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# NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

VOL. XV NO. 1

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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
REVIEW**

**Issued Monthly  
U.S. Naval War College  
Newport, R. I.**

## NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

### EXTENSION COURSES

General Order Number 325 of 6 October 1884, established the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island, as a 'college for an advanced course of professional study for naval officers.' It soon became apparent that the resident courses could not educate the numbers of officers which the service required. In order to overcome this deficiency and extend as much professional education as possible to all officers of the Navy, General Order Number 89 issued 1 April 1914, authorized the conduct of professional courses by correspondence. This was the beginning of the present Extension Education Department of the Naval War College. From the beginning the aim of this Department was to provide as many as possible of the educational benefits of the College to those officers of the naval service not in residence. To this end the extension courses are continually reviewed and compared with the resident courses. The most recent revisions were made during calendar year 1962. Listed below are the courses currently available.

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Two installments, approximately 60 study hours.

#### MILITARY PLANNING.

Two installments, 60 hours.

#### COMMAND LOGISTICS.

Three installments, 60 hours.

#### NAVAL OPERATIONS.

Two installments, 60 hours.

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Six installments, 250 hours.

#### INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

Six installments, 250 hours.

#### READING COURSE, INTERNATIONAL LAW.

One installment, 50 hours.

#### READING COURSE, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

One installment, 50 hours.

#### STRATEGIC PLANNING.

Four installments, 120 hours.

Any officer of the U.S. armed services, regular or reserve, active or inactive, above the grade of ensign (or second lieutenant) is eligible to enroll in any of the courses.

Prior to applying for any of these courses, consult BUPERSINST 1500.49 (series) which contains brief course descriptions, previous course equivalents, and present course prerequisites.

Officers on active duty should submit their applications for enrollment to the Extension Education Department, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, via their Commanding Officer.

Officers not on active duty should submit their applications for enrollment to the same address via the District Commandant or other command carrying their records.

Requests for detailed information on any of the courses should be made by informal letter direct to the Extension Education Department, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.

## COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IN GREECE

A lecture delivered  
at the Naval War College  
6 June 1962

by

Ambassador Karl L. Rankin

I do not recall hearing the word *insurgency* applied during the Greek uprisings of 1941-1949, but it would have been an accurate term. They were directed against constituted authority in every case. First, there was revolt against the Axis forces of occupation; then, after liberation, against the only recognized Greek Government. Insurgency in Greece during that period, however, took on international significance because it was so largely Communist directed. Widespread delay in recognizing this fact, notably in Britain and the United States, brought Greece close to irretrievable disaster. Had it not been for two men who could take decisions promptly, Prime Minister Churchill in 1944 and President Truman in 1947, Greece today would be a Communist satellite. Doubtless most of the other Eastern Mediterranean countries would have gone the same way, and who knows how many others?

Now that the scales have fallen from most eyes, it sometimes is said that prewar Greek history had little or no bearing on what occurred later. But I believe that some consideration of earlier events is necessary to an understanding of what happened after 1941. Greece has been a parliamentary democracy since 1864. In the subsequent 98 years it has been a constitutional monarchy most of the time, with intervals under presidents and dictators. During the greater part of a century, however, Greece has enjoyed governments which, whatever their faults, were basically democratic and derived from the consent of the governed. Of no other Balkan country can this be said. Moreover, the Western Allies bear a heavy responsibility for the upsets in Greek politics during World War I, and the subsequent disastrous campaign in Asia Minor, which overturned two Greek regimes.

My first visit to Greece was during this turbulent period, in 1920. I recall Constitution Square in Athens, with a pile of captured Turkish guns surrounded by tables where the Athenians were enjoying their late afternoon coffee. A short distance down Stadium Street, in front of Parliament, an equestrian statue of Kolokotronis, hero of the Greek War of Independence, was pointing toward Constantinople. Of course, some irreverent

Greeks observed that he was also pointing to the royal stables, where members of Parliament might feel more at home than in the legislative halls. Today, Turkey and Greece are allies, the old stables are no more, and Kolokotronis is pointing at an office building which houses various American Government agencies.

By the late 1920's Greece was making good progress in absorbing nearly two million refugees from other countries, and in developing the territory acquired in the Balkan Wars. In this process new political alignments arose, which had the effect of creating what have been called *Old Greece* and *New Greece*. The country is fortunate in having only small racial minorities; the population is over 90 per cent Greek. But those living in Greece as it existed prior to 1911 were for the most part conservative and royalist. The population of the territory gained subsequently from the Ottoman Empire, plus the refugees who also came largely from Turkey, considered themselves liberal and republican. As a former minority under the Sultan, this was only natural.

A result of the situation just described was the emergence of two major political groups: the Liberal Party, led by the elder Venizelos; and the Popular Party, headed by the elder Tsaldaris. In general, the Liberals represented New Greece and were considered republican, while the Populists were from Old Greece and favored a monarchy. Among a people so individualistic as the Greeks, of course, party lines were not always clearly drawn. Venizelos did not regard himself as anti-Royalist, except as he found King Constantine to be autocratic. Nor were all members of the Popular Party necessarily opposed to a Republic. But if there was one major political issue which the simplest peasant could understand, it was that of the Monarchy.

Greece had a republican form of government from 1924 to 1935, although during more than a third of this period the country was ruled by military dictators. Venizelos and his Liberals were in power from 1928 to 1932, but lost the election to the Populists in the latter year. The two parties were nearly equal in parliamentary strength, and new elections in 1935 confirmed this unstable situation. The Popular Party won 143 seats and the Liberals 142. The remaining 15 were gathered in by the Communist Party of Greece, which gave it the balance of power.

Greek history for the period of World War I and the years up to 1935 were not without instances of insurgency. Abetted by the Allies, Venizelos led a movement which brought Greece into the war against the Central Powers, with no obvious benefit either to his own country or to the Allied cause. Other insurrections followed. The first one I witnessed personally was the abortive Plastiras revolt of 1933, promoted by



Venizelos after his defeat at the polls. I remember watching events from the roof of the American Legation. Leaflets, signed by General Plastiras, had been scattered over the city from a plane. The people were called upon to join him in throwing out the Government. An armored car passed the Legation shooting live ammunition in the air; bullets whined over my head. A taxi reached the corner at the same moment, from a cross street. Stepping on the gas, blowing his horn, and holding up his hand, the taxi driver made the armored car stop while he raced across in front of it. Athens taxi drivers are not to be trifled with.

Insurgency in Greece before World War II resembled the traditional Latin-American Revolution. No one was supposed to get killed, and in due course a general amnesty benefited the losers. The elder Venizelos' final bid for power in 1935 was rather more serious. Several scores were killed, and two army officers were subsequently tried and shot, while Greece's ablest statesmen of his generation died in voluntary exile the following spring.

General Kondylis as Defense Minister had the primary responsibility for putting down the 1935 revolt, and took advantage of his success to promote a plebiscite, which brought King George II back from exile. There were the usual complaints that the voting had been rigged. But in all probability, the King would have received a good majority in any case. The Populists, his supporters, had won the previous election fairly enough, and the Liberals were further, if only temporarily, discredited by the failure of their subsequent revolt and the flight of their leader.

Unfortunately, the return of the King failed to help the unstable parliamentary situation. Within a few months several prominent leaders of both major political parties had died. Sophoulis, who succeeded Venizelos as head of the Liberal Party, indulged in some flirtation with the Communists, apparently hoping with their support to upset the Populist Government. Seizing an opportunity to exploit what appeared to them a *revolutionary situation*, the Communist Party called for a general strike. On August 4, 1936, General Metaxas, who had become Prime Minister, persuaded the King to suspend certain articles of the Constitution and to dissolve Parliament. Thereafter, until his death in January 1941, Metaxas ruled Greece with comparative efficiency and benevolence, but with dictatorial powers.

The Communist Party had overreached itself in its first open bid to play a major role in Greek politics. The Party was founded in 1918, and eventually gained limited support in so-called intellectual circles, as well as with some of the refugees from Asia Minor, and among industrial workers, particularly in the tobacco industry. In 1935, the Party's

numerical strength was measured more or less accurately by its occupancy of 5 per cent of the seats in Parliament. The leadership was Russian trained. Under Metaxas the Communist Party was outlawed and went underground. There it prepared to exploit the advent of the next revolutionary situation.

\* \* \* \* \*

I have dealt with the pre-World War II period in some detail to help explain the subsequent success of the Communists in gaining physical control of a large part of Greece, in preventing the King's return with the recognized Government in 1944, in obtaining cabinet portfolios in that Government and, finally, in all but capturing the city of Athens and bringing the entire country into the Communist camp. Their successes were political, not military. Of course, the military organization, ELAS, or National Liberation Army, was an essential factor in the program. But it was used primarily to eliminate rival resistance groups and to cow the populace, rather than for significant operations against the Axis Forces. On a smaller scale, the Greek Communist Party was employing the same methods as Tito in Yugoslavia. The primary purpose was not the defeat of the Axis Powers, toward which their contribution would have been almost negligible in any case, but to gain such control in their own country as to assure an eventual Communist takeover.

Starting with no more than 5 per cent of the Greek people actually in Communist ranks, the Popular Front technique was adopted. The Greek Communist Party founded EAM, or National Liberation Front, in September 1941. Its first year was devoted to organizing a system of cells throughout Greece, in the usual Communist pattern. Not until the summer of 1942 did the first guerrilla bands of ELAS appear in the field. Their initial activities were devoted to sweeping out of the way or absorbing rival bands. At the same time, EAM was welcoming other parties, groups, or individuals who wished to join them. Only two minor political parties did so, the Political Democratic Union and the Socialist Party of Greece, but many non-Communist individuals joined, either under EAM pressure or because they saw no other way to demonstrate patriotic resistance to the Axis occupation. But if many members of EAM were not Communist, the ultimate control remained exclusively so.

