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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
REVIEW

Issued Monthly
U.S. Naval War College
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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND NATIONAL SECURITY

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
13 February 1962

by

General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, U.S. Army

The topic I have been asked to discuss is "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Security." I understand that you are already familiar with the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, the Department of Defense, and the Unified Command system, and with the formal relationships between these various agencies. Therefore, I will not spend a great deal of time on the mechanics of the system as such. My principal attention will be devoted to telling you something about how the Joint Chiefs of Staff actually operate, in practice, within the established system as a whole.

However, as a background, I want to say something about how the Joint Chiefs of Staff system evolved. In doing so, I will review some of the system's high lights which I believe are especially important.

What some people fail to remember is that our Joint Chiefs of Staff system is the product of experience in actual war. Our Joint Chiefs of Staff were established as the United States component of the British-American *Combined* Chiefs of Staff. That body was created, you remember, to co-ordinate the combined British-American military effort in World War II.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff held their first meeting in February, 1942. While their original purpose had been to represent the United States in

dealing with the senior British military authorities, they soon began to function as the corporate leadership for the entire United States military structure. They became the principal agency for the co-ordination and strategic direction of the Navy and Army, including the Army Air Forces.

This body was immediately and directly responsible to the President. It advised him with regard to strategy, requirements, manpower, production and allocation of munitions and shipping, and other matters of joint policy.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also were the source of the broad strategic guidance on which Theater Commanders based their detailed operational plans. Furthermore, they allocated the resources and shipping required to support these plans.

This system worked so well for directing global military operations that it clearly deserved to be continued, especially in view of the world-wide military responsibilities which faced the United States after World War II. But it was also felt necessary to give it a legislative basis to formalize the working arrangements that had evolved. The result was the National Security Act of 1947. While this involved the substantial reorganization which established the Department of Defense and a separate Air Force, it also provided, among other things, a full-time Joint Staff of one hundred officers under a Director. An amendment of 1949 created the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Experience showed the need for revision, and the basic law was in fact amended several times. The major change, of course, took place with the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958.

I think it is important to understand clearly the specific intent of the Congress in this revision.

The Congress was concerned particularly with setting up a simple, clear-cut chain of command for all of our operating forces in the field. Also, it wanted to establish authoritative co-ordination and unified direction of all elements of our Armed Forces. At the same time, these goals had to be achieved within a framework of civilian control, and without suppression of the specialized military skills and outlooks which are essential elements in the over-all complex of modern military operations. Putting it another way, the object was a system which, under civilian control, would have centralized direction, common doctrine, and decentralized execution.

Centralized direction is essential for consistency and effective co-ordination between our many areas of military effort throughout the world.

Common doctrine is necessary for flexibility in grouping—and regrouping—the elements of our forces, wherever we may need them.

Decentralized execution is required because only the commanders on the spot can have the detailed familiarity with local conditions that is essential for prompt and effective action.

The 1958 Reorganization Act gave clear-cut authority to the commanders of Unified Commands over all elements of their component forces. This provided for *decentralized execution* by the various Unified Commands, and for *centralized direction* within each Unified Command.

The Act also set up a direct chain of command from the President and the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Unified and Specified Commands. This provided *centralized direction* of our military effort world-wide.

The Act retained the authority of the various Services over such matters as doctrine, training, and equipment. This preserved *common doctrine* within each of the major functional areas of warfare—sea, land, and air.

Finally, the 1958 Reorganization Act kept the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their advisory role. This insured the preservation of *civilian control* by keeping the authority for final *decision* with the President and the Secretary of Defense.

The changes in the chain of command to the Unified and Specified Commands had a direct effect on the scope of activity of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff. Previously, their responsibilities had been confined to planning. With the simplified chain of command, they became concerned with operations as well. This brought added responsibility, which the Reorganization Act recognized by authorizing an increase in the size of the Joint Staff to 400. Experience under the new system caused the Joint Chiefs to review their administrative procedures, which led to a recent change in the method of operation of the Joint Staff. By this change, the Chiefs delegate to the Joint Staff authority to take action in their name, within specifically established guidelines and under circumstances when a decision by the Chiefs themselves is either unnecessary or would cause delays that would detract from the effectiveness of the action.

So much for the formal organization. The fact is, of course, that the way an organization actually functions depends even more on the personalities and relations of the people who comprise it than on the way the lines are connected to the boxes on the charts.

I am particularly aware of the differences that personalities make even within identical organizational

structures, because I happen to have served in close association with every Secretary of Defense—Forrestal, Johnson, Marshall, Lovett, Wilson, McElroy, Gates, and now McNamara—and every Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since those offices were established. Each of these men has tended to operate in his own individual way, partly due to his individual personality and partly due to the reaction of each Secretary and his JCS Chairman to each other.

This can be most clearly illustrated in describing the way that disagreements among the Joint Chiefs of Staff—or "splits"—have been handled. Broadly speaking there have been three general approaches.

One has been for the Secretary to deal solely with the Chairman, without the Joint Chiefs being present. This approach is predicated on the assumption that the Chairman will always be able to present both sides of the disagreement with equal objectivity.

A *second* has been for the Secretary to call in the Chairman and the particular Service Chief who has nonconcurred in the proposal or policy in question. This permits the Secretary to hear both sides at firsthand.

The *third* method was initiated by Secretary Gates and continued by Secretary McNamara. That is, when a disagreement among the Joint Chiefs develops, the Secretary is notified. He then meets with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, listens to the arguments, takes part in the discussion, and makes his decision on the basis of a thorough understanding of all the points of view involved.

