has appeared and survived only in those communist countries unoccupied by Soviet military forces and it has appeared in all of these. Third, with the possible exception of Red China, the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to enforce its democratic centralism by military means in these countries is primarily due to Soviet unwillingness to accept the risk that these unoccupied countries might ask for and obtain Western military support in resisting Soviet aggression. At the very least, Soviet insistence on a completely subservient government in countries such as Yugoslavia, Albania, or Cuba where Soviet domination is not clearly established could only serve to cause these countries to seek and gain a haven in the Western camp. Therefore, so long as the West remains undefeated and undefeatable by the Socialist Bloc, it would be impossible to expand 'true communism' as defined in the pre-Khrushchev Soviet strategic concept beyond the point where Soviet arms could be applied without risk of Western military interference. Finally, it could have occurred to Khrushchev and company that with the advent of nuclear weapons, any revisionist communist countries currently in the fringe area of Soviet power, and consequently unresponsive to Soviet control, could be easily and immediately brought permanently under Soviet domination once the threat of Western interference could be removed by the disintegration, surrender or defeat of the West. To Khrushchev then, it could have been apparent that the old Stalinist domineering and inflexible attitude toward communist countries beyond firm control was self-defeating and unnecessary.

In Khrushchev's view, defeat of the West with its nuclear strength was, and still is, no less of a problem than it was for Stalin; but in Khrushchev's appraisal it is likely that Soviet attempts to hold all communist countries in a status of complete subservience to the USSR while the critical battle goes on with the West appears, as it actually is, a pointless diversion of Soviet effort and resources. Further, it is a policy doubly destructive of Soviet objectives. Inflexible Soviet attempts to implement this policy were doomed to failure until the West could be defeated; and the Soviet image

of imperialism this policy portrayed to all nonaligned countries made the spread of communism among them more difficult. In essence, a long-range objective stemming from a fundamental national interest was being misinterpreted by a bankrupt concept. This defunct concept had generated a policy which was attempting a short-term objective beyond the current Soviet political-military capability.

This matter of power and matter-of-fact evaluation of polycentrism appears a more credible explanation of the current Soviet abandonment of a policy of subservience for fringe area satellites than does the 'mellowing Soviet Union' theory so widely accepted in the West. With this concept, the important political fact for the Kremlin to keep in mind is that a communist country, however independent and intransigent, is a loss to the West; it will fall like a ripe plum in the Soviet basket when the West is defeated. Under no circumstances should it be driven into the Western haven to add to the enemy total strength. A far more enlightened policy is to display a tolerant, fraternal, and patient attitude toward 'unarmed' fringe countries attempting independent roads to communism. With the exception of Red China, none has any real potential for contesting Soviet domination when the nuclear-armed West is defeated. But the Chinese People's Republic is a special case.

*The Special Case of Red China.* The unique status of the Chinese People's Republic in the communist world is a multifaceted subject still incompletely recorded and analyzed in the voluminous Western studies which have thus far been undertaken. Variations of status which exist to a lesser degree in other Bloc countries are all magnified in China by the fact that China's point of departure on the road to communism was radically different in the historical, ethnic, social, economic, and political atmosphere surrounding the movement. China's ruling regime, for instance, is more communist—in the Spartan-like and ideological sense of the world—than the CPSU; China's is the only communist government which can credibly claim to have achieved power at the head of an appreciably broad base of popular support; and paradoxically, despite a minimum of Soviet domination, China's regime, at least until 1958, has been the most consistent and effective proponent of Soviet leadership in a monolithic communist camp. These and the multitude of other factors affecting the complex relation between Russia and China are competently documented in a number of recent studies such as Mr. Zagoria's *The Sino-Soviet Conflict*. (31)

However, for the purposes of this paper, which are: to outline the principal elements in a new Soviet strategic appraisal occurring about 1958; to measure them against a Soviet communist frame of reference; and, to estimate the substance of the resultant revisions in a strategic



concept, it is necessary here to note and consider only those peculiarities of China's status directly relevant to Soviet national interests.