While perfecting their organization throughout most of Greece, the Communists had the advantage of several ready-made political issues. King George and his Government were first in London and later in Cairo; they suffered from the handicaps of all governments-in-exile. While avoiding any actual break with what was, after all, the recognized Government of Greece, the Communists lost no opportunity to undermine and discredit the King and

his Ministers. By implication, at least, this appealed to many of republican sympathies, particularly in the traditionally republican areas of Northern Greece where geography favored resistance activities. Everyone also was reminded repeatedly that King George had been responsible for bringing the dictatorial Metaxas regime into power. On the more tangible side, EAM agents promoted unrest among the Greek military forces operating under British command in the Middle East. The mutinies of 1943 and early 1944 were the result.

British officers who parachuted into Greece from 1942 to 1944 quickly recognized EAM as a Communist front. They reported in detail their efforts to rescue other resistance groups from Communist ruthlessness, and to persuade ELAS to undertake operations against the Axis military forces. Some operations were indeed undertaken, notably the destruction of two railway bridges in Central Greece, which cut the Germans' only through rail link to the port of Piraeus whence supplies were shipped to North Africa. But these and similar operations were carried out largely by British personnel, aided later by a few Americans.

ELAS did kill Germans and Italians from time to time, but in general for no compelling military reasons. Rather, it was part of their systematic development of an atmosphere of terror so essential to Communist enterprise. The Germans took increasingly horrible reprisals on the Greek populace, who were thus driven into the arms of ELAS as the only visible alternative to collaboration with the enemy.

The collapse of Italy in 1943 provided opportunities for more effective military operations inside Greece. One entire Italian division in Thessaly, with its officers and full equipment, joined ELAS in fighting a successful action against a large-scale and determined German attack. But obeying the invariable Communist rule to eliminate actual or potential rivals wherever possible, systematic steps were taken to break up the cohesion of this important addition to anti-German strength. Desertions were encouraged by Communist propaganda, Italian equipment was *borrowed* by ELAS and never returned, and in October the Communists ordered the disarming of every co-belligerent Italian unit in Greece, ostensibly to *forestall a Fascist plot*.

The large amount of Italian arms and equipment which fell into ELAS hands in 1943 facilitated an immediate attack on the forces of General Zervas, the most important non-Communist resistance leader. The Germans took quick advantage, and began a drive into guerrilla territory. In a few days, the military effectiveness of the resistance movements in Central Greece was reduced almost to zero. But beaten as they were in the field, the Communists emerged stronger than any of their Greek

rivals, and with hidden arms and equipment to be used for more decisive purposes than fighting Germans.

EAM did not deceive many Greek politicians as to its true intentions. Foreigners were more gullible. Any resistance group that made a show of fighting was hailed in Washington and London, where the ultimate political and military consequences were widely ignored. We must remember, of course, that the Russians were highly popular at that time as they drove the German armies westward. There was no significant adverse reaction, therefore, when in March 1944 EAM set up a shadow government in the Greek mountains, with the acclaim of the Soviet press. At the same time Russia began to denounce the Greek government-in-exile as *reactionary*. It was the same pattern as in Yugoslavia.

Of course, the Greek Communists took care to appear reasonable in some of their major pretensions. As the largest resistance group in Greece, they wanted representation in the recognized Greek Government. As to the Monarchy, they asked only that King George announce his intention not to return to the country until invited by a plebiscite. Both demands were accepted in the West as entirely proper. There was as yet no general appreciation of what a few Communists in key governmental posts could accomplish. Nor was it understood that EAM planned to be in full control of Greece before any plebiscite or election could be held. The result at the polls would have been no more in doubt than in the elections held under Tito's auspices in Yugoslavia. In retrospect, without questioning anyone's good intentions, it seems fair to say that Western opinion was governed largely by short-term military considerations, wishful political thinking, and failure to recognize Communists for what they were.

In September 1944 EAM won another point, with British support, by the inclusion of six Communist-selected ministers in the Greek Government. This had resulted from meetings in Lebanon and in Cairo, attended by EAM representatives flown out of Greece by the British. The six ministers included two avowed Communists; all were completely under Communist orders. They were sworn in by Crown Prince Paul in Cairo. Shortly afterward, an agreement was signed by all concerned which, among other provisions, placed all guerrilla forces in Greece under nominal British command.

King George hoped to return to Greece with the liberating forces. He had spent much time with troops, particularly during the Metaxas regime when he stood aside from politics, and possessed not inconsiderable military qualifications. Undoubtedly, he had contributed to the effectiveness of the Greek Army, which gave such a good account of itself against the Italians in 1940. Whether the King's presence in Athens would have helped or

hindered during the dark days of December 1944, no one can be certain. British opposition, added to that of many non-Communist Greeks, kept him from Greece at that time, and at the end of 1944 he finally announced from London that he would not return unless *summoned by a free and fair expression of the national will*.

The British forces which came to Greece in October and November 1944 have been described as a *corporal's guard*. The Germans were withdrawing northward, with negligible interference from ELAS, and no actual contact with the enemy was foreseen for British troops. For several weeks after the initial landings, the British were greatly outnumbered by the Germans still in Greece. But the latter were chiefly on a few islands, where they remained isolated until the end of the war. The British Ambassador and the British officers who had been in Greece with ELAS were unhappy about this situation. The possibility of civil war had been pointed out by the commander of the British Military Mission to Greece and by others. But the Allied Command would spare only enough troops to conduct what was regarded as a relief operation to get food to the Greek civil population. The United States contributed no military personnel beyond a few for liaison duties.

The Communists were taken by surprise at the arrival of so few British troops. They apparently had not intended to take military action at that time. With their men installed in key positions in the Greek cabinet in Athens, and with EAM organs already in physical control of most of the countryside, collecting taxes and dispensing their own brand of justice, an eventual take-over by quasi-legal means seemed promising enough. Now, however, they saw a chance to gain power immediately. We cannot be sure what orders came from Moscow, but Stalin doubtless could have stopped his Greek minions had he so desired. On the contrary, everything EAM did was fully approved and supported by Soviet propaganda.

EAM began to show its hand again soon after the arrival of British forces in Greece. Despite the formal agreement that all resistance units would be subject to the orders of the British Commander, acts of terrorism and victimization continued on an increasing scale. The Greek Government, including the Communist ministers, unanimously agreed that the EAM *police* would hand over their arms, but they refused to do so. This was on December 1, 1944. General Scobie at once issued a statement that he would stand firmly behind the constitutional Government until a Greek State could be established with a legally armed force, and free elections could be held. This warning was backed up immediately by a statement from No. 10 Downing Street that the British Commander's action was taken with the knowledge and entire approval of the British Government. But the Communists had decided to go ahead.

I had returned to Greece in mid-November 1944, and recall very clearly what could be seen from the American Embassy of the December 3 demonstrations. The Communists were using their old techniques. Crowds, made up largely of young people and others who looked like factory workers, were being shepherded toward the center of Athens by men wearing armbands. Police tried to disperse them and, in any case, to steer them away from Constitution Square, where EAM had ordered a monster demonstration. The Government, acting without the six EAM ministers, had forbidden the gathering, which quite evidently was organized for provocative purposes. Despite the efforts of the police, a large crowd eventually assembled in Constitution Square. A scuffle started in which some of the crowd disarmed a few policemen. Shots were fired and several people were killed. The foreign news correspondents, in the Hotel Grande Bretagne on the Square, had ringside seats. They were able to report to the world in sensational style that they had watched 'Greek police fire on an unarmed crowd.' This was the first Communist victory in the postliberation series; it was not a military one.

ELAS forces had been ordered to converge on Athens, and on the morning following the December 3 demonstration, a battalion of 800 arrived from Thebes. The British disarmed them. Meanwhile, ELAS units began taking over outlying police stations in Athens and Piraeus, and as we learned later, sending the policemen on duty to torture and death. General Scobie ordered ELAS Headquarters to stop all such acts. He gave ELAS until midnight of December 6 to be clear of the Athens area. On the contrary, ELAS units continued to arrive from various quarters, and before the time limit expired there was fighting in earnest.

I do not know that the British ever admitted officially how few troops they had assigned to the Greek operation. But whatever mistakes had been made in planning were made up for by brave and effective action during that unfortunate month of December. One Greek unit loyal to the Government, the Rimini Brigade, arrived from Italy and acquitted itself with great credit. But this unit and the British were outnumbered many times over by ELAS forces. Ironically, the Soviets never had been called upon to supply their agents in Greece; arms and money had come from the Allies and the Italians.

Militarily, the ELAS effort as a whole was a poor show, despite much dogged fighting. The British were widely scattered, and their road communications were often interrupted; yet the Communists never succeeded in getting control of the harbor, the airport, or the central business district of Athens where British Headquarters was located. They did capture a hotel in a distant suburb, where Royal Air Force personnel surrendered after a brave defense.

Word came that personnel of the United States Air Transport Command were threatened in a small hotel which they occupied on the northwestern fringe of the British perimeter. I went there to see what the trouble was. ELAS had notified them that their hotel was to be dynamited for a road-block, as had been done to other corner buildings in the neighborhood. They had no place to go. I invited them to bring their bedding rolls and cots, and sleep in the Embassy Chancery, which some 60 of them did. Under trying conditions, we were delighted at their discipline and good humor. When they finally left the Embassy, everything was in perfect order.

ELAS wreaked its vengeance on the Greek civil population and captured police. Literally thousands of hostages were taken in the Athens area, including many prominent individuals, elderly men and women, and children. They were marched off into the country in bitter weather. Hundreds were shot; others were killed on the way when they were unable to keep up. In the immediate vicinity of Athens, new refinements in torture were employed on the police and on many civilians who fell into ELAS hands. Similar events, if on a smaller scale, took place in other parts of the country. No one will ever know how many Greeks died in this tragic period, but the usual estimate is 50,000 for the number who were, quite simply, murdered.

