

1962

Emergency Planning

Ralph E. Spear

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review>

Recommended Citation

Spear, Ralph E. (1962) "Emergency Planning," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 15 : No. 6 , Article 3.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol15/iss6/3>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

EMERGENCY PLANNING

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
6 March 1962

by

Mr. Ralph E. Spear

The activities of the Office of Emergency Planning cover virtually every segment of our society, ranging from the federal structure in Washington, D.C. down to the smallest, but perhaps strongest, element of the American matrix—the individual family.

The Office of Emergency Planning is guided in its policies and programs by a fundamental maxim which, coincidentally, I found restated in the Naval War College pamphlet for guest lecturers. It is not surprising that the College subscribes to this belief since it is really basic to every activity related to the national security. Your educational philosophy is—and I quote—

The art and science of modern warfare is an extremely complex web of political, economic, social, and military factors. Analysis of wars of the past has shown that there are certain fundamentals, both military and nonmilitary, which have been common to all. The identification and study of these fundamentals are undertaken at the Naval War College, so that the individual may be prepared to employ them in actual situations of the future, but the College advocates no fixed set of rules by which wars may be conducted or battles won.

That is a truly fundamental statement, but I am particularly interested in its last clause. There is no *fixed set of rules*. To put it another way, we live in a swiftly changing world of technology and politics. Let us retain the basics but let us not be mesmerized into a *maginot line* mold of thinking unsuited to today's world. But I am getting ahead of my story.

The objective of emergency planning, on the national as well as the local level, is the establishment and maintenance of a reliable nonmilitary planning posture.

Last July, major operational functions of civil defense were transferred to the Department of Defense. These include the shelter program,

radiological, chemical and biological defense, and the national warning network, all of which are now being advanced rapidly by the Secretary of Defense.

Subsequently, the Office of Emergency Planning was established in the executive office of the President. The director of this office is Mr. Edward A. McDermott.

The OEP is a newly formed agency which exercises a very old function. Its experience dates back to mobilization tasks of World War I and was considerably enlarged in World War II and Korea. We are responsible for the mobilization and management of resources for national security purposes. Among other things, this includes the management of an eight billion dollar stockpile of critical materials, specific recommendations related to the economic health of our allies, and the waging of economic offensive in concert with friendly nations. It also includes national plans and facilities to preserve the federal structure under any emergency; federal relief activities in time of natural disaster, continuity of government programs, and a specialized advisory role to the President in the field of tariffs, import quotas, and other economic areas.

When we talk about management of resources on the national or local level, we are not grappling with *ivory tower* theory. Perhaps the jargon of the specialist, a necessary tool of communication, tends to leave that impression. In truth, we are really talking about the fundamentals of life on this earth; the elemental problems of safeguarding the food we eat; the fuel we consume; the transportation we need to maintain a steady flow of commerce; an intricate telecommunications system which will continue to function under all conditions; and perhaps, most important, the foundation of constitutional government which underpins our way of life. These are the things that concern the Office of Emergency Planning. Of course, most federal agencies conduct operational functions in all these fields.

Last month, the President signed nine executive orders assigning important emergency preparedness functions to the Secretaries of the Interior; Agriculture; Commerce and Labor; Health, Education and Welfare; to the Postmaster General, to the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency, to the Housing and Home Finance Administrator, and to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

In these orders the agencies are directed 'to develop a state of readiness with respect to all conditions of national emergency, including attack upon the United States.'

The President has charged Mr. McDermott, as Director of the Office of Emergency Planning, with the responsibility to advise and assist him in determining policy for and co-ordinating the performance of these functions with the total national preparedness program.

I will not cover all of these delegations in detail, but let me give you a capsule account of some of the operating responsibilities held by federal agencies in emergency planning.

First, when we talk about the economic consequences of possible war or cold war, we are talking about their impact on the world's most complex economy, presently generating a gross national product of about five hundred and twenty billion dollars annually. In 1965 our economy is likely to produce a gross national product of six hundred and twenty-five billion dollars.

More than four million businesses are concerned with this economy, producing and distributing about eight million items. About 67 million persons are employed in these businesses, with an additional four million farmers making up our agricultural economy. Our retail food stores alone last year did more than 53 billion dollars worth of business. Our economy is productive enough to have generated over one hundred and thirty billion dollars worth of taxes last year, and to have sustained a federal budget of more than 80 billion dollars. It has produced in the last eight years some 50 billion dollars more in taxes than in the 164 years prior to that period.