In connection with this question of disagreements in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, there is a point which I want to make very emphatically. The charge is sometimes made that disagreement is so normal that the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization is completely

hamstrung when it comes to taking effective action. In fact, it has been argued that the only way to get authoritative action is to replace the Joint Chiefs with a Single Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.

The basic premise here is simply not valid. The fact of the matter is that the Joint Chiefs of Staff reach agreement in something like ninety-eight per cent of the host of questions coming before them. Of course, there is *some* disagreement, and often it involves questions of fundamental importance. However, I cannot see that this is unique to military problems. Nor can I see that it is particularly deplorable because it is in the military field. Finally, I do not think that military unanimity is necessary for decisive action. A basic principle in the governmental philosophy of the United States is civilian control over military activities. Unless the Secretary of Defense actually exercises his authority for decision—and decision implies a choice between courses of action—the principle of civilian control would be nothing but a meaningless rubber stamp.

Almost as a paradox, there has also been some public criticism that the Secretary of Defense has been exercising his authority too freely. There have been allegations that Secretary McNamara in particular has been "overriding" the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and that friction and resentment exist between the military and civilian authorities in the Pentagon. These views overlook some fundamentally important circumstances. I can assure you that they have no basis in fact.

The key factor is that at the time *any* new Administration takes office, one of its first actions must be to submit the National Budget for approval by Congress, which authorizes the funds to carry out the Budget. This must be done by February or March each year. But a Budget takes months of preparation. A new Administration, which takes office late in January,

does not have time to go through the normal process of drawing up the Budget. All the detailed work on the Budget which it must present will have been done by the preceding Administration.

Now, a new Administration could simply accept the Budget as it was inherited. But in doing so, it would be postponing for a whole year the chance to put its own programs into operation. Its other choice is to undertake a rapid review, necessarily using short cuts and crash programs, to decide—in time for the Congressional hearings—what changes it may want to make.

This is what happened last year. For that matter, it happened in 1953 also, when the Eisenhower Administration took office, and I presume it happened whenever an Administration was changed in the past. I believe that the close timing of the Presidential inauguration and the annual Budget hearings makes the same sort of thing inevitable whenever *any* new Administration takes office.

The conditions which required hasty review a year ago no longer exist. Also, during a year of association, the military and civilian authorities in office have learned to know and understand each other as individuals. The result has been mutual accommodation, achieving a degree of teamwork which I believe is at least as harmonious and effective as any ever attained in the past.

I am certainly not suggesting that the Secretary and the Joint Chiefs are always in one hundred per cent agreement from the outset. But, when all views have been expressed, there is never any question about accepting the decision which is reached, or about who it is that makes that decision.

While I am on the subject of widespread misconceptions, it might be a good thing for me to say

something about the President's appointment of General Maxwell Taylor as his military representative on the White House Staff. There have been suggestions that General Taylor was being interposed between the President and the JCS, or between the President and Secretary McNamara.

Such statements are simply not true. The function General Taylor was chosen to perform—and which he *has* performed—is to provide the President with a highly qualified military professional, immediately available to look at selected problems from the Presidential point of view. General Taylor's mission to South Viet-Nam last fall, as the chief of a group representing all interested Government Departments, is an example of the very valuable contributions his position enables him to make. Such a mission required a very senior military officer to head it up, but no member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff could have filled this slot without detriment to his primary responsibilities.

As a matter of fact, Secretary McNamara and I, and frequently the Joint Chiefs, meet with the President two or three times a week. From the amount of work we have to do, I can assure you that neither the Joint Chiefs nor I feel that we are being by-passed in any way whatsoever!

In what I have said about the advisory role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I do not want to overstate the case. I certainly do not want to imply that unless we can convince the Secretary and the President, our views on the military aspects of a major problem will not be available to other officials who are entitled to have them.

For example, one way that this is provided for through our organizational system is that, as Chairman, I attend meetings of the National Security

Council. I am not, of course, a *member* of the NSC, but I am its professional military advisor. In that capacity, I speak for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and advance their views on the military considerations which apply to the questions the NSC considers. As this group is composed of the Secretaries of all Executive Departments concerned with national security activities, the JCS views get a wide hearing.

Even more important is the relationship between the Joint Chiefs and Congress. The 1958 Defense Reorganization Act is specific in requiring the members of the JCS to reply fully to the questions of Congress on military matters, regardless of whether the views they express coincide with the official position held by the Department of Defense. In a sense, what this amounts to is that the JCS serve as the senior military advisors not only to the Secretary of Defense and the President, and through the Chairman to the NSC, but also to the Congress—particularly to those Congressional Committees which are concerned with areas on which military factors have a bearing.

To get back to the matter of Defense organization, however, there have been a few rather major changes during the past year which I want to mention.

One of these was the establishment of the United States Strike Command. This combined the Strategic Army Corps and the combat forces of the Tactical Air Command located in the United States. What it did, in essence, was to place under a single command two elements of our strategic reserve which previously had worked together largely on the basis of co-operation.

The other organizational changes I have in mind concern the centralization of certain functions common to all the Armed Forces. Specifically, I am referring to the establishment of the Defense Communications Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Defense Supply Agency.

These moves are consistent with a trend that has been going on for some time. As a matter of fact, while the first of these, the Defense Communications Agency, was activated after Secretary McNamara took office, the decision to activate it and most of the preliminary arrangements took place under Secretary Gates. I think that with regard to common functions, where centralized direction can add to efficiency and economy, we will see further centralization in the future.

