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Naval Strategy

Bernard L. Austin
U.S. Navy

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NAVAL STRATEGY

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
18 January 1962

by

Vice Admiral Bernard L. Austin, USN

I am going to talk to you today on a subject which some might judge to be important only to the naval service. This subject is Naval Strategy. It is far from a parochial one. In fact, there are very few elements of United States military power which do not rest wholly, or in part, upon the naval strategy of the country. As you gentlemen rise in your profession and come to deal with problems of national security on increasingly higher levels, you will find this subject ever more frequently at the center of gravity of your problems. It is not my purpose to bring you to have an exaggerated opinion of the importance of naval capabilities, but rather to open for you new vistas of strategic thinking.

A very fine definition of strategy was given in 1944 by Professor Edward Mead Earle, an American writer on strategy. Professor Earle said that in the present-day world:

Strategy is the art of controlling and utilizing the resources of the nation—or a coalition of nations—including its armed forces, to the end that its vital interests shall be effectively promoted and secured against enemies, actual, potential, or merely presumed.

Professor Earle went on to say that:

The highest type of strategy—sometimes called grand strategy—is that which so integrates the policies and armaments of the nation that the resort to war is either rendered unnecessary or is undertaken with the maximum chance of victory.

I ask you to note that both of these definitions would appear to have been written with prophetic appreciation of our present-day world. Professor Earle strikes me as having taken a long-term view. To use current parlance, he has defined strategy and grand strategy in terms that are appropriate to cold war, deterrence, and protracted conflict.

Other definitions of strategy and grand strategy have been written which take a shorter view. They are more applicable to situations which exist after hostilities have commenced.

Many people, when they think of naval strategy, think merely of the development and employment of naval forces. For the large view, which we are now going to take, this is too restricted. We need a background as well as a foreground. Let us consider first in broad terms the over-all strategy of maritime nations as our background. Against such a background we will better understand the foreground of naval strategy.

Strategy has always been affected by geography. This is no less true today, when the theater of operations can be global in its extent, than it was in the past ages when the known world was small. We cannot change geography significantly. We can only seek to understand its influences, to utilize the advantages, or to overcome the disadvantages which it presents.

The United States and its Free World Allies constitute a maritime alliance. Our major physical

communications are by sea. It is a fact of life that our strength is dependent upon the preservation of these communications. Being of an oceanic world, we are more accustomed to the deployment of our strength by sea than by land. Furthermore, we are, or should be, conditioned to the idea that nearly all of the potential and presumed opponents of our alliance can be reached from the sea, either directly or indirectly.

The opponents of the Free World are, for all practical purposes, continental powers. They are not accustomed to the deployment of their strength by sea. They do not possess unimpeded access to the great open waters. They find their ways to sea obstructed by offshore islands and restricted to narrow passes. This fact may restrict their use of naval forces, but it does not bar such use. They are at a relative geographical disadvantage. The seas do not serve them as well as they serve us.

The maritime-oriented rimlands of Eurasia are members of the Free World Alliance. Most of these nations are vulnerable to direct assault by land; a few are not. All of them are reinforceable by sea and all of them are dependent upon the prompt arrival of these reinforcements. To the continental Sino-Soviet bloc, then, the seas are important because they are vital to us, the Maritime Free World Alliance.

There are other basic considerations which stem from the geographic facts of life. To some extent, nearly all of our rimland allies are vulnerable to what has been called the "salami" technique of conquest. On the other hand, the Communist bloc, with its somewhat monolithic structure, is much less vulnerable to reduction by small slices. Leaving moral considerations aside, this means that it would be more feasible for the Communist bloc to precipitate military conflict for limited objectives than for us to do so. Furthermore, the communications of the continental powers are imbedded in their territory.

Those communications cannot be attacked without casting the die of attacking their homelands. In our maritime world, this is not the case. Our communications can be attacked quite independently of our land areas.