Foremost among these is China's real potentiality for becoming a first-class world power. Of all the communist states, China is the only one which has the slightest chance of ever effectively contesting Soviet predominance in a communist world after 'the great and total victory.'\* It is immaterial whether or not Soviet communism has any real chance of gaining this long-sought total victory; the point is that a Soviet communist believes it is inevitable. Further, even the most benign of noncommunists would be strained to credit the Soviet communists with a dedicated desire to win the world for a competing plethora of independent communist states all free to interpret the 'bible' according to their own interests and all free to utilize their new-found communist peace, prosperity, and abundance to develop the requisite nuclear power calculated to hold secure their new material and social affluence. To credit the masters of an ideology dedicated to violence and strife in pursuit of its aims, and dependent upon power to nourish its growth and expansion, with the naivety required to embrace the idea of such a polycentric world is intellectual blindness.

It is apparent to any student of dialectical materialism, and even more so to practical and experienced materialistic politicians as are Khrushchey and company, that such a communist world would soon degenerate into the divided and antagonistic international structure so 'characteristic of the

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\*All other members of the current Socialist camp lack one or more of the factors essential to first-class power status. Those such as Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland, which are relatively advanced in industry and technology, lack the geographic position and dimensions required to survive independently in a world ruled by power. In addition, these countries are already under 'satisfactory' Soviet control and presumably, so far as the Kremlin is concerned, will remain in a true satellite status. Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary are even less favorably situated. Yugoslavia, Albania and Cuba—though currently in a position to take independent roads to communism—lack the resources in population, industry, technological finesse, and geographic spread to seriously aspire to first-class status. Thus none of these can pose a long-range threat to Soviet supremacy in a communist world. Their varying ability to resist complete domination by the USSR and make polycentrism a reality of our time is almost directly proportional to their potential capability for escaping into the Free World haven.

capitalist-imperialist system.' The great struggle with the West would then have been won in vain because intrinsic in the vision of the communist Utopia is a world without international boundaries, a homogeneous world of humanity in which the 'classless society' can generate no conflicting aspirations and strife. It is certain that the strategists of the Soviet Union cannot help but be emphatically aware of the fact that effective management of conflicting group aspirations depends on the power to adjudicate and enforce if these conflicting aspirations are to be kept below the threshold of violence, strife and war.

Red China's potentiality for real power, independent of Soviet control, and hence her potentiality for being the first 'unresponsive' competitor in the communist world in a position to make her unresponsiveness durable, became conspicuously (and perhaps painfully) apparent to the Soviet Union throughout the 1952 to 1958 period during which China made remarkable progress toward industrialization. This material progress was confirmed and acknowledged by competent observers from both sides of the bamboo and iron curtains.\* There appears to be little disagreement on the fact of significant industrial progress in the new united China which, like it or not, does have an intensity and singleness of purpose and an effectiveness in central direction and control never before experienced in this huge nation. The likelihood for continued Chinese progress toward the industrialization and technology required for first-class power status is variously assessed by different observers, but all agree that the potentiality is there. China has the natural resources, the geographic proportions, the industrious and potentially competent population, and the zealous national intention and dedication required to achieve top-level rank among the world's powers.

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\*No nation was in a better position to witness this progress and no nation was more closely concerned and thus inclined to carefully consider and weigh its implications to the line-up of world powers than was the Soviet Union, which furnished thousands of technicians to spark the program. Concurrently, Chinese success in countering Soviet attempts in political subversion and infiltration made it evident to the Kremlin that political control of China by the USSR could not be achieved by measures short of military force—a course of action currently inexpedient because of the risk of Western interference, involvement and advantage.