I want to stress, however, that the changes which have been made do not affect the performance of functions unique to any given Service, and that they have been made within the existing authority given to the Secretary of Defense by the National Defense Act of 1958. They have not extended to the types of changes that would involve amendment or revision of that Act. Most specifically, they have not impaired the separate identity of the individual Armed Forces, or detracted from their capability to perform the functions assigned to them by law.

Now, to conclude, I would like to offer, very briefly, my assessment of how the Joint Chiefs of Staff system is working.

As a general verdict, I would say without qualification that it is working well. I do not mean that we cannot see details where improvements could be made. Also, I recognize that as we go along, experience will dictate certain changes. But the present system not only permits certain vital qualities to be preserved, but in fact is indispensable if those qualities are to be safeguarded.

One of these qualities is that *all* the varied and complex aspects of military effort are considered, and are given proper weight before a final recommendation is made. I know of no better way to accomplish this than for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be made up of the senior officers of each of the military services.

This composition of the JCS also serves another very valuable purpose. As the uniformed Chiefs of their respective Services, they share in the responsibility for *carrying out* the decisions resulting from the recommendations which they make as a corporate body. This is about as sure a way as can be devised to keep those recommendations realistic, and to make sure that they are consistent in terms both of the limitations and capabilities of the Services.

Among the other qualities which are provided by our present system are those which I mentioned earlier as essential features—centralized direction, common doctrine, and decentralized execution. These are insured by the combination of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as over-all directors (under the Secretary of Defense and the President), the Unified Commanders as the operators in the field, and the individual Services as the custodians of their respective Service doctrine, training, and equipment.

Finally, I consider that the present system is the best way to insure the maintenance of civilian control which, while having access to balanced and complete military advice, is effective and authoritative.

To sum up very briefly, I believe that while there may be better organizations for carrying out the functions which our JCS system is performing, I do not know what they are. Certainly, as a device created by the human mind, our system is not perfect. But its details are continually being reviewed and improved. And its fundamental characteristics, to my mind, are viable and sound.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, U.S. Army

General Lemnitzer entered the U.S. Military Academy in 1918, graduating in 1920. His assignments from that time until the outbreak of World War II alternated between duty with troops and service as student and instructor at Army schools. He completed two tours at Fort Mills, Corregidor, P.I.; he was twice assigned to the U.S. Military Academy as an instructor in the Department of Natural and Experimental Philosophy; and, following his graduation from the Command and General Staff School in 1936, he served three years as an instructor of tactics at the Coast Artillery School, Fort Monroe, Va.

As a member of the last prewar class at the Army War College (1940), he began establishing a firm reputation as a thorough and imaginative planner. In consequence, with the beginning of the expansion of the U.S. Army, early in 1941, he was recalled from duty with an antiaircraft artillery brigade at Camp Stewart, Ga., to an assignment with the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff, and during succeeding months with General Headquarters, U.S. Army and Headquarters, Army Ground Forces.

In August 1942, he became Commanding General of the 34th Antiaircraft Brigade, later assigned to General Eisenhower's Allied Force Headquarters, as Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations.

After a brief return to England, General Lemnitzer moved to North Africa as a member of General Eisenhower's staff. In January 1943, he was assigned as Deputy Chief of Staff to General Mark Clark in Morocco. Resuming active command of his brigade in late February 1943, he led it through the Tunisian Campaign and the early landing phases of the Sicilian Campaign.

General Lemnitzer's service during the remainder of the war was as U.S. Deputy Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff to General Sir Harold Alexander. In addition, General Lemnitzer served as Chief of Staff to the Commanding General of the (U.S.) Mediterranean Theater of Operations. Under Sir Harold Alexander, General Lemnitzer took part in the negotiations with Marshal Badoglio which led to the capitulation of Italy, in the discussion with Marshal Tito and with Soviet Marshal Tolbukhin for the co-ordination of the final military operations by the Yugoslav and Russian armed forces against the German armies in Southern Europe. In March 1945, General Lemnitzer entered Switzerland in civilian clothes, charged with management of the discussions with German representatives which resulted in the unconditional surrender of the German armed forces in Italy and Southern Austria.

Following the war he was designated as the Senior Army Member of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He next became Deputy Commandant of the National War College. At this time, he also served as head of the U.S. Delegation to the Military Committee of the Five (Brussels Pact) Powers in London. He next was named the first Director of the Office of Military Assistance.

Returning to duty with troops, in 1950 General Lemnitzer qualified as a parachutist, at the age of fifty-one, and assumed command of the 11th Airborne Division. A year later he went to Korea, commanding the 7th Infantry Division.

Back in the United States in 1952, he was named the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research. During this same period he was the Army's Associate Member of the Kelly Committee to Study the Defense of North America against Atomic Attack, and a member of the Secretary of the Army's Advisory Committee on Army Organization.

General Lemnitzer returned to the Far East in March 1955, assuming command of the U.S. Army Forces, Far East and the Eighth U.S. Army. He was named Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations and Far East Commands and Governor of the Ryukyu Islands. In July 1957 he took up new duties as Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. In March 1959 General Lemnitzer was named to succeed General Maxwell D. Taylor as Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and assumed his new duties on 1 July 1959.

President Eisenhower, on 15 August 1960, nominated General Lemnitzer as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and was sworn in as Chairman on 30 September 1960.

LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
2 January 1962

by

Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

It is always a pleasure to speak here because the Naval War College represents something of transcendent importance to the Navy and to the nation, and that is, the dedication to the ideals of command and of rigorous military thinking. We must never forget those ideals, even though we may not always be able to reach them.

