

Naval War College Review

Volume 15
Number 7 *October*

Article 1

1962

October 1962 Full Issue

The U.S. Naval War College

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Recommended Citation

Naval War College, The U.S. (1962) "October 1962 Full Issue," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 15 : No. 7 , Article 1.
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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

VOL. XV. NO. 2

OCTOBER 1962

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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
REVIEW**

**Issued Monthly
U.S. Naval War College
Newport, R. I.**

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

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General Order Number 325 of 6 October 1884, established the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island, as a 'college for an advanced course of professional study for naval officers.' It soon became apparent that the resident courses could not educate the numbers of officers which the service required. In order to overcome this deficiency and extend as much professional education as possible to all officers of the Navy, General Order Number 89 issued 1 April 1914, authorized the conduct of professional courses by correspondence. This was the beginning of the present Extension Education Department of the Naval War College. From the beginning the aim of this Department was to provide as many as possible of the educational benefits of the College to those officers of the naval service not in residence. To this end the extension courses are continually reviewed and compared with the resident courses. The most recent revisions were made during calendar year 1962. Listed below are the courses currently available.

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Prior to applying for any of these courses, consult BUPERSINST 1500.49 (series) which contains brief course descriptions, previous course equivalents, and present course prerequisites.

Officers on active duty should submit their applications for enrollment to the Extension Education Department, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, via their Commanding Officer.

Officers not on active duty should submit their applications for enrollment to the same address via the District Commandant or other command carrying their records.

Requests for detailed information on any of the courses should be made by informal letter direct to the Extension Education Department, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.

TROPICAL AFRICA: PROBLEM CHILD OF THE 60'S

A Research Paper written by

Lieutenant Colonel David R. McNaught, U.S. Army

Naval Warfare Course, 1962

INTRODUCTION

The cold war has focused the attention of United States and world leaders on the strategic position, vast mineral wealth, and newly acquired political power of Africa. Recent events in the Congo, Ghana, and Guinea have forced Americans to reflect on the advantages of a friendly Africa or even a neutral Africa as contrasted with a communist-oriented Africa.

This paper is concerned with the United States policy toward Africa. The two ends of the continent, Mediterranean Africa and the Union of South Africa, are sufficiently different from the rest of the continent to justify their exclusion from this study, which concentrates on the remaining vast central, undeveloped Tropical region. This region is the real Africa, the home of the Negro and is referred to in this paper as Tropical Africa. While Mediterranean Africa and the Union had relatively close ties with Europe, Tropical Africa was known only to a few colonial administrators and missionaries until very recently. Even today it is hard to get reliable data on which to base Tropical African programs, and American impressions of Tropical Africa are colored by emotion and prejudice.

There is a growing danger that after years of neglect, Tropical Africa is becoming a fad and a political football. A major objective of this paper is to place African considerations in perspective with United States global considerations.

The situation in Tropical Africa is changing so rapidly that any attempt to describe the current situation is out of date in short order. Consequently, this paper concentrates on the fundamental forces common to the future and the current situation. In approaching this problem, it is considered appropriate to: describe the physical and human setting against which the changes are taking place and the forces shaping Africa's destiny; analyze the economic, social, political, and military factors which combine to form the basis for United States policy; and develop from this analysis some conclusions relative to the present and future United States policy toward Tropical Africa.

I. BACKGROUND AND UNDERSTANDING

American Impressions of Africa. In October 1961 Miss Margery Michelmore, a Peace Corps teacher-trainee in Nigeria, dropped a post card describing her reaction to African living conditions. The post card, which fell into unfriendly hands, quickly became a cause célèbre. *Newsweek* described Miss Michelmore as 'what an all-American girl is supposed to be,' and her reaction to African conditions was typically American. She wrote: '. . . With all the training we had, we were really not prepared for the squalor and absolute primitive living conditions . . . We had no idea what underdeveloped means.'¹

Miss Michelmore's reaction illustrates how difficult it is for anyone, who has not seen at firsthand underdeveloped regions, to appreciate the meaning in human terms of words like squalor, primitive, and underdeveloped. As difficult as this is, these are primarily tangible, physical conditions which Americans have seen.

It is much more difficult to appreciate intangible conditions such as the way people react and think. Some of the most severe setbacks the United States has suffered in Africa can be traced to a failure to appreciate that Africans react to a situation in a vastly different manner than Americans. The depth of this difference is illustrated by the comment an American Negro, in Africa, made to Stewart Alsop: 'I never realized before I came over here, how much I am an American and how little an African. I never know how these people are thinking.'²

George Kimble understated the case when he said, 'The darkest thing about Africa has always been our ignorance of it.'³ The problem in America today is not just ignorance, i.e., the lack of knowledge.⁴ It is ignorance compounded and confused by two extremes of prejudice. There is a tendency today to associate prejudice with the white supremacist, who refuses to see any good in Africa because it is populated by black men. This type of prejudice is not prevalent in the United States Government. However, prejudice tends to find a counterforce, and there is one in this case--'an equally extreme view that the Africans can do no wrong; that their lapses are only caused by nonindigenous factors such as the machinations of the colonialists or the great powers.'⁵

The influence of the second view is obvious to anyone who followed the Katanga crisis and observed the United States joining Russia in blaming all the woes of that troubled land on a handful of white mercenaries and European capitalists. An even more extreme, albeit unofficial, illustration is the remark of the NAACP official at the 1960 National

Democratic Convention who referred to the mass orgy of rape, pillaging, and murder then taking place in the Belgian Congo as 'a few birth pains.' Americans must be made to realize that Africa's problems are not an extension of the American Negro problem.

Any understanding of United States policy towards an area must begin with an understanding of the area, its people, geography, culture, and history. A paper which starts, as this one does, with an implied assumption that there can be a broad policy applicable to the entire area, must necessarily paint the background information with broad strokes and concentrate on the forests rather than the trees.

A Continent in Transition. All of Africa, but particularly Tropical Africa, is in a period of dynamic, turbulent change, the exact nature and direction of which is not clear. What is true today will be out of date tomorrow. For example, a college textbook written four years ago states that five European countries still control the majority of Subsaharan Africa.⁶ This was true four years ago. Then there were only five independent countries in all of Africa. With the independence of Tanganyika on 9 December 1961, there were 29 and at least one other is on the threshold of independence today. Changes and developments that took centuries in the rest of the world are compressed into a generation. As John Gunther put it, 'Africa is springing in a step from black magic to white civilization.'⁷ The discussion of the changes taking place in Africa suggests two fundamental questions: why was Africa so backward and what new conditions are causing the accelerated development today?

Isolation: the Key to Africa's Backwardness. The key to the backwardness of Tropical Africa is its effective isolation from the rest of the world until the last half of the nineteenth century. A review of the geography of Africa reveals the primary reasons for this isolation. The region lies south of the Sahara, an effective barrier to any flow of culture from the North. Below the desert there is the high central plateau, which drops sharply to narrow coastal plains. The rivers which fall suddenly from the highlands through narrow rocky defiles to the coastland are useless for navigation. If this is not a sufficiently uninviting picture, add wide areas of swamp, impenetrable jungles, and vast deserts. The terrain would seem to provide ample reason for outsiders staying away, but not for Africans failing to break out and make contact with the outside world. The climate and environment of the Tropical Zone lacks the stimulus of necessity to force development. Subsistence is easy, but a radical increase in living standard is impossible without stimulus from outside. The necessary stimulus, however disagreeable, was initially provided by the colonial powers. A high official of one independent African country recently explained the relative backwardness of his country in terms of its failing to experience colonial tutelage.⁸

European Settlement. Serious European settlement in Tropical Africa began shortly after the American Civil War. In the space of a single generation the European powers carved Tropical Africa into a mosaic of meaningless enclaves, protectorates, and spheres of influence with little, if any, relation to African societies, economic units, or geography. Consequently, the new African nations are not homogenous nations like the European nations. They have no common tongue, culture or historical heritage (although Ghana has been accused of forging a history in the best Russian manner, e.g., Aesop is pictured as a Ghanian who educated the Greeks).⁹ Boundaries may split major tribes or enclose a hundred rival tribes.

Colonial Policies. The colonial powers had vastly different colonial policies and objectives, particularly after it became evident that colonialism had to go. As realists the British adopted an objective 'to guide the colonial territories to responsible government within the Commonwealth.'¹⁰ While there were differences between policy in theory and policy in practice, the British on the whole have done an outstanding job of developing the capacity for independence in their areas and have retained good relationships with the new nations. The opposite extreme is the former Belgian Congo.

Belgian colonial policy was best described as enlightened paternalism, but the Belgians had no intent to let the child grow up. A former Governor General of the Congo summed up the policy in what has become a classic as 'To dominate in order to serve.' The Congo administration did more to improve the health and welfare of the Africans than any other colonial regime. On the other hand it permitted virtually no African participation in the government above village level.¹¹ The sad results of this policy, as applied to the Congo, are well known.

French colonial policy prior to 1944 could be described by a single word 'assimilation.' The objective of this policy was to assimilate or integrate the overseas territories into the mother-country, to make Frenchmen out of the Africans. In the minds of the Frenchmen this was a far greater blessing than independence. In 1944 the French abandoned the 'assimilation' policy in favor of a 'closer association in one indivisible French Union.'¹²

Portugal, like France, has long considered her overseas territories as integral parts of the nation. Since the government of Portugal is highly authoritarian, it should surprise no one that the government in the overseas territories is similarly authoritarian. Portugal has indicated no interest in changing her relationship with her overseas territories. On the plus side, racial discrimination, in fact racial consciousness, is relatively absent in Portugal and its overseas territories.

It is not a coincidence that those colonies with the least white settlement have made the smoothest and most rapid transition to independence. The entrenched white minorities form a definite block to independence (except a white-dominated form of independence). The manner and extent of white settlement continues to exert an influence today. The three countries, or elements of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, were all governed under the same British policy and towards the same general objective, but with vastly different results. Southern Rhodesia was seized by force, the tribal structure destroyed, and the natives forced onto reserves. Southern Rhodesia today has extensive white settlement and a government and culture modeled after the Union of South Africa. Northern Rhodesia was infiltrated by traders and treaties were peacefully negotiated. The government was conducted through the tribal chiefs. White settlement in Northern Rhodesia was limited until the discovery of the copper mines in 1923 and even today is probably less than 20% of Southern Rhodesia's. Nyasaland, with little to offer, was left to the missionaries and white settlement was negligible.¹³

The Tribal System. Another fundamental force affecting Africa today is the tribal system. The white settlers are slowing the implementation of British policy in the Rhodesias, but in Nigeria independence was delayed by tribal disputes.¹⁴ In fact, independent Nigeria is today effectively broken into regional parts along ancient tribal lines.¹⁵ Ghana, for example, has over one hundred tribal states, each with its own chief, and the Congo has even more. The new elite of Africa are coming to think of themselves as Ghanians or Congolese, but the common people still think of themselves as Ashanti, Baluba or Mende.¹⁶ Tribal feuds lie at the bottom of many African problems. Tribalism is the antithesis of nationalism in Africa.

African Nationalism. One hears a great deal about nationalism these days; however, the newly independent countries, or the areas seeking their independence, are, as was pointed out earlier, not homogenous nations. Consequently, African nationalism is really Africanism more than it is nationalism.

The Physical and Human Setting. Americans tend to associate Tropical Africa with jungles and Tarzan swinging through the trees. They forget that this vast region also contains mountains with permanent snows, and areas where no living person remembers rain.¹⁷ There is also the great central plateau where most of the Europeans settled. Tropical Africa has modern cities like Elizabethville or Accra, but it also has mud-hut villages. Tropical Africa is a land of unusual diversity, combining features of great beauty and harsh ugliness, diamonds and poverty.