China also has formidable obstacles to overcome before arriving at her goal. Control of the Chinese population explosion is perhaps the major problem which seriously threatens her prospects of success. (32:42) However, barring unpredictable factors such as internal political derailment of the regime, or frequent repetitions of the gross error in management exhibited in the Great Leap Forward, China is almost certain to some day arrive to take a position among the front rank powers; a position which will always be reserved for her by virtue of geography, population, and resources. When this may happen is a matter of obscure uncertainty. It is certain, however, that extensive material, technical, scientific, and educational assistance such as was being afforded by the Soviet Union during the 1952-1958 period, would significantly enhance China's prospects and expedite the process of industrialization.

The essential element of the situation then, so far as Soviet interests are concerned, is that effective control of China must be gained before China can develop a first-class industrial and scientific base; or, failing that, that Russian interests will be best served by a Soviet policy designed to inhibit and undermine Chinese industrial progress until such time as the Soviet Union, at the head of the communist movement, can defeat the West. When the 'inevitable victory' occurs, as is so fervently promised in the ideology and so empirically 'proven' in the last 45 years of history, the Soviet Union, under the guidance of the CPSU, will be free to apply her resulting monopoly of nuclear war power to the problem of establishing democratic centralism effectively on a world-wide basis. To the communist mind thoroughly conditioned in a materialistic philosophy of morality, the effective establishment of the doctrine of democratic centralism by means of a Soviet monopoly in nuclear war power can easily be envisioned as the 'concrete objective condition' which the 'historical evolutionary process' will bring forth in accordance with the 'science of communism and its laws of historical determinism.' (18:37-56) Translated out of jargon, this means that, given the requisite amount of ruthlessness, any nation which can achieve a monopoly in nuclear strike capability can, with the modern technological advancements which have largely solved the heretofore insurmountable technical, administrative, and communication problems, gain and maintain the subservience of the world with a relatively economical expenditure of national effort and resources.

To the Western mind an appraisal of the situation in these terms appears fantastic, but it is nevertheless a fact that Western contentions and disbelief regarding the capability of the Soviet Union to ever gain such a monopoly, or to use it in such a manner, are immaterial and irrelevant to the Soviet formulation of those portions of the Soviet strategic appraisal and concept associated with this view, if the Soviets believe that a total communist victory is inevitable and that the ends justify the means. In any event,

we have no reason to argue the point. It is a possible enemy intention which must be considered and weighed. Like the Western democracies' refusal to seriously take note of the unbelievable beliefs of Hitler, openly enunciated in his *Mein Kampf* and so frequently repeated thereafter, a similar Western refusal to credit Khrushchev and the CPSU with a sincere intention to 'bury' the West and a sincere belief in their ability to do so, would constitute a gross oversight in the Western estimate of the enemy's intentions.

## V. SOVIET STRATEGIC CONCEPTS

*Scope.* A comprehensive Soviet strategic concept necessarily will include the entire spectrum of planning for cold, limited, and general war considerations, and it will outline the strategic approach and general tenor of national efforts to be employed in the struggle against the West. The principal portion of this overall concept will therefore be concerned with the direction and nature of national efforts supporting the central and paramount objectives of insuring the security of the nation while concurrently maintaining pressures against the noncommunist world best calculated to eventually result in a Western defeat. These must be the central and principal concern of any Soviet strategic concept and it is certain that the post-1958 strategy is primarily addressed to these problems.

New and post-1958 Soviet policies, derived from the current overall strategic concept and concerned with the overall struggle, are discernible in recent Soviet foreign policy trends. Notable among these are the Soviet advocacy of 'peaceful coexistence,' the about-face regarding the inevitability of major wars, and the post-Stalin mellowness and 'generosity' toward neutrals. The prodigious national effort concentrated on heavy industry and scientific and technological supremacy is a fundamental policy in support of the overall struggle which has been common to both the pre-Khrushchev and the post-Stalin eras.