The basic foundation for the understanding of modern human conflict is found in the understanding of strategy, logistics, and command. If these three abstract terms are understood, the other elements of war—of conflict—will fall naturally into their proper places. If, on the other hand, strategy, logistics, and the art of high command are not understood, no amount of technical or tactical proficiency can bring success in warfare, and this points up the importance of basic concepts and of understanding cause and effect principles.

The electronic-nuclear phase of the industrial revolution has cast doubt upon the classic theories of war. Does that mean that we should reject theory? No. Does that mean that we should re-examine theory? Yes. Clausewitz said, "Theory says to pull up the weeds which error has sown everywhere." Corbett said, "It is little use to approach naval strategy except through the theory of war. Without such theory we can never really understand its scope or meaning, nor can we

hope to grasp the forces which most profoundly affect its conclusions." Mahan said, "The search for and establishment of leading principles, always few, around which considerations of detail group themselves, will tend to reduce confusion of impression to simplicity and directness of thought with consequent facility of comprehension."

I will discuss theory. Theory does not solve problems. It explains problems. It sheds light on problems. Coherent theory provides unity of concept which can be obtained no other way, and unity of concept is one of the essential attributes of the exercise of command.

Now what is a theory of war—a theory of modern conflict? I suggest that a comprehensive theory of war should include a description of the nature and structure of modern conflict, and of the elements which comprise it; the manner in which these elements are related to each other; the manner in which war is related to other parts and actions of human society; and the nature of the various forces which act throughout the whole structure; and the description of the way these forces act and interact. Well, that's very general. Let me be more specific, and put it in somewhat different and more specific terms. A theory of modern war can be expressed as the following group of interrelated theories: the general theory of modern conflict; the theory of strategy; the theory of logistics; the theory of tactics; the theory of command decision; and the theory of military organization.

Now no such theory as I have outlined will ever be complete, final, or definitive. It can be developed only incompletely because we are dealing with the actions of living human beings and with human thought and emotions. One can never complete such a formulation, put it into a catalog or package and say, "This is it; all you have to do is follow this." Human

beings are not that way and we are dealing with human affairs. But the thought that goes into the formulation and study of a group of theories of this sort, will give anyone who works at it a much better understanding of the realities with which he is going to be dealing. It will assist him to think more clearly in dealing with those realities.

In understanding modern human conflict, it is of overriding importance to understand that for the present, and for the foreseeable future, the most important element that we must acquire and maintain is strategic flexibility. Strategic flexibility has its primary sources in the competence, perception, and character of high command. While other factors are also important, sound logistic concepts and a sound logistic system provide the physical base for strategic flexibility. This means that logistics must be studied from the perspective of high command, and it means that commanders must understand logistics.


Now what is this perspective of command? Well, I suggest, gentlemen, that the perspective of command is that point of view which knows the nature and relationships of the technical problems of the command, which recognizes how they affect its capabilities, and which understands the amount of time and effort required to solve these problems. Now we hear a great deal about the study of economics and of management science, and some persons believe that these two subjects embrace all that there is in logistics. This is simply not true. The President of the United States is not the general manager of the U.S. Army and Navy. The President of the United States is the Commander in Chief. The terms *economics* and *logistics* are not synonymous. There are important, if subtle differences. Management and command are quite different. The major difference between command and business management and economics, is *that command must exercise the power of life and death over tens of thousands of human beings*. In all the literature and studies of

business management and management science, you will find no discussion of this vital distinction. Economists do not discuss the awesome nature of the personal responsibilities of military commanders in various echelons of command, making life and death decisions. Nor do theorists in decision-making, who base much of their discussion on business decisions, deal with this vital aspect of command.

Economics and business management are very important subjects for commanders to understand. We can consider the study of logistics as involving a combination of many aspects of economics, and of management, as modified by military considerations. The logistics officer must also always have the viewpoint of command. He must always seek to harmonize and reconcile conflicting technical interests in order to further the broad objectives of command. Frequently the interests of a single technical specialty must be sacrificed in the interests of the command objectives. Technical specialists must be broadened to understand the command perspective, for only then can their proper search for technical perfection be directed in the most productive manner. It is equally important for the commander to understand logistics, for if the commander does not understand logistics, *logistic considerations will dominate his decisions*; whereas if he does understand logistics, *logistic considerations will influence his decisions*. There is a tremendous difference.

Let me sum this up by saying that command—high command—has the responsibility *to create, to support, and to employ combat forces*. From the perspective of command all major decisions require a blend of strategic, logistical, and tactical considerations, somewhat as follows: Command thinking is in the center where strategy, logistics, and tactics intersect. Intelligence sheds light on the subject; communications transmit information and the decisions of command. The major factors in the command decision

will be this common area where strategic considerations, logistic considerations, and tactical considerations enter into his decision and action, using intelligence to shed light and communications to transmit information and decisions.



Now what do we mean by these terms *strategy*, *logistics* and *tactics*? I will not define them. They are, in fact, indefinable in any single, precise definition. I will, however, describe them, for there can be many useful descriptions of strategy, logistics, and tactics. I will attempt to give you a group of coherent descriptions in order to apply the command perspective in a useful way.

I suggest, gentlemen, that strategy is the *comprehensive direction of power to control situations and areas in order to attain broad objectives*. Strategy is comprehensive; it is the direction of power; it is aimed at control; and it is always thinking of objectives. *Strategy and destruction are not synonymous*. *Strategy uses destruction only when there is no better way to attain control*.

