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THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
6 October 1961

by

Professor Charles Burton Marshall

For ten years I have been waiting for an opportunity to come back to Newport to make a rejoinder. The last time I was here was in June of 1951. In the course of my remarks I referred to the military way of looking at things. I used the phrase "the military mind." I was seriously taken to task for this by two subsequent speakers, including the redoubtable late General William Donovan. It was obvious that I had given offense to some people by this phrase. So I have been waiting to make this rejoinder to defend my use of the phrase. I think I am right, I hope I am right, and if I am not right, I ought to be—in assuming the existence of a military way of thinking about problems.

Every profession in a culture must have its own way of looking at reality. I expect an engineer to look upon a mountain or a canyon differently from the way I do. I expect a chemist to take a particular view of material factors of life. I expect a poet to take a special attitude toward words. I expect a musician to have his own particular insight into the uses of sound. I expect a doctor to have his own particular professional way of regarding the human body. With each one of such professions, a way of its own in looking at reality is essential to what the profession has to contribute to civilization. It is the same, I must insist, with men-at-arms. I think there is something essential about the pride, the

lore, and the comprehension that are identified with this profession. I do not expect military men to be identical with civilians in their outlook on life. I think a distinctive set of attitudes is essential to what the profession has to contribute. I think we are going to need it for a very long time.

You have called on me this morning to deal with a far from simple subject. To dispose of the topic in about 45 minutes, I must address it in broad and theoretic strokes. Let us start here with a concept of the state—telling not everything needing to be known about it, but a few essential things bearing on the topic. I refer to its finite and human character. It is man written large, but not infinite. It is not superman. Let us touch briefly upon an essential of the state in relation to man as an intention-forming being. Let us be rigorous in our own minds as to what is meant by an intention. When I have extracted a desire from the realm of wishes and have made that desire a purpose—that is to say, when I have committed means to it and have made it the object of action—I have formed an intention.

Let us pass along to one more simple thought. It is that man lives in society. He does not live in isolation from other men—except under extraordinary conditions. The circumstance that gives society its texture is that intentions do interact with intentions; and so there arises a continuous requirement for adjustment of intentions among human beings and among groups of human beings. Intentions can be adjusted in two general ways. To act upon another man's intentions by demonstrating to him that his purpose and one's own purpose are mutually serviceable to each other, or at least compatible with each other, is to elicit his consent. To act upon another in such a way to impinge upon his means to act diversely to one's own purpose—that is, to deprive him of the means of adversary action is to coerce him.

While keeping these distinctions in mind, let us not assume fallaciously that these two things—coercion and consent—belong in two separate compartments of reality. Capacity to coerce and capacity to elicit consent are interdependent. Effectiveness in bringing factors of force to bear is the basis of a government's capability to give protection. That, in turn, underlies its ability to elicit consent. The point is simply that they are interrelated and do interact with each other and that they are not mutually exclusive.

An essential matter about the state as a form of human organization is this. Its existence rests on the achievement and the maintenance of a monopoly of the right to coerce and to authorize coercion over a defined area. That is an essence of the structure of the state. I do not mean by that that the monopoly of coercion needs to be a perfect one. There may be always challenges to the perfection of that monopoly. Even in a firmly established political society there may be challenges from lawless elements or from groups within the society trying to usurp legitimacy for their own point of view and thinking of their own particular interests as identical with the interests of the state. Certainly among the emerging states of the contemporary world one may see in one area after another challenges to the existence of the state rising from residual tribal resistance to the monopoly of coercive authority asserted on behalf of the state. It is true of all states, however, that to the degree to which they do have effectiveness as such is the degree in which they approach the achievement of a monopoly of coercion and are able to maintain it. This does not exhaust the characteristics of the state, but it is an essential part.