No discussion of the geography of maritime strategy would be complete without mention of what we call the strategic waterways. These waterways fall generally into two categories: those which serve us, and those which hinder our opponents. Some few are man-made such as the great canals; most are the works of nature. Close at home are several examples. The Florida Straits, the entrances to the Caribbean, the Panama Canal—these are all of great importance to our communications.

In the European area, Gibraltar, the Sicily Straits, and Suez are focal points familiar to us all. The Bosphorous, the Danish Straits, even the Greenland-Iceland United Kingdom gaps—these are waterways which hinder our opponent from free egress into the North Atlantic.

In the Indian Ocean are the approaches to the Red Sea and to the Persian Gulf. The Straits of Malacca and Sunda lie astride the communications of Southeast Asia and Indonesia with the Free World.

Finally, there are the offshore islands of the Western Pacific which act to restrict the access of China and the USSR to the open sea. In that part of the world they have the same strategic significance as the Danish Straits and the Bosphorous in their areas.

Of all the geographic factors which influence our maritime strategy I would rank these strategic waterways first. Closely second I should rank those waterways upon which the continental bloc is dependent

for egress into our oceanic zone of communications. A capability on the part of the Free World to exercise firm control of both is, or ought to be, a strategic objective that is second in importance only to possession of an adequate nuclear deterrent. Successful implementation of the broad strategy implicit in these facts can require a full range of measures. This full range of measures may extend from the presence of naval power, as in the Mediterranean and the Far East, to the actual landing of troops ashore as in Lebanon.

Now let us consider how we cope with the geographic situation that confronts us. What advantages or disadvantages does it confer? How has the unfolding of science and technology influenced our situation? How will we be affected in the future? On coming to grips with these questions we can concentrate our view somewhat. Now we will be considering specific problems and means. You will, I am sure, keep the bigger picture in mind as we proceed.

Let us begin optimistically by considering the greatest advantage which we have derived from our maritime situation: Strategic Mobility. By this I mean that we, having ready access to ocean communications, have thereby been given wide choice in the approach to an opponent. Land communications, governed as they are by terrain and political barriers, do not provide such wide choice. The importance of this can hardly be overstressed. Liddell Hart, the well-known British military writer, has stated it thus:

Effective results in war have rarely been attained unless the approach has had such indirectness as to ensure the opponent's unreadiness to meet it

This principle is used each year by our most successful football coaches. Liddell Hart went on to say:

Historically it is worth note that the use of strategic mobility for an indirect approach was realized and exploited much earlier in sea than in land warfare.

In speaking of strategic mobility and of the indirect approach, I do not want to leave you with only half of an idea. There is the question of mobility for what purpose, or an indirect approach to what?

The answer is in this quotation:

Land, as the natural habitat of man, is always the principal storehouse of his indispensable resources, as well as the primary scene of his activities. Naval operations, therefore, have always in view the eventual maintenance or creation of a favorable military situation in critical land areas. From this fundamental viewpoint, the eventual physical objective of military operations is always a land objective.

To put this in fewer words, easier to remember:

The fundamental purpose of naval operations is to produce an effect ashore.

This is the use to which a naval strategist will put his strategic mobility. If he is good at his work he will select an indirect approach when one is permitted by the situation.

What has been, and will be, the effect of science and technology on strategic mobility? Here I refer simply to our ability to move from place to place. Aircraft, of course, have given us a high velocity for a small load. Airlift, however, is no substitute for sea lift. Airlift complements sea lift, and paradoxically, an airlift under certain probable conditions necessitates a sea lift to follow up with

heavy logistics which are essential for staying power. The basic unit of strategic mobility is the ship, and present and predictable developments seem to indicate that it will continue to be the ship for many years to come.

In passing, it is interesting to note that at one time ships gave man more strategic mobility than he could stand. I refer to the days of sail when combustible fuels were not a logistic problem. Man's physical endurance, however, was quite a problem. Starvation and disease ruined many a military plan. I wonder how many of you know that Napoleon's decision to sell the Louisiana territory was reached only after yellow fever and malaria had decimated the French forces sent to recover the island of Hispanola and to establish there a base for great conquests in the New World?