British reinforcements were flown in from Italy, and Athens was gradually cleared in house-to-house combat. British officers said that the fighting was as tough as anything they had seen. By December 18, ELAS began to pull back. Peace feelers arrived, with offers to withdraw from Athens and Piraeus, but coupled with unacceptable political conditions. On Christmas Eve, Prime Minister Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden arrived in Athens. The continuation of a determined policy toward the Communists was approved. In the succeeding weeks ELAS gradually accepted defeat, and on February 12 an agreement was signed which resulted in the eventual surrender to the British of 41,500 rifles, 2,015 machine guns, and other arms, as well as the release of British prisoners.

Greeks of nearly all political schools were dazed by what had happened. Many refused to believe that their fellow Greeks could have pursued a deliberate policy of terror to such extremes. Stories about Slav-speaking members of ELAS being primarily responsible for the atrocities were seized upon eagerly as evidence that Greeks would not do such things. No doubt the ELAS forces included men from the small minority in Northern Greece who spoke a Slav dialect (call them Macedonians, Bulgars or Greeks, as you will). But the great majority and the leaders were Greeks—Greek Communists. One result of this

period of terror—so much worse than what had happened during the occupation—was to make the Greek people all but forget the earlier German atrocities.

Altogether, the Winter of 1944-45 was the most difficult period of the war in my experience. I had seen the Germans bomb and occupy Brussels. I was at Dunkirk shortly after the evacuation, next in Belgrade during the German bombing and occupation, then in Manila when the Japanese bombed and later interned us. But all of this was more or less orthodox warfare. In Athens, snipers were the worst pests. They seemed to be everywhere, including the areas controlled by the British. For weeks we had no electricity, no water supply, no telephone service, and refuse was piled high in the streets.

Every day a Vice Consul and I walked to our Embassy, to keep the Chancery open for callers who needed assistance. The Naval Attaché slept there, and the three of us, with some of his staff and two or three Greek employees, kept things going after a fashion. It was most disagreeable going back and forth with snipers' bullets singing overhead. One never could be sure what they were shooting at. In due course, the British saved the situation and kept us fed with field rations in the process.

I could wish that the American part in all of these happenings had been less inglorious. Washington's official position was one of neutrality, although how we could justify being neutral under such circumstances, I shall never know. Officially, however, we were not much of a burden to the British with our course of *masterly inaction*. The same could not be said of the American press. About ten American correspondents were in Athens at the time. With the notable exception of Sedgwick of the *New York Times*, who reported accurately and ably throughout, they earned the right to be on the Communist payroll at generous if varying salaries. I am confident that not more than one at most was truly a Communist, but they supported the EAM case fervently. The British correspondents were no better.

Prime Minister Churchill put the matter fairly in a speech during the ensuing debate on Greece in the House of Commons:

There is no case in my experience, certainly not in my wartime experience, where a British Government has been so maligned and its motives so traduced in our own country by organs of the press or among our own people. That this should be done amid the perils of this war, now at its climax, bodes ill for the future.



Turning to the American press, Churchill went on to say:

How can we wonder at, still less complain of, the attitude of hostile or indifferent newspapers in the United States, when we have here in this country witnessed such melancholy exhibitions as are provided by some of our most time-honored and responsible journals?

Our task, hard as it has been and is still, has been rendered vastly more difficult by the spirit of gay, reckless, unbridled partisanship which has been let loose on the Greek question.

The Greek Communists lost the battle of Athens militarily, but they won a propaganda victory which was to plague us in the years to come. How can we explain the fact that so many intelligent and sincere Americans, and British, were so wrong on the Greek question in 1944? There are various partial explanations. First, our press and public had been oversold on resistance movements in general. EAM was, indeed, the largest Greek resistance group; its sins were overlooked and its patriotic professions accepted at face value. Then there was the current enthusiasm for our Soviet allies. Stalin had become 'Uncle Joe'; many Americans thought that in the future we should have no trouble in getting along with the 'old buzzard.' And Uncle Joe's propaganda supported EAM. Finally, there was the latent American prejudice against kings, and the Greek government-in-exile was headed by King George II.

But all of the factors just cited are insufficient to explain the confusion in American opinion. It seemed to me at the time that the average well-informed American was reasonably objective on most international issues, except sometimes about the enemies with whom we were at war. But let anyone mention Greece, or Spain, or China, and emotions would rise! Whether or not they had any special knowledge, most Americans of my acquaintance had long since made up their minds one way or the other. Emotions had taken charge, and there was no reasoning with them. Perhaps the long-continued smear campaigns by the Communists against those three countries, fostered by American fellow-travelers, had been a decisive influence. A negative factor in December 1944, of course, was that American attention was centered on the Battle of the Bulge on the western front.

I have devoted some time to what might be called the American public opinion aspect of the Greek situation in order to stress its importance. In recent years, various cases of insurgency in other countries eventually have involved the United States. There will be more in the future. Particularly in the early stages, issues may not be clearly drawn, and the

American public may be misled by propaganda and by superficial or unwarrantedly sensational press reports. As a result, our Government may be hampered in dealing with a situation promptly and effectively. I see no other simple explanation for our initial neutrality in Greek affairs in 1944, which later involved us so heavily. At that time, of course, it was great fun for our correspondents and editors to blame the Greeks and British for everything. Probably most of them were unaware that the United States not only had avoided military participation in the liberation of Greece, but had vetoed the larger Balkan operation envisaged by Churchill. We had military reasons for our position, but we also missed a chance to save Greece from civil war, and perhaps as many as four neighboring countries from the Communist rule which still enslaves them today.

The military defeat of ELAS was followed by strenuous efforts to bring relief to the sorely tried people of Greece, and to start economic reconstruction. The physical damage in a few weeks of the Communist conflict was greater than the country had suffered in the previous four years of war and occupation. The political picture was equally chaotic. True, a line had been drawn between Communists and non-Communists. There would be no more experiments, for the foreseeable future, with 'broadening the base of the Government' by the inclusion of Communists and/or fellow-travelers. But the old-line parties had lost much of their significance. For the time being, there was only one issue—Communism. Nearly everyone by now hated it. But it was not enough to be *against* something; people needed to be *for* something.

It was no surprise that Greece suffered from ineffective government during the year following liberation and the Communist revolt. King George remained in London, but had appointed the Archbishop of Athens as Regent. Archbishop Damaskinos, for whom I had a high regard, introduced an element of stability. But one Prime Minister succeeded another, and none was able to accomplish what he set out to do. Inflation was rampant, and presented all but insoluble problems in Greece's exhausted state. Moreover, in the absence of an elected Parliament, it was not easy to say what each politician represented. Finally, a cabinet was formed under the aged Liberal leader, Sophoulis, which lasted until the internationally supervised parliamentary elections of March 1946.

After long argument, it had been agreed that the elections for Parliament would precede a plebiscite on the issue of the Monarchy. It was not difficult to predict the outcome of the first postwar voting in Greece. An overwhelming majority would vote *against* Communism, and they would do this by voting *for* the most conservative element, which was the Popular Party supporting the Monarchy. Other political parties, notably the Liberals and the Communists, had paid lip service to the idea of early

elections, but actually wanted to see an indefinite postponement in view of their own unfavorable prospects. Predictions were circulated that if the elections were held in March 1946, as scheduled, there would be bloodshed; a longer cooling-off period was urged. These reports were not without effect in Washington and London. It was one of those occasions when a diplomatic representative abroad may feel forced to make a grave decision on his own.

The British Ambassador continued to urge that the elections be held on the agreed date. I perhaps exceeded my instructions in taking a firm line with Sophoulis, and leaving with him a *Note Verbale* opposing delay. With any encouragement from either of us, he might well have put off the elections indefinitely. As it happened, the voting took place on March 31, 1946, and there was a minimum of disorder, mostly promoted by the Communists. Their supporters had been ordered to abstain, but the Allied Mission to Observe the Greek Elections, after careful analysis of the results, determined that Communist voting strength was less than 10 per cent of the electorate. The Popular Party won a decisive victory, and after an interval of ten years Greece again had a Government based upon the expressed will of the people.

With the elections out of the way, the Populists naturally wanted an early plebiscite on the King's return. Again, there was no doubt but that the outcome would be favorable. Washington and London were in no hurry. I believe that both Governments were genuinely impartial, but there was concern over inevitable criticism that we were 'forcing' the King on the Greek people. Delay was favored in both capitals, but the British Embassy in Athens disagreed, as did I. This problem was one that the Greeks simply had to get out of their systems, for a time at least, and we felt that delay was unfair and unhelpful. Of course, the Greek Government could have gone ahead without our consent, but agreement was preferable. After repeated urging, objections in Washington and London were withdrawn in May, and the plebiscite was set for September 1, 1946.

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I left Greece in July 1946 with the hope that a period of peace and progress lay ahead. It was not to be. The King returned to Athens on September 27, after a decisive victory in the plebiscite. About the same time there was a resumption of guerrilla activity, more or less openly supported by Greece's Communist neighbors to the north. The insurgency of the succeeding three years assumed a more important military aspect than before. The purely Communist character of the revolt was in no doubt this time, and the political issues were correspondingly clear. Only a few American correspondents came to the aid of the Greek rebels by exaggerated and sensational criticism of the Government in Athens.