This economy involves the role of the Treasury and emergency programs for money, credit and banking; savings and loan operations in the Federal Home Loan Bank System; and emergency wage and salary programs, among others. Our national objective is peace, but if this country should be forced to fight even a limited war, it should have available and ready for use, if needed, a comprehensive economic stabilization program which would include credit control, and the whole family of *direct* controls such as price, wage and rent controls. Rationing might be avoided depending upon the nature and severity of a conflict.

The reason for this general approach to economic stabilization in a limited war would be one of *psychological* inflation not arising out of genuine shortages. Our economy probably could absorb the initial requirements of a limited war without serious economic impact.

But try to imagine our economy hit by a massive nuclear attack, as a result of which 30 or 40 per cent of our productive capacity had been destroyed or disrupted. Imagine our Federal Government temporarily unable to regulate or administer, or to respond automatically and instantly.

Assume that islands of survival would exist among the heavily damaged areas or the partly damaged areas close to them, and that these would include wholly undamaged but demoralized cities, towns and communities. What would be the alternative to conventional operations and procedures?

The Government has chosen *now*, before any such emergency can arise, to develop a national and self-executing capability to respond to the foreseeable economic consequences of such an attack. Such response would have to be through a system of national regulation imposed and generated by people on the spot. Their first problem, of course, would be survival, public welfare, and civil defense actions. But their second problem, so often lost sight of in this kind of planning, would be how to make the most constructive use of remaining resources and people.

Your Government must attempt to keep our economy solvent, functioning, and operating in support of immediate recovery. Therefore the Office of Emergency Planning has been concentrating on the development of a national capability for a variety of self-triggering economic measures for an emergency. Along this line we are endeavoring to preposition national plans and policies—the orders, objectives, machinery and techniques—necessary to insure the continued functioning of the national banking and monetary systems.

I cannot say that this work has proceeded rapidly or that it has been adopted enthusiastically by all the fourteen thousand commercial banks in the country, but I can say that the Federal Reserve Board, the Treasury, and their colleagues in the Home Loan Bank Board and elsewhere, have worked very hard to help get it started. In at least 38 states today a beginning has been made in this direction.

Let me add, however, that if this country is to deal with postattack economic problems and controls, it will have to rely strongly on state and local people in financial and related fields. Economic stabilization cannot succeed nationally without local support. In effect, your national government would not be able to carry out many of its orthodox and classic responsibilities in the event of an attack on this country without turning to the undamaged areas and relying upon them to respond.

The development of a local and state capability to impose and administer temporary emergency rationing of a most radical kind, together with price and rent controls if necessary, is wholly new in the history of this country even as a temporary substitute for federal action in such a situation. This applies to other areas as well.

The U.S. Department of Labor, for example, has been assigned two major planning responsibilities in connection with the Federal Government's program for dealing with economic stabilization in an emergency. It is responsible for developing plans and procedures for a wage and salary stabilization program, and for the maintenance of effective labor-management relations during such emergency.

In previous wars, time was a less critical factor in the establishment of emergency programs and months were required to establish new agencies. For example, about four months were needed to establish the National Wage Stabilization Board during the Korean emergency, and four to five months to establish a fully functioning regional organization. In another emergency we must be prepared to administer such programs with little or no warning time.

Salary and wage control will likely be administered by the Department of Labor through its nation-wide field organization.

Similarly, the Department of Agriculture has a vital role in the distribution of available food supplies at the farm and wholesale levels. At the preretail and retail levels all food, except items which are likely to spoil, might be subject to some suspension of sales which would give local authorities time to invoke prearranged plans to ration supplies.

Also under consideration is a proposal to have the Department of Agriculture redistribute stockpiles of surplus commodities, especially wheat, to food deficit areas, such as New England and the West Coast. This would contribute to our ability to sustain the population under severe attack conditions.

The Department of Health, Education and Welfare will accelerate its program for the stockpiling of essential medical supplies and equipment. Our research indicates that as many as 10 per cent of the attack casualties can be saved from subsequent death if medical supplies and equipment are available.

The Department of Commerce has major responsibilities in connection with the nation's industrial and economic preparedness for any emergency. These responsibilities include not only planning for economic and industrial mobilization which includes industrial preparedness, but also the responsibility for the industrial support of our defense and other national security procurement at the present time. This latter responsibility is of particular interest to this audience because during this cold war period, the Department of Commerce operates the defense materials system which insures the on-time delivery of products and materials to programs of the

military, atomic energy and space programs. The defense materials system is essential in keeping these critical programs on schedule and, in an emergency, can be expanded overnight to embrace the entire industrial materials and production complex.