Later, with the development of steam propulsion, strategic mobility was limited to the cruising range of ships rather than to the endurance of men. The strategies of the maritime nations required the acquisition of coaling stations and overseas dockyards. It is only the gradual evolution of the ship, the basic unit of strategic mobility, which has and is continuing to reduce slowly our dependence on base facilities overseas. I would like to stress, however, that overseas, and perhaps even underseas facilities, are likely to be deeply embedded in our maritime strategic thinking for many years.

As far as I can foresee, the greatest effect of science and technology on the basic transportation aspects of strategic mobility will probably be in the speed of ships, in greater endurance, in improved techniques for getting ashore, and possibly in submerged transport of liquid type cargoes.


There have been, and will continue to be, other developments which bear on our great asset of strategic

mobility. Let us consider the element of concealment. I do not mean concealment only under the surface. I mean concealment in the vast ocean spaces, concealment, if you will, over the horizon from the lookout on land. This has been a fundamental asset of naval power. In war, to have one's location unknown to the enemy while knowing his, is a priceless advantage. It provides a degree of immunity from attack, and often permits you to achieve surprise. The vastness of the oceans for centuries has conferred a measure of security on sea communications not enjoyed ashore.

Of course, submarines and aircraft have long since challenged the natural security of sea communications. You are all generally familiar with the Battles of the Atlantic in 1917 and 1941. The Allied Powers won these battles principally because they were never effectively deprived of the element of concealment which lay in their favor. The formation of convoys reduced the number of targets, thereby increasing the emptiness, if you will, of the great ocean spaces from the U-boat captain's point of view. Allied aircraft in both wars, aided by radar in the second, kept the U-boats off the surface. Running submerged, or on schnort, their reconnaissance range, relative to the vastness of the seas, was practically nil. In effect, they became nearsighted, semifixed positional weapons of limited effectiveness.

Of course, what was missing was reconnaissance intelligence to seriously challenge the advantage of concealment enjoyed by convoyed shipping. I cite this example in order to highlight a point I wish to make, that science has finally begun to reduce the advantage of concealment at sea. In thinking about strategic mobility as an advantage on the side of our maritime situation, we must remember that the natural concealment we formerly enjoyed can now be challenged. Let me illustrate this visually.

The narrow black lines show the sea communications upon which the Allied Powers were dependent in



both world wars. In the first war, the range of German reconnaissance aircraft was insufficient for them to enter the North Atlantic. In the second war, at the insistence of the U-boat command, a small number of long-range land planes were used for convoy locations. A typical search pattern which the range of this aircraft permitted is shown emanating from Southern Norway. It was capable of visual reconnaissance only. Its range was too limited and it was committed in such small numbers that the effort was ineffective. However, on several occasions notable successes were achieved that clearly pointed the way of the future.

The heavy black line shows the flight path of a typical jet aircraft conducting an ocean reconnaissance mission at 40,000 feet at a speed of 600 knots, from a base in the Murmansk area. The aircraft was refueled at altitude north of Iceland on the way out. Given an active radar capability of 150 miles against a 50-ship convoy, the swept area of this one flight would be as shown in the double crosshatched area. Given a 250-mile passive detection capability, the swept area would include both the double and single crosshatched areas.

I have dealt with this example at some length in order to fix in your minds that strategic mobility is faced with some new problems which naval strategists will have to take into account. I will leave it to your imaginations to conjecture the situation which will exist when, in the not-so-futuristic world, we have to reckon with reconnaissance satellites.

Before leaving the subject of strategic mobility, I want to mention briefly several of the indispensable capabilities which we must have if we are going to be able to move successfully. These capabilities embrace specific means. They can be budgeted for. The problem of the naval strategist is therefore one of priorities. As we go through these items which are not arranged in any particular order, I would like to

ask that you give some thought as to what relative priorities you would assign:

1. Adequate port facilities for embarkation and debarkation.

2. High speed assault shipping adequate for the amphibious assault forces in being.

3. Follow-up shipping of sufficient boom capacity and deck strength for military cargoes without extensive modification or strengthening.