All of the foregoing policies, however, reflect portions of the Soviet strategic concept beyond the scope of this paper which has the more limited purpose of an attempt to integrate Sino-Soviet and intracamp relations with the Soviet national interest in controlling the world-wide communist movement. Accordingly, only that segment of the Soviet strategic concept concerned with these issues is outlined here. This approach neither denies nor ignores the fact that all segments of a national strategy, horizontally across the various national interests and vertically down to the national policies, are interrelated and interdependent. Such an approach does permit, however, a focus of attention on those segments of the Soviet strategic concept related to the considerations discussed in preceding chapters and it confines the problem to proportions manageable within the scope of this paper.

The following sections of this chapter are therefore conjectures on the substance of Soviet concepts which might be derived from an appraisal of the situation as previously discussed. Following each proposed replica of a Soviet concept of the best approach in specific problem areas are national policies which might reasonably stem from such concepts. In many cases

these policies will coincide with actual Soviet policies openly advocated and currently being implemented. These latter are included and related to the appropriate hypothetical concept because the nature of a Soviet national policy and its impact on the Free World may vary considerably depending on the intent behind it.

*Concept on Polycentrism.* The Soviet strategic concept relative to polycentrism now regards this condition as a symptom of the times—a condition which cannot be avoided so long as the Free World affords a haven into which weak and wavering 'socialist' states on the fringes of Soviet power can escape. Soviet attempts to completely dominate these countries without a real capability to do so merely serves to drive them closer to the Western Bloc and damages the image of both world communism and the Soviet Union in the eyes of all uncommitted nations. While the critical struggle with the Western democracies is underway, rigid subservience of minor communist nations to the Soviet Union is neither vital nor expedient. What is required is that these countries must be kept within the Communist Bloc in a political 'cold storage status' secure from Western overtures until the USSR acquires the capability needed to correct their revisionist attitudes. In the meantime, these countries have not the slightest chance to develop the kind of nuclear war power required to resist Soviet 'corrective measures' once the danger of interference from the Western world is removed. A considerate, sympathetic, and understanding Soviet attitude toward their internal problems will safeguard Bloc solidarity and encourage the sincere and united efforts of Bloc countries in the spread of communism via the economic, cultural and social fronts.

*General Policy on Polycentrism.* Throughout the communist world an image of the USSR as the invincible bastion of Socialist power will be promoted together with the impression that the Soviet Union is receptive, sympathetic, and tolerant toward the separate interests and unique problems of the less powerful and less influential communist states.

*Policies Toward True Satellites.* Where the Soviet Union already has the military capability to effectively dominate the government of a satellite, this domination will be maintained to the extent necessary to dictate the choice of national leaders, the structure of the government, control of the military, and foreign policy.

Harsh and unpopular measures to insure conformity to Soviet practices on internal matters will not be pressed.

All expedient measures calculated to afford these countries the form, but not the substance, of national independence will be prosecuted.

*Policies Toward Semiindependents—Yugoslavia and Albania.* Well-established and recognized communist regimes in countries beyond current Soviet military capabilities and influence will be warmly tolerated within the Socialist camp, complete with their revisionist or dogmatic tendencies, in order to shield these countries to the maximum extent possible from Western association and influence.

Ideological, political, and social aberrations, formerly intolerable in the Socialist Bloc, will be ignored so long as these diversions do not threaten Soviet long-range objectives.

*Policies Toward Newcomers to the Communist World—Cuba.* No overt attempts will be made to enforce political subservience to the Soviet Union, nor to place obvious Soviet puppets in positions of control in these countries, until such conditions can be effectively supported by Soviet military power. However, all appropriate undercover methods, short of those which risk decisive local reaction to Soviet influence and infiltration, will be undertaken in order to build a dependence of the local regimes on Soviet support for internal security and economic management.

Nonvital differences between the attitudes of these countries and those of the Soviet Union will be freely admitted and agreements negotiated in 'democratic' fashion in order to give credence to the 'true independence' of communist states.