As for tactics, I would suggest that tactics is the *immediate employment of specific forces and weapons to attain the objectives of strategy.*

Logistics is the *creation and sustained support of weapons and forces to be tactically employed to attain strategic objectives.*

Command has the obligation to create, to support, to employ weapons and forces to attain strategic objectives.

I believe that this group of descriptions which represents both the point of view of command, and the relationship of these vital abstract elements of military thinking, gives us a sound basis for further consideration—intelligence shedding light, and communications transmitting information, and decisions.

Let me repeat, that command has responsibility to create, to support, and to employ combat forces. Therefore, the chief, but not the only, criteria by which to judge our military system becomes that of combat effectiveness, for that is the purpose for which the entire defense system exists.

Let us look more closely at this blending of strategy, logistics, and tactics. Strategy is the comprehensive direction of power to control situations and areas to attain objectives. The essence of strategy lies in control, not destruction. If we look at the course of events of the last forty years we can see how skillfully the great communist leaders such as Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, and Mao Tse-tung, have applied this concept of strategy being the art of control.

What then is a strategic concept? A strategic concept is a verbal statement of: What do I wish to control? For what purpose do I wish to exercise control? To what degree must I exercise control to

accomplish that purpose? When do I wish to initiate control? How long do I wish to maintain that control? And in general, how will I exercise that control?

What are the implications of this idea of a strategic concept? It enables us to move from theory into the realm of practice. The practical application of a strategic concept consists of specific tactical operations which must be preceded by logistic action.


Let me be more specific. Practical operational planning is a statement of: the mission, the character of the theater, the forces involved, the scheme of action, the intensity of action, and the duration of action. If you apply good logistic planning factors to such a group of strategic and tactical considerations you can develop time-phased logistic requirements: What do I need? How much of it do I need? When and where? Command must understand these things because command's responsibility is to create and support and employ combat forces.

Now it is a practical necessity to develop and maintain good logistic planning factors. Naval logistic planning factors are numbers which represent the quantitative relationship that exists between the composition and employment of naval forces on the one hand and the availability, consumption, or utilization of materials, personnel, and facilities on the other hand.

Well, what does all this mean? It means that practical operational planning is an intimate blend of tactical and logistical thinking to carry out strategic concepts. It also means that this unity of concept and coherence are essential for swift decisive military action in any type of human conflict.

Now, let's look at this just a little differently. And here we can think, as some people do, that the great element of war is strategy, and that the

knowledge of strategy must encompass the knowledge of both logistics and of tactics, and that operations is that area within the general field of strategy where logistics and tactics blend. This idea gives us, in my opinion, a correct concept of the relationship between operations, tactics, and logistics. You can look at this and you can think of strategy as being dominant, and I think it is.



Now the vital part logistics plays in the attainment of strategic flexibility, and the need for viewing logistics as a system rather than just as a collection of technical functions, are both clearly brought out by the U.S. Army historian, Ruppenthal. At the end of Volume I of his history of World War II, in discussing the situation in Northern France in September 1944, he wrote: "For the next two months supply limitations were to dominate operational plans, and the allies were now to learn the real meaning of the tyranny of logistics." And in the concluding chapter of Volume II: "The movement of supplies entailed a series of highly synchronized functions, the failure of any one of which could have a resonant effect, reverberating along the entire line of communications. The theatre was occupied at all times with the effort to eliminate some bottleneck and to bring the system into balance."

Now if one views the problems of national defense as that of creating pushbutton nuclear forces, which at some command would loose nuclear devastation on preselected targets from heavily protected missile sites, then a relatively static logistic system, based on the full application of the weapon system concept, is appropriate. However, if one thinks in terms of military forces which have the capability of using varied, flexible combat power in accordance with the unfolding needs of uncertain combat situations, then an entirely different logistic system is required. In this logistic system the weapon system concept has only a very limited useful application. In each case a good logistic system is vital.

Now let us look at logistics itself. Duncan S. Ballantine in his book, *Naval Logistics in World War II*, says among other things: "The logistic process is, at one and the same time, the military element in the nation's economy, and the economic element in its military operations." Let me put this thought into somewhat different words. Logistics is the bridge between the economy of the nation and the tactical operations of the combat forces.

There are three particularly important corollaries to this principle:

First; An effective logistic system must be in harmony on the one hand with the economic system of the nation, and on the other hand with the tactical concepts and environment of the combat forces. This principle of harmony explains why a single logistic system cannot successfully apply identical procedures to the support of ground, sea and air forces. Differences in the tactical concepts and the tactical

environment create different needs for logistic support organizations.

Second; *Economic factors limit the combat forces which can be created; logistic factors limit the combat forces which can be employed.* I can imagine no greater waste in the national defense system than to devote so much attention to the economic factors involved that the logistic factors are neglected. For then these huge forces on which so much has been expended cannot be effectively employed in combat.

Third; *Command transforms war potential into combat power by its control and use of the logistic process.* This principle is one reason why you must always look very skeptically at statistical evidence of war potential. Economic factors limit the creation of combat forces and logistic factors limit the employment of combat forces. Thus, wisdom in high command requires a knowledge of both economic factors and of logistic factors. This problem is poignantly illustrated by the gap between the tactical ideals of the strategic army command, and its actual capability as limited by the lift available.

There is another aspect of this matter. We must remember that an equal waste, and an even greater frustration, can come about when vast sums are spent on forces which cannot be employed, because their employment will not accomplish an appropriate strategic purpose. In other words, the availability of any particular weapon should not determine the strategy to be used. Strategy must have at its disposal a variety of weapons and forces so that that particular combination most suitable to the situation as it actually arises, may be quickly formed, and swiftly and decisively employed in the appropriate manner. And that is the true meaning of strategic flexibility.