The Secretary of Commerce has assigned the operational responsibility for the defense materials system to the Business and Defense Services Administration of his department. This organization represents the nucleus of an emergency production agency which in the event of national emergency or war would perform functions similar to those of the War Production Board during World War II and the National Production Authority during the Korean conflict.

In the event of a nuclear attack upon this country, or in the case of a major natural disaster, it is of the utmost importance to know which production facilities are essential to survival. The Department of Commerce has compiled a list of such facilities, known as the Critical Industries List. This list has been distributed through the OEP area offices to the state and local civil defense authorities so as to make it possible for the first time for both company management and civic officials to know which facilities should be accorded the highest priority in preattack preparedness measures. This list will be an invaluable aid in the work of local resources management boards, a concept of vital importance which I shall discuss in a few moments.

These mobilization functions of the Department of Commerce will enable the department to serve as the agency responsible for organizing and guiding the nation's productive capacity in an emergency.

The vital role of communications and our communications industry is too clear to need emphasis from me here, yet we cannot pass lightly over the fact that this country's intricate and interdependent economy relies on quick and effective communications. The need for communications to meet the requirements of limited war has been generally recognized, and the demand for effective communications would be even more urgent following a nuclear attack. Without reliable and effective communications, we won't know what happened; we could not determine an intelligent course of action; and we would have no way of keeping our people informed at a time when official information would be the chief means of dispelling fear and heading off panic and confusion.

In such an emergency it would be necessary for federal, state and local governments, along with industrial and other private groups, to react as quickly as possible in accordance with plans designed to further the common recovery.

One of the major lessons learned from previous conflicts was that we can no longer depend upon last-minute preparations to meet emergency. Certainly we cannot rely wholly on improvisations to meet nuclear attack if it should come.

Because transportation is one of the most critical national resources, it must be maintained in healthful condition; it is more directly related to the strategy and logistics of war than almost any other part of the economy. We must be able to move military forces and supplies wherever they are needed, in bulk, and we must be able to support the essential needs of the civilian economy in war as well as in peace.

Unlike some other aspects of our economy, however, the services of the transportation industry cannot be held in stockpiles for emergency use; it must be able to respond instantly to whatever emergency may arise. Should attack come suddenly, it would be today's trained people and today's existing facilities which would have to meet the emergency.

Each of the present methods of transportation would have its major emergency role in an attack—rail, bus, truck, air, and shipping. Each must be able to respond quickly. Automobiles and trucks would be needed to move survivors and to bring up relief supplies. Waterways, less vulnerable to the effects of nuclear fallout, would provide emergency avenues of support. Air transport, committed largely to emergency military use, would be invaluable for flying in medical and other supplies. As in the past, rails would be depended upon for carrying the heavier burdens.

We have developed and are constantly improving standby measures for transportation which would go into effect automatically if we were attacked. The heart of these measures involves priorities for the most urgent traffic, and restriction of all but the most essential movement of freight and personnel. These measures are being developed by the best brains in the transportation industry and in the federal transportation agencies, assisted by the executive reserve.

From this you can see that the Office of Emergency Planning exercises a co-ordinating authority affecting numerous segments of our society—as large and as diversified as the country itself. I have not discussed all of the delegations, but I think you have an idea of the complexity of problems we face.

Now let me note briefly some of the legislation on which our program is founded.

OEP's authority derives chiefly from the Defense Production Act of 1950, the Critical Materials Stockpile Act of 1946, and Section 8 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act, but most importantly from the National Security Act of 1947 as amended.

Earlier I mentioned the strategic stockpile. Let me describe its purpose and its meaning for national security. The strategic stockpile is composed of about 75 materials, chiefly metals and minerals, all of which are vital to defense production.

It grew out of experiences of shortages in relying on deficient or insufficiently developed domestic resources, and on uncertain or costly foreign sources of supply in time of emergency. In the words of the law giving OEP authority to establish and maintain a stockpile, we are directed to 'decrease and prevent wherever possible a dangerous and costly dependence of the United States upon foreign nations for supplies of these materials.'

In simple terms we recognized in the twilight of conventional war techniques that we had to have on hand an adequate supply of materials needed to keep industry going and to support any war effort imposed on the United States.