This is true of all states. It is true of free states, and it is true of accountable and constitutional orders, just as it is true of despotic and totalitarian orders. The difference between them is

not as to whether there is, or is not, a monopoly of coercive authority. It is, rather, as to whether that monopoly is bridled. The determining point is whether those who have custody over the instruments of coercion are themselves left free to determine the purposes and the occasions and the instruments for applying it or, on the other hand, are dependent on some consensus which they must not coerce. We find this principle of limitation exemplified in the idea of a constitution as the source and expression of such restraints upon the whole pattern of purposes for which coercion can be authorized at all. We find it in the idea that somehow or other the assent of a legislature must be obtained uncoercively as a condition precedent to the establishment of any purpose even within the limits that have been defined by a constitution. The principle is exemplified also in the idea that the legislature must be a representative body, with its representative character flowing from election by an uncoerced electorate. Still further exemplification is that there must be a judicial test whenever coercion is brought to bear in a particular instance, even within the approved pattern, and that those exercising the judicial power must not be coerced.

Our government is based upon the idea of a bridling of the apparatus of coercion. Those who exercise the coercive instruments are not themselves free to choose the occasions, the purposes, and the usages for applying it. Now this general concept is attuned to some values about the state set down for us as the purpose of collective life in the Preamble of our Constitution. I should not suppose it to be necessary to rehearse them here. The enjoined task of foreign policy, keep in mind, is to maintain in the world an environment compatible with the maintenance of those values and those purposes in the United States as political realities. This is the enduring and basic purpose of American foreign policy.

Now I call upon you to appreciate what kind of an art is required in the conduct of foreign policy. One method of differentiating among the arts is on the basis of the relationship in time between what is produced by the effort and the effort itself. Let me illustrate what I mean. In one frame of what we call artistic endeavor, what is produced comes into existence—into reality—only as the effort leaves off. This would be true of the composition of a novel, or of a painting, or of the composition of a work of music. We might call these the enduring arts. In other branches of the arts, the effort and the product of the effort are coterminous in time with each other. That is to say, in the performance of music, or in the performance of drama, or in the dance, the effort and the realization of the concept take place together; and when one leaves off, the other passes into memory. Let us call these arts the performing arts.

Let us keep track of what is the difference of what is exacted from the performer—the requirement he must meet—as between the enduring arts and the performing arts. Let's think of the difference in terms of, say, the symphony. Beethoven could write a Fifth Symphony, putting his concepts into reality. Realizing them, he could put that symphony behind him, move on to a Sixth Symphony or some other work, finish it as an established fact, then move on into something else, one by one making them enduring realities which survive the efforts that produced them. This is very different—is it not?—from, say, the task that falls upon the conductor of the symphony. He must endlessly work, as long as his career lasts, at the questions of insight, interpretations, and the discipline of the orchestra—the question of tempo, the question of pitch. He never comes to a time which permits him to say that he has finished any one of these things, to claim it as a permanent achievement, and to ask what he is to do next. I ask you to keep this distinction clearly in mind. I ask you to comprehend that the conduct of a nation's foreign policy lies in the field of the performing arts.

A great difference between these two forms of arts in what is the character of the payoff comes to our minds immediately. In the performing arts the payoff is not in royalties. The payoff is the instant payoff at the box office. You see at once that one could say of a composer that he is a great composer although he had not turned out anything very good in the last few years. One could say the equivalent thing of a painter in the same circumstances. One could say a like thing of a novelist who had not written any good books lately. One can never say of an orchestral conductor that he is a great conductor, but has been missing the beat lately or has been off in his interpretations. You can never say properly of an actor that he is a great actor although the last couple of years he has been muffing his lines. You can never say of a tenor that he is a great singer, but now has a cracked voice. One would have to use the past tense in paying such tributes.

Now, this is a very, very great difference. Keep it in mind about the conduct of foreign policy. What I say here is true of all the great purposes of the state—an environment for the perpetuation of which it is the purpose of foreign policy to foster and ensure. We can never say that we have established justice and so ask, What do we do next? We could never say that domestic tranquility has come to rest as a permanent fact and ponder what to turn our attention to now in its place. We could never do likewise as to the general welfare, the blessings of liberty, or any of the other propositions about the purposes of politics laid down in the Preamble to the Constitution of the United States.