4. Airlift capability for immediate deployment of "fire brigades."

5. Overseas emplacement of POL and heavy equipment to support airlifted fire brigades.

6. Carrier-based tactical aviation to ensure air supremacy in the objective area.

7. Air and naval forces sufficient to deny reconnaissance and attack on sea communications.

8. Naval striking forces capable of dealing with the sources of enemy counteraction.

9. Marines.

10. Indigenous forces equipped and trained to seize and defend vital landing areas and port facilities.

11. Mobile logistic support forces.

12. Ground forces capable of carrying the battle beyond the lodgment.

Gentlemen, this shopping list is an expensive one. As long as we cannot have everything we want, we

must make correct decisions as to priority and quantity.

A sound appreciation of maritime strategy in its broad implications and a keen professional knowledge of the supporting naval strategy are essential in the budget-making process. If I may paraphrase the famous quotation that "War is too important to be left to the generals," I suggest that "Strategy is too important to be left to the comptrollers."

I hope that in dwelling at some length on the question of strategic mobility, I have given you an appreciation of its position at the center of gravity of the collective security of the maritime alliance which we call the Free World.

In illustrating some of the means necessary to exploit this great asset, I have concentrated on the sea-lifted deployment of ground power. Remember what I said earlier about aiming to produce an effect ashore. Perhaps some of you will be reluctant to agree with me, gentlemen, but there are ways to produce an effect ashore other than by landing the indomitable U.S. Marines. These other ways are essential elements of the naval strategy which supports our maritime position. The three principal means which I want to discuss are:

1. Nuclear deterrent forces.
2. Sea-borne striking forces, and
3. Blockading forces.

Many of you, I feel sure, have given considerable thought to the question of nuclear deterrence. If so, you will have already reached an understanding of the relationships which exist between the factors which make a deterrent effective. These factors support deterrence like the three legs of a stool:

1. Retaliatory Capability.
2. Survivability.
3. Credibility.

Let me remind you that an effective nuclear deterrent is dependent upon all three.

How can naval strategy assist in the maintenance of an effective nuclear deterrent? The answer lies in the fact that mobility and concealment coupled with modern naval weapon systems add up to capability with great survivability.

The open nature of our society takes care of credibility. If we have it they know it.

At this point I want to return a moment to the question of concealment. In talking of strategic mobility I discussed the natural concealment of surface forces in the great ocean spaces. I point out that modern reconnaissance systems could challenge this factor. We recognize the fact that this situation has an effect on sea-borne deterrent forces as well. As a result, we have put much of it underwater in the ballistic missile submarine. That element residing in surface forces is being given adequate means for safeguarding its concealment. If we are to preserve the great advantages which our strategic mobility gives to our deterrent forces, we must be prepared to establish and maintain air supremacy over sea areas to a degree not seen before.

Before leaving the question of sea-borne deterrent forces, I want to mention the fact that, unlike other weapon systems designed for deterrence, our surface striking forces are dual purpose. They have a nuclear deterrent capability and also a wide range of other capabilities suitable for situations other than the thermonuclear exchange. I believe a wise naval

strategist in the future will seek to continue and even to enhance this dual capability in our naval forces.

Let us now turn to the second of the three principal means of producing an effect ashore—that is, other than by landing the Marines. I have in mind our sea-borne striking forces, the nonamphibious variety, the basic purpose of which is to deliver offensive power against land targets. Of course, our striking forces are capable of dealing with the naval forces of an opponent, but considering the realities of today's situation, the greatest effort would be delivered against targets ashore.

Many years ago Admiral Lord Nelson expressed the view that "a ship was a fool to fight a fort." As a means of getting at an understanding of the contributions made by our striking forces, and their limitations, let us begin by taking Lord Nelson's statement apart for analysis, and then bringing it up-to-date. "A ship is a fool to fight a fort." Why? In Lord Nelson's day and nearly half a century later, the answers were much the same.