The make-up of the strategic stockpile has not remained static. Neither have its objectives remained the same. It changes as the need for specific materials changes. When the stockpile was first established it was expected to counteract shortages for a period of five years. As stockpile goals were achieved and technological changes occurred in weapons and delivery systems, the planning period was reduced to three years.

We are now studying this planning period and possible revisions in the strategic stockpile in response to even newer weapons and delivery systems. More significantly, the strategic stockpile is being viewed from the standpoint of its immediate value in a nation-wide recovery operation.

As you may know, we are currently engaged in a thoroughgoing review of the size and make-up of the stockpile. On the legislative side, we are co-operating with Senator Symington in the conduct of such a review.

Concurrently, President Kennedy has appointed a committee of cabinet and other top ranking officials, under the chairmanship of the Director of OEP, to review the principles and policies which should guide our stockpile program. We will, of course, co-operate closely with the general services administration, the actual manager of the stockpile, in making available to the Senate Committee as much information as possible consistent with national security interests.

This points up the radical changes in security problems faced by the United States today. As I said earlier, these changes are the product of technological breakthroughs on atomic fission and missile technology. During the last fifteen years weapons have been developed which, for the first time, make it feasible to achieve quick destruction of economies and populations. Fundamentally new problems have thereby been created. We have scarcely had time to learn what they are, much less to think about them.

But think about them we must. In terms of thermonuclear war, our traditional concept of emergency planning is no longer adequate. By and large, the mobilization base has been designed with little consideration of the possible effects of massive destruction of facilities, supplies and manpower throughout the nation. In planning against the problems of this kind of war, we need to develop not so much a mobilization base as a *survival base*.

That is the heart of emergency planning today. The responsibility is shared by the Federal Government, state governments, and municipalities.

I have already described some federal functions. Let me refer to some other vital activities of OEP. In order to carry on as a nation after attack we must be sure that Government itself survives as an operating entity. For the Federal Government this requires among other things emergency operating sites outside of Washington. Most federal agencies have stored in such sites essential records and current papers that would enable them to operate. The sites are tied into an interagency communications system, using television, radio, teletype and telephone so that all the relocation sites can contact each other to carry on their business.

Many of these sites are staffed around-the-clock by small cadres of administrative and communications specialists. Some of these locations are *hardened*; we are hopeful that more of them will be upgraded to withstand blast or fallout.

Plans are now being readied for construction of additional protected sites and these will be continuously manned with adequate operating personnel. In face of shortened warning time, these sites would give us far greater assurance of the continuity and rebuilding of Government in an emergency than we can claim at present.

This federal network assures that states and communities would not be required to exist indefinitely without assistance from the National Government. But no matter how well we are prepared on the federal level we cannot guarantee immediate help for states and communities in nuclear attack.

Emergency planning concepts must be enlarged to assure continuity of civil authority. We need an emergency management organization in being, ready to handle the myriad of resource and economic problems necessary to save lives, sustain survival and expedite recovery.

This thought has purposely been a recurring theme in my comments.

The concept is relatively new in emergency planning. It assumes that the resources of the states have not been sufficiently tapped in defense of the nation, and that the strength and vitality of our society is rooted in local government. Moreover, it is a policy dictated by necessity. With fragmentation and isolation the likely prospect in the wake of attack, our destiny as a nation may well be determined by the ability of states and local communities to survive assault.

Accordingly, we have staked out four immediate objectives in local emergency planning. The states must prepare to:

1. Conserve, and to some extent control production, distribution and use of essential resources such as food, medical supplies, petroleum, electric power, and other vital materials I mentioned earlier.
2. Manage and provide essential transportation and communications services.
3. Stabilize the economy and control and preserve the monetary and credit systems.
4. Administer a consumer rationing system and other measures for distribution of essential items to consumers.

These are broad objectives. How they would be achieved is another matter. In this regard, let me point out what the Office of Emergency Planning *cannot* do. We cannot develop detailed guidance for each and every locality in the country. We can provide the benefit of our experience at the national level and we can establish broad criteria, but we cannot lay down blanket rules. Economics differ, the social fabric varies, and the degree and type of industrialization is not the same in any two areas.

The states and municipalities must be enlisted in the emergency planning task. It is the only realistic approach to a problem which offers no past experience. Acknowledging that the problem has no precedent, however, does not mean it has no solution. Neither does it mean that damage and disruption would necessarily be so widespread as to make recovery hopeless.

Recovery is not only probable, it is a certainty if we prepare adequately now. I would not wish to be drawn into the nuclear numbers game controversy in which scientists endeavor to apply precise figures to highly unpredictable conditions. I realize that experts differ widely in their views of the consequences of nuclear attack.