Now, then, in the conduct of foreign policy there is no payoff in history. There is no refuge in a successful past. The test is always the present and in what men's estimate may be of the future. The only way to be relieved of the exigent requirements is through

death or defeat. As Christina Rossetti once put the question and gave the answer in another connection:

> Does the road lead uphill all the way?
> Yes, to the very end.

Let us keep another point in mind about foreign policy and the conduct of it. There must always be a balance between means and ends. Anything which has been asserted to be a purpose, but to which means have not been allocated, and to which will has not been committed, is in the realm of wishes. It is not within the range of policy. Policy consists not of wishes, but of courses of action. Let us keep this in mind all the time in being critical of our own foreign policy. Perhaps there is a certain danger in this direction at a time when literary men, historians, and professors are plentiful in the line of policy. It is true of these callings, honorable as they are, that to have put something into words is to have acted; to have phrased a proposition is to have effectuated it, and to have put something into rhetoric is to have brought it into fulfillment. There is perhaps always present—and we are not spared it in the current circumstances—a danger that men may think that foreign policy is a literary exercise or tantamount to a classroom lecture, and that it is susceptible of achievement by speaking as I am speaking to you from a platform, or by setting words down on paper. Words have meaning in the line of foreign policy only insofar as they have a backing in capability and will.

Now let us keep this sort of thing in mind when we hear some of the overblown propositions which tend to abound at all times as purported propositions in policy—these great rolling phrases which seem to stand for the conduct of a policy, but really under analysis prove to be only expressions of ultimate wishes, having little relationship to the present exigencies.

My next point that I urge you to keep in mind is that foreign policy does concern things beyond our jurisdiction. This is true by definition. Our world environment is not subject to our fiat. Baruch Spinoza characterized all human beings, and all human institutions, as existing in a mixture of bondage and freedom and said that, in the degree in which one is affected by things which he in turn cannot affect, one lives in bondage. This is true of all of us. The state itself is free only in the degree that it is vouchsafed capability to affect its environment, and it can affect it not by ordnance, but only by influence. It is always, even under the best of situations, perhaps only a small share that we can exercise in the determination of our environment. This is not a happy thought. It is sobering to remind ourselves of the finiteness of our state in the courses of history, and in the contingencies of world affairs; yet it is something that we must always keep in mind.

In speaking as I did a moment ago, saying that there is no payoff in history, and that there is no guarantee for the future in having had a great past, I do not mean, by any means, to minimize the past. It is the source from which developed what we are and have. It is out of the past that we know what we are to affirm, and that we have what is given to us to protect. Let us look, then, for a moment into the character of the American past and compare it with the present and the prospect for the United States.

Our national experience all falls within a period of history called the modern era. That era stands also as the great age of diplomacy. The great age of diplomacy is often described as having had its point of origin in the Peace of Westphalia, about three and one-quarter centuries ago. It was at the Peace of Westphalia that the powers of Europe came into a general body of understanding in which they took each other's existence and each other's character as given, and so no longer attempted to impose their

wills with respect to each other's internal structure and religious and political character, and no longer were disposed to challenge each other's existence. I do not mean to say that the Golden Age was ushered in at Westphalia. Indeed, trouble and violence were common recurrences in Europe for another century and a half. By the early nineteenth century Europe had settled down to a remarkable tranquility and stability.

The nations with a power to dispose in world affairs were located in Europe. The centering of power in Europe was an enormously important circumstance. It is hard for us to recall now in some ways. Parenthetically, as a point of reference on this matter, keep in mind this simple negative fact related to that fateful summer of 1914, when the governments of Europe were going through that tragic series of miscalculations which eventuated into the great wave of violence of World War I. Among all their communications with each other, all the memoranda giving appreciations of the situation within the foreign offices and chancelleries concerned, all the dispatches in the archives, there is no indication that any one of them ever felt that it was necessary or even appropriate to ponder the possible relationship of extra-European countries, including especially the United States, to the hostilities then impending. I cannot attest to this. I can only repeat what I have read in diplomatic history. There may even be a record of some passing official notice to the topic which I say was neglected—a record such as would contradict the absoluteness of my statement. The fact would remain that Europe was the center of power and concern then, and the rest of the world marginal and of small import.