Natural Resources. There are many dramatic and graphic presentations of Tropical Africa's wealth of strategic minerals. It is common practice to list 15 or so minerals and to note that Tropical Africa provides, or can provide, from 50 to 99 percent of the Free World's requirement for these metals. However, it is quite possible for a continent or even a country to possess a large portion of the world's columbium ore, or bauxite for example, and still be poor. Africa's mineral resources are not evenly distributed. The Niger, Somalia, the Sudan, Mali, Togo, and the Voltaic Republic have little known resources, while the single province of Katanga has been described as a cornucopia of mineral wealth or the Ruhr of Africa. In the words of Colin Legum, 'Africa is basically a poor continent with scattered outcrops of unusual wealth—gold on the Witwatersrand, copper in the Northern Rhodesian copper belt, the geological monstrosity of Katanga.'¹⁸

The People. Most, but not all, of the people of 'Black Africa' are black. There are somewhat less than a million European settlers and approximately 400,000 Asians.¹⁹ The Negro majority is divided into three broad groups: the Bantu, the Half Hamites, and the Guinea or Sudanese Negro. These in turn break into hundreds of different peoples and tribes each with its own distinctive cultural and sometimes physical traits.

Although the area has some large cities, it is on the whole sparsely settled. The average population density is 14 to 18 people per square mile compared to 54 in the United States and 306 in India. Total population is approximately 135 million.²⁰ In these days when population explosion is ranked alongside fallout as the world menace, it is difficult to realize that the greatest shortage facing some of the new African countries is manpower. The lack of skilled manpower is generally understood and appreciated, but many of the new nations are short of manpower in simple quantitative terms. Three of the new countries have less than a million people and of the remainder only three: Nigeria, the former Belgian Congo, and the Sudan have more than ten million.

It is possible to make some generalization about the people of Tropical Africa. They are poor; the average annual income is 89 dollars.²¹ They are sick; the average African acquires several chronic ailments almost at birth. As is typical of tropical (and sick) people, they are lazy. They are basically friendly and happy, but they are extremely sensitive, and people may confuse their sensitivity with antagonism. They are superstitious; even a college-educated Christian leader may seek assistance from a witch doctor. They are young; their life expectancy is less than one-half of that enjoyed by the average American.

Summary. Africa is entering into a period of revolutionary economic, social, and political change. To a large extent the final nature and direction of this change will be determined by forces outside of Africa. The intent of this initial chapter has not been to describe the current situation, but rather to paint a background against which those changes and the forces causing them can be understood. The following chapters will analyze the economic, social, political, and military facets of the challenge against this background.

II. THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATION

It is not by chance or alphabetical order that this paper begins the examination of the components of African policy with the economic factors. This is done for two reasons. First is a desire to keep this analysis on a realistic nonemotional basis. Nothing forces realism quite so quickly as a look at the price tag. The second reason is to stress the role of the economic factors. Various writers on international affairs have described money as the cement that binds the other elements of national power together, the muscles of peace, or the sinews of war. Nikolai Lenin in his book, *The Three Sources and Three Constituent Parts of Marxism*, said political institutions are a superstructure resting on an economic foundation.¹ All of these descriptions, regardless of the simile used, illustrate the all-pervasive, fundamental role of the economic factors.

Notwithstanding the importance of the economic factors, it is well to stress at the start that economic development is not a panacea. Economic development can produce, or be produced, under almost any form of government; it does not automatically produce peaceful attitudes, efficient self-government or individual freedom. On the other hand, it is well nigh necessary to the achievement of these social and political goals.

Africa's Importance to the United States. In order to assess whether Africa is being given enough, not enough, or too much weight in the development of United States foreign policy, it is necessary to determine the importance of Africa to the United States. Africa is more important today to the United States, in terms of trade and investment, than it was prior to World War II, but, nevertheless, it is still relatively unimportant. For example, the United States trade with the other countries of the Western Hemisphere is ten times as great as with Africa and United States investment in the Western Hemisphere is twenty times as great as in Africa.² So, on the surface the loss of Africa would not be a grave blow to the United States economic position. This would be a relatively superficial and short-sighted view.

Tropical Africa is the primary, and in some cases the only, Free World source for many strategic materials. As a case in point with current interest, the only significant source of cobalt³ left to the United States is Katanga. The United States spent 70 million dollars developing a source of nickel cobalt in Cuba, which would have begun production in 1960.⁴ It seems unnecessary to explain what happened to that source.

Perhaps Africa's greatest economic significance to the United States is indirect. Tropical Africa is of major importance to the countries of Western Europe as a market and as a supplier of raw materials and food.

Objectives of United States Economic Policy. Having weighed the significance of Tropical Africa in economic terms, the next question might well be, 'What does the United States want to do about it?' According to the United States Senate, the United States wants to 'help strengthen the forces of freedom by aiding peoples of less developed parts of the world to develop their resources and improve their living standards, to realize their aspirations for justice, education, dignity, and respect as individual human beings and to establish responsible governments.'⁵

Implicit in this statement of United States objectives are humanitarian principles, defense, and self-help. One goal not mentioned in this otherwise comprehensive statement is the hope that with economic development will come increased markets for United States goods. The United States believes that the environment described in these goals is the most effective defense against world communism. These American goals must next be correlated with African needs.

Africa's Needs. It is wise to examine the patient before prescribing treatment. The next few paragraphs will isolate and examine Africa's economic complaints. Tropical Africa is changing rapidly from a tribal, village basis of life to a complex pattern with urbanization and increased contact with the outside world of the twentieth century. There is an obvious need for drastically increased standards of living, training in technical skills, business management, and for a concerted attack on disease and illiteracy. These are social problems which demand economic treatment and whose solution is essential to further economic development.

Most of Tropical Africa is involved in subsistence farming, i.e., where crops are raised for consumption rather than trade. The subsistence farming system is a brake on further social and economic development. Farming must become more efficient in order to release manpower for industry, to provide food for the growing urban centers, and raise the standard of living of the rural areas. The Africans must learn to use their soil without wasting it. Better distribution of water, methods of cultivation, and soil conservation are essential to the development of Africa.⁶

There is a need for research directed to African and tropical problems. To use farm productivity as a case in point, Marston Bates⁷ speculates on the possibilities that must be latent in an environment that creates the tropical rain forest. He asks, 'Can soils be really poor that support the most complex vegetative growth in the planet?' Just consider for a moment

the potential effects of applying a fraction of the research devoted to the problems of the temperate zone to those of the tropics.

Another fundamental weakness is the lack of transportation facilities. Money spent on transportation frequently pays dividends in other areas. For example, coffee production in the Ivory Coast increased 300% when roads were cut into the forest. Lord Lugard went so far as to say 'the material development of Africa may be summed up in one word, transportation.'⁸

The economies of all but the most richly endowed of the new countries rest on slim, slippery foundations. Most of the economies are dependent on a single product, e.g., Ghana on cocoa, Somalia on bananas. The demand and price of these products are dependent on factors over which the African countries have no control. A drop in the demand for sisal hemp could, for example, be disastrous to Tanganyika. Efforts to broaden the base of their economies have so far met with limited success.⁹

Government Aid. There is a tendency to compare the scope of United States aid to Africa with aid to Asian nations or to Latin America. For example, the United States aid to South Korea in 1960 exceeded our total aid to Africa. However, the conditions and the requirements for aid are entirely different. The only thing such a comparison can possibly demonstrate is that the United States is able to give a great deal more to Africa than it does now, if it is in the United States interest to do so. As noted earlier, money is no cure-all. As a matter of fact, the *UN Economic Survey of Africa* states on page 2, 'lack of finance has not generally been an obstacle to African development. Much more important have been the physical limitations, inadequate transport facilities, lack of data, and shortage of technical skills at all levels.'

One of the most frequent criticisms of the United States aid programs is that it is a disadvantage to be a true friend of the United States. Another, and related, criticism is that we are supporting undemocratic governments, e.g., Ghana and Guinea.¹⁰ The first criticism is to an extent justified, but it is primarily a sales gimmick for more aid and should not unduly disturb policy makers. The second criticism to some extent reflects a lack of political sophistication. Under many conditions the American way is not suited. As Lenin said, 'You cannot put the same shoe on every foot.' The tempo of the change has developed conditions similar in some ways to wartime, and even the United States adopted some rather autocratic procedures in World War II. The question of undemocratic governments will be explored thoroughly as a political problem in Chapter IV.

A prime question is whether the United States aid to Africa should be administered bilaterally, i.e., directly with the country concerned or through multinational channels such as the UN or the OECD. The proponents of bilateral aid appeal to such basic human appeals as desire for credit and confidence that the United States can do a better job than any multinational agency. In many areas the only way is bilateral. There are, however, good reasons for channeling a major part of our aid through multinational channels, specifically:

(1) Surprisingly enough, there is blame attached to aid. People do look gift horses in the mouths. There is definitely less suspicion of the motives behind aid when it comes from an international agency. This is particularly true if the recipient is a member of the organization administering the aid.

(2) It fosters the recipient's sense of self-respect to receive aid from an organization to which he belongs rather than from a rich nation.

(3) Of interest to the American taxpayer, it spreads the load.

(4) The multinational organizations have a greater variety of experience and technical personnel available, e.g., Japanese or Norwegian fishermen.

(5) It builds the prestige of the UN which is an announced goal of the United States.

The fact that the UN is a world organization, specifically that Russia and her satellites are members, poses some particular problems. The Soviets have placed considerable pressure to obtain executive positions in the UN agencies controlling technical and economic assistance to underdeveloped countries.¹¹ This leads to the rather obvious observation that there are advantages to using Free World organizations like the OECD rather than the UN.

The multinational approach can be applied at the receiver end in some cases. That is to say, aid can be given on a regional basis rather than on a country-by-country basis. One outstanding example in practice is the special program for Tropical Africa established by the Mutual Security Act of 1960. This fund has provided educational and technical assistance on a regional basis. This approach is less vulnerable to communist propaganda charges of economic enslavement, or to the 'complaining neighbor who wants everything the next country gets.'

Private Investment and Trade. It is essential that the great capacity of United States private capital be brought to bear on the problem when

appropriate, but it is equally important to remember and consider the limitations of private investment. As a general rule, private investment can foster growth in an economy that has reached a 'take-off point,' but it cannot help countries reach that point. Private investment needs an environment of education, public health, sound administration, roads, irrigation, etc. This environment is the 'take-off point' referred to in the second sentence. Private investment can and has gone into countries that have not reached the 'take-off point' with unfortunate results. In these cases it succeeds in extracting raw materials to meet the needs of more advanced countries, thereby broadening rather than lessening the gap between developed and undeveloped nations.

However, once the 'take-off point' is reached, in other words the environment for private capital exists, private investment has definite advantages over public investment. Many of the new nations are approaching the 'take-off point.' There are a number of things the United States can do to encourage American investment in Africa. Most of the measures fall into three categories: (1) Measures to protect and guarantee the rights of United States investors—this could vary from treaties and risk insurance to the use of military power; (2) Measures to make investment more profitable—this is largely a matter of tax benefits; (3) Measures to assist and advise potential investors.¹² The United States is already taking large steps in all three categories. Perhaps the greatest lag has been in the matter of protection of United States investment. While this is not specifically applicable to Tropical Africa as yet, United States failure to protect the property of American citizens in Cuba has repercussions in Africa.