First, it was simply a question of damage resistance. Stone was tougher than wood. Second was the matter of gunnery. Ships were restricted to sea level. Forts could take the highest situation the terrain afforded. A ship could not be hidden from view during an attack. A fort could be. Third was the element of surprise. I know of no recorded incidents when a fort surprised a ship. On the other hand, there are surprisingly few incidents when a ship effectively surprised a fort. The ship might appear suddenly or even at night, but generally its actual attack could not be delivered until some time after an alert fort would know of its presence. The point is, the ship had to disclose its presence before it could attack. Until well after it came into view it was not a direct threat. Fourth, and most important, was the question

of necessity. Unless the ship chose to engage it, the fort could do the ship little harm.

All of these were cogent reasons why few of Nelson's captains pitted wooden walls against stone walls. As we have run over these reasons, I think probably they have brought to mind certain related but somehow altered situations which exist today. Let's bring Lord Nelson up-to-date and see what changes he might make in his dictum.

For "ship" let us think of the Attack Carrier Striking Force. In place of "fort" let us think of land bases (submarine and air).

The first question is, Does the ship today have an option to fight the fort or not to fight it? In Nelson's day he did because beyond cannon shot, the fort was no threat. Today the fort is one of the principal threats to the ship and to the sea communications the ship must protect. Unless, for the most urgent political reasons, the fort must be accorded sanctuary, or unless other elements of our military power can be relied upon to perform the task, the ship has no alternative but to attack the fort to insure its neutralization, if not its destruction. Therefore, the question is not whether the ship is a fool. The question is whether the ship, considering all factors today, is capable of successfully engaging the fort.

Fortunately, our ship of today, meaning our naval striking forces, can exploit many inherent advantages which the opponent ashore is denied. Our naval striking force has built-in mobility. Viewing it as a target, the ship task force is apt to disappear from view. Yet it nearly always knows where the targets ashore are. It can concentrate on them co-ordinated attacks launched from widely dispersed positions. Furthermore, having accurate target location, the ship can employ weapons of the highest velocity of attack. Not so the fort which still must seek, locate, identify, report, and then attack.

The fort today can intrude on the natural concealment of the ship, but the ship can make any intrusion difficult and expensive. Because the "ship" is today a direct threat at all times, and more so when its location is unknown, the "fort" is obliged to commit great effort into reconnaissance and surveillance.

I feel fairly certain that Lord Nelson would agree to some changes in his dictum. First, he would probably admit that the capability of the continental fort to challenge our maritime strategy requires that our naval strategy include means to defeat the fort with certainty and promptness.

Secondly, he would find that the capability of the ship to do this today is heartening. He might not go so far as to say that a fort today is a fool to fight a ship, but he would agree the factors favoring one or the other are far more balanced now than they were in his own great days.

Now, gentlemen, let us take up the subject of blockade. Your initial reaction to the word *blockade* may be to suspect that I am bringing out an ancient elephant from a defunct circus, interesting only as an historical relic. If so, I hope to convince you that while it may be dusty from lack of recent use, it is far from dead. In my opinion it is not unlikely that before too long blockade may again become a live issue.

Let me start by defining what I want the word *blockade* to convey to you. First, blockade is the exercise of sea supremacy in such a way that an opponent is isolated from the effective support of neutral or allied powers or from vital sources of raw materials. Second, blockade is the exercise of sea supremacy in such a way that the sea and air forces of an opponent are effectively denied entrance into vital sea areas.

History, gentlemen, is a great teacher, because as the Frenchman said, in spite of atom bombs and satellites, the more things change the more they are the same. To illustrate these two meanings of blockade I want to draw on one or two historical examples which I believe will interest you.

If I were to ask you what was the Anaconda Policy, most of you would know that it was a Union policy for defeating the Southern states in the Civil War. Gentlemen, I suggest that the Anaconda Policy was the naval strategy of the Federal Government. Its primary aim was the isolation of the agricultural economy of the South from the industrial support of Europe. Its secondary aim was the prevention of Southern commerce raiders from getting to sea. The policy was executed by a naval blockade of the Southern seacoast from Alexandria, Virginia, to Brownsville, Texas, a distance of 3500 miles, where there were no less than 189 harbors and navigable river mouths to be watched and controlled. The blockade was the greatest undertaking of its sort in history—and the most effective. If you gentlemen will excuse what might be erroneously considered a sectional point of view, I would like to observe that if the manhood of the South had not been isolated from the industrial support of Europe, the armies of the South might never have been defeated.