Besides sharing a common location, the powers then broadly disposing authority in world affairs had a shared notion of human possibilities. They had a largely mutually consistent set of notions about the

future and of expectations about the future. They had a disposition to keep their controverted interests limited. When they fought, they fought generally for limited objectives and to early reconciliations. They had a common view of legitimacy—a way of restating what I said, namely that they had a shared notion of expectations and shared concept of standards. No one of them was a revolutionary power—no one of them was the possessor of Messianic aspirations, or anything of that sort.

Such was the situation that applied among the powers of the West, the then powerful and determinative elements of world politics, in the relationship between their homelands. Beyond these there were a set of different relationships obtained. This is a point often overlooked by the fanciers and the devotees of the great diplomatic traditions such as Ambassador George Kennan and Sir Harold Nicolson. They tend to overlook that the usages of diplomacy applied only in a clubby situation among the governments having entrê to it, and that beyond those governments the frame of relationship was not an equalitarian one consistent with the idea of diplomacy, but the inequalitarian frame of relationship of an imperial colonial order.

I do not deplore the now-lapsed fact of that imperial colonial order, nor do I celebrate it. I want only to note objectively that the great age of diplomacy was coexistent with the great age of an imperial colonial order, and that the character of order and relationship among political entities highly diverse in level of development, in the character of their culture, their outlook, their human expectations, was one very different from that of the diplomatic order.

The erosion of that great system of relationships, the imperial colonial order, is one of the great dominant central political and historic facts of the time that we live in. How did it happen? It is

something, I assume, that you know in a general way. I can't possibly recount it to you.

> . . . How could communities . . .
> But by degree, stand in authentic place?
> Take but degree away, untune that string,
> And hark, what discord follows!

Those lines from *Troilus* and *Cressida* have relevance to the problem now confronting the world and the United States, which is thrust into a central position of power and responsibility for a great set of interests, outlooks, and purposes in that world. I refer to the problem of creating a new basis of world order consonant with the usages of an equalitarian way of doing business, based upon a generalized realization of national independence and juridic equality of states—this in succession to the now eroded pattern of relationships identified with the imperial-colonial order.

Something concomitant with the breakdown of the imperial-colonial order is the emergence of a large number of entities called states, having in a juridic and technical sense the status of states, and yet in a very real and essential way lacking many attributes of statehood. Heaven knows how much longer this process is going to go on in the world and how far it will reach. We have now a sort of a mass production of states. A friend of mine only recently predicted that the Falkland Islands would enter the General Assembly as the 150th member thereof in the year 1980—a facetious prediction, but, for all I know, it may come true. Let us keep in mind this: that the pattern of order which will be achieved in the world, if it ever does prove to be within reach—a new pattern of order to take the place of the one which has departed—is going to depend in an essential way upon the character that these new states develop as policies. This will not depend solely on them, of course, for it will depend also on the character maintained by the longer established states.

Let us take a critical measure of the notion that somehow or other the character of the world and the problems of order will be settled by what contrivances of a purely organizational type may be made in world affairs—the idea that the determining considerations will be those of organization and procedure at the United Nations. No, the character of world politics is going to continue to be determined by the measure of capability of the component states of the world, and of the character of the internal order of the entities participating in world affairs.

It is up to us in the preservation and in the enhancement of the environment that we seek in world affairs to do what we can to help the neophyte states to become going concerns politically—to help them, by precept and by economic assistance where we have any opportunity to do so, to develop the attributes of allegiance and authority and the qualities of public life necessary to follow a successful course as a state under the conditions of modern times. I hope you know what such terms as *authority*, *allegiance*, and *public life* mean so that I shall not have to dwell upon them. I can specify one of them to you: the meaning of the idea of authority. As an experiment a geneticist once crossed a tiger with a parrot. Somebody asked him how the experiment turned out, and he answered, "Well, when it talks, I listen." That is what I mean by the attribute of authority in a governing institution—the capacity to get others to pay heed to one's pronouncements.