Northwestern University's African Studies Department reported that opportunities for investment in Africa are far greater than generally realized, and that there is little evidence to warrant fears of expropriation or unfair taxation by the new countries.

Trade, as well as investment, must be stimulated if these countries are to advance. They must break away from their one-crop economies. At a negligible loss in revenue and little risk to United States industry, the United States could establish one-way free trade with the underdeveloped nations of the world. The propaganda value of such a move would alone be worth the cost.

European Aid. Americans tend to ignore, or are not aware of, the sizable economic assistance provided Africa by the countries of Western Europe. In 1960 France and Britain provided more than three times as much aid to Africa as did the United States.¹³ Belgium, West Germany and the Netherlands provided lesser, but still significant amounts. Obviously this aid should be considered when the United States aid

program is developed. Just as the United States considers the military strength of its allies, so must the economic efforts of its allies be considered when the economic posture for the cold war is developed.

The Soviet Economic Offensive. Soviet aid and trade are among the most important instruments in the Soviet policy towards Africa. Soviet propaganda is designed to give an exaggerated view of the size of Soviet aid. At first sight the reports of Soviet aid look truly impressive. For example, the Soviet extended over 197 million dollars in loans, or more accurately, credits to Tropical African countries between July 1959 and July 1961.¹⁴ However, there is limited piecemeal data as to how much of these credits has actually been paid out. As of November 1960, Ethiopia had drawn only two million of the \$100 million in credits extended her by the Soviet. Ironically she deposited this in dollar holdings in New York at 3%.

The close relationship between the Soviet economic and propaganda campaigns is ever present. All Soviet accounts stress the economic dependence of Africa on the West. Following this line, Soviet aid and trade become liberating factors.

Nevertheless, it would be most misleading to imply that Soviet aid is the creation of a propagandist's imagination. The Soviets have provided two hospitals, schools, a printing plant, and a radio station to Somalia, to cite but one example. The Soviets indicate that this is just the beginning of an all-out integrated propaganda-economic campaign. V. S. Semenov, deputy foreign minister of the USSR, speaking at the Third Session of the UN Economic Commission for Africa in February 1961, said that by 1965 the USSR and other socialist countries will account for one-half the industrial production of the world and as Khrushchev has pointed out, '... with the development of our economy we shall expand more and more our co-operation with the countries of Africa.' Russia does not stand alone. The eastern satellites and China have given significant aid to African countries. ¹⁵

It is difficult to avoid extreme statements on Soviet trade in Africa. The old saw about figures not lying, but liars figuring, is applicable to many of the cries about a vast Russian trade offensive in Africa. This is illustrated by an item in the *New York Times*. The headline read: 'Soviet Bloc Trade with Africa Continues to Expand.' However, the body of the report notes that 'although Communist bloc imports from Africa are increasing steadily, they remain at only 3 percent of total African exports.' Further, 65 percent of the communist trade was with the United Arab Republic.¹⁶ A speaker recently described in comic terms the large amounts of cocoa the Soviets were buying from Ghana (supposedly far more than she could possibly use

in years). The only thing wrong with this humorous illustration was that the United States bought far more cocoa from Ghana than did Russia.¹⁷

Summary. From a comparison of present-day trade and investment figures, Africa is not nearly as important as Western Europe or the other American countries to the United States. It is generally predicted that Africa's role as a supplier of essential raw materials and as a market for American goods will increase in the future. Before this can happen, tremendous economic and social development must occur in Africa. This development in turn requires large amounts of external assistance. The United States must provide a significant part of this assistance either directly or through multinational channels, such as the UN. While there is a role for private investment, most of the basic problems, e.g., health, education and infrastructure, require public investment, i.e., government aid, before private investment can become effective.

The Soviet Union looks on the undeveloped countries as the Achilles heel of capitalism. While Russia is prepared to wage economic and propaganda war, her economic aid and trade to date are minute compared with that of the West.

It is virtually impossible to separate the social and economic aspects of the African situation. In this chapter the economic medicine was discussed. A significant portion of the next chapter will be devoted to social measures necessary if these economic measures are to advance the ultimate and primarily social objectives of the United States in Africa.

III. SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ELEMENTS OF UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD AFRICA

Students of Tropical Africa frequently summarize the problems facing it as 'a vicious circle of poverty, sickness and ignorance.' Poverty, both individual and national, was fundamental to the discussion of the second chapter. The latter two elements of the circle, sickness and ignorance, provide the central theme of this chapter.

Disease. Despite significant, but nevertheless piecemeal, efforts by missionaries, colonial administrations and international agencies, sickness continues 'to be the norm [in Africa]'. It starts at birth and continues to death.¹ The noted African authority, T. Walter Wallbank, in his book, *Contemporary Africa*, singled out the tsetse fly, which carries sleeping sickness, as the greatest enemy of progress in Tropical Africa. Sleeping sickness is almost a national, as well as an individual ailment, but it is only one of the many diseases endemic to Africa. Other deadly and debilitating diseases common to Tropical Africa are malaria, leprosy, and various dysenteries.²

The African leaders realize the necessity of conquering disease, but it is one thing to recognize the need and another to be able to do something about it. Native resources are not adequate to fight even a delaying action against disease. For example, a Carnegie International Commission reported that in 1958 there were only 623 doctors and 35 dentists to care for over 35 million people in Nigeria.³ It would be possible to cite figures illustrating the discrepancy between the magnitude of the problem and the limited means available for solution *ad nauseam*. The problem requires a massive attack far beyond the skilled manpower and capital available in the area. This paper is not concerned with a specific health program, but it should be noted that the program would have many facets, e.g., medical personnel, technical advice, sanitation and preventive medicine, hospital construction, research and education.

Education and Training. The third element of the vicious circle described in the opening paragraph is ignorance. It is difficult to imagine a problem requiring a greater effort than the health and sanitation problem just discussed. However, the demand for education and training, while perhaps no greater, is on a similar order of magnitude. Once again it is possible to cite figures so out of proportion to American conditions as to be almost meaningless to an American.

The new African leaders fully appreciate the importance of education and are devoting a major part of their limited resources to the problem. However, as with the medical program, their local resources are not sufficient. For example, Somalia's estimated annual revenue of less than 10 million dollars is not adequate to establish a second-rate school system,⁴ much less do all the other things facing the government.

Ignorance, like sickness, poses tremendous problems which are beyond the native capacity for rapid solution. Africans do need help solving these problems. However, external assistance must be designed to develop and motivate native capacity to take over, unless the United States wants to repeat the Belgian Congo on a grand scale. In the words of Dr. Schweitzer, 'The African must be made able to help himself. The immediate problem is . . . a lack of know-how to fight want and disease. What is needed is more doctors, engineers and farming experts who can dispel apathy and superstition among their people.'⁵

'Universal Primary Education' is a symbol of statehood. This is certainly a desirable and a reasonable goal when 95 to 99% of the population is illiterate as it is in many of the new nations,⁶ but, startling as those figures are, the greatest weakness may be in the area of secondary education. The Congo prior to independence had over 26,000 primary schools, but only 300 secondary schools. As a result less than two percent of those finishing primary schools went on to secondary school.⁷ One of the most fundamental shortages is that of teachers, and particularly secondary school teachers. Despite the new showplace colleges, most of the specialized college requirements will continue to be met by non-African institutions.

There were about 1,100 African students⁸ in 1960 behind the Iron Curtain and about 2,000⁹ in the United States. In theory there is a secondary benefit for the United States when African students study in the United States, i.e., they should see and like the American way of doing things. The bad part is that there is evidence that the African students have not liked everything they have seen in the United States. A recent survey in the United States indicated that most of the African students were disappointed in the United States. Surprisingly many of them were disappointed in the treatment they received from American Negroes.¹⁰ It is only fair to note that exchange students in Russia have been similarly dissatisfied.¹¹

Post-School Problems. The schoolhouse may be as Barbara Ward said, 'the gateway to the future,' but the road beyond that gate is a rocky one for many young Africans. Despite the long-term need for education, at the moment there are not enough jobs for the new school-leavers. The school

output is multiplying at a far greater rate than the available jobs. The boy who leaves school does not want to work in the villages where 80% of the jobs are even today. A school certificate used to guarantee the bearer an apprenticeship in the city, but no longer.

The long-term answer lies partially in increased industrialization. But heavy industry provides a relatively small number of jobs in proportion to the investment. For example, a proposed oil refinery in Nigeria will cost about \$30 million, but will provide only three hundred jobs when it is completed, or about ten jobs per million dollars of investment.¹² Under present systems of farming there is little incentive for the school-trained youth to return to the village. Means must be found to keep a portion of the school-trained youth on the land productively.¹³

Land Reform. Agrarian reform or any euphemism has become a nasty word since the Chinese masquerade in the late 1940's. Consequently, it is well to define what land reform, rural reform, or agrarian reform means to Americans. One United States official described the United States view of land reform in these words: 'We in the United States regard land reform in the broad terms of the improvement of all economic and social institutions of farm life.'¹⁴

Some writers are coming to use the term *rural reform* which seems more descriptive of the all-inclusive nature implicit in the definition above. This definition would probably be acceptable to the Russians. They would differ only as to what constitutes 'improvement of all economic and social institutions.' The success of United States foreign policy may well depend on the direction and nature rural reform takes.

Technical Assistance. It might well be argued that technical assistance should have been covered as an economic instrument of foreign policy in the second chapter. This argument is indicative of a failure to appreciate the social nature of technical assistance and the need for expanding the human relation approach to technical assistance. Eugene Staley in his book, *The Future of Underdeveloped Countries*,¹⁵ points out the difference between the United States approach to technical assistance and the communist. The Americans as practical businessmen have in the past concentrated on the know-how of controlling the material environment, how to grow better grain, build better roads, control disease, etc. Communist technical assistance concentrates on a social technique.

This paper has established the requirement for better roads, farming methods and disease control, but it has also shown that economic development can produce or be produced under almost any form of government. The technologies of advanced and underdeveloped countries differ not only in

how roads are built, but in human relations, the patterns of family life, how public affairs are set up, the relations between business and labor, the role of labor unions, etc. Free trade unions are an important part of a dynamic economy in a democratic state. Labor movements in Africa, if not provided with dynamic, democratically oriented leadership will become tools in the communist 'class struggle.' Trade unions are but one illustration of needed social technical assistance.

The Battle for Men's Minds. The reader may wonder if he has not already read about the battle for men's minds. Indeed he has. Propaganda is best used in conjunction with other programs. The discussion of Soviet economic programs stressed the close relationship between the economic and psychological factors of Soviet African policy; how the Soviets exaggerated their own achievements; how they pictured the United States programs as economic enslavement and their programs as means of liberation from capitalist economic enslavement. They even played on African ignorance and superstition by describing American technical aid as witchcraft.¹⁶

The battle for men's minds in Africa is not a simple two-contestant match. There are several campaigns. There is a communist campaign. What many people do not realize is that there is a Moscow line and a Peking line and that they are at times opposed. There is a Free World campaign which also unfortunately has more than one voice. There are national and supranational or African campaigns.