The Greek Communists and their masters in the Kremlin realized how badly they had done in a military sense in 1944. This time it was to be different. One of the old-line Greek Communists, Markos Vafiades, was placed in command. Training for his men in guerrilla warfare was carried on to the north of Greece's frontier, and arms were provided on a systematic basis. In clashes with Greek Army units, the insurgents often enjoyed superior firepower, thanks to a higher percentage of automatic weapons. In December 1946 Greece formally complained to the Security Council that the rebels were being trained and armed on foreign soil, and that Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria were giving asylum to fugitive guerrillas, and allowing the use of their territory for operations against Greece. The complaint included a request that these charges be investigated by the United Nations. The Soviets reversed their earlier position of opposing such an inquiry, and on December 19 it was agreed that the United Nations should investigate. Nine teams were organized to collect evidence, and by the end of January 1947 they were at work in Greece. The subsequent reports of UNSCOB, or Balkan Commission, provide voluminous confirmation of Greece's charges against its northern neighbors. Other evidence established that thousands of Greek children had been abducted and taken to Communist countries. (The League of Red Cross Societies at Geneva placed the total at 23,700 by the end of 1948.)

Early in 1947 the British Government informed Washington that its economic commitments in Greece must come to an end on March 31. President Truman at once sent a special message to Congress, asking \$400 million for aid to Greece and Turkey. He stated that 'totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.' The formal recognition of this fact, and the proposal that the United States take the necessary steps to deal with it, specially in the cases of Greece and Turkey, became known as the Truman Doctrine. The money was appropriated, and soon afterward the American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG) was functioning in Athens, one branch dealing with military matters and the other with economic affairs. The Truman Doctrine was operational by July 1947.

In the new round of insurgency started by the Communists in 1946, their activities were limited for some time to relatively small operations, chiefly near Greece's 600 mile northern frontier. Villages were harassed, and communications interrupted. Sophoulis, who had first negotiated with the Communists in 1936, tried again in the first part of 1947, on the theory that a policy of conciliation and moderation would bring the guerrillas down from the hills. As the principal opposition leader, his right to deal with those in armed revolt against the Government may be questioned, but eventually he recognized that the rebels would accept no reasonable compromise. Negotiations were broken off. The Communists apparently

regarded further political maneuvering as useless; they were now prepared to fight in any case. Hostilities on a larger scale coincided with the establishment of AMAG in the Summer of 1947.

At the beginning of August, Albanian, Yugoslav and Bulgarian military representatives met in Bled, Yugoslavia, to plan the Communist operation in Greece. Arms, supplies and instructors were to be furnished. The three participants reportedly foresaw the intervention of their own troops if this should promise to be decisive. They would also station military representatives at the seat of the 'Greek Democratic Government' as soon as it was established. Meanwhile, a foreign legion, or international force, was to be organized to enter Greece and assist in the revolt there.

Several efforts were made by the Communists during 1947 to capture towns in Northern Greece, but the Greek Army showed that it too had been preparing. None of these attacks was successful. At Christmas time, the Communists mounted a large-scale assault on the town of Konitsa, intending to make it their temporary capital. Their foreign legion was supposed to attack the town of Florina at the same time. The Konitsa operation was well prepared and well led. The Communists fought with skill and resolution. With the capture of this town, and the establishment of a government there, recognition of the 'Greek Democratic Government' by the Soviet Union and other Communist states apparently had been promised. The attackers were totally defeated, the assault on Florina failed to materialize, and the whole Communist plan underwent drastic modification. It was decided to revert to traditional guerrilla warfare.

In November 1947 our Ambassador to Greece was seriously ill and his Minister-Counselor was not in good health. Much to my surprise, I received orders to leave Vienna, where I had been for only a year, and to return to Athens. I made a quick trip to Greece, flew to Washington for consultation, and returned to Athens only to find many of my fellow countrymen almost in despair. The victory at Konitsa gave us all a lift, but Greece was faced with the prospect of guerrilla warfare for an indefinite period. There was no physical possibility of closing the long northern frontier. The guerrillas were well armed and well trained by this time. They had revived all of the techniques of terror: abductions, tortures, murders, and reprisals. Even if they could not capture a well-garrisoned town, they could roam the countryside at will, while the Greek Army was tied down to defense duties. And there was always the possibility of an incursion by foreign troops from the north.

In January, I called a meeting in my office of all the senior American officials, civilian and military, and invited discussion. The consensus

was depressing. Some believed that there was no hope unless we could bring over two American divisions to Greece. Others thought that perhaps Greece was no longer important to American security; the range of our bombers had so increased that Russia could be reached from bases at the Suez Canal and in Libya, making Greek facilities unnecessary.

After everyone who wished to do so had had his say, I disagreed with most of the opinions expressed. I pointed out that the Truman Doctrine was only ten months old and was still our official policy. Greece, therefore, was still important. Its loss to the Communists would, in my opinion, have disastrous effects in nearby countries. As to the military situation, I thought that the Greek Army and militia of 200,000 men should be able to take care of 25,000 guerrillas in the absence of intervention by foreign troops. I saw no need for American forces, and did not believe that they would be available in any case. A tremendous asset on our side, I said, was that the overwhelming majority of the Greek people stood with us. General Van Fleet had just arrived in Greece to head the military branch of AMAG. He attended the meeting, but as the newest arrival took no part in the discussion. Afterward he told me that he agreed with my views.

Under the guidance of a British Police Mission, the various police forces of Greece were reaching a high state of efficiency. I remember the British officer in charge telling me that if he had been given the authority and facilities to organize and equip the constabulary as he saw fit, the new guerrilla war in 1946 could never have started. In any event, the police proved their effectiveness in dealing with a campaign of murder organized by the Communists in the same year. A few murders were, indeed, successfully carried out, but they were by no means so numerous as had been intended. The Communist newspaper *Eleftheri Ellada* called for the killing of Zervas, Gonatas, and Papandreou, three prominent Greek political figures. Only an abortive attempt on the life of Gonatas resulted. In May 1947, however, the Minister of Justice, Ladas, was murdered by a Communist agent, and in the following month George Polk, an American newspaper correspondent, met his death under mysterious circumstances. The Communist press claimed that he had been murdered by agents of the Greek Government for his rather critical stories. It was later proved to have been a Communist job.

I recall a long conversation with General Zervas about this time. He maintained that the Greek Army was not properly organized and equipped to fight guerrillas. In his view, a self-contained battalion of 500 men was the ideal unit. It should be highly mobile, well equipped with automatic weapons, trained to move and fight at night, and should keep continually on the offensive. In brief it should operate like the guerrillas, only better. He went on to expound the widely held view that success in

guerrilla warfare depended 20 per cent on combat and 80 per cent on intelligence. And, of course, intelligence depended largely on the co-operation of the civilian population.

Van Fleet was thinking along much the same lines as Zervas. But evidently there was no time to start a reorganization of the Greek Army. Instead, he persuaded the Greeks to pry loose from garrison duties first one and then two infantry divisions. By the early Summer of 1948 the Greek Army was on the offensive in a manner which led to the final defeat of the Communists in the following year. A large guerrilla-infested region would be surrounded. The Army, advancing in two or more concentric circles, would clear the area. There was much hard fighting, and the extensive use of mines by the guerrillas caused many casualties, both to troops and to the returning civilians.

Often it was difficult to persuade the peasants to return to a ruined village, for fear of new guerrilla depredations or reprisals. It was found useful to help at least a few villagers, who were known to be reliable, to rebuild their houses in such a substantial fashion that they could be defended against a small band of attackers. Rifles were then issued to a limited number of inhabitants. It was the Army's duty to keep the guerrilla bands small. The shift of troops from defensive to offensive tactics, however, was not accomplished without injury to some of the smaller centers they had been protecting. Communist raids on a number of towns were accompanied by the usual destruction, murders and abductions. There were several reports of actual crucifixions, in one case of a priest. But once the Greek Army undertook what was to be a sustained offensive, the outcome was never seriously in doubt.

Meanwhile aid came from an unexpected and unintentional quarter—Moscow. The creation of a Macedonian state, to include what is now Yugoslav and Greek Macedonia, with the cities of Salonika and Skoplje, was an old Marxist project. This reconstituted Macedonia was to be a member of a Communist Balkan Federation. Apparently Tito of Yugoslavia and Dimitrov of Bulgaria were working on a new version of the scheme, presumably in connection with the aid they were giving to the Greek Communists and the territorial concessions which might be obtained at Greece's expense in return for this aid. Stalin learned of these plans, and called Tito and Dimitrov to heel. Dimitrov came.

We cannot be positive about everything that was going on behind the Iron Curtain, and under such circumstances it is not always easy to distinguish between cause and effect. It seems probable, however, that Stalin realized the dangers of the Macedonian project under the auspices of a dynamic personality like Tito. Under the Truman Doctrine, the United States was showing that it meant business. Moreover, there was

still a token British military force of about 3,000 men near Salonika. They had taken no part in the guerrilla warfare which resumed in 1946, but had been kept in Greece as a stabilizing influence. The United States had urged that they stay on. Any incursion of troops from the north almost certainly would have headed for Salonika, and would have faced this British force. Stalin was not ready for his Balkan satellites to go to war with Greece, the United States, and the United Kingdom all at once. That would have been something quite different from the localized guerrilla conflict which he had approved for Greece.

It often has been said that Tito's breach with Stalin saved Greece. As a matter of fact, our Greek friends were well on the road to success before internal frictions to the north could affect the situation. Those frictions developed, to an important degree, as a result of the successful implementation of the Truman Doctrine. While the Macedonian affair was not the only point of difference between Tito and Stalin, it is quite likely that they would never have come to an open break otherwise. Their differences often have been described as ideological, which is nonsense. It was and continues to be a power struggle.

On June 28, 1948, Stalin had the Cominform denounce Tito as a deviationist. The effect on the guerrilla war in Greece was not immediate. The Greek Communists wanted aid from both parties, and delayed taking a position as long as possible. Finally, they declared for the Cominform. Not until 1949 did Tito close the Yugoslav border to the guerrillas. The Bulgarian frontier was too far away to be of much help by itself, and the Albanian border area thus became the strategic center.