These key points raise specific questions as to the nature of the research we should undertake. For

example, do we know what are the criteria by which flexible combat effectiveness can be judged? Do we know what are the sources of flexibility?

In the first place, as I said before, flexibility comes initially from the perception and character of the commander. It comes from sound strategic and tactical concepts, and from a variety of weapons *appropriate to the nature and degree of control that you wish to establish*. That means there must be versatility of forces and personnel. There must be mobility of forces and there must be a flexible organization. No military organization in the history of the world has the flexibility of the traditional naval organization using Numbered Task Forces drawn from Type Commands. The logistic support must be responsive to strategic and tactical command needs, and that means there must be responsive logistic reserves and a transportation system which is responsive to the immediate needs of the operational commander. There should be common doctrine with maximum decentralization of operations.

Further questions arise: What are the factors which strengthen flexibility, and what factors inhibit it? What is the best balance of size between the combat forces and the logistic forces which will bring maximum combat effectiveness within the limitations on resources that are established by our economic system? In many instances a reduction in the number of combat units and an increase in the number of logistic units in a force will increase the combat effectiveness of the force. However, the degree to which this element of optimum balance operates can be determined only when first, logistics is viewed as a system; and second, a special analysis is made of a particular force operating in a particular system and situation. This last matter brings us to the great paradox and dilemma posed by modern technology: the advance of technology is producing more specialization in weapons, whereas the requirement for strategic flexibility

demands more versatility of weapons, of equipment, and of personnel. Furthermore, as technology advances, more and more logistic support is required. However, the center of gravity of this logistic support moves back toward the home base.

I want to go very briefly through some logistic principles of cause and effect: In the first place, we must understand that in all logistic action and operations, the fundamental principle of the logistic snowball operates. Very briefly stated, all logistic activities have a natural tendency to grow to inordinate size. Imagine that on a day with three or four inches of snow, a young boy goes out on the front lawn, makes a small snowball that is the hard essence of combat support, and starts rolling that across the lawn. He will not have gone twenty feet before his hard core of combat support is surrounded by a mass of slush that is unmanageable. Unless command understands the causes of the logistic snowball, and knows how to control it, this will inevitably happen. I don't have to tell you the illustrative examples in this, except to say that one of the most prominent examples in World War II was the overdevelopment of advanced bases in the south, and parts of the central Pacific, particularly the building of the base at Samar.

The principle that underplanning eventually results in overplanning: In other words, if you do not plan your logistic support well to begin with, there will be critical shortages. Everybody and his brother will get into the act and start yelling about it and pretty soon you become snowed under by excess material. For example, the belly tanks that were piled high in Guam at the end of the war, or the excess of the 20-millimeter ammunition in World War II.

The limitation of resources: Logistic resources are always limited. If one commander uses more logistic support than he should have, the tactical operations of other commanders will suffer. Or else logistic

support in relation to combat support will be out of balance. This limitation of resources is clearly illustrated by the row in late 1944 between Bradley and Montgomery as to how best to invade Germany.

What is the most important element in the control of the snowball? It is discipline—not only the traditional military discipline—not only just supply discipline, but a strong sense of logistic discipline. General Palmer's discussion of the extraordinary waste that took place in Korea, entitled *Commanders Must Know Logistics*, is a brilliant discussion of the waste due to lack of discipline. Furthermore, another World War II illustration of the ill effects of poor logistic discipline was the way the Third Army under General Patton highjacked gasoline in their move across France. They finally made it impossible to send the trucks back, for they took the gasoline out of the fuel tanks of the trucks that were bringing the gas to them. Since the truck could not go back for return trips, his supply lines broke down.

How do you handle these things? Logistic reserves—you have got to have logistic reserves and use them in the same way you use tactical reserves. That means there have to be allocations and priorities. No system of priorities has ever worked unless it was associated with allocations. When a system of priorities has worked without allocations, it merely means that priorities were not needed to begin with.

An essential element is to see these relationships; we've got these things—logistic resources are always limited. You need discipline; you've got to have the logistic reserves; you've got to use the system of allocations and priorities, and that means you've got to have control of movement and transportation.

Now all this doesn't necessarily mean that an operational commander has to control every bit of

movement, and every bit of transportation. It does mean that he has got to have an adequate control of movement and transportation, and what is adequate depends on an analysis of the particular situation and the command that is operating.

And all of this requires information. Information is one of the hottest topics there is in logistic discussions today. The new *Command Control Centers* which are being developed are built around the use of electronic data-processing and electronic displays. But remember this, it takes from six to eighteen months to set up the information system of a new large theatre of war.

Flexibility, momentum, and exploitation: The ability to make a strategic exploitation of a tactical success is one of the greatest things in war; it is one of the greatest attributes of a successful high commander.

Let us now look at the combination of discipline, reserves, allocation priorities, control of movement and transportation, information, and flexibility. Where were they illustrated? The fact that after we captured Kwajalein, we were able to advance the capture of Eniwetok by a month because these elements were present in the forces under Nimitz' control in the central Pacific in the Spring of 1944. Why was Halsey able to capture the Philippines ahead of schedule? Because they had those attributes in the forces that were deployed. Why was the German 7th Army successfully knocked out in August 1944? It was because Bradley, Patton, and Eisenhower were able to see the opportunity when it came. If you read Walter Bedell Smith's, *Six Great Decisions of World War II*, you will find the description of the conference that made this decision. The success of the plan rested on their ability to control their logistic support and make the encirclement at the La Falaise pocket.