There is a general view in America that the Soviet propaganda effort in Africa far outweighs that of the United States. Comparative data on such things as hours of radio broadcast time, numbers of exchange students, information offices, etc. would indicate that the efforts are roughly comparable at least in quantity. As noted earlier, the Chinese are taking a very active role in Africa. In the past two years, seven new specialized Chinese propaganda organizations have been identified in Africa. Without getting involved in an evaluation of the 'Chinese-Russian ideological split,' it is most evident in the different party lines expressed in Africa. Some of the Chinese propaganda, if not deliberately anti-Russian, is opposed to Russian interests in Africa.^{17, 18}

Since Americans seem to consider that the Soviets are masters of propaganda, it might be well to note that the Soviets have made serious mistakes. Their propaganda is openly anti-Western. The new African countries do not want to choose sides. The Africans are beginning to realize that the Soviets regard African issues as opportunities to be exploited in the cold war. Even such an avid Marxist as Sekou Toure was provoked to the point where he would refer to 'Machiavellian Marxists'

and accuse the Russians of trying to set off a Marxist revolution in Africa.¹⁹ The Soviets boast of their African accomplishments for European consumption. This boasting is extremely irritating to sensitive Africans. The Soviets are attempting to force Soviet ideas on the Africans. The Africans want to do things in the African way.²⁰ It does not require an extremely high degree of perception to realize that Americans have made the same mistakes. It is possible to learn from the Soviet mistakes.

Lack of Communications. All of these campaigns face a common obstacle. There are too many people who do not get the word. It is fine to compare hours of broadcasting, but to be effective radio broadcasts require radios. Drums are still the primary means of communication in parts of Africa. A recent UNESCO meeting in Paris determined that it would take 360 million dollars²¹ to raise African news media to the minimum UNESCO standards²² and the bulk of the need was in Tropical Africa. They found, for example, that there were more than one thousand people for every newspaper in Tropical Africa²³

United States Propaganda Goals. This paper began by stressing the need for Americans to understand Africa, but as Professor David Apter recently pointed out to the House Sub-Committee on Africa, there is a second aspect to this question. There is a need for Africans to understand Americans. The primary goal of our propaganda program should be to meet that need. Africans must be able to appreciate the diversity of life in America and the different points of view represented in America. Africans must understand that America was once an underdeveloped country, that America has a revolutionary background. According to Professor Apter many Africans view America as a rich, self-centered country and consider United States aid as just crumbs from the table. On the other hand they view communist aid as representing a real sacrifice. Consequently, Africans are almost resentful of United States aid. The goal of American propaganda must be to correct this misinterpretation. ²⁴

Summary. Tropical Africa is faced with twin problems of disease and ignorance that far exceed the indigenous capacity for rapid solution. The Africans recognize the problem and their need for help. It is important, as with economic aid, that social development programs stimulate the native capacity and will to continue development.

United States programs are hindered by African misunderstanding of the United States, its people and motives; United States economic and social programs must be coordinated with the propaganda programs toward a common objective of a better image of the United States.

In many ways the social factors serve as a bridge or link between the economic and the political factors. Two things are necessary if the United States programs in Tropical Africa are to be effective:

(1) A substantial, continuing, and self-generating economic/social advance.

(2) A social/political outcome which produces self-reliant citizenship in a free society, with stable governments responsive to the will of their people.

IV. POLITICAL PROBLEMS AND MEANS

Political Maturity. Previous chapters demonstrated the need for parallel economic and social development. This chapter will add another essential, political maturity.

The United States supports the nationalist aspirations of those peoples who are progressively advancing toward the charter's [the UN Charter] goal of self-government and independence. It is the policy of the government to support the attainment of freedom by all peoples who, by their acts show themselves worthy of it and ready for it.¹

The phrase 'worthy of it and ready for it' strikes at the heart of political maturity. The Congolese at the time of their independence had the best standard of living and the highest rate of literacy in Tropical Africa. Despite this, they had not been prepared for independence and the responsibility of self-government. They were not politically mature. Democracy requires a high order of political maturity.

Strong Man Governments. The new African governments tend to be dominated by a single strong party and usually a single man. Despite the trappings and framework of democracy, they are in practice highly authoritarian. The people of Africa are accustomed to being told what to do by colonial authorities and tribal chiefs. They are in many cases not yet politically or socially ready for the concept of a 'loyal opposition.' It would be surprising if there was not almost unanimous support for the nationalist party that led the way to independence.² Two countries offer examples of what happens when there is not a universally accepted leader. In Kenya the two major parties are locked in combat and independence is delayed. In the Congo old tribal feuds rose to the surface and anarchy followed.

African leaders do not deny the charge of one-party governments, but they do deny that they are nondemocratic. Julius Nyerere, the foremost of the African moderates, defends the one-party rule in Tanganyika.³ Mr. Nyerere has two principles to determine if a nation is a democracy: (1) Are the rights of the individual respected, and (2) Can the government be overthrown without assassination.⁴ These rules may seem rather ridiculous to the politically mature American; however, American concepts of democracy may not fit the African personality without some modification. Mr. Nyerere speaks for a nation concerned not with how to finance medical care for the aged, but conquering disease that cripples and weakens most, if not all, of its population. His nation is concerned not with a 5% increase

in gross national product, but with springing in a leap from the dark ages to the twentieth century. The economic and social programs necessary to achieve these goals require highly centralized authoritarian controls.

There are, however, many nations which do not meet the requirements for one-party democracy as established by Mr. Nyere, e.g., Ghana, Northern Rhodesia, Guinea.^{5, 6} As noted in the discussion of government aid, many Americans are concerned about United States aid supporting undemocratic governments. How to deal with these countries is a question to which there is no rigid answer. This question is second only to the colonial question as a continued problem facing the United States planners.

Anticolonialism. Africans are united on any issue involving anticolonialism. Anticolonialism in Africa today is a romantic notion. It glorifies the precolonial past and ignores the positive side of the colonial era. Colonialism laid the basis for the economic, educational, social and political advances in Africa. Colonialism as was noted in the first chapter provided the necessary revolutionary stimulus for development. Anticolonialism grossly distorts the conditions of the past and the needs of the future.⁷ This is not an attempt to defend colonialism. Colonialism is, if not dead, dying. Anticolonialism is a live, dynamic force which American officials must recognize and understand.

The United States must steer a difficult course with sympathies on both sides of most colonial disputes. As Senator Church noted, popularity should not be the basic goal of United States policy. In later discussion the Senator expressed extreme concern about African opinion.⁸ African popularity is no more a proper goal of United States policy than European popularity.

The primary colonial issue today is Portugal and Angola. It would take a paper at least as long as this to objectively explore all aspects of the Angola dispute and then it is doubtful that sufficient unbiased information is available. One side of the Angola question is well presented in the United States press. However, at least two American eyewitnesses⁹ accuse the United States press of distorting the issues in Angola. The United States press has generally described the uprising in Angola as a nationalist rebellion against Portuguese control. These observers describe it as a mixture of tribalism and fetishism, stirred by communists and Africans from other countries.

Political Significance of Tropical Africa. The importance of Tropical Africa in economic and human terms was evaluated in the earlier chapters. The political importance of Tropical Africa can be summed as UN vote. Mali and Chad can outvote the United States in the General Assembly. The

Tropical African nations, representing less than two-thirds as many people as the United States, have almost one-fourth of the UN votes. It should not be construed from this that African votes are delivered as a bloc. Only when the question involves colonialism is this true. On most key issues the African nations have split. For example, on the question of Red China's admission to the UN, the African nations split nine for, nine against, and eleven abstentions.¹⁰

African Neutralism or Nonalignment. The newly emerging nations have favored a policy of nonalignment. While the leaders of the nations in the French community have been less vocal than Nkrumah or Sekou Toure, even they on the occasion of their admission to the UN, stressed their desire to concentrate on African problems, to keep the cold war out of Africa and stick to a policy of nonalignment.¹¹ Nor have the nations of Tropical Africa exhibited any strong desire to join an Afro-Asian neutralist bloc or to become, a la Nehru, a mediator of the East-West conflict.¹²

The basic desire of the Africans to concentrate on their own problems and avoid the cold war should be understood by a nation whose first President warned of the dangers of entangling alliances. The problem of the United States today is to make sure that when the time comes for the Africans to turn one way or the other, they turn to the West.

Regional Organizations. There have been several moves toward federation or some form of regional organization of African states. The African nations cannot remain satisfied with boundaries created in Europe without regard for African realities. Many of the new countries are so small that it is difficult to see how they can exist. Three have less than a million people, and of the others all but three have less than ten million people.

The weak countries invite conquest by their very weakness. Their neighbors who ruthlessly snuff out internal opposition, e.g., Ghana or Guinea, surely will not hesitate to eliminate external opposition to their dreams of federation or fusion. The armies they are creating are hardly necessary for defense.¹³

There is a definite requirement for more co-operation among the new countries and probably some form of regional association. Wider association of the African states may promote the political and economic stability of the new countries and should facilitate the technical and economic developments of the area. Such associations, as long as they respect the rights of the nations involved, are in the interests of the United States.

Afro-European Organizations. Many of the new nations, although avoiding cold war issues, have maintained ties with the colonial powers. Six of the former French colonies have remained in the French community. Four of those who elected not to remain in the community have signed pacts with the French. Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Tanganyika are all members of the British Commonwealth.¹⁴

The Human Element. The best policy is worthless if it is to be implemented by 'ugly Americans.' The most important element of the total equation is the people who implement the policy. Every American in Africa, regardless of his purpose for being there, can help to overcome the 'understanding gap' in Africa. United States programs in Africa require a wide range of technical qualifications.

Many Americans assume that a black skin is the best qualification for an African post. For many years the United States Army went out of its way to select Negro officers for African attache posts. Color, contrary to American opinion, is not a passport in Black Africa; nor does it make understanding easier. The American Negro has come a long way from Africa. The situation was illustrated by the American Negro quoted earlier, as saying that he did not know how American he was and how little African until he came to Africa. Richard Wright, the American Negro writer, reflected much the same sense of frustration when he told Peter Abrahams, 'I was black and they were black, but it didn't help me.'¹⁵

Obvious efforts to assign Negro personnel to African posts are interpreted by the Africans as a kind of reverse racialism. Professor Apter, a noted African authority, was asked to comment on this when he was appearing before the House Subcommittee on Africa. He replied that he had never been asked by Africans why the United States did not send more Negroes, but, to the contrary, why it did.¹⁶ The emphasis must be on good people regardless of the color of their skin.

The State Department. Africa is no longer the burial ground of the State Department. The post of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs is held by an energetic individual who was discussed not only as a possible Secretary of State, but as a presidential candidate. New consulates and embassies have been opened and are being filled with top-flight men. Foreign service officers do not wonder, as they once did, what they have done wrong when they are assigned to an African post.¹⁷

There is a requirement, as yet unfilled, for a career service of professional technical people, skilled in the art of development. The

members of this service would advise African political leaders as to what they might expect of development processes and they would help United States policy makers to undertake reasonable projects.¹⁸ This requirement will not be met, is not intended to be met, by the Peace Corps.