Bowing to instructions, the Greek Communists on March 1, 1949, with tacit approval, broadcast the new Cominform resolution in favor of Macedonian 'independence.' This was now little more than an empty gesture, probably to humor Bulgaria, but once again the Greek cause was helped by its enemies. Many Greek soldiers were tiring of the long and painful struggle against the guerrillas. This pointed threat to Greek Macedonia gave them something new and tangible to fight for.

In its final stages the Communist insurgency centered in Greece's Grammos Mountains, near the Albanian frontier. I recall a trip to inspect the front lines with General Van Fleet. It was savage country, and small-scale guerrilla warfare might have continued indefinitely, with help from the Albanian side. Some 10,000 Communist troops were almost surrounded there. Most of them eventually were captured or killed; about 3,000 withdrew into Albania. But even in the last months, there were sporadic outbreaks in other parts of Greece, supplied by air drops or by small boats coming from Albania. Then someone in Moscow pressed a button and the



fighting stopped as suddenly as it had in 1945. Trouble could be started again at any time along that 600 rugged miles of frontier, by pushing another button in Moscow.

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Without going into technical military matters, I think that we may draw useful conclusions from experience with Communist insurgency in Greece. Conditions vary from country to country, and from one period to another. But a common problem is that of dealing with a situation where the insurgents receive support from a nearby or contiguous country. A second question is the handling of the civilian population in guerrilla territory so as to keep them on the right side. Third, we have the use of token military forces to consider. Finally, there are the propaganda aspects of insurgency. Public support in the United States and elsewhere is essential to carrying through any serious operation in which we are involved.

During and since my experience in Greece, I have questioned our rigid American policy of avoiding direct action against a third country which supports insurgents. Of course, any such action should be taken only after all factors have been considered. But hot pursuit into Albanian territory, and a blockade of Albanian ports, might well have shortened the Communist struggle in Greece. Establishment of a blockade has an ancillary advantage, in that its continuation or termination can be used for bargaining purposes.

As to the danger of 'provoking' someone, I would say that Communists are difficult to provoke. Their actions are not lightly undertaken, and they are prepared for all eventualities that can be foreseen. I may quote Mao Tse-tung on the subject. He wrote that when one meets a man-eating tiger, either one kills him or gets eaten; it does not matter whether the tiger is provoked. It would be prudence on our part to consider Communists in the same class as man-eating tigers.

In dealing with civilian populations in insurgent territory, the Communists may seem to enjoy important advantages. They commonly introduce a reign of terror to compel the population to collaborate with them, or at least to discourage assistance to their opponents. Cruel reprisals face those who disobey. Then the Communists may also enjoy a virtual monopoly of news and propaganda dissemination in guerrilla territory. Since they do not bother about telling the truth, public opinion often can be swayed in such areas. Obviously we cannot engage in reprisals against civilians, except in the most limited fashion, nor can we tolerate such action by foreign forces which we support. Yet if we cannot get the people behind the cause we are aiding, final success will elude us. Military victory is not enough, as France has learned in Algeria.

When our adversaries are Communists, we should be able to gain the support of the civilian population if we try. The Communists can be counted on to make themselves hated in due course. By showing proper consideration for their safety and welfare, we and our allies usually can retain the sympathy and support of civilians. Keeping them informed is an important factor, although ideologies as such normally mean little to people in areas where guerrillas usually operate. In all of this it is essential that, by word and deed, we and our allies convince all concerned that we expect to win.

The use of token military forces in exposed positions is anathema to many military men. But particularly in the post-World War II period, we have found that such forces can be invaluable. Of course, there are risks involved, but nothing demonstrates our intentions quite so definitely as the presence of American military units, even if small, in the path of an aggressor. The British force at Salonika served such a purpose, and we should not hesitate to use American forces wherever they promise to have a similar effect.

On the home front, in the United States, we continue to be plagued by irresponsible journalism. I have indulged today in several strictures about news correspondents. Under no circumstances do I wish to be understood as opposing freedom of the press, nor do I defer to anyone in my respect for the remarkable job that many able and conscientious editors and correspondents are doing. But in the often complex and obscure conditions surrounding insurgency, we should not simply leave it to chance whether the American public is properly informed. By judicious official statements and otherwise, our Government must bear the responsibility for insuring that a balanced picture is presented.

I remember early in 1948 we were particularly annoyed by the stories being sent in from Athens by a well-known American correspondent. I called him in for a talk. I said that his reports were well written, and I did not question his facts. But in almost every case he had interlarded facts with slanted editorializing. The net result was to give an unfair and unduly sensational picture. This was damaging to what we were trying to do in Greece. He took it well, but obviously felt no remorse. After all, his stories had just made the front pages of one of our leading newspapers for five days in succession! No, we cannot leave this to chance. The Communists have won too many propaganda victories in the past.

If, in a given situation, the American public can be persuaded that our Government is following the right course, and intends to pursue that course until our goal is attained, most of our real friends in other countries of the Free World will support us. That accomplished, we need not

worry overmuch about opinion behind the Iron Curtain, which is a synthetic product at best. And having convinced ourselves and our friends that we are determined to win, we shall be on the road to victory.

## BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Ambassador Karl L. Rankin

### SCHOOLS:

California Institute of Technology  
Federal Polytechnic Zurich  
Princeton University

### CAREER HIGHLIGHTS:

- 1918 - Active duty, U.S. Navy (LCDR)
- 1922-25 - Construction superintendent, Near East Relief, Russian  
Caucasus
- 1925-27 - Manager, real estate development company, New Jersey
- 1927 - Assistant trade commissioner, Prague
- 1929 - Commercial attaché, Prague
- 1932 - Commercial attaché, Athens and Tirana
- 1939 - Commercial attaché, Brussels and Luxemburg
- 1940 - Commercial attaché and consul, Belgrade
- 1941 - Assigned as commercial attaché, Cairo, but interned by  
Japanese in Manila prior to arrival
- 1944 - Commercial attaché, Cairo
- 1944 - Counselor of embassy for economic affairs, Athens and Belgrade
- 1946 - Charge d'affairs, Athens
- 1946-47 - Counselor of legation, Vienna
- 1947 - Counselor of Embassy, Athens
- 1947-48 - Charge d'affairs, Athens
- 1949 - Consul general, Canton, Hong Kong, Macao
- 1950-53 - Minister and charge d'affairs, Taipei
- 1953-57 - Ambassador to China
- 1957-61 - Ambassador to Yugoslavia
- Retired

## EMERGENCY PLANNING

A lecture delivered  
at the Naval War College  
6 March 1962

by

Mr. Ralph E. Spear

The activities of the Office of Emergency Planning cover virtually every segment of our society, ranging from the federal structure in Washington, D.C. down to the smallest, but perhaps strongest, element of the American matrix—the individual family.

The Office of Emergency Planning is guided in its policies and programs by a fundamental maxim which, coincidentally, I found restated in the Naval War College pamphlet for guest lecturers. It is not surprising that the College subscribes to this belief since it is really basic to every activity related to the national security. Your educational philosophy is—and I quote—

*The art and science of modern warfare is an extremely complex web of political, economic, social, and military factors. Analysis of wars of the past has shown that there are certain fundamentals, both military and nonmilitary, which have been common to all. The identification and study of these fundamentals are undertaken at the Naval War College, so that the individual may be prepared to employ them in actual situations of the future, but the College advocates no fixed set of rules by which wars may be conducted or battles won.*

That is a truly fundamental statement, but I am particularly interested in its last clause. There is no *fixed set of rules*. To put it another way, we live in a swiftly changing world of technology and politics. Let us retain the basics but let us not be mesmerized into a *maginot line* mold of thinking unsuited to today's world. But I am getting ahead of my story.

The objective of emergency planning, on the national as well as the local level, is the establishment and maintenance of a reliable nonmilitary planning posture.

Last July, major operational functions of civil defense were transferred to the Department of Defense. These include the shelter program,

radiological, chemical and biological defense, and the national warning network, all of which are now being advanced rapidly by the Secretary of Defense.

Subsequently, the Office of Emergency Planning was established in the executive office of the President. The director of this office is Mr. Edward A. McDermott.

The OEP is a newly formed agency which exercises a very old function. Its experience dates back to mobilization tasks of World War I and was considerably enlarged in World War II and Korea. We are responsible for the mobilization and management of resources for national security purposes. Among other things, this includes the management of an eight billion dollar stockpile of critical materials, specific recommendations related to the economic health of our allies, and the waging of economic offensive in concert with friendly nations. It also includes national plans and facilities to preserve the federal structure under any emergency; federal relief activities in time of natural disaster, continuity of government programs, and a specialized advisory role to the President in the field of tariffs, import quotas, and other economic areas.

When we talk about management of resources on the national or local level, we are not grappling with *ivory tower* theory. Perhaps the jargon of the specialist, a necessary tool of communication, tends to leave that impression. In truth, we are really talking about the fundamentals of life on this earth; the elemental problems of safeguarding the food we eat; the fuel we consume; the transportation we need to maintain a steady flow of commerce; an intricate telecommunications system which will continue to function under all conditions; and perhaps, most important, the foundation of constitutional government which underpins our way of life. These are the things that concern the Office of Emergency Planning. Of course, most federal agencies conduct operational functions in all these fields.

Last month, the President signed nine executive orders assigning important emergency preparedness functions to the Secretaries of the Interior; Agriculture; Commerce and Labor; Health, Education and Welfare; to the Postmaster General, to the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency, to the Housing and Home Finance Administrator, and to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

In these orders the agencies are directed 'to develop a state of readiness with respect to all conditions of national emergency, including attack upon the United States.'

The President has charged Mr. McDermott, as Director of the Office of Emergency Planning, with the responsibility to advise and assist him in determining policy for and co-ordinating the performance of these functions with the total national preparedness program.

I will not cover all of these delegations in detail, but let me give you a capsule account of some of the operating responsibilities held by federal agencies in emergency planning.