Military aid in the form of Soviet material and personnel will be offered under conditions which will encourage Soviet influence in the maintenance of internal security and discourage Western interference in the internal affairs of the country.

*Concept on the Chinese Problem.* China is unique in the communist world because of its independent ruling regime, its current position beyond expedient military domination, and its ominous potential for first-class power status. As such it poses a serious threat to uncutested Soviet domination of the communist world. As a consequence, Soviet influence must be exerted wherever possible to inhibit China's industrial growth and to insure that China's war potential remains subnuclear. So long as China can be kept restricted to conventional arms it poses no appreciable threat to the eventual Soviet supremacy essential in the communist world following defeat of the West.

*Policies Toward China.* The policy of rendering substantial material and technical aid to China, as pursued until 1958, was not consistent with

Soviet interests.\* The aid-to-China policy was therefore quietly and deliberately reversed, not because of accumulating frictions and conflicts with China, but because such aid was clearly inimical to Soviet national interests. Consequently, the throttle on this program began closing down in 1958 and by 1960 it was almost completely closed off without drawing a great deal of attention from the West and without unduly alarming the Chinese about the fundamental cause of the shutoff. Under the new concept of strategy toward China, Soviet influence will be exerted wherever possible to insure that China's war potential remains subnuclear.

When, and if, the Chinese explode their first nuclear device (as is generally expected in 1963), they will get no substantial Soviet technical or material assistance on their long road to the creation of an effective delivery capability.

Chinese intransigence toward the West will be encouraged but not supported militarily in order to insure that China does not become eligible for the Western aid and trade which might enhance her prospects for industrialization.

The Soviet Union will give only lip service to the admission of Red China into the United Nations.

Chinese aid to other underdeveloped countries will be greeted by the Soviet Union as a hopeless Chinese policy which depletes Chinese resources without doing any permanent harm to Soviet objectives.

Chinese opportunism and dogmatism, where exhibited in ways contrary to Soviet interests and objectives, such as was the case in the Indian border war, will be impeded to the maximum extent possible without completely disrupting Sino-Soviet relations. In this respect, every attempt will be made to keep the friction between China and the USSR open to negotiation.

The Soviet Union will not precipitate an open break for any reason short of effective Chinese actions directly contrary to major Soviet objectives, so long as China remains industrially and militarily confined to the status of a nonnuclear power.

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\*This was a policy which could not even be blamed on Stalin. It grew like Topsy out of the strategic inertia and lack of decisive and perceptive top-level control which existed in the Soviet Union between the time of Stalin's death in 1953 and the consolidation of CPSU and governmental power under Khrushchev in 1958.



## VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WEST AND CONCLUSIONS

As can be noted, Soviet policies which can be reasonably derived from the hypothetical concepts proposed in this paper coincide closely with actual overt Soviet policies now being energetically implemented throughout the world. By no means should the conclusion be drawn then, that these and similarly derived hypothetical concepts are necessarily a mere exercise in philosophy or academic construction. The intent or motivation behind a policy is often more important than the policy itself in a determination of the reaction or attitude which the West should adopt in response. The Soviet policy of 'peaceful coexistence' is perhaps the outstanding current illustration of this fact. If the Soviet idea of 'peaceful coexistence' stemmed from a sincere Soviet concept of live-and-let-live, the Western world could accept it with pleasure. In the case of 'peaceful coexistence,' however, the Kremlin has frankly admitted that it is a policy aimed at burying the West without the necessity of resorting to war. With this intent behind it, the identical policy obviously becomes much less palatable for Western consumption.

The hypothetical concepts proposed here then merit consideration even though their credibility may seem strained. Until they are factually disproven they remain credible possibilities which may coincide with actual Soviet strategic concept. Many seemingly benign or only innocuous Soviet policies may assume a different character if they stem from the concepts proposed here rather than from the more generous Soviet concepts which the West often tends to presume motivate the USSR—until proven otherwise. Further, an understanding of the true intent behind a policy may often afford a clue as to the best course of counteraction. A few examples of this are cited below.