The Peace Corps. This paper started by referring to a human incident involving a Peace Corps trainee in Africa. It is important for Americans to realize that in a program involving young enthusiastic people there are bound to be slip-ups. When they occur, the press—communist and American alike—will blow them up all out of proportion; the communist for political gain, the American for circulation. The Peace Corps will do much to fill the human relations gap noted in Chapter III, but being human it will make mistakes. Any judgment of the Peace Corps in Africa would be premature. There are presently only three projects underway in Africa. Two are comparatively small teaching projects in Ghana and Nigeria and 35 volunteers are serving as engineers, surveyors, and geologists in a road-building project in Tanganyika. The important thing to note is the comparatively limited scale of operations. The Peace Corps is faced with a lot of round pegs to fit into square or octagonal shaped holes. Of the first 750 volunteers in training over two-thirds were liberal arts graduates. These can be well used to meet the teaching requirements. However, two agricultural projects have had to be canceled for the lack of agricultural graduates. Other programs are threatened by the lack of plumbers, mechanics and sanitation inspectors.¹⁹

Nongovernmental Agencies. United States diplomatic capabilities are by no means limited to the formal government agencies. The State Department should consider every American who visits Africa whether for business, pleasure or education as an American 'ambassador.' Perhaps most important of the nongovernmental agencies are the missionary and quasi-missionary agencies. The Phelps Stokes Fund conducted an extensive survey of foreign activities in Africa. One of the major findings of that survey was 'The missionary societies both Protestant and Catholic, have led the way in education, medicine and other fields.'²⁰

Ambassadors in Khaki. The deployed forces of the United States have served most effectively as agents of United States diplomacy in many places. However, United States deployments in Tropical Africa are limited. The United States Army has its attache posts, two MAAG's and some senior officers visit Africa on six weeks orientation tours. The Air Force has even less representation in the area. The Navy then is the primary representative of the services in Tropical Africa and Navy activities are essentially limited to coastal areas. The Solant Amity cruises have enjoyed outstanding success. They have provided a valuable people-to-people contact in an area where understanding is in short supply on both

sides. However, they can do even more. The scientific and technical information and expertise available in the Navy could be used to provide 'cheap' technical assistance; for example, oceanographic data that could help native fishing industries.

V. MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD TROPICAL AFRICA

Military Significance of Tropical Africa. Earlier chapters assessed the economic, political, and social significance of Tropical Africa to the United States. Without repeating these chapters, the reader is reminded that 'the military significance of Africa is interwoven with her culture, resources and political fragmentation.'¹

The sum total of military forces of all the countries of Tropical Africa would not materially affect the balance of power in the cold war. Some countries have sufficient military forces, as was noted in the discussion of political factors, to threaten the existence of smaller African states. None, however, have any ability to project their power outside of Africa. The key to Africa's military significance is position not power. Tropical Africa's military significance is measured in geographical terms, not men, ships, or planes.

West Africa or the Other Shore of the Atlantic. The direct air or missile route from Europe to Latin America passes over West Africa. The West African bulge is the Old World's closest warm water approach to America. The significance of enemy air, missile or naval bases, particularly submarine bases, in West Africa is readily apparent. The possibility of the Suez Canal or the Straits of Gibraltar being closed increases the importance of the sea route around Africa.

East Africa. As long as there is a possibility of the Suez being closed, East African bases, such as Mombasa or Dar es Salaam, are highly desirable for the support of operations in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Persia. The British have proven the value of 'fire brigade' forces based in Kenya for Middle East operations. The Nairobi complex in Kenya is adequate as a base for considerably larger forces.² East Africa would be the last line of defense if the communists attempted to seize the rich mineral resources of Northern Rhodesia and Katanga.

Defense in Depth. Africa is a natural complement to Europe.³ Western Europe is a densely populated area. Africa adds about eleven and a half million square miles of territory to Western Europe. Various authors have made different proposals to incorporate this added depth into the defense of Western Europe. General Gavin in his book, *War and Peace in the Space Age*, suggested deploying all NATO retaliatory weapons in sparsely populated sections of Africa away from the population centers of the West.⁴

Nonalignment as a Military Factor. Any military concept for cold war deployments of United States or NATO forces in Africa runs into the political reality of nonalignment. Tom Mboya recently warned the British that they could not expect to keep their bases in Kenya.⁵ Nonalignment in Tropical Africa is akin to 'mother love' in the United States. Nonalignment is a political fact of life that military planners must recognize.

Military Power as an Instrument of Foreign Policy. Americans were astonished by the neutralist reaction to Russian resumption of nuclear testing. American newspapers and magazines were filled with discussions and explanations of the neutralist reaction. Fundamental to most of the explanations was the feeling that the neutralists recognized and feared Russian military power more than United States military power. Military power is a real and respected thing in African thinking. Most Africans have been, are in fact today, subjected to or threatened by some form of military power. United States inaction and bumbling in Cuba as contrasted with ruthlessly efficient Russian action in Hungary affects the thinking of African leaders.

Africa is in a period of change and change necessarily involves instability. Many of the smaller nations are threatened by larger nations with ambitious leaders. Even the largest nations face the very real danger of tribal conflict and civil war. When the Congo situation broke out, Russia and her satellites were ready and willing to move into the military vacuum. Only the rapid move of the UN precluded this. President Eisenhower wisely avoided the use of United States combat forces in the UN forces and consequently dealt the Russians out of the game. Unfortunately, the UN forces were not adequate to do the job quickly and the situation went from bad to worse. By November 1961 the UN found itself an active participant in a civil war. This situation would never have risen if the UN had been given adequate forces in the first place.

Even the most militaristic individual must realize that there are strong factors against the use of United States military power in Tropical Africa, e.g., neutralism and anticolonialism. Nevertheless, if the UN had not countered the Russian challenge in the Congo, what would have been the consequences of United States inaction? While there are advantages to the use and support of UN police forces, the UN is not an instrument of United States policy and UN police forces could act contrary to United States interests.

Things change rapidly in Africa. The day may come when the Africans have to choose sides. When they do, regardless of the choice, the United States must be ready to act. This is particularly true of the Army and the Marine Corps who must be prepared to operate in Africa. The Army has

recently realized that it must have a greater competence in Africa and is taking positive action to develop this competence. For example, it has contracted with American University for an accelerated African FAST program,⁶ emphasized African language training and initiated a program of African orientation tours for senior officers.

Military Assistance in Africa. There is no better illustration of need for military assistance and advice than the Congolese Army. The troubles in the Congo stem from 'the failure of military force and the lack of military control.'⁷ The Congolese Army will have to be rebuilt from the bottom up. General Mobutu has admitted that the Congolese cannot accomplish the reform by themselves. As an initial step, the Congolese Army must be officered from the outside.⁸ Putting it bluntly, they need 'mercénaries' such as the UN in driving out of the Katanganese Army.

Summary. Tropical African forces could not materially affect the balance of power between East and West, but the possession of Africa could. Africa affords depth to Europe and a buffer defense to America. The United States cannot allow one of the shores of the Atlantic to fall into the hands of a potential enemy. Communist forces in West Africa could cut off Europe from essential resources and in effect turn the flank of NATO. African neutralist sentiment reduces the potential role of military power as an element of United States policy. However, it is possible to visualize many circumstances that would favor the use of some form of military power. The United States military forces must be ready.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

At the start, the author, who is somewhat of a Monday morning quarterback, was convinced that there was something basically and drastically wrong with the United States policy towards Tropical Africa. In fact, he persisted in this notion to the extent of preparing a 'new' policy. Comparison of the 'new' policy with the current United States policy led to the primary conclusion of this paper, a vote of confidence for the present United States policy. However, policy is a broad set of principles and there is considerable room for differences of opinion within the policy as to programs, undertakings, emphasis, etc. United States policy reflects an awareness of the potential importance of Tropical Africa in military, political, economic, and human terms. American awareness of Africa and its problems is a relatively recent development and even today it would be unfair to imply that this awareness extends to the general public. Nevertheless, there is a potential danger of overemphasis on Africa.

Associated with this is a tendency to judge African problems on an emotional basis. While United States policy toward Africa should not be developed solely as a by-product of the cold war struggle, the United States is in a cold war, and the subject is United States policy. Much of Tropical Africa's importance is derived from and dependent on Tropical Africa's importance to Western Europe.

The Understanding Gap. One hears constantly that the United States does not understand Africa. The United States has taken tremendous strides, particularly in official circles, towards a better understanding of Africa, but Africans do not understand America. African misunderstanding of the United States goes so far as to turn expensive United States aid programs to the disadvantage of the United States. Africans come close to resenting United States aid, considering it as an instrument of economic colonialism, or 'crumbs from a rich man's table.'

The United States must intensify its efforts to overcome African misunderstanding of the United States and to counter Soviet distortions. The verb *intensify* was used rather than *expand* to indicate a qualitative rather than a quantitative shift. Propaganda considerations must be integrated into every economic, social and military program. The Solant Amity cruises are an outstanding example of the subtle use of military forces to create a better image of the United States.

Soviet Economic-Propaganda Offensive. The scale of the Soviet economic offensive is generally overestimated in the United States

Soviet economic programs are closely integrated with Soviet propaganda which strives to exaggerate Soviet aid and to distort the nature and purpose of United States economic programs.

There is a tendency in the United States to use exaggerated claims of the Soviet economic offensive as a lever for increased United States economic assistance. This technique is frequently coupled with a convenient ability to ignore the economic assistance programs of the former colonial powers, e.g., France and Great Britain.

Free World Economic and Social Programs. Africa needs external assistance if it is to rupture the vicious circle of poverty, sickness, and ignorance. It is in the United States and Free World interest to provide this assistance. External aid, however, must be self-generating, i.e., it must stimulate native capacity. Any significant advance will be due to the efforts of Africans, not outside aid. In other words, the goal of these programs should be to make the Africans able to help themselves rather than simply to help the Africans. Africans must participate in project planning.

While large amounts of capital will be required, the most urgent requirements are human and physical, e.g., the development of know-how, data on which to base solutions, and rural reform.

The United States should channel the major portion of its aid through the OECD or the UN. Many programs should be administered on a regional basis rather than on a country-by-country basis.

While private investment does not provide an answer to the most pressing problems in Africa, it can help particularly in the more advanced countries. The United States should encourage private investment and trade with Africa.

Regional Associations. Some form of increased co-operation between the new nations and regional approach to the problems of Africa is inevitable and desirable. The United States should support and to the extent feasible influence the nature and direction of these associations. Continued ties between the new nations of Africa and Europe are in the best interest of the United States.

Undemocratic Republics. The United States should not expect the new nations in their present state of political immaturity to model their governmental processes after the United States. On the other hand the United States should not help those nations that abandon the basic principles of personal freedom.

Military Considerations. Under the present political environment the UN provides the best means of applying military force and maintaining stability in Tropical Africa. However, the explosive situation in Tropical Africa, the limited military ability of the UN and the strategic significance of Africa all underline the need for the United States to be ready to act unilaterally. While East African bases are highly desirable from a military standpoint, a neutral buffer zone is a realistic military/political objective.

The Importance of People. In the end the success of the policy depends on the people who implement it. The Peace Corps holds forth a promise of freshness and enthusiasm. There remains, however, a need for a corps of career professional experts familiar with the problems and techniques of social and economic development. Race should not be a consideration in selecting people for African posts.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I

¹'The Story of a Post card.' *Newsweek*, 30 October 1961, p. 28.

²Stewart Alsop. 'Africa: the Riddle without an Answer.' *Reader's Digest*, June 1961, p. 82.

³Palmer and Perkins. *International Affairs*. (Boston: 1957), p. 549.

⁴*Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary*. (Springfield, Mass.: 1953), p. 412.

⁵U.S. Congress. Senate. *Study Mission to Africa*. (Washington: 1961), p. 8.

⁶Palmer & Perkins. Similar comments can be found in most texts published prior to 1958.

⁷John Gunther. *Inside Africa*. (New York: 1955), p. 3.

⁸U.S. Senate. *Study Mission to Africa*, p. 4.

⁹Bretholz Wolfgang. 'No New Africa!' Translated from *Die Kulture*, Germany, February 1961 in *Atlas*, June 1961, p. 15.

¹⁰Palmer & Perkins, p. 561.

¹¹This description of Belgian colonial policy does not apply to the period prior to 1903 when the Congo was the private property of King Leopold. During this earlier period the Congo was fairly described as a hell on earth.

¹²At a conference in Brazzaville in French Equatorial Africa.

¹³John Hatch. *Africa Today - and Tomorrow*. (New York: 1960), p. 97-109.

