The Soviet Economy

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The author has made a penetrating and critical analysis of the military disaster that was Dieppe. The initial part of the book is an inquiry into the background of the operation (the first battle of World War II involving the Canadian Army), including the inept preparations; the conflict between Canadian and British generals over the prerogatives of command; the eagerness of the Canadian units to engage in action; the basing of tactical decisions on the existence of naval gunfire and air support, and the removal of this support without a corresponding alteration in the concept of operations; the cancellation of the raid; and its hasty, ill-prepared reinstitution, with all its inherent tactical defects still intact, to satisfy political requirements. The second part is a narrative of the action as seen through the eyes of the survivors whom Mr. Robertson interviewed. The author concludes that two now famous military men were responsible for the initiation and the poor planning of the Dieppe raid. These men, Louis Mountbatten and Bernard Montgomery, were detached and engaged in other tasks at the actual time of execution of the raid. The lessons learned at Dieppe were applied in later raids and amphibious operations, but the extreme cost makes it imperative that the lesson not have to be relearned.


Not often in researching a subject does a person find material representing two diametrically opposed viewpoints arranged conveniently, by subject, in a single volume. In the case of *The Soviet Economy*, however, we find exactly this situation. This particularly penetrating book consists of 53 articles by both Western and Soviet writers and economists, and discusses general subjects such as Soviet statistics, the Soviet consumer, labor unions, Soviet economic growth, Soviet agriculture, gross national product and many others. What makes the book unique is that the articles are arranged with the two viewpoints confronting one another in the same section, and with a bare minimum of editorial comment (usually only one or two pages of introductory material). Included are many excellent nontechnical, enlightening presentations that would be worth reading by themselves, such as 'The Proclaimed Emergence of Communism in the USSR' by Alexander S. Balinsky of Rutgers University, as well as a few somewhat technical dissertations on Soviet economics. Written not for the
esoteric research of economics majors or graduate students, but for the easy comprehension of anyone motivated to read it, the book points up, among other things, problems of comparing standards of living between nations, where definition of terms is not consistent, standard nor agreed upon.


In this recounting of the events leading to and resulting from the Munich Pact of September 1939, Keith Eubank has produced an extremely well-detailed and documented chronicle of that fateful meeting. The greater portion of the book is virtually an hour-by-hour review of every action of each of the principals involved. The detail is staggering, and goes to great lengths to relate the story of the agreement which has come to be universally equated with appeasement and even cowardice. The author neither defends nor blames the leading actors in the drama—Chamberlain, Halifax, Bonnet and Daladier. Instead, he meticulously identifies every facet of the problems faced by them in dealing with Hitler at a time when both Britain and France were neither morally nor physically prepared to go to war to defend distant Czechoslovakia, over a question about which they knew or cared little. Mr. Eubank's meticulous research takes the reader into countless conference and meeting rooms and allows him to witness the rantings of Hitler, the forbearance of the British, and the frustration of the Czechs. The results of the Munich Pact are now history, but were accurately predicted by Emile Krofka, Czech Foreign Minister, at the time of Munich, when he said, 'We are certainly not the last; after us, there are others who will be affected and who will suffer from those decisions.' Munich is surely an outstanding documentary showing the diplomatic maneuverings which resulted in the fateful decisions. It is an unbiased and objective encyclopedic of the failure of diplomacy without power.


This book presents a precise and quite detailed résumé of the cultural exchange activities in which the United States has participated during the past 25 years. It traces this country's efforts through private organizations, semi-official groups, and official government agencies. The term 'cultural' is used in its