These hypothetical concepts merit consideration for another reason. In the war for men's minds, communist propaganda repeatedly and deliberately impugns the motives behind well-intentioned Western concepts and often succeeds thereby in inhibiting and impeding Western efforts. An illustration of this technique is the 'economic exploitation' tag which Soviet propaganda hangs so freely and so consistently on any Western aid program designed to bolster and stabilize the economies of underdeveloped countries. While the West is rightfully disinclined to adopt communist falsification techniques, there is no reason why Western counterpropaganda should not actively and energetically impugn Soviet motivations where a case for a reasonable suspicion can be made. It is not enough for Western sources to publicize the obvious connection between Soviet efforts in trade, aid, and politics with their obvious interest in spreading communism. In the communist world and in many of the earth's backward areas, the spread of communism is accepted as a legitimate motivation. Where these efforts can be reasonably

associated with Soviet imperialism they lose their legitimacy and their appeal not only in nonaligned backward areas, but also in communist territory. The current Soviet policy of 'equality among equals in the Socialist camp' is a case in point. Currently, this innocuous Kremlin policy merits scant attention in the West. When it is noted in the press it is generally noted only to question its sincerity. Seldom, if ever, are credible ulterior Soviet motives attached to this policy in order to raise legitimate Bloc suspicions about the validity of this new Soviet tolerance and 'mellow' attitude. There is no Western or Christian ethic which precludes the West from sowing legitimate seeds of destructive suspicion in the 'Socialist camp' whenever the opportunity can be found.

In view of the Soviet predilection for impugning even the best of U.S. and Western motives, some thought could be given to retaliation in kind. The hypotheses presented herein offer possible avenues. For example, as noted above, Khrushchev's current attempts to sell the idea of a fraternal and benevolent Soviet attitude toward associate members in the communist camp is accepted in the West as an innocuous move which in no way threatens Western interests; and therefore no serious attempts on the propaganda level, via the Western press, are made to uncloak this mellow Soviet posture and disclose the 'likely' purpose behind it. It is conceivable that national communists such as those in Czechoslovakia might be less diligent in promoting world communism if credible doubts about their standing in an all-communist world are raised. It is conceivable also that Yugoslavia, currently being wooed back into the Communist Bloc, might be less willing to abandon her substantial connections with the Free World if she is given reasons to suspect that, by embracing Soviet overtures, she is stepping into a 'Soviet cold storage' status.

Chinese reaction to widespread speculation in the Western press that Soviet assistance is being withheld because of a Soviet strategy which deliberately keeps Chinese industry and war potential in a 'back-burner' status so that it will remain susceptible to Soviet domination at a later period is difficult to judge. This question merits a careful study in itself. The increasingly direct and violent denunciations of Khrushchev by Chinese spokesmen are indications that Mao Tse-tung and the CCP are leaning increasingly toward the conclusion that hidden Russian motives bode no good for China.

Finally, it is certain that if the theories proposed in this paper reflect actual Soviet motivation and strategy, then the West can conclude that the level of intensity with which the Soviet Union prosecutes the cold war, and her willingness to undertake warmer versions, will vary directly with Chinese industrial and scientific progress. If—and while—China stagnates, the Kremlin can and will remain patient in pursuing victory over the West.

There will be no conspicuous cause for Khrushchev to abandon communism's alleged alliance with time which enables the movement to maintain a steady but no-risk strain on Western resistance. However, if, and when, China begins to show appreciable progress toward the level of industrialization which will support a sizeable nuclear armament program, the Soviet Union will be forced to adopt a more aggressive posture against the West and undertake greater risks in order to achieve its long-sought victory over the West before the Chinese can pre-empt Russia's position as sole custodian of nuclear war potential in the communist world.

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