¹⁴Palmer & Perkins, p. 562.

¹⁵Rupert Emerson. 'The Character of American Interests in Africa.' *The United States and Africa*, Walter Goldschmidt, ed. (New York: 1958), p. 15.

¹⁶George H.T. Kimble. 'Survival Issues for the New Africa.' *New York Times Magazine*, 26 November 1961, p. 117.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 118.

¹⁸Colin Legum. *Congo Disaster*. (London: 1961), p. 121.

¹⁹United Nations. *Economic Survey of Africa Since 1950*. (New York: 1959), p. 5.

²⁰Population estimates for this area are notoriously poor, but vary from 120 million to 160 million. Density is of course dependent on the population estimate.

²¹G. Mennen Williams. 'Africa's Challenge to America's Position of Free World Leadership.' *The Department of State Bulletin*, 12 June 1961, p. 913.

CHAPTER II

¹As translated by Max Eastman.

²American Assembly. *The United States and Africa*. (New York: 1958), p. 118.

³Cobalt is used extensively in high temperature, high strength alloys and permanent magnet alloys.

⁴U.S. Department of the Interior. *1959 Minerals Year-book*, 1960, p. 363-373.

⁵U.S. Congress. Senate. *S1983 Public Law 87-195*. (Washington: 1961).

⁶United Nations, p. i-3.

⁷Eugene Staley. *The Future of Undeveloped Countries*. (New York: 1961), p. 249.

⁸William A. Hance. *African Economic Development*. (New York: 1958), p. 85.

⁹Kimble, p. 117.

¹⁰These views are reflected frequently in the press. For example, the *New York Times* on 14 January 1962 contained two items. The first of these reports an interview with Lady Chesham, who was in New York to raise funds for community development in Tanganyika. She complained that Tanganyika 'as the good child among the problem nations' of Africa is ignored by the major powers. The second item was headed '3 Senators Chary on Aid to Africa.' This item described the concern of three senators about the United States giving assistance to countries 'which do not measure up to the standards of free societies.'

¹¹'List of UN Posts Sought by Soviet.' *New York Times*, 9 February 1962, p. 7:1.

¹²Staley, p. 336.

¹³G. Mennen Williams, p. 914.

¹⁴David L. Morison and Walter Kolarz. 'Africa: New Target.' *Problems of Communism*, November/December 1961, p. 10.

¹⁵Gordon Brook Shepherd. *Red Rivalry in the Black Continent*. 'The Reporter,' 18 January 1962, p. 23.

¹⁶*New York Times*, 28 January 1962, p. 18:4.

¹⁷*New York Times*, 7 January 1962, p. 60:4.

CHAPTER III

¹George H.T. Kimble as quoted by Stewart Alsop, p. 82.

²American Assembly, p. 236.

³*New York Times*, October 1960, p. 18:6. Microfilm.

⁴Kimble, p. 117.

⁵Albert Schweitzer as quoted in George W. Herald's, 'Africa Strategic Prize of the Century.' *United Nations World*, February 1962, p. 48.

⁶American Assembly, p. 230.

⁷Norman Cousins. 'Report from the Congo.' *Saturday Review*, 3 February 1962, p. 12.

⁸Shepherd, p. 23.

⁹G. Mennen Williams, p. 913.

¹⁰'The Plight of the African Students in the United States.' *New York Herald Tribune*, 5 December 1961, p. 1:5.

¹¹David Burg. 'The Peoples Friendship University.' *The Problems of Communism*, p. 50.

¹²Kimble, p. 118.

¹³Barbara Ward. 'Change Comes to African Villages.' *New York Times Magazine*, 19 November 1961, p. 24, 49, 50.

¹⁴Clarence J. McCormick (U.S. representative to the 1951 session of the Food and Agriculture organization) as quoted in Staley, p. 251.

¹⁵Staley, p. 187-9.

¹⁶Herald, p. 20.

¹⁷Morison, Kolarz, p. 8.

¹⁸Shepherd, p. 23.

¹⁹'Slap for Red Pals.' *Time Magazine*, 5 January 1962, p. 26.

²⁰Morison and Kolarz, p. 14.

²¹It is refreshing to note that they planned for two-thirds of this to be provided by local sources.

²²Ten newspapers, five radios and two movie seats for every one hundred people.

²³'UNESCO Maps Gains in African News.' *New York Times*, 7 February 1962, p. 2:3.

²⁴U.S. Congress. House. *Briefing on Africa 1960*, p. 89-91.

CHAPTER IV

¹Secretary of State Acheson quoted in *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, v. 1, 3 October 1949, p. 1.

²Kimble, p. 118.

³Mr. Nyere's Tanu Party controls 70 of the 71 seats in the Parliament of Tanganyika.

⁴Elsbeth Huley. 'Africa Struggles with Democracy.' *New York Times Magazine*, 21 January 1962, p. 72.

⁵*Ibid.*

⁶Kimble, p. 118.

⁷Palmer & Perkins, p. 555.

⁸U.S. Senate. *Study Mission*, p. 8.

⁹Max Yergan, a prominent Negro scholar, head of a private research organization, African Consultants, and Frank L. Howley, Vice President of New York University, as reported in the *Reader's Digest*, November 1961, and the A.P. Dr. Yergan has spent more than 20 years of his life in Africa.

¹⁰'African States Shun Alignment.' *New York Times*, 15 January 1962, p. 7:1.

¹¹*New York Times*, 13 October 1960, p. 17:1. Microfilm.

¹²Northwestern University, p. 10.

¹³Kimble, p. 117.

¹⁴'African States Shun Alignment,' p. 7:1.

¹⁵Peter Abrahams. 'The Blacks.' *An African Treasury*. Langston Hughes, ed. (New York: 1961), p. 51.

¹⁶U.S. Congress. House, p. 101.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 701.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 98.

¹⁹Peter Braestrup. 'Peace Corps Opens Drive to Find More Specialists.' *New York Times*, 7 January 1962, p. 1:6.

²⁰T. Walter Wallbank. *Contemporary Africa*. (Princeton, N.J.: 1958), p. 128.

CHAPTER V

¹'Africa the Challenge.' *The Military Review*, October 1960, p. 75.

²William H. Hessler. 'East Africa: Bastion for the Western World.' *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, March 1961

³G.M. Nemo. 'The Military Side of African Problems.' *The Military Review*, October 1960, p. 78.

⁴p. 277. [Sic.]

⁵Leonard Ingalls. 'Africans Display a Desire to Rule.' *New York Times*, 3 December 1961, p. 31:1.

⁶Foreign Area Specialist Training Program.

⁷Brigadier General S.L.A. Marshall. 'Black Soldiers Burden.' *Army*, August 1961, p. 27.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 28.

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OVERSEAS SHORE DUTY: United Kingdom; Europe; Korea

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 28 May 1962

by

Professor Albert Somit

INTRODUCTION

Those who arrived at the auditorium early noticed that the classification of this lecture was suddenly changed from SECRET to UNCLASSIFIED. I have always wanted to give a SECRET lecture and, since I really will say nothing today that is not a matter of common knowledge, I feel we could reasonably have kept the SECRET classification.

In any event, the major question is—‘What aspects of counterinsurgency shall I talk about?’ As you know, there will be a number of distinguished military authorities following me as speakers. Because of this, I will not deal with the *military* aspects of counterinsurgency, since this can be much more ably dealt with by others.

After some cogitation, I decided to attempt three objectives: The first was to see if we could impose some order on this vast number and variety of insurgencies about which you will be told and about which you will presumably be reading. This is the problem of classification and ordering of data. The classifications I will use may not be exactly the same classification as those which you will get from the other speakers or in the literature, since each person classifies according to the problem with which he is concerned.

The second thing I will try to do will be to put insurgency in its proper historical perspective. The rationale of this special course is that the type of insurgency we see today is so different and unique from previous types of insurgency and constitutes such a serious threat that a fresh outlook as well as special training will be needed if we are effectively to cope with it. This, I would say, is the administration’s viewpoint and the justification for what we are doing here today. However, there are those who say that insurgency is really nothing new, that it is simply a new name for an age-old phenomenon. According to this view,

no new techniques or approaches are either needed or desirable. These are two opposing viewpoints and, after surveying the arguments pro and con, I will take my position courageously between these two and argue that both sides are partially correct, both partially in error.

The third thing I will attempt is perhaps the most hazardous and may evoke the most disagreement. I am going to try to suggest certain generalizations or 'laws' which seem to be operative in insurgencies and in revolutions. That is, laws bearing upon the nature, likelihood, and probable success or failure of insurgencies. To the extent that these generalizations are valid they suggest the direction of measures to be undertaken in programs, or at least the measures to be considered. The study of revolutions has engrossed social scientists since the French Revolution and the nature of insurgency and revolution has been the subject of recurrent analysis. But I should emphasize that generalizations in social science are subject to serious reservation. Such generalizations apply to *groups* of phenomena rather than to *individual* phenomena. They would apply, therefore to revolutions taken collectively, rather than to a specific instance. There are also an uncomfortable number of exceptions to every generalization. Third, the 'laws' are generally rather than precisely stated. Thus, one must be quite cautious in applying them to specific situations.

With this warning, we can look at some of these generalizations. I might add here that they have been measurably modified by our experience since World War II. If you examine the earlier literature you will see many of the statements and evaluations stated have been vitiated by subsequent developments.

Underlying much of my remarks will be a general thesis. It is this: The United States faces extraordinarily difficult problems in dealing with insurgencies in, say, Vietnam and Laos in that it is an *indirect* object of these insurgencies. Though aimed at the United States, these insurgencies are not conducted against the United States, but rather against the 'native' governments. We operate at one remove. And because we operate at one remove, we face difficulties and problems which are almost unique in the history of counterinsurgency. This is a theme to which I will later return.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF INSURGENCY

Let me begin by very briefly identifying what I will call the 'behavioral traits' of insurgencies. When we have an insurgency, what characteristics does it show? I will deal with two sets of characteristics: Those *traditionally* shown by insurgent and revolutionary movements; and those *new* characteristics observable in post-World War II insurgencies.

Let me start with the traditional traits: Insurgencies have, as a common characteristic, guerrilla war. In the Spanish, 'guerrilla' means 'a little war' but this is not an affectionate diminutive. Guerrilla war is 'little' only in geography. It is a small war but it is *total* war, and it has all the very unpleasant aspects of total war. In guerrilla warfare the 'laws of war' are suspended. (The concept that war is something to be conducted according to fixed rules may have disappeared with World War II.) In guerrilla war, you get a 'no-holds barred' struggle. The distinction between combatant and noncombatant disappears; the distinction between civilian and military breaks down; and there is a resort to terror, torture, and violence which exemplifies human behavior at its worst. This is what is meant by the aphorism that guerrilla war is total war on a limited scale.

Another characteristic of insurgency is the disproportion in strength between the insurgents and the regime that is being challenged. This is a crucial element in the theory of insurgency and one with which the military experts will deal. To put it briefly, the insurgents are much weaker than the government they fight; otherwise they would not be *insurgents*.

The last characteristic I want to mention here is that insurgency has traditionally had a domestic origin and has been directed at a political or an economic objective. Politically, as we shall see, they entailed efforts either to oust foreign rulers or to accomplish specific political goals. The usual economic objectives were land reform or tax reform. The main point is that until 1945 insurgencies tended to seek the one or the other.