How often we hear it said that our purpose in world affairs is to preserve a pattern of diversity! Heaven knows there is going to be enough of diversity in this highly diverse world without our endeavoring to preserve diversity. The point I emphasize is that a world order is based upon elements of community—the elements as shared precepts—and not of diversity. When one speaks of establishing community, one does not mean absolute community. I do not mean that life

must become uniform throughout every part of the world. I mean that there must be a certain minimum set of shared standards.

I would call your attention in this connection, by the way, to an article in the current issue of the *Yale Review* by Dean Acheson. There he ponders this difficult equation between the concept of order within the constituent elements of world political structure and the idea of a universal order set up in the framework of a universal organization.

We could note here—I will only mention them and not dwell upon them—some of the things which bear, in such a complex way, upon the creation of a basis of a new order and concord, a new set of shared premises among the states which dispose some choices in world affairs.

We could note the impact of communications in this respect—the intensification and the speeding up of communications in the world and the great effect it has had in tending to make every problem a problem which resounds through the world, and in making every problem an immediate and exigent problem. It is not simply the great volume of concerns generated in a world drawn together by a pattern of communication, yet lacking in a sense of community. It involves also, I stress, a factor of acceleration. How different a world it is from the one reflected in something that occurred in Thomas Jefferson's time as Secretary of State. Jefferson noted that it had been two years since our Minister at Madrid had been heard from, and he added that if another year passed by without any word heard from the Minister, then it would be an occasion for looking into the matter.

I go on here to the character of the adversary and his competing design in trying to establish the premises of a new order, if there is to be one. Perhaps this is the most baffling aspect of contemporary

foreign policy. At least, gentlemen, we can make it less baffling for ourselves by taking the measure of the adversary's intentions as they really are.

There is a recent article in one of our prestigous magazines which I read only the week before last on the way down to Maxwell Field. It is by a writer of great repute. He reveals a sort of shock to the premises of the Americans in charge of the conduct of great affairs by the occurrences in the months of the summer and the relevant behavior of the Russians. The writer says that it is now altogether conceivable that the Russians really intend to get rid of the Western presence in Berlin altogether. Is it not surprising that a man would say a thing like that? I could almost expect the writer in some future issue to produce another article in which he mounts his horse and rides through every Middlesex village and plain shouting that the British are coming. This writer goes on to allege grounds for suspecting a great deal of hypocrisy in Khrushchev's talk of peaceful coexistence.

Now let us be wary about this idea of such an element of hypocrisy. True—to quote Shakespeare again—our adversary might have been the man that Shakespeare had in mind when he wrote the lines:

> Upon my tongues continual slanders ride,
> The which in every language I pronounce,
> Stuffing the ears of men with false reports.
> I speak of peace, while covert enmity
> Under the smile of safety wounds the world.

Let us keep this in mind, however—that there is no disjunction between peace and enmity in the adversary's way of looking at things. Peace is to him a way of exercising enmity. This is inherent in a view of history which he takes to ordain by its inherent laws the ultimate triumph of his purposes, outlook, and interests. According to his view of history and of the character of world politics, that assumed law of

history is the sole source of any concept of legitimacy. No outlook, interest, or purpose different from his own has any legitimate basis upon which to rest, in his view. Peace—being a nonviolent situation based upon a concept of legitimacy, which is what peace by definition means to all of us—to his point of view means a nonviolent order based upon a legitimacy which is cognate with his outlook, interests, and purposes exclusively. When he speaks about peace, this is what he means. When he speaks about peaceful coexistence, he simply means the coexistence for a time of those outlooks, interests and purposes which are different from Communism and thus are destined by a law of history to go down to defeat, and those of Communism which are destined and entitled to achieve the complete success by a historic law. On this basis he asserts a total claim on the future. Anything that stands in the way of peace as he sees it has the tinge of war upon it. So when our adversary talks about peaceful coexistence, this is what he means. There can be no doubt about this whatsoever. He has said it to us over and over again since 1917. He has reaffirmed it to us three times in stately documents within the last year.