Now the final principle of logistics: Logistic planning is always a series of approximations, compromises, and refinements. To give you an illustration: the advanced base plans for the invasion of Okinawa went through twelve cycles of approximations, compromises, and refinements, before they were finally approved.

In my book, *Logistics in the National Defense*, I have discussed these principles and given more illustrations.

In conclusion: Nothing so contributes to unity of purpose, to efficiency and to combat effectiveness, as does conceptual unity. One of the major intangible responsibilities of military command is to establish clear unity of concept from the top down through all echelons of command. Logistics will always limit strategy and operations, and since, when one logistic limitation is overcome, another limitation will take its place, a commander must always be sure which logistic factors are exercising their limiting influence in any particular strategic or operational plan he is carrying out or contemplating.

Similarly, in war games, the various commanders and umpires must be concurrently aware of the nature and degree of the logistic limitations which govern the maneuver as it progresses. Now this does not mean that the commander must become obsessed with logistic limitations. Far from it, for such an attitude can destroy his initiative. It does mean that the planning of all operations and all war games should be so conducted that these logistic limitations are clearly identified, and when, and as required, they can be quickly presented to the commander in person. Once such a practice becomes established, a good commander, or operations officer, will acquire an instinctive awareness of these matters without being burdened or obsessed with them.

Finally, the logistic support which may be considered inadequate by a timid or mediocre commander, may be adequate for a bold and competent commander, who understands the nature and sources of flexibility, provided he has adequate command control of a flexible logistic system. It is with hope that I can help in understanding these vital aspects of modern conflict that I have given you today—these concepts of command, of strategy, and of logistics.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

Present Position: George Washington University,
Logistics Research Project; Ohio
State Research Foundation.

Schools:

Columbia College
U.S. Naval Academy, 1922
Columbia University, M.S. degree, 1930
Naval War College, 1943

Career Highlights:

Spent twelve years in submarine duty, the remainder in battleships, cruisers, and destroyers. During World War II, had command of *USS John D. Edwards*; assigned to the Navy Department; served with Service Force, Pacific Fleet.

1946-47 Commanded *USS Washington*
1947-51 Served as first Head, Logistics Department,
Naval War College.
1951-52 Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics,
Commander Allied Forces, Southern Europe.
1952- Retired from U.S. Navy and assumed present
position.

RECOMMENDED READING

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find them of interest.

The inclusion of a book or article in this list does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein. They are indicated only on the basis of interesting, timely, and possibly useful reading matter.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Certain of the books on the list which are not available from these sources may be available from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books are obtainable on loan. Requests from individual officers to borrow books from an Auxiliary Library Service Collection should be addressed to the nearest of the following special loan collections:

Chief of Naval Personnel,
(G14)
Department of the Navy
Washington 25, D.C.

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station
(Attn: Station Library)
San Diego 36, California

Commandant FOURTEENTH Naval
District (Code 141)
Navy No. 128
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Commander Naval Forces,
Marianas
Nimitz Hill Library, Box 17
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

U.S. Naval Station Library
Attn: Auxiliary Service Collection
Building C-9
U.S. Naval Base
Norfolk, Virginia

BOOKS

Dunham, Donald. *Kremlin Target: U.S.A.; Conquest by Propaganda*. New York: Ives Washburn, 1961. 274 p.

Mr. Dunham effectively begins his work by defining his terms of discussion, propaganda and agitation. This is followed by an example of Soviet propaganda showing the similarity of its use in the Romanian and Cuban take-overs. The author then demonstrates how the Soviets hope to bring about our downfall by propaganda means. He extensively covers their methods of slander, delusion and control, and documents his reasoning with instances of Soviet propaganda having already been employed against us: Khrushchev's visit of 1959, the U-2 incident and 1961 political campaign. Finally, he prescribes what we as a nation, as individuals and as professional propagandists should do to improve our own efforts in this field of influencing others. The book contains eight appendices covering a glossary of communist propaganda terms and strategy which should prove valuable to anyone researching this subject field.

Benton, William. *The Voice of Latin America*. New York: Harper, 1961. 204 p.

After devoting "intensive months to 12 Latin-American Countries," William Benton, U.S. Senator, educator, publisher, businessman and former Assistant Secretary of State, writes what is essentially a staff study on the problem of United States relations with an "impatient" Latin America. He sets up the problem, gathers his facts and assumptions, discusses them in relation to the problem, comes to conclusions and offers concrete recommendations. He feels that the big problems of Latin America are four: economic underdevelopment and agricultural insufficiency which compound themselves with the movement of the poverty-stricken from the farms to the cities, thereby reducing the agricultural output and further increasing

the prodigious slums of the large cities; the influence and the spread of communism and "Fidelismo," a trend which, according to many of the thinking leaders of Latin America, will in five to ten years, unless blunted, create explosions in the region that will make the Cuban revolt seem cream-puffy by comparison; and the unbelievably primitive, inadequate and class-perpetuating educational facilities and resources. Senator Benton concludes from his observations and experience that the greatest contribution United States assistance could make to the Latin-American countries would be in helping them to help themselves.

Wood, Bryce. *The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961. 438 p.

This survey of the policies pursued by the United States State Department in its good neighbor objectives toward the nations of South and Central America is not presented as a history, but rather as a study of the policies followed by United States Government officials. It demonstrates their differing and developing ideas of the extent and type of action to be utilized in our new concepts of being a good neighbor to Latin America in the period 1926-1943.