Before relating blockade to present circumstances, I want to point out that there are examples of blockade which are far more recent than those of our Civil War. Turn our minds to March of 1918 to the Western Front in France. The German Army, led by Ludendorff, began its last great offensive. Thirteen weeks later, after a narrow gain of eighty miles and a loss of nearly 700,000 men, the offensive ended. As one historian, Leon Wolff, expressed it, the German Army was not defeated in 1918, "it committed suicide." Winston Churchill wrote: "They were worn down, not by Joffre, Neville and Haig, but by Ludendorff."

After four years of experience in the futility of such effort, what drove Ludendorff to make this last desperate try? The answer was that after years of privations due to the blockade of the Royal Navy, the will of the German people to continue the contest was nearly at an end. In March 1918 General Ludendorff considered it was a case of victory then or never. Victory must be gained in the West before the arrival of the Americans and before starvation caused a collapse of the civilian morale at home. Few people today even knew or recall that during the last two years of that war, over 800,000 deaths were estimated to have occurred in Germany from the starvation which the blockade produced.

Let us consider yet one more example of the blockade. Turn your minds back to Japan in the Spring of 1945, before the great fire bomb raids. After four years of blockade by United States submarine forces, "Japanese industries essential to the war had been halted by the reduction to the point of elimination of oil, iron ore, and bauxite imports." The United States Strategic Bombing Survey concluded that with the initiation of the fire bomb raids, "Japanese economy was in a large measure being destroyed twice over, once by cutting off imports, and secondly by air attacks."

With this quick historical review in mind, let us apply the blockade to our present situation. My first observation is that the maritime nature of the Free World might appear to render it more vulnerable to blockade than the continental bloc of Communist powers. Remember what we observed earlier about the members of our Free World Alliances being dependent upon the prompt arrival of reinforcement by sea. Korea affords us an excellent illustration of this point. In my opinion, the Korean War would very likely have been lost had the communists exercised the capability they then had to interdict our sea-borne logistic system. I should also like to point out that

this lesson was not lost on the Kremlin. It was after this demonstration of our strategic mobility that the modern Soviet submarine fleet was constructed. Commencing in 1952, the construction of surface vessels was drastically curtailed in favor of submarines. Today, the great majority of Soviet submarines are less than ten years old (over 320 or about 85% since 1951).

Yes, gentlemen, the interdiction of our sea communications by submarine is a way of applying blockade against us. But before such measures could be effective, our opponent would have to win sea supremacy from us, at least in selected areas. Do not underestimate the importance he may attach to this or the scale of the effort he might be able to make. The last continental power to undertake this task was Nazi Germany, who committed to the Battle of the Atlantic over 1100 submarines, of which 781 were destroyed by allied naval and air operations.

On the other hand, there is significant potential advantage available to us in the use of naval forces to promote our national interests through blockade or threat of blockade. For example, blockade might be an acceptable means short of a shooting war to inhibit the introduction of Communist military equipment into areas now outside the Communist bloc.

SUMMARY

In closing, I shall summarize quickly the principal ideas regarding naval strategy which I want to leave with you.

First and foremost is an understanding of the maritime position of the United States vis-à-vis our continental opponents. This is a governing, unalterable, geographic condition. Because of it, the maritime or naval aspects of our national strategy are, and will continue to be, the keystone of the arch of our security. The same is true of our Free World strategy and security.

Second is an appreciation that naval strategy provides a choice of means for producing essential results ashore in furtherance of our over-all strategy.

Third, never before has our national strategy been better served by the great advantages which strategic mobility offers now to the whole range of our military capabilities.