For the most part the foregoing characteristics are present in contemporary insurgencies, but a number of new elements have been added. Because of these newer features insurgency poses a different problem today from which we have previously known. The insurgent in Laos, or in Vietnam, has a reasonably secure base in a neighboring country. He gets a steady flow of supplies, materiel, weapons and perhaps even men. If necessary he can retreat behind the border and come up at some other point. He has access to competent political and military advisors. He

does not have to learn by his own errors and can profit from the experience of other insurgencies. Even more important, present day insurgency has an international aspect to it. The insurgent is not fighting simply by himself, but as part of a general, international effort. If things go too badly for him, he can expect that the 'heat' will be turned on somewhere else, and our attention and efforts distracted or diverted. It is here that we have one of the most unique aspects of contemporary insurgency. Traditionally, insurgency has been a national problem aimed at a given government. Today it is part of a world-wide struggle, and pressure is increased or relaxed as dictated by the strategy of this struggle.

Finally, the contemporary insurgent can employ two very powerful doctrines, two very powerful ideologies—nationalism and communism—in eliciting popular support. Compared to the more limited ideological appeal of the older forms of insurgency, this is a significant advance.

These attributes, or characteristics, create new and serious problems for the government directly threatened, in that these governments must employ limited national resources and talents against an insurgent movement able to draw upon an international pool of talent, ability, and strategy. Clearly, this can be a gross mismatch, a heavyweight versus lightweight situation. For the United States a major problem arises in that, though almost directly challenged, we are not able to move directly, but can only function through the established—though often shaky—government. Since the insurgency is not against the United States itself, we are never in a position here to react directly. In addition, we are faced with the danger of indefinite and expanding commitment to a type of warfare for which we are not yet really well prepared.

It is because of these new characteristics and the resulting problems, that we hear today the argument that insurgency has taken on a new dimension and that we must change—or at least modify—our approaches to it. As we have seen, contemporary insurgency embodies both old and new elements and you will have to decide for yourself whether it is simply something old under a new name or whether it is something new which demands a new form of reaction.

TYPES OF INSURGENCY

Next, it may be useful to examine the various *types* of insurgency, since the task of classification often facilitates that of deriving tentative generalizations. As all insurgencies have much the same characteristics, they differ primarily according to their *objectives*. I would suggest a threefold classification on this basis. The three types of insurgent efforts would be:

1. As a means of carrying on war between sovereign states;
2. As employed by a colonial or subject people attempting to overthrow their masters;
3. As a means of carrying out a domestic or internal revolution.

First, insurgent operations as an aspect of traditional warfare. This will occur in two quite different situations. Insurgent and/or guerrilla efforts are sometimes used as an adjunct to conventional operations. Thus, in the Civil War, both sides employed guerrilla forces. Earlier, you will remember, the French used Indian guerrillas against the British on this continent in the 18th century. Numerous other examples will undoubtedly occur to you. Traditionally, however, the professional soldier does not like to engage in guerrilla war. There are two reasons for this aversion. Guerrilla warfare is a dirty business and the military have always had a very high sense of ethics as to how warfare should be conducted. There is also an opposition based on expediency, the contention being that guerrillas cost more in the long run (because of their irresponsibility) than they are worth. Thus, though Clausewitz discusses guerrilla warfare, he suggests that this is to be used only as a last resort.

Here we come to the second variant of guerrilla warfare employed as an aspect of what I have called, with no intentional irony, normal war between states. When the military situation gets so bad that you cannot meet your opponent head-on, of necessity there is a resort to guerrilla warfare. In fact, we date modern guerrilla warfare from the Peninsular Campaign conducted by the Spanish against Napoleon. Perhaps better known are the guerrilla insurgent operations conducted by the Greeks, the Yugoslavs, the French, and the Russians against the Germans in World War II. And, I am sure, you remember that Hitler threatened to organize the 'Werewolves' and to conduct guerrilla warfare from the mountains of Bavaria if his armies were beaten in the field.

This type of guerrilla warfare is not one with which the United States is particularly concerned. We are not faced with it today, though conceivably it may be encountered after a nuclear exchange as a form of 'broken-back' war. However, I mention this type of insurgency to simply identify it and to differentiate it from the two other types of guerrilla warfare and insurgency that do concern us today.

One of these is the insurgency conducted by a subject people against a colonial master, sometimes called a *nationalist* insurgency. Of this we have many, many examples: Boers versus the British; the Irish versus the British (the Irish Republican Army reportedly ended its efforts only a

few months ago); the Israelis versus the British; and the Cypriot Greeks versus the British (as you can see, the British have a distinguished colonial record). Other examples would include the Burmese versus the Japs (they next turned against the British); the Arabs versus the Turks; and the long history of Ukrainian insurgencies against their Soviet masters. Currently we are vividly aware of the nationalist uprisings in Southeast Asia against the French, the Algerian nationalist uprisings, and the Katangan insurgency in the Congo.

We have encountered in the last decade a phenomenon which we might call a nationalist *counterpart insurgency*. I use this term to refer to the French secret army in Algeria fighting both against its own government and against the insurgent Algerian nationalists. This is insurgency compounded upon itself and, if insurgency and guerrilla wars are by definition brutal and bloody, there seems to be no limit to the depths to which this sort of fighting can descend when you get this double involvement. Nationalist insurgencies are probably not going to bother the United States greatly in the foreseeable future. The places where they may occur I think, may readily be identified; conceivably in the Portuguese possessions; conceivably in the Union of South Africa, if the blacks decide to turn upon the government; conceivably in Tibet. But, if the nationalist insurgency does not appear to threaten us at the moment, we do not seem to be able to employ it in our own behalf. The areas in which a 'throw the foreigner out' effort might be popular would, of course, be Hungary and the other Iron Curtain countries. Although our government does not seem prepared to encourage this type of nationalist insurgency at present, conceivably something of this sort may be possible at some future time.

The third and last of the three types of insurgency is the one which is giving us our present full measure of trouble. This form is usually called a 'revolutionary' insurgency although we should make at least a mental distinction between a 'rebellion' and a 'revolution.' A rebellion seeks merely to seize and to exercise governmental power; a revolution to remodel the entire social structure. Communist insurgencies, if we take them at their face value, are revolutionary efforts, rather than a form of rebellion.

Both revolution and rebellion aim at a seizure of internal power and both have three possible courses of action open to them.

(1) Power can be seized by a coup d'état. This is the way Napoleon seized power; the way Mussolini seized power; the way the Bolsheviks seized power; and, one could argue, the way in which Hitler finally came to power in Germany. The coup d'état is most familiar to us in Latin America and in the Middle East. One clique strikes at another clique;

one group is in, the other is out. In this situation the armed forces remain essentially passive—that is, they give passive consent to what is going on.

(2) The second revolutionary path is that entailing a full-scale civil war. Here, the armed forces are divided in their loyalties and play an active and, in all probability, a decisive part in the struggle. The Spanish revolution in the 1930's and the struggle in China in the mid-forties are our most recent examples.

(3) The third mode of seizing power is, of course, an insurrection or insurgent movement. The other two alternatives can be attempted only when one has substantial strength. Lacking this strength, one resorts to insurrection and to guerrilla war. Insurgent operations are thus an open admission of weakness. Mao Tse-tung himself testifies to this and it is basic to his four 'principles' of guerrilla warfare: Those are (1) Enemy advances—we retreat. (2) Enemy halts—we harass. (3) Enemy tires—we attack. (4) Enemy retreats—we pursue. Obviously these principles derive from weakness, and insurgency is the course of the weak. Consequently, insurgency is simply a transitional stage in which one weakens the enemy to the point of being able eventually to defeat him via full-scale military operations.

Contemporary insurgent movements in Asia represent a transformation of the second type of insurgency, (nationalist), into the third, (revolutionary). With almost no exceptions, they began as nationalist movements, aimed at the ruling colonial power. But, when independence was achieved, control of the Government went to a relatively conservative element rather than to the Communist nationalists. And as a consequence, the Communists 'advanced' from a struggle directed against the foreigner under the slogan of 'liberation' to a struggle against their countries' newly established independent government under the slogan of 'social revolution.' Accordingly, the borderline between the second and the third categories of insurgency is a very blurred one. They are going to continue their efforts to seize power, and it is the official policy of the Soviet Union to encourage and assist them in their struggle. The Soviet position has been stated quite clearly by Khrushchev: 'The Communist Party of the Soviet Union regards it as its internationalist duty to assist the peoples who have set out to win and strengthen their national independence, all peoples who are fighting for the complete abolition of the colonial system.' That Communist line, as you know, is that new, independent (non-Communist) governments in Asia and Africa are 'colonial' governments because the men who run them are 'tools' of the West. And, if they are colonial governments, then these peoples have not as yet achieved true national liberation and independence. By definition, they will not

achieve 'liberation' until they have a Communist government. A real difficulty here is not whether Mr. Khrushchev is right or wrong but the fact that we have been maneuvered into using his language. If Khrushchev and the Communists are in favor of 'national liberation,' we are put in the unhappy position of opposing 'liberation' as long as we accede to their terminology. The same thing I think is equally true with the phrase 'counter-insurgency.' It is an unfortunate term. Men tend to react positively to insurgency—it suggests a struggle for freedom. Serious thought should be given to the problem of developing a terminology which is less embarrassing to us and, I should add, more truly descriptive of the situation.

THE 'LAWS' OF INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

Representing as it does a major instrumentality of Communist foreign policy, it is this last type of insurgency—the 'revolutionary' variant—from which I will attempt to draw some generalizations.

What have we learned about insurgency? What guidance can we derive as to our own policy in dealing with it?

a. *Economic Conditions and Revolution.* One of the first things that students of revolution have tried to ascertain is the nature of the relationship between economic conditions and the incidence of revolution. Here Marx has again won one of those curious victories. As a philosophy—Marxism has been rather well demolished. But individual aspects of Marxist doctrine still color our thinking and most of us still view revolution as stemming primarily from economic causes. That is, when things get really bad, when people are starving, they will revolt. Marx suggested this in his famous phrase—"Workers of the world unite, you have nothing to lose but your chains!" Actually this is not when revolution usually comes. In the majority of instances, revolution does not come at the bottom of economic conditions but rather as things are getting better. Consequently, it may be argued that revolution is not so much a consequence of economic deprivation as of economic frustration. If it were a consequence of deprivation, the time of greatest economic hardship should be the point at which the outbreak occurs. But revolutions actually tend to take place during an economic upswing. The crucial point here, however, is that while economic conditions may be getting better they are not getting better fast enough for enough people. Revolution thus springs from the frustration of expectation. Poverty, at least the sort of poverty which gives rise to revolutionary movements, is thus more a state of mind to be exploited by a skillful propagandist than an objective condition.

We might draw certain moral object lessons from this. If economic disappointment and frustration are the sparks that might set fire to revolution, we may be giving unwitting encouragement to it by exposing colonial peoples to Western standards of living. Unless they can reasonably hope to bring their own conditions closer to this standard, a dangerous feeling of popular frustration may develop. Most specifically, there is the danger that Western economic help given to these countries may create a very dangerous time-period for us. Economic aid is provided, economic conditions get a little better, but the country is still short of what the literature refers to as the 'take-off' point, that point at which things will materially improve. If this improvement does not occur rapidly enough, if the benefits are not widely distributed through the nation, if the people do not experience the benefits they have come to expect, Western economic help may be a factor contributing to revolutionary sentiment rather than a means of countering it.

b. *Role of the Masses.* So much for the relationship between economic conditions and revolutions. What is the role of the masses in a revolution? So much emphasis has been placed in recent weeks upon the importance of winning the support of the people that we might profitably devote a minute or two to an examination of the question.