First, when we talk about the economic consequences of possible war or cold war, we are talking about their impact on the world's most complex economy, presently generating a gross national product of about five hundred and twenty billion dollars annually. In 1965 our economy is likely to produce a gross national product of six hundred and twenty-five billion dollars.

More than four million businesses are concerned with this economy, producing and distributing about eight million items. About 67 million persons are employed in these businesses, with an additional four million farmers making up our agricultural economy. Our retail food stores alone last year did more than 53 billion dollars worth of business. Our economy is productive enough to have generated over one hundred and thirty billion dollars worth of taxes last year, and to have sustained a federal budget of more than 80 billion dollars. It has produced in the last eight years some 50 billion dollars more in taxes than in the 164 years prior to that period.

This economy involves the role of the Treasury and emergency programs for money, credit and banking; savings and loan operations in the Federal Home Loan Bank System; and emergency wage and salary programs, among others. Our national objective is peace, but if this country should be forced to fight even a limited war, it should have available and ready for use, if needed, a comprehensive economic stabilization program which would include credit control, and the whole family of *direct* controls such as price, wage and rent controls. Rationing might be avoided depending upon the nature and severity of a conflict.

The reason for this general approach to economic stabilization in a limited war would be one of *psychological* inflation not arising out of genuine shortages. Our economy probably could absorb the initial requirements of a limited war without serious economic impact.

But try to imagine our economy hit by a massive nuclear attack, as a result of which 30 or 40 per cent of our productive capacity had been destroyed or disrupted. Imagine our Federal Government temporarily unable to regulate or administer, or to respond automatically and instantly.

**Assume that islands of survival would exist among the heavily damaged areas or the partly damaged areas close to them, and that these would include wholly undamaged but demoralized cities, towns and communities. What would be the alternative to conventional operations and procedures?**

The Government has chosen *now*, before any such emergency can arise, to develop a national and self-executing capability to respond to the foreseeable economic consequences of such an attack. Such response would have to be through a system of national regulation imposed and generated by people on the spot. Their first problem, of course, would be survival, public welfare, and civil defense actions. But their second problem, so often lost sight of in this kind of planning, would be how to make the most constructive use of remaining resources and people.

Your Government must attempt to keep our economy solvent, functioning, and operating in support of immediate recovery. Therefore the Office of Emergency Planning has been concentrating on the development of a national capability for a variety of self-triggering economic measures for an emergency. Along this line we are endeavoring to preposition national plans and policies—the orders, objectives, machinery and techniques—necessary to insure the continued functioning of the national banking and monetary systems.

I cannot say that this work has proceeded rapidly or that it has been adopted enthusiastically by all the fourteen thousand commercial banks in the country, but I can say that the Federal Reserve Board, the Treasury, and their colleagues in the Home Loan Bank Board and elsewhere, have worked very hard to help get it started. In at least 38 states today a beginning has been made in this direction.

Let me add, however, that if this country is to deal with postattack economic problems and controls, it will have to rely strongly on state and local people in financial and related fields. Economic stabilization cannot succeed nationally without local support. In effect, your national government would not be able to carry out many of its orthodox and classic responsibilities in the event of an attack on this country without turning to the undamaged areas and relying upon them to respond.

The development of a local and state capability to impose and administer temporary emergency rationing of a most radical kind, together with price and rent controls if necessary, is wholly new in the history of this country even as a temporary substitute for federal action in such a situation. This applies to other areas as well.



The U.S. Department of Labor, for example, has been assigned two major planning responsibilities in connection with the Federal Government's program for dealing with economic stabilization in an emergency. It is responsible for developing plans and procedures for a wage and salary stabilization program, and for the maintenance of effective labor-management relations during such emergency.

In previous wars, time was a less critical factor in the establishment of emergency programs and months were required to establish new agencies. For example, about four months were needed to establish the National Wage Stabilization Board during the Korean emergency, and four to five months to establish a fully functioning regional organization. In another emergency we must be prepared to administer such programs with little or no warning time.

Salary and wage control will likely be administered by the Department of Labor through its nation-wide field organization.

Similarly, the Department of Agriculture has a vital role in the distribution of available food supplies at the farm and wholesale levels. At the preretail and retail levels all food, except items which are likely to spoil, might be subject to some suspension of sales which would give local authorities time to invoke prearranged plans to ration supplies.

Also under consideration is a proposal to have the Department of Agriculture redistribute stockpiles of surplus commodities, especially wheat, to food deficit areas, such as New England and the West Coast. This would contribute to our ability to sustain the population under severe attack conditions.

The Department of Health, Education and Welfare will accelerate its program for the stockpiling of essential medical supplies and equipment. Our research indicates that as many as 10 per cent of the attack casualties can be saved from subsequent death if medical supplies and equipment are available.

The Department of Commerce has major responsibilities in connection with the nation's industrial and economic preparedness for any emergency. These responsibilities include not only planning for economic and industrial mobilization which includes industrial preparedness, but also the responsibility for the industrial support of our defense and other national security procurement at the present time. This latter responsibility is of particular interest to this audience because during this cold war period, the Department of Commerce operates the defense materials system which insures the on-time delivery of products and materials to programs of the

military, atomic energy and space programs. The defense materials system is essential in keeping these critical programs on schedule and, in an emergency, can be expanded overnight to embrace the entire industrial materials and production complex.

The Secretary of Commerce has assigned the operational responsibility for the defense materials system to the Business and Defense Services Administration of his department. This organization represents the nucleus of an emergency production agency which in the event of national emergency or war would perform functions similar to those of the War Production Board during World War II and the National Production Authority during the Korean conflict.

In the event of a nuclear attack upon this country, or in the case of a major natural disaster, it is of the utmost importance to know which production facilities are essential to survival. The Department of Commerce has compiled a list of such facilities, known as the Critical Industries List. This list has been distributed through the OEP area offices to the state and local civil defense authorities so as to make it possible for the first time for both company management and civic officials to know which facilities should be accorded the highest priority in preattack preparedness measures. This list will be an invaluable aid in the work of local resources management boards, a concept of vital importance which I shall discuss in a few moments.

These mobilization functions of the Department of Commerce will enable the department to serve as the agency responsible for organizing and guiding the nation's productive capacity in an emergency.

The vital role of communications and our communications industry is too clear to need emphasis from me here, yet we cannot pass lightly over the fact that this country's intricate and interdependent economy relies on quick and effective communications. The need for communications to meet the requirements of limited war has been generally recognized, and the demand for effective communications would be even more urgent following a nuclear attack. Without reliable and effective communications, we won't know what happened; we could not determine an intelligent course of action; and we would have no way of keeping our people informed at a time when official information would be the chief means of dispelling fear and heading off panic and confusion.

In such an emergency it would be necessary for federal, state and local governments, along with industrial and other private groups, to react as quickly as possible in accordance with plans designed to further the common recovery.

One of the major lessons learned from previous conflicts was that we can no longer depend upon last-minute preparations to meet emergency. Certainly we cannot rely wholly on improvisations to meet nuclear attack if it should come.

Because transportation is one of the most critical national resources, it must be maintained in healthful condition; it is more directly related to the strategy and logistics of war than almost any other part of the economy. We must be able to move military forces and supplies wherever they are needed, in bulk, and we must be able to support the essential needs of the civilian economy in war as well as in peace.

Unlike some other aspects of our economy, however, the services of the transportation industry cannot be held in stockpiles for emergency use; it must be able to respond instantly to whatever emergency may arise. Should attack come suddenly, it would be today's trained people and today's existing facilities which would have to meet the emergency.

Each of the present methods of transportation would have its major emergency role in an attack—rail, bus, truck, air, and shipping. Each must be able to respond quickly. Automobiles and trucks would be needed to move survivors and to bring up relief supplies. Waterways, less vulnerable to the effects of nuclear fallout, would provide emergency avenues of support. Air transport, committed largely to emergency military use, would be invaluable for flying in medical and other supplies. As in the past, rails would be depended upon for carrying the heavier burdens.

We have developed and are constantly improving standby measures for transportation which would go into effect automatically if we were attacked. The heart of these measures involves priorities for the most urgent traffic, and restriction of all but the most essential movement of freight and personnel. These measures are being developed by the best brains in the transportation industry and in the federal transportation agencies, assisted by the executive reserve.

From this you can see that the Office of Emergency Planning exercises a co-ordinating authority affecting numerous segments of our society—as large and as diversified as the country itself. I have not discussed all of the delegations, but I think you have an idea of the complexity of problems we face.

Now let me note briefly some of the legislation on which our program is founded.

OEP's authority derives chiefly from the Defense Production Act of 1950, the Critical Materials Stockpile Act of 1946, and Section 8 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act, but most importantly from the National Security Act of 1947 as amended.

Earlier I mentioned the strategic stockpile. Let me describe its purpose and its meaning for national security. The strategic stockpile is composed of about 75 materials, chiefly metals and minerals, all of which are vital to defense production.

It grew out of experiences of shortages in relying on deficient or insufficiently developed domestic resources, and on uncertain or costly foreign sources of supply in time of emergency. In the words of the law giving OEP authority to establish and maintain a stockpile, we are directed to 'decrease and prevent wherever possible a dangerous and costly dependence of the United States upon foreign nations for supplies of these materials.'

In simple terms we recognized in the twilight of conventional war techniques that we had to have on hand an adequate supply of materials needed to keep industry going and to support any war effort imposed on the United States.

The make-up of the strategic stockpile has not remained static. Neither have its objectives remained the same. It changes as the need for specific materials changes. When the stockpile was first established it was expected to counteract shortages for a period of five years. As stockpile goals were achieved and technological changes occurred in weapons and delivery systems, the planning period was reduced to three years.