Vali, Ferenc A. *Rift and Revolt in Hungary; Nationalism versus Communism*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961. 590 p.

For students of Eastern Europe who are interested in developments in Hungary since World War II, this is an invaluable and scholarly work. Professor Ferenc Vali is eminently qualified to write this volume; international lawyer and political scientist, public servant and university professor, he lived in Hungary during the years of which he writes. Although Professor Vali's love for Hungary is reflected in his writing, it only adds to its vividness. The book is thoroughly documented from a wealth of published and unpublished sources, including the polemic writings of

Imre Nagy, clandestinely brought out of Hungary after the Revolution. Of particular interest to the students of United States foreign relations is the author's chapter on how foreign factors, i.e., Yugoslavia, Suez, and the Soviet Union, affected the Revolution.

Stanton, Robert. *Forces for Freedom*. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1961. 111 p.

Mr. Stanton states in his preface that his purpose in writing this book is to focus attention on the stark reality of communist aggression affecting our economy and ultimate freedom. This is not a pretentious book, nor does the author make any exaggerated claims for it. It is the sincere and astute reflections of a dedicated businessman and public servant who is deeply disturbed about the communist threat to our country, and, more especially, the apparent lack of awareness of this threat demonstrated by the man in the street.

Hodgkins, Jordan A. *Soviet Power: Energy Resources, Production, and Potential*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1961. 190 p.

The Soviet Union's continual emphasis on industrial output, especially from heavy industries, has been viewed with considerable interest by the Western world. A knowledge, then, of the Soviet Union's resources and production potential of coal, petroleum, gas, and other fuels, is essential for critical evaluation of Soviet industrial prospects and plans. *Soviet Power* is a documented piece of research and analysis of the Soviet Union's energy resources. The author specifically covers the potentials, production and consumption of coal, oil, oil shale, and natural gas resources. This is an excellent example of a well-prepared and documented research book.

Fuller, John F.C. *The Conduct of War 1789-1961*.
New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press,
1961. 352 p.

This book by one of Britain's foremost military writers is both a history and analysis of the wars fought since 1789. Although the author quotes freely from other writers, which makes for tedious reading at times, this is an interesting and complete documentary of the personalities, weapons, tactics and societies associated with these conflicts.

McDougal, Myres S. and Feliciano, Florentino P.
Law and Minimum World Public Order. New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1961. 872 p.

This scholarly and comprehensive treatment of the process and function of coercion in the world community is a legal landmark in this vexed, misunderstood and mismanaged area of human affairs. A naval officer who reads this book will think about it long after returning it to the shelf.

Speier, Hans. *Divided Berlin: the Anatomy of Soviet Political Blackmail*. New York: Praeger, 1961.
201 p.

This book can be considered among the most up-to-date volumes on the Berlin problem. The study deals with the *political* history of divided Berlin, with but a short portion of the total work devoted to events prior to 1958. One of the author's main theses is that Khrushchev has little regard for the magnitude of the risks involved in his political warfare, so long as he is in control of the risks. When Western countermoves threaten to lessen his own control, he has always decreased the pressure of the political offensive. Although this book proposes no solutions, nonetheless it is recommended for students who would seek some clarification of the question of a "divided Berlin."

Petrov, Vladimir. *What China Policy?* Hamden, Conn.: Shoe String Press, 1961. 141 p.

This book is a two-part study of the "Chinese issue" in which Mr. Petrov presents the results of his research conducted under the auspices of Yale University. In this highly controversial area of United States foreign policy, Mr. Petrov has achieved a remarkable degree of objectivity in his systematic presentation of arguments, formulated by authoritative sources, both *for* and *against* recognition of Communist China, and for the representation of that government in the United Nations. From this wealth of research, the author develops convincing reasons for his conclusions that the United States should continue its policy of nonrecognition.

Warner, Denis. *Hurricane from China*. New York: Macmillan, 1961. 210 p.

The author presents a very interesting discussion of the menace that Red China poses currently and in the future to the Western world. Part of the book traces the rise of Mao Tse-tung from a nondescript guerrilla, who, with a thousand men and two hundred rifles, conquered and now guides and controls a nation of 670 million people which will increase in population to over a billion by 1980. Considerable analysis is devoted to Mao's methods and intentions for the ultimate isolation and collapse of the "imperialist" United States and her allies. The remainder of the book deals with a discussion of the Chinese Communist Party and its prospects for survival.

Casuso, Teresa. *Cuba and Castro*. New York: Random House, 1961. 249 p.

The author was a close companion, advisor and personally-appointed ambassador-at-large of Fidel Castro. She reiterates what is common knowledge to American readers—the tempestuous character of the

Cuban leader—in an authentic and detailed biographical presentation. The broken promises to her people and the deterioration of an aggressive and sometimes sociable character to one obsessed with destruction, hatred, retaliation and self-importance, led the author to abandon Fidel in his confused struggle to govern the island. The entire book deals with the peculiar characteristics of Fidel Castro, descriptions of his personal relationships with those around him and his controversial abilities as a political leader.

Tucker, Robert C. *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx*.
London: Cambridge University Press, 1961. 263 p.

Dr. Tucker's thesis concentrates upon the early works of Karl Marx which were not made available for study until years after his death, and remain largely unknown even today. Dr. Tucker's critique of Marxism is devastating in its completeness and his concluding chapter is an excellent summary of its basic fallacies. In this chapter, the author contends that Marx's concept of communism is more nearly applicable to present-day America than his concept of capitalism, and from this premise proceeds to show the emptiness of his thought as a contribution in the continuing journey of the human mind towards self-clarification.