It is my conviction that we should do well to avoid any extremes in this controversy. There is no question that damage would be severe and that many lives would be lost. But this much is certain: In a nuclear attack many areas would be lightly damaged or damaged not at all. Most of our land area would escape the destructive effect of blast and fire, and much of our industrial capacity would remain under the worst conditions.

Clearly, we can reduce the effects of damage and casualties even more by a steady build-up of state and local preparedness. It is in the national interest that we be ready to move quickly and purposefully to meet human needs, conserve resources, restore productive facilities, and re-establish a functioning society capable of controlling its own destiny and rebuilding the nation. The first full-scale effort to achieve this readiness is now underway.

As a starter, every governor has been asked to appoint an Emergency Planning Director and to establish an Emergency Planning Committee drawn from government and civic leadership. They will advise the governor in assessing the resource readiness of the state, identifying deficient areas and taking steps to correct those weaknesses.

Concurrently, area offices of OEP have been instructed to offer all possible assistance and guidelines to the states. The components of this new and comprehensive approach to local emergency planning include:

First, continuity of government which is really the core of the problem. Some time ago the Office of Emergency Planning, with the assistance of Columbia University and the Council of State Governments, developed sample legislation to guide the states in a program with four major objectives:

1. The establishment of lines of emergency succession for key officials, to insure that there will always be constitutionally qualified persons to direct an operative government.

2. Preservation of essential records to go hand in hand with emergency succession. Relatively few records are necessary for emergency operation, but they must be at the place where decisions will be made and must be in a form which makes them immediately useful.

3. Protected emergency operation centers for government. The Federal Government matches expenditures of the states for the establishment of protected emergency centers.

4. Personnel and equipment for efficient emergency operations. This will often require advance enrollment, training and assignment of volunteer citizens as auxiliaries to the existing government departments.

While on the subject of continuity of government let me return to the national level for just a moment. There is now legislation pending in Congress to assure continuity of the House of Representatives. Unlike the Senate, which can be maintained by gubernatorial appointment, members of the House must be elected. The architects of our Constitution could not foresee a nuclear catastrophe which might decimate a part of this vital representative forum. But such a possibility could come to pass.

Getting back to the local level, the Office of Emergency Planning has worked with the National Association of County officials, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, and The American Municipal Association, to develop a sample ordinance enabling succession of key officers in counties and municipalities. This is the counterpart of Constitutional amendments at the state level.

To date, 45 states have adopted some continuity of government measures, 31 state legislatures have approved amendments to state constitutions for this purpose, and such amendments have been ratified by the people in 20 states.

From continuity of government I will move to the next front on which we are mounting a major assault—the local management of resources, including manpower, and economic stabilization. As in our federal programs, this covers a great variety of resources including food, water, health and medical supplies, transportation, petroleum and gas, electric power, manpower, communications, production, housing and others.

Under limited war conditions, the Federal Government would exercise primary responsibility in these fields. For its part, the Office of Emergency Planning uses highly advanced electronic computers to evaluate national availability. At a national resources evaluation center, we feed the machine information about the location of resources, factories, population concentration, power plants, bridges, tunnels and so forth. The output is a remarkably accurate but always changing picture of our current resources, plus projections of supply estimates of surviving resources under a wide range of attack conditions.

It is obvious, however, that states and localities will, under massive attack, be obliged to fend for themselves for at least a period of time. Federal direction will be restored as quickly as possible, but certainly not immediately.

These would be trying days for states and local communities. They would have to look to their own resources and ingenuity in dealing with disaster conditions. I haven't the slightest doubt that the states would conduct themselves in a manner which befits a national heritage of self-reliance. But self-reliance is not enough. It must be coupled with know-how and prepositioned plans. In this area we have barely scratched the surface, but we are wasting no more time.

Last month in Pittsburgh, OEP held the first of a series of eight area conferences at which local emergency management was examined thoroughly. These area conferences have a twofold purpose.

First, we will provide representatives from the states with comprehensive reports on the Federal Government's program of emergency planning. Assembled at these conferences will be government and nongovernment leaders of the several states comprising eight planning areas. Virtually every topic I have discussed will be reviewed in depth.

Second, and equally important, we will hear from state and local representatives on the status of their programs, their studies of specific areas, the deficiencies they have discovered, and the measures they propose to correct these conditions.