We are now studying this planning period and possible revisions in the strategic stockpile in response to even newer weapons and delivery systems. More significantly, the strategic stockpile is being viewed from the standpoint of its immediate value in a nation-wide recovery operation.

As you may know, we are currently engaged in a thoroughgoing review of the size and make-up of the stockpile. On the legislative side, we are co-operating with Senator Symington in the conduct of such a review.

Concurrently, President Kennedy has appointed a committee of cabinet and other top ranking officials, under the chairmanship of the Director of OEP, to review the principles and policies which should guide our stockpile program. We will, of course, co-operate closely with the general services administration, the actual manager of the stockpile, in making available to the Senate Committee as much information as possible consistent with national security interests.

This points up the radical changes in security problems faced by the United States today. As I said earlier, these changes are the product of technological breakthroughs on atomic fission and missile technology. During the last fifteen years weapons have been developed which, for the first time, make it feasible to achieve quick destruction of economies and populations. Fundamentally new problems have thereby been created. We have scarcely had time to learn what they are, much less to think about them.

But think about them we must. In terms of thermonuclear war, our traditional concept of emergency planning is no longer adequate. By and large, the mobilization base has been designed with little consideration of the possible effects of massive destruction of facilities, supplies and manpower throughout the nation. In planning against the problems of this kind of war, we need to develop not so much a mobilization base as a *survival base*.

That is the heart of emergency planning today. The responsibility is shared by the Federal Government, state governments, and municipalities.

I have already described some federal functions. Let me refer to some other vital activities of OEP. In order to carry on as a nation after attack we must be sure that Government itself survives as an operating entity. For the Federal Government this requires among other things emergency operating sites outside of Washington. Most federal agencies have stored in such sites essential records and current papers that would enable them to operate. The sites are tied into an interagency communications system, using television, radio, teletype and telephone so that all the relocation sites can contact each other to carry on their business.

Many of these sites are staffed around-the-clock by small cadres of administrative and communications specialists. Some of these locations are *hardened*; we are hopeful that more of them will be upgraded to withstand blast or fallout.

Plans are now being readied for construction of additional protected sites and these will be continuously manned with adequate operating personnel. In face of shortened warning time, these sites would give us far greater assurance of the continuity and rebuilding of Government in an emergency than we can claim at present.

This federal network assures that states and communities would not be required to exist indefinitely without assistance from the National Government. But no matter how well we are prepared on the federal level we cannot guarantee immediate help for states and communities in nuclear attack.

Emergency planning concepts must be enlarged to assure continuity of civil authority. We need an emergency management organization in being, ready to handle the myriad of resource and economic problems necessary to save lives, sustain survival and expedite recovery.

This thought has purposely been a recurring theme in my comments.

The concept is relatively new in emergency planning. It assumes that the resources of the states have not been sufficiently tapped in defense of the nation, and that the strength and vitality of our society is rooted in local government. Moreover, it is a policy dictated by necessity. With fragmentation and isolation the likely prospect in the wake of attack, our destiny as a nation may well be determined by the ability of states and local communities to survive assault.

Accordingly, we have staked out four immediate objectives in local emergency planning. The states must prepare to:

1. Conserve, and to some extent control production, distribution and use of essential resources such as food, medical supplies, petroleum, electric power, and other vital materials I mentioned earlier.
2. Manage and provide essential transportation and communications services.
3. Stabilize the economy and control and preserve the monetary and credit systems.
4. Administer a consumer rationing system and other measures for distribution of essential items to consumers.

These are broad objectives. How they would be achieved is another matter. In this regard, let me point out what the Office of Emergency Planning *cannot* do. We cannot develop detailed guidance for each and every locality in the country. We can provide the benefit of our experience at the national level and we can establish broad criteria, but we cannot lay down blanket rules. Economics differ, the social fabric varies, and the degree and type of industrialization is not the same in any two areas.

The states and municipalities must be enlisted in the emergency planning task. It is the only realistic approach to a problem which offers no past experience. Acknowledging that the problem has no precedent, however, does not mean it has no solution. Neither does it mean that damage and disruption would necessarily be so widespread as to make recovery hopeless.

Recovery is not only probable, it is a certainty if we prepare adequately now. I would not wish to be drawn into the nuclear numbers game controversy in which scientists endeavor to apply precise figures to highly unpredictable conditions. I realize that experts differ widely in their views of the consequences of nuclear attack.

It is my conviction that we should do well to avoid any extremes in this controversy. There is no question that damage would be severe and that many lives would be lost. But this much is certain: In a nuclear attack many areas would be lightly damaged or damaged not at all. Most of our land area would escape the destructive effect of blast and fire, and much of our industrial capacity would remain under the worst conditions.

Clearly, we can reduce the effects of damage and casualties even more by a steady build-up of state and local preparedness. It is in the national interest that we be ready to move quickly and purposefully to meet human needs, conserve resources, restore productive facilities, and re-establish a functioning society capable of controlling its own destiny and rebuilding the nation. The first full-scale effort to achieve this readiness is now underway.

As a starter, every governor has been asked to appoint an Emergency Planning Director and to establish an Emergency Planning Committee drawn from government and civic leadership. They will advise the governor in assessing the resource readiness of the state, identifying deficient areas and taking steps to correct those weaknesses.

Concurrently, area offices of OEP have been instructed to offer all possible assistance and guidelines to the states. The components of this new and comprehensive approach to local emergency planning include:

First, continuity of government which is really the core of the problem. Some time ago the Office of Emergency Planning, with the assistance of Columbia University and the Council of State Governments, developed sample legislation to guide the states in a program with four major objectives:

1. The establishment of lines of emergency succession for key officials, to insure that there will always be constitutionally qualified persons to direct an operative government.

2. Preservation of essential records to go hand in hand with emergency succession. Relatively few records are necessary for emergency operation, but they must be at the place where decisions will be made and must be in a form which makes them immediately useful.

3. Protected emergency operation centers for government. The Federal Government matches expenditures of the states for the establishment of protected emergency centers.

4. Personnel and equipment for efficient emergency operations. This will often require advance enrollment, training and assignment of volunteer citizens as auxiliaries to the existing government departments.

While on the subject of continuity of government let me return to the national level for just a moment. There is now legislation pending in Congress to assure continuity of the House of Representatives. Unlike the Senate, which can be maintained by gubernatorial appointment, members of the House must be elected. The architects of our Constitution could not foresee a nuclear catastrophe which might decimate a part of this vital representative forum. But such a possibility could come to pass.

Getting back to the local level, the Office of Emergency Planning has worked with the National Association of County officials, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, and The American Municipal Association, to develop a sample ordinance enabling succession of key officers in counties and municipalities. This is the counterpart of Constitutional amendments at the state level.

To date, 45 states have adopted some continuity of government measures, 31 state legislatures have approved amendments to state constitutions for this purpose, and such amendments have been ratified by the people in 20 states.

From continuity of government I will move to the next front on which we are mounting a major assault—the local management of resources, including manpower, and economic stabilization. As in our federal programs, this covers a great variety of resources including food, water, health and medical supplies, transportation, petroleum and gas, electric power, manpower, communications, production, housing and others.

Under limited war conditions, the Federal Government would exercise primary responsibility in these fields. For its part, the Office of Emergency Planning uses highly advanced electronic computers to evaluate national availability. At a national resources evaluation center, we feed the machine information about the location of resources, factories, population concentration, power plants, bridges, tunnels and so forth. The output is a remarkably accurate but always changing picture of our current resources, plus projections of supply estimates of surviving resources under a wide range of attack conditions.



It is obvious, however, that states and localities will, under massive attack, be obliged to fend for themselves for at least a period of time. Federal direction will be restored as quickly as possible, but certainly not immediately.

These would be trying days for states and local communities. They would have to look to their own resources and ingenuity in dealing with disaster conditions. I haven't the slightest doubt that the states would conduct themselves in a manner which befits a national heritage of self-reliance. But self-reliance is not enough. It must be coupled with know-how and prepositioned plans. In this area we have barely scratched the surface, but we are wasting no more time.

Last month in Pittsburgh, OEP held the first of a series of eight area conferences at which local emergency management was examined thoroughly. These area conferences have a twofold purpose.

First, we will provide representatives from the states with comprehensive reports on the Federal Government's program of emergency planning. Assembled at these conferences will be government and nongovernment leaders of the several states comprising eight planning areas. Virtually every topic I have discussed will be reviewed in depth.

Second, and equally important, we will hear from state and local representatives on the status of their programs, their studies of specific areas, the deficiencies they have discovered, and the measures they propose to correct these conditions.

I believe these meetings, the first of their kind, will be of tremendous value. We are not seeking a piecemeal approach in which specific areas are examined separately. Rather, we are going after an across-the-board concept, emphasizing the interlocking character of these varied programs such as management of resources, economic stabilization and continuity of government. This we call the *comprehensive program for survival of government and management of resources*. We are convinced that every program interacts with others and each aspect must be dovetailed if we are to succeed.

I hasten to add that greater state and local participation in emergency planning in no way diminishes the federal responsibility for its success. I have already discussed President Kennedy's assignment of important functions to departments and agencies with peacetime competence and experience in the fields delegated to them.

This approach will, I believe, produce a more responsive federal program than we have heretofore achieved. It will, for one thing, reduce the duplication, overlapping, and friction which inevitably occurs when several agencies perform parallel, and in some instances, identical functions. Secondly, the presidential executive order will raise the priority assigned to emergency planning functions by the several agencies. No longer will emergency planning be regarded as a secondary role to be performed in a somewhat perfunctory and *spare time* manner. Finally, federal agencies will now include in their own budgets, specific funds to execute emergency planning functions assigned to them.

What really has happened is this: emergency planning has now become a regular function of the federal establishment—a function performed with daily skill and vigor by almost every agency of that establishment.