You see at once the problem of coming to any concept of agreement about an ordered world with a powerful adversary, willful and established in great positions, who claims a monopoly of legitimacy, exercises a total claim on the future—a claim of a character which seems to foreclose any concept of settlement with him. The problem of closing with such an adversary, of relating oneself to him is, as you know as military men, enormously complicated by what the modern invention has done to the structure of weapon systems. Alfred North Whitehead once said that the invention of invention is the greatest of our inventions. We see the importance of this when we see what has happened to the structure of weapons in world affairs, and how it has enormously complicated the problem of contending with such an adversary over the conditions of a new world order.

We have, on one hand, a situation akin to perpetual mobilization between the adversaries involved in the confrontation. There is, as you well know, in modern weapon systems a vast excess of destructive power in relation to any rationally conceived political purpose in the launching of war. There is, thirdly, this rather novel circumstance that the instruments of attack are no longer susceptible of being interposed as instruments *per se* of defense. This constitutes a strategic situation—does it not?—very different from what we have known historically. It was certainly true in former times that the divisions which one might deploy against an enemy in attack were the same divisions as one would use to fend off attack against the homeland. A fleet used in deployment against an adversary to intimidate him or to vanquish him would be the fleet which stood as a defender between him and one's own homeland. No longer is this true of weapon systems—at least the more advanced ones. No longer are the same instruments serviceable both for attacking and for fending off attack. One is presented with the prospect that if it ever comes to a question of a settlement of the issues by arms, there is inherent danger of escalation to a level of violence which, when realized, will in the sequel of such an exercise, leave oneself, one's own country, one's own nation, bereft of the means of carrying on a policy to pursue its intentions. There is a further factor of the as yet unknown potential for genetic damage, which may have reverberations for many generations.

All this puts us in a great set of dilemmas in the conduct of foreign policy. To let this contest in invention go on and on being the mother of necessity may carry us closer and closer to the realization of a potential of destruction which will tend to get beyond human control altogether. Yet to give up unilaterally can only open the way for a complete and definitive imposition of will unilaterally by an adversary who is foresworn to the conditions of a world order which are

incompatible with our own values relevant to such an order. There seems to be no coming to terms on these matters with an adversary who states explicitly that he regards disarmament as a means of rendering us completely defenseless and incapable against the sweep of his will.

Now, if we put these things in proportion, we see that we have two purposes as matters for realization in a long range of time, but requiring, nevertheless, to be worked at unremittingly from this moment on, because the long future and the short term do have in common the characteristic that they both begin now. One is the purpose to lay the foundation of a world order. The other is to try to establish a pattern of community between ourselves and the emerging states.

Now there are these other two things which I have referred to and which have to be realized every moment from this moment on if we are even to get a chance at the first two I mentioned. They also carry on into a long future. One is the prevention of further preëmption of positions by the adversary, or at least the minimization of such preëmption, if we cannot altogether prevent advances by an adversary so disposed. The second is to maintain a capability to meet him on the level of force if matters come to such an exigency.

Some among us come to a faulty conclusion. I think it is a faulty one. I mean the conclusion that since the instruments of coercion have become too large for rational employment in the world, and since coercion has thus become in a way impractical because of the prodigious forces of coercive power, then there must, as a result and by definition, be a universal community. By this reasoning, coercion and consent are complementary in such a way that the less there is of one, the more there must be of the other. If there is less of coercion because of these new factors affecting weapons, then the conclusion follows that there is

bound to be a blossoming of the factors of consent all over the world. I submit that this reasoning overlooks the core character of the relationship between consent and coercion.

Now we hear this fallacious reasoning—I think it is such—reflected in many of the passing maxims of national policy. We hear that there is no alternative to peace, or we hear it put forth that we must always go the last mile in negotiation. Is it really prudent to issue an invitation to our adversary to go on and on putting up mileposts along a course which he hopes will lead to our undoing? We hear that we must never fear to negotiate and must also never negotiate from fear. It sounds good, perhaps too good. The phrasing makes me wonder. There are times when a government might in all prudence fear to negotiate. There may be times when the factors are unacceptably unfavorable. Indeed, I must say further that all great power relationships of the character under discussion involve factors bearing on fear. Settlements are arrived at on the basis of a belief that the terms of agreement available are vastly preferable to a test of force and preferable to letting disagreement persist. There is an integral relationship between the coercive things that we sum up in the word fear and the idea of negotiation in relation to great contests of power and purpose.

