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## Communist Revolutionary Warfare; the Vietminh in Indo-China

George K. Tanham

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Butwell, Richard A. *Southeast Asia Today—and Tomorrow, a Political Analysis*. New York: Praeger, 1961. 182 p.

Feeling deeply the importance of the Southeast Asian countries in the Cold War today, Professor Richard Butwell has written a concise study of the problems facing these countries. He states that his purpose in writing this book was "to describe and assess the records, to suggest, to chart the probable future development." It is written in an informal style, but does not lack for clarity and scholarship. As an introduction to the problem and an impetus for more involved study it is an excellent work. A first-class bibliography, both general and specific, is included.

Tanham, George K. *Communist Revolutionary Warfare; the Vietminh in Indo-China*. New York: Praeger, 1961. 166 p.

Mr. Tanham reveals the core of communist revolutionary warfare, namely, its emphasis on the integration of all means—political, economic, military and psychological—to win the war, and above all, to win the minds of the people. The book exposes the communist techniques of revolutionary warfare in an underdeveloped country, particularly emphasizing the importance of guerrilla warfare. As the author notes, the revolutionary techniques of the communists offer them the greatest potential gain at the least possible risk. It also highlights the Vietminh's use of the works of Mao Tse-tung, especially *On Protracted War*, as their doctrine and theory of warfare. The initial low level of violence precluded intervention from the West. It enabled the Vietminh to pose as the leaders of the insurgent nationalist movement and to gain popular support, while consolidating their power.