I believe these meetings, the first of their kind, will be of tremendous value. We are not seeking a piecemeal approach in which specific areas are examined separately. Rather, we are going after an across-the-board concept, emphasizing the interlocking character of these varied programs such as management of resources, economic stabilization and continuity of government. This we call the *comprehensive program for survival of government and management of resources*. We are convinced that every program interacts with others and each aspect must be dovetailed if we are to succeed.

I hasten to add that greater state and local participation in emergency planning in no way diminishes the federal responsibility for its success. I have already discussed President Kennedy's assignment of important functions to departments and agencies with peacetime competence and experience in the fields delegated to them.

This approach will, I believe, produce a more responsive federal program than we have heretofore achieved. It will, for one thing, reduce the duplication, overlapping, and friction which inevitably occurs when several agencies perform parallel, and in some instances, identical functions. Secondly, the presidential executive order will raise the priority assigned to emergency planning functions by the several agencies. No longer will emergency planning be regarded as a secondary role to be performed in a somewhat perfunctory and *spare time* manner. Finally, federal agencies will now include in their own budgets, specific funds to execute emergency planning functions assigned to them.

What really has happened is this: emergency planning has now become a regular function of the federal establishment—a function performed with daily skill and vigor by almost every agency of that establishment.

The Office of Emergency Planning will serve almost exclusively as an expediting and co-ordinating arm of the executive office of the President and will act on the President's behalf to assure prompt and efficient fulfillment of the program by the federal structure, as well as a steadily improved posture in the states and localities.

Let me emphasize that a program of this magnitude will depend greatly on close co-operation from industrial, labor and other nongovernmental groups. In fact, the actual work of the local management resources boards which I mentioned earlier will be concerned largely with industrial resources in the areas under study. In effect, the states will be *taking inventory*, finding out exactly what they have and where it is located. In the final analysis we will want to know that in an emergency the right materials will be available for the right purpose, in the right places, in the right amount, and at the right time, in order to *squeeze* the greatest possible benefits out of the nation's resources, and to meet the emergency in as orderly a manner as possible.

That is the heart of the problem. It is a difficult one, but by no means insoluble. But it will take considerably more time and energy than states and communities have devoted to the problem in the past.

It is my feeling that we are on the threshold of such support for several reasons. First, after more than a decade of indecision, confusion or indifference, the facts of nuclear life are beginning to sear the consciousness of every American citizen. And, ironically enough, this constructive mood has emerged not from scare campaigns and crash promotions which hardly produce the kind of sustained initiative that the problem demands, but through a calm and rational indoctrination in reality.

A recurring theme in our presentation to state and local leaders has been the possibility, not the probability, of full-scale war. In fact, we stress that such a war is unlikely rather than imminent. We have simply made a case for the *existence* of the peril and the practical ways of coping with it.

There has never been a time in history when so many people have hoped and prayed so earnestly for enduring peace. And yet a peace upon which we can rely has eluded us. We must live under the haunting spectre of a horrible conflict, but that in itself is not cause for despair.

We have the military strength and the economic strength to deter any aggression. But, as President Kennedy said in his State of the Union message, 'Arms alone are not enough to keep the peace.'

What is required of all of us—each of us—is an intelligent and informed understanding of the world in which we live, and the most constructive actions we can take to prevent the worst from happening without sacrifice of our fundamental principles. This is the fuel that will carry us over the rugged and tortuous road ahead.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Mr. Ralph E. Spear

Mr. Ralph E. Spear is Director of Research, Policy and Review, for the Office of Emergency Planning. He served as Director of Program and Policy for the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization from 1958 to 1961; and from 1951 to 1958, he was with the Federal Civil Defense Administration, serving as Assistant Administrator for Planning beginning in 1954.

Born in Brockton, Mass., he was graduated from Yale University with the degree of Bachelor of Arts in 1932, and received the degree of Master of Science in Public Administration from Syracuse University in 1935.

From 1935 to 1944 he was on the staff of the American Public Welfare Association in Chicago. He served as a lieutenant in the U.S. Navy from 1944 to 1946. From 1946 to 1951 he was with the Veterans Administration.

He has been a consultant on government organization and administration to the International City Managers Association, Public Administration Service and the management firm of Booz, Allen & Hamilton. He has also served as a member of the Industry Evaluation Board of the Department of Commerce. He was a member of the Planning Board of the National Security Council from 1958 to 1961.

Mr. Spear is a member of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, American Public Welfare Association, American Society for Public Administration, Kiwanis International, and the Izaak Walton League of America.