But we are told, too, that we do not have to worry about these things because the adversary really does not want war. Of course, he does not. As Clausewitz pointed out a long time ago, an aggressor never wants war. It is always up to the side having something to defend to exercise the option for war.

I might liken the situation, if you please, to something one might see in the plot of a typical western drama of the sort abounding on TV. You live in a community. You have interests there. You count on a future there. There is also present in that place a

man who wears two guns, who sports a reputation as a quick draw and a straight shot. He makes known his will to interpose in every problem in that community. He is going to have a voice in every difference. He says this community rightfully belongs to him, that it eventually will become his, and that he will strive to that end. It does no good whatsoever to say to yourself that this man really does not want to shoot up the town. Presumably he does not want to shoot up the town. Our adversary does not want war either. He wants to take us alive with our assets intact.

You face the problem: what are you going to do about this fellow? It is no answer to the problem to say to yourself comfortingly that he does not want to shoot. If he can be more persuasive to you than you are to him that, if pushed, he would be willing to draw, then he has you at a disadvantage on every difference. The future will belong to him. He will not have to shoot to take possession of it.

You have friends in that town. There are others who are less closely associated with you. Given an option these weaker ones would probably prefer to have you as the dominant figure in that town. If they get the idea that the coercive factors relevant to the future are in the hands of your adversary and that you have neither the will nor the capability to face him on these differences, then little by little they are going to heed the voice of prudence. Like the sinful Irishman who was counseled on his deathbed to renounce the devil, they are going to conclude that it is unwise to make unnecessary enemies. You are lucky if you learn in time that the relationship between consent and coercion is an integral, not an exclusive, relationship.

I invariably face a lecture of this sort with certain misgivings. It is so easy to pass judgment from the outside when you do not have access to the dispatches. It is easy—too easy—to rattle off the

ambiguous and dubious adjectives in which the conduct of policy is so often criticized. Every one of them has another side. It is always, as you know, fine to stand firm. It is always bad to be rigid. It is always nice to be flexible. It is never good to be wobbly. It sounds good to speak of having a dynamic policy, but is it really good to have policies that go on generating factors of change of themselves and beyond your control—which is the sense I would infer from that trite adjective "dynamic" in this context? Every one of these alleged good qualities is ambiguous.

Moreover, I am aware that in foreign policy there is always the temptation to give answers of a sort illustrated by something that happened concerning a college friend of mine in my college phase. Uninvited and without warrant, he went into the honorific lecture given by a great clinician to the senior class in medical school. The clinician described a hypothetical patient and the symptoms. He turned to my uninitiated and uninvited friend and asked, "How would you proceed?" My friend said in answer, "I would call a doctor." Of such character are many of the things that get by as propositions in foreign policy.

Time closes on me now. I have made small headway into my notes. I have only touched upon ways of thinking about foreign policy and have scarcely dealt with actual specific problems of foreign policy. Perhaps we can get into these in the question period following. I have said nothing here to assure you of easy answers. In G.K. Chesterton's words:

> I bring ye naught for your comfort
> Nor yet for your desire,
> Save that the sky grows darker yet
> And the sea rises higher.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor Charles B. Marshall

Present Position: Research Associate, Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research.

Schools:

Texas College of Mines & Metallurgy, 1930.
University of Texas, A.B. degree, 1931; A.M. degree, 1932.
Harvard University, Ph.D. degree, 1939.

Career Highlights:

1938-42 Instructor, Harvard University.
1942-46 Officer, U.S. Army.
1947-50 Staff Consultant, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives.
1950-53 Member of State Department Policy Planning Staff.
1955-57 Adviser to Prime Minister of Pakistan.
1957- In present position.
Visiting Research Scholar, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1958-59.
Alumni Visiting Professor, University of North Carolina, Fall Semester, 1960.
Headed Task Force to reëvaluate the U.S. Military Assistance Program, Department of State and Department of Defense, March-June, 1961.

Publications:

Author of *The Limits of Foreign Policy*, Holt, 1954.