What is the relationship between popular feeling and the success or failure of a revolutionary effort? Well, in a *coup d'état* practically none. In a *coup d'état*, what the masses think is relatively unimportant. As long as the instruments of organized power (the police and the Army) are on your side, the state can be seized with relatively little concern for public feeling. Similarly, in a civil war the outcome is essentially a matter of military strength, and popular sentiment is not likely to be the decisive factor.

There can be no question, however, that in insurgency the masses play a more significant and conclusive role than in the other two types of revolution. Most students agree that in insurgency and guerrilla warfare success or failure depends upon what I will call the 'friendly neutrality' of the population. Here we have, of course, Mao's famous aphorism that 'the people are like water and guerrilla troops are like the fish who live in it. A fish out of water cannot live.' The 'water' provides nourishment, concealment, intelligence and a means of communication for the guerrilla.

I would say that an even more accurate assessment is given by another great guerrilla strategist, Lawrence of Arabia, who led a successful insurgency against the Turks. 'A rebellion,' he observed, 'must have a friendly population, not actively friendly but sympathetic to the point of not betraying rebel movements to the enemy. Rebellions can be made by 2 percent active in a striking force and 98 percent actively sympathetic.'

I think here Lawrence is correct in his view of what can reasonably be expected from the masses. As most students of revolutionary efforts will agree, the majority of people will try to stay out of things. Why? According to Machiavelli, the reason is quite simple: 'This is said to be said in general of men. That they are ungraceful, fickle, false, and cowardly.' (Of course Machiavelli did not know Americans and his conclusions undoubtedly reflect this.) Quite apart from this solicitude for their own health is the brutal fact that in the 'undeveloped' countries political consciousness is limited to a relatively small number of individuals and the great masses tend to be primarily concerned with the daily task of earning enough to keep body and soul together.

But, while we should not overestimate the commitment of the masses, passive popular sympathy is still of urgent importance to the guerrilla, and this passive sympathy poses a major problem for the 'legitimate' government trying to cope with insurgency. The government must find some means to deprive the insurgents of even passive help. It is extremely difficult to accomplish this by terror, since the guerrillas are probably more effective at terror than is the government, and there is always the danger of driving the population into the hands of the insurgents. The policy attempted has to be a combination of military strength, a program of social reform—because there usually are real grievances which the insurgents can exploit—and the willingness to carry out these reforms.

In short, it is important to state and to implement a positive political program as a means of winning popular support, or at least of denying that support, even though it may be largely passive, to the rebels. At the same time we should not overestimate the political commitment of the population, particularly in an area which has no well-established political consciousness or tradition.

c. Role of Revolutionary Leadership. Time precludes more than a very brief comment here as to the relative ability of guerrilla leaders and that of those against whom they are pitted. Those in formal power operate under grave handicaps and limitations inherent in their position. They tend to be committed to the status quo and extremely reluctant to engage in the forceful and energetic steps which counterinsurgency requires. Contrast this with the position of the insurgent leadership which has the advantages of an ideological fervor and a psychological drive not always manifested by representatives of the established order.

d. Post-1945 Lessons.

What can we learn by combining what we knew about insurgency and revolutions prior to 1945 with that which we have seen since then?

I think the first lesson we should draw is the danger of trying to base our own policy today on tactics which worked in Malaya and in the Philippines. Much of the literature argues these are the models we should emulate. But there is an important difference—one that I have already stressed. In Malaya and in the Philippines the threatened government itself effectively opposed the insurgents. The Malayan government (the British) stepped in and moved energetically. The Philippine government eventually found a man who was willing to move in and to take the steps necessary to deal with the HUK movement.

We, the United States, cannot do this because the insurgency is not being fought against us. Consequently we lack *direct* political control over the situation. Only last week we again found it necessary to rebuke the Laotian government for failing to act on our advice. Here is the difficulty of our position: We must fight insurgency through an instrumentality which is something less than completely co-operative. For this reason we cannot hope to employ exactly the same tactics that were effective against insurgencies elsewhere, under different conditions. We lack the ability to say, 'This is what will be done.'

Other lessons, and here I must move rapidly against the clock, are as follows: The folly of agreeing to a truce in activities against an insurgent group, unless such a truce is clearly to our own advantage. We should have learned by now that insurgents will honor a truce or cease-fire agreement only as long as it is to their interest to do so and will promptly violate it when it is to their advantage.

I think the same doubts can be raised about the two other devices which have been employed by the West in trying to deal with insurgencies. One is the idea of territorial partition. Our naive assumption is that, having won a partial victory, the insurgents will be satisfied with what they have been given. Unfortunately, as we can see in Vietnam, partitions serve simply to provide a legal base of operations for the next expansion. The policy of trying to set up a 'neutral' government, as we are seeking to do in Laos, is also one where we have been singing a number of times. The neutral government invariably turns out not to be so neutral; the Communists have been given entree to legal power—and the next series of events can be predicted with sad accuracy.

I concede that I have done more in the way of raising problems than of providing solutions or panaceas. But you must remember that my job today was the task of indicating what has happened in the past, putting this in historical perspective, and of leaving the answers to the experts who will follow. In this respect, I am something like the first of the spirits in Dickens' *Christmas Carol*. I serve as the spirit of insurgency

past; we will later hear from the spirits of insurgency present and insurgency future. Together with you, I will listen with you with great interest to see what they come up with in the line of solutions.

However, I will say this: I would be very much surprised if their solutions differ too much in their general tenor from what has been, from Machiavelli down to the present time, probably the single most useful political maxim. It is the one, I think, which all governments should keep constantly in mind—'Do unto your enemy what he would do unto you, but do it first!'

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor Albert Somit

Present Position:

Chester W. Nimitz Chair of Social and Political Philosophy, Naval War College; on leave from position of Professor of Administration, New York University.

Schools:

University of Chicago, B.A. degree, 1941
University of Chicago, Ph.D. degree, 1947

Career Highlights:

- 1941-42 Teaching Assistant, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago.
- 1945-60 Department of Government, New York University; rank, Associate Professor; member, faculties of Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Washington Square College of Arts and Science, and Graduate School of Public Administration. Fields of instruction: Political Theory, Public Administration and American Government and Politics.
- 1960- Professor of Administration, New York University.

Military Experience:

- 1951-53 U.S. Army (Staff Officer USA, Intelligence, Army Psychological Warfare, European Command).

Publications:

Co-author: *Government in American Society*, 1950.
Achievements in Federal Reorganization, 1955.
The Government and Society of Burma, 1956.

Plus various articles in professional journals.

RECOMMENDED READING

The evaluation of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find them of interest.

The inclusion of a book or article in this list does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein. They are indicated only on the basis of interesting, timely, and possibly useful reading matter.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Certain of the books on the list which are not available from these sources may be available from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books are obtainable on loan. Requests from individual officers to borrow books from an Auxiliary Library Service Collection should be addressed to the nearest of the following special loan collections.

Chief of Naval Personnel, (G14)
Department of the Navy
Washington 25, D.C.

Commandant Fourteenth Naval District (Code 141)
Navy No. 128
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station
(Attn: Station Library)
San Diego 36, California

Commander Naval Forces, Marianas
Nimitz Hill Library, Box 17
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

U.S. Naval Station Library
Attn: Auxiliary Service Collection
U.S. Naval Base
Norfolk 11, Virginia

BOOKS

Stoessinger, John G. *The Might of Nations*. New York: Random House, 1961. 475 p.

Dr. Stoessinger has brought scholarship, writing talent, and originality to bear on this interdisciplinary study of this generation's world power struggle. For inspiration at the start of each chapter, he ranges from Camus to Plato. Himself a literary stylist, he still quotes profusely from Morgenthau, Kissinger, and many other contemporaries. This book deserves careful reading and is more enjoyable than most. Dr. Stoessinger employs two key concepts in his book. First, he discusses world politics in terms of the ever-present tension between the struggle for power and the struggle for order among nations. Second, and included within the above broad and general conceptual framework, he introduces a specific substantive theme: the linkage between the East-West struggle and the struggle between nationalism and colonialism. Then he adds an important new dimension to international relations: the frequent and highly significant differences between the way nations perceive one another and the way they really are.

Osgood, Robert E. *NATO, the Entangling Alliance*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. 416 p.

This book is a comprehensive and thoroughly documented analysis of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The author describes in appropriate detail the evolution of the alliance and traces very effectively its development to the present. As a consequence, the book is most timely. The student of military affairs will find a great deal of interesting material in this book, particularly with regard to the author's discussion of the effects of the impending diffusion of nuclear capability among the nations of the alliance, the problems of control of nuclear weapons within the alliance, and past and future concepts of disengagement.

Payne, Pierre S. R. *Portrait of a Revolutionary; Mao Tse-tung*. rev. ed. New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1961. 311 p.

Mr. Payne is a gifted author-poet with an extensive experience in China. He is a non-Communist who has made a considerable study, and appears to have a good understanding of the appeal of communism to Asiatics. About 12 years ago Mr. Payne wrote a book entitled *Mao Tse-tung, Ruler of Red China*. His new book, complete with a new title, according to the author, fills in many of the gaps that existed in the previous work, carefully revises much of the previous material in light

of new and more complete information, and adds a final chapter to bring the story up to date. The book is a highly readable, fluent, and assertive account of Mao as the scholar, the one-time library assistant, the poet, the military strategist, and the mystic who now possesses more direct power over more people than any other person in history.

Kohn, Hans. *The Age of Nationalism*. New York: Harper, 1962. 172 p.

The Age of Nationalism is an excellent treatise on the forces involved and the implications of nationalism. The author is no theorist but a realist who has spent a great part of his life in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, studying the subject. He reviews history and the role that nationalism has played in such a manner that the book reads more like a fascinating novel than the scholarly work that it is. Students of nationalism, neutralism or foreign policy will find this an interesting reference book.

Goodspeed, Donald J. *The Conspirators; a Study of the Coup d'État*. New York: Viking, 1961. 252 p.

Major Goodspeed, a historian on the staff of the Canadian Army Headquarters, has come to the opinion that of the three successful ways for deposing a government by force—revolution, civil war, or the coup d'état—only the latter has any chance of prospering in the world today. He has made a brilliant study of the history of the coup d'état and has written this book as 'an attempt to study the coup d'état empirically.' In spite of its storylike format, this is a well-documented and scholarly book. It boasts an impressive bibliography and the scholarship of the author is beyond question.

Yoshida, Shigeru. *The Yoshida Memoirs*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962. 305 p.

The Yoshida Memoirs is an absorbing firsthand account of a real patriot's unsuccessful efforts to keep his country out of a war which he considered suicidal, of his attempts to bring that war to an early close to prevent unnecessary destruction, and of his monumental contributions toward rebuilding his devastated fatherland after the war. The long and brilliant career of the author lends unusual credibility to this record of Japan's history during the fateful years, from the 'unfolding tragedy' of the 1930's to the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951. This distinguished statesman, who served as Ambassador to Great Britain before World War II, and five times as Prime Minister after the war, identifies his country's interests as being intimately bound up with those of the West.

Chakravarti, Prithwis C. *India's China Policy*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962. 180 p.

The most interesting feature of this book is the very detailed accounting of the border incidents between India and China in recent years. The last half of the book is devoted to this subject. In the end, the author concludes that India should not change her policy of friendship toward China in spite of the many armed intrusions into India's territory by Chinese soldiers. The author also concludes that India should not change her established position of nonalignment. 'The validity of the Indian policy of nonalignment will remain unassailable,' he says. The book is a short, yet rather complete, survey of recent Indian-Chinese relations written for the general reader. It recounts historic friendship between these two Asian nations, the relation of Tibet to both, the over-running of Tibet by the Chinese communists and the eventual border troubles between India and China.