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Dieppe: the Shame and the Glory

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The author has made a penetrating and critical analysis of the military disaster that was Dieppe. The initial part of the book is an inquiry into the background of the operation (the first battle of World War II involving the Canadian Army), including the inept preparations; the conflict between Canadian and British generals over the prerogatives of command; the eagerness of the Canadian units to engage in action; the basing of tactical decisions on the existence of naval gunfire and air support, and the removal of this support without a corresponding alteration in the concept of operations; the cancellation of the raid; and its hasty, ill-prepared reinstitution, with all its inherent tactical defects still intact, to satisfy political requirements. The second part is a narrative of the action as seen through the eyes of the survivors whom Mr. Robertson interviewed. The author concludes that two now famous military men were responsible for the initiation and the poor planning of the Dieppe raid. These men, Louis Mountbatten and Bernard Montgomery, were detached and engaged in other tasks at the actual time of execution of the raid. The lessons learned at Dieppe were applied in later raids and amphibious operations, but the extreme cost makes it imperative that the lesson not have to be relearned.


Not often in researching a subject does a person find material representing two diametrically opposed viewpoints arranged conveniently, by subject, in a single volume. In the case of The Soviet Economy, however, we find exactly this situation. This particularly penetrating book consists of 53 articles by both Western and Soviet writers and economists, and discusses general subjects such as Soviet statistics, the Soviet consumer, labor unions, Soviet economic growth, Soviet agriculture, gross national product and many others. What makes the book unique is that the articles are arranged with the two viewpoints confronting one another in the same section, and with a bare minimum of editorial comment (usually only one or two pages of introductory material). Included are many excellent nontechnical, enlightening presentations that would be worth reading by themselves, such as ‘The Proclaimed Emergence of Communism in the USSR’ by Alexander S. Balinsky of Rutgers University, as well as a few somewhat technical dissertations on Soviet economics. Written not for the