Finally, our maritime position will remain for us a tool for victory only so long as we exert ourselves to exercise the advantages it offers. Let us fail to do so and we shall see this great asset become for us instead a strategic liability of the first rank.

We are not the first Americans to be required to exert ourselves towards this end. Nor will we be the last. In closing, let me leave with you an evaluation of our earlier efforts which highlights the central message that I have tried to convey to you this morning. Making due allowances for technological advances and for the varied forms which future conflict might take, these words of a former enemy have valid meaning today:

Since the entry of America into the war, there has been very little prospect of our achieving ultimate victory. Some hope did remain so long as our submarines were able to maintain their mastery of the Atlantic, for the greatest production of tanks, guns and vehicles would have availed America nothing if she could not have carried them across the seas. But this 'Battle of the Atlantic,' which in all probability decided the whole war, was soon lost by us with frightful casualties among our U-boats. All else was dependent on this fact, and we were now doomed to inevitable defeat at any place which was accessible to the Anglo-American transport fleets.

This man, gentlemen, not only understood naval strategy, but he fully appreciated its overriding importance in shaping that part of history in which it was his misfortune to participate.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Vice Admiral Bernard L. Austin, U.S. Navy

After graduation from the Naval Academy in 1924, Vice Admiral Austin was assigned to the Bureau of Ordnance, Navy Department, Washington, D.C., for temporary duty under instruction at the Naval Gun Factory, the Naval Proving Ground, Dahlgren, Va., and at the Naval Powder Factory, Indian Head, Maryland. Completing his instruction in August 1924, he joined the *USS New York*. Between July and December 1926, he had instruction at the Naval Torpedo Station, Newport, Rhode Island, followed by submarine training aboard *USS Chewink*, station ship at the Submarine Base, New London. In July 1927 he joined the submarine R-10, based at Pearl Harbor, T.H., and in June 1929 was transferred to the submarine R-6 in which he served until May 1931.

The three succeeding years he was an Instructor in the Department of Electrical Engineering and Physics at the Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland. Returning to sea in May 1934, he commanded the submarine R-11 until June 1937, and the next six months served as Executive Officer of the *USS Potomac*. In December 1937 he became Press Relations Officer, Navy Department, Washington, D.C., and remained in that capacity until August 1940, when he was assigned duty as Special Naval Observer at the American Embassy, London, England. He commanded the *USS Woolsey* from February to December 1942. After fitting out the *USS Foote*, he assumed command of that destroyer upon her commissioning, December 22, and in May 1943, became Commander Destroyer Division 46.

In December 1943 he reported as Commander, Destroyer Squadron Fourteen, and with additional duty as Commander Destroyer Division Twenty-seven, and on April 15, 1944, was transferred to duty as Assistant

Chief of Staff for Operations and Training on the staff of the Commander Destroyers, Pacific Fleet. On June 9, 1944 he became Assistant Chief of Staff for Administration to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.

On October 25, 1945 he was ordered to duty in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, and in December of the same year, was assigned duty as Navy Secretary of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. Completing the course at the National War College, Washington, D.C., in June 1947, he was detached to duty as Assistant to the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Politico-Military Affairs, Navy Department. He served in that capacity until October 1949, when he went to England for special duty for one year.

In January 1950 he was designated Commander Service Squadron One, and in July was sent to the Western Pacific to organize and command Service Squadron Three. In May 1951 he became Assistant Director, International Affairs Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and from February 1952 to March 1954 served as Director of that Division. He then reported as Commander, Cruiser Division Two, and in April 1955 joined the staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

On March 15, 1956 he became Director of the Joint Staff Office, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C. On May 5, 1958 he assumed command of the Second Fleet with additional duty as Commander Strike Fleet, Atlantic and in February 1959 was ordered detached for duty as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans and Policy), Navy Department. In June 1960 he was ordered to duty as President of the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island.

Among his many medals and decorations, Admiral Austin holds the Navy Cross with Gold Star in lieu of

a Second Navy Cross, the Distinguished Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star with Combat "V," and the Ribbon for the Presidential Unit Citation.

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