The Office of Emergency Planning will serve almost exclusively as an expediting and co-ordinating arm of the executive office of the President and will act on the President's behalf to assure prompt and efficient fulfillment of the program by the federal structure, as well as a steadily improved posture in the states and localities.

Let me emphasize that a program of this magnitude will depend greatly on close co-operation from industrial, labor and other nongovernmental groups. In fact, the actual work of the local management resources boards which I mentioned earlier will be concerned largely with industrial resources in the areas under study. In effect, the states will be *taking inventory*, finding out exactly what they have and where it is located. In the final analysis we will want to know that in an emergency the right materials will be available for the right purpose, in the right places, in the right amount, and at the right time, in order to *squeeze* the greatest possible benefits out of the nation's resources, and to meet the emergency in as orderly a manner as possible.

That is the heart of the problem. It is a difficult one, but by no means insoluble. But it will take considerably more time and energy than states and communities have devoted to the problem in the past.

It is my feeling that we are on the threshold of such support for several reasons. First, after more than a decade of indecision, confusion or indifference, the facts of nuclear life are beginning to sear the consciousness of every American citizen. And, ironically enough, this constructive mood has emerged not from scare campaigns and crash promotions which hardly produce the kind of sustained initiative that the problem demands, but through a calm and rational indoctrination in reality.

A recurring theme in our presentation to state and local leaders has been the possibility, not the probability, of full-scale war. In fact, we stress that such a war is unlikely rather than imminent. We have simply made a case for the *existence* of the peril and the practical ways of coping with it.

There has never been a time in history when so many people have hoped and prayed so earnestly for enduring peace. And yet a peace upon which we can rely has eluded us. We must live under the haunting spectre of a horrible conflict, but that in itself is not cause for despair.

We have the military strength and the economic strength to deter any aggression. But, as President Kennedy said in his State of the Union message, 'Arms alone are not enough to keep the peace.'

What is required of all of us—each of us—is an intelligent and informed understanding of the world in which we live, and the most constructive actions we can take to prevent the worst from happening without sacrifice of our fundamental principles. This is the fuel that will carry us over the rugged and tortuous road ahead.

## BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

### Mr. Ralph E. Spear

Mr. Ralph E. Spear is Director of Research, Policy and Review, for the Office of Emergency Planning. He served as Director of Program and Policy for the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization from 1958 to 1961; and from 1951 to 1958, he was with the Federal Civil Defense Administration, serving as Assistant Administrator for Planning beginning in 1954.

Born in Brockton, Mass., he was graduated from Yale University with the degree of Bachelor of Arts in 1932, and received the degree of Master of Science in Public Administration from Syracuse University in 1935.

From 1935 to 1944 he was on the staff of the American Public Welfare Association in Chicago. He served as a lieutenant in the U.S. Navy from 1944 to 1946. From 1946 to 1951 he was with the Veterans Administration.

He has been a consultant on government organization and administration to the International City Managers Association, Public Administration Service and the management firm of Booz, Allen & Hamilton. He has also served as a member of the Industry Evaluation Board of the Department of Commerce. He was a member of the Planning Board of the National Security Council from 1958 to 1961.

Mr. Spear is a member of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, American Public Welfare Association, American Society for Public Administration, Kiwanis International, and the Izaak Walton League of America.

## RECOMMENDED READING

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find them of interest.

The inclusion of a book or article in this list does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein. They are indicated only on the basis of interesting, timely, and possibly useful reading matter.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Certain of the books on the list which are not available from these sources may be available from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books are obtainable on loan. Requests from individual officers to borrow books from an Auxiliary Library Service Collection should be addressed to the nearest of the following special loan collections:

Chief of Naval Personnel, (G14)  
Department of the Navy  
Washington 25, D.C.

Commandant  
Fourteenth Naval District (Code 141)  
Navy No. 128  
Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, California

Commanding Officer  
U.S. Naval Station  
(Attn: Station Library)  
San Diego 36, California

Commander Naval Forces, Marianas  
Nimitz Hill Library, Box 17  
Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, California

U.S. Naval Station Library  
Attn: Auxiliary Service Collection  
U.S. Naval Base  
Norfolk 11, Virginia

## BOOKS

Seton-Watson, Hugh. *The New Imperialism*. Chester Springs, Pa.: Dufour Editions, 1961. 136 p.

Hugh Seton-Watson, one of the foremost writers and lecturers on communism and the Soviet Union, places in full perspective the true nature of the theory and practice of communism with relation to its extraterritorial aggrandizement. The new imperialism of Russia is developed from that country's beginnings as the Principality of Moscow in 1261 to its present immense and growing stature. Short and well organized, *The New Imperialism* is excellent basic reading to gain an understanding of the significance of the U.S.S.R. and the Communist Party, Soviet Union, in the current power struggle between East and West.

Teller, Edward with Brown, Allen. *The Legacy of Hiroshima*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1962. 325 p.

Dr. Teller has combined into one volume an autobiographical narrative of his role in nuclear weapon development, a resumé of the arguments that support his views on a number of public issues, including the future of scientific achievement and a statement of his belief that the 'legacy of Hiroshima' has been a complex of fear and guilt that has dangerously distorted public opinion away from fact and weakened public determination to see democratic liberalism guide the affairs of mankind. The reader may take exception to some of the author's views, but will not fail to be awed and inspired by the broad sweep of this man's concern for the problems of the world.

Jackson, Barbara (Ward). *The Rich Nations and the Poor Nations*. New York: Norton, 1962. 159 p.

Barbara Ward Jackson, the well-known British economist, has here set forth in lay language the vital importance to the Atlantic Community of helping poor nations develop. She describes this age as the most revolutionary of all, portraying four aspects of revolution: those of equality, of the possibility of material change leading to a better world, of rising birth rates and of rapid scientific change.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew K. *Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics*. New York: Praeger, 1962, 180 p.

The author of the five essays that make up this short book says that his purpose is to stimulate thought and not to convince. Dr. Brzezinski, who is an eminent authority in the field of Soviet bloc affairs, is adept at postulating comprehensive definitions of the terms he uses. These definitions of the

author give points of departure for the discussions that serve to show how ideology and power are linked together in the Soviet scheme of controlling the masses. Frequent comparisons are made between Czarist and Soviet Russia. Three of the essays deal with the internal aspects of Russian politics, and two with Russian international affairs. The essays, together with the extensive footnoting, provide a valuable insight into Russian application of ideology and power.

Keller, Werner. *East Minus West : Zero*. New York: Putnam, 1962. 384 p.

The author explains in lavish detail that Russian power, great as it is, has always been, and is now, relatively weak when compared with that of the West as a whole. The reason for this is that the West is the prime source of the Russians' power. They contribute no new ideas of their own, but borrow or steal all of their ideas from the West. The atom bomb, the rocket, the jet airplane are but a few of the Russian developments of the current generation that have been totally derived from Western intellect. This pattern existed during the reigns of the Ivans, Peter the Great, Catherine II and successors, and still exists. The Russians excel beyond all comparison at copying the works of others. The author believes that Russia lacks the basic potential—educated, free men in numbers approaching those of the West—and can never catch up on its own; though by devoting vast effort and energies to specific projects, it may occasionally lead the West in certain fields. He concludes by admonishing the West that whether Russia overtakes the West will be decided by the West itself, and the attitude it adopts toward Russia in the light of the Russians' past behavior. 'There is only one way of dealing with a power like Russia, and that is the way of courage.'—Karl Marx, 1853.

Cressey, George B. *Soviet Potentials; a Geographic Appraisal*. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1962. 232 p.

The author, who has crossed Siberia seven times, points out the effect of the great distances within the Soviet Union on utilization of resources and world trade. The center of Soviet production, for example, is 6000 rail or 4000 air-line miles from the center of consumption in China. The distance from the Polish frontier to Vladivostok equals that from San Francisco to London. What is not so obvious, but of basic importance, is that most of this vast country lies in the latitude of Canada rather than of the United States. The great water bodies of the southern Soviet Union, such as the Black, Caspian and Aral Seas, lie on a parallel with the Great Lakes of North America. Those parts of the Union that resemble the United States correspond to Montana, the Dakotas and Nevada. Nowhere does the Soviet Union have a Mississippi Valley, an Iowa or an Ohio. Only small parts are really good, and much of their best farmland is inferior to that of

Minnesota. With this background of vastness, low fertility and wasteland, the author has attempted to cover all of Russia by geographical groupings of likenesses. As a result, it is hard to assimilate the facts of climate, rainfall, resources, distances, people, etc., of each similar locale as one moves across Russia from east to west, north to south and vice versa. The book abounds in statistical data and, for the general reader, student and/or professional, provides an up-to-date background on our opponent in the struggle for world leadership.

Daniels, Robert V. *The Nature of Communism*. New York: Random House, 1962. 398 p.

The stated purpose of this book is to contribute to the breakup of the vicious circle of fear, hostility and oversimplified misunderstanding of communism. The objective is a definition of the communist movement—an attempt to answer such questions about communism as: What is its real nature? How has it developed? What distinguishes it from other political movements and systems? What does it mean to say that an individual, an organization, or a government is communist? What, apart from nomenclature, do all have in common? What are the sources of such common denominators of the movements?

Grinnell-Milne, Duncan. *The Triumph of Integrity: a Portrait of Charles de Gaulle*. New York: Macmillan, 1962. 334 p.

This is a timely study of Charles de Gaulle in light of the Algerian cease-fire. The author, an RAF liaison officer to General de Gaulle in World War II, was assigned to, and accompanied, his subject throughout the war from 'the Thames via Dakar, Freetown and Lagos, to the banks of the Wouri and the quayside at Duala.' He takes the reader through the many personal triumphs and frustrations of De Gaulle, and the book is generous in its deep admiration. *Integrity* is perhaps De Gaulle's strongest virtue; the book shows how faith in his leadership compels the French to accept his authority